

The elite changes in Indonesia's Electoral Democracy: case study analysis of Tuban Regency, East Java

KURNIATY, Rika

Abstract

This article aims to critically discuss changes affecting the local elite in Indonesia in the age of decentralization and electoral democracy. After Suharto's authoritarian New Order collapsed in 1998, Indonesia entered a phase of reformation and democratization. Reform in Indonesia was marked by a decentralization program featuring the introduction of a direct election system. Scholars focusing on Indonesia's democratic development have tried to assess the character of democracy in Indonesia. Some influential scholars in their oligarchic theses maintained that a small group of wealthy people rooted in the New Order regime have continued to define politics in contemporary Indonesia. This paper attempts to show an argument differing from the oligarchic thesis by assessing whether changes in democratic institutions through direct elections (implemented in 2005 through Law No. 32 of 2004) have strengthened the oligarchy, or opened up opportunities for the rise of populist leaders. This study focuses on the Tuban Regency, in East Java as the selected case study. The result of this study confirms that direct elections in the Tuban Regency attested that the *pilkada* as a new institutional transformation has opened the door to prospective regional heads from various backgrounds and increased the opportunities for elite competition. The direct election of the regional head of Tuban made political conditions more dynamic and showed that the power of wealth was not always the main factor in candidates' victories.

Keywords: Democracy, Indonesia, Oligarchy, Tuban, Populist

1. Introduction

After 32 years under Suharto authoritarian regime, Indonesia finally experience reformation phase began in May 1998. Under President B.J. Habibie, the government established the basis for Indonesia's democratic transition and decentralization. In the New Order era, the government limited the number of political parties and controlled their activities¹⁾.

While in the reform period there were hundreds of political parties registered to the Ministry of Justice between 1998 and 1999, which 48 parties finally participated in the first democratic elections in 1999. Besides, Golkar Party (an acronym for Working Groups or functional groups) - a political tool to legitimize the power of President Suharto, can no longer easily get a seat in the legislature.

The military as one of the foundations of the New Order's power also experienced significant changes, due to the abolition of the dual function concept (which legitimized military involvement in social and political affairs) and the elimination of seat quotas for the military in parliament (Honna 2003; Sebastian 2006; Mietzner 2009; Manea & Born 2013). Another critical reform introduced by the Habibie government was broad regional autonomy²⁾, which was seen as one of the most radical transformations from centralism to decentralization, given its incredibly fundamental changes.

The decentralization policy shifts most of the political power to the municipality (*kotamadya*) and regency (*Kabupaten*), leaving the central government with fewer political and economic responsibilities than before. Concerning the great authority is given to the regions, decentralization has made the emergence of new autonomous regions or known as *pemerintahan daerah*. Back in the New Order era, there were only 26 provinces and 303 regencies, and in 2016 the number of provinces increased to 34 with 514 *kabupaten* and *kotamadya* (Statistics Indonesia 2016).

Indonesia's decentralization implemented through the enactment of Law Number 22 of 1999 concerning Regional Government and Law Number 25 of 1999 concerning Financial Balance between Central and Regional Governments. Both decentralization laws significantly changed the power of political decision making and financial resource transfer from the center to the regional government. The fundamental change can also be seen in strengthening the position of the Regional People's Representative Council (*Dewan Pimpinan Rakyat Daerah*, DPRD) when dealing with regional heads. The decentralization Law gave authority to the DPRD to elect regional heads and their representatives. The DPRD can also dismiss the regional head if the regional head has committed a violation or misuse of his/her authority. This arrangement made the position of the DPRD very powerful and no longer subordinated as during the New Order regime (Crouch 2010).

Although the concept of the decentralization Laws was very radical and revolutionary, the implementation of these regulations was more often colored by various problems (i.e., the tug of interest between the center and the regions; disputes between regions related to the management of various financial sources). Therefore there was the urge to revise the laws that came from various parties, especially the Ministry of Home Affairs (MOHA) and the Association of Indonesian Provincial Governments- both were parties that have lost many authorities due to the decentralization program. In response to the criticism, Law Number 32 of 2004 concerning Regional Government was established as the amendment of previous decentralization law. The introduction of direct election for executive government heads, including regional heads through *Pemilihan Kepala Daerah langsung (pilkada)* as mandated by law number 32 of 2004, completed the process of electoral liberalization in Indonesia. With *pilkada*, constituencies determine who will lead their local government institutions. Thus for the first time in Indonesia regents and mayors were directly elected

by the people thorough 2005 *pilkada*.

Furthermore, after more than three decades of Suharto's authoritarian leadership fell in 1998, scholars of Indonesian studies have tried to characterize the broad construction of contemporary Indonesian politics (Aspinall 2013). In the study of democracy and Indonesian politics, there is a debate between two prominent approaches namely: The structuralist approach that relies on "thesis of oligarchy" and works of literature that focus on agencies-also categorized as pluralists. The structuralist approach maintains that the structure of the elites of the state has not changed much during the Reformation Era. This structuralist approach has received many attentions in the study of contemporary Indonesia. ³⁾ Aspinall (2014) expresses that there is a kind of consensus in the literature analyzed the transition and consolidation of Indonesia democracy that the oligarchs with their wealth or material power control Indonesian politics. The thought of the oligarchy was shared by several prominent political scientists who had been involved in Indonesian studies for decades such as Jeffrey Winters, Richard Robison, and Vedi Hadiz. (Ford & Pepinsky 2014), states that in contemporary studies of Indonesian politics, the work of scholars supporting the oligarchic thesis is most widely cited and become references for understanding Indonesian politics. However, actor-centered scholars claim that there are gaps in the thesis of the oligarchy, especially the failure to recognize or theorize the role of mass mobilization and agency (Aspinall 2004; Buehler 2014, Liddle, 2014). In short, those actor-centered scholars challenge the oligarchy thesis.

This article shares the argument with the study of 'agency' or 'actor-centered approach' about Indonesian politics, especially at the local level. This study argues that institutional change, such as decentralization and regional elections, has created competition among elites. These included elites who had no place in the Suharto era. The *pilkada* as new institutional democracy has opened the door for the prospective regional heads from various backgrounds and increased political opportunities for populist and reformist leaders. This study, therefore, discusses the actual conditions and facts related to elite variation in the Indonesian democratization process, taking the case evidence of local democratic and political processes in Tuban Regency - East Java. The author selected Tuban regency because it has a distinctive political dynamic that lack attention from other works. The purpose of this study is to present a more balanced view of Indonesia's local political conditions. This study quests how the local political configuration and elite changes in Tuban in the age of reformation and democratization; and how the local elites adapt to the new Indonesia's democratic environment.

