

Article

An Analysis on the Contradiction Between China's Non-intervention Policy and Intervention Activities

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Introduction

In international relations, non-intervention principle,¹ a logical corollary of the sovereignty, has been taken as an important method to deal with the international anarchy. This principle therefore has become the foundation of the contemporary international order and a critical norm of international politics. However, in practice, countries are difficult to avoid interfering or being interfered in domestic affairs. From the perspective of realism, sovereignty is merely organized hypocrisy, and strong powers continually intervene in weak ones' domestic affairs for sake of their own geostrategic and economic interests (Krasner, 1999; Finnemore, 2003, p.5). The scholars of liberalism argued, with the globalization of economic relations, regional integration as well as the neo-interventionism developed, sovereign state is being eroded or transcended (Strange, 1996, pp.12-15; Santoro, 2010; Jones, 2011, p.11). The international society, predominantly the Western society,² is moving, or has moved, beyond

1 The term "non-intervention" used in this article is interchangeable with "non-interference". This article limits the discussion of non-intervention in the field of international politics rather than economics or others.

2 Although the concept of international society has been elaborated by the English School theory of IR as a group of states that are bound by a common set of rules and share common values in a society, in this article this term is defined, according to the pluralism, as a states-system composing various sovereign countries with diverse values, cultures, and political systems. The term "West" or "Western" refers to the coalition of states, primarily located in Western Europe and North America, taking the lead in promoting humanitarian intervention. In this article, the discrepancy between Western society and international society is that members of the former have a shared perspective of maintaining the concept of limited sovereignty and advocating humanitarian interventions; otherwise, in the international society, countries have different interpretations on the concepts of sovereignty and

the traditional concept of the modern state toward a post Westphalia of limited sovereignty that must yield to democratic, humanitarian, and economic needs (Jackson, 1990, p. 40; Zhang Y., 1998, p. 250; Ziegler, 2012, p. 413). Therefore, tensions between non-intervention principle and limited sovereignty plagues foreign policies of many countries, particularly for those countries insisting on the absolute non-intervention principle.

This context makes China's adherence to non-intervention policy exceptionally peculiar. Although non-intervention principle has been advocated by some developing countries and is referred in the treaties of regional organizations such as the Constitutive Act of the African Union,³ the Charter of the ASEAN, and the Pact of League of Arable States, the degree of countries' opposition to interventions varies,⁴ there are few individual countries, especially great powers, take non-intervention as the diplomatic principle. China is distinctive, on the one hand, due to its great power status. China is different from small powers that countenance non-intervention for defense; it has the capability, or in some circumstances the obligation, to intervene in others' domestic affairs no matter whose interests are concerned, thereby influencing the current international order. On the other hand, non-intervention principle has been written into China's Constitution, and the Chinese government has repeatedly emphasized its opposition to interventions. The normative principle of non-intervention, which regards sovereignty as virtually absolute, has therefore been understood as the dogma of China's foreign policy (Mitter, 2004, pp. 208, 222-223; Carlson, 2010, p. 55; Wu & Taylor, 2012, p. 10).

This policy consequently places China's foreign policy in a dilemma. China proactively engages in the contemporary world comprising numerous international organizations such as the World Trade Organization, which inevitably confines China's sovereign rights. Simultaneously, Beijing portrays itself as a responsible country in order to ease the other countries' concerns about this rising power that has ambiguous intentions and strategies. However, the non-intervention policy is unfavorable to China's national interest. For instance, China's economic interests have increasingly extended beyond its border and might be threatened due to the political turmoil in far-flung regions such as the Middle East and Africa. The non-intervention policy restricts China's involvement in these domestic issues and

non-intervention, but the members share one consensus that the state sovereignty is still a foundation of the current international order. As Western countries have decided the basic rules and norms of the current international order, the Western society is the pivot of the international society, in other words, it dominates the current international society.

3 It is worth noting that African Union has amended the application of non-intervention in the Constitutive Act, which entitles the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances (The African Union, 2003, Article 4).

4 A Scholar Chu Shulong (2001) in his conference paper argued even if compared with Western Countries, most East Asian countries strongly defend traditional concepts of national sovereignty and firmly resist foreign intervention in the internal affairs of independent states, the attitudes and perspectives within East Asia on national sovereignty and foreign intervention are in different degree.

sacrifices its economic interests.⁵ Furthermore, this non-intervention policy is apparently inconsistent with its promise of being a responsible power. China's non-intervention policy has been constantly criticized by the Western countries, owing to its reluctance to support necessary international interventions and its ignorance of the human rights abuses in some developing countries. If one takes maintaining interests and image into consideration, the Chinese government ought to abandon this hands-off policy when it comes to others' domestic affairs. China's approach to sovereignty and intervention determines the role it plays in the international society and the extent that it is compatible with the Western society. Therefore, the approach that the Chinese government deals with this dilemma imposes opportunities and challenges for the international community and thus merits closer analysis.

The existing literature has not thoroughly elaborated the seeming dilemma of China's non-intervention policy. The Chinese academia lacks the discussion on these questions, but focuses on the debate about whether China is ought to abandon non-intervention policy (Su, 2011; Yan, 2011; Cui, 2012). Otherwise, the Chinese scholars either follow the government's pronouncement by justifying the non-intervention policy or defend the actual intervention activities for the Chinese government (Zhu& Liu, 2009; Qiao, 2011; Wang, 2011). In addition to the argument that the Chinese government is rigid to non-intervention policy (Mitter, 2004, pp. 208, 222-223; Ziegler, 2012, p.413), Western scholars explain China's participation in international interventions in the light of interests (Carlson, 2010; 2011; Karlsson, 2011). The interest-oriented argument does not specify which interest is China's diplomatic priority, and it also fails to explain why the Chinese government has been insisting on the non-intervention policy even if the interests are changing.⁶

This article intends to redress those shortcomings by analyzing the following questions: 1, provided that China is not an absolutely non-interventionist country who insists on the principle of non-intervention regardless of any reasons and never conducts interventions, why does China espouse the non-intervention policy at a rhetorical level? 2, why do China's acts belie its words with respect to non-intervention policy? 3, how does China cope with contradiction between non-intervention policy and intervention actions? To answer these questions, this article develops five sections. Section One defines non-intervention and its intervention behavior. Based on the categorization of the intervention behavior, the problem of China's contradiction between the political pronouncement and practice regarding the non-intervention has been selected for a close examination in the section two. Sections

5 The Libya War is a prominent case in which China's economic loss amounts to \$ 16.6 billion.

6 At least in official documents there is no sign that the Chinese government is considering changing this policy. For example, the "China's white paper on national defense" in 2010 explicitly reiterated, "China unswervingly pursues an independent foreign policy of peace and promotes friendly cooperation with all countries on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence" (Information Office of the State Council [IOSC], March 2011). Non-intervention policy is a vital part of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, which is abbreviated to the Five Principles.

Three and Four continue to explain the reasons why China espouses non-intervention in an immovable attitude but behaves the opposite by combining ideological and material terms. In these two sections, this article builds arguments on the basic premise that China's foreign policy behavior is shaped by the interplay between domestic and international factors. It hypothesizes that the long-lived non-intervention policy contains the pursuits of both values and interests. In China's context, the application of the non-intervention dogma has never been fixed in reality. It is worthwhile to note that the Chinese government tactically justifies the intervention activities by combining the principle with flexibility in its political culture, which will be briefly discussed in Section Five. The conclusion offers some final thoughts on the current non-intervention policy and the questions needed to be scrutinized in the future study.

