

Old Wine in a New Bottle: TNI's Pursuit of Corporate Interests after *Reformasi*

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Abstract

The Indonesian military (TNI) following the fall of Suharto in 1998 embarked military reform aiming at creating a professional military. The military gradually reduced its presence in non-defence affairs, notably the withdrawal from the parliament in 2004. Post-2004 Indonesia also witnessed the ratification of the 2004 Law on TNI, marking a crucial juncture in Indonesia's military reform progress. The military often cited looming internal threats in early Reformasi period as a strong justification to reject reform prescription. Post-2004 security circumstance in the country was greatly improved compared to the early reform period. Despite these marvellous achievements, military engagement in politics kept occurring. Then the question is why expansion of military engagement in politics happened in the post-2004 period despite the existing of better regulations and stable political and security circumstance? This article attempts to take a look at TNI's organizational behaviour as well as the nature of Indonesia's post-reform political environment to answer the question. This paper argues that the necessity to protect corporate interests plays a significant role in determining the military behaviours in adhering reform ideals. The pre-2004 period in addition reflected a time when pressure for reform was high, forcing the military to opt for minimum fulfilment of its interests. The deterioration of this

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pressure in the post-2004 period on the other hand has allowed the military to gradually increase its political influence.

Keywords:

Indonesia, TNI, Civil-Military Relations, *Reformasi*, Military Reform

INTRODUCTION

The fall of Suharto in 1998 did not only end the New Order regime, but also created an opportunity for the start of reform for the Indonesian military (*Tentara Nasional Indonesia* or TNI). After the end of the regime, the Indonesian military was perceived as part of the authoritarian rule that must be held accountability due to its past atrocities. The event triggered the so-called *Reformasi* or reform era which induced democratization as well as eradication of authoritarian practices, such as media restriction, in Indonesia. Since then, some reform initiatives have been introduced to diminish the TNI's influence in politics and professionalize the institution. The military reform reached its peak in 2004 with the promulgation of Law on TNI as well as the abolishment of military-police faction in the parliament. More than two decades after the *Reformasi*, the discussion of the progress found another juncture with the inclusion of the TNI in some government projects under President Joko Widodo (Jokowi). The progress of military reform previously has drawn positive plaudits from international community due to its significant achievements, particularly withdrawing from direct political involvement.

Existing literatures perceived the encroachment of the TNI towards civilian realm is sustained due to regulation loopholes and transactional politics between the military and the civilian (Crouch, 2010; Sebastian & Iisgindarsah, 2013; Sebastian, Syailendra, & Marzuki, 2018). Meanwhile, the preservation of TNI's political influence is possible due to the volatile perception of incumbent presidents on the security of their rule (Mietzner, 2018). The different level of reform engagement by the military before and after 2004 nonetheless displayed an intriguing fact against the existing literatures. The timeline between 1998 and 2004 was deemed as political transition period and coloured by deep divisions between civilian groups

which enabled the military to preserve its privileges under the new democratic environment. The period also witnessed the gradual introduction of various laws to reform the security sector. Although some regulations related to the military had been ratified,¹⁾ specific laws for administering TNI affairs were nonexistent. All of the three presidents in this period, B.J. Habibie (1998-1999), Abdurrahman Wahid (1999-2011), and Megawati Soekarnoputri (2001-2004), faced detrimental political turbulence during their time in the office. Despite this chaotic political circumstance and lack of regulations, the reform progress managed to beget the Law on TNI in year 2004 that was perceived as military reform zenith, though it was also a product of negotiation and bargain between the military and the civilian side.

While the afterwards of 2004, we have witnessed stronger government control over the TNI that deemed as a result of stabilization of civilian politics and deterioration of societal conflict, though the appearance of a full-fledged democratic army is not yet achieved (Mietzner, 2009, p. 360; Mietzner, 2011; Croissant & Lorenz, 2018, p. 98). Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) presidency (2004-2009 and 2009-2014) displayed a stronger civilian control over the military compared to the previous administrations. However, SBY government made concessions to the military rather than solely imposed control over the TNI, such as abolishing formal business of the armed forces but neglecting the informal economic activities and including active military officers in Counterterrorism National Agency (BNPT) (Mietzner, 2011; Honna, 2017). Meanwhile, Jokowi presidency (2014 – now) included the military in various government works, including producing a handful of agreements for the TNI to aid ministerial labours (Sebastian, Syailendra, & Marzuki, 2018).

Then the question is why expansion of military engagement in politics happened in the post-2004 period despite the existing of better regulations and stable political and security circumstance? In order to answer the question, we need to take a look at TNI's organizational behaviour as well as the nature of Indonesia's post-reform political environment. This paper argues that the necessity to protect corporate interests²⁾ plays a

1) For instances, President's Instruction on Separation of Police from Military, Law on State Defence, and Anti-Terrorism Law were introduced in 1999, 2002, and 2003 respectively.

