

<論 文>

An Inter-Group Socio-Psychological Analysis on Resolving Japan-U.S. Economic Frictions

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This study analyzes the psychological changes in resolving the Japan-U.S. economic frictions, focusing on the factors impacting how intimate Japanese and American people felt about each other. The period of time in question is when the Japan-U.S. economic frictions have most intensified, peaking around 1990. The period is divided into two; “earlier stage” and “later stage.” The contact hypothesis conditions were used as criteria for judging the impacts of major factors, i.e., end of the Cold War, informatization, establishment of the WTO, etc. As a result, more positive impacts were found in the “later stage” than the “earlier stage,” particularly in Americans’ views on Japan. With the investigations above, applying inter-group socio-psychological analysis onto the Japan-U.S. economic frictions, reorganizing their impact factors and analyzing both parties’ collective emotions should be appropriate and valid in analyzing the dynamics of economic frictions.

Keywords : Friction, Japan, United States, Socio-psychology, Contact hypothesis

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INTRODUCTION

Economic frictions between Japan and the United States became intense particularly from the 1970s to 1990s. Both sides were accumulating frustrations over time, peaking around 1990-1995, while they started to diminish thereafter. This paper focuses on why the Japan-U.S. economic frictions started to dissolve by investigating the psychological conditions of major factors that made impacts on the emotions between each groups. While it places reliance on extensive works in political economy, socio-psychology and international relations, such an approach is expected to bring a new perspective to analyzing formation and dissolution of inter-group frictions.


At the early stage of economic frictions, frustrations accumulated over time on the both sides of the Pacific, evidently starting to intensify from the 1970s. From the side of Japan, repetition of voluntary export restraints (steel in 1969-75, color TV in 1977-1980 and automobile in 1981), the Structural Impediments Initiative (SII) talks (1989-90) and setting numerical targets in semiconductor agreements were considered as against America's "free trade" policies in the first place. Critiques argued that these cases were violating Japan's national sovereignty. While in the United States, Japanese way of doing business, industrial policies and registration processes were regarded as exclusionary and complex that were often criticized as opaque and unfair. On top of that, as the Cold War ended almost at the time of the peak in the Japan-U.S. economic frictions, distrust of people on the both sides on the Japan-U.S. alliance prevailed, especially around 1990. The frictions did not only center on economic and industry issues but also diffused and infiltrated into people's emotions of frustrations and distrust between each other.

Media in both countries sometimes reported that the Japan-U.S. Alliance itself was also facing the risk due to such bruising economic frictions. Antipathy not only centered on economic and political issues but also shifted to emotional and unreasonable levels. It was the time when certain scholars and journalists in the U.S. who became known as "revisionists" alleged that Japan is different from "ordinary" market economy. Indeed in 1991, George Friedman and Meredith Lebard published a book with an astonishing and sensational book titled "The Coming War with Japan," contending that Japan has strategically been a "protectorate" during the Cold War period to prepare for a coming war and the United States and Japan are on the collision course within the following twenty years, which, thankfully, did not come true.¹⁾ In 1989, Karel Van Wolferen tried to explain unfairness of Japan's trade and the mysteries of business success by "Japan, Inc." in the

post-World War II period with his book entitled “The Enigma of Japanese Power,” which was translated into eleven languages and sold about 750,000 worldwide.^{2), 3)}

While sense of threat against Japan was diffusing into American citizens, Ishihara and Morita retaliated that it is the United States who is unfair by claiming that Japan cunningly exports in a large scale while importing a little, and Japan should rather say “no” to the U.S. and become closer to the Asian neighbors both economically and politically.⁴⁾ This controversial book was translated into English in 1991, but Morita felt concerned to publish it in the U.S. as a co-founder of Sony Corporation, which already had business operations in the U.S. at a large scale, and had his chapters removed. The book was taken as an in-your-face vulgarness in the U.S. and was considered as one of the symbols of defiant attitude of Japan.

