学内提案公募型研究推進プログラム

Theme

国際貿易、貿易政策と不法移民に関する一般均衡モデルの構築

執筆者
経済学部　教授

吉田　千里

Profile

専 門 分 野／理論経済学
研 究 テ ー マ／不法移民の意思決定
主な所属学会／日本経済学会、日本国際経済学会、
　　　　　　　The Econometric Society、IEFS Japan

Chisato Yoshida and Alan D. Woodland (Professor, Australian School of Business, The University of New South Wales) develop a general equilibrium two-country model of international trade in commodities in which immigration is restricted, thus providing the incentive for illegal immigration. Unlike the previous researches on illegal immigration, we explicitly consider decision making of potential illegal migrants based upon expected utility maximization. Thus, we allow for non-neutral risk preferences. To focus on the relations between international trade and il-legal immigration, we examined how border controls act on commodity trade and illegal immigration, and how unilateral and bilateral tariff reductions by the two countries affect trade and illegal immigration. We next show a summary of this research.

During the post World War II period, the world has witnessed a significant reduction in tariffs and other barriers to international trade in goods and services. This has been achieved primarily through multilateral reductions carried out through the World Trade Organization (and its predecessor, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) and through the more recent proliferations of customs unions and preferential trading arrangements between groups of countries. This increased freedom in international trade of goods and services has not been matched by the international movement of labour, for which substantial impediments continue to exist.

The European Union (EU), which became effective in 1994, had already established the free movement of goods and persons within the European Economic Community by the Schengen Agreement enacted in 1985. Since the agreement came into force in March 1995, member nations implement a common policy of the temporary entry of persons with the Schengen Visa, the unification of external border patrols and cross-border police cooperation. Of the 30 nations comprising the European Union, all except the United Kingdom, Ireland and three non-EU members (Iceland, Norway, and Switzerland) have signed the agreement, and it is currently implemented by 15 nation members. Border checks have been removed among countries in Schengen area. Thus, the EU provides for the free intra-union movement of labour.

However, there are impediments to the movement of labour between non-member and member nations. Hence, migrants from outside the Schengen area become illegal migrants if they enter the EU with no checks at the frontier. Also, migrants who stay in the EU with expired temporary visas become illegal aliens. An illegal immigrant may be defined as a person dwelling in a country with no official residence permit (Staring, 2000).

It has been estimated that there are approximately 4.5 to 8 million illegal migrants in the EU (Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 2007). Recently, illegal immigration from the so-called Mediterranean countries (such as Turkey, the Middle Eastern and North African countries) has increased. This trend is attributed to a large income gap between EU and the countries along the Mediterranean Sea: per capita gross domestic product in this region is roughly 10 percent of that in the EU. Hence, there is a strong incentive to illegally immigrate to the EU to earn higher income. Recently, French President Sarközy has proposed plan for a Mediterranean Union (including France, Spain, Portugal, Italy, Malta, Cyprus, Greece, Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Israel, Egypt, Libya, Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco) to curb illegal immigration toward EU from the Mediterranean countries by promoting free trade within member countries to reduce the regional income disparity.

In other regional agreements, internal movement of labour is restricted. For example, North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) between the United States (US), Canada and Mexico provided for the gradual elimination of tariffs and stimulation to trade and investment, but not for labour mobility. The disparity between incomes in the US and Mexico has resulted in a large body of illegal immigrants in the US.

Within this backdrop, our research is concerned with the interaction between tariff policy and illegal immigration. Tariff settings affect the real wages that illegal immigrants can attract and so have an influence on the amount of illegal immigration. Conversely, the existence of illegal immigrants can influence the effectiveness of changes in tariffs. So we propose a model of trade between two countries that have tariffs on trade and that experience illegal immigration and use this model to draw out the important interactions between tariff policy and illegal immigration.

References:

Nihon Keizai Shimbun (2007) EU, Chichukai shokoku to jiyuboueki-ken koso (in Japanese), 15 November.

Staring R (2000) International migration, undocumented immigrants and immigrant entrepreneurship. In: Rath J (ed) Immigrant business － The economic, political and social environment, Macmillan Press Ltd, Great Britain.

Our paper was presented in a book and two conferences as shown below:

1. Woodland, Alan D. and Chisato Yoshida, 2008, Trade Policy and Illegal Immigration, Kamihigashi Takashi and Laixun Zhao eds., International Trade and Economic Dynamics: Essays in Memory of Koji Shimomura (Springer, Heidelberg and New York), pp. 95-113.
2. Woodland, Alan D. and Chisato Yoshida, 2008, Trade Policy and Illegal Immigration, presented at The European Trade Study Group (ETSG) 10th Annual Conference, 12th September.
3. Woodland, Alan D. and Chisato Yoshida, 2008, Trade Policy and Illegal Immigration（日本国際経済学会関西支部研究会）、9月27日.