I . Non-intervention/ intervention: between international law and politics

The principle of non-intervention in the domestic or territorial jurisdiction of other states constitutes one of the foundations of current international law (Brownlie, 2008, pp. 311-312). Although it is a ramification of state sovereignty, it has been proliferated and widely accepted as a norm in the world after the Second World War. The movements of self-determination of ex-colonies reinforced its significance.⁷ It contains twofold approaches: one country does not permit external actors to interfere in its domestic affairs, and neither will it interfere in other countries' internal issues. This normative principle indicates the reciprocal recognition of states as independent and legal members in the international society. In the jurisprudential logic of the UN Charter, non-intervention is the norm, and intervention is what must be justified (Jackson, 1995, pp.69-70).⁸ The only formal decision process justifying intervention is the authority of the Security Council under the enforcement provisions of Chapter VII of the UN Charter (Lyons & Mastanduno, 1995, p. 17). In this point, intervention is not a conception that is merely labeled the moral inferior or the violation of the international order.

In practice, there are numerous cases of intervention. Interpretations of intervention obviously vary from state to state; and the acceptance of it depends on international environment. What to one state looks like unobtrusive and even benign attempts at influence may appear to be blatant intervention and infringement on sovereignty (Lyons & Mastanduno, 1995, pp. 10-11). Here is a typical example, peacekeeping operations (PKOs), considered as intervention by some governments during the 1960s and 1970s, are now accepted as standard practice. Indeed, scholars interpret intervention in different

7 Before the Second World War, some important constitutive norms of the Western society, such as sovereign integrity, did not apply to the non-Western countries that were called barbarians (Jackson, 1990, pp.16-17; Anand, 2003, p.20).

8 Judging whether certain interventions are justified produces the problem to define the sovereignty/intervention boundary academically and empirically (Weber, 1995, pp11-29).

approaches. Some limits intervention as involving military coercion or the use of force, while to others, intervention can be equated with the whole of international relations.⁹ This article uses intervention in a broad way both negatively and positively. Intervention includes the activities that are undertaken to influence the political and social processes of another country, usually without the consent of the legitimate government, including diplomatic interference, subversion and clandestine political action, military intervention, etc. (Holsti, 1967, pp.318-340). It also involves the physical crossing of borders with a clear-cut purpose, such as transporting relief workers into the territory of a sovereign state to deliver humanitarian assistance, providing materials to other states to suspend the internal disorder or bombing a country's nuclear or chemical facilities to stem the development of weapons of mass destruction, etc. (Lyons & Mastanduno, 1995, p. 10).

Although the duty of non-intervention is a master principle, which draws together many particular rules on the legal competence and responsibility of states (Brownlie, 2008, p.292), intervention is hardly an unusual phenomenon in international politics. The complete isolation of internal events from the external environment is impossible in current era with a high degree of interdependence; therefore, intervention behavior occurs almost every day, no aid or trade program, military action, or important diplomatic communication can avoid having some impact on the public international realm of other sovereign states (Holsti, 1967, p.318; Jackson, 1995, p.246). In addition, after the Cold War, some intervention actions are the necessary method or a last resort to deal with domestic and international problems, especially when a majority of the international interventions are gradually recognized legitimate and justified. This tension between international law and politics perplexes almost all the countries in the current world, particularly big powers. China is not an exception. The contradiction of advocating the international norm and confronting the reality of international politics is quite striking in China's diplomacy.

II. Steady principle but changing behavior

It is undisputed that China apparently holds fast to non-intervention principle, since the Chinese government has been consistently expressing the pronouncement of non-intervention. The principle of non-intervention was first enclosed in the alliance treaty of Sino-USSR signed in 1950,¹⁰ and then was clearly established as a part of the important diplomatic principles in 1954 when the Five Principles

⁹ The detail can be found in the discussions of Richard Little (1987) and Stanley Hoffman (1984).

¹⁰ The Fifth Article refers to "each Contracting Party undertakes, in a spirit of friendship and co-operation and in conformity with the principles of equality, mutual benefit and mutual respect for the national sovereignty and territorial integrity and non-interference in the internal affairs of the other Contracting Party, to develop and consolidate economic and cultural ties between China and the Soviet Union, to render the other all possible economic assistance and to carry out necessary economic co-operation" (Foreign Languages Press, 1950, pp. 5-8).

was endorsed as the norms guiding the relations between China and India (Chinese Foreign Ministry [CFM], 2000). The Five Principles has been enshrined in the Chinese Constitution (National Congress of the Communist Party of China [NCCPC], 2004, Pref.), and is included in virtually every bilateral treaty made by China. As a result, as a fundamental element of the Five Principles, the non-intervention has become one of China's foreign policy tenets.

In addition to the Mao's period, Mao's successors follow this tradition even in the post-revolutionary period. Deng Xiaoping (1983, pp.278-279) expressed China's attitude toward the Communist Party in other countries that "the guideline and way of country's Party (Communist Party) should be judged by its own citizens." The reports of the fifteenth NCCPC in 1997 and the sixteenth NCCPC in 2002 explicitly conveyed that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) would continue to develop exchanges and cooperation with political parties and organizations of all countries and regions on the principles of independence, complete equality, mutual respect and non-interference in each other's internal affairs (Jiang, 1997, pt.IX ; 2002, pt.IX). President Hu Jintao (2007) stated in the "Report to the Seventeenth NCCPC" in 2007, "We maintain that all countries, big and small, strong and weak, rich and poor, are equal. We respect the right of the people of all countries to independently choose their own development path; we will never interfere in the internal affairs of other countries or impose our own will on them." However, it is easy to get confused and to draw an imprudent conclusion if one only looks at the political pronouncement. In fact, although the Chinese government has signed numerous treaties including clauses prohibiting mutually interventions in each other's internal affairs, it has frequently violated these stipulations.

Based on the aforementioned discussion of the intervention and Tesón's categorization of different interventions including soft intervention, hard intervention and forcible intervention, this article examines China's actual intervention activities.¹¹ Articulate and useful as Tesón's classification is, it is too general to specifically apply to the context of China's intervention behavior developed here. Thus, this article draws on Tesón's analysis and summarizes the characteristics of China's intervention conducts into three types according to their methods: direct intervention, indirect intervention, and silent intervention.¹²

Direct intervention includes soft intervention and military actions. China conducts the former kind of intervention by sending diplomatic personnel to other countries aiming at resolving these countries' domestic crisis, in the cases of Myanmar, Sudan, and North Korea, etc. Military actions are carried out

11 The soft intervention means simply discussion, examination, and recommendatory action. The hard intervention refers to the adoption of measures that are coercive but do not involve the use of force, such as economic and other kinds of sanctions. The forcible intervention denotes acts involving the use of force (Tesón, 2005, pp.171-175).

12 The notion of intervention is not value-free. But the author does not presuppose any moral judgments when considering the specific behavior of intervention.

for the various intentions ranging from human rights to self-benefit by dispatching military force, and these intentions include rescuing nationals abroad, protecting the security of objects such as people and materials beyond its territory, and enhancing one country's political influence on other countries.¹³ China deprecates the actions of toppling regimes by force in a general way no matter what the intentions are, but it has made its efforts on rescuing its nationals and ships abroad like the navy mission around the Gulf of Aden in 2008. It is notable that the dialects of China's diplomacy do not perceive soft intervention and abroad rescue as the true intervention behavior.

