

CALMING DOWN THE GHOST OF CONFLICT: Post-Conflict Governance at Poso, Central Sulawesi-Indonesia 2001-2011

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INTRODUCTION

This is the study about post-conflict governance, in Poso District, Central Sulawesi Province in Indonesia. Poso experienced a bitter violent conflict between communities based on religious lines in 1998-2001. The communal scale conflict was abruptly stopped by a peace agreement in 2001, but conflict on a smaller-scale continued until the year of 2007.

Despite the fact that former Poso district was the widest and the richest district in Central Sulawesi Province, its existence was almost unheard at the national level. So that, the bloody sectarian conflict of Poso was unexpected and it gained concern from scholarship. Moreover, even though Poso District is located in the rural coastal area of Sulawesi Island, which is also far from the capital city of Indonesia, Jakarta, and the impact of Poso conflict reverberates through the national level.

Ten years after the peace agreement in 2001 call for an assessment of how the governance has been conducted in Poso. A decade after the peace agreement, the open conflict was ended; however, the underground disagreement remains. Many people never returned to their old villages and lands since the conflict erupted, due to the old fears and, unofficially but factually, territory segregation between conflicted parties. Criminal deeds related to the old conflict also occur once in a while until the early of 2011. What is more, Poso still holds the title as the home of terrorists in Indonesia, especially since many ex-combatants of Poso are proved to be connected to some terrorist events and plans in all over Indonesia.¹

This work based on field research in the affected area, from December 2010 until January 2011. The study seeks to describe and analyze the post-conflict governance, its actors and their roles, the obstacles, and the prospect for sustainable peace. The work using the concept of governance provided by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), which defines governance as “the exercise of economic, political, and administrative authority to manage a country’s affairs at all levels. It comprises mechanisms, processes, and institutions through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, exercise their legal rights, meet their obligations, and mediate their difference” (UNDP 1997). Thus, effective governance can be defined as the way in which higher institutions exercise some rules, with balance, in order to serve and to restrain different interests in the society. Therefore, applying the concept and taking the state of the governance in current Poso, the study comes to the main argument that even after a decade of post-conflict, the state of peace in Poso is under questions due to the remaining disagreement among communities and weak law enforcement. As peace and reconciliation require a long journey of works, the study underlines that the post-conflict governance that been conducted in Poso is reminiscent of calming down the potency of conflict, ghost of conflict, rather than banishing it.

1. The history of the conflict, the conflict, and the current social posture

Poso conflict has rooted in its history. Separation between communities along religious lines has existed since the colonial period. In pre-colonial times, indigenous groups lived in coastal areas met Muslims sea-traders and became Muslims, whereas different ethnic groups lived in the interior highlands followed their animist beliefs. In the early 1900s, the Dutch Protestant missionaries: Netherlands Mission Society (*Nederlands Zandeling Genootschap*) came to proselytize indigenous animist groups to Christianity. The headquarters was established in Tentena, Poso (Aragon 2001; Schrauwers 2000). Further, they managed these Protestants as an ally in opposite with the Muslim-influenced coastal kingdoms. The colonial administration gratified its ally with education, health facilities, agricultural knowledge, and position in bureaucracy. By favoring Christians over Muslims, the colonial government created a situation that made Islam a force of anti-colonial resistance (Brown, Tajima and Hadi 2005). Soon, Poso, especially its mission centre of Tentena became famous as one of the most successful Christian mission fields in the Netherlands Indies (van Klinken 2007).

After independence in 1945, regional rebellions affected Central Sulawesi; some took form in clashes between communities. During 1966-1998, the majority population of Poso was still Pamona Protestants and their leaders held partial control over local bureaucracy. Lorraine Aragon claims that Poso and Central Sulawesi in the 1980s was “Fields of the Lord” for their geographical isolation and their devotion to Christianity (Aragon, 2000). However, privilege changed when Central Sulawesi became transmigration destination in 1973² and the construction of Trans-Sulawesi Highway. It attracted voluntary migrants from other part of Sulawesi Island who were mostly Muslims. It gradually shifted the balance of Christian-Muslim population in Poso District. Steadily, Muslim population became majority. Voluntary migrants brought with them the knowledge of cash crop farming of a major export commodity, i.e. Cocoa (Acciaoli 2005) and rapidly changing the agricultural practices.³ Some natives could adapt to the new situation and became the haves, like some entrepreneur immigrants, yet many were left behind. Tania Li noted that Cocoa did create classes of agrarian haves and have-nots (2007). The national financial crisis in late 1997 exacerbated the economic gap. Furthermore, the natives started losing their customary lands by sold it to successful immigrant farmers. My informant similarly suggests the native people’s grievance of losing lands.⁴

Further, national politics put an enormous impact on political and social life in Poso. In the last decade of Suharto’s regime, there was a resurrection of Muslim community in Indonesia’s political contestation. Nationally wide, Christians grew to be anxious about the possibility of marginalization in the future (Bertrand, 2004). As Suharto changed attitude toward Muslims, there were the growing demands to revise the status of Muslims in politics (Bertrand 2010; Nordholt 2002). Poso was no difference. With the flood of successful entrepreneurial Muslims into the region, the more educated young Muslims increasingly occupied the desirable civil service positions. Further, competition between elite Muslims and Protestants for military posts and government positions, including the position of the head of Poso district (*Bupati*), was also intensified (Aragon 2001). Adnan Aarsal, a charismatic leader

of Muslim community, stated in interview that, in order to win the power competition in Poso, Protestants encouraged the idea to split Poso into 3 districts. Since the Muslim majority mostly lived in the area which would be included in Morowali District and Tojo Una-Una District, the idea splitting the region was an instrument for Protestants to win the power rivalry in Poso.⁵

The disagreement escalated and it topped by four periods of violence during 1998-2001, which cost thousands lives. The trigger of incidents was a competition among elites to get the position of Poso's District Head (*bupati*). The two parties favored different candidates based on their religious background.

Hence, the cause of Poso conflict was the nexus of some grounds. First, there were community power struggle both political and economic between natives and migrants communities. Second, the long rivalry between indigenous Protestants and migrant Muslims as a result of the Dutch colonial favored over Protestants. Third, the local elite struggle for power, which exploited communication gap of both communities.

