

Article

A Study of Relationship Between Changes in the Ideologies of the Chinese Communist Party as Expressed in the Chinese Spring Festival Gala

JIAO, Ran

Abstract

This paper addresses the changes of ideologies in contemporary China seen through one of the most popular television programs today, the Chinese Spring Festival Gala (SFG). In China, the SFG is an important propaganda instrument used to transmit messages from the central government. All the contents of the Gala must be carefully selected by the producers, and the Gala demands the programs keep pace with the times and make full use of current events to both entertain and educate audiences.

While the contents of the Gala have undergone significant changes over the past four decades, the core theme has remained consistent. It serves as a platform for spreading messages from the central government to the public. Additionally, it reflects China's progress during globalization and in terms of social and economic development. As a program broadcast on a nationally owned media outlet, it contains information that helps the audience develop a basic understanding towards their nation and form their awareness of what the ideological changes are.

This study explores the relationship between changes in the ideology of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) as expressed in the five-yearly meetings and the expressions of those changes in the SFG. This study uses the qualitative content analysis as the research method to examine songs and sketches from 1983 to 2023. It illuminates a temporal and socially influenced framework that warrants a closer examination of how are changes in the ideological stance of the CCP expressed in the SFG.

This study concludes that loyalty to the country and appreciation of the CCP are at the core themes that reflected in the SFG. The themes of work and economy, geopolitical and natural environment have constantly evolved under the influence of changing ideological stances. Especially, since Chairman Xi Jinping assumed power in 2012, themes related to geopolitics and natural environment development have become important components of

the SFG programs.

Key words: ideology, China, the Spring Festival Gala, Chinese leadership

1. Introduction

According to the Oxford Dictionary, media refers to the way that people receive information and entertainment. This word originally came from the Latin “medium”, which means a way to communicate and exchange information.

In 1958, the first television network began broadcasting as Beijing Television (later named China Central Television (CCTV) in 1978), it was a symbol of advanced technology and new approach to integration into the world (Song & Bai, 2014). In the late 1980s, with the supportive activity of the Open-Door Policy, many factories started technical investment in the field of television, and it soon became a part of the materialist consumer culture and a symbol of modern life (Yu, 2009). In the 1980s, people tended to receive information through television rather than listening to radio programs. The Chinese Communist Party began to consider its potential to instill political education while entertaining citizens (Song & Bai, 2014).

The Spring Festival in China is the most important and festive holiday of the year, the tradition of celebrating China’s new year has been perpetuated as a period of the time that most citizens in the country can have a rest from their work. At the same time, family members have an opportunity to gather, to say goodbye to the old year and welcome the new year. The date of celebrating the Spring Festival is on the first day of the Chinese Lunisolar calendar. Dating from the third millennium BC, Chinese people have celebrated the new year for thousands of years, though the various customs associated with celebrating the Spring Festival varies from region to region.

In 1983, the first SFG was launched on China Central Television (CCTV). According to the CCTV archive, the main purpose of creating SFG was to provide a platform to entertain Chinese citizens during celebrations of the most important Chinese traditional festival. It serves not only as a medium of television entertainment on this holiday but as a propaganda platform and educational instrument to convey information from the central government to the engaged national audience (Shambaugh, 2007; Zhao, 2004; Townsend, 1988). For many Chinese people, the SFG is not simply term that refers to the show on the television, it creates a magical feeling triggering nostalgic memories of when family members gathered together (Zhao, 1998).

In the 1990s, the television industry developed rapidly and the TV industry grew to reflect the political ideologies in China, and emerged as a tool to mobilize the imagination of the nation (Pan & Chan, 2000). Shi (2014) argues that mediated entertainment can be considered a form of education which can influence audiences’ attitudes and beliefs. The social cognitive theory, proposed by Bandura (2002), suggests that mass media entertainment can enhance viewers’ understanding of the world, and that the frequency and salience of entertainment programs can influence viewers’ attitudes towards social life and potentially their perception of social change. The Chinese television industry and media are developed under

the supervision of the Chinese Communist Party (Guo 1991). Thus, television entertainment retains a distinct role in regulating information and diffusing political propaganda.