This article will be divided into five sections. Following this introduction, the second part is a brief discussion on previous studies on Indonesian local politics and two important approaches in Indonesian political study. The third part elaborated the elite configurations in Tuban after the Reformation, including analysis the case of Tuban riots that occurred after the first *pilkada* in 2006. The next section will discuss the *pilkada* in 2011 and the emergence of local leader that is considered more populist by the community. Before the concluding remarks, the fourth section will analyze the democratization and elite changes in Tuban with the theoretical approaches. This research paper will show that although oligarchs once dominated local politics in Tuban, in the course of the democratization process and direct

elections influential leaders with good abilities will be elected as regional heads.

2. Previous studies and approaches

The impact of the direct local election on the democratization of Indonesia was highly debated among scholars. Several studies have explored and highlighted the negative and positive aspects of the Indonesian democratization process. Some argue that old figures during the Suharto regime continued to dominate Indonesian politics (Winters 2011, Hadiz 2005; Sulaiman and van Klinken 2007; Bakti 2007; Aragon 2007; McDougall 2007; Schulte-Nordholt 2007; van Klinken 2007; McCarthy 2007; Hidayat 2007; Romli 2007; Mietzner 2009; Schiller 2009; Bühler 2009; Aspinall 2010). Some studies also conclude that money politics both in the conventional form through the provision of cash, or indirectly (material things other than money, such as t-shirts, groceries, worship clothes) are widespread in Indonesia. Electoral fraud, money politics, rent-seeking, and symbiosis of political business, have become endemic (Hidayat 2005, 2007, 2009; Lesmana 2007; Susanto 2007; Bunte 2009). Some argue that grassroots organizations from political parties have turned into political vehicles for local leader candidates (Pratikno 2009; Choi 2007, 2009). There is also patronage politics in the era of direct elections (Hadiz 2003; Schulte-Nordholt 2005; Sidel 2005). Besides, there are also studies that try to analyze the character of Indonesian local politics, such as the question of whether local elections have made Indonesian society more democratic and have given birth to a dynamic civil society (Romli 2006; Legowo 2005; Fitriyah 2005; Antlöv 2004).

The structuralist approach which depends on the oligarchy thesis maintains that the structure of the state elites has not changed much during the democratization Era. The oligarchic scholars highlighted the durability and continuity of the old elite and the oligarchic structure in the post-New Order government.⁴⁾ Although institutional reforms exist, democratic change remained superficial because the core structure of power remained unchanged (Chua 2008; Hadiz 2010; Robison & Hadiz 2004, 2014; Winters 2011, 2014). Oligarchy studies argued that in the Post Suharto era, Indonesia is still also influenced by the continuity of oligarchic structures and disproportionate influential actors who had superior material resources.

Moreover, Hadiz & Robison (2014) stated that their analysis on oligarchy focused on structural factors that gave rise to certain forms of political-business oligarchy, in particular about how state authority and bourgeois interests historically evolved, interacted, and became integrated during the New Order. They define oligarchy as a system of power relations that allows the concentration of wealth, authority, and its collective defense (Hadiz and Robison 2014, p.37). These oligarchs managed to hijack post-Suharto reforms and reorganized their interests. Robison, Hadiz, and Winters acknowledged that decentralization and new democratic institution have a real effect on oligarchic power, but for them, the influence of oligarchs cannot be reduced by competitive election processes. They contended that although after 1998 the free and fair elections increasingly grew, power continued to preserve a handful of wealthy people and the clientelist nature of Indonesian politics

In the contemporary Indonesian political studies, there are also adherents of an

actor-centered or agency approach. They view elites as crucial players in social and political change. The actor's approach does not entirely ignore the condition of the structural scope for elite analysis in society (Ford & Pepinsky 2014). However, actor-centered approaches differ from structuralists because they do not consider them to be the decisive and dominant factors for elite social composition and behavior.

Elites are described as different people from the masses because of their unique capacity or psychological character, not because of their social class or status. The actor-centered approach pays more attention to the significant role of political actors and individuals that can voluntarily and strategically influence and determine the nature of political structures.⁵⁾ The scholars contended that the policy change at a far higher level is the result of the elite actions, not determined by structure. The elite actions are the crucial explanatory variable in an actor-oriented analysis, while a structure may be the best variable that affects. In short, the actor-centered scholars share the same argument in positively appreciating the impact of democratic change on the behavior of political elites, increasing inter-elite competition, and empowering the electorates. Both approaches are the basis of the analysis in reviewing the democratization process in Tuban. The oligarchic approach has been able to answer the political picture in Tuban at the beginning of the implementation of reform and decentralization policies. Whereas after 2011, the agency approach explained how the local elite of reformers emerged with the power of resources that could defeat the oligarchs.


3. The case study of Tuban regency

3.1. A brief description of Tuban Regency

Tuban regency located on the North Coast of East Java. Tuban has around 1.2 million population lives in 20 sub-districts. Tuban Regency has a strategic location: on the border of East Java and Central Java Province which is crossed by Daendels National Road on the North Coast. Tuban Regency is bordered by Rembang in the west, Lamongan in the east, and Bojonegoro in the south. The government center of Tuban Regency is located 100 km northwest of Surabaya (the capital of the province of East) Java and 210 km east of Semarang (the provincial capital of Central Java). Therefore, in ancient times Tuban became the main port of the Majapahit Kingdom and became one of the centers for the spread of Islam by *Walisongo*.⁶⁾

The population of Tuban Regency is 1,315,155 people with the Muslim majority 98.74 percent, Protestants 0.61 percent, Catholics 0.48 percent, and the rest are divided into Buddhism, Hinduism, and Confucianism (Statistics of Tuban, 2017). Based on the cultural background category in East Java⁷⁾, Tuban is classified as the Mataraman culture (Geertz, 1960). Tuban regency still has a strong influence from the culture of the Kingdom of Mataram. The customs of the people in the Mataraman region are similar to those in Central Java, especially Yogyakarta and Surakarta. In this study, understanding the macro situation with its cultural and political background is expected to help analyze how the configuration of the elites and local political economy in Tuban. Besides, histories related to cultural and religious backgrounds and past political landscapes are also crucial in new political settings.