The communal clashes ended after a fifth peace agreement so called The Malino Accord (*Deklarasi Malino*) in December 2001. The four previous agreements failed with new clashes. Yusuf Kalla the Coordinating Minister for People's Welfare who is also a native Sulawesi, succeeded in heading the mediation team and helped ensure resources for rebuilding and other crucial follow-up activities.⁶ Following the declaration, the government established a working group *pokja Malino*, to spread the message, monitor and implement the agreement. Security forces maintained weapons confiscation programs and deployed more security troops. These developments changed drastically the nature of violence in Poso.

2. Security governance during 2001-2011

Security sector is a main arena in the post-conflict recovery. The United Nations, in its famous *An Agenda for Peace* states that security is the key issue which must be settled to prevent societies from falling back into violent struggle.⁷ Building up the government capacity to provide security is crucial. Once security is maintained, the next step is political stability to ensure that democratic mechanism works to perform legitimate and accountable government.

The security governance of post-conflict Poso faced different challenges in two periods. The implementation of security governance did not run smoothly in the first period since the violence continued in a different form; terror actions. The second period started after a police raid in 2007 to arrest the terrorist suspects. Since then, the state of security is improving in Poso. However, despite the frequent government claim that the current state of security in Poso is stable and heading to sustainable peace it is in practice the state of 'order,' not 'peace.' Open conflict ceased and reconciled, and mass violence settled; though, evidences illustrate the remaining disagreement that sparked violence once in a while. Moreover, there are also many potential conflicts in the future that should be addressed.

For the better governance in post-conflict society, Brinkerhoff (2005) suggested three pillars. The first is legitimacy; referring to the acceptance of a governing regime as correct, appropriate and/or right. The strongest legitimacy source for governance is taking the form in democracy. The second pillar is security. This is an essential element to ensuring political stability as a foundation for normalizing economic and political activities. The third is effectiveness.

Poso is a small town in Indonesia. Even though the region was chaos, the state was strong, and the national government was legitimate. Therefore, the government legitimacy was not the issue in Poso's peace-building agenda. However, it did not apply to the legitimacy of security forces. The police admitted that, during 2001-2005, the legitimacy of security forces was weak, and it enhanced terrorism (Karnavian, et al. 2008).

2.1. The 2001-2007 period; the terror period

The 2001 Malino peace-agreement did not ended the violence in Poso. Radical groups had their own targets even after the agreement. Poso embraced many radical groups working for both sides during the clashes. In the Muslim side, Laskar Jihad (LJ), a paramilitary force formed in Java, came after a mass massacre of Muslim.⁸ They believed that Poso was the place for a real jihad.⁹ Then Jamaah Islamiyah (JI) a regional terrorist network infiltrated. They recruited and trained angry young man from Muslim side. After the peace agreement, Laskar Jihad dispersed and went back to their homelands. Nevertheless, the JI stayed (ICG 2007).

Terror actions replaced communal violence since the peace agreement. Hit and run shootings, kidnapping, killing, and bombing terrors stained Poso and the neighbourhood areas such as Palu City and Morowali District. The police recorded that, in the initial period of post peace-agreement, the violence were involved armed groups which attacked a village or neighbourhood. After the police raided the suspected groups, the form of violence shifted to attacking individuals and smaller groups. Bombing terror in public places took shape as well as random shooting toward ordinary people. The public got panicked. Informants mentioned that, at the moment, people used to hear the sound of gun shoot.¹⁰ Furthermore, bombing terrors were also flared. Three biggest bomb blasts that claimed high fatality were; the bomb in Central Market of Poso, a day before Islamic holy day of *Idul Fitri* in November 2004, at Tentena Market in May 2005, and a bomb blast in Maesa Pig Market at Palu City on the last day of December 2005. In total, around 37 people dead and 146 people injured from those bombings. Nevertheless, the most awful case was the beheaded of three school girls in October 2005, which gained national public concern and a stern pressure to the police.

The weak and unprofessional law enforcement was the source of the lasting violence in post peace-agreement of Poso. The governance actors failed to conduct disarmament of armed groups and enforced the law. In addition, radical groups blamed the police for its unfair law enforcement. The accusation derived from the process of the Malino peace-agreement. In the peace processes, the Muslim side were unsatisfied with the statement and decision of Jusuf Kalla, the initiator of peace-agreement, which considered all cases of violence have been closed and resolved to

the peace treaty.¹¹ Kalla stated that since peace was achieved, both parties should forgive each other, and the violent cases were closed. The Muslim pact translated it as; the perpetrators of violence and massacre toward Muslims during the crisis were free to walk away. Kalla insisted that his view was based on the fact that the form of violence during the conflict was communal and almost every person was involved, so, it made everyone had the possibility to be punished.¹² The Muslim side, however, argued that since Muslim suffered many in the loss of lives, the murder cases should not be closed without legal actions against the attackers.¹³ The lack of justice and the lack of neutrality in law enforcement were the reasons of the sustaining violence in the post peace-agreement.

In fact, the government conducted law enforcement toward the suspected persons involved in violence. The police caught Adrianus Tibo, Dominggus da Silva, and Marinus Riwu as the suspects of the massacre of Muslims in Pesantren Walisongo at May 2000.¹⁴ They were tried in court and sentenced to the death penalty in April 2001. In the trial, which went under the public high pressure, Tibo and friends insisted that they were innocent and accused 16 other people as the master-minds and the real perpetrators of the violence.¹⁵ The death penalty stimulated public discourses. Judging from the education and religious background of the convicts, who were uneducated migrant farm-workers and Catholics, many people doubted that those men were the real actors of the violence. On the other hand, Muslims in Poso supported the court decision based on the witness's confessions. The police tried to investigate the alleged involvement of the 16 persons; yet, they then declared there were no enough evidences to charge those alleged men.¹⁶ Interestingly, the former Central Sulawesi Police Chief, Commissioner General Oegroseno, shared his personal view of the doubt regarding the Tibo's role as the sole perpetrators of violence.¹⁷ Oegroseno, however, was promoted to another province before the execution of the three men. His successor, Police Brigadier General Badrodin Haiti, conducted the execution three weeks after his assignment. The investigation of the 16 other accused men stopped.

The trial of the three men was the only trial with the killing accusation and the death penalty. Other trials that had been conducted were on the possession of weapons, arms or bombs. The trials of violence resulted in the decisions of under 3-years imprisonment in average.