The economic conflicts, however, started to converge particularly after the Japan-U.S. automobile and auto parts talks that concluded in Geneva, Switzerland, in June 1995. The case of the automobile and auto parts talks was in general considered as Japan’s strategic victory against America’s threat of sanctions by the Trade Act Article 301, backed by the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in January 1995. It was also the time when only few years after the Cold War system collapsed, when Japan’s role in the international arena was questioned particularly with its impotent task in the Gulf War,



Source: *Nikkei Telecom* [2012]

Figure 1: Number of times the word “gaiatsu – 外圧” (external pressure) appeared annually in the Nikkei Newspaper.

and when Japan's domestic political system shifted from Liberal Democratic Party's (LDP) conventional dominant government to smaller coalition forces. **Figure 1**, the statistics of the number of times the word "*gaiatsu*" (外圧 – external pressure) was used annually in the Nikkei Newspaper, evidently indicate that the time around the year 1990 was when the Japan-U.S. frictions had been intense and diminished thereafter. Appearance of the word "*gaiatsu*" started to shift from articles related to America's pressure on Japan to that on China after the early 2000s.

Taking Japan's public investments, distribution, land policy and competition policies issues as cases, Schoppa [1997] resolved strategic dynamics of Japan and the United States during the economic friction period, based on the analysis of the two-level games that investigates the double layers of domestic politics and inter-governmental negotiations. In his book, Schoppa argues that at the time of resolving Japan-U.S. economic frictions, the conventional American *gaiatsu* started to lose its power due to the collapse of the Cold War systems, establishment of the WTO, and domestic political reform of Japanese politics that shifted away from the LDP ruled system to new coalition among smaller parties.⁵⁾

Nakato [2003] also utilized the two-level game framework to analyze the double-layered strategies of domestic politics and international contacts with various cases, such as government procurements, automobile and auto parts, semiconductors and insurance negotiations. While Nakato also took the high road by focusing on strategies of the both countries and industries, the contrasting point with Schoppa [1997] was in his conclusion that factors such as end of the Cold War and establishment of the WTO did not necessarily give Japan advantages in trade negotiations.⁶⁾ Details are provided at the section OBSERVATION later in this paper.

The framework that Obi [2009] took was not in the two-level game analysis but in how policy ideas (the free-trade principle in this case) transmit from one country to the other through relationships. At her conclusion, she stresses that the reason why the Japan-U.S. automobile and auto parts talks resolved was in the policy idea of the free-trade principle that transmitted in line with globalization, which altered the roles of governments at the phase of resolving frictions.⁷⁾ Such a constructivist approach that it is the intersubjective relations that spreads policy ideas provided an important implication to the methodology of this paper.

The two-level game strategic analysis, which Putnam [1988] created a foundation, and the constructivist approach are highly suggestive and offer insights to this paper.⁸⁾ Meanwhile, a research that applies psychological analysis to people's emotions related to

economic frictions is unable to find. Since economic frictions in the first place occur between the groups of people as psychological phenomena, socio-psychological investigation should be necessary and worth conducting.

Considering the arguments above, the novelty of this study lies on its inter-group socio-psychological analysis on economic frictions. The analysis is an interdisciplinary attempt to validate the methodology and leans on tireless efforts of scholars in various fields, such as political economy, socio-psychology and international relations.

ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

As revisionists' views were gradually being recognized in the United States, even in in Washington's policy circles, some stereotypes on Japan was formulated, regardless of whether those views reflect the reality or not. Following the principles of Edmund Husserl's intersubjectivity, having recognition gaps among countries on the Japanese economy are unavoidable, because not even the residents in Japan can ultimately understand the "actuality" of the Japanese economy. This paper analyses why the Japan-U.S. economic frictions started to dissolve after 1990s by investigating the psychological conditions of major factors that made impacts on the emotions between each groups. From the field of inter-group socio-psychology, the "contact hypothesis" will be applied as benchmarks to examine the impacts of major factors that may have influenced the sentiments of both citizens.