Indirect intervention represents the actions authorized by the UN or occurred in the UN such as participating in the PKOs and international sanctions. From the standpoint of the Chinese government, this type of action, enjoying the legitimacy, is also not intervention with a negative meaning. Nevertheless, China emphasizes that the multilateral intervention must be under certain conditions: it must proceed with respect for sovereignty, under the UN authorization, and in the invitation of the target state; and force is only to be used when all other options have proven ineffective (Carlson, 2004, p10). Since China is the permanent member of the Security Council in the UN and enjoys decisive power, its attitude is pivotal in some international intervention. Despite not directly participating in the intervention activities, China's support for certain intervention resolutions could be taken as an intervention position.

Silent intervention stands for the undisclosed or secretive behavior as well as ambiguous attitudes toward certain issues encompassing other countries' domestic affairs and international intervention. The former type involves the hidden intervention behavior, which is to support one certain Party of another state in the process of election by providing necessary materials or public expressions. This kind of intervention took place frequently in China's revolutionary era when Beijing had publicly supported certain Party in another state and provided material assistance to the reigning regime, but was seldom discovered in the post-Cold War period. The latter type of intervention is manifested by China's abstention or not voting on some resolutions regarding international intervention in the beyond revolutionary period. Through these activities, China avoids the criticism from the West regarding obstructionist opposition to intervention activities without reversing its commitment to non-intervention, and simultaneously expresses its dissatisfaction without changing the consequence.

The revolutionary period (1949-1978)

These three kinds of intervention have been performed throughout the history of China's diplomacy,

¹³ The intentions of using force are intricate and in some times are hard to judge, may coming from both the self-benefit and altruism.

though in different periods China's behavior has different emphases. In the Mao's era (i.e. the revolutionary period),¹⁴ China mainly carried out the silent intervention activities, as it proclaimed a policy of supporting and encouraging armed national liberation struggles by revolutionary forces elsewhere in Asia, including the Japanese Communist Party and Communist Parties in South and Southeast Asia such as Thai Communist insurgents; and it also engaged in illicit third-party trades with South Africa and South Korea, although some activities were covered and hidden by other methods (MacFarquhar & Fairbank, 1987, p. 260; Kim, 1984, p. 9). For example, in 1983 Beijing's withdrawal of support for the Thai communist revolutionary movement had reached the point of shutting down the insurgent radio station, the Voice of the People of Thai, which had been transmitting from China for years (Campbell, 1983). During the Omani Wars (1967-75) in the Middle East, China's military and political involvement by supporting Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arabian Gulf (PELOAG) would be another case.¹⁵ These activities are hardly labeled as interventions from the Chinese government's perspective, and could be explained by Mao's personal revolutionary passion as to ally China with communist states and to make the projects of the anti-imperialist and anti-colonialism workable through foreign activities.

The Chinese government, which is synonym for the CCP, did not received the Western countries' diplomatic recognitions in its incipient stage, so the announcement of non-intervention enhanced its prestige among the developing countries, thereby benefiting the Chinese regime in the international arena. But after Sino-USSR relationship went collapsed in the 1960s, the CCP paid much more attention to the struggle against the Soviet Union by seeking the political support from the "intermediate zone". The Chinese government thus ignored the promise of non-intervention, when the priority was its relations with the Soviet Union concerning the ideological confrontation on the orthodoxy of Marxism that they inherited along with the issues of China's security, such as their conflicts on territories and administration authority to the harbors of Lüshun and Dalian as well as Changchun railway (Hsu, 2011, pp. 684-701; Shen, 2013). During the Sino-Soviet tension, China actively expanded its influence in the "intermediate zone" to compete against the Soviet Union. However, hindered by the non-intervention policy, China was scrupulous with interference in other countries' domestic affairs and concentrated on providing some Third World countries and Communist Parties with ideological supports and limited material helps, instead of direct military intervention.

14 The author divides the history of China's diplomacy into the Revolutionary and Post Revolutionary period by the symbol of the third plenary session of the eleventh central committee of the CCP held in 1978. At that conference, the CCP decided the new strategic center that was transferred into economic developments, and also established Deng Xiaoping's leadership in the CCP.

15 That can be explicitly evidenced by the ceremonial speech of Hasan Ghassani, from the PELOAG's office in Aden in which he expressed the Front's 'heartfelt thanks to socialist countries, particularly the PRC, for their moral and material support and aid to our revolution' (Behbehani, 1985, pp. 175-188).

Beyond the revolutionary period (1979-now)

China started the period focusing on developing economy, when Deng Xiaoping took power in the late 1970s. Through the calamity of the Cultural Revolution, the belief in Mao's thought encountered a crisis, which meant CCP's ideological basis of legitimacy was going through a declination. The democratic thought rooted from the Western countries was largely proliferated in Chinese academia and thus led to the democratic demonstration of Beijing's students on June 4th 1989. In the wake of the Tiananmen issue, China adjusted domestic and foreign policies and laid the foundation of current China's political inclinations including maintaining stability in internal politics and keeping low-profile yet actively participating in multilateral organizations on the international scene. In this process, state sovereignty has acquired huge resonance in China's domestic politics and diplomacy. From another point of view, that issue provides China with an opportunity to immerse itself in increasing economic capacity instead of ideological debates and deep engagement in international issues. Consequently, China has become an emerging power in the twenty-first century for its skyrocketing economy. Concomitantly, with the augment its capacity, China's status and role are intensified on the international platform, and so are the needs and responsibilities.

The international system has also gone through a series of structural changes since the end of the Cold War. Various changes in perceptions and many episodes of intervention act in combination produces a qualitative shift in the relationship between state autonomy and the authority of the international society, and thus the significance of international intervention has grown. Over the last three decades, the UN authorized a wider set of more extensive peace enforcement and humanitarian operations that made international intervention an increasingly frequent phenomenon within international politics (Carlsoln, 2004, p.12). Moreover, the concept of responsibility to protect (R2P) decays state sovereignty as a shield to illegalize appropriate intervention particularly the humanitarian intervention. The internationalization of human rights and the diffusion of R2P have promoted the evolution of non-intervention principle in international law, at least, in customary law. Therefore, the tension between human rights and state sovereignty, two pillars of international law, complicates China's diplomatic decisions.

In reality, China's attitude toward intervention is never uncompromising. Instead, it has evolved in accordance with the changes in the international environment. Taking PKOs as an the example, in the early years, China was so strongly opposing any kind of intervention activities that it would not even approve the UN PKOs. At the end of the Cold-War era, China began to participate in some peacekeeping tasks. China has gradually committed itself to a series of multilateral operations that

modified China's approach to peacekeeping and sovereignty's role in the international society. By 2008, China had become the fourteenth largest contributor and the second largest one in the five permanent members of the UN PKOs (Gill & Huang, 2009, p. 1). In addition, by abstentions or not voting on the UN resolutions, China has allowed the multilateral interventions to implement. For example, as for the resolutions on Iraq in 1989 and 1990, China showed a cooperative position and supported the relevant proposals. In this period, China's intervention behavior focuses on indirect intervention and is supplemented by silent intervention; recently, China has gradually engaged in the direct intervention activities.