The long periods of violence existed due to the lack of legitimacy of the police in front of public. Kamavian (2008) pointed out that the source of the lack of legitimacy was due to the fear of the police officers to be the target of violence actions. Moreover, the clash between the police officers and the army soldiers, that happened several times, worsen the image of the security forces. There were several armed clashes between the police and the army during security operations in Poso, and they were caused by the institution rivalry between the two security forces. The leaders of these institutions were also holding some disagreement regarding the implementation of security control in the region. Civil society organizations strongly criticized the performance of security forces. The accusation was that the long violence in Poso was "by design" to smooth the plan of security forces to enlarge territorial commands, covering corruptions, and for the interest of the so called "security project" (*proyek pengamanan*).¹⁸

Violence decreased sharply in 2007, after police conducted stern raids on a place that was suspected to be the home base of terror actors on 11 and 22 January 2007. The place was Pondok Pesantren Amanah at Tanah Runtuh neighbourhood of Poso City, owned by Haji Adnan Aarsal. It was also the shelter for child refugees from the former Pesantren Walisongo that had been attacked during the crisis. Even the students were mostly young girls and children of the refugees, some teachers (*ustad*) from Java Island were the member of radical groups. They composed the place as the centre of the radical groups (ICG 2008). Surprisingly, not until 2004, the police did not recognize the role of those teachers in organizing terror actions in Poso (Kamavian, et al. 2008). In the raids, police received hard resistance. ICG (2008) reported that Muslims from across Poso and neighbouring districts came to join forces with their Tanah Runtuh colleagues in solidarity. Though, the Police succeed in the operations. Around eleven people of the suspects got killed. 64 people arrested, dozens of heavy weapons, thousands of ammunitions, and dozens of homemade bombs seized. Although there was criticism of human rights abuses in the way the police conducted the raid, it resulted in the decrease of violence in Poso.

2.2. The 2007-2010 period; the stabilization period

The second period of security governance in Poso started after January 2007. The violence disappeared, and the tension reduced. However, even though the police had succeeded in jailing some criminal actors, some suspects managed to escape. The remaining uncaught ex-militia and the ex-militia prisoners who already completed their short sentences were the factors that lingered radicalism. Additionally, the Chief of the Indonesian Military, General Djoko Santoso, stated the same warning. He affirmed his subordinates to be wary of terrorist threats in some conflict-prone areas of Indonesia, such as Poso (Antara News September 7, 2009). Therefore, one of the hard tasks in nurturing peace in Poso is still countering radicalism.

Radicalism is still the biggest problem of security governance in Poso. The remnants of radicalism even can be seen in 2011; three policemen were shot in Palu City, 25 May 2011. The police investigation found the link between the criminal suspects and the former radical groups. The shooting was also a proof that even the police and the army have raided and confiscated guns, and have appealed to the people to give up their weapons; illegal arms are still circulating in Poso.¹⁹ Moreover, informants shared their concern about the existence of radical thought laying in the society. They point out the possibility of activities in small *musholah* (minor praying centre) in the rural villages as the new spot of the study place of the radical groups.²⁰ However, judging from the response of the public toward violence threat, the situation is heading to the positive side of the state of security in Poso. Nowadays, people do not easily to get panicked when rumors and violence threats spreading.²¹ On a police raid to chase police shooter perpetrators, in June 2011, people did not move to defend the suspects. The situation was different few years back, when people stood against the police in a police raid on suspected shooters.²²

2.3. The potential sources of conflict

Despite the fact that there are still disappointments over the judicial process regarding the former violence and that there is no explicit resolution to overcome the underlying grievances, the tension in Poso has reduced and the live of people has been rebuilt. Nevertheless, it is too overconfidence to claim Poso is stable and normal. The potent of violence exists not only the potential for violence associated with the past, but also the violence related to the current social and political development. These potential conflicts of Poso are;

1. The land ownership disputes

There are conflicts potentials in to the dispute over land rights. During the past conflict, many people sought refuge and left their land. In aftermath, many have not gone back to their former neighborhoods. Some went back only to find that their old houses and lands were used by other people. Few people were able to manage the land trouble, and some stuck in debate of lands ownership evidences.²³

2. Transmigration issue

Currently, the national government is re-conducting a government-sponsored migration, so-called transmigration (*transmigrasi*), to Poso. It started to locate hundreds of people from other part of Indonesia, mostly from East-Java Province. Despite the fact that people of Talabosa Village and Betue Village rejected the idea of their 600 hectares of land being used in the resettlement project,²⁴ the government went on the program. The project started in 2010 and the Poso district government is providing 5,347 hectare land for the project. The government is preparing an “independent integrated city” (*Kota Terpadu Mandiri*, KTM) in Lore Peore sub-district to welcome the migrants.

3. Ethnic and identity competition

Like elsewhere in Indonesia, the revival of the sentiment of ethnicity and religion has been used to win the people's votes in the election. The phenomenon is a new development in the last ten years of democratic political contestation in Indonesia (Bourchier 2007). In the context of Poso, during the crisis, as an attempt to exclude themselves from conflict the native Muslims of Poso established the identity of Muslim To' Poso (the native Muslim of Poso). They tried to differentiate themselves with their Muslim counterpart from migrant groups. Furthermore, in the aftermath of crisis, people in Poso are identifying themselves in neighborhood's name rather than ethnicity. Marzuki, an academic from Tadulako University see it as people's effort to avoid religious identity that sticks to ethnic identity.²⁵

Though, during election times, candidates are still exploiting religious identity as the instrument to win the votes. In the district head election, the unwritten rule is to have a running mate from different religious groups. The combination is to keep the religious/ ethnic harmony in district. However, when the ethnic groups of Poso are getting more complicated and the other religious groups entering the power contestation, a simple combination of Muslim and Christian is no longer useful enough to maintain the social balance.

4. The treatment to ex-combatant

The police and local government have undergone a reintegration program to tame the violence potentials. Mc Rae (2009) noted that the best attribute of the programs was its side effect: the police were able to develop relations with ex-combatants which they were then able to leverage to develop their ability to manage security. The networks of ex-combatants are activated as an early-warning instrument, to tame the approaching violence.

