Article

The Prospect of Mediation in West Papua-Indonesia Conflict Transformation

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Abstract

This research examines the conflict transformation process through mediation in the West Papua conflict of Indonesia conducted by the Papua Peace Network (*JDP*, *Jaringan Damai Papua*). The paper assesses the challenge and opportunity of civil society in promoting dialogue through mediation in an ongoing conflict. The study found that the West Papua-Indonesia conflict is multifaceted in nature, whereby the conflicted actors are linked, and against each other at the same time, under a complex power configuration within the society. It concludes that the Papua Peace Network is facing a burden in the form of a network of interests of conflicted actors, as well as the problem of finding a fit representation of the parties. Thus, in order to reach a successful mediation process, the work proposes that the Papua Peace Network should acknowledge the complexity of the society, detach itself from the mediation process and request a mediator without conflict of interest with both parties.

Key Words ： Mediation, Dialogue, Conflict Transformation, West Papua, Indonesia.

Introduction

The conflict transformation concept has been widely accepted as a means by which to change a violence prone society into a peaceful society.[1] Transformation or change in society is a natural process. A normal and peaceful society will unavoidably transform when there is a change in political and economic dynamics, as well as a change in surrounding environment such as environmental degradation or technological discoveries. In a society troubled by conflict, these changing factors are also present. Although conflict is always political, other factors also affect its development. Since the transformation outcome is difficult to predict, a society in conflict can easily plunge into a worse state if there is an unconstructive change in those factors. Thus, in order to reach a positive conflict transformation, the social and political changes should be directed to a peace-oriented transformation. With this said however, guiding a positive political and social change in an area of conflict is challenging. Indeed, there may well be interests of the elites of disputed parties which oppose an assertive change. Consequently, the largest burden of conflict transformation in a clashed society is finding the mutual interests of the elites and

constructing a transformation strategy accordingly.

　　This research departs from the argument put forth by Lederach (1997) that conflict transformation refers to understanding the nature of conflict existing in society and working toward avoiding the destructive consequences of the conflict. The argument expands on this by accepting the existence of conflict as an unavoidable result of diverging interests, but states that the conflicted parties can move forward and accept the existence of others and their interests. In this concept, transformation relies very much on sustainable dialogue as the basic instrument with which to acknowledge others' needs. The next problem would be; how to set up a sustainable dialogue in a fierce political dispute atmosphere? In such a non-communication condition between the conflicted parties, the role of mediation prevails.

　　Mediation as a key instrument with which to transform a hostile situation in the early stage of conflict transformation has been supported by many scholars. Writers such as Papagianni (2010), Horowitz (2007), and Haynes, et al. (2004) acknowledge the importance of mediation to cease violence and help warring parties to meet and negotiate their issues. In his review on the context of international mediation in international disputes, Bercovitch (2011, p. 16) stated that mediation is "the best practical method of managing conflict and helping to establish some sort of regional and international order". Summing up the importance of mediation; mediation encourages finding an agreement regarding how to modify the way conflict is expressed, discovering the mutual interests, consulting justice from both perspectives, and establishing order. Once an acceptable expression of differences is found, a simultaneous dialogue is expected to follow in order to guard a positive change in the society. Therefore, mediation and dialogue are pivotal in the conflict transformation process.

　　Yet, mediation also contains certain limitations. Mediation is not a means by which to secure a lasting concurrence; it is merely an initial step to construct a political bond (Papagianni, 2010). Other limitations of mediation include the tendency for bias to arise when it comes to the elite's privileged. Instead of serving as a means by which to channel people's hopes and interests, the mediation processes become the elite's bargaining table for wining personal interests. [2] Furthermore, since conflict area in nature develops some faction inside the conflicted parties, it is hard to measure how much power and leverage of the elites who join the peace talk to others. These factors should be acknowledged in order to measure the success of an ongoing mediation.

