

An investigation into ways forward for Cosmopolitan Theory, including a summary and consideration of Simon Caney's cosmopolitan approach to the question of international distributive justice

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Abstract

This research note will focus on a description and analysis of Simon Caney's review article: "International Distributive Justice", published in "Political Studies: 2001, Vol. 49, (pp. 974 – 997)" and will also reflect my own views and reasons for arguing that elements of Cosmopolitan awareness and identification both do and should, continuously and increasingly inform and dominate the global realities of our times. This claim and conviction acknowledges, at the same time, the on-going relevance of Communitarian approaches (particularly, in Caney's case, with his on-going debate and dialogue with David Miller) that co-exist with Cosmopolitan ones amid the contemporary realities of Globalization, Regionalism and Nationalism. As various Cosmopolitan and Communitarian theorists explore in their different ways - such terms and the variety of ways of thinking that we find in cosmopolitanism, communitarianism, pragmatism, democracy, diplomacy, realism and liberalism etc., are all linked together as part of our contemporary reality and as a result of our inherited histories and political philosophies. However, it is with the firm conviction that Cosmopolitan Theory can lead us into the most interesting and beneficial future paths that this research note concludes.

Keywords:

cosmopolitan; communitarian; international distributive justice

RITSUMEIKAN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS Vol.11, pp.95-118 (2013).

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In his abstract, Caney clearly lays out his procedure and parameters:

“The literature on global justice contains a number of distinct approaches. This article identifies and reviews recent work in four commonly found in the literature. First there is an examination of the cosmopolitan contention that distributive principles apply globally. This is followed by three responses to the cosmopolitanism – the nationalist emphasis on special duties to co-nationals, the society of states claim that principles of global distributive justice violate the independence of states and the realist claim that global justice is utopian and that states should advance national interest.” (Caney, 2001)

Thereby clarifying the need to always give both sides of the argument in any theoretical debate and to lay the groundwork for identifying possible overlaps and convergences. Caney then prefaces his paper with two topical quotes from writers of the fairly recent past, who are largely reiterating (as *all* writers inevitably do to some degree) what has been expressed by others before:

“Our normal attitude to foreigners is a complete negation of that absence of discrimination on irrelevant grounds which we have recognized as the principle of equality.” (E.H. Carr)

“I believe in the right of every living human being, without distinction of colour, race, sex, or professed belief or opinion, to liberty, life and subsistence, to complete protection from ill-treatment, equality of opportunity in the pursuit of happiness and an equal voice in the collective government of mankind.” (H.G. Wells)

Caney begins by pointing out that, generally speaking, most political philosophers have stated that distributive justice should develop, if at all, *within* countries. From this premise we can observe the growth of Nationalism, national consciousness and political realism in different parts of the world. In more recent developments, and especially since the end of WWII to the present – such insular and protectionist (albeit natural) ways of thinking have been strongly challenged, and a number of political philosophers and theorists have argued that principles of distributive justice

should have a *global* scope.

Caney focuses on the central cosmopolitan contention that “distributive principles should operate globally”, and then goes on to examine:

“...three responses to this position, namely the *nationalist* emphasis on special duties to fellow-nationals, the *society of states* claim that principles of global distributive justice isolate the independence of states and *realist* claims that global justice is utopian and that states should advance the national interest.”

(Caney, 2001)

We are to remember that there are both weak and strong versions of the claim for international distributive justice. The ‘weak’ being regional in nature – thus, in the example he gives:

“...the British might have obligations of distributive justice to other members of the European Union, say, but not to Malaysians.” (Caney, 2001)

This ‘weak’ consideration may also be seen to be operating in terms of economic and social cooperation in the various evolving regional groupings such as ASEAN and the TPP, for example. The ‘strong’ version implies *global* responsibility – from the ‘haves’ to the ‘have-nots’ – where the scope of justice is global.