However, the risk of over-using ex-combatant group's service is also present. Since there is no strict definition of the term "ex-combatant", many youth joined the group and claimed themselves as ex-combatant and enjoyed their privileges. The complication occurred when those groups abused the good faith of the government then by demanding assistance and financial support.²⁶ There is a trend of "project businesses" (*bisnis proyek*) in which the ex-combatant groups demanding to be appointed as the executors of the government's projects. There was a case that can be the signal of the morbidity of the relationship between the government and ex-combatant groups. It was a case of a beating against the chief of the Department of Settlement and Regional Plan of Poso District, Ir. Max Tungka, regarding the dissatisfaction of a tender of a project in 2008.²⁷

Interestingly, the politicians' utilizing ex-combatant groups as their political backup. The ex-combatant groups are serving as bodyguards, election campaigners, and supporters for the politicians. Sometimes they clash to each other and created tensions. The cases of terror bombings and threats in election times and violent demonstration are all proving the danger of having violence-familiar groups into the post-conflict political process. Aspinall (2009) found the same condition in Aceh; the ex-combatants in the aftermath of war became powerful actors in society. Thus, the current treatment for the violence-experienced groups should be reconsidered to prevent the risk of future incidents.

5. Security forces and exploitation of natural resources

Security forces are visible in Poso. Their posts are scattered all over the city. Police raid is still been conducted once in a while. The presence of heavily armed security forces guiding an event or demonstration is not a rare vision. NGOs have been criticizing the presence of security forces based on at least two reasons as follows. First, there are indications that the security forces, especially the military, have been riding the issue of communal violence to push the idea of increasing the number of territorial commands and by splitting Sulawesi Regional Military Command (Kodam VII/ Wirabuna) into two Regional Command (Aditjondro 2001; 2004). Furthermore, the suspicion that the Poso violence was "by design" of the military to conserve the "military business" is spreading. One of the problems of military business was that gun and ammunition trade with militias (ICG 2010; YTM 2004), illegal logging and exploitation of Poso's forest (Kontras 2004), and security protection business. The local military strongly denied these allegations. However, these are widely recognized as 'off-budget' revenue for the local territorial commands and, in fact, many informants during interview mentioned that during the crisis, the military personnel

were charging their operation cost, such as gasoline, truck's tire, foods and even the phone expense to the district government.²⁸ It was raised the question of where did the official budget of security forces from the central government gone. The indictment of military's unofficial business cannot be ignored in understanding the lack of neutrality of the military during the crisis.

The second allegation is regarding to the allocation of security forces' posts and bases are that mostly sited near the place of natural resource exploitation. In the creation of new army battalion in Poso (Battalion 714/ Sintuwu Maroso) who has three companions, the chief of local territorial command, Colonel Suwahyudi, claimed that the new battalions are designed to secure oil field and gas mining areas of Sinorang Toili owned by a notorious national-level businessman Tomy Winata.²⁹ Winata has been investing three million US dollars for the mining exploitation. Thus, a suspicion says that the new battalion is to protect the business of particular elite in Jakarta.

In Poso, PT Bukaka, a company owned by the former Vice President, Jusuf Kalla, entered the region in 2005 to exploit the water by building a hydropower plant. The investment, located in the Sulewana Village, is around 6 billion rupiah (6 million USD), and it is intended to provide electricity in South Sulawesi.³⁰ The army located an infantry in a village located between Sulewana Village and Tentena area (the Christian basis of Poso). The company is also located between headquarter of Battalion 714, and the Saojo Village as the companion base. By chance, Sulewana Village is also the hometown of the Poso Head District, Piet Inkiriwang. The project met protests since the beginning. People were objecting the takeover of their lands and the use of the water that could decrease the population of Sogili fish and threaten their fisheries livelihood. Yet, the project went on. Informant mentioned that the project officers of the company have used the military personnel to persuade people giving up their ancestral lands. Some resisted people been labeled as "unsupportive to development" as well as PKI (communist).³¹ An incident happened in March 2011 when the people of Peura Village objected the construction of two electricity towers in their village, due to the fear of the impact of the hanging wires to their health. The company responded by sending military personnel, police and state apparatus to confront the people. It created a tension in the area.³²

Therefore, judging from these facts, the connection between security forces and investments is clearly unfair for local population. The security forces have been used to back up the business investment.

3. Economic reconstruction

Economic reconstruction is crucial in the post-conflict management. Once violence is contained, the government has to restore public sector services and initiate economic recovery in a way to prevent the re-eruption of conflict. The AUSAID (2009) guide of economic growth in post-conflict countries stated mainly 4 causes of economic growth. They are economic rebound activity; the donor consumption; donor investment and; self-sustaining growth. The guide noted that: "The 'normal pattern of recovery after conflict is marked by an initial burst of economic rebound

activity but relatively disappointing progress thereafter.” In Poso, the challenge to rebound economic activity lays at self-sustaining growth using government economic policies as the instrument. Before analyzing the appropriate economic policies of a successful post-conflict reconstruction, the scope of “post-conflict economic reconstruction” should be formed. With this scope, we may be able to find the measurement to analyze whether a region has recovered economically from a conflict episode or not. Collier (2006) argued that raising the growth rate is more effective in reducing risks than enhancing military capability in conflict prevention. Growth directly shrinks conflict risk by cumulatively raising income and expanding economy. Hence, the appropriate economic policies are needed to raise growth. We should be careful of using the concept of per capita income, since it does not measure income distribution or wealth. The tricky situation is when income per capita of the region in post-conflict exceeds the pre-conflict period, but, the distribution of wealth is not evenly. The extreme investment in a post-conflict region can rapidly boost growth rate and income per capita, but it does not necessarily mean raising the wealth of the conflict-affected people. In this study, the definition of post-conflict economic reconstruction is revering to one offered by OECD (2003); which is “reactivating the economy and bring it to a sustainable development path through all the policy measures, including stabilization and structural reform, as well as institutional and capacity building activities.”

Investment is needed to rebuild the economy in post-conflict region. Peace scholars agree that a rapid post-conflict economic recovery represents the best opportunity of escaping from the poverty-conflict trap (Bigombe, Collier, and Sambanis 2000; Collier et al. 2003). A responsible private sector investment in the post-conflict region is also crucial part to break the poverty-conflict trap, not only by creating employment opportunities and providing incomes, but also by providing hope and a future standpoint for war-torn societies and leaders (Feil 2007). Moreover, as Mills and Qimiao (2006) notes, development partners need to ensure that their presence in post-conflict economies does not damage the sectors they are trying to support. Hence, to meet the challenge, the type of investment and its impact to the people economics and peace-building should be carefully examined

However, post-conflict Poso has faced serious challenges in its economic reconstruction. The challenge was regarding the exploitation of its natural resources. The pre-conflict of Poso was basically dominated by farming, fishing, various small-cap businesses and government-related works. However, the post-conflict economic reconstruction of Poso is heading toward the large-scale investment business for the exploitation of natural resources. The current economic reconstruction has changed economic dynamics of Poso. My study argues that the government efforts of post-conflict Poso economic reconstruction are more inclined to economic development. It has marginalized many weak communities and this has created new tensions and new sources of conflict.