Facing the pressure from the Western countries, China tries to use its leverage to intervene in certain countries' politics with severe human rights violations, such as Myanmar and Sudan, and deals with their domestic conflicts. In the Libyan War in 2009, China launched the military power to rescue its nationals in Libya for the first time. To protect its shipping security, the Chinese government also sent forces to Somalia targeting the piracy in the Gulf of Aden in 2008, and since then it has undertaken ten such missions- protecting some 4500 ships (China. org.cn, 2012). In order to improve its relationships with other countries, the Chinese government implicitly expresses its supports to some parties. For instance, in the run-up to the election, China delivered agricultural equipment, electricity transformers, and planeloads of T-shirts with the insignia of Mugabe's party to Zimbabwe who was in the run-up to the election. And the Chinese government is said to have sent Harare riot control gear to prevent demonstrations (Eisenman & Kurlantzick, 2006, p. 223). In sum, China opposes the idea of intervention by and large; however, it has participated in intervention actions in different manners out of variable intentions.

To interpret China's foreign behavior, it is appropriate to examine the paradox between China's words and actions. It does not necessarily mean China is of hypocrisy, bad faith or deliberate obfuscation. A word/deed or perception/policy dichotomy commonly exists in all state behavior, and to some extent, all human behavior. Moreover, the intervention has always been a major feature of international politics. As long as a country is not isolated, the actions of intervention are unavoidable though they may appear in different forms such as by exerting political influence transnationally. In China's situation, this gap between principles/norms and policies/actions can be accounted for by China's pronounced liability to espouse principles beyond its capability, sometimes the intention, to implement them (Kim, 1994, p. 9). In addition, China is prone to pursue political goals with certain emotional appeal and moral judgment.

III. Ideological base

As a newborn and weak regime, CCP carried out the policy of “leaning to one side” toward the socialism when it faced the international circumstance that two great powers existed and were antagonistic with each other (Mao, 1966, pp. 1477-1478). It is apparently contradicted with the principle of non-intervention, as the alliance of Sino-USSR means the intervention from the Soviet Union is inevitable. From the perspective that laggards could not afford the luxury of *laissez-faire*, the alliance with the Soviet Union was the only available choice for China considering the survival of the weak regime.¹⁶ However, the non-intervention introduced to China's diplomatic decisions seems natural and necessary.¹⁷ As for China's oral intransigence, what are the philosophical bases and normative implications underlying the principle of non-intervention in the ruler's interpretation, in other words, how does the authority conceptualize the non-intervention? The answer could or must be found by examining the meaning of intervention in China's domestic and foreign policies.

A term interpreted in different environments or from different perspectives will be given distinctive meanings. As Wittgenstein (1956, Part VI, §28) pointed out when language games change, concepts and notions change and the meaning of words change therewith. Words carry specific modes of thinking and of questioning that are based on historical experiences (Descarries, 2003, p. 634). Non-intervention and sovereignty are basically two sides of the same coin; and how to understand and apply these conceptions to foreign policies depends on one country's intent and value judgment, which will produce different fruit, either negatively or positively. The notion of non-intervention originally exogenous in Chinese understanding is derived from its historical experience, which yields the positive meaning, rather than the negative meaning of intervention.

China's history does matter in shaping its view of international order and legitimacy, and has an extraordinary presence in contemporary Chinese life and thought. As Samuel Kim (1994, p. 12) argues, “In no country does history seem to be playing as omnipotent and omnipresent a role as in China”. Including the history of “a century of humiliation” mentioned frequently by the Chinese people, thousands of years of history carries Chinese mixed sentiments imbuing their pride, disgrace, and hope for the future.¹⁸ Hence, the legacy of the history, particularly the exploitation by more economically developed countries, profoundly affects China's political thinking, thus shapes its attitude toward

16 The alliance ended in the 1960s due to the Sino-USSR split (MacFarquhar & Fairbank, 1987, pp. 262-270; Hsu, 2011, pp. 684-701).

17 The Chinese government implemented the intervention policy not merely because non-intervention was a norm widely recognized by majority countries. Considering the CCP regime in the Cold War, adhering to some international norms was not its prior concern. Besides, the PRC was not a member of the UN.

18 That is the reason why CCP tends to emphasize an orthodox history to justify its power. For instance, President Xi Jinping, the current CCP's general secretary, elaborated the miserable history of China and appealed that the country and its citizens should be united to realize the “Great Rejuvenation of Chinese Nation” under the new leadership of CCP (South China Morning Post, 2012).

non-intervention.

Non-intervention principle expresses China's standpoint of advocating the infrangible state sovereignty, for which Chinese people have been longing since they acknowledged the concept of sovereignty at the end of the Qing Dynasty.¹⁹ The concept of sovereignty is not static, and has taken on diverse meanings at different historical junctures as different elites evolve different stakes in the contents and applications of the concept (Rosenau, 1995, p.192). It was not rooted in Chinese civilization and cognition, but was imported into China through the translation and diffusion of the "Elements of International Law" (Wheaton, 1865). When this conception was established in the Chinese cognition, it was thus treated as exogenously given, and not as a locus of contestation, because it met the exact demands of China, a de facto semi-colony. Thanks to the proliferation of "Elements of International Law" in Chinese intellectual circle, the sovereignty becomes a momentarily conceptual instrument for the Chinese to face the Western society and to rethink China's identity, and to some extent it results in the overthrow of the Qing Court.²⁰ The amalgamation of instrument and morality of sovereignty persistently influences the Chinese foreign thoughts even in the contemporary era.

China's ruling group has interpreted non-intervention as an absolutely justifiable concept for anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism, particularly in the Mao's era. Non-intervention represents the international order and norm in the Chinese perspective, particularly in the mind of Mao Zedong, and has been capitalized on as a legitimate tool to oppose imperialism and colonialism. Mao, as a romantic nationalist, has always been pursuing an independent China from imperialism and colonialism. Before the establishment of the PRC, Mao (1966, p. 1461) stated his diplomatic idea embodying the spirit of non-intervention in "Li Tao Statement".²¹ He (1966, p. 1469) re-elaborated in 1949 that China's issues must be handled and addressed by Chinese people; and China would not permit a tiny bit of intervention from imperialist countries. This interpretation of non-intervention not only affected China's doctrine of the "united front"²² against hegemonism in the Cold War period, but also shaped China's current thought and cautious attitude toward intervention actions initiated by Western countries which may be by the Chinese government as hegemony.

Non-intervention also goes to the corollary of a nation's independence, self-reliance, modernization

19 It is consentingly considered Asia was a tributary system in which China was the center before the end of Qing Dynasty.

20 In fact, the case that late-Qing China changed the administrative status of Taiwan and Xinjiang from the dependency to the province was a consequence that China had been affected by the very conception of territorial sovereignty (Lam, 2009, pp. 272-275).

21 It is the shorten form of "On the Outrages by British Warships (1) Statement by The Spokesman of the General Headquarters of the Chinese People's Liberation Army". It records "In future, new China's diplomacy with other countries must be based on the equality, mutual benefit, and mutual respect for territorial integrity".