Recent cosmopolitan arguments, that the principles of distributive justice should be applied to the world as a whole, can also be found in the work of Brian Barry, Charles Beitz and Thomas Pogge, among others. Caney stresses the importance of distinguishing between two prevalent types of cosmopolitanism – what he terms ‘radical’ and ‘mild’:

“Radical cosmopolitanism, as I define it, makes the two following claims: first, there are global principles of distributive justice (the positive claim), and, second, there are no state-wide or nation-wide principles of distributive justice (the negative claim.) Mild cosmopolitanism, by contrast, simply affirms the positive claim. As such it can accept the claim, denied by radical cosmopolitanism, that people have

special obligations of distributive justice to fellow nationals or fellow citizens.” (Caney, 2001)

There are some contrasting views among cosmopolitans here – Beitz, for example thinks that state boundaries can have derivative, but not fundamental moral importance. (Beitz, 1988; 1999, cited in Caney, 2001) Others – like Brian Barry, Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen, do *not* subscribe to this view.

Another distinction, made by Thomas Pogge, is between institutional and interactive forms of cosmopolitanism. Pogge supports the institutional approach – where:

“...principles of justice concern the distribution of resources within institutions and the focus of attention is on the fairness of the institution(s).” (Caney, 2001)

He does this because he believes that because of the high degree of international economic interdependence, there is a basic global structure and thus there are global principles of distributive justice.

Other cosmopolitans – especially utilitarian cosmopolitans such as Peter Singer follow, by contrast, the ‘interactive’ argument which states that principles of justice concern individual behaviour and one thus has obligations to other people whether they are members of the same institutions or not.

Who is entitled to the goods transferred? Most contemporary cosmopolitans would affirm that duties are owed to *individuals* and not to states. Beitz takes this view for example, as does Pogge. Barry’s view has fluctuated between thinking that *states* were primarily entitled to receive resources – but has more recently reverted to the more common cosmopolitan position that *individuals* are primarily entitled to receive resources.

Practicalities – *how* are resources to be effectively and efficiently redistributed? Again, opinions amongst cosmopolitans differ. Beitz and David Richards endorse a ‘global difference principle’ – arguing that the least well-off humans need the most urgent help. Others, such as Hillel Steiner argue that everyone is entitled to an equal proportion of the Earth’s resources. Barry stipulates four principles of global justice – being that we should agree to:

“(i.) an overriddable commitment to equality,
 (ii.) a principle compensating people for involuntary disadvantages,
 (iii.) a commitment to protecting people’s basic needs and
 (iv.) the claim that where these three principles are already met, we may prefer that arrangement which is most mutually advantageous.”
 (Barry, 1998, cited in Caney, 2001)

Pogge argues for what he calls the ‘global resources dividend’ – a plan whereby people have to pay a dividend when they use the Earth’s natural resources. Communitarians will no doubt respond with the criticism that such cosmopolitans are being impractical and utopian. Caney rightly points out that these brief summaries reveal the common ground upon which cosmopolitans stand – which is broadly within the realm of ‘pragmatic idealism’:

“What is more important is that they all have in common the conclusion that the current system is extremely unjust and that a redistribution of wealth from the affluent to the impoverished is required.”
 (Caney, 2001)

Gerard Delanty, in his book: “The Cosmopolitan Imagination – The Renewal of Critical Social Theory” also makes some very strong arguments that Habermasian pragmatism is influencing and encouraging new waves of cosmopolitan thinking. Ulrich Beck (2000, 2002, 2006) for example, is putting forward an interesting case for a ‘methodological cosmopolitanism’:

“The basis of his case for a new methodological cosmopolitanism is the simple recognition that social reality has become cosmopolitan.” (Delanty, 2009)

As Caney rightly states in his review, it is most important to consider very carefully what the central claims and tenets of cosmopolitanism are, for some of the leading modern and contemporary cosmopolitans like Barry, Beitz and Pogge.