Timeframe

As shown in Figure 1, the timeframe of the research will be the time when the American *gaiatsu* on Japan intensified the most from approximately early 1980s till late 1990s.

Additionally, the period will be divided into the two parts: the "earlier stage" and the "later stage." The purpose of dividing into two periods is to make the psychological change from the "earlier stage" to the "later stage" distinguishable. The "earlier stage" corresponds to the time from early 1980s to around 1990, about the time when the *gaiatsu* was at peak, the Cold War was over, Japanese bubble economy was to collapse, the Japanese political system was to change, and later the American economy was to revive thanks to the information technology boom. The "later stage," therefore, applies to around 1990 to 2000.

Use of “contact hypothesis”

Although this research attempts to investigate the psychological transition of Japanese and American peoples' views on each other, it is very difficult to explain in objective data, as such primary research data is hardly accessible. Hence, this paper applies qualitative analysis by categorizing the factors that are considered to make impacts on the Japan-U.S. relations during the given timeframe into three types: bilateral relations; domestic economic and political backgrounds, and; international political backgrounds. On these factors, estimated psychological impacts on views of each other were reviewed: positive, neutral, or negative.

As the “contact hypothesis” that Gordon W. Allport laid conceptual foundation was introduced to analyze the nature of prejudice, stereotype and discrimination,⁹⁾ applying it to the case of Japan-U.S. economic frictions should be effective and justified due to the following reasons:

1. The fundamental reason why frictions between Japan and the United States occurred was that ample communications or contact between both groups were lacking. So-called “revisionists,” who in some cases have never lived in Japan, represent the most powerful example of this reason. Additionally, because in America there was a shared sense of Japan as a threat among citizens, people were ready to take the introduction of the English translation of Morita & Ishihara’s “Japan That Can Say No” very seriously and sensitively in 1991.
2. Even though, in the late 1990s, there are some cases of continued frictions in selected industries, such as insurance talks, the frictions overall were diminishing particularly after 1995 in general. Therefore, in order to explain the effects of the ending Cold War, worldwide informatization, rise of China and establishment of the WTO on the psychological distance of each groups, using the “contact hypothesis” should be reasonable and rational.

Amir [1969] reached milestone in analyzing the field of inter-group socio-psychology by introducing the six favorable and unfavorable conditions that impact on ethnic relations. According to the thesis, ethnic relations can be investigated with attribution analysis of the six categories listed in **Figure 2**.¹⁰⁾ For the sake of expedience in this paper, the six conditions that make ethnic relations favorable / unfavorable are named as noted at the right column in **Figure 2**.

favorable conditions	unfavorable conditions	categorized in this paper as:
when there is equal status contact between the members of the various ethnic groups	when the prestige or the status of one group is lowered as a result of the contact situation	"contact status equity"
when the contact is between members of a majority group and higher status members of a minority group	in the case of contact between a majority and a minority group, when the members of the minority group are of a lower status or are lower in any relevant characteristic than the members of the majority group	"minority's contact members"
when an "authority" and/or the social climate are in favor of and promote the intergroup contact	when the groups in contact have moral or ethnic standards which are objectionable to each other	"contacting environment"
when the contact is of an intimate rather than a casual nature	when members of a group or the group as a whole are in a state of frustration (i.e., inadequate personality structure, recent defeat or failure, economic depression, etc.) - here contact with another group may lead to the establishment of an ethnic "scapegoat"	"contact intimacy / frustration"
when the ethnic intergroup contact is pleasant or rewarding	when the contact is unpleasant, involuntary, tension laden	"contact pleasantness"
when the members of both groups in the particular contact situation interact in functionally important activities or develop common goals or superordinate goals that are higher ranking in importance than the individual goals of each of the groups.	when the contact situation produces competition between the groups	"contact with common goals / contact that leads to competition"

Source: Amir [1969], pp.338-339

Figure 2: Amir's contact hypothesis conditions¹¹⁾

Factors that made impacts on the Japan-U.S. relations

As Putnam's two-level game analysis provides double-layered intricate strategic web of domestic and interstate politics, this paper also will break the impact factors into three categories: First – factors related to the Japan-U.S. bilateral relations; Second – factors related to domestic economic and political background, and; Third – factors related to international political background that surrounds both countries. In each factor, either "positive," "neutral" or "negative" psychological impacts on counterpart are marked to indicate the effects.