Map 1. Tuban Regency



Source: Tuban Central Bureau of Statistics (2017)

Before the Reformation, Tuban regency was widely known as a “gift” from the central government for military officers (where the Regent in Tuban was usually selected from the police officer).⁸⁾ Unlike the repressive treatment is given to political opponents, the New Order regime gave gifts to its supporters and followers. Suharto’s loyalist generals, national politicians, bureaucrats, also local elites obtained incentives ranging from formal political positions such as ministers, governors, parliamentarians, and ambassadors to positions on board of commissioners in state companies and enjoyed privileged access to business licenses and state protection (Crouch 2010). Recruitment of regents and mayors was deliberately given to bureaucratic and military officials. The regime controlled not only civil institutions in government but also military institutions. The last military officer became regent of Tuban was Lieutenant Colonel H. Hindarto from 1996 to 2001. This political configuration changed after the Reformation. The fall of Suharto opened the space for local politics to be more dynamic and competitive, particularly after the implementation of the *pilkada*. The section below will elaborate the elite configurations in Tuban regency from the beginning of the reform to the introduction of *pilkada*.

3.2. In the early period of reform

Although there were various political parties arose during the Reform, the politics in Tuban still related to the constellation of the three political parties that existed in the Suharto regime. In 1997 election, the Golkar Party as the dominant party received 67 percent of the vote, followed by the United Development Party (PPP) with 26.6 percent of votes,

and 4 percent obtained by the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI). With the end of the authoritarian regime, Golkar's domination also collapsed in the first free and fair 1999 elections⁹. Golkar only ranked in the third place with 18.2 percent of the votes. The PDI-P won the 1999 election, followed by the National Awakening Party (*Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa*, PKB).

Table 1. Party seats of 1999 in Tuban Regency

Political Parties	Seats in 1999-2004 periods
PDIP	14
PKB	11
Golkar and coalitions	8
PPP and coalitions	7 (2 PAN, 3 PPP, 1 PKP, and 1 PNU)
TNI Polri fractions	5
Total	45 seats

Source: processed from General Election Commission of Tuban Regency Data (2004)

Although Golkar party only obtained a few seats in the legislative, Haeny Relawati Rini Widyastuti as Golkar cadre succeeded in being elected as the chairwoman of the DPRD for the period 1999-2004. Haeny Relawati and Ali Hasan (her husband) later became a symbol of power and wealth in Tuban.¹⁰

Haeny began her political career in the Golkar party as chief of the women's works association (*Himpunan Wanita Karya: HWK*)¹¹ She later became deputy chairman of the Golkar Party's Regional Council in 1992. Haeny's political career began to increase when in reform-era she succeeded become chief of DPRD, defeating candidates from the party holding the majority seats of the DPRD in 1999 election.

However, many opinions stated that Haeny's success was due to her husband's role in lobbying other legislator members. Ali was an established businessman in Tuban. With the financial strength, he has a considerable influence on the political economy stage since the Suharto era. Ali was willing to negotiate with other parties to win Haeny to become the chairwoman of DPRD, including making bribes to legislative members before the voting day.¹²

From the pre-reform era, Ali was recognized as an entrepreneur that often provided gifts to government bureaucrats appointed by the central government.¹³ Providing gifts to appointed regents was Ali's strategy to get closer to selected regent so that he could easily obtain the government projects and regional economic resources. The strategy later changed with the introduction of the decentralization policy that transferred broad authority to the regional government at the regency /municipality level - the second level from the regional government, rather than the first level (province). Decentralization allows local governments to maintain the substantial income they collect, thus giving them greater independence and financial responsibility. Under decentralization, the authority over all matters is transferred to the regions, except for five main areas: defense and security, foreign policy,

fiscal and monetary affairs, judicial, and religious affairs. In short, the new decentralization policy fundamentally changed the relationship between the central and regional governments, changing the character of the Indonesian state (Aspinall & Fealy, 2003).

Additionally, the decentralization arrangement made the position of the DPRD very powerful, which it can elect or dismiss regional heads and their representatives. The position of chairman of the DPRD then became a promising position in local politics. Thus Ali made his wife as chairwoman of DPRD. They controlled the formal position and the configuration of local politics, which had led them to gain dominant power in Tuban.

3.3. The first female regent in East Java

The democratization and decentralization successfully quelled the power of Golkar as part of the New Order party. Even though Golkar was no longer a dominant party in legislative, in the 2001 Tuban regent elections, Golkar succeeded in winning Haeny for the period 2001-2006 with total 29 of the 44 legislative votes.

The Golkar had an effective strategy by making Soenoto, from PDIP party¹⁴⁾, to become deputy regent. The strategy was used to draw votes from the PDIP which obtained the majority votes in Tuban 1999 elections. Soenoto himself was a former prominent figure from the Indonesian National Party (PNI) of Tuban during Sukarno presidency. Soenoto's candidacy as the deputy regent of Haeny made tension in PDIP party. Go, Tjong Ping, as chairman of PDIP of Tuban, did not agree with the nomination. Tjong Ping refused Soenoto's candidacy because PDIP had already formed a coalition with the PKB party.¹⁵⁾

In 2001 election, Haeny's competitors were only Slamet Susilo and Noor Nahar Hussein. The pair was supported by two major parties (PKB 11 seats and PDIP 14 seats). Before the election, with the total votes held by the coalition, Susilo and Noor were optimistic about being elected in the DPRD plenary session. They estimated that they had more than half of the legislative votes (with the largest mass base in Tuban: nationalists represented by PDIP and the religious-based masses represented by PKB). However, the result was beyond PKB and PDIP predictions. Haeny with Golkar's minority voice in the DPRD managed to win the contestation. Subsequently, in 2001 in Indonesia's political history, Haeny became the first head female regent in East Java.¹⁶⁾ During the New Order era, it was quite impossible for a woman to have some government office.

After the vote count completed, and Haeny's victory was announced and heard by the public, most of Susilo and Noor's supporters objected the results. They refused and accused Haeny of using money politics. Some even refer to her as the reincarnation of the New Order which was not feasible to lead a reformist government. Slamet and Noor supporters acted brutally. They pelted the regional council building and destroyed various public facilities. However, demands and accusations from the public did not discourage Haeny from becoming the first female regent in Tuban. The explanation of Haeny's victory case is following Crouch's study that payments were routinely made to DPRD members in the regional head election. In many cases, rumors of 'money politics' arise when successful candidates were not from parties that hold the most seats in the assembly. Blatant vote-buying become so ubiquitous that it had begun to undermine the legitimacy of Indonesia's new democracy (Crouch 2010, p. 112).

Furthermore, Tuban political configuration began to change when the regional election commission announced 24 political parties that were eligible to participate in the 2004 legislative contest.