They all view the following points as key factors, which they regard as both intuitively appealing and plausible:

“(a) individuals have moral worth
 (b) they have this equally and
 (c) people’s equal worth generates moral reasons that are binding on everyone.”
 (Caney, 2001)

Clearly, these universal considerations suggest that the scope of distributive justice should be completely global and not just limited to fellow-citizens or fellow-nationals. Pogge and others point out that – when it comes to considerations of justice – ethnicity, social status, gender etc. are irrelevant. Samuel Black, Charles Jones and Robert Goodin are among those who argue further that:

“...the considerations standardly adduced to defend redistribution refer to features (like the capacity for autonomy) that are possessed by humans throughout the world.” (Caney, 2001)

Again, nationality is irrelevant – the basic thesis put forward by contemporary cosmopolitans is that:

“...the principle cosmopolitan claims: given the reasons we give to defend the distribution of resources and given our convictions about the irrelevance of people’s cultural identity to their entitlements, it follows that the scope of distributive justice should be global.” (Caney, 2001)

Caney cites the Rawlsian term – the ‘*principal cosmopolitan claim*’ which makes a claim about people’s ‘moral personality’. All persons, irrespective of their nationality, creed, culture or ethnicity, needs be included within the parameters of a *global* justice. Such a basic cosmopolitan argument can be seen generally in *all* cosmopolitan literature.

Caney goes on to describe three central types of cosmopolitan justice:

- (a) contractarian
- (b) rights-based
- (c) goal-based

A: The contractarian version:

Rawls's contractarian device is the original position, and Charles Beitz is famous for utilizing it in his work, where he argues that instead of asking what people in different societies would agree to – one should hold on to a global original position. Beitz has changed his position from the one he expressed earlier in his book: "Political Theory and International Relations", that:

"...everyone should be included in a global original position on the grounds (i.) that principles of justice should dictate the distribution of goods generated by a system of co-operation and (ii.) that there now existed a global system of economic co-operation." (Beitz, 1983, cited in Caney, 2001)

To arguing that:

"...everyone should be included in a global hypothetical construct because the morally relevant features of humans are universal properties like their capacity for forming and revising their conception of the good and that their nationality is not morally significant." (Beitz, 1999, cited in Caney, 2001)

Caney then goes on to describe how the '*principle cosmopolitan claim*' is also adopted in various ways by Richards, Barry and Scanlon.

Barry clearly points out that he views his brand of contractarianism as:

"...the best way of giving content to the idea of impartial treatment that underlies moral cosmopolitanism." (Barry, 1998, cited in Caney, 2001)

In "Democracy and the Global Order", David Held asserts the ideal of autonomy and further utilizes the *principle cosmopolitan thesis* by defending seven kinds of core right which protect and enable people to take part in autonomous action. (Held, 1995, cited in Caney, 2001) In *all* of the contractarian arguments for the universal principles of distributive justice – the *principle cosmopolitan thesis* is defended and embodied in some way.

B: The rights-based version:

Rights-based cosmopolitan theories of justice defended by Pogge, Shue, Steiner and, more recently, Charles Jones, have in common with the above, the belief that all humans have rights, and among such rights are rights to economic resources. Both Shue and Jones argue that subsistence rights are just as important as basic civil and political rights.

Steiner takes it somewhat further, arguing that everyone has rights to equal freedom and thus each is entitled to an equal amount of the Earth's resources. (Steiner, 1994, cited in Caney, 2001)

Pogge also vigorously defends global economic rights and focuses in particular on the defence of welfare rights as expressed in Article 25 (1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which states that:

“Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services...”
(UDHR, 1998, cited in Caney, 2001)

The UDHR is arguably among the most important of documents to have been formulated since the end of WWII and continues to posit its cosmopolitan arguments to all observers. Governments can now be held more accountable and responsible (at least in theory) as a result of it. Both the UDHR and the arguments above, express the universalism of cosmopolitan thinking, which stresses that a person's nationality or citizenship should not determine their entitlements.