2) Harold Crouch (1985, p. 290) defined military corporate interests as agenda that

significant role in determining the military behaviours in adhering reform ideals. The pre-2004 period reflected a time when pressure for reform was high which forced the military to opt for minimum fulfilment of its interests. The deteriorating of this pressure in the post-2004 period allowed the military to gradually increase its political influence.

The discussion in this article starts with an elaboration on various behaviours of the Indonesian military in engaging with the government leadership, particularly the president. The analysis is then continued with an examination on civil-military relations during the 1998 to 2004 period. The following part elucidates the post-2004 period civil-military relations. The argumentation is then continued with an analysis to identify factors that shaping military behaviours towards the civilian government.

MILITARY IN POLITICS IN INDONESIA

Indonesian military has been claiming its 'guardian of the nation' image based on the revolutionary war experience. During this period as well, the military started to claim itself as the only vanguard of the nation as it perceived civilian leadership as a colonial collaborator. Damien Kingsbury (2003) noted history of military development and the construction of Indonesia as the two contextual developments that shaped the Indonesian military. These contextual features have greatly contributed to the way the military operating and encroaching to the socio-political arena, galvanizing TNI's 'guardian of the nation' self-conception. The historical development of the Indonesian military has imperatively shaped the way the TNI perceiving its relationship with civilian counterparts. The failure of civilian government in the early days of the republic to give proper guidance to the military and stabilize the political brouhaha turned out to be the pretext for the TNI's political dominance. The 'self-created army' belief was also galvanized through this mechanism (Said, 1992, pp. 2-3). Increased prestige and heightened self-image of the military are the two crucial elements that the armed forces will protect and develop to protect their corporate interests, even with the risk of deluding the institution's decision-making process (Snyder, 1984, p.

associated with organisational survivability and maintenance of the military institution's primacy.

24).

Throughout the history of the nation, the Indonesian military has been showing different behaviours in engaging with the civilian side. Sukardi Rinakit (2005) described three different roles of the TNI: spoiler, critical supporter, and political tool. As a spoiler, the Indonesian military displays an opposing act against the policies of the leaders. The military did so when the policies threatened or contradicted its interests. The case of 17 October 1952 Affair was an instance of this spoiler act when a group of military officers aimed a cannon at the presidential palace to oppose the government's plan, which was perceived as an intervention towards military's internal affairs, to modernize the armed forces. The next behaviour is as critical supporter. It refers to the circumstance where the military provides input, proposes policies, and offers criticism to the leadership in a proper manner. Rinakit gave an example of Suharto's relations with his inner circle generals, such as Ali Moertopo, Soedjono Hoemardani, Sudomo, and Yoga Sugama, in the first two decades of the New Order era.

Evan Laksmana (2008) added a category of uncritical supporter to further explain the phenomena. This type of behaviour appears when the military acts as a partner with the president to maintain the leadership with a specific set of agreements where the president could formulate any other national policies, except related to the military's internal affairs. This happened during B.J. Habibie presidency (1998-1999) as the president allowed TNI Commander-in-Chief and Minister of Defence and Security Gen. Wiranto (1998-1999) to craft and conduct all internal military policies, including military reforms, without any intervention from the president.³⁾

The last act is as political tool. It occurred when the military heavily depended on the leader to fulfil its interests. In this situation, the military also gained relatively higher benefits in economic and political sectors compared to when those officers becoming the president's critical supporters (Rinakit, 2005, p. 50). Rinakit pointed out at the period of late 1980s until the end of the Suharto presidency as the time when the military acting as political tool. The military became the regime protector

3) See also Chrisnandi (2005) for study on civil-military relations in the early days of post-Suharto period.

and an instrument to defend Suharto's economic and political interests.

Despite these different behaviour forms, the model from Rinakit and Laksmana provided us an insight that the foundation of those acts is the fulfilment of military's corporate interests. When those interests were threatened, the military turned into a spoiler. The dependency of the military to the leader for securing the material gains on the other hand forced the army into a political tool. Based on the above discussion, the military shows a tendency of bargaining for symbiotic relations which aims to protect their interests. Indonesia's coalitional presidentialism nature (Mietzner, 2016), in which the president needs to maintain cabinet loyalty through a combination of persuasion and pressure, makes bargain between the military and the government leadership inevitable. Mietzner (2018) argued that it is therefore necessary to treat the military the same as parties and legislators in the coalitional presidentialism system as the TNI trades its supports to presidents against concessions and rewards based on loss and benefit judgements. In securing its corporate interests in the post-Suharto period, the military also attempted to use different sectors to execute the plan. For instance, a study from Muhamad Haripin (2017) scrutinized military operations other than war (MOOTW) of the TNI which has evolved into a tool to contest the definition of TNI's military professionalisation. Moreover, based on the participation of retired generals, namely Wiranto, Prabowo Subianto, and Yudhoyono, into the 2009 General Elections, Muhammad T.A. Kurniawan (2011) noted retired military officers joining the political fray for becoming political elites, covering past human rights violations, and gaining wealth.