　　The study examines the effort of the Papua Peace Network (JDP, *Jaringan Damai Papua*) with regards to the promotion of mediation and dialogue in the West Papua conflict as a part of the conflict transformation process. The West Papua conflict is an ongoing conflict in Indonesia which has been long unsettled and has deep historical roots as well as a connection to the sovereignty of Indonesian territory. The Papua Peace Network is a network of individuals including peace activists, religious leaders, youths, academics, and prominent figures. The study explores how civilian attempts to bring dialogue and mediation to the table have been challenged by some conditions. Those conditions are sensitive to the elites' interests, adaptable in narrating the idea, keeping the distance with the conflicted parties, and carefully measuring the readiness of both parties to conduct a

dialogue. The civilian effort to promote mediation is also distinctive since it does not possess real power to pressure the conflicted parties to surrender their antagonism and reach an agreement. The research also proposes to acknowledge the society context in which the mediation takes place. Consideration of the internal relations within society is also important in order to avoid the mediation process becoming an elite tool of negotiation. Finally, the paper assesses the required characteristics of a mediator in the West Papua conflict resolution process.

The nature of conflict

The most effective interpretation of the West Papua conflict is a conflict connected to the wish of the Papuan to secede from Indonesia.[3] The conflict takes many forms, from political expressions to armed violence. The conflict is rooted in the history of the independence of Indonesia. The embryo of Indonesia is the territorial area under Dutch colonials. Yet, when Indonesia gained independence in 1945, West Papua remained under Dutch governance. West Papua formally came back to Indonesia in 1969. The region re-entered Indonesia through a referendum process involving the international community's intervention. It became internationally recognized as Indonesian territory after a voting process held by the United Nations of so called "The Act of Free Choice".[4] However, the region was shaken up by violent conflict in resistance of Indonesia even before it formally rejoined Indonesia (Djopari, 1993; Ismail, et al. 1971; King, 2003). Current West Papua, located in the eastern part of Indonesia, consists of 2 provinces, namely West Papua province and Papua province.[5] Both are situated in the western half of New Guinea Island with Papua Province as the border and its closest neighbor Papua New Guinea. Since the island is geographically located on the Oceania continent,[6] the indigenous people of West Papua are of Melanesian race, unlike the majority of Indonesian Malay. Racial differences also play as an important part in the contention.

The root of the Papuans' opposition to the Indonesian government is connected to the integration process into Indonesia, which they consider as fraudulent. The Papuan resistance accused the Indonesian Government and the international community have denied the Papuan independence, as Papuan nationalists had prepared to achieve independence under the guidance of the Dutch government in 1949-1960 (Alua, 2006). On the other hand, the central government of Indonesia perceives the integration as lawful and final. It is justified by arguments that the integration is the result of a legal referendum in 1969, and by the historical claim that Indonesian territory is based on the ex-Dutch colonial territories. Hence, Papua is considered an integral part of the country from the beginning, and the referendum process was the odds created by the Dutch. For this reason, the Papuans' expression of discontentment has been translated as an act of treason and has been answered with military pressure.

With this said, the resistance movement never stopped, even under the harsh security treatment of the military-dominated regime of President Soeharto during 1966-1998, also known as the New Order regime, although it was relatively calm from political turmoil. In order to completely press the wish of secedes, the Soeharto regime exercised rapid

development projects which attracted people from many places of the country to flow into the region. The influx of more skillful laborers formed a structural economic marginalization toward the indigenous. In addition, the Soeharto regime was also known as a regime which highlighted uniformity. The diversity of cultures from various minority ethnic groups in the country had been discouraged for the sake of a national identity. Papuan cultures were also the first victim of the uniform culture policy of the regime. In the long run, marginalization, combined with human rights abuses, has accumulated the anger of the West Papuan nationalists.

A new horizon for the Papuans came after Indonesia entered the democratic post-Soeharto era. Along with the political resurrection in the country, the West Papuan Nationalists also reached a new turning point. Self-determination demand reappeared in a new costume. Political acts, along with clashes and violence, became everyday incidents in Papua. The idea of independence reemerged. The central government of Indonesia responded by re-applying a stern military operation. As a consequence, human rights abuses toward Papuans increased (Imparsial, 2011). Nonetheless, at the same time, the central government also adopted a development approach to tame the turmoil. The idea is to increase people's prosperity to differ the wish to secede. Unfortunately, the development approach failed due to the elites' rampant corruption and governance misconduct.