C: The goal-based version:

Utilitarianism is the most well known of the goal-based theories of justice. The groundwork laid by Bentham and Mill – the principle of “the greatest happiness of the greatest number” is modernized and adapted by such contemporary utilitarians as Peter Singer and Amartya Sen. The welfare of *all* human beings is the prime concern. A commitment to moral equality and universal justice incorporating everyone's utility is central to Singer's thought, for example, and therefore welfare discrimination on the grounds of ethnicity or nationality is irrelevant. (Caney, 2001)

Richard Falk, in his recent work “On Humane Governance” employs a non-utilitarian consequentialist cosmopolitan theory of distributive justice, which is driven by the same credo. People *everywhere* have the same basic human needs and thus, discrimination on the grounds of citizenship or nationality is simply wrong. Falk is deeply indignant about the *unfairness* of the current global system because of the way it allows rampant poverty, infant mortality, oppression and militarization (what Falk calls ‘avoidable harm’) and also environmental degradation (what he calls ‘eco-imperialism’.) (Falk, 1995, cited in Caney, 2001)

Caney concludes this section by reminding us of two key points:

“(1) that there is a great variety of different cosmopolitan theories of distributive justice *but* also (2) that they are united in their commitment to an account of ‘moral personality’ according to which people’s entitlements are independent of their culture, race and nationality.” (Caney, 2001)

Caney also mentions the work of two other cosmopolitans – namely, Philippe van Parijs, who argues for an unconditional basic income ‘for all’, and Onora O’Neill, who puts forward powerful arguments for cosmopolitanism in such books as “Towards Justice and Virtue” (1996) and “Bounds of Justice” (2000) and “International Ethics” (1985). Her arguments for the importance of the recognition of ‘personhood’ and her insistence that liberal traditions of individual integrity, responsibility and universal consciousness be maintained and promoted are also central to cosmopolitan thinking.

Caney proceeds to consider some key communitarian arguments in opposition to cosmopolitanism as exemplified in definitions of Nationalism.

He reviews recent research into the definition of Nationalism, citing David Miller’s “On Nationality” (1995) and Yael Tamir’s “Liberal Nationalism” (1993). Both Miller and Tamir take the position that nations are distinct from both states and ethnic groups.

Caney cites Miller's definition as giving the clearest description of what a nation is:

“...a community (1) constituted by shared belief and mutual commitment, (2) extended in history, (3) active in character, (4) connected to a particular territory, and (5) marked off from other communities by its distinct public culture.” (Miller, 1997, cited in Caney, 2001)

In contemporary nationalist political theory there are three general claims, which Caney examines in turn. These are:

- a.) the ‘national duties’ thesis
- b.) the ‘viability’ thesis
- c.) the ‘allocation of duty’ thesis

A: The ‘national duties’ thesis:

The key charge *against* cosmopolitanism is that it does not recognize the ethical ties generated by membership of a nation. Specifically, cosmopolitans are accused of overlooking or ignoring the following claim:

The ‘national duties’ thesis: individuals bear special obligations of distributive justice to other members of their nation.

Both Miller and Tamir accept the above claim on the grounds that it is intuitively plausible. But, Caney asks, why should we accept this argument? And we return to ponder the point made by Chris Brown in his book: “International Relations Theory – New Normative Approaches” (1992) that cosmopolitans and communitarians simply see and interpret the world in different ways.

Miller often appeals to the concept of ‘reciprocity’ in his defence of special obligations within a national community and, in his paper in an edited volume on “The Morality of Nationalism” Jeff McMahan defends the ‘national duties’ thesis on the grounds that individuals have special duties to others if they engage in a joint co-operative system and second that a nation is such a system. (McMahan, 1997, cited in Caney, 2001) Caney points out that there are several possible cosmopolitan arguments against this point of view. The first is that it is *implausible* to think of nations as simple systems of reciprocity as no one common enterprise involves all

members of a nation. Each person is following his or her own career/existential path. As Anthony Giddens has pointed out – modern day societies are complex and global in orientation and many have growing areas of multiculturalism and integration. The difficulties of tolerance and co-existence, are destined to be gradually overcome:

“Unpredictability, manufactured uncertainty, fragmentation: these are only one side of the coin of a globalizing order...An ethics of a globalizing post-traditional society implies recognition of the sanctity of human life and the universal right to happiness and self-actualization – coupled to the obligation to promote cosmopolitan solidarity and an attitude of respect towards non-human agencies and beings, present and future.” (Giddens, 1994)