Figure 1. Political parties participating in the 2004



Source: General Election Commission of Tuban regency (2004)

With Haeny's post as a regent, Golkar won back the legislative election (with 28.5 percent votes), followed by PKB (with 21.9 percent votes), and PDI-P (with 21.7 percent votes). Referring to the results of the 2004 Legislative Election, it appears that Tuban was a place where various parties compete with each other. Although the number of parties competing in the 2004 legislative elections was quite large, these parties were only divided into two ideological camps (Islam and Nationalists). Local political competition in Tuban can be concluded as a competition between Golkar, PDIP, and PKB which has many muslim supporters from *Nahdhatul Ulama* (NU) ¹⁷Its adherents are commonly called *Nahdliyin*.

In short, in this early reform stage, Haeny and the Golkar party dominated the position of the local executive and legislature. Haeny as regent also held the position as general chairman of Tuban Golkar party. So it was difficult to carry out the control/supervision function of the legislature for government executive activities in Tuban.

3.4. The first direct *pilkada* and riots in Tuban

Many criticisms regarding the local chief executive election by DPRD made the system worked only until 2004. The government replaced the 1999 decentralization rules through Law Number 32 of 2004 concerning Regional Government that introduces the new *pilkada* system. The first *pilkada* was held in Tuban in 2006, where Haeny as an incumbent competed again for the second period. With great power in the legislature and executive, in this contestation Golkar confident enough to nominate both regent and deputy regent candidates from the Golkar cadres.

Like the previous 2001 election, there were only two pair candidates in this 2006 election: Haeny Relawati-Lili Soehardjono (HeLi) and Noor Nahar Hoesin-Go Tjong Ping (NonStop). HeLi was supported by the Golkar party and a coalition of 21 political parties, while NonStop was supported by two major political parties (PDIP and PKB).

The contender of the incumbent, Noor, was the chairman of the Tanfidziyah Management of NU Tuban. He employed PKB as political vehicles under Gus Dur's leadership. At that time, PKB was experiencing conflict between its cadres (Muhaimin Iskandar versus Choirul

Anam's camp).¹⁸⁾ Realizing there was a difficulty within internal PKB, Haeny then exploited the situation. She mobilized support through politicians and Kyai that opposed Gus Dur's Camp.

The candidate of Noor's deputy-regent was Tjong Ping, the Chairperson of the PDIP of Tuban. He actually wanted to be a regent. Nevertheless, he realized that as an Indonesian citizen of Chinese descent, he would be easy targets for anti-Chinese issues. One of Noor and Tjong Ping's campaign team admitted that racial problems were still unavoidable. There was a black campaign circulating in the Tuban community not to elect Chinese to become a leader, considering that during Suharto era many strategic economic fields monopolized by Chinese entrepreneurs, this black campaign influenced some people in the grassroots (Utomo 2006).¹⁹⁾

Furthermore, Haeny's candidacy for the second period become a public debate. The public perception of incumbents is usually access to all networks and the tendency to abuse power. This condition was most likely occurred in Tuban, given that incumbents have direct access to local policy and budgeting processes. The incumbent can encourage budget allocation and disbursement to their advantage. Also, incumbents could get certain political benefits from policies and programs during their tenure. Also, they can influence the bureaucracy and get more attention from the mass media. Incumbents also benefit from their position to establish personal patronage networks and collaboration with the business community, mass media, religious leaders, local politicians, NGOs and mass-based organizations (Sulistiyanto 2009; Schiller 2009; Ratnawati 2009; Hidayat 2009).

Like the incumbent study conducted in several regions in Indonesia²⁰⁾, the results of the author's interview with some activists and the Tuban communities have shown that Haeny also exploited her position as the incumbent of the regent. Haeny maintained civilian power with a strategy of establishing good relations with the community, including the Islamic boarding school (*pesantren*). Besides, Haeny also maintained relations with journalists by improving their welfare (providing and giving money prizes). Until it was challenging for someone to find a critical journalist who evaluates the course of Tuban government (Utomo, 2006). Haeny also often provided program assistance to local Non-Government Organizations (NGOs) to create 'community participation' as part of the political strategies.

As an incumbent regent who had control over all the bureaucratic lines in Tuban, Haeny forced the sub-district heads and village heads to win her again. One of Haeny and Golkar's strategies was to instruct the sub-district head and village head to collect many votes. If the target vote was not fulfilled, then the village head will be moved to a 'dry' position.²¹⁾ The election took place with promises and great rewards for the campaign team that managed to mobilize the masses.

Although Haeny's nomination was considered superior, political support for Noor-Tjong Ping was also high. The local Election Commission announced the results of the election on May 3, 2006, with Haeny winning 51.75 percent, while Noor received 48.25 percent.

Figure 2. The Election Results of *Pilkada* 2006 in Tuban

No	District	Total Voters	Total Votes obtained		Valid	Invalid
			HELI	NONSTOP		
1	Tuban	60,754	14,902	31,814	46,716	1,789
2	Merakurak	41,082	10,491	22,250	32,741	1,218
3	Kerek	50,221	19,870	16,762	36,632	1,711
4	Montong	38,741	14,384	15,283	29,667	1,049
5	Palang	57,267	17,049	26,521	43,570	1,074
6	Plumpang	56,870	18,384	21,739	40,123	1,082
7	Widang	35,732	14,093	12,119	26,212	651
8	Semanding	72,825	19,125	34,654	53,779	1,675
9	Rengel	43,545	17,790	14,047	31,837	1,018
10	Soko	60,673	31,520	15,253	46,773	1,229
11	Parengan	40,100	23,445	7,431	30,876	846
12	Singgahan	29,157	13,814	7,325	21,139	899
13	Senori	29,510	15,748	5,372	21,120	803
14	Bangilan	33,306	15,904	7,057	22,961	855
15	Kenduruan	20,618	11,410	3,884	15,294	551
16	Jenu	36,660	8,207	20,234	28,441	746
17	Tambakboyo	29,147	9,834	12,698	22,532	1,062
18	Bancar	42,454	18,093	15,534	33,627	1,505
19	Jatirogo	40,375	20,475	8,949	29,424	1,668
20	Grabagan	27,477	13,267	6,634	19,901	529
Total		846,514	327,805	305,560	633,365	21,960

Source: Tuban regency Election commission (2006)

The slight margin of victory caused disappointment and skepticism towards the incumbent. The election witnesses from Noor-Tjong Ping's camp refused to sign last vote reconciliation at the general election commission office. Noor supporters protested the results of the *pilkada*, and resulted in riots. They gathered in front of the election commission office until late at night (Merdeka 6 May 2006). Noor's supporters considered that there were many frauds in the election. The next day, around 30,000 Noor supporters gathered again in front election commission office and delivered their objections (Radar Surabaya 30 April 2006). One of the criticized issues was the re-election without a transparent voter list-*Daftar Pemilih Tetap* (DPT).