The political incidents and violence occurring in the name of Papuan political rights suggest that the antagonistic parties of the West Papua conflict are the West Papuan nationalists versus the Government of Indonesia. West Papuan resistance is represented by many groups such as; the Free Papua Organization (OPM, *Organisasi Papua Merdeka*) which carries out guerilla attacks in jungles, Papuan Presidium Council (PDP, *Presidium Dewan Papua*) which conducted a Papuan People Congress in 2000, National Committee for West Papua (KNPB, *Komite Nasional Papua Barat*) which frequently conducts political demonstration and acts, 'Free West Papua' held by Benny Wenda, who is a Papuan in asylum, West Papua National Coalition for Liberation (WPNCL) which actively travels to Melanesian countries to seek support, West Papua National Authority (WPNA), National Committee of Papuan Youth (KNPP, *Komite Nasional Pemuda Papua*), Federated Republic of West Papua (NRFPB, *Negara Republik Federal Papua Barat*), and many more organizations.

These groups, despite their shared spirit, wish to resist the Indonesian government, and commit different acts and goals in pursuit of their mission. The armed groups or OPMs differ in their goal of resistance, since they are characterized by local armed groups without consolidation to each other. The PDP is urging acknowledgment of Papuan political rights through dialogue (Alua, 2000). In contrast, KNPB and 'Free West Papua' insist on exercising the right of self determination through referendum. These groups, with the exception of KNPB and 'Free West Papua', regrettably, are unconsolidated and competed. Many smaller groups also exist. Some of these small groups are incidental groups with temporary acts and exploit the cries of 'M' (*Merdeka*, freedom) in their actions. The minor groups are usually halted after their grunts are responded to by the government. Generally speaking, the conflict in the region could be read as a conflict between indigenous people (Papuan) against the central government, even though every group carries with it a

different goal and purpose.

Putting society in the context

Assuming that all Papuan or people living in West Papua resist the central government is a misleading understanding. Present day Papua is a habitation of many ethnic groups and races. These include native Papuans who are divided into approximately 200 ethnic groups, while other inhabitants are migrants from numerous parts of Indonesia. The Indonesian migrants' number, usually referred to as '*pendatang*', is almost exceeding the indigenous statistic. They came rapidly to the region during the period spanning 1969-1998, which was the New Order or Suharto regime's period. Post-1998, the influx of migrants was not as rapid as during the previous period. Yet, in some areas such as Merauke, Sorong or Kaimana, the migrants have been arriving since the early 19th century (Viartasiwi, 2013). Inter-marriages between natives and the long-settler migrants have also taken place, with many mixed-race communities being built. Those communities claim to be Papuan, and no less so than the indigenous Melanesian-Papuans.

However, many studies, such as King (2003), Elmslie (2006), or Kirksey (2012), tend to see the migrants as a unitary entity. Their studies imply that the migrants are simply Indonesians, and thus they unconsciously place the migrants in the opposition side toward the Papuans. This identification ignores the complexity of Papuan society, and in the end, enhances the antagonism image of the society. Unfortunately, it is not always the case. This research found that the classification is more complex than the findings of other studies might suggest. The findings suggest that the characteristic of Papuan population can be classified by four categories; first, the native Melanesian-Papuan. The second category is the mixed-race Papuan, the combination of Melanesian and other races of Indonesian; third, the long-settler migrant; and fourth, the new migrants. Additionally, in fact, not all migrants groups or communities, even from the fourth category, are sided with the government of Indonesia. Immense human rights abuses in Papua have prompted many migrant communities and individuals to side with the Melanesian-Papuans, although they do not automatically support the idea of independence. The mixed-race and long-settler migrants, however, are the most unfortunate communities since they are trapped in a dilemma of identity. They have always identified themselves as Papuan; yet, after the revival of Papuan identity in 1998, they were no longer acknowledged as Papuan due to their race and heredity. These communities stay away from the political frontier. Nevertheless, some begin to reidentify their existence in social line. Hence, understanding the identity diversity of Papuan society is crucial when it comes to the allocation of conflict transformation potencies.