The contact hypothesis conditions (horizontal) and impact factors surrounding the Japan-U.S. relations (vertical) are plotted in matrix as shown in Figure 3.

OBSERVATIONS

		Amir's contact hypothesis conditions										contact with common goals / contact that leads to competition	
		contact status equity		minority's contact members		contacting environment		contact intimacy / frustration		contact pleasantness			
		earlier stage	later stage	earlier stage	later stage	earlier stage	later stage	earlier stage	later stage	earlier stage	later stage	earlier stage	later stage
bilateral relations	Japan	- Negative: The Security Alliance (secured by the U.S.)		- Negative: Military base issues		- Negative: "kenbei" (hating America)		- Negative: Bush's visit with auto CEOs; Clinton's numerical targets					
	U.S.	- Neutral: The Security Alliance (securing Japan)		- Positive: Information technology		- Negative: Japan's reactive and slow pace attitude		- Negative: Japanese leaders' gaffe on US minorities					
domestic economic and political backgrounds	Japan			- Negative: Political reforms				- Negative: Populism due to public rightward tilt					
	U.S.			- Positive: Introducing American way of business				- Positive: Balancing public finances				- Negative: Considered Jpn as threat	- Neutral: Japanese econ's relative decline
international political backgrounds	Japan	- Negative: the Cold War system (America's nuclear umbrella)										- Slightly positive: Socialist states as shared imaginary enemies	- Neutral: Rise of China
	U.S.	- Neutral: the Cold War system				- Negative: Frustration on Jpn's role in intl politics						- Slightly positive: Socialist states as shared imaginary enemies	- Positive: Rise of China

Figure 3: The matrix analysis of Amir's contact hypothesis conditions and impact factors on the Japan-U.S. relations

The Japan-U.S. bilateral relations

First and foremost, the condition of the “contact status equity” should naturally be asymmetric, given the asymmetric roles of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty (*Anpo*). From the side of Japan, which is secured by the U.S., the Treaty itself did not help people as much to see the United States as a close friend but rather as a predominating partner. Due to such subordinate feelings of Japanese people in general, the Security Treaty should have a slight negative impact on Japanese. In addition to that, the military base issues, such as Marine and Navy officials raping an elementary school girl in Okinawa in 1995, continues to linger in Japanese people’s mindset that the word *Anpo* has negative social connotation. On the other hand, while many Americans conceive Japan as a positive ally, there is also a mixed feeling on the Treaty being a burden on the U.S. side, thereby cancelling off each other.

Rise of “*kenbei* (America hatred)” on the Japanese side and revisionists on the U.S. side around the 1990 were influential byproducts of the Japan-U.S. economic frictions, given their effective roles to strike a chord with their citizens to be exclusive. Particularly, the fact that Akio Morita, a co-founder of Sony Corporation who is well-known to be a pro-American and a true internationalist, was a co-author of the original version of the controversial book “Japan That Can Say No” shocked many Americans. The Sony brand was so popular that many Americans believed it was a local brand.

On the other hand in the U.S., “Japan bashing” did not only break out purely from people’s emotions but were also often used for the sake of appealing certain interests. For example, in the early 1980s, there was a case when Japanese citizens were shocked by the scene of American auto workers on TV destroying a Toyota car with big hammers. However, there were placards with a slogan “UAW (United Auto Workers) says if you sell in America, build in America,” which backs up the fact that American people were bashing Japan not necessarily because of ethnic hatred but because of economic reasons. While the act of destruction seemed outrageous to Japanese, the slogan was contrasting, realistic and much less hostile than the workers’ behavior.