22 The united front is a form of struggle or political organization that may be carried out by revolutionaries or communist political regimes. In Chinese history, the united front has been carried out three times. In this article, it is the latest one that is established by the CCP for against the Soviet Union's hegemonism in 1973 and 1974.

and equal status in the international community. Struggling for independence has been labeled by CCP as China's diplomatic strategy and fundamental policy. In and after Mao's period, Chinese decision-makers have been following the political goal of pursuing independence. In the twelfth NCCPC, Deng Xiaoping (1983, p. 372) pointed out that the independence and the self-reliance are the foothold regardless of the past, present or future; and Chinese people not only cherish the friendship and cooperation with other countries, but also value the independent rights obtained through long-term fights. As Deng's successors, Jiang Zemin (2002) and Hu Jintao (2007) respectively highlighted the independent foreign policy in the reports of the sixteenth NCCPC in 2002 and the seventeenth NCCPC in 2007. Although these reports do not lack ideal catchwords and propagandas, they reflect Chinese consistent logic and self-position in foreign policies. Strengthening China's capacity and enhancing its prestige as an independent nation in the international arena are the steady goals for which the Chinese have been striving for decades.²³ In short, one feature of China's foreign policy is a keenly rhetorical emphasis on ensuring respect for sovereign rights.

In the context of China's foreign thoughts, non-intervention also stands for the national values and moral judgments, though different circumstances may take on distinctive meanings related to independence, self-reliance, anti-imperialism, anti-colonialism, and anti-hegemonism, etc. Opposing intervention activities from other countries means the Chinese people have the power, prerogatives and capability to manage their own affairs, and also represents the termination of China's disgraced history. The intervention, however, is a word that often comes to Chinese minds to describe the Western countries actions that should be denounced. Therefore, the notion of intervention has been constructed in the Chinese government's worldview as powers' coercive actions toward the weaker, and thus is perceived as a sign of immorality. In China's diplomatic discourse, Western intervention activities concerning Beijing's domestic issues, such as issues on Taiwan, Tibet, Xinjiang, human rights etc., must be firmly rejected. The Chinese government officials' statements lashing out Western countries' interventions reinforce the negative meaning of intervention. China's understanding toward non-intervention engenders problems that the Chinese government tends to broaden the negative side of interference to describe intervention behavior proposed by Western countries, but blurs its own intervention actions by applying different Chinese words that are essentially similar to intervention, such as conciliation, mediation, creative engagement and involvement, etc., instead of the very "negative" word intervention.²⁴ Finnemore (2003, p.18) argued that to "work" and be politically useful,

23 In the history of China's diplomacy, China has experienced the alliance with the Soviet Union and the quasi-alliance with the United States. Yet these episodes, may be taken as tactics or contingencies, cannot deny the whole story that China is continuously pursuing independence.

24 These words are easy to find in official documents and Chinese scholars' academic articles. The typical one is the book of "creative involvement" written by a famous researcher Wang Yizhou (Wang, 2011).

intervention must achieve a goal that states and domestic publics accept and do so in a manner they view as legitimate. Since the Chinese government continually exploits the negative meaning of intervention, there is no convincing reason to change the non-intervention policy.

IV. Motives and payoffs of the non-intervention policy and intervention behavior

Foreign policies encompass decisions and actions deemed imperative to protect domestic core value from external threats and to pursue country's interest (Leffler, 1990, p.143). In other words, the ideology and interests intersect in foreign policies. In addition to the ideological incentive, the non-intervention policy and actual intervention behavior are consistently in line with Chinese national interests, even if these interests have been evolving with the international environment and China's own demands. The term of national interest has appeared frequently in Chinese official discourses and the state-owned media since China implemented "the reform and opening-up policy".²⁵ Nevertheless, the Chinese government had not given an explicit definition on what interests are prominent until the White Paper on "China's Peaceful Development" was released. It demonstrates China's core interests including state sovereignty, national security, territorial integrity and national reunification, China's political system established by the Constitution and overall social stability, and the basic safeguards for sustainable economic and social developments (IOSC, September 2011). Although the definition is still comprehensive and obscure, it explicitly takes the terms of "state sovereignty" and "economic and social development" into the sort of core interests.²⁶ It indeed reflects China's domestic priorities and opinions in accordance with China's declarations.²⁷ Due to the correlation and mutual embedment of these interests, for analytical convenience, this article roughly summarizes and categorizes these interests into three objectives: guaranteeing the survival of the current regime, keeping the authority control over domestic issues, and maintaining the country's development. The policy of non-intervention is embodied in the process of realizing these interests.

25 Zhang Qingmin and Li Minkan conducted a statistical analysis that calculates the frequency of the key word of "national interest" appearing in the officially mainstream newspaper—Renmin ribao [People's Daily] (Zhang & Li, 2011). This research examines the change that Chinese government has choose different words to express its foreign policy.

26 Some critiques (Zhang W. , 2011) argue the essence of this announcement or the core interests is to maintain China's political system, in other words, to keep the priority of CCP. The author agrees with this argument, but the point is these core interests are the requirements and the function of political legalization for CCP.

27 These pronouncements are natural not merely for the Chinese government, according to Holsti (1967, pp. 132-133), most policy-makers assume that the most essential objectives of any foreign policy are to ensure the defense of the home territory and perpetuate a particular political, social, and economic system based on that territory.

Regime's survival

Maintaining political survival of the existing regime is the crucial objective of Chinese reigning elite (i.e. CCP). It is a combination of socialist authoritarianism and national developmentalism.²⁸ In other words, the Chinese ruling group commits itself to assuring its authority, reputation and power, which are the basic determinant of Chinese foreign policy. Although some episodes such as the Cultural Revolution and the Tiananmen carnage have undermined the CCP's internal and external legitimacy, the remedies involving strengthening the nation's capacity and reputation by various approaches have worked effectively. Internationally, attaining diplomatic recognition includes being recognized as the administrative state and heightening international prominence. It is sensible to exert the non-intervention policy as an appropriate method for China to fulfill these objectives.

China's non-intervention principle was endorsed broadly at the Bandung Conference of non-aligned nations where China played an active actor. At that Conference, Zhou Enlai pointed out that abstinence from interventions in the internal affairs was what the developing countries concerned most and thus expressed China's assurance of non-interference in the internal affairs of these countries (New York Times, 1955).²⁹ The acceptance by the majority of countries in the 1955 Asian-African Conference at Bandung to some extent empowered China's non-intervention principle.³⁰ Being deeply congenial with Chinese experience, the Third World countries also emphasized non-intervention because they were sensitive to Western countries' management and the possible erosion of the sovereignty, and were suspicious of the development of a "right" to international intervention, which may serve to cloak domination by the major powers. In light of the proposition of liking, as the folk wisdom goes, "birds of a feather flock together", similarity increases proximity and easily leads to trust, particularly in the condition of stressing the proximity.³¹ It is not difficult to understand China's positive image praised by the like-minded countries. As a consequence, China's prestige and influence rose steadily, and at one point Peking (Beijing) seemed to be emerging as the champion of the world's newly independent nations (MacFarquhar & Fairbank, 1987, p. 261). At that time when most Western countries did not recognize the CCP's control over China, non-intervention policy played a significant role in enhancing

28 The CCP reiterates the Four Cardinal Principles is the ideological principles: the Four Cardinal Principles of adherence to the socialist road, the people's democratic dictatorship, the leadership of the Communist Party of China, and Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought.