Papuan society has endured segregation due to the antagonistic notion of migrants versus natives. Some conditions, such as economic advancement of the non-Melanesian's communities and positive discrimination/affirmative actions to the natives, encourage a divided society. Ethnic-politics also emerges in Melanesian-Papuan communities. As a response, non-Melanesian communities create ethnic-based communities and organizations as a self-defense mechanism. What is more, elites exploit ethnicity sentiments in order to

gain leverage in political and economic interests, thus adding more complication to Papuan anatomy of conflict. In addition, as the Indonesian Institute of science's scholars concluded in their annual report, certain Papuan elites are also involved in intelligence operations as informants and opinion makers to counter civilian political movements (Tim Kajian Papua LIPI, 2012). These individuals perform as the government's agents to topple secessionist movement in Papua and cover the failure of development. As a result, Papuan society is hectic with rumors and gossip. Unreliable information generates suspicion and distrust among communities.

Society is the main object of conflict in the transformation process and the the main sponsor of a sustainable dialogue. Therefore, understanding its complexity is crucial. Bearing in mind that mediation is an initial step of conflict transformation which will rely on societal support and elites' involvement, the present challenge in West Papua society is gathering a collective consicence of its fragmented society. This collective concience,[7] the assembly of which is essential, is the need for peace. Should Papuan society pull together in one voice of a peaceful setlement of the conflict, the society support to mediation and dialogue can be expected. Society support will ensure civil obedience as a result of the mediation and help the elites to remain on track. Thus, the utmost task of the Papua Peace Network (hereafter refers as JDP), is understanding the complexity of the society and gathering a collective conscience to be brought as the foundation of the mediation and dialogue process.

JDP in action

Papua Peace Network (JDP, *Jaringan Damai Papua*), a movement to promote dialogue as a conflict resolution tool in the West Papua conflict, is activated by the concerned West Papuan observers and Papuan leaders. The activists, known as facilitators, come from various backgrounds such as religious leaders, academics, human right activists, youth leaders, and prominent figures, as well as those from various ethnic and religious groups. They work voluntarily to link the various warring parties and to help the Papuans and the Indonesian government, to prepare Jakarta-Papua mediation and dialogue.[8] JDP members are Papuan and non-Papuan settled in Papua or elsewhere. The level of conflict on which JDP is working is the high political issue since it is directly connected to the violence taking place in West Papua. Through reconciling the core disagreement as the main source of the conflict in Papua, JDP wishes to transform other conflicts in the society.[9]

JDP, however, encounters many obstacles in promoting dialogue from both the Papuan society and the government of Indonesia. Dialogue relies on voluntary and non-coercive nature in which the ultimate decision making power is in the hands of the parties involved (Bercovitch, 1999). Thus, opposition of the conflicted parties to engage in dialogue of West Papua conflict is the main task of JDP. The Papuan nationalist, such as KNPB (*Komite Nasional Papua Barat*; National Committee of West Papua), opposes dialogue on suspicion of being misguided.[10] Subsequently, they insist on holding independence demands. KNPB's goal is to find acknowledgement of the fraud integration process and justice. Therefore,

their utmost goal is to hold a referendum as an instrument with which to achieve independence. Other groups, even though they do not formally oppose the idea of mediation, doubt, to a certain extent, the acceptance of Indonesian government to hold a dialogue. Yet, other groups also fail to offer alternative concepts in conflict resolutions. So far, various groups in the government-resistant camp have failed to adopt a single voice in dealing with the mediation and dialogue plan.

On the other hand, since dialogue requires equality for both parties, the central government of Indonesia (Jakarta), as the framed conflicted parties on the dialogue, is unwilling to allow mediation and dialogue to act as conflict resolution mechanisms. Jakarta accepts dialogue merely to the extent of consultation from region to the superior. For this reason, the Indonesian government resists acknowledging the Papuan discontentment and persists in maintaining the unity of the state without compromise. The position also implies the rejection of arbitrary notions such as mediation, since it has been translated as opening the involvement of other countries in Indonesian domestic affairs.

Unluckily, JDP not only faces trouble with regards to reconciling the sharp pole of the conflicting parties, but also faces indictment from both parties in connection with its liability. JDP members face the risk of being suspected as separatist sympathizers by the government. Yet, the opposed party suspects JDP of being the government's supporter. The indictment prevails since some of the JDP members are prominent figures in the Papuan society, which is simply translated by the government as the insider of the conflicted parties. On the other hand, some of the JDP members are government-institution based scholars who are sometimes accused of being government supporters.