Even so, Japanese officials’ responses on trade negotiations and other structural *gaiatsu* were so reactive and time consuming that people around Washington were often frustrated, knowing that such reactive and slow responses were strategic moves of Japan’s clever bureaucrats.


Blaker, Giarra & Vogel [2002] studied Japan’s attitudes toward America’s *gaiatsu* by

investigating the cases of the orange negotiations in 1977-88, the rice negotiations in 1986-93, the FS-X fighter jet negotiations in 1985-98 and the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty renegotiations in 1991-96. It reckons up the following six characteristics of Japanese officials' negotiations: 1) defensive coping; 2) use of *gaiatsu*; 3) consensus building; 4) back channel; 5) slow pace, and; 6) confidentiality.¹²⁾ Even though Washington understands that such reactive and obscure characteristics are based on Japanese bureaucrats' reluctant realism, such frustration on Japan created "contact frustration" on the America's side.

Moreover, slips of tongues related to minorities living in the U.S. by Japanese leaders in the 1980s, such as prime ministers Yasuhiro Nakasone, Noboru Takeshita and other prominent political figures, were greeted with hostility by Americans in general. Such remarks obviously fueled the fires and were taken as insult to America's history of fighting against racial discrimination.¹³⁾

The survey of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan [2012] asking to U.S. citizens on how they think about Japan (Figure 4) is a clear indication of such frustration of Americans to Japan back in the *gaiatsu* period. It shows that Americans' sense of friendship on Japan hit the lowest point around the time of frictions and bounced back thereafter, particularly from 1995.

On the other hand, the contrasting survey of Japan's Cabinet Office on Japanese people's




Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan [2012].

Figure 4: Percentage (%) of respondents in the United States replied Japan as a "dependable ally / friend"

attitudes on the U.S. (Figure 5) indicates asymmetric psychological transition compared to Americans. Their feeling of friendship has been relatively stable, with some exceptions of 1986, when Japan signed the Japan-U.S. Semiconductor Arrangement in July, and 1995, the fiftieth anniversary of Japan's surrender and when an elementary school girl was raped by American Marine and Navy officers in Okinawa. Even though it is difficult to single out the effect of *gaiatsu* on Japanese people's sentiment against the U.S., *gaiatsu* can be considered as just one of many other factors of reluctant realities for Japanese people. The mixed feeling of being a reliable ally and sense of mistrust may have been persistent until today.

Meanwhile, there is no doubt that diffusion of personal computers and rapid advancement of information technology in the 1990s made positive impacts on the both sides of the Pacific for knowing each other in numerous ways. It increased people's knowledge about each other at an explosive pace, opened up more chances for students to study abroad mutually, and simply enabled each citizen to communicate on time over the Internet.

Overall, while Japanese people's mixed feeling against the U.S. has been relatively stable during the period of the Japan-U.S. economic frictions, American people's views on Japan bottomed out around the early 1990s when many Americans felt threatening by Japanese companies acquiring iconic properties and brands, such as Rockefeller Center in New York,



Source: Cabinet Office, Japan [2012].

Figure 5: Percentage (%) of respondents in Japan replied that they feel friendly to the United States

Pebble Beach Golf Links, Columbia Pictures and MCA, and resurged thereafter. Given the conditions above, it is fair to say that American people's negative feeling on Japan around the time of frictions more or less rooted in a sense of economic threat or mistrust by one-off controversial remarks, not necessarily a sense of ethnic hatred. Such trend is also evident in **Figure 3**, where Japanese people's negative (or mixed) feeling has been constant, while American people's sentiment on Japan shifted from "negative" to "positive" due to various impact factors.