29 Zhou Enlai added that non-intervention policy applied to all countries; and he merely took these two countries as examples.

30 These principles- 1 mutual respect for each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity; 2 mutual non-aggression; 3 non-interference in each other's internal affairs; 4 equality and mutual benefit; and 5 peaceful co-existence, were ultimately written into the "Declaration on Promotion of World Peace and Cooperation" (CFM, 2000; European Navigator, pp. 9-10).

31 Research in social psychology supports the "proximity" argument (Myers, 1996, p. 499).

Chinese prestige within the Third World countries, which brought the external acknowledgment to CCP's legitimacy.

The Third World was seen as a vast and pivotal area with tremendous revolutionary potential and became more significant to Chinese international relations (Chan, 1999, p. 204). Premier Zhou Enlai applied the conventional Chinese exhortation “Do not do unto others what you yourself do not desire” to explain China's attitude toward intervention and to appease these countries weaker than itself.³² As historian Immanuel Hsu (2011, p. 669) pointed out, China, as a weaker, finds a route to transfer its destiny and to enhance its status. Thus, China becomes an aspiration to some developing countries. In 1963, during Zhou's official visit to Africa, he emphasized the non-intervention principle and brought out “The Five Principles of relationship between China and Africa-Arab countries”, in which the fifth term was “the state sovereignty should be respected; and thus we are opposing any violations and interventions from anywhere” (Zhou, 2012, p. 38). Seen from the consequence, at least through the Cold War period except the 1960s, non-intervention policy consolidated the relationships between China and the Third World countries. Indeed, to a large extent, in addition to China (PRC)'s entrance into the UN, breaking the enclosure of Western countries' sanctions after the Tiananmen issue has attributed greatly to the supports from the Third World countries.

China's promise of non-intervention attracted many developing countries, but its intervention activities dissatisfied these countries. With the decay of Sino-USSR relations, China's foreign policy concentrated on objecting to the USSR imperialism and the US hegemonism, although oppositions to the two powers seldom occurred at the same time. Many Afro-Asian countries grew suspicious of Chinese intentions, went looking for proof of Chinese duplicity, and usually found it in the form of arms caches or Chinese supported anti-regime guerrilla training bases (MacFarquhar & Fairbank, 1991, p. 228). Due to the disclosure of China's intervention activities, some “traditionally” friendly countries cut their diplomatic relations with China. For instance, a Chinese-assisted plot to murder the president of Burundi was discovered in early 1965, which led to cutting off diplomatic ties with China by the Burundi government. Following Burundi, two African countries, Dahomey and the Central African Republic, broke diplomatic relations with China in early 1966. As a consequence of its intervention activities, China's Asian and Latin American policy collapsed. The typical cases are in Cuba whose leader Fidel Castro broke with China on grounds of Chinese interference in Cuban affairs, and in Indonesia where the failure of China supported Indonesian Communist Party resulted in enormous loss of China's prestige (MacFarquhar & Fairbank, 1991, pp. 229-231). The succession of diplomatic failures of China's “People's War” in the international arena to a certain degree has influenced China's

32 “Ji suo buyu, wu shi yu ren” was used in Zhou's speech in the Bandung Conference (Lawrance, 1975, p. 163).

domestic policy, and thus initiated the long-term disorder of the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976).

Furthermore, the non-intervention policy also brings challenges for Chinese diplomacy, as the external recognitions that China needed were not only from the developing countries especially at the end of the Mao's era. China, therefore, implements a comprehensive foreign policy, which develops diplomatic relations with all countries no matter what their political regimes are. With China's rise, the self-appointed responsible country is a principal method used to enhance its international image. The non-intervention in other countries' affairs is one facet of Chinese promise of being responsible power. On the other hand, the non-intervention policy not only belies China's self-position but also highlights China's discordance with Western countries. The Chinese government employs the non-intervention policy to woo the developing countries, and simultaneously to stand at the opposite side of the Western countries. However, if the Chinese government abandoned this policy, Beijing not only would break its own promise but also would damage its own interests in developing countries. Although some criticisms have undermined China's international image, they will not shake the foundation of the current regime. The benefit surpasses the cost from the Chinese government's perspective. However, China does not totally ignore the appropriate unfavorable judgments and makes a compromise and changes its attitude and behavior toward specific cases to relieve the international pressure. In the example of resolutions on Iraq in 1989 and 1990 after the Tiananmen Massacre, China encountered the double legitimacy crises, domestically and internationally; Beijing thus supported the Western countries' proposal without hesitation to dilute the international denouncement. That is the reason why China performs the indirect or silent intervention behavior in the post-Cold War period. Whether the Chinese government conducts direct interventions depends on the degree of international stress and to what extent the stress will result in a legitimacy crisis to the current regime.

Domestic issues

Historical experience and geographical situation set the agenda for Chinese foreign policy. Considering China's conventionally political value of unity, it is natural that China's first objective is to recover and maintain territorial integrity. In addition to the historical legacy, territoriality may be an efficient strategy for enforcing control. Indeed, the initial purpose of establishing the Five Principles was mainly to resolve the territorial problem (Tibet) between China and India. At that time, Taiwan was listed as an "un-liberated Chinese territory", making U.S. support for the Nationalist there seem to Peking (Beijing) yet another egregious Western interference with China's internal affairs (Ford, 2010, p. 199). In addition to reclaiming the lost regions such as Hong Kong and Macao, China has been seeking to hinder outside supports for separatist movements in Tibet, Xinjiang, and Inner Mongolia, and hence

built up the intense military boundary protections. The Chinese government is so sensitive to these domestic issues that it denounces other countries' actions and words by applying the non-intervention policy.

Furthermore, the Chinese government has been taking advantage of non-intervention policy to oppose denouncement on its issue of human rights since the Tiananmen incident took place. It protests the US issuance of the "Country Report on Human Rights Practices" almost every year, claiming that the report violates China's sovereignty and interferences with China's internal affairs.³³ Ironically, China also publishes the "Report on Human Rights Practices of the US" following the US Report to counterattack the US, but the Chinese government does not take its behavior as a violation to the US sovereignty or to its non-intervention policy. The principle of non-intervention provides the Chinese government with a legal shield, with which external criticism will be labeled interference in internal affairs and therefore deemed illegitimate. China can hold the weapon of non-intervention policy in its unrelenting efforts to maintain its control over the domestic problems. In short, China has traditionally paid grave attention to the sovereign rights, in keeping with its resistance to outside involvement in its affairs.

The non-intervention policy is used as a shield by the Chinese government to keep its absolute control over domestic affairs away from the foreign engagements. These knotty domestic affairs simultaneously delimit its foreign behavior, particularly the participation in international intervention. For example, China highlighted the non-intervention during the Yugoslavia War and refused to recognize the independency of Kosovo to avoid the similar issues occurring to itself, since the problems of Tibet and Xinjiang existed and Taiwan issue was still pending. Besides, China usually does not support toppling a current regime by force in the form of foreign intervention activities or domestic rebellions, no matter what the reasons are. It mirrors that the Chinese government supports whoever is in power in other countries' affairs, because China insists on the CCP's legitimacy as the current regime and its infrangible control. By employing the non-intervention policy, China can wait on the sidelines, and then decide whether to recognize the legitimacy of opposition movements when dictators have fallen or how to behave after receiving responses from the rest of the world. The response of the Chinese government at the start to the upheaval in Egypt was typical of this style. The state-owned media portrayed Egyptian anti-government demonstrators as lawless troublemakers and played down their impact (Economist, 2011). In order to defend against foreign interventions in China's domestic affairs, the Chinese government cannot proactively interfere in others' problems. Therefore, the indirect

33 But the sacred non-intervention principle is not able to stop the Western countries from the "violation of China's sovereignty" (Qiao, 2011, pp. 3-4).

and silent intervention activities are adopted by China.