Nonetheless, the realities of the personal backgrounds of JDP members add some merits and demerits to the JDP progress. As prominent figures in Papuan society, some JDP members have an open access to campaign the dialogue and win support from the society. However, the movement is restricted toward the opposite party. Unfortunately, the case of slightly favoring his/her own community is also present, such as the case of declaration in a conference held by JDP named the Papua Peace Conference, July 2011. The conference was held to gather a mutual understanding to define a concept of "Papua as the land of peace". Yet, a declaration read at the closing ceremony of the conference created a controversy. The declaration suggested that formal negotiations should be set up, whilst it also stated a commitment to an independent Papua, and listed five individuals as the Papuan representatives in the negotiation. According to the ICG report (2011), the declaration created a shock in JDP internal consolidation since non-Papuan members of JDP were sidelined when the conference was used to suggest an agenda for a negotiation. The declaration, in fact, resulted in a setback regarding JDP's legitimacy in front of the opposite party. A similar situation occurs with JDP members who happen to be the government employees. On the one hand, they comprise access to channel the idea of dialogue to the decision makers in the government. On the other hand, the accusation from the Papuan community of being not neutral and being able to fully understand the Papuan problems are something which confront them daily. Thus, JDP, as the dialogue promoter/facilitator/intermediaries, also faces the burden of being bound to the conflicted parties.

The next challenge of promoting mediation and dialogue is the elites' personal

interests. The elites of both parties carry personal interests in the ongoing conflict. To gain some leverage toward Jakarta, elites do not hesitate to exploit the cries of freedom, which can also easily spark violence. The case of a demand to obtain a political gain is presented by Cornelis Yanuaring, a local parliament member of Jayapura. The man, claiming to represent his group, demanded the formation of three new provinces in Papua and threatened to command for secede if the wish was not fulfilled by May 1st, 2013.[11] The case is painting a picture that self-determination is a handy weapon for elites to receive private advantage in the ongoing conflict. Moreover, elites involved in the conflict are linked and against each other at the same time, due to the nexus of interests from the actors. A tense situation when it comes to political competition between the elites, including election, describes the notion of elites' networks and antagonism. The notion of "*Papua Gunung*" (highlander Papuan) versus "*Papua Pantai*" (coastal Papuan) emerged in the current West Papuan Indigenous society. It creates tension since political elites utilize the differences among society for their benefit. During the election periods, the highlanders accused their fellow Papuans from coastal areas of being less Papuan since they were touched by civilization in the past years. Moreover, highlander-based politicians exploit the accusation by demanding leadership and position in political and social arenas as compensation for their backwardness in the past. It is time to take a turn. The call also appeared in the Papua Province's governor election's campaigns in 2013. However, confronted by the self-determination issue, the elites bond together on the same side. Under such an environment, addressing elites in the West Papua conflict also means addressing not only the real player in the opposite party, but also the random elites who claim to be the valid representation of the people.

　　Other obstacles have also persisted, such as the unwillingness of non-Papuan communities to support dialogue due to fear of being accused of being separatist sympathizers. The non-Papuan communities were also detached from the conflict because they perceived it as a conflict between the central government and the natives. The stance of the non-Melanesian communities is counterproductive given that society's support is the main condition of the conflict transformation process. In order to guarantee the successful dialogue, it is not only crucial that the conflicted parties exercise equality and listen to each other, but also the supporting environment (Galtung, 2011). With this in mind, additional homework of JDP is encouraging non-Melanesian communities in Papua to find their interests in peaceful Papua. By acknowledging the benefit of a peaceful Papua, voluntarily involvement in dialogue can be expected.