In a study conducted by Zhang and Qiu (2019), the focus was on exploring the changes of trends of social thoughts since the reform and opening from the perspective of SFG. They examined the social thoughts reflected in the main theme of the SFG from 1983 to 2019. The central theme across these 37 SFGs was country unity. They organized the arguments chronologically on a timeline basis, spanning from the 1980s to the 21st century. They concluded that SFGs consistently played the role of conveying dominant values through an array of symbolic representations, aiming to foster a deeper societal identification with the prevailing values among the general public (Zhang & Qiu, 2019). Although they discussed the relationship between core socialist values and the SFGs, they did not explore how the changing stances were reflected in the SFGs.

This study discusses how the ideology presented in the Party Constitution after the National People's Congress (NPC). Due to the SFG making its debut in 1983 and the NPC held five-yearly. The SFG editions analyzed in this paper include those from 1983, 1988, 1993, 1998, 2003, 2008, 2013, 2015, 2018, and 2023.

The significance of this study lies in the fact that while television programs are widely recognized as a means of government propaganda, there is limited research on how government ideologies are specifically portrayed on television.

Through qualitative content analysis, this paper explores how changes in central ideology are represented in the Spring Festival Gala, summarizing the shifts in China's guiding ideology over the past 40 years, including what has been retained and what has been discarded.

Thus, the main research question guiding this study is:

How are changes in the ideological stance of the CCP reflected in the SFG?

(1) RQ1: How particular shifts in ideology change the content of the SFGs?

(2) RQ2: What ideas are discarded and what new ideas included on the SFGs?

2. Research Background and Literature Review

2.1 The Historical Development of Chinese Spring Festival Gala

The SFG has been broadcast live by CCTV on the Eve of the Chinese New Year since 1983, and it has become an integral part of the festival celebration (Zhao, 1998). The SFG is not only an entertainment show in China, but a 'national project' which can reflect the ideologies of the CCP on TV.

With forty years of operation, the SFG has become the most well-known program in China, the Gala has both reflected the transformations of contemporary Chinese society and changes in political ideology. Thus, the goal for the Gala is hybrid, blending cultural value, commercial value and political aims simultaneously (Liu, Ning & Zhu, 2015).

From 1983 to 1990, the content of the SFG was under the influence of the market economy and aimed to include programs which present western culture such as food and customs on the stage. Most of contents were mainly talking about China's economic development, the establishment of links between Chinese and overseas factories and the main idea of central

government ideology over China's development. Consequently, political discourse, commercial discourse and folk discourse construct three components of Gala's ideologies (Rydholm, 2005).

With the convening of the Summer Olympics in 2008, China's economy began to take off, and with the Internet developing rapidly, the products advertised during the Gala changed. Electronic products and home appliances became the most popular advertisements on the Gala. Meanwhile, the electronics manufacturer *Midea*¹⁾ became the highest bidder and became the sponsor for the Gala for twelve years (SFG, 2008, SFG, 2010 & SFG, 2014).

Since 2013, TV in China has adapted to the digital era. By the end of 2014, there were more than 650 million Internet users in mainland China, the Gala started to broadcast live through mobile applications. In 2015, the Gala started broadcasting live on social media including *Douyin*²⁾, *Kuaishou*³⁾, and it was also broadcast on overseas platforms such as YouTube for the first time (SFG, 2015).

In 2020, to attract young audiences to enjoy the Gala, the producers of the Gala reorganized the program, more and more pop stars and the most well-known actors were invited to the show. Besides, in order to promote the virtual reality, *Luo Tianyi*, as a viral singer created by young programmers in China, appeared on the stage of the SFG in 2020. Although producers of the SFG believed that the introduction of pop stars and viral singers could attract more young audiences, the result was criticized by the public. The audience thought that the SFG was tacky and had demonstrated limited Chinese traditional cultural value (Qing, 2020).