Domestic economic and political backgrounds

In Japan

It was at the Lower house elections on July 18, 1993, when the LDP lost many seats and handed over the government to minor coalition parties led by currently defunct Japan New Party's leader Morihiro Hosokawa. This sensational regime change was the first time in the LDP's history since 1955 to become an opposition party. Even though the government was short-lived, the entire political scene started to shift from conventional LDP's honeymoon with the United States. According to Schoppa [1997], "post-1993 reforms in domestic political institutions led to increasing confidence on the part of the Japanese that the nation could deal with its own problems without *gaiatsu*." ¹⁴⁾ Following Schoppa's argument, Japan's political reforms that started in 1993 could make Japanese less tolerant on reliance on the U.S. and become inward-looking. Indeed, Hosokawa prioritized multinational cooperation based on the United Nations systems, rather than the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. Moreover, weak economy and populist politics swayed Japanese media and citizens that pushed its society to become more inward-looking. The fundamental reason why the Japanese diplomacy is not functioning well can be attributed to domestic populism.


Meanwhile, political instability and economic downturn did not only influence on the Japan-U.S. relations negatively. On the business side, the business mood in the late 1990s and the early 2000s was to learn from "*gaishi*" (foreign capital) and introduce more market-oriented, efficiency-driven, and individualistic way of doing business. In line with Japan's reforms in capital control, many American companies operating in Japan played a certain role in enhancing business and inter-personal relations across the countries.

In the U.S.

Especially at the “earlier stage,” Americans were feeling threatened by Japanese companies purchasing symbolic American properties and brands, such as Rockefeller Center in New York, Pebble Beach Golf Links, Columbia Pictures and MCA. A number of Japanese banks also acquired or took stakes in American banks. It can be easily imagined that such commercial movements provided negative impacts on American people’s views on Japan.

While Japan’s economic downturn offered Americans to feel slightly relieved by decreasing threat of takeovers by the rival economy, stagnant Japanese economy is not beneficial for the U.S. economically, as Bergsten, Ito & Noland [2001] states that “ (c) ontinuing Japanese economic weakness poses a far greater threat to the United States than Japan’s previous strength ever was.”¹⁵⁾ Overall in the “later stage,” easing impacts of sense of threat and economic partner’s stagnation should have been canceling off between each other.

Yet the late 1990s was the time when the American economy was reemerging from long period of stagnation, nonetheless it was a bubble, due largely to the information technology industries that stormed the world. The nation’s public finances also showed miracle recovery by achieving budget surplus in the late 1990s, a rare thing to see in the current global economic turmoil (Figure 6). Thanks to the economic revival, Americans may have recovered confidence and did not need to feel threatened by the Japanese economy any longer.



Source: OCED [2012].

Figure 6: Real GDP growth (%) and general government balance (% of GDP) ; Japan and the U.S.

International political backgrounds

The intense period of the Japan-U.S. economic frictions was the time when the world politics has also been changing dramatically. The two major changes that made impacts on the Japan-U.S. relations were the end of the Cold War around 1990 and establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in January 1995. In this section, perspectives of Schoppa [1997] and Nakato [2003] on these two international political incidents are closely investigated, as well as another important change; rise of China.

End of the Cold War

Japan has basically been under America's nuclear umbrella, which in turn forced, or at least reluctantly limit, Japan to stay at a subordinate position in economic relations. During the Cold War environment, Japan and the U.S. did moderately share imaginary enemies of socialist states and a common goal of protecting the "free world." However, Japan did not share the backbone of deterring the influence of the Soviet Union around the world. Moreover, the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev had already started his perestroika (reform) and glasnost (opening) policies already during the 1980s (at the "earlier stage"). Therefore, sense of the Soviet as a common threat of Japan and the U.S. has already been weakened at the "earlier stage" of the period.

That means the chain of democratic shifts of former East European communist states in 1989 and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991 may not have made significant impact on changing Japan's subordinate status in the Japan-U.S. relations to something new, despite that conditions for "contact status equity" seemed to be set as a proposition.

The argument in Schoppa [1997] was that the end of the Cold War prompted Japan to rethink about bargaining strategy in trade negotiations, or "to rethink their habit of giving in to the U.S." ¹⁶⁾ He took at face value the impacts of the change in global system on Japan-U.S. relations, as degree of Japan's reliance on America's nuclear umbrella dropped after 1990s.