　　Nonetheless, JDP has been relatively successful in performing its duty to transform the Papua conflict through dialogue. The idea of dialogue has been spread in the diverse Papuan communities. After a series of public consultations in many parts of the region, JDP has gained support from both native and migrant communities. On the government side, JDP recorded a small victory in 2010 when the President of the Republic of Indonesia, Yudhoyono, expressed the government's intention to obtain dialogue in tackling the Papua problem. After a spate of violence and intelligence input, however, the government withdrew the plan and rolled out a new strategy. To euphemize the word 'dialogue', which requires equality of both parties, the central government launched a new concept of so

called '*komunikasi konstruktif*' (constructive communications). The idea is to set a 'consultation type' of communication. Fortunately, instead of refusing to entertain the idea, JDP accepted the idea, albeit in a different costume. The government never seriously proceeded with the new concept; thus, JDP can continue the works of promoting dialogue with a new narration as government's preference.

The next step of setting a dialogue is introducing mediation as its practical operation. Dialogue in perception of Jakarta is a mere consultation, while for West Papuan nationalists, it is a political negotiation. JDP needs to reconcile the different connotation in defining dialogue as it is connected to the level of expectation of the conflicted parties to the affair. Arbitrary models such as dialogue have been declined by Jakarta, as they are viewed as Indonesia's domestic problems. Yet, the Aceh case is a worthwhile lesson to be learned. Jakarta experienced involvement in a mediation process in the Aceh conflict resolution back in 2005.[12] Despite the extraordinary situation which provided the possibility of Aceh mediation processes,[13] JDP's effort in promoting mediation would not come without precedent. The problem would be, however, what situation needed to spark the prospect? Escalating violence is surely not an option, while peace alone seems insufficient to motivate both parties to go to mediation. Therefore, JDP needs to adapt a strategy to engage Jakarta and Papua in mediation without awaiting conflict to occur as a result of violence escalation. Once the conflicted parties agree to engage in an arbitrary council, another task of JDP is to find a 'fitted' mediator.

The problem of mediator

Mediation calls for the involvement of a third party. Horowitz (2007: 51) defined mediation as "the intervention of a third party unfamiliar to the conflict, trustable, unbiased and intending to be neutral". This definition highlights the notion of an outsider as the mediator. In line with the previous suggestion, Bercovitch (1999, 2011) and Haynes (2004) also outlined the involvement of a third party in mediation to influence the mindset of the conflicted parties. Haynes' notion, however, accents the role of facilitator without necessarily trying to influence the negotiating parties as per Bercovitch's suggestion. In summary, the three studies propose a mediator in the form of a third party, which can help the conflicted parties to negotiate their interests and cease conflict. However, this gives rise to yet another question; what characteristics must the mediator (third party) have for the negotiation? What are the implications which they can influence in the decision making process?

Young (2006) presented a compelling opinion regarding the role of third parties (mediator) in a negotiation. He suggested that intermediaries may play some kind of role in the decision making process in two possible ways; first, when the third party intervenes in the decision making process with the motive to help one conflicted party. Second, a so called partial transformation, when the third party's motive is to facilitate a settlement rather than to lever the interest of one side in the negotiation. Young's study draws an illustration of the potency of mediators as the determining parties, as well as neutral facilitators in the dialogue. Since negotiation is also a voluntary basis act, there is no

standard of what classes as rational outcome of both parties, whereas the resulting agreement binds them. The negotiated matter is not the main value, and the binding agreement is the most relevant to scale the behavior of both parties afterwards. Thus, both parties can gain or give up their interests during the process; hence, the tendency to manipulate and conceal the goal of each party is also recognized. In a such a situation, the mediator's ability to remain neutral is crucial in order to reach a justifiable negotiation.

Many cases provide evidence regarding how an impartial, yet influential, mediator can affect the result of negotiation. Such cases can be found in Indonesia's conflict resolution of Poso communal conflict in Central Sulawesi Province in 2001 (Viartasiwi, 2011). In Poso, the central government of Indonesia set mediation to end the severe communal clashes which caused the deaths of thousands of people. During the negotiation, the Minister of Public Welfare of the Republic of Indonesia Jusuf Kalla, the mediator, pressed the conflicted parties to sign an agreement of ceasing violence. Additionally, he suggested that the conflicted parties forgive and forget, without further judicial process to the perpetrators. As a result, the conflicted parties agreed to cease hostility, although they still bore a grudge toward each other. Massive range violence ended, although society was divided into two groups, and violence on a small group scale connected with past affairs appeared occasionally. The same conflict settlement occurred in the Maluku conflict resolution. Poso and Maluku's conflict resolutions have been acknowledged as a successful model of mediation in Indonesia. However, the current situation in the region must be taken into consideration before concluding the success of the mediation.[14] The Poso's case reflects how a mediator, despite remaining neutral during the process, can influence negotiation participants to make certain agreements. In fact, the agreement had been made without full sincerity from the conflicted parties. In the end, an imposed peace generates fragile order in society. Thus, it can be argued that even an impartial mediator may heavily influence the conflicted parties due to his/her higher position. With this in mind, it is worth mentioning another characteristic of a mediator; unsuperior third parties.