After 40 years of development, the SFG has developed some new ideas to demonstrate the development of the Chinese technology and stronger economy in China. The Gala applied new visualization technology and AI+VR naked eye 3D technology started to appear on the Gala's stage and on the other hand, it reflected, to some extent, the speed of China's technological development and China's social modernization (SFG, 2020).

Now, the SFG has become something more than just a television show, it represents a collective memory of the nation and demonstrates China's social development. Many viewers, perhaps, have lost interest in watching the Gala from the beginning to the end, but it is still an important part of the Chinese New Year celebration.

2.2 Media in China

Scholars state that TV in all countries is a basic stratum for the construction of everyday life and plays a central role in educating citizens to be loyal to the country, and television programs is capable to reflect the development of the times (Schneider, 2012; Silverstone, 2005; Song, 2022; Martin & Lewis, 2016).

Guo (1991) states that the television industry in China was directly supervised by the CCP, the main purpose of operating mass media in China was to present the social-economic development of the country and to distribute the main ideologies from the central government.

Recent scholars observed that the mass media industries obtained financial independence through its own profit-making approaches, they operated their own television programs and made eye-catching entertainment programs to attract audiences and advertising (Zhao,

1999). However, unlike the provincial television stations, CCTV does not need to plan programs for its profit-making. It has been regarded as the voice of the central government and thus, programs broadcast on CCTV are based on political affiliation with the Party (Wei, 2000).

In recent years, China is mired in increasing conflicts and contradictions as it establishes a complex interrelationship with the nation's past pride and searches for a national identity in the times of globalization. TV program emphasizes the cultural capital that can be used to constitute what makes China and Chinese people distinct from other nations in the world and how television programs promote the awareness of Chinese identity in the mass media (Wong, 2018; Song, 2022). The emergence of global entertainment, to a large extent, is a product of the export of the commercial system based on the US model (Herman & McChesney, 1997). Chairman Xi Jinping stated an important message, at the opening session of the 20th National People's Congress of the Communist Party of China in 2022, that China must develop a socialist culture with Chinese characteristics and be confident in China's traditional culture, and have a strong sense of belongings to the nation-state. Accordingly, the idea to maintain China's own characteristics while integrating into the development of globalization has become a common task for television producer when designing programs (Yu, 2009).

As scholars in the field of communication studies, Lu (2009) and Sun (2007) argue, the SFG contains social and ideological values from the CCP and the theme of each Gala has been extensively influenced by the central government's ideological beliefs.

In the early studies, Zhao (1998) distinguishes different categories of ideologies from the 1997 Gala, which including national unity, national pride, loyalty and tribute to the Communist Party of China. Later, in 2016, Feng concludes that the SFG promotes a national spirit and positive social values to the audience in the country.

Accordingly, the SFG can be utilized as a vehicle for national propaganda, disseminating images and ideas, and revealing possible changes in government ideological control, thereby it can reflect national changes in political and cultural values due to changes in the ideology of the CCP leadership in China.

2.3 The SFG and content representation

Since 1983, CCTV has broadcast the SFG every year on Chinese New Year's Eve, it soon drew the attention of scholars in and outside of mainland China. One productive line of academic inquiry focuses on entertainment as the demonstration instrument of social development and another productive line of scholarly inquiry focuses on ideological contestation (Bai & Song, 2014).

From the television studies perspective, Pan and Chan (2000) argue that Chinese television is usually utilized for national integration purposes. The national integration purpose means that the state will get involved in the process of media production and promoting nationalism to bolster the image of the Communist Party as representative of the Chinese nation. On the other hand, national integration is a concept that involves cultivating a common cultural and historical identity among a population by promoting the development of shared values, customs and cultural backgrounds across local and regional communities

through the utilization of shared experiences and meanings.