Meanwhile, Nakato [2003] puts additional insights on this issue. He agrees to Schoppa that the Japan-U.S. alliance had been adrift during the early post-Cold War period (around the time of the Framework Agreement in 1993-96 and the agreement of automobile and auto parts negotiations in 1995) and Japan need not give too much consideration to the U.S. However, Nakato also looked into the attitude of the U.S. and assessed that end of the Cold

War has also provoked Americans to select hardline approach in negotiating with Japan, thereby cancelling off the influence against each other.¹⁷⁾

Now the question arises whether, in the early post-Cold War period, it was just Japan whose freedom in bargaining options has increased or on both sides of the Pacific. As noted in INTRODUCTION, the criteria of impact in this paper are not in strategic push and pull but are in psychological intimacy between each group. Since the shackles of the both countries were released at the end of the Cold War, it would be fair to judge that psychological impacts were neutral between each other.

Establishment of the WTO

As international trading system was finally institutionalized and launched the WTO in January 1995, such third party institution should have strengthened the condition of “contact status equity.” How about in the reality then?

Schoppa [1997] took the impacts of the WTO establishment as an emergence of third party free-trade watchdog and “gave Japanese official the opportunity to challenge American threats under the strengthened dispute settlements mechanism.”¹⁸⁾ Nakato [2003] agreed that the WTO establishment has pushed Japan’s position in the trade negotiation with the U.S. one notch higher, because it enabled Japan to appeal based upon multilateral imperatives, made America’s Article 301 of the Trade Act difficult to put in motion, and could gain supports from third party countries, such as those in Europe and Asia.¹⁹⁾

Nakato [2003], however, also emphasized that the establishment of the WTO could not necessarily make America’s *gaiatsu* on Japan an end and give an advantage to Japan. Such cases include the cases of breach of existing bilateral agreements and when third party countries are supporting the U.S. (i.e., the Japan-U.S. insurance negotiations).²⁰⁾

Taking the above into consideration, the WTO establishment should have provided Japan a positive psychological impact by releasing its sense of *gaiatsu* threat by having more freedom than before. On the other hand in the U.S., it may not have worked as an opportunity to reduce the degree of mistrust on Japan, as the WTO’s role is limited in cases when third party countries are supporting the U.S.

Rise of China

Rise of China is considered to have stronger psychological impact on the side of the U.S. than on Japan. Despite China’s enormous economic potentials, America’s conventional

allergy against socialism may have contributed to increase awareness on the Japan-U.S. alliance. Putting it into the contact hypothesis propositions, rise of China had an effect of having a “common goal” of protecting the existing alliance, at least on the U.S. side. Successive American governments have been supporting the policy of East Asia’s security that Armitage & Nye [2012] suggested, emphasizing the strategic importance of the Japan-U.S. alliance.²¹⁾

In contrast, rise of China is considered to have weaker impact on Japanese people with regards to changing their psychological intimacy to the U.S. It may be due to a mixed feeling of the following sentiments; China locating geographically nearby with much longer history of relations, while at the same time feeling threat of China’s rapidly increasing military might, thereby relying on the U.S. Such mixed feeling may be cancelling off each other. Moreover, people are increasingly having paranoia of American forces not protecting Japan in case of emergency, or of the risk of interpreting the degree of commitment at America’s convenience, despite long history of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. Thus, psychological impact of rise of China on Japanese people’s feeling of intimacy on the U.S. is neither positive nor negative.

Something unchanged

A consistent frustration of Americans on Japan can be attributed to Japan’s weak commitment in playing an important role on issues on a mass global scale. Putting aside the issue of Japanese constitution’s Article 9, its tepid approach in the Gulf War exposed such an example. In addition, Japan’s reactive and slow pace attitude in trade negotiations also created frustrations on the U.S., which still lingers today.