Development perspectives

A country's development is one of the indispensable approaches to sustaining a regime's survival, provided that the common good to citizens is the rightful source of domestic political authority.³⁴ The goal of self-preservation engages CCP to maintain the absolute control and to keep economic development at a high rate in the post-Cold War era. China has been keeping low-profile diplomacy and has immersed itself in the economic development for more than two decades. Bulwarking China through two serious economic crises underscores the effectiveness of economic performance as the critical way to CCP's legitimacy. China's economic model impacts its relationship with the Third World countries, and the roles of these countries are no longer the purely political partnerships of China. China's high-speed economy growth is supported by abundant energy sources and merchandise exports. In 1993, China transferred its role in the market of resources, especially natural oil, from an exporter to the importer. Nowadays approximately half of China's natural resources are imported.³⁵ China thus develops a growing hunger for more energy and natural resources, in which the developing countries are rich. More than half of the crude oil imported is supplied by the Middle East and one-third come from Africa.³⁶ In sum, the demand of China's domestic development reshaped the relations of China and the developing countries, particularly oil-producing countries.

Nonetheless, if taking the continuity of policies into account, it is not pertinent to argue that China's non-intervention policy is a sheer instrument for attaining natural resources from the developing countries. In 1983, Premier Zhao made a clear presentation of China's non-intervention policy, "Without any political preconditions and privileges, China involves the cooperation with African countries on the base of solidarity and friendliness and adheres to the principle of equality and mutual benefit (Sina, 2006)." In 1992, Chinese President Yang Shangkun visited three African countries and declared that China would like to develop friendly communication and diverse economic co-operations with African countries on the basis of the Five Principles.³⁷ He particularly accentuated that China supported the African countries' endeavors to maintain state's sovereignty and nation's independence,

34 A regime usually adopts three approaches including ideological legality, performance legality, and procedural legality to achieve legitimacy (Easton, 1965; Beetham, 1991). In China's case, after the Cultural Revolution, the ideological legality gradually loses the effectiveness; and as an authoritarian country, it does not satisfy the procedural legality. Thus, the performance legality is the last method to the Chinese government.

35 China's import dependence ratio of natural oil is as high as 55.2% in months during January to March of 2011, and that number is higher than that of US. The datum is adopted a report (Li & Ma, 2011, p. 2), but there are two other accumulated data of 53.5% and 61% given respectively by the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology and the National Development and Reform Commission of PRC.

36 See the statics provided by the General Administration of Customs of the PRC.

37 The speech is titled "Six Principles on relationships of Sino-African countries".

opposing external interventions, and developing the economy (Sina, 2006). In the official visit to African countries in 1996, Jiang Zemin made a speech and emphasized the non-intervention principle. In his speech, the assistance without any political preconditions was highlighted (CFM, n.d.). The principle of non-intervention indeed has its attraction and assists China with easy access for natural resources, which can be clearly demonstrated in the case of African countries.

That does not necessarily mean China is hypocritical and immoral toward the developing countries. As a latecomer of natural resources explorer and exporter, Chinese enterprises lack the technologic advantages, experience and market in cooperation with developing countries. Companies reasonably acquire the market share by taking advantage of sound relationships between China and the developing countries. Although it is the behavior of companies for pursuing profits, given China's demand for natural resources and the nature of state-owned enterprises, these companies unavoidably undertake the task of the countries' development. On the other hand, the Chinese government is obliged to help companies fulfill these tasks. The defense of sovereignty is a major element in the policies and rhetoric of developing countries that view intervention as an endemic and pervasive feature of international relations, embedded in the very structure of power relations between themselves and the highly industrialized countries of the North (Gamba, 1993, pp. 115-125). China does not impose its value on weaker nations, and thus offers an alternative to the American conception of a new kind of world (Nathan & Ross, 1997, p. 5). Therefore, China can utilize the policy of non-intervention to consolidate the friendly relations with these developing countries.

Implementing non-intervention policy and promising not to intervene in the domestic affairs of other countries, usually weaker than China, not only appease these countries, but also portray China as the moral superiority different from Western countries. Thus, China's outreach has been well received by many leaders of developing countries, who welcome China's rhetoric of non-interference and constant inveighing against American "hegemonism" (Eisenman & Kurlantzick, 2006, p. 222). For instance, on the visit to Beijing, Mozambique's prime minister announced that his country would support China's "independent foreign policy"- a term Beijing uses to denote independent foreign policy from American power, and called for China to play a larger role on the African continent (Eisenman & Kurlantzick, 2006, p. 219). China's success of non-intervention policy to some extent attributes to the political compatibility. The similar undemocratic regimes facilitate reaching consensus on opposing foreign intervention activities between China and some developing countries. Therefore, China's non-intervention policy has been marked by the strategy of enhancing its own status.

Viewed in the perspective of rationalism, the non-intervention policy draws its vitalities and meanings in specific circumstances from its service to China's national interest. This approach has

enabled Chinese leaders not only to avoid diplomatic disputes and to enhance its diplomatic status during the Cold War, but also to easily maximize the resources directed toward domestic economic growth and to build foreign relationships with a wide variety of regime types in the post-Cold War era. However, this non-intervention policy has been criticized by Western countries and put China into a diplomatic dilemma. China's investments and assistances benefit the governors of pariah countries rather than average civilians because China ignores the terrible human rights records of these countries and acquiesces in their inhumane behavior. If China chooses to adhere to its non-intervention policy or to remain silent when it faces the authentic mass human violation, it will be probably interpreted as implicit moral approval of the wrongdoing. Furthermore, as an emerging power, the isolationism of foreign policy is not corresponding to China's capability and position on the international stage. China is in a less favorable position to take advantage of non-intervention today than it was in the Cold-War period and the early 1990s. Thus, albeit overall reluctant and cautious, China is slightly tweaking its behavior, and engages in some international intervention activities.

V. Principle versus flexibility

Although China's pronouncements and activities are contradicted regarding the non-intervention, from the standpoint of China, fixed principles with flexible policies are compatible. It is easy to find the words principles (*yuanze xing*) and flexibilities (*linghuo xing*) seemingly contradicted but simultaneously recorded in China's foreign documents. When the CCP prepared to establish the new China in 1949, Zhou Enlai brought out the basic guideline of diplomatic work, which was adhering to the principles but at the same time keeping a flexible position to deal with specific problems according to their natures (Li P., 1994, p. 306). In addition to foreign policy, Mao (1966, p. 1437) asserted the governance position by using the combined notion, "Our principle must be steadfast, but in order to fulfill that principle we also need to hold the permitted and necessary flexibility". China's claim to an independent foreign policy is a case in point. Even though the Chinese government takes it as a value and objective, the independence has never been attained to the absolute extent owing to the alliance of Sino-USSR and the quasi-alliance of Sino-US.