Liu (2013) states that mass media in China play a role in introducing appropriate social behaviors and cultivating national education quality. More recent studies emphasize that the foremost mission of television is to glorify socialist moral standards and, in addition, to establish national pride, and to realize the Chinese dream of establishing a great national unity and reducing the importance of individuals in Chinese society (Wang, 2022). As Wang (2022) argues, the main concept of 1983's Gala emphasized the importance of the individual and downplayed class identity, people were encouraged to develop their own business in the times of the Open-Door Policy. The sense of national unity had faded and the sense of nationalism had been whittled away. However, in 2014, "Chinese dream" had become the most important keyword at CCTV Spring Festival Galas. Class identity, of course, had been abandoned in the performance, at the same time, the concept of individualism had also been replaced by national unity. The key concept for the Gala was to emphasize national unity and the Gala inherited the collectivist style from the early socialist era.

Liu, An and Zhu (2015) studied geopolitics of China through the perspective of popular songs in the SFGs from 1983 – 2013, emphasizing that only programs "deemed as mainstream cultures and in accordance with the official ideologies in China can be screened" (p. 612). They pointed out that most of the songs in the SFGs are sanctioned popular songs that demonstrate the ideological imperatives of the central government and official politics. Therefore, all popular songs in the SFGs can be recognized as official regulated songs. On the other hand, Zhang (2017) analyzed Chinese cultural policy through the SFGs, she mainly argued that the main themes, including patriotism, collectivism, individualism, social class changing and foreign policy, are presented through different SFGs .

Thus, the SFG was utilized as a vehicle for national propaganda, disseminating images and ideas, and revealing possible changes in government ideological control, thereby reflecting national changes in political and cultural values due to globalization in China.

Overall, previous scholars concluded that programs presented on SFGs are responsible with the official ideologies in China, and the programs shown on the SFGs can reflect the main theme of cultural policy. However, there has been limited exploration into the specific ideologies developed and revised in China and how these changed ideologies are reflected in SFG programs. Therefore, this study aims to address this gap by analyzing the evolving Chinese ideologies and examining how these changes are reflected and expressed in SFGs.

2.4 Main ideologies in China

CCP embraced Marxism as its primary guiding ideology upon its establishment in 1919. Over the past century, different guiding ideologies have emerged in China with shifts in leadership, encompassing Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory, the Three Represents, the Scientific Outlook on Development, and Xi Jinping's Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era (Xi Jinping's thought) (Shen & Xu, 2021). This section aims to provide a comprehensive review of these different guiding ideologies from the Open-Door Policy to the present day.

After 1840, Western colonial powers compelled China to establish a network of interaction with the West. China's resistance to Western powers became the important factor in the

final victory of the CCP in 1949 (Knight, 2003). These factors influenced and shaped the way Chinese saw the world and China's position in the world. Mao Zedong, the first leader of People's Republic of China, and his followers aimed to reestablish China from the ruins after the war, they followed Marxism and received support from the Soviet Union.

The connection with the Western countries was increasing, the central leadership was less belligerent towards the West. However, with the Sino-Soviet split and the Great Cultural Revolution, China's engagement with the world declined significantly. Keeping a homogenous society became the central ideology after 1978 (Knight, 2003).

When Deng Xiaoping ascended to power in 1978, modernization became the primary task for China's central government (Zhao, 2004). Deng insisted that China should play a role in the global market. He also emphasized the importance of racial and cultural nationalism as well as the ideology of liberal nationalism. The main approach was to avoid the mistakes of Mao's leadership and to explore the new approach to develop China's economy (Gao, 2006; Modongal, 2016). However, the adaptation of western ideologies and the strong western democratic aspiration caused social chaos. As a result, the disturbance of Tiananmen Square Protest erupted in 1989, this protest also affected relations between China and the West. The CCP recognized that the pro-western policy would weaken its political reign of the country.