On the other side, post-1998 Indonesia's political stage has been crippled by the rise of predatory politicians battling for wealth and influence (Hadiz 2011). Jeffrey Winters (2011, p. 140) described Indonesia's political arrangement under Suharto as a sultanistic oligarchies system where one supreme oligarch provided protection as well as set the rules for other oligarchs. The fall of Suharto nevertheless broke the scheme and caused the appearance of what Winters said as untamed oligarchies. In this new system, those oligarchs are competing with each other to gain and defend wealth materials. The parliament and political parties also seemed facing difficulties to enhance their capabilities in channelling

people's aspirations.⁴⁾ The decentralization system, that was introduced about a year after the fall of Suharto and allowed regional governments to manage their own resources, contributed exponentially to the appearance of political dynasties beyond the national political stage in the capital. This murky situation is seen blatantly in the sub-national or regional level where many of those dynasties have established their influence (Kenawas 2018). The waning reform zeitgeist in Indonesia's political system reflects the country's path to democracy was rather borne out of necessity rather than strictly guided by democratization prescription (Sebastian, Chen, & Priamarizki, 2014). As a result, dissolution of pressure to reform permitted power struggle and pragmatic politics for taking the driver seat in moulding the political system, including military reform.

1998-2004: BETWEEN REFORM AND RECALCITRANCE

Let us more closely examine civil-military relations prior to the year 2004. This period is often described as a chaotic circumstance coloured by political turmoil and internal security disorder. Impeachment of President Wahid in 2001, the internal conflicts in Poso and Ambon, and the protracted insurgency in Aceh were some of the issues that marked this stage. In spite of the problematic juncture, the zenith of military reform, the Law on TNI, was ratified in year 2004. The discussion in this part therefore aims to elucidate the dynamics leading to the ratification of the law as well as other reform achievements. Below we will start the discussion by looking firstly at the Habibie presidency and then continued with subsequent administrations.

The early *Reformasi* era turned to be a harsh environment for the TNI. Lifting of media restrictions⁵⁾ opened a wide channel to criticize the New Order regime and its legacies, including the TNI that was one of the regime's main supporters. Former TNI Commander (2002-2006), Gen (ret.)

4) Mujani and Liddle (2010) identified the weakening ideological ties between political parties and their politicians and voters which have characterized Indonesian democracy.

5) During Habibie presidency, he produced the Press Law in 1999 as an effort to promote freedom of press. This effort was strengthened by President Abdurrahman Wahid (1999-2001) in the same year through abolition of Information Ministry which primarily acted as a censorship body for the press during Suharto period.

Endriartono Sutarto, in an interview with the author argued that the pressure for military reform at that time made the TNI no choices but to initiate reform.⁶⁾ Sutarto also mentioned that many senior and retired military officers actually rejected the reform agenda, though in the end those officers realized that initiating reform would be the only way for the military to win the sympathy from the people.⁷⁾

Since *Reformasi* started in 1998, some reform initiatives have been introduced to diminish the TNI's influence in politics and professionalize the institution. The reform progress within the TNI itself was relatively free of intervention from outside parties due to the political consolidation that also occurred at the same time amongst the civilian political elites as argued by Lt. Gen. (ret.) Agus Widjojo, former head of TNI-Police faction in the parliament (1999-2004) and the current Governor of National Resilience Institute (Lemhanas).⁸⁾ Ideally, civilian authority should be the patron for the military reform. Nevertheless, the Indonesian military underwent the reform process internally and made its own reform agenda independently. Widjojo stressed the decision to reform independently was taken due to the absence of guidance from the civilian authority.⁹⁾ The military was practically alone when it commenced the reform, including no notable significant supports from the civil society at that time.¹⁰⁾

When Habibie took over the presidency from Suharto in May 1998, the third Indonesian president had little political supports and faced mounted pressures to deliver reform mandates. Habibie therefore had no choice but to include the military into his patronage circle. This compromise in return gave him better political influence towards the military and ensure TNI's compliance to the government. For instance, Habibie appointed former Commander in Chief (1993-1998) Wiranto as Minister of Defence and Security, Syarwan Hamid, former Chief of TNI's Social and Political Division (1996), as Home Affairs Minister, and former Jakarta Regional Commander (1993-1994) Abdullah Makhmud Hendropriyono as Transmigration and Forest Settlement Minister. On the

6) Author's interview with Gen (ret.) Endriartono Sutarto, former TNI Commander, Jakarta, 7 September 2016.