The protester's aspirations were not accepted by the Tuban the commission, so they finally forced their way into the office which was guarded by the police. There was a dispute between the police and the demonstrators. Finally, the demonstrators made it into the commission office by crashing into a police's barricade with a large truck, then destroying

and burning down the office (detikNews 29 April 2006).

The protested masses called themselves as the '*Aliansi Masyarakat Tuban Peduli Pilkada* or The alliance of Tuban community for *pilkada*.' They wanted the cancellation of the election results and asked the regent to resign from her post. The demonstration then continued in front of the Regent's office and the Tuban local government office square.

However, the claim received no response. The demonstrators continued their anarchic action at *Pendopo Krido Manunggal*, the official residence of the regent, and five other buildings, such as the state-run cooperative building, PKK building (women's organization building), guesthouse of Pertiwi Dharma building (Jawa Post 30 April 2006). Haeny's private home and family were also not spared from mass anger (Kompas 30 April 2006). The masses damaged and burned many regent's assets, such as a mansion that stood on an area of about 10 hectares, Mustika Hotel, warehouse 99, several gas stations belonging to the regent, and the Golkar Party office on Jalan Basuki Rahmat (Merdeka 29 April 2006).

The police arrested people suspected of being provocateurs and involved in the incident. The police detained and assigned 41 people as suspects. The police investigated the alleged presence of actors who financed the riots (Merdeka 6 May 2006). The author had the opportunity to interview several people who became suspects and had been jailed for the incident, including Tjong Ping as deputy regent candidate. Tjong Ping was jailed for allegedly being a provocateur and mastermind of the riots. However, during the interview, Tjong Ping and some activists rejected the accusation. They assume that the main factors driving violence were disappointment, and skepticism towards the government. The burning of several regional command assets and the regent's house also seemed strange because the tools used by disappointed demonstrators could not have had such an enormous impact. They move spontaneously and only use simple tools at the time. The demonstrators later were directed to some planned places that were ready to be burned when they arrived at the place a big fire suddenly happened. Fires that are not possible by using only simple tools, it seems that there was a 'free rider' in the incident.²²⁾

From the case of the Tuban regional election, it can be reviewed that riot was ridden by groups that rejected Haeny, as well as economic interests. Tuban community was disappointed because Haeny exploits these government projects for personal wealth accumulation. Haeny and Ali monopolized almost all strategic economic sectors. The combination of political rulers and elite business in one family was the formation and portrait of political and economic leadership in Tuban. During Haeny's reign, Haeny's husband monopolized the government's strategic projects. Especially projects related to infrastructure development such as highways and building construction (Utomo, 2006). In Indonesia, government infrastructure projects are the most easily corrupted works. Because of the high project prices, and the general public does not know how the standards and values/prices of these projects. Besides, Ali and Haeny often converted the government land into their family's private property. Some strategic buildings and land assets in the downtown area were converted into their own and acquired into private property (Utomo 2006). In the case of government project monopoly and local resource exploitation, the regional legislative assembly could solve nothing because the Golkar party dictated the Tuban legislature. In discussions and negotiations with members of the Tuban regional legislative council, Haeny became

dominant because of the support of her husband who had extraordinary wealth. From the report on the wealth of state officials of the Corruption Eradication Commission (LHKPN-KPK), Haeny assets experienced an enormously increase from 1999 to 2011.²³⁾

The DPRD members had also received considerable money from Haeny. The distribution of money was not only done 'under-table' but also in public to show the strength possessed by Haeny.²⁴⁾ From the pre-reform era, Haeny's husband was famous as an entrepreneur who often gave gifts (luxury houses or cars) to government bureaucrats who were serving at the time to build proximity.²⁵⁾ It was impossible for new entrepreneurs to enter because the Haeny family monopolized almost all business sectors.

It can be concluded that, despite public dissatisfaction with Haeny and Ali's dominance, there was almost no room left to challenge Tuban's political oligarchy. The formation of the political power in Tuban reflects oligarchic politics where power was held by a handful of very wealthy people who take advantage of the government. The DPRD does not play a significant role, because the Golkar Party was the most prominent political engine power for the oligarchic power.

3.5. *Pilkada* 2011: the fall of entrenched power

In 2011 Tuban regency held the second *pilkada*. Having a bitter experience in the 2006 *pilkada*, the community became enthusiastic about welcoming the 2011 democracy event. After was ten years under the leadership of Haeny and Golkar party, the Tuban community already required the change and welfare improvements (Utomo 2006). Many people were interested in participating or being nominated as new leader of Tuban. The candidates come from various professions (doctors, entrepreneurs, lecturers or teachers, civil servants, and regional legislators). Overall, the candidates who participated in the Tuban regional election in 2011 were six pairs.

Table 2. Total votes of Direct Election Results in Tuban 2011

No	Name of Regent and deputy regent candidates	Total Votes	Percentage
1	Mochamad Chamim Amir -Drs. Ashadi Soeprapto	6,744	0.99
2	Kristiawan, SP, MM-Dra.Hj.Haeny Relawati Rini Widyastuti, M.Si	207,894	30.66
3	H.Muhammad Anwar-Tulus Setyo Utomo, S.Sos	39,504	5.83
4	H. Fatkhul Huda -Ir. H. Noor Nahar Hussein, MSi	374,147	55.18
5	H.Setiadjit, SH-Dr.H.Bambang Suhariyant	44,854	6.61
6	Dr.Bambang Lukmantono, SH, MM- Edy Toyibi, S.Pd, SH	4,928	0.73
Total Votes for all candidates		678,071	
Invalid number of votes		14,601	

Source: Processed by the author from the General Election Commission data (2011)