Some scholars argue that a ritualistic conformity to proper form (*orthopraxy*)-coexisting with a practical acceptance of divergent beliefs (*heterodoxy*)- has been a hallmark of traditional Chinese culture; and the ancient Chinese money, round with a square hollow in the middle, serves as a metaphor in thinking about the dichotomy (Chan, 1999, p. 198; Zhao, 2007, p. 119).³⁸ From the perspective of

38 This is a traditional Chinese people's philosopher that one needs to shape his/her personality resembles to the ancient Chinese money (*waiyuan neifang*).

culture, China's case is so complex and diverse that there is bound to be substantial flexibility in its components to enable it to adapt to changing conditions and issues.³⁹ China usually holds various doctrines and principles that are mutually contradicted at the same time, but the Chinese consider them complementary rather than competitive.⁴⁰ In this way, the Chinese could freely address the realistic problem about which they concern most without breaking the certain principle. Thus, China's politics has a traditional feature that the governors tend to conceal their interests by emphasizing the moral pursuit vocally in order to maintain the self-comfort when they have to compromise for a long-term goal.

Despite opposing interventions, the Chinese government has not clarified the definition and means of interventions. This obscure way leaves China's foreign behavior much more room, but brings about a difficult observation on China's non-intervention policy. As for the extraneous concepts, non-intervention is a typical case; China can interpret their meanings according to its own purposes for guarding its domestic system from foreign influence and justifying its foreign activities by supporting this conventional Westphalian system. Chinese diplomatic officials use the word "non-intervention" so freely that they undermine the respect for this principle. It engenders the notion of non-intervention as a cliché for China to blindly counterattack foreign critiques and to technically escape international responsibilities.

Conclusion

This article has mainly shed light on the reason why China's international behavior contradicted its rhetoric of non-intervention policy; a theme has not been extensively elaborated by the previous literature. First it explained why the Chinese government has been strongly insisting on the non-intervention principle in political pronouncements. In China's diplomatic history, the Chinese government has possessed various ideological concepts and doctrines including the united front, the People's War, the Five Principles and the Three Worlds theory, etc., which served Chinese interests in certain times, however, only the Five Principles lasted for almost six decades. In addition to conforming to the non-intervention principle as the norm of the contemporary international order, China's adherence to non-intervention principle can be explicated by contemplating its ideological base and real demands. Except the legitimacy of non-intervention established in Chinese minds, the non-intervention policy in the context of China's diplomacy has two purposes targeting different objects in the international society. Roughly speaking, protecting its domestic affairs from interventions

39 This article does not intend to defend the contradicted behavior of the Chinese government. Instead, it is to explain that the behavior is looked short of a consistency, but took for granted in the Chinese culture.

40 The typical case is the principles of "peaceful coexistence" and "anti-hegemonism" carried out by the Chinese government at the same time.

aims at the Western countries. In contrast, the object in which China promises not to intervene is the developing countries. Concomitantly, China's attitude and proclivity under the dichotomy of intervention yield different assessments that the Chinese government minimizes the scope of its own intervention activities toward developing countries but broadens the cognition of intervention actions from Western countries.

Second, this article is different from the mainstream theories of international relations that cannot specifically explain China's motivations and diplomatic priorities regarding non-intervention policy and intervention behavior. It emphasized on China's domestic needs for non-intervention policy and argued that both the non-intervention principle and the intervention behavior are continually emphasized in different situations in accordance with China's actual interests concerning the regime's survival, domestic issues and country's development. China's decisions on whether to employ interventions depend on the degree of three factors' significance in different situations. It is worth paying attention to that the non-intervention policy was never as consistent as it appeared. In the China's diplomatic history, the government has not continuously emphasized on the non-intervention principle, although the officials were keen to highlight the consistency. Not to change the non-intervention policy does not mean China did not conduct any intervention activities. In fact, China's behavior is flexible and pragmatic. China participates in some interventions but avoids using the very term "intervention" to justify the behavior. As a result of China's increasing economic and military might and altered status on the international scene, its national interests have extended well beyond the traditional boundary of its territorial borders, and so have its responsibility assumed in the international society. The non-intervention policy has become an increasingly controversial issue in the evolving relationship between China and the outside world. The non-intervention thus becomes a double-edged sword for Chinese foreign policy. On one hand, it can produce optimal effects. On the other hand, it incurs denouncement.

However, China's ambiguity and vagueness toward non-intervention, though often poorly interpreted as mystery and obscurity, is a good tool that can be applied to changing situations. In terms of China's diplomatic culture, the adherence to non-intervention principle and the flexible implementation of intervention actions are compatible. This contradiction in Chinese perspectives is an advisable approach to confront different issues in various circumstances.

This article generally drew a contour of the word/ deed dichotomy existing in China's non-intervention policy. Nevertheless, the real task is probably not only to identify the incongruity between China's words and deeds, but also to systemically analyze and compare this contradiction of Chinese foreign policy in specific issue areas and toward different actors including countries and

international organizations. Therefore, how China changes its cognition and activity of intervention in certain international organizations to address specific problems, and how China balances its political pronouncement and practice regarding non-intervention policy should be under further scrutiny.

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中国の不干渉政策と干渉行為に対する分析

要約

中国は国際社会との関係においては他国の内政には干渉しない不干渉政策を原則としてきた。そのことは中国がウエストファリア体系の絶対的主権概念に従っていることを意味した。しかし、国際環境が変化し、中国の国力が増大するにしたがって、この不干渉政策が中国の国益に合致しない側面が生まれており、実質的にそれに反する政策も実行されている。それにもかかわらず、中国政府はこの政策を変更していないし、また、変更する考えもないと言明している。すなわち、中国の不干渉政策において言行不一致がみられるようになっているのである。本稿はこの不干渉政策における言行不一致の発生要因について分析する。

まず、中国の不干渉政策の歴史を回顧してみると、不干渉原則が単にウエストファリア体系の思想を受け入れたというだけでなく、自国の半植民地化の歴史および第 2 次世界大戦後の冷戦の現実と第三世界の発展を基礎としたものであることがわかる。中国が不干渉政策はこのような背景の下で、①国内レジームの維持、② 国家の核心的利益（国家主権、国家安全保障、領土保全）の擁護、③経済発展のための対外関係の維持、のすべてを行うということによって動機づけられている。

ついで、中国の不干渉原則の言明と実際の政策の不一致の発生要因について分析する。まず、中国に限らない一般論として、原則がある一方で柔軟な対応を行うのが、外交政策上は必要である。中国の不干渉政策は上記に見たような歴史的・国際的背景をもつことから、容易に撤回できない。しかし、国際情勢の変化、中国の国外権益の増大、中国の国際的責任負担の要求の高まりのなかで、実質的にそれに反する政策も求められるようになっている。そこで、中国は「干渉」を否定的かつ攻撃的なものに限定した狭義の定義を行い、積極的・防御的なものについてはその定義から外し、別の用語でもって表現することを行ってきた。中国は今や①直接的介入、②間接的介入、③黙認による実質的介入の 3 つの次元での介入を行うようになってきている。かくして、中国は政策の一貫性の外観を担保しつつ、政策実行面の柔軟性を獲得しているのである。このような言行不一致の対応は問題があるとはいえ、決して不可解なことではなく、中国の外交政策上の合理的根拠を持つものである。

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