7) Ibid.

8) Author's interview with Lt. Gen (ret.) Agus Widjojo, Jakarta, 7 September 2016.

9) Ibid.

10) Author's interview with Gen (ret.) Endriartono Sutarto, former TNI Commander.

other hand, Habibie did not intervene reform process within the TNI.

On 5 October 1998, the TNI announced the so called *Paradigma Baru* or New Paradigm. The concept described some efforts of the military reform, such as separation of the police from the military, abolition of Socio-Political Division, reduction of the number of military representatives in the parliament, abatement of the military's involvement in the civilian related day to day activities, and revision of the military doctrines (Mabes ABRI, 1999). However, the military did not show a sobriety to revise its doctrine. The TNI retained the doctrine of Total People's Defence¹¹⁾ which allowed them to maintain the regional, sub-regional, and district commands as well as the sub-district command and Non-Commissioned Officer or *Babinsa* in the village level¹²⁾ (Rinakit, 2005, p. 165). The military then withdrew its faction from the parliament in 2004 as part of the reform initiative. However, the New Paradigm failed to address the issue of dual functions or *dwifungsi* concept that allowed the military to be involved in day to day politics. The New Paradigm required the military to disembark from politics, but without neglectation of the *dwifungsi*. On 5 October 2001, the military proposed a follow up document of the New Paradigm concept.¹³⁾ The follow up document showed a better commitment from the military in implementing the reform agenda. It stressed the abolition of *dwifungsi* as well as the placement of the TNI under a civilian supremacy (Hafidz, 2006, pp. 119, 152).

In 1999, Gus Dur became the Fourth President of the Republic of Indonesia through the presidential elections in the parliament. Although his era was marked by chaotic political situation due to power struggle between political parties, Gus Dur managed to push forward the military

11) Total People's Defence or *Pertahanan Rakyat Semesta* is Indonesian Military doctrine that focuses on the use of Indonesian citizens to aid the armed forces in defending the country. See Law No. 20 Tahun 1982 on Guidance on the State Defence and Security of the Republic of Indonesia (*Pokok Pertahanan Keamanan Negara Republik Indonesia*).

12) The regional commands system mirrors the civilian government structure. These regional commands serve as the military's defence instrument, primarily internal threats. Under the New Order regime, this system was used to repress political opposition, control the regional government, and help Golkar winning the elections. Therefore, its existence has been criticized as major left-over issue of military reform. See Crouch (2010, p. 156).

13) The upgraded version stated a more detail discussion on its internal reform programmes, such as gradual abandonment of its socio-political roles, focus on its primary duty of national defence, transfer of duty and authority to maintain internal security to the Police force, implementation of the Joint Services doctrine, and improvement of its internal management performance. See (Mabes TNI, 2001A; Mabes TNI, 2001B).

reform agenda. The most significant programme was a pilot project by Lt. Gen. (ret.) Agus Wirahadikusumah, Chief of *Kostrad* (Army Strategic Reserve Command) (2000), to disband territorial commands from *Korem* (Resort Military Command) level, municipality / city level, downwards. Nonetheless, the reform agenda was halted when Wahid losing the support from civilian politicians following several cabinet reshuffles that ousted many of his political allies. Wahid started to making concessions with the military, such as forgoing the proposal to reform the territorial commands, to consolidate his power (Honna, 2003, p. 184; Mietzner, 2009, p. 217).

Wahid presidency was also occupied by the continued conflict in Poso and Ambon as well as separatism threats in Aceh. Wahid failed to curb military involvement in escalating the conflict in Poso and Ambon. TNI was allegedly helping the arrival of 3,000 members of *Laskar Jihad*, a vigilante group that involved in inciting violence in Poso and Ambon, in May 2000 as well as providing them with standard military weapons (Hasan, 2006, pp. 186-190). Moreover, the TNI showed a non-compliance behaviour towards Wahid when the president prohibited extremist groups from Java to go to Ambon. The security apparatus let them come to Ambon via Surabaya port rather than Tanjung Priok port in Jakarta. The military employed the tactic in order to undermine the credibility of Gus Dur and halt the peace negotiation with the Free Aceh Movement. The ultimate aim of the military was to restore its previous powers, though it was unclear whether the individuals within the armed forces or the institution that crafted such detrimental strategy (Crouch, 2010, p. 254).