The Golkar Party nominated the chairman of the DPRD Tuban, Kristiawan, as a candidate with Haeny (the incumbent) as deputy regent. Haeny, as the incumbent of the Tuban regent,

also participated in the contestation, but as a candidate for deputy regent. Haeny was unable to re-nominate to be a regent because she had been in the office for two consecutive periods. There are restrictions regarding the nomination of the regional head that contained in the article of Law No. 32 of 2004.²⁶⁾ Haeny realized a gap in the article so that she ran for the deputy regent candidate. She wanted the power to remain in her hands and proposed candidates that could be controlled. With a strategic position as chairman of the Golkar Party's regional council and incumbent regent, Haeny easily determined who was appointed to advance as a candidate for regent in the elections. The nomination of the incumbent (for two periods) in this contest became controversial in the Tuban community.²⁷⁾

Haeny's motive for running for deputy regent in the 2011 election was to keep control of politics and economics in Tuban. Candidates for regent will become like 'puppets' because the regent candidate was Haeny people as well. The power would remain in Haeny's hands as deputy regent. Besides, the nomination of Haeny aimed to maintain and secure her wealth. Also ensuring wealth and power for her family members, and guarantee the control of political parties in Tuban for them.²⁸⁾

In the end, the 2011 election won by Huda and Noor (supported by PKB, PPP, Gerindra and PBB parties). Tuban community considered Huda's victory to replace Haeny was a victory against the arrogance of political oligarchs. The people of Tuban were already saturated with political conditions that have not brought changes to their welfare. (Hidayati 2010). Huda succeeded in all districts, even the districts of South Tuban which had been the base of loyal supporters of the incumbent (such as Senori, Bangilan, Jatirogo, Kenduruan, Parengan, Soko and Grabagan). Haeny's defeat as an incumbent in this election shows that the people of Tuban have wanted change. It was found in many sub-districts that people were willing to sacrifice their time and energy to support Huda. Farm laborers, civil servants, private employees, traders and entrepreneurs all work together to prevent support for incumbents (Hidayati 2010). Among the candidates, Huda and Noor were considered to be able to defeat the incumbent.

Huda was a new face in Tuban politics, but he was known as an Islamic religious teacher or *Kiai*²⁹⁾ and an entrepreneur close to the community. Huda was very active in social and religious activities in Tuban, and often holds social community events (such as providing assistance and helping the poor), holding and leading Islamic public studies for Tuban community and government employees, also known for always supporting orphans (Muna 2013). Huda was also gravely concerned with the construction of public facilities for the community, such as setting up local hospitals, establishing health schools, and built a free school for in need people. These social and religious activities made Huda known by Tuban people as potential leaders close to the community (Muna, 2013).

The idea of nominating the *Kiai* was initiated by a meeting of PKB leaders and *Kiai* from the most significant mass organization in Indonesia, *Nadhatul Ulama* (NU), and the PKB party. For historical reasons, Tuban is one of the places for the spread of Islam on the island of Java. Tuban people name their regency as *Bumi Wali*³⁰⁾ or the 'Earth Guardian,' so there was a thought to bring the regent from the 'white,' group or the *Kiai*. Ahead of the Tuban Regional Election in 2011, Huda's name came to the surface as a candidate deserved to be a regent.

Both Huda and Noor have a strong relation with NU. Huda was the former chairman of the NU branch of Tuban, and Noor also an NU cadre. As *Kiai*, Huda did not become interested in joining the political contestation. However, finally, in 2011 he decided to run for the election. Huda stated that everything he did was purely concerned with seeing the condition of Tuban, and he wanted to be someone who was beneficial to society. Huda has held the principle of Islamic life that the best humans are human beings who benefit society.³¹⁾

During the meeting of PKB and NU, All participants agreed that NU must have candidates to partake in the 2011 elections. NU considered participation in politics to be very important because of the belief they held that 'a piece of power is more meaningful than a myriad of gold.' This consideration has something to do with local income and expenditure budgets that have been widely abused by Haeny's regime.³²⁾

PKB and NU finally decided to submit Huda and Noor as a pair candidate, yet Huda was still refused to be nominated. Then, Noor was determined to be a regent candidate with Nasrudin Ali (Huda's brother) as the deputy regent. However, Noor submitted a statement that if later Huda was willing to be nominated as regent, Noor will voluntarily withdraw from the nomination. The sentences below are the rough translation of author interview with the deputy regent.

"[...] When everyone was pessimistic because Mr. Huda did not want to be nominated, we all then asked that one of Mr.Huda's family must run to become a deputy regent candidate. Finally, Nasruddin Ali agreed (Mr. Huda's younger brother) to be nominated as my deputy candidate. Even my duet with Mr, Nasruddin as candidates for regents and deputy regent candidates has been socialized to the Tuban community for almost a month, Mr. Huda himself witnessed this socialization before he left for the pilgrimage to the Muslim Holy Land (Mecca). Finally, Mr. Huda was willing to take part in the nomination.." (Noor Nahar Hussein, 2018).³³⁾

Furthermore, the period of registration of candidates in Tuban regional elections in 2011 coincided with the month of Hajj in Islam. Huda went to Saudi Arabia to perform the Hajj. In the Hajj process, Huda implied that he was ready to become a regent candidate. Although still accompanied by doubt, Huda still requested that the regent registration documents be prepared. Until the last moment, before the regional election commission closed the registration period, the certainty of Huda's nomination was still questionable. Finally, after having thoughtful consideration, Huda wholeheartedly agreed to be nominated as regent. Huda advanced his schedule of returning to Indonesia.

With the availability of Huda nomination, the political constellation considerably changed to Huda as a candidate for regent and Noor as his deputy. PKB central board directors quickly changed the recommendations from Noor to Huda nominations. Likewise, the PPP party also immediately changed the party's recommendations for Huda. Nashruddin as deputy regent candidate was also ready to withdraw from the 2011 elections candidacy.

After Huda officially registered as a candidate for regent in the election commission, PKB and the coalition formed a campaign team. Huda's victory strategy was to form several groups that have their respective duties. Some of these groups were the campaign team from the parties, the rainbow team (consisting of several elements of society), the red team or *Abang/ Merah* as representatives of the Muhammadiyah mass organization, and the

green team as a representation of the NU mass organization. One of the tasks of the campaign teams was to inventory sub-districts whose people wanted a change in the political economy in Tuban. The strategy was to mobilize people from all sub-district in Tuban, so the power of Huda was built from the grassroots community. The team worked very hard, knowing that what they were fighting was an oligarchy that had long been entrenched in Tuban.³⁴⁾ Finally, the hard work of the campaign team of various elements in Tuban produced encouraging evidence for the people of Tuban.