In the context of West Papua conflict, the characteristics of mediators must also be carefully considered. Thus far, JDP has not yet taken the step to find a mediator for the dialogue. Taking into account the nature of the West Papua conflict, the acceptance of both parties to a dialogue and the feature of the society, the research suggests that a mediator should be found. This mediator should have certain atributes; the mediator should be an outsider who has never been involved in the West Papua conflict throughout the history of West Papua. Second, there should be an unsuperior third party in order to avoid an imposed negotiation. Bearing in mind that the two conflicted parties are not in an equal power capability, a mediator from a foreign country might be a wise choice. These two attributes can be added to other requirements of a mediator which have been studied by various scholars.[15]

JDP and the way forward; a concluding remark

JDP's efforts in the West Papua conflict transformation through mediation and dialogue face many challenges. To sum up, these challenges include the reluctance of the

central government, the hard-headed Papuan movement activists, deceitful Papuan elite politics, and an unsupportive environment. Moreover, JDP has also confronted an internal burden of being attached to the conflicted parties. Under such challenges, however, JDP has recorded a meaningful conflict transformation in the West Papua conflict. After two years of campaigning, the idea of dialogue as a mechanism to change the situation has been widely acknowledged, with various levels of acceptance. Public sentiment toward a dialogue is rising. Although the government's position does not recognize the idea of mediation, it does not reject the idea of dialogue. Thus, one momentous step towards a conflict transformation mechanism campaign has almost been concluded.

After the idea of dialogue has been received, the next awaiting step is setting mediation. The previous chapter of the paper has discussed the characteristic of mediation to be considered in relation to the West Papua conflict resolution mechanism. Taking into account the problem that JDP is facing in order to perform its role, the paper suggests that JDP detach from the mediation process. The involvement of JDP members in core dynamics within both parties has helped the success of the dialogue campaign. However, the position is also critical to the fairness and legitimacy of the mediation. Therefore, to achieve a meaningful and fruitful mediation, JDP has to deliver its role to a new mediator with some additional attributes to a known requirement of a mediator due to the uniqueness of the West Papua conflict.

All in all, although it seemed difficult and perhaps even impossible, mediation and dialogue have become visible and dignified alternatives via which to put an end to the West Papua conflict. Nevertheless, since conflict transformation is also a sustainable process, mediation and dialogue are expected to be an endurable course in many aspects of the disagreement. Therefore, an ad hoc and single mediatory moment should not be a target of all parties involved in the conflict to seal the conflict in West Papua.

Acknowledgements

NOTES

1 ） See for example works by: Lederach, J. P. (2003). *The Little Book of Conflict Transformation: Clear articulation of the guiding principles by a pioneer in the field.* Intercourse, PA: Goodbooks. And Galtung, J. (2007). Introduction: Peace by peaceful conflict transformation - the TRANSCEND approach. In C. a. Webel, & J. Galtung (Eds.), *Handbook of peace and conflict studies* Oxon and New York: Routledge. pp. 14-32.

2 ） See mediation process in Poso conflict: Viartasiwi, N., 2011. *Calming down the ghost of conflict: post-conflict governance at Poso, Central Sulawesi Province, Indonesia, 2001-2011,* Kyoto: Graduate School of International Relations, Ritsumeikan University.