3.1. The natural resource exploitation and investment for economic transformation

Despite its natural richness, the pre-conflict Poso was a quiet area with slow economic change. It was a place of traditional agricultural plantation, fishery and limited exploitation of its forest wealth; ebony, rattan, and resin.

Unfortunately, during the conflict when the supervision of the forest was weak, there was massive exploitation of ebony in Poso's forest by military personnel and their cronies, and it caused serious shrinking of Ebony population in the Poso's forest.³³ The pre-conflict Poso was also blessed with natural resources such as water of Poso Lake and minerals; Iron Ore, Nickel, Marble, Coal, Chromit, Cooper Ore, and Gold.³⁴ The exploitation of natural resources was small scale.³⁵

The state-dependent economy was Poso's characteristic during until 1998. The job and works opportunities that considered decent and economically prospective were the government-related jobs such as government officials or state-school teachers. Even the business entrepreneurship in the regions were relying on the government's projects. The state dependent local economy created a tight power struggle among local elites to control the economic resources. In 1998, Indonesia was experienced a political regime change. As the response, local elites sought newly positions and balance in their own places. The civil servant appointment has been an opportunity of corruption given that the right to select the civil servants is under the power of the local ruler.³⁶ Thus, holding a political power also meant holding economic resources. In sum, from the economic perspectives, root cause of conflict of Poso was its state dependency, which created rivalry of elites for having power over economic resources.

My research found that Poso and its former area, Morowali District, and Tojo Una-Una District have been developing rapidly in the post-conflict era in comparison to its pre-conflict period. The development is especially in exploitation of natural resources. The Investments in these areas are conducted during or post-crisis as part of economic development efforts in the conflict-affected areas. International and national level companies came to the area and put their money in mining, infrastructure and plantation industries. This rapid development has changed the economic features of Poso.

In the Poso district, the initial investment is one that has been conducting by PT Bukaka Hydropower Engineering & Consulting Company; later change its name in Poso as PT Poso Energi, owned by Jusuf Kalla. The company has built a hydro power plant with capacity of 580 MW, intended to provide electricity to South Sulawesi Province, which is headquarter of the company and the home of its factories.

The investment of the hydro power plant is around 6 billion rupiah (6 million US dollar). The factory is expected to operate in 2011. Kalla has repeatedly stated in public that his company will solve the electricity crisis in Central Sulawesi Province and for the sake of the welfare of the people.³⁷ Nonetheless, NGOs are doubtful toward the statement by some reasons. First, the electricity voltage produced by the power plant is too high for household electricity and it only matches for industrial needs. Second, there is no tower from the power plant directing to Poso town. All towers are constructed in the hilly areas and they are heading toward South Sulawesi. Moreover, NGOs are questioning the benefit of the private hydro company for people. It is based on the reason that the water and the land, that the company has exploited, belong to people of Poso and it is also the people who will suffer from the impact of

environmental degradation. Especially, there is no agreement of the government and the company regarding the outcome of the plant.³⁸ Not only benefiting from the use of water for power plant, the company is also benefiting from the industrial minerals in the land, such as sands and soil at the land surface.

Additionally, Poso District government is also building its own mini hydro power plant in Sawidago II in Tentena with a capacity of 910 KW. It costs 17 billion rupiah (1.7 million US dollar), and is expected to operate in 2011. The local government-owned power plant will be more likely to cover electricity needs of the district rather than the private mega power plant.

Poso district government is very active in attracting investors. It follows the generic development approach in which investment is an opportunity to increased growth rate, and it eventually will benefit for the people. In order to facilitate investment, the government is reconstructing the Kasiguncu airport and the Poso seaport that has been crippled for the last 10 years.

Some investors have landed in Poso. The Poso district government claims a Singapore based company, PT INA, has expressed interest in Tuna fishing as well as Sogili (Eel) breeding, and dairy farms. The government also announced that there are three companies interested in exploiting the gold, and four companies interested in iron ore exploitation. The mining advocacy network (*Jaringan Advokasi Tambang*, JATAM), an NGO works as a watchdog of mining industries in Indonesia, noted that PT INCO Tbk has already been granted a right to construct gold mining in Poso. Other oil palm plantation companies, such as Guthrie, a Malaysian palm oil plantation company, had also presence in the region.³⁹

What is interesting in the case of investments in the area of Poso is the fact that the investors did not hesitate to come to the areas during the crisis time. Logically, as it is mentioned in the literature of post-conflict management, the investors are unlikely to put investment in a crisis or post-crisis time due to the weak security condition. However, investors of Poso were coming during the peak of the crisis in 2000. The investors were especially targeting the lands for palm oil plantation.⁴⁰ In the current Morowali district, a palm oil plantation company, PT KLS, even pilfered the nature forest preservation area.⁴¹ The boldness of investors to come to a conflict area can be interpreted as a proof that the conflict was somehow beneficial and connected to the economic interests of some actors.

3.2. Economic development of the people

The government has provided some programs to boost economic development of the Poso society. However, the program runs occasionally and lacks long-term planning. The result is not measurable and hard to be used as a benchmark for the future society economic development. It is simply a short response of the needs to improve the economy in the initial step of post-conflict development. Two major programs are as follows. First, the vocational training program to address ex-combatants and their families funded by both international donors and

government budget (the police department budget).⁴² Second, the livelihood assistance program (the cash grant program) targeted other ex-combatants and their family who were ineligible for the vocational training program. It was funded by the local government, and completely separated from the police program. However, reports found that many ex-combatants were excluded from the programs, while many people received double programs (ICG 2008; Al Khairat 2008; YTM 2007). An informant, a Christian ex-combatant, expressed his dissatisfaction since he was also excluded from both programs.⁴³