However, in response to the return of Hong Kong in 1997, China's leader had to reconsider its situation in Asia and in the world. Globalization became the central concept in the political discourse of the CCP. Given the fact that the global economy was dominated by capitalism, the debate about how best to conceptualize globalization within CCP's ideological repertoire became the main argument in China. Given that the CCP would not abandon its commitment to both Marxism and Mao Zedong Thought, it is essential to understand the enduring influence of these ideologies on the party's principles and policies. China's leaders, on the one hand, were cognizant of the challenges posed by globalization and on the other hand, they were sanguine about engaging with globalization to benefit China (Zhao, 2004; Cui, 2009; Lieber, 2013).

Jiang Zemin was largely influenced by Deng's ideologies. On the one hand, he declared the Party's capacity to engage with globalization, on the other hand, he had to legitimate the Party's leadership in the country. In order to avoid similar conflicts to those that had happened in the late 90s, he emphasized the importance of patriotic education in constructing the Chinese national identity (Hughes, 2006). In 1999, the American bombing of China's embassy in Belgrade fueled the rise of nationalism in domestic China (Dong, 2010). In 2001, China was again confronted with America, a spy airplane was found over the South China Sea, the conflict between China and America further fueled the already strong nationalism in China. By the end of 20th century, the world's economy had changed from industrialization to post-industrialization. In order to promote China's modernization and make it fit for global development, the "new four modernizations"⁴⁾, including knowledge, information, urbanization and democratization had been proposed by the CCP. Besides, in order to avoid the conflict that had happened in 1989, the patriotic nationalism and maintaining the nation's territorial integrity became the major task for the CCP (CCP Central Literature Research Office, 2014).

Hu Jintao became the leader of the country in 2002. The main ideology that he proposed was to create a “*Hexie shehui*” (Harmonious Society) (most.govn.cn 2006). With the rapid openness and the engagement of globalization in the form of increasing number of foreign investments in mainland China and increased trade between China and the rest of the world, the country has witnessed a significant transformation in its economic landscape and international relations. Western ideologies permeated institutions, social structures and everyday life in Chinese society (Hong, 1998). As far as the development of mass media concerned, Chinese people started to express their opinions online after 2005. With China’s accession to the global market, demands to be respected by the international community have increased (Lijun & Kia, 2010).

Xi Jinping became the leader of the country in November 2012. With the help of holding the Olympic Game in 2008, China’s economy had developed rapidly, Men (2014) argued that “China’s rise and fall has been closely linked with the evolution of its national identity” (p.193), and China had changed from a closed country to an open one, and it had become recognized as a big country and a great power in the world. Since Xi became the country’s leader, he saw bolstering the CCP’s supremacy as an essential instrument to promote the country’s security and the longevity of the regime (Tsang & Cheung, 2022). In April 2013, he issued ‘Document No. 9’ to order cadres at all levels to prohibit seven “false ideological trends”: (1) constitutionalism; (2) universal values, (3) civil society; (4) neoliberalism; (5) Western view journalism; (6) historical nationalism; (7) negative of the reform of Chinese socialism (Tsang & Cheung, 2022).

In late 2017, “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era” has been proclaimed. The new ideology aimed to develop China as a “strong modern socialist country”, that is, to build the strong nation state domestically as well as internationally (China Daily, 2019).

Xi introduced his ideology into the Party Constitution in 2017, and the country’s constitution in 2018. This action was not rare in the CCP, just like Jiang Zemin added his “The Three Represents”⁵⁾ (Party General Secretary, 1989-2002), and Hu Jintao (Party General Secretary, 2002-2012) added the Scientific Outlook on Development to the Party’s Constitution. Xi especially required that everyone in China should learn about this ideology and emphasized the reinvigorated party-centric nationalism. Xi seeks to enhance China’s global leadership and reform the global order (Tsang & Cheung, 2022; CCP Central, 2018). Although he claims that China will not start a war with other countries, he is preparing China for any eventual military clash.

Based on the information provided above, the CCP ideology has undergone changes. The CCP was initially rooted in Mao Zedong Thought and Deng Xiaoping Theory, the emphasis of the ideology evolved with China’s economic development. The emphasize of ideological stances are subject to change over time and in different political contexts. The primary CCP ideology aimed at building a well-developed economy and improving the lives of Chinese citizens. However, after 1989, patriotic education became an important part in shaping the national identity. Previous literature indicates that Chinese national identity is profoundly influenced by the ideologies emanating from the central government. Moreover, it also suggests that the construction of national identity is continually reshaped by evolving ide-

ologies from the central government.