Dissatisfaction towards Gus Dur's presidency was culminated in the form of impeachment towards the president by the parliament in July 2001. The president reacted by trying to utilize the military to prevent the impeachment. The military however rejected the idea and opted to keep the distance from the fray.¹⁴⁾ Interestingly, the military and police faction, together with most political parties, voted to support the impeachment on 23 July. This resulted in the end of Gus Dur administration. The rise of Megawati Sukarnoputri as the fifth president of Indonesia following Wahid impeachment in 2001 marked the rise of anti-reform military officers to the central political stage. During her presidency, the military

14) Author's interview with Gen (ret.) Endriartono Sutarto, former TNI Commander.

reform progress was practically halted due to the rise of conservative military officers who prioritized internal security missions over reform agendas, such as Ryamizard Ryacudu (Army Commander, 2002-2005).

Megawati nonetheless was not the sole factor that jeopardized the military reform. Marcus Mietzner (2009, pp. 226-230) believed a combination of international and national structural factors contributed notably to the alteration of military reform direction at that time. Some of those factors were dependency to the military to support her political activism, continued communal conflicts in Eastern Indonesia and the expanding influence of separatist movements in Aceh and Papua, and the emergence of the United States Global War on Terror.¹⁵⁾ Megawati allowed the takeover of security management from the police to the military in Maluku province to handle the conflict in Ambon in 2002. Moreover, she permitted the TNI to play a greater role in handling separatism in Aceh, a move that was also supported by other civilian politicians as they perceived Habibie and Wahid administrations too soft towards the insurgents. Megawati's relations with the TNI actually started to deteriorate since 2003, particularly with the commander-in-chief at that time Endriartono Sutarto. Her administration's procurement of Russian Sukhoi jetfighters was deemed as the cause of this rift. In a parliament hearing, Endriartono claimed that no prior communication with TNI Headquarters prior the purchase. The Air Force Chief of Staff Chappy Hakim (2002 – 2005) also mentioned the same issue when asked by parliament members (Lesmana, 2008, p. 296). The military perceived the civilian government did a *fait accompli* against the TNI that caused disgruntlement amongst top military officers.

Nonetheless, the Law on TNI, that was ratified near the end of Megawati period in 2004, put another milestone for the military reform progress in Indonesia. She proposed the bill to the parliament on 30 June 2004. The law was agreed by the parliament on 30 September 2004 and then signed by the president on 16 October 2004. The law regulated that the military must be under the Ministry of Defence and military officers

15) The bitter experience of Wahid impeachment had made Megawati distrusting civilian politicians and relying more on the support of the military in consolidating her political power (Mietzner, 2009, p. 226). Moreover, the continuation of communal conflicts in Ambon (until 2002) and Poso (until 2007) had been Megawati administration's internal security issues.

must be retired prior to running for governmental positions. The TNI law also mandated the government to take over military's businesses within five years. Nonetheless, the law did not regulate the existence of territorial command which became the spearhead for shady security business of the military (Mietzner, 2003, p. 246). Interestingly, the law's short discussion time was intended to give the last chance for military and police faction in the parliament to contribute to the law-making (Imparsial, 2004, p. 10). This circumstance however had benefited the military as its faction, though a well-known reformist Agus Widjojo led the group, was able to negotiate the law. Moreover, the victory of SBY, who was deemed as a pro-reform general, in the 2009 Presidential Elections contributed significantly to fasten the discussion. The conservative nationalist generals, such as Ryamizard and Hendropriyono, were afraid that Yudhoyono will add further reform clauses which will further jeopardize military interests.¹⁶⁾ On the one hand, the 2004 Law on TNI signified a remarkable achievement of military reform. On the other hand, it was a product of negotiations and compromises that did not adhere reform spirits entirely.

2004 ONWARDS: A QUID PRO QUO AFFINITY

The post-2004 period exhibited a growing political influence of the military. Intriguingly, the two presidents in this timeframe, Yudhoyono and Jokowi, were considered as strong proponents of democracy. Mietzner (2014) even wrote an analysis arguing how Jokowi's victory had contributed to the preservation of democracy. The promising background however failed to deliver maximum results in further reforming the military. SBY did some concessions with the TNI in return for its political support. Jokowi meanwhile went farther with practically registering the military for upholding ministerial duties through several agreements. Let us discuss the civil-military relations under the two presidents below.

In 2004, former military general, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono who served Megawati government as Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal and Security Affairs, won the country's first direct presidential elections. President Yudhoyono himself is considered as one of the reformist officers

16) The author would like to thank Muhamad Haripin for his insight for this part.

within the military. His ascendancy to the top position in Indonesia marked a new opportunity for military reform to proliferate, particularly after he managed to get rid of those anti-reform generals who were also his political opponents.¹⁷⁾ The Yudhoyono years (2004-2014) witnessed the decline of military representation in several institutions, including intelligence body, though some positions were still filled by TNI officers, particularly in the security sector.