3 ） The interpretation of the conflict in West Papua is diverse according to different sources. The

Indonesian government is rather ambiguous in seeing the conflict. On the one hand the Indonesian government perceive the conflict as violent expression of the people in connection with discontentment of development, but, on the other hand, they perceive the conflict as a separatists conflict (Indonesia, 2013). Papuan writers such as Alua (2000, 2006), Wonda (2009), al Rahab (2010), and Yoman (2012), however, claim that the violent actions and disputes are connected to the wish to secede.

4) For a more detailed and extensive elaboration of the event, see Drooglever (2010).

5) West Papua in this study refers to two provinces, West Papua Province and Papua Province, and treats it as a region. Officially, the government of Indonesia does not recognize the region in the territorial administrative division. However, in political discourse, the two provinces have always been treated as one entity; West Papua (or Papua in Indonesian context).

6) For geographical grouping of the world's continent, see: United Nations. (2013, February 11). *Composition of macro geographical (continental) regions, geographical sub-regions, and selected economic and other groupings*. Retrieved July 14, 2013, from United Nations. Department of Economics and Social Affairs: http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49regin.htm

7) The concept of collective conscience or collective consciousness in this article refers to the concept built by sociologist Emile Durkheim (1893); a common norms and belief acts as a bound to the society.

8) For the more explanation of the organization see: http://jdp-dialog.org/profil/tentang-jdp.

9) Author's interviews with Dr. Neles Tebay, JDP coordinator, a Catholic clergy, Rector of the College of Philosophy and Theology (STFT) "Fajar Timur" Jayapura at Jayapura, Sept. 6, 2012 and Jakarta, Dec. 13, 2012. Author's interviews with Anum Siregar, JDP facilitator, Human Rights lawyer, Director of Human Rights NGO ALDP (*Aliansi Demokrasi untuk Papua*), at Jayapura, 18, 23, 25, 28, Aug. 2012 and Jakarta, 17 Dec. 2012. Author's interviews with Dr. Muridan Widjojo, JDP coordinator, researcher of the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI, *Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia*), at Jayapura 23, 26, 28 Aug 2012.

10) Author's interview with anonymous leader of KNPB based in Mimika Regency, at Timika, 12 Aug. 2012.

11) See *Radar Timika*, Wednesday, December 5th, 2012; "SBY dideadline, Papua dimekarkan atau merdeka" (SBY has got a deadline: Papua will be divided in more provinces or freedom).

12) For more detail on the matter see Miller, M. A., 2009. *Rebellion and Reform in Indonesia: Jakarta's Security and Autonomy Policies in Aceh*. London and New York: Routledge .

13) Aceh entered a rapid process of mediation, after a very long conflict during 1976-2005, after it was hit by a natural disaster the 2004 Indian Ocean Earthquake followed by a big tsunami. Both parties agreed to cease violence and shift to the negotiation table after hundreds of thousands of people died and the area was devastated by the tsunami.

14) Divided societies in Poso and Maluku

15) To find more on the characteristic of mediator see: Horowitz, S., 2007. Mediation. In C. a. Webel, & J. Galtung (Eds.), *Handbook of peace and conflict studies*. Oxon and New York: Routledge, pp. 51-63. And Bercovitch, J., 1999. Mediation and negotiation techniques. In: *Encyclopedia of violence, peace & conflict. Volume 2* . San Diego. London. Boston. New York. Sidney. Tokyo. Toronto : Academic Press, pp. 403-412.

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インドネシア・西パプアの紛争転換に関する調停をめぐる展望

　本論は，西パプア紛争（インドネシア）におけるパプア平和ネットワーク（JDP, *Jaringan Damai Papua*）の仲介をとおした紛争の変容プロセスについて検討する。この考察は，進行中の紛争において対話を促進するうえで，市民社会にとっての挑戦と可能性を評価するものである。

　考察は，西パプア紛争が社会内における複雑な権力構造のもと，紛争中の主体が繋がりを有しながらも同時に対立しているという点において多面的であることを明らかにした。パプア平和ネットワークは，紛争中の主体の利害関係による負担に直面し，両勢力から適切な代表を見出すことに課題を抱えているものと結論づける。したがって，パプア平和ネットワークは，仲介プロセスから離脱して紛争中の両勢力と利害競争をもたない仲介者を要求するうえで，社会の複雑性を認めることを提言する。

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