Interestingly, the Poso District Head, Piet Inkiriwang, in his public announcement in 2007, persuaded people to make proposals to the local government in order to grab fresh money to start business.⁴⁴ Therefore, during 2007-2009 there were a phenomenon people submitting proposals to the local government. Given that ordinary people do not have a skill required to make a printed business proposal, some employees in the village offices offer their services to make one, for extra cash.⁴⁵ The fresh money was granted without supervision for its use from the government. Eventually, it went mostly to expenses other than the entrepreneurship effort.⁴⁶ A top official in Poso District Government stated in interview that some money also went to individuals who claimed themselves as ex-combatant. The self-claimed ex-combatant, mostly youngsters, alternately come to the local government offices, brings along a printed proposal and demand for some cash. The informant said that his office and the other government offices in Poso District preferred to give away some money to keep these young men in check and cooperate.⁴⁷ Other informants mention about similar tactics taken by businessmen toward ex-combatant groups in order to secure their investment and business endeavors.⁴⁸

3.3. Measuring the successful economic reconstruction

Whether the program and economic policy implemented by the government contributed to the peace-building program or not is an important question to ask. The reason of using a different yardstick rather than the common measurement (purely economic or financial criteria) of development is because the post-crisis region has a different characteristic in compare to a stable region (Del Castillo 2008). It has a problem of security, large movement of people and capital during the crisis, land disputes, the ex-combatant problems, as well as the scarcity of and distortion in the data of economics.

The common measurement of economic development such as growth rate and per capita income cannot be used, since it does not imply the distribution of wealth to the people, so that its support to reconciliation processes is also hard to see. Moreover, especially for Poso, the measurement is hard to be used since the post-conflict Poso is much smaller than Poso before conflict due to the district division. From these reasons, the pre- and post-conflict economies of Poso are difficult to be compared.

In Poso, the government boosted the investments and achieved remarkable economic growth during 2001-2005. The growth rate was 7.59%, the highest in the Central Sulawesi Province.⁴⁹ Per capita income in 2005

was 6,294,000 IDR (629.4 US dollar). Yet, that time the security condition in Poso was far from stable. During the period, Poso suffered from terrorism and violence. In short, the economic achievement did not correspond with the peace in the region.

In the periods after 2007, Poso has enjoyed another economic growth. The per capita income rose to 7.7% in 2008-2009. The statistic bureau of Poso District (2010) noted that, in 2009, the per capita income was 9,413,913 IDR (941 US dollar), rising from the 2008 per capita income of 8,735,274 IDR (873 US dollar). It was indeed a positive signal of the successful economic development in the area. However, the biggest growth supporter was the sector of financial, leasing, and business services of 18.5%. Mining sector is growing 13.7%, while agriculture is growing 16.17%.⁵⁰ Meanwhile, the choice of work of Poso District population was 69% for agricultural works, while workers in the manufacture sector were only 6.69%. The unbalanced percentage of growth in agriculture, which had been conducted by more than half of the population, implied the unjust wealth distribution in the region. The financial, leasing, and business sector, as well as mining sector, was growing rapidly as a result of the government efforts to open the region for investment. Yet, it did not directly help the income of the most population since they are hardly involved, as seen in the small percentage of work choice of the population in manufacture sector. Moreover, the gap of the number is alarming the danger of widening the bias of economics development in Poso which has been heading toward the opposite of common livelihood and needs of the people.

CONCLUSION

Poso has been awarded as a successful case of post-conflict reconstruction. The government proudly declared that Poso was already peaceful. Speedy economic growth, massive investments, and peaceful elections were used as a token of the tamed Poso. My research tried to present the post-conflict governance that has been conducted in Poso after the peace agreement in 2001. My research found the opposite signs of the government's claims. People in Poso are living under the constant fear of chaos and violence. They live separately inside their community by religion lines, and they are also easily manipulated for the benefits of local political elites. A decade after official reconciliation, social cohesion is far from complete. I suggest that peace in Poso is not real. It is order, not peace, which exists in Poso.

Every conflict is local. This premise is widely accepted in peace and conflict studies. Bringing the idea into the field, we took a careful step in analyzing Poso's conflict and peace-building.

We first examined the post peace-agreement security reform in Poso. The Malino peace accord tried to lock up the conflict by reconciled community leaders. Nonetheless, the most important matter for the people (i.e., justice for the victims) was not accommodated since the accord was also intended as a symbol for forgiveness. The justice system tried only 3 persons as the war criminal of the mass murder and did not dig deeper to find the

masterminds. When the militia groups translated it as the partial law enforcement, they developed their own justice; terrorism. This became the factor of a long violent crisis after the peace accord until 2007.

After 2007, security improved rapidly. However, another problem was discernable when political elites started to use ex-combatant's groups to strengthen their political basis. Instead of reintegrating ex-militias into civilian lives, elites enhanced the group's expertise in violence. These violent-experienced groups represent the visible future problem of Poso.

In economic reconstruction, the Poso district government has conducted special-designed programs for the post-conflict area to boost people's economy. But the programs were far from successful, due to the lack of long-term planning and low capacity of the field officers. Moreover, the program mainly targeted to ex-combatant and their families and it did not cover the most population and the victims of conflict. Moreover, the profusely post-conflict recovery aid was blessed by political elites as an opportunity to enrich them. Corruption has undermined Poso's economic recovery.

The government attempts to draw investment in the region have paid little concern to its impact on people's livelihood. The government oversimplified the peace-building as it seemingly believed that economic growth in the district would automatically end all conflict. As a result, many development policies did not effectively support the peace-building process in the region. The government's claim that economic development will reconcile people's disagreement is proven false.

All in all, we can assume that Poso's local government has failed to perform the post-conflict good governance. Security condition that is present at this moment is bearing potential future conflicts for many reasons; namely, the political use of ex-combatant's by political elites, economic jealousy between communities, excessive natural resource exploitations, and the remaining social distrust among communities. In the eyes of international community, these problems are difficult to be assessed because the 'visible' violence no longer exist and the local political economy seems to be stable in Poso, at least on paper. Thus, we are easily convinced that the peace-building process is on the right track. My study sounds an alarm to such a tendency, and hopes to contribute to the better understanding of Poso's current situation that should be exposed to the wider audience in the globe.

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¹ Many Indonesian terrorist suspects are ex-combatants of Poso. After the Poso conflict, they left the region and continued their faith and activities. Many have been arrested, jailed, or shoot to death during the police chase, yet few are still un-tracked and they continue spreading threat.

² The transmigration program was a government program to reduce poverty and population density in the most densely populated island, and to provide other islands with a skilled farmers coming mostly from Java and Bali.

³ *Kompas*, July 30, 1998 reported that in 1994, the Central Sulawesi Province's export volume of Cocoa was 12,817 tons. In 1998, the export volume of Cocoa increased to 116,272 tons, due to the high demand for Cocoa in international market. There were many Cocoa farmers who also became rich.