In just a week before the official resignation, Haeny inaugurated 119 echelon IV Tuban government officials and four Village leaders. Haeny's action invited controversy from the community. The inauguration and the changing of formal arrangements when the authority was about to end, create various speculations about Haeny's policy as part of an effort to secure the future position of Haeny loyalists (Detiknews 6 June 2011). The policy was also part of reciprocation event for those who in the previous elections had assisted Haeny's campaign. Even though the inauguration policy did not against the rules, the community considered it was full of political motives (Detiknews 6 June 2011).

4. Tuban case analysis to the approaches

From the case study in Tuban, we can identify that at the beginning of the fall of the New Order authoritarian in Indonesia, the old local elite and the Golkar party suffered a severe collapse. However, the old forces could rise again in a short time. It was evidenced by the victory of Haeny as a Golkar cadre became the DPRD head in the 1999 elections.

For Tuban conditions at the beginning of the Reformation, the author agrees with oligarchical scholars that highlighted the durability and continuity of the old elite and the oligarchic structure in the post-New Order government. In the Post Suharto era, Tuban was still also influenced by the continuity of oligarchic structures and disproportionate influential actors who had superior material resources. The formal structure of electoral democracy can coexist with oligarchic power, that democratization has reduced the form of Indonesian politics without getting rid of oligarchic power (Hadiz & Robison 2014). The policy of decentralization and electoral democracy that is very different from the Suharto era has created a new arena for power struggles. New local elites of reformers and new political parties have emerged, but they have been absorbed quickly in the politics of oligarchy that has long existed. At the beginning of institutional reforms, such as the introduction of freedom of elections, decentralization of power, and party system reforms were used by local elites who in the Suharto era did not get a chance. "Small kings" rigged the rules of the game and formed a collusive network that prevented the social forces from gaining access to the local political system (Hadiz 2011). The structural approach views that individuals are powerless against imperative structural (Hadiz & Robison 2014). The collapse of the New Order and the existence of reforms have made it necessary for individuals to accommodate the logic of existing structures.

Not much different from the national level, Tuban political economy conditions at the beginning of the 1999 reform until 2011 were also oligarchic under Haeny family's authoritarian. Haeny's patronage was similar to the authoritarian Suharto era at the national

level that dominated both the executive and legislative government. Haeny with the Golkar party as the vehicle almost completely controlled the local politics and state institution. Haeny and her family also utilized power to increase personal wealth. The structure was similar to that study of Dhakidae (2014) which the cycle of the super wealthy is becoming a ruler: utilizing politics to become super rich, and utilizing wealth to achieve political power. After about two decades of reform and decentralization implementation in Indonesia, the author argues that there might be significant changes towards the positive political environment in Indonesian local politics, especially in Tuban regency. *Pilkada* and the dynamics of contemporary Indonesian politics have made competition between local elites. The actor-centered approach, therefore, could explain the further development of Tuban local politics, where the competition of the local elite in Tuban succeeded in defeating the oligarchic domination of the incumbent regent with her material strength. Besides, the elites accepted the demands of an increasingly rational society so that there must be changes inevitably. Democratic change has an impact on the behavior of political elites, increasing inter-elite competition, and empowering the constituencies.

5. Conclusion

Since the New Order collapsed in 1998 scholars, have tried to define the forms of contemporary Indonesian politics. These studies centered around the question of whether the leaders of the old regime continued to dominate politics or whether groups marginalized during the dictatorship had the opportunity that did not exist before. Political decentralization and the new *pilkada* system generally provided equal opportunities for various types of social interests which were previously in the center of Suharto's New Order to assert their power at the local level.

Among the various results of the democratic process in Indonesia, the experience of Tuban regency shows unique political dynamics. At the beginning of the reform, the New Order party and the old elite powers had fallen. However, the 'oligarchic' elites that had been built since the days of President Suharto could rise quickly and survive to adapt to the new democratic system when central authority was almost entirely left to the regional government. The great authority of the DPRD can be taken over easily through the conventional strategy of money politics as the primary weapon.

Then the situation changed when the new institution of democracy-*pilkada* was put in place. *Pilkada* causes competition among local elites to become increasingly tight. The strength of wealth or material cannot guaranty a regent candidate or incumbent to gain a victory. In the case of Tuban, Haeny with Golkar's support and wealth experienced lost in the *pilkada* contestation. The oligarchy approach failed to explain some phenomena of local politics in Indonesia, as in the case of Tuban, Haeny with extraordinary wealth could be defeated by organized groups of society supported Huda. The agency approach might explain Tuban's condition with its claim that state-community relations in Indonesia are changing: that individual decision makers are the significant drivers of this change because classes cannot defeat and deny individual capacity for autonomous choice. In short, at the Tuban case, decentralization of power might facilitate the emergence of a reformist leader.

Notes

- 1) During New Order era only three political parties were allowed to exist as proof of ornaments that Indonesia was not a one-party state, namely: government-owned party, Golkar; the Indonesian Unity Party (PPP); and the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI).
- 2) Political demand for decentralization arose because the centralized government under Sukarno and Suharto did not share politics and the economy equitably. The excessive centralization of the New Order had become a significant complaint in the region. Not only are regional social, political and economic activities strictly regulated and controlled by the central government in Jakarta, Jakarta also takes most of the region's wealth. Regional aspirations for decentralization emerged and expanded.
- 3) To discuss the structural approach as a framework for analyzing contemporary Indonesian politics, in 2012, Indonesian political and economic-political scholars (Among them were Vedi Hadiz, Jeffrey Winters, Edward Aspinall, and Thomas Pepinsky) held workshops at the University of Sydney, Australia. The results of the workshop were then published in 2014 with the book title `Beyond oligarchy: wealth, power, and contemporary Indonesian politics
- 4) For more detail information on the oligarchy thesis, see Richard Robison and Vedi R. Hadiz. 2004. *Reorganizing Power in Indonesia: The Politics of Oligarchy in Age of Markets*. Also *The Political Economy of oligarchy and the reorganization of power in Indonesia*. In *Beyond oligarchy: Wealth, Power, and Contemporary Indonesian Politics*. Pp. 35-56; Jeffrey Winters. 2011. *Oligarchy*. *Oligarchy and Democracy in Indonesia*. In *Beyond oligarchy: Wealth, Power, and Contemporary Indonesian Politics*. pp. 11-34
- 5) See for example Buehler M. 2014. *Elite Competition and Changing State-Society Relations: Shari'a Policymaking in Indonesia*; Aspinall E. 2014. *Popular Agency and Interest in Indonesia's democratic transition and consolidation*.
- 6) *Walisongo* is a symbol of the spread of Islam in Java, which began in the 14th century. They live in three critical areas on the north coast of Java. Hindu and Buddhist domination ended in Indonesia with the *Walisongo* era, replaced by Islamic culture.
- 7) East Java regions have different cultures with their respective characters. The political configuration in East Java cannot be separated from the cultural identity inherent in society (Sutarto, 2008). The area of East Java is divided into several *tlatah*/ traditional culture places, mainly: *Mataraman* culture, *Arek* culture, and *Pendalungan* culture (including Madura)
- 8) Interview with MA, a government bureaucrat in Tuban, on 14 August 2017.
- 9) The General Elections of the People's Legislative Assembly and the 1999 Regional People's Legislative Assembly were held simultaneously throughout Indonesia for the period 1999-2004. The General Election was supposed to be held in 2002, but at the urging of the public to carry out reforms and replace legislative members relating to the New Order, the general election was accelerated from 2002 to 1999.
- 10) Keluarga Haeny, Mantan Bupati Tuban, dan Kisah Istana Pribadinya. Available at: <https://www.jpnn.com/news/keluarga-haeny-mantan-bupati-tuban-dan-kisah-istana-pribadinya-2-habis>, 08 August 2011, (accessed 21 May 2017).
- 11) HWK is a part of the organization of the Golkar party which was established on February 28, 1981, as a manifestation of the determination of Golkar women's cadres. The primary objective is to formulate a forum for improving the quality of female cadres (as development cadres and organizational cadres).
- 12) Interview with one of the former legislative member of Tuban from PDIP party, 18 February 2018.