As Caney puts it:

“Many, for example, live overseas; others do not engage in any co-operation since they are handicapped; others live in multi-national states and engage in co-operation with people from different nations.” (Caney, 2001)

Caney points out that there are interesting *parallels* between cosmopolitan and nationalist arguments and in an important sense, the ‘national duties’ thesis does not contradict the cosmopolitan position. The idea that nationalism and cosmopolitanism are basically incompatible is simplistic. There can (and will) be differences in *degree* of course – nationalists may be persuaded to defend more *minimal* cosmopolitan principles and there may remain differences in the ranking of national duties in relation to cosmopolitan ones, but cosmopolitan claims that individuals have duties to everyone *are* consistent with nationalist claims that they are under special duties to others of their nation. (Caney, 2001)

B: The ‘viability’ thesis:

Miller argues that people will generally adhere to systems which involve the redistribution of wealth to fellow nationals but are not willing to see their money go to foreigners – thus he rejects cosmopolitan accounts of

distributive justice through the formulation of the 'viability' thesis, which states that:

“...systems of distributive justice, to be feasible, must map onto national communities and hence that global systems of distributive justice are unworkable.”(Caney, 2001)

Cosmopolitans, like Beitz and Pogge respond with the moral argument that moral criteria transcend the nation-bound criteria of party political policies or institutional structures. Cosmopolitans believe in the capacity for human beings to change and adapt to new historical circumstances, and thus the 'viability' thesis is outmoded in their eyes. Goodin and others stress this point. Man evolves socially and thus his moral psychology does not remain static or insular. As Caney puts it:

“People might for example, seek to combat something (like apartheid or landmines or cruelty to animals or child abuse) not because they necessarily share the same identity as the oppressed (or feel themselves to be part of the same community) but because of their commitment to principles of universal rights. Given this, however, it seems reasonable to suggest, against Miller, that people may be motivated by cosmopolitan distributive ideas.” (Caney, 2001)

Caney believes that greater awareness of global unfairness and the suffering of the have-nots will (and has) influenced many people to act against what Falk has termed 'global apartheid'. Through the mass media – the liberation of South Africa became a global rallying cry – and hence the power to influence, of such an analogy. Caney wonders how Miller can coherently square off his defence of the 'viability' thesis with his own recent suggestions for principles of international distributive justice which include:

“...a principle of human rights, a commitment to non-exploitation and a commitment to provide political communities with enough to be self-determining.” (Miller, 2000, cited in Caney, 2001)

C: The 'allocation of duty' thesis:

In "On Nationality" Miller defends the 'allocation of duty' thesis, in which:

"...nations have special duties to ensure that their members receive their just entitlements as defined by a cosmopolitan theory of distributive justice." (Caney, 2001)

Some parallels with Shue's cosmopolitan claim that all individuals have a basic right to liberty, security and subsistence, are to be found in Miller's arguments – but his emphasis is always that entitlements belong *mainly* to fellow-nationals. Miller is always trying to *narrow down* the cosmopolitan affirmation of rights – but he never *denies* them. Caney accepts as plausible, Miller's view that the duties to ensure that people receive their just entitlements should *not* be borne equally by everyone.

However, Caney strongly disputes Miller's contention that fellow-nationals deserve each other's aid above and beyond the rights and needs of *all* human beings, wherever they are living. The 'allocation of duty' thesis only succeeds if the 'national duty' thesis's claim that individuals bear special obligation of distributive justice to co-nationals is fully taken on board – and Caney argues (from his strongly held cosmopolitan stance) that this thesis is implausible.