For Japanese people’s emotions against the U.S., citizens have consistently been wavering between the senses of affinity and paranoia. While in theory people understand the value of American forces protecting Japan, there has always been uncertain doubt whether Americans will protect Japan in case of emergency. On top of that, occasional misbehaviors of young American military officials in Japan continue to betray people’s commitment.

In regard to the Japan-U.S. economic frictions, however, Japanese people have gradually been self-assertive particularly at the “later stage,” due partly to the end of the Cold War and establishment of the WTO (created contact status equity). In other words, one can explain this phenomenon not only as American officials loosened *gaiatsu* after Japanese officials started to counterattack but also as if Americans started to feel friendly by

encountering Japanese people's evident reactions. It is because one of the fundamentals of the Japan-U.S. economic frictions has been in America's sense of mistrust and mystery on Japan's intentional passiveness and reactiveness.

CONCLUSION

This paper focused on the factors impacting how intimate Japanese and American people felt about each other. The period of time in question is when the Japan-U.S. economic frictions have most intensified, peaked around 1990, and the period was divided into two; "earlier stage" and "later stage." The contact hypothesis conditions of Amir [1969] were used as criteria for judging the impacts of major factors, i.e., end of the Cold War, informatization, establishment of the WTO, etc. As a result, more positive impacts were found in the "later stage" than the "earlier stage," particularly in Americans' views on Japan. With the investigations above, applying inter-group socio-psychological analysis onto the Japan-U.S. economic frictions, reorganizing their impact factors and analyzing both parties' collective emotions should be appropriate and valid.

Notes

- 1) Friedman and LeBard [1991], pp.400-403.
- 2) Wolferen, Van [1989].
- 3) Japan Times, The [2007].
- 4) Morita & Ishihara [1989].
- 5) Schoppa [1997], pp.305-306.
- 6) Nakato [2003], pp.250-254.
- 7) Obi [2009], pp.262-266.
- 8) Putnam [1988].
- 9) Allport [1958].
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- 14) Schoppa, op. cit., p.306.
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日米経済摩擦沈静化についての集団間社会心理学的一考察

日米経済摩擦が最も熾烈であった1980年代から1990年代前半にかけて、日米両国が互いに対して抱いていた感情が変化していった背景について分析した。その際、時間軸を日米経済摩擦がピークとなる1990年頃を境として、その前を“earlier stage”、そのあとを“later stage”として比較を行った。分析に際し、集団間社会心理学の分野で民族間対立などの分析に用いられてきた「接触仮説」を尺度とした。その結果、冷戦構造の崩壊や1995年のWTO発足（接触の平等性）、中国の台頭（共通の目標）、情報通信技術の発達と普及（接触環境）などの背景から、全体的に見れば“earlier stage”に比べて“later stage”で日米相互に感じる親近感は改善されていったことが確認できた。特に、米国側が日本に対しての警戒心を緩めていったことが見て取れた。

一方、戦後の歴史を通じて不変の感情も観察された。米国側が日本に抱く不満では、日本が十分に国際貢献をしていないというものが挙げられる。このことは、日本国憲法第9条の問題はさておき、湾岸戦争での日本の不甲斐ない対応などに見て取ることができる。また、もう一つの不満材料として、交渉の際の日本側の官僚的かつ受動的態度と意図的な遅延行為などが挙げられ、この傾向は今でも有効である。他方、日本が米国側に一貫して抱いてきた感情としては、敗戦後の占領期から安全保障の面で非対称的に守られる立場でありながらも、本当に有事の際に助けてもらえるのか疑心暗鬼になっている点である。これに加え、基地にいる若い将校が事件を起こすたびに、長く不満に耐えてきたことによる反米感情が高揚している。日本人の米国に対する感情は、日米同盟と米国への疑心暗鬼な感情が不自然なバランスをもって恒常的に混在している。

経済摩擦の変遷を集団間社会心理学における「接触仮説」を用いて分析することは、両国国民が相互に抱く感情的要因を読み取るうえで効果的であると考えられる。

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