- 13) Interview with MA, 14 August 2017.
- 14) PDIP is an abbreviation of *Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan*, or Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle, led by former Indonesian president, Megawati. PDIP was a “fragment” from one of the parties in the New Order era, namely the Indonesian Democratic Party.
- 15) Interview with Go Tjong Ping, the former chairman of PDIP Tuban and deputy regent candidate in *pilkada* 2006. 05 December 2017.
- 16) For more information, see, *Bupati Perempuan Pertama di Jatim*. Available at: <https://tokoh.id/biografi/2-direktori/bupati-perempuan-pertama-di-jatim/>. Accessed 20 Dec 2017
- 17) *Nahdlatul Ulama* (NU) is the largest Islamic community organization in Indonesia. It is a revival of traditional religious scholars and teachers.
- 18) The PKB conflict began in 2008 when the chairman of the highest council of PKB, former Indonesia president-Abdurahman Wahid (Gus Dur) dismissed the executive chairman and secretary general of PKB (Muhaimin Iskandar and Lukman Edy). Muhaimin and Edy then filed a lawsuit to the South Jakarta District Court. The court granted the claim and determined that the dismissal was contrary to the PKB constitution (Kompas, 2008). At the local level, the conflict made two PKB camps, namely Gus Dur Camp and Muhaimin Camp.
- 19) China's racial issues have long existed in Indonesia. There is social jealousy from indigenous Indonesians because, in the Dutch colonial era, ethnic Chinese were given more positions than the natives. Suharto in the authoritarian era also built a close economic coalition with ethnic Chinese businessman (Chua, 2008).
- 20) See for example Erb, Maribeth, and Sulistiyanto, Priyambudi (eds.) (2009) *Deepening Democracy in Indonesia? Direct Elections for Local Leaders (Pilkada)*. Singapore: ISEAS Publishing.
- 21) Interview with MA, 14 August 2017.
- 22) Interview with MA, 14 August 2017 and Tjong Ping, 05 December 2017.
- 23) For more detail on Haeny's assets, see KPK homepage at <https://elhkpn.kpk.go.id>.
- 24) Interview with Tjong Ping, 20 December 2017.
- 25) Interview with MA, 14 August 2017.
- 26) Restrictions regarding the nomination of the regional head are contained in Law No. 32 of 2004 concerning Regional Government. Article 58 letter o confirms that candidates for regional head must fulfill the requirements, among others: have never served as regional head for two terms in the same position. Therefore, leaders in Indonesia at both national and regional levels can only serve two terms of office.
- 27) Some people argue that the spirit of limiting the two regent's tenure in Law No. 32 of 2004 which later amended by Law No. 12 of 2008 has been violated. Because in the middle of the term of office, the deputy regent can replace the regent. So that means there was a chance that Haeny would occupy the same seat for three periods.
- 28) Interview with MY, an activist and legislature member of Tuban, 18 March 2018.
- 29) Kiai refer to Islamic religious teacher and leader
- 30) The cultural identity of the *Bumi Wali* city brand attached to Tuban is because the majority of the population embraces a devout Islam and the existence of more than hundred grave sites of saints. There are also other characteristics that support the symbol of dignity, such as the establishment of Islamic institutions (Islamic boarding schools, mosques, and free Islamic school) that significantly growing in Tuban. Tuban has become one of the religious tourism destinations in Indonesia.
- 31) Interview with Tuban regent, Fathul Huda, 17 March 2018.

- 32) Interview with HW, 15 August 2017.
- 33) Interview with Tuban deputy regent, Noor Nahar Husein, 17 March 2018.
- 34) Interview with MA 14 August 2017.

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Radar Bojonegoro
Radar Surabaya

(KURNIATY, Rika, Doctoral Program in International Relations,
Graduate School of International Relations, Ritsumeikan University)

インドネシアの選挙民主主義におけるエリートの変化 —東ジャワ州トゥバン県の事例を中心に—

1998年にスハルト権威主義が崩壊した後、インドネシアでは改革（reformasi）の名のもとで民主化が急速に進められた。本稿で注目する寡頭制に関しては、その先行研究の多くがインドネシアにおける民主主義の深化を評価しつつも、現代政治の中核は未だにスハルト権威主義時代に台頭した一握りの富裕層が牛耳っていると主張する。

上記の言説に対し、本論文では首長公選制（pilkada langsung）の導入を定めた新地方行政方（法律2004年第32号）に着目しつつ、この施行が単に寡頭政治を強化するものであったのかという問いに答える。本論で注目する東ジャワ州トゥバン県における県知事選挙では、多様な社会および経済的な背景をもつ人々が県知事になり得る可能性を示唆し、ポピュリストに代表される新勢力の台頭を確認した。すなわち新地方行政法施行後のトゥバンにおいて見られる構造変化は、従来議論されてきた金権政治を超えたより動的な実態をもたらしたのである。

キーワード：民主主義、インドネシア、寡頭制、トゥバン県、ポピュリスト

（リカ クルニアティー，立命館大学大学院国際関係研究科博士課程後期課程）