The 'Society of States' approach:

Leaving aside cosmopolitan and nationalist perspectives on global justice, Caney considers, in this section of his review, what he terms: the 'society of states' approach, which appears to be a mixture of realist and liberal principles stipulating that international justice:

"...requires that sovereign states respect other states' independence. Accordingly they should not seek to implement cosmopolitan ideals of distributive justice which some states would reject." (Nardin, 1983, cited in Caney, 2001)

Rawls has made similar claims in his lectures and book: "The Law of Peoples" and rejects cosmopolitan theories of justice – although he himself

has influenced some of them. His chief concern in much of his work is to present a series of international principles – based on ‘justice as fairness’ as he sees it. He deems the principles fair because they could be adopted by both liberal and ‘*decent*’ non-liberal societies. According to Caney, Rawls’s theory centres around four key themes. The first separates the concept of a ‘people’ from that of a ‘state’ – but the two are clearly linked. Caney considers Rawls’s conception of states to be idiosyncratic – defining states as necessarily being entitled to (a) pursue their national interest no matter what its impact is on non-citizens and (b) treat their own subjects as they see fit. He goes on to say that states lack moral motives and are only concerned with their own power and wealth. (Rawls, 1999, cited in Caney, 2001)

Caney’s view is that neither (a) nor (b) is a defining feature of the ‘state’ as normally described. He suggests that, by contrast, it is possible to “make perfect sense of liberal reasonable tolerant states.” (Caney, 2001)

Caney goes on to assert that Rawls conflates ‘people’ with ‘state’ by saying that peoples have political institutions, governments and electoral systems and constitutions (Rawls, 1999, cited in Caney, 2001) and thus he defines Rawls’s position as affirming a ‘Society of morally respectable states.’ (Caney, 2001)

Caney then describes what he perceives as the second essential feature of Rawls’s position – being his splitting up of world society into five distinct types:

- a.) ‘liberal peoples’
- b.) ‘non-liberal decent peoples’
- c.) ‘outlaw states’
- d.) ‘societies burdened by unfavourable conditions’
- e.) ‘benevolent absolutisms’ (Caney, 2001)

Caney describes the third aspect of Rawls’s argument as being that:

“...fair principles are those that would be adopted by liberal and decent societies. Rawls defends this stipulation on the grounds that there are morally respectable forms of political society other than lib-

eral ones and they should be tolerated. It is thus quite wrong for egalitarian liberals to argue (in the manner suggested by the thinkers analysed in the first section) that their egalitarian principles of justice should govern the global economy.” (Caney, 2001)

Finally, Caney outlines the fourth part of Rawls's theory, which describes his proposed principles of international justice. According to Rawls, liberal and decent hierarchical societies would support the following:

- 1.) the freedom of peoples,
- 2.) keeping treaties,
- 3.) the equality of peoples,
- 4.) non-intervention,
- 5.) self-defence,
- 6.) human rights,
- 7.) principles of just warfare and
- 8.) 'a duty to assist' burdened societies. (Rawls, 1999, cited in Caney, 2001)

Caney draws out from this two principles which he deems to be particularly important in regard to international distributive justice – the first being that liberal and decent hierarchical societies are committed to (or see themselves as being committed to) human rights in general and this includes subsistence rights. The second principle is that liberal and hierarchical societies are obliged to help burdened societies develop into internally just regions. *But*, this duty of assistance does *not* necessarily need or imply the transfer of resources. Rawls's guidelines in regard to these duties appear to be rather vague:

- 1.) wealth is not essential for a well-ordered society
- 2.) a country's political culture is the most important thing
- 3.) the arguments *for* any assistance is that it enables societies to operate in a 'decent' fashion. (Rawls, 1999, cited in Caney, 2001)

Caney clearly respects Rawls's work in its breadth and suggestiveness, but proceeds to make some interesting criticisms of it. The first of these is that he regards as weak, Rawls's opposition to the 'principle cosmopolitan

claim' of a universal responsibility. He (Rawls) does not wish to foist liberal values on other societies who do not affirm these values. Caney demands more clarification from Rawls as to what clearly defines liberal and decent hierarchical societies and why they both represent morally acceptable forms of society. Why are such societies committed to some rights and not to others? What are Rawls's reasons for espousing *some* ideals (such as freedom of conscience) but not others (such as equality of opportunity)? Does Rawls's vagueness in these areas undermine his rejection of more thorough-going liberal cosmopolitan proposals? Caney thinks that it does.