⁴ Interview with John Losikoy (academic from Tentena Christian University), Tentena, December, 2010

⁵ Interview with: haji Adnan Aarsal (Muslim's leader) Palu, December 2010. He mentioned that the initiator, funder and lobbyist of the idea were a Tentena indigenous who was also a member of the Parliament (DPR) in Jakarta.

⁶ Interview with Jusuf Kalla Jakarta, January 6, 2011; in interview, Jusuf Kalla mentioned that Muslim communities rejected the term of "peace" since in their opinion there will be no peace until the justice is done. However, Jusuf Kalla said that he convinced the Muslims that the agreement is a process of cease-fire and justice will be conducted afterwards. Nonetheless, in my interview with Adnan Aarsal, he clearly stated that Jusuf Kalla twisted the agreement by stating later that since the peace agreement was achieved, both sides were supposed to forgive each other and to achieve justice. This is the source of discontent and wedge for the Muslims.

⁷ See the United Nations *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping*, A/47/277-S/24111, 17 June 1992 <http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agpeace.html>

⁸ There was a mass massacre conducted by the Christian militias against 200 Muslims hiding in Walisongo Pesantren on 28 May 2000, and it destroyed the adjoining village of Sintuwu Lembu (HDcentre 2009). The incident triggered anger from a radical Islamic group including Laskar Jihad (Fealy 2001). Laskar Jihad went to Poso and spread radicalism in Poso; the situation was deteriorating since then, especially when an organization so called Jamaah Islamiyah, which was also believed as a terrorist organization linked to Al Qaeda, rode Laskar Jihad and join in Poso's combat (ICG 2007). Later, not only Jamaah Islamiyah adjoined the combat, but also another hard line organization named KOMPAK. They generated some terrorist cells, and were active until years after Laskar Jihad left Poso.

⁹ There is a distinctive difference between many Indonesian Islamic organizations and Laskar Jihad in defining jihad. Laskar Jihad defines Jihad as a battle toward what they believed as Islam's enemy (Fealy 2001), whereas major Indonesian Islamic organizations led by Indonesian Islamic Theologian Councils (*Majelis Ulama Indonesia*, MUI), defines Jihad in a context of peace (*ishlah*), or making an improvement or correction to society with a pacifist actions such as religion teaching (*dakwah*) (Dakwatuna 2009).

¹⁰ Interviews with: Sf (news reporter from Matahari radio station and NGO activist) and Rf (Muslim's ex-combatant) at Poso, December 2010.

¹¹ There was a dispute during the process of peace agreement. The Muslim side insisted that the agreement was not to make peace with other party; instead they insisted that it was merely a cease-fire. The Muslim side hoped during the cease-fire the perpetrators of violence toward Muslim (the massacre of pesantren Walisongo and Sintuwu Lembah) would be punished by the government. Jusuf Kalla agreed with the semantic discourse of term “peace” but went with the treaty which was “peace-agreement” in essence. Interview with Jusuf Kalla, Jakarta, January 2011.

¹² Interview with Jusuf Kalla, Jakarta, January 2011

¹³ Interviews with the signers of Peace Accord from Muslim’s side: Haji Adnan, Ustad Jamaludin, Sofyan Leumbah, Palu, December 2010

¹⁴ Tibo was accused as the leader of the most deadly toward Muslim on May 28, 2000. The red troops (Christians’ troops) attacked an area known as Kilo Nine (*Kilo Sembilan*), a successful Javanese transmigration settlement. They massacred hundreds of unnamed men, women and children who sought shelter to an Islamic boarding School (*pesantren*) named Walisongo. They dumped the bodies in river, ravines or buried in mass graves. Some women survivor also had been molested and held hostage for several days.

¹⁵ Those people are: Paulus Tungkanan (retired army), Ladue (retired army), Theo Manjaya (retired army), Impadeli (retired civil servant), Eric Rombot (civil servant), Edi Bunkundapu (civil servant of Poso District Government), Yahya Patiro (a high rank official at Poso District Government), Sigilipu H.X. Obed Tampai (high rank civil servant), Rungadai Son (teacher), Yanis Simangunsong, Angkou, Angky Tungkanan, Heri Banibi, Sarjun alias Gode alias Guntur Tarinje, Ventje, Sanrue Gadi (*Tabloid Rohani Populer Sabda* No. 85/thn IX/2006, April 2006)

¹⁶ In April 2006, the final months before the executions of Tibo and his friends, the Central Sulawesi Police Chief (Kapolda Sulawesi Tengah) Brigadier General Oegroseno conducted a meeting to confront Tibo with one of the man accused to be highest master mind of the conflict. Tibo, however, could not recognize the man he accused and rectified his confession regarding the name of the master minds. See *Tempo* Magazine April 23, 2006.

¹⁷ Interview with Commissioner General Oegroseno, Kyoto, May 3rd, 2011.

¹⁸ LPS-HAM, KontraS, and Yayasan Tanah Merdeka were NGOs who have long accused the security forces’ involvement in violence of Poso.

¹⁹ The Police conducted raids to confiscate illegal arms both the crude contraptions guns (*senjata rakitan*) and the original weapons of heavy and light caliber. Sometimes, police appealed people to giving up their weapon possession and gave some money. In October 2010, Central Sulawesi police held a ceremony to destroy the seized guns of 2010; 334 firearms, long barrels and short barrels, homemade and original, and 2752 rounds of ammunition of all types, grenades and homemade bombs. See *Media Indonesia* October 10, 2010 at: <http://www.mediaindonesia.com/read/2010/10/10/173140/76/20/Senjata-Sisa-Konflik-Poso-Dimusnahkan> . The similar ceremonies had been held several times before.