SBY tried to win the support of the military or at least to prevent disgruntlement amongst them by giving compromises. When the government decided to take over official military business as mandated by the 2004 TNI Law,¹⁸⁾ the unofficial business activities of military officers remained intact. Another crucial step for military reform under the Yudhoyono administration was the reduction of dependency on off-budget sources to fund the military budget (Mietzner, 2011, p. 135). Nonetheless, during this period of political stability under Yudhoyono, many civilian politicians tried to use the military to gain political advantage, particularly to mobilise political supports during the elections. According to General Sutarto, this situation was proven harmful for the military reform progress as it could drag back the military indirectly to the political arena.¹⁹⁾

Besides the half-hearted effort to diminish military economic activities, the establishment of the National Anti-Terrorism Agency (BNPT) by Yudhoyono in 2010 made the Indonesian military institutionally included in domestic security task.²⁰⁾ Furthermore, the

17) Prior to the end of her presidency, Megawati nominated Ryamizard to become Commander in Chief replacing Endriartono Sutarto. However, Yudhoyono stalled the nomination until Ryamizard and instead kept Endriartono as TNI Commander until 2006. Yudhoyono also beat Wiranto in the 2004 Presidential Elections. The absence of both Ryamizard and Wiranto allowed Yudhoyono to impose stronger authority over the armed forces (Mietzner, 2009, p. 295).

18) See Law No. 34 Year 2004 on TNI.

19) Author's interview with Gen (ret.) Endriartono Sutarto.

20) Many of active military officers become members of the agency. Some current military officers in BNPT are Maj. Gen. Gautama Wiranegara (First Secretary, *sestama*), Maj. Gen. Abdul Rahman Kadir (Prevention, Protection, and Deradicalization Affairs Deputy), and Brig. Gen. Dadang Hendrayudha (General Affairs Bureau, *Karoum*). In addition, BNPT signed an MoU with the army on 5 September 2013 to cooperate together in counterterrorism task. The MoU regulated the use of army's territorial command to support the BNPT (Saragih, 2013).

emergence of terrorist group led by Santoso in Poso²¹⁾ provided a momentum for the military to jump in to counterterrorism work by conducting counterterrorism training in 2015. It also further justified the existence of territorial command structure which is vital for the army to promote fundraising, generate economic opportunities, and provide patronage resources (Honna, 2017).

After more than a decade of military reform Indonesia, the Indonesian military was side-lined from formal politics, but it still preserved privileged positions in social and political life, such as enjoying impunity from legal investigations (Mietzner, 2009, p. 361). Moreover, the territorial command structure, which was perceived as a repressive tool and symbol of inward-looking doctrine, has not been abolished yet. Even recently, the military added two more regional commands in 2017, which are Merdeka Territorial Command in Manado, North Sulawesi Province and Kasuari Territorial Command in Manokwari, West Papua (*CNN Indonesia*, 2017).

Following the decade of Yudhoyono, Jokowi won the 2014 presidential elections with a tight margin against his opponent, Prabowo Subianto, a former military general and close aide of the late authoritarian ruler Suharto. Being an outsider of national politics and a non-party leader forced Jokowi to form a large coalition with many political elites, including military generals. He surrounded himself with retired military generals, such as Luhut B. Pandjaitan, Hendropriyono, and Ryamizard Ryacudu. Nonetheless, these generals belong to different political groups. Pandjaitan certainly is in a separate team with the other two generals. Luhut brought his own military men to gain some influential positions, namely Gen (retired) Subagyo Hadi Siswoyo²²⁾ (Army Chief of Staff 1998-1999) as member of President's Advisors Council (Wantimpres) and Luhut's son in law Brig. Gen. Maruli Simanjuntak who is the current Presidential Security Guard (Paspampres) (2018-now). Meanwhile

21) Abu Wardah Santoso (Santoso) led a terrorist group called Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (*Eastern Indonesia Mujahidin*, MIT) and had a link to the perpetrator of Bali bombings, Jamaah Islamiyah (JI). When JI was crushed in 2007 by the Indonesian government, he went to Poso to establish a JI cell. Later, his MIT declared allegiance to the Islamic State (ISIS) in 2014. Santoso was killed on 18 July 2016 during Tinombala operation of the police and the military. For further information on Santoso and his MIT group see ICG (2012) and Sugara (2014).

22) Subagyo is also close with Wiranto who supported the former Army Chief's nomination as a member of Wantimpres.

Hendropriyono and Ryamizard are part of Megawati's inner circle. Later Jokowi also included Wiranto as Coordinating Minister for Legal and Political Affairs in July 2016 to his cabinet, allegedly to balance Luhut's influence.