Another point which Caney makes in his critique of Rawls, stresses the importance of liberal and decent hierarchical societies maintaining their stability and self-respect – if they don't do *more* to help other, less stable and well-off societies, are they not in danger of damaging their self-respect? Success, measured in terms of economic well-being is obviously a good and natural aim for *all* societies – therefore, Caney argues, Rawls should embrace egalitarian principles of global justice more than he does. As both Beitz and Pogge point out – societies are complex and are affected by international factors just as much, if not more than by national ones. Thus, Caney questions Rawls's insistence that the political structure of a given society is the main determinant of economic growth. It *could* of course be a dominant factor, when one considers issues of patriarchy, class and corruption in different societies – but, as Caney and other cosmopolitans argue – fair or unfair international aid and trade is also a key element.

Realism:

Caney finally turns to realist arguments against cosmopolitanism and against international distributive justice. The traditional view in realist and neo-realist approaches is simply that states serve their own interests at all costs and that is an inevitable and necessary part of 'the way things are'. What realists may lack in terms of ethical idealism – they make up for in hard-nosed cynicism and many agree that this, at the end of the day, is the way the world works and we should therefore pay attention to it and give less credence to egalitarian idealism. Caney draws out three clear re-

alist challenges to global justice in the contemporary literature:

- a.) human nature
- b.) the international system
- c.) consequentialist considerations

A: Human Nature:

We are all aware of the traditions of realist thinking in the history of political theory from political philosophers like Hobbes and on to contemporary writers who specify self-interest as being the *central* element in human nature. Caney notes the strong influence of Kenneth Waltz who explains international politics by reference to the selfish nature of human beings – and also more recent realist commentators and critics of cosmopolitanism like David Hendrickson and Danilo Zolo.

Caney argues that even if some of these negative claims about human nature are true – this does not mean that people cannot or should not aspire to improve themselves and the world. A deep-rooted sense of moral obligation, stemming (in Western political theory at least) largely from the political writings of Kant, clearly continues to influence Caney and other cosmopolitans.

B: The International System:

Waltz offers further challenges to cosmopolitanism by defending the so-called ‘third image perspective’ which sees world politics as a free for all struggle between different states in which they have no choice but to put the national interest first (Waltz, 1959, cited in Caney, 2001) thus echoing the English School Realism of such writers as Hedley Bull (“The Anarchical Society”) and Martin Wight (“Power Politics”). But Caney argues that both self-interest *and* altruism *are* possible in the behaviour of states and the evidence is there to prove it:

“States are able to devote part of their GNP to overseas aid, to admit the impoverished who wish to immigrate to their country, and to cooperate with other states in cancelling third world debt. It is therefore not plausible to reject cosmopolitanism on the grounds that the

international system *compels* states simply to further their national interest. Within the parameters set by the international system, states do have leeway and thus are able to further cosmopolitan ideals.” (Caney, 2001)

C: Consequentialist Considerations:

Even if some consequentialist programmes are deemed to be inefficient and badly executed (according to Krasner, 1992, and Zolo, 1997, cited in Caney, 2001) – then more effective policies for international distributive justice can be adopted which will have greater success – and so the cosmopolitan project continues. (Caney, 2001)

Caney brings to an end his review article: “International Distributive Justice” by concluding that none of the theories, which ostensibly oppose cosmopolitanism, do or can undermine its moral authority. It is within the totality of cosmopolitan moral theory and practical applications, that nationalist, communitarian and realist perspectives need to come to terms and to adapt. It is with *this* claim that David Miller primarily takes issue against. Caney summarizes his own arguments thus:

“(1)...first we have seen that underlying all the very different cosmopolitan theories there is a common claim and justificatory move, namely the contention that persons’ entitlements should not be determined by factors such as their nationality or citizenship.