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- ²⁰ Interviews with: Ustad Ib (Muslim's leader, ex-combatant) at Poso and Ustad JH (Muslim's leader) Palu, December 2010. They also point out that there are children of the past conflict victims who are unnoticed and unmonitored. They are saved during the crisis. Recently they are adult burdened with resentment due to the justice against violence perpetrators who attacked their parents and families. Ex-Central Sulawesi Chief of Police, Commissioner General Oegroseno stated the similar concern in interview in Kyoto, May 3rd, 2011.
- ²¹ One of the rumors was the rumor of "Bloody Lebaran" (*Lebaran Berdarah*) in 2010. The rumors said Christians from Tentena would attack Poso Town during *Lebaran*. The rumor was a continuation of a rumor about hundreds of radical Muslim radicals had arrived in Tentena to hold *tarawih* prayer (a special prayer during *Ramadhan* month). The rumors were defeated after community leaders, ex-combatant networks and NGO activists contacted each other to confirm. Interviews with: JM (Christian's ex-combatant), TI (Christian's ex-combatant), Reverend Felix, and police officer Ld at Tentena, Ustad Ib (Muslim's leader) and Sf (news reporter from Matahari radio station) at Poso, December 2010
- ²² See Kamavian, et al. 2008 .
- ²³ Interviews with: Ustad Gani (the member of DPRD of Poso District at Poso) and Ustad Ib (Muslim's leader) Poso, December 2010. Interviews with: John Losikoy (NGO's activist), Jm (Christian's ex-combatant, NGO's activist), Reverend Felix (the current minister in GKST), lady minister Lies Sigilipu, and Abdullah (civil servant, the head of local office of religious affairs in Pamona sub-district), at Tentena, December 2010.
- ²⁴ The natives rejected the program due to the fear of losing their earning since income depended only on their land. Giving up the lands may create the shrinking in income resources. Interviews with: SS (local news reporter, NGO's activist) at Poso, Vincent (environmental NGO's activist) Yandi (NGO's activist), Heidy (NGO's activist), Lian (NGO's activist) at Tentena, December 2010.
- ²⁵ Interview with Muhammad Marzuki (academic from Tadulako University) Palu, December 2010.
- ²⁶ Interviews with: the chief of BakesbangLinmas (the office of social and political affairs) of Poso District Government, SS (news reporter of Matahari radio station), and Rf (Muslim's ex-combatant), Poso, December 2010.
- ²⁷ See *Radar Sulteng* 28 March 2008.
- ²⁸ Interviews with Malik Sahadat (former Poso's vice District head) and Arnold Bouw (the head of Social and Political Affairs' Office of Poso District), December 2010.
- ²⁹ *Radar Sulteng* 3 March, 2003. Winata is known as Indonesia's 'god father' in the criminal underworld
- ³⁰ Interview with Jusuf Kalla, Jakarta, January 2011.
- ³¹ Interview with NGO's activists: Vincent Lumintang, Lian Gogali, and Yandi, Tentena, December 2010. The mark of PKI is the threat long used by the regime during Suharto period to identify the enemy of the country.
- ³² Personal communication with Lian Gogali (NGO's activist) trough email, 2011.
- ³³ Interviews with environmental NGO's activists: Yandi and Vincent at Tentena, and Hamdi at Palu, December 2010

³⁴ Indonesia Investment Coordination Board 2011

³⁵ Informants mentioned that in Napu highland people were able to find gold by simply sweeping their yard after the rain. Interviews with Sofyan Lembah (Muslim's leader) and Jamaludin Hadi (Muslim's leader) at Palu, PY (local businessman) at Tentena, December 2010.

³⁶ Like in many provinces and districts in Indonesia appointing civil servants is the corruption opportunity for the high rank official at local government. The modus of the corruption is, by appointing someone to be a civil servant for certain benefits, mostly money. In order to cover the operation, the seller will not place the buyer in his/her own territory, but exchanges the appointing area with other officials from other regions. This is a finding of my field observation on the appointment of civil servant in the Poso District in 2010. When interviewing a high rank district official, I was interrupted by a telephone to him came from his colleague in a different district. The conversation was regarding the appointment of the civil servant of Poso district in the 2011 fiscal year.

³⁷ Interview with Jusuf Kalla Jakarta, January 2011.

³⁸ The company has not made an agreement with any institution including the National Electric Company of the electricity outcome. See <http://www.bumn.go.id/23543/publikasi/berita/poso-energy-tak-jual-listrik-ke-inco/?lang=en>

³⁹ Jatam (Mining Advocacy Network) report, 2009: "Sulawesi Tengah: kaya bencana, kaya byar pet." the paper is un-dated. See at: <http://www.jatam.org/content/view/595/22/>.

⁴⁰ *Kompas* July 26, 2000

⁴¹ *Kompas* January 26, 1999

⁴² In mid 2007, Police started the vocational training program. This program, which taught automotive mechanics and furniture making for male members and cooking and sewing for female members, was succeeded educated around 200 persons. Participants were trained for sixteen days, with the pocket money during the time, and they would be equipped with the working tools after the program. The total cost of the program was \$8,000. Later, Police asked a local Poso based NGO, named Yayasan Bina Bangsa Mandiri (YB2M), to conduct other vocational programs targeting ex-combatants and families in 2008. Soon, the NGO invited Christian community to join the programs. The program was a fish raising program which opened the opportunity for both Muslim and Christian to cooperate. There were also animal husbandry project, community forest project, automotive repair, organic cacao cultivation, and savings and loan project. The project only gives training and in-kind assistance, no cash money (ICG 2008).

⁴³ Interview with a Christian ex-combatant; T1, Tentena, December 2010.

⁴⁴ Piet Inkinriwang's statement was very popular among Poso people. The statement is as follow: "*Tidak usah ngonon ribut-ribut sebentar lagi torang akan berenang diatas doi, cepat bikin proposal, semua akan dapat*" (You do not need to be noisy, soon we will swim in money, hurry up make a proposal and everyone will get the share).

⁴⁵ A business proposal project was known among Poso low-ranking government officials at that time. They typed few pages of business proposal with the cost around at least 500,000 rupiah (50 US dollar) per volume. The fee will be paid after the applicant got money from the government.

⁴⁶ The amounts of money to the applicants were various. There were stories that some applicants used it for buying new handphone, building a house, having a wedding party, or for daily expense. Nevertheless there were also applicants who successfully used their money for developing the business.

⁴⁷ Interview with the chief of social and political affairs office (*Badan Kesatuan Bangsa dan Perlindungan Masyarakat*, Bakesbang Linmas) of Poso District, Arnold Bouw, Poso, December 2010

⁴⁸ Interviews with: Sf (news reporter from Matahari radio station) and Rf (Muslim's ex-combatant) Poso, December 2010. Interview with BM (Poso's NGO activist) Yogyakarta, January 2011.

⁴⁹ Badan Pusat Statistik (BPS-Statistics Indonesia), Central Sulawesi Province 2005

⁵⁰ Badan Pusat Statistik (BPS-Statistic Indonesia), Poso 2010