In addition to putting retired generals, Jokowi has been attempting to forge a closer relationship with the TNI. Facing with political turmoil, he appointed Gatot Nurmantyo, an army general, as TNI Commander in 2015, breaking the post-1998 tradition of rotating the position amongst the army, navy, and air force.²³⁾ Jokowi proposed more than 30 MoUs with the TNI, ranging from monitoring Indonesia's maritime resources to joining search and rescue operations (Kompas, 2017; Sebastian, Syailendra, & Marzuki, 2018). Moreover, TNI signed an agreement with the National Police (POLRI) on 23 January 2018 to regulate the use of military in handling demonstrations, labour strikes, riots, social conflicts, and protection of government and community activities (*BBC Indonesia*, 2018). This situation led to the encroachment of military role to the domestic security role which was previously compartmentalized by the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) Decree No. VI Year 2000 on Separation of TNI and National Police and Law No. 34 Year 2004 on TNI. The intrusion to internal warfare consequently has jeopardized the military reform progress.

Under Jokowi, the military, particularly the army, has showed some attempts to increase its political influence by lifting the issue of 'proxy war'. Gen. Gatot Nurmantyo, TNI Commander, has been reiterating the threat of 'proxy war' since he was Army Chief of Staff. According to him, other countries are trying to attack Indonesia via many proxies, including social media, drugs, and pornography (Abdulsalam, 2017). In an interview with the media, Gatot explained that 'proxy war' is a warfare by using third party or other groups to destroy a particular country without military power (*Republika*, 2017).

Moreover, Jokowi's Minister of Defence, Ryamizard Ryacudu, who was one of Megawati's anti-reform military officers, announced the implementation of *Bela Negara* or defend the state programme. According to him during the launching of the programme on 22 October 2015, *Bela*

23) It was supposed to be a turn for the Indonesian Air Force. Previous TNI Commander was held by Gen. Moeldoko, (2013-2015), an army general.

Negara's primary objective is to promote patriotism and loyalty to the state (*Rappler*, 2015).²⁴⁾ The promotion of *Bela Negara* by Ryamizard was perceived as an effort to militarized Indonesian citizens by giving military training for Indonesian youths across the nation (Gabrillin, 2015). It was also criticized by a member of parliament from Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) and former army general, Tubagus Hasanuddin, as wasting state budget (Damarjati, 2015).

The 'proxy war' and *Bela Negara* narratives however implicitly showed the intention of the military to regain its prominence in the country through asserting an in-ward looking doctrine (Haripin, 2016; Marzuki, 2016). This circumstance therefore put military reform into question as some activists and Agus Widjojo, Governor of Indonesia's Resilience Institute (Lemhanas), have echoed during interviews with the author. In addition to these two narratives, Widjojo noted the detrimental affairs between civilian politicians and TNI elites in pursuing political interests is another cause for deteriorating civil-military relations degree in Indonesia.²⁵⁾ Aris Santoso, a member of human rights activists group KONTRAS (The Commission for Disappeared and Victims of Violence), argued the military did not entirely adhere to military reform principles in terms of its relation with the civilian political elites and could neglect the agenda to fit the armed forces' interests.²⁶⁾

Another military reform activist, Mufti Makarim believed military reform agenda has not entirely transformed TNI, particularly its organizational culture. The military still believes it possesses the ability to handle every issues in the country.²⁷⁾ Recently, Ryamizard even encouraged the police to hand over the investigation of attacks to several

24) Prior to Ryamizard's promotion of *Bela Negara*, the concept has been stated in at least seven laws: Law No. 29 Year 1954 on People's Defence Guidance (*Pokok-Pokok Perlawanan Rakyat*), Law No. 20 Year 1982 on Guidance on Defence and Security of the Republic of Indonesia (*Pokok Pertahanan dan Keamanan Negara Republik Indonesia*); Law No. 56 Year 1999 on Trained Citizens (*Rakyat Terlatih*); Upper House Decree No. VII Year 2000 on TNI and Polri Roles (*Peranan TNI dan Polri*); Amendment of 1945 Constitution Article 30 Clause 1 – 5 and Article 27 Clause 3; and Law No.3 Year 2002 on State Defence (*Pertahanan Negara*).

25) Author's interview with Lt. Gen (ret.) Agus Widjojo.

26) Author's interview with Mr. Aris Santoso, member of KONTRAS (The Commission for Disappeared and Victims of Violence) Jakarta, 8 September 2016.

27) Author's interview with Mr. Mufti Makarim, military reform activist Jakarta, 7 September 2016.

religious leaders in early 2018 to the military (*Republika*, 2018).²⁸⁾ The persistence implementation of territorial command and 'proxy war' and *Bela Negara* narratives exhibited the fact the military reform had only managed to regulate the military formally via the introduction of some security and defence related laws and regulations. Informally, instead of adhering military reform staunchly, the military displayed no guarantee to stick with the proposition and could neglect it at any time.