(2)...second, an analysis of the literature suggests that the extent to which cosmopolitanism conflicts with the other perspectives should not be exaggerated. Nationalists, for example, make claims – like the ‘national duties’ thesis and the ‘allocation of duty’ thesis – that are quite consistent with cosmopolitanism. In addition, acceptance of nationalist concerns about viability does not undermine cosmopolitanism. The same points can be made about the relationship between

cosmopolitanism and realism. Indeed, as we have just seen, those realist critiques of humanitarian and 'idealistic' foreign policy which take a consequentialist form do not dispute the cosmopolitans' fundamental moral tenets. Furthermore, realist claims about human nature do not challenge cosmopolitan moral standards." (Caney, 2001)

As Caney notes, future research into what theoretical and practical directions international distributive justice should take is manifold with possibilities. Fairly recent (2006) moves on the part of the G8 nations, led at the time by Britain's Gordon Brown, to cancel some third world debt and to regulate environmental policies, immigration and humanitarian intervention are concrete results of arguments put forth by various theorists such as Bader; 1997, Black; 1991 and Barry and Goodin; 1992 (all cited in Caney, 2001).

Caney argues that although some important work combining empirical and theoretical explanations of the nature of global politics has already been done – he cites the work of Beitz, Brown, Barry and Pogge – there is always room for further research. How can aid be rendered more effective? How can sustainable development be more effectively achieved and monitored? How can the role, activities and legitimacy of institutions such as the WTO, IMF, UNICEF, UNESCO, ILO and the various other bodies of the UN be improved and developed? How can democratic structures reduce economic stagnation within non-democratic states? And so on.

Caney cites several important theorists who remain engaged with these problems such as: Sen, Held, Linklater, Beitz, O'Neill, Pogge and Singer. (Caney, 2001) He suggests that more research is needed into the practical improvement of international distributive justice – at state, regional and global levels. Can greater efforts to improve the efficiency of aid, sustainable development and the interaction between states, regions and NGOs be made? And so on. Caney concludes with an important reflection and proviso:

"A final area worth exploring concerns non-Western ethical traditions. The approaches discussed in this review all draw almost exclusively on 'Western' thinkers, whether they are Hobbes, Thucydides, Herder, Kant or Rawls. If, however, we wish to analyse global norms and principles of distributive justice then it is of vital importance to explore traditions of thought other than those prevalent in the West." (Caney, 2001)

Some cosmopolitans, communitarians and nationalists in the 'non-West' – be it in parts of Asia, Africa or South America would readily agree with this statement – but then so would many cosmopolitans (and perhaps some communitarians) in the West, both living and dead, such as Stuart Hall, J.J. Clarke, Fred Dallmayr, Edward Said and Peter Singer. What is at issue here is the need to pay due respect to non-Western forms of political philosophy and both religious and non-religious philosophical thought and to seek out areas of connection and agreement. Concluding his chapter on “Humanity and Humanization”, from his book: “Alternative Visions – Paths in the Global Village”, Fred Dallmayr cites a poignant Confucian source, revealing a ‘non-Western’ formulation of cosmopolitanism:

“In the Confucian tradition there is a passage by Chang Tsai (1020 – 1077) often called the ‘Western Inscription’. It is a passage that Tu Wei-Ming loves to quote – and which indeed deserves to be quoted and even memorized: ‘Heaven is my father and Earth is my mother, and even such a small creature as I finds an intimate place in their midst. Therefore that which fills the universe I regard as my body and that which directs the universe I consider as my nature. All people are my brothers and sisters, and all things are my companions.’” (Dallmayr, 1998)

Simon Caney’s analysis and overview of the importance and indeed, inevitability of cosmopolitan thinking in the area of international distributive justice (and in general arguments about Global Justice) is helping me to re-confirm my own conviction that Cosmopolitan Theory remains vitally important and is more able to evolve and adapt to human needs in our rapidly globalizing world. The resurgence of Nationalism and the experiments in Regionalism, which we are witnessing in various parts of the world, are destined to be contained and tempered by the necessity for peaceful co-existence, mutual growth, and wellbeing. In future research notes and articles I hope to provide further discussion and analysis of the Caney-Miller debate and also of the wider on-going debates of international distributive justice and Global Justice, among other key areas of Cosmopolitan Theory and to investigate further, comparative cosmopolitan approaches from various parts of the world.

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The Editorial Board accepted this article with reviews by referees on January 15, 2013.