PURSUING CORPORATE INTERESTS BY OTHER MEANS

The previous sections have discussed the dynamics of civil-military relations following the departure of Suharto from the presidential seat. Honna (2003) argued that internal power struggle within the military has been the main factor determining TNI's response to democratic demands. Military reform thus produced a rather mixed result rather than a product that completely reflects democratic principles. It was thus unsurprising that the 2004 Law on TNI has failed to address reform appeals comprehensively. We can draw three characteristics of Indonesia's post-1998 civil-military relations based on the abovementioned discussion.

First, there is a continuation trend of military engagement in politics though with different level of involvement and means. Coming back to address the question on the kind of change that the Indonesian military went through, the military reform following 1998 *Reformasi* put some formal regulations to limit TNI involvement outside the defence realm. The existence of these regulations regrettably failed to deliver the expected reforms. The most apparent instance is the separation between internal and external security duties. The reform spirit mandated the TNI should solely focus on establishing a professional military that concentrates to combat external threats. Although the regulations administered the partition, the military has been engaging internal security territory covertly. The inclusion of active military officers to BNPT and the possibility of TNI to handle riots are two striking instances of how the military creating ways to keep their domestic security role.

28) Between December 2017 to February 2018, the police received 21 reports on attack to religious leaders. Nonetheless, only two of them really happened with religious leaders as the victim. The other cases were either hoaxes or nothing to do with religious leaders. See Movanita (2018).

Second, maintaining reform progress turned into a tug-of-war game which caused a fixed formula to professionalize the military is non-existence. Professionalism is then articulated pragmatically as the ability to deliver results as a substitute of adhering democratic fundamentals. Bargain and negotiation became two unavoidable consequences which resulted in the failure to maximize the reform progress. The circumstance is also closely related to the next characteristic of civil-military relations in the post-Suharto Indonesia. Third, the cacophony of Indonesia's political stage has opened the possibility of exploiting the military to secure civilian politicians' interests. Those gullible politicians attempted to use the military as a political instrument or at least to prevent the TNI turns into a disruptive force which made them avoiding implementation of full reform measures. These three characteristics of post-*Reformasi* civil-military relations have facilitated the protection and fulfillment of TNI's corporate interests.

It should be noted however that the TNI's corporate interests are dominated by the army's agenda rather than the two other services. The army domination can be traced back to the Revolutionary War period (1945-1949) when the ground force became the spearhead in combating the Dutch through guerilla strategy. Moreover, Suharto's favoritism over army generals contributed significantly in sustaining this army supremacy within the Indonesian armed forces. The army domination in return enables the service to dictate the military's behaviour in general. The military's interests therefore have been mainly a reflection of the army's scheme. Besides that, the large number of army personnel, which facilitated by a handful of army's territorial structure, also aided the service's dominant position.

CONCLUSION

Based on the discussion above, we can conclude that the military encroachment to civilian affairs has been significantly determined by the protection and fulfilment of corporate interests of the armed forces. The cut-throat competition amongst civilian political elites together with deteriorating reform pressure in the post-2004 period have served a fertile ground for the military to increase its political influence. The pre-2004 witnessed the military internally consolidated itself which produced the

so-called *Paradigma Baru*. Although the concept seemed half-hearted in accommodating reform demands, it at least displayed a commitment from the military to adapt democratic principles. However, it should be noted that the TNI at time had not choice other than embracing reforms in order to win the trust from Indonesian populations as mentioned by Endriartono.

Such mounting pressure for reform was practically decreased in the post-2004, though better regulations have been ratified. The post-2004 also experienced the increasing political influence and military encroachment to civilian affairs. Existing literatures pointed at the absence of proper regulations as the culprit for the intricacy. The discussion of this article on the other hand has shown that the pursuit of corporate interests, which accompanied by declining pressure for reform, allowed the military to intrusively reinforce its presence beyond defence territory. The ratification of better guidelines, particularly Law on TNI in 2004, in reality did not prevent the military to actively engage in non-defence duties.

The post-2004 furthermore noticed an adjustment on the way the military enhancing its political influence and demeanour outside the barracks. Civilian politicians exploited the military to safeguard their political interests and increase their bargaining power against other political groups. In addition, the fear of emergence of dissenting voices from the military made civilian leaders avoiding confrontational and zero-sum approaches in continuing military reform. Instead of doing so, negotiation and concession became quintessential procedures for imposing further reform agenda. Despite this negative trend, the military reform is not completely moribund. The continuing presence of the TNI in civilian affairs may lead into re-definition of military professionalism which can be more pragmatic and result oriented with partial adoption of democratic principles. The situation also sustains the supremacy of the army within the TNI as the army plays the military's key representative in the TNI's adventurism in civilian affairs.

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