This paper aims to provide readers with a more detailed and intuitive reference on how Chinese guiding ideologies are applied in practice. The research design is as follows:




Figure 1. Research process

3. Research Method

3.1 Qualitative Content Analysis

Qualitative content analysis is a research method for analyzing written, verbal or visual messages. It can be used as a method to analyze newspapers, texts, magazine articles and speeches (Miles & Huberman, 1994). The method allows the researcher to distill words into content-related categories, aiming to provide new insights and describe the phenomenon of the outcomes (Miles & Huberman, 1994).

This study aims to explore how CCP ideologies presented on the SFG, and the data are derived from the dialogues of the sketches, and the lyrics of the songs. Background music, stage design, and performance customs are not included in this study.

Before moving on to the next step of data analysis, the author faces the first difficult task of sample selection. As it has been presented in the previous sections, the SFG has a strong connection with the changes in CCP ideology. The NPC is the largest parliamentary body in China, it constitutes the top legislature, and the highest state power. According to China's Constitution, the NPC is held every five years. Thus, the SFGs of 1983, 1988, 1993, 1998, 2003, 2008, 2013, 2018 and 2023 have been selected for analysis.

The selected SFGs constituted about 40.5 hours of audiovisual material, which contained 381 episodes of different forms of performance. Because the study aims to analyze the dialogues and narratives embedded in the Gala, hosts' greetings and the introductions to the various performances were not included in the coding process. In addition, the SFG in 1983 featured one singer with more than 2 performances with similar style, whereas the rest of the SFGs tended to combine songs or shows with common theme by several singers. All these performances were coded as one analysis unit.

The next step is data coding. This step includes open coding, creating categories and

creating common themes. There are six types of coding categories in this method, in this study, vivo coding and descriptive coding are used as the main coding methods: (1) descriptive coding (DC): it uses a phrase to summarize a passage from the raw data; (2) vivo coding (VC): it adopts the original term from the raw data; (Saldana, 2015; Charmaz, 2006).

After this open coding, the list of codes is grouped under a category (example shown in Figure 2). Codes conveying similar meanings are initially grouped together, forming different categories. The aim of grouping data is to generate similar categories into a particular group and to increase understanding of the category meaning (Charmaz, 2006). The final step is to generate themes, this step formulates a general description of the theme through classifying categories (Robson, 1993; Burnard, 1996). Each category is named using thematic words. These thematic words indicate the representation of ideologies from the SFG.



Figure 2: Example of data analysis process

4. Findings and Analysis

The main research question in this study addresses how the changes and continuities of ideological stances reflected in the SFGs. There are total five main themes identified from the data analysis, including China’s development and patriotism; individual development and family; Chinese culture and leisure; geopolitics and territory issues and finally the natural environment and biodiversity.

4.1 China and patriotism education

Based on the data, it is evident that communist songs, often referred to as the “red songs”

are the most frequently employed genre within the SFG. This type of song is deeply connected to the country’s revolution from 1921 until the present⁶⁾. These kinds of songs are known as ‘main theme songs’⁷⁾ (Chinadaily.com, 2007). The communist songs contain the historical background and the heroism of the CCP. In China, the Chinese Central Red Army represented liberation and freedom. The Red Song is not only the symbol of collective memory of days part, it also reminds young people not to forget history (Liu, 2007).

The color red served as both the background color of the Army’s flag and symbolized the self-sacrifice of the Red Army soldiers who were committed to saving the people of China. The SFG analyzed in this study consistently refers to the color red and the Communist Party as one category under the common theme of “love the country”.

Additionally, Chinese people have a strong connection to their ancestors and their roots through folklore and often use imaginary animals such as the dragon as national symbols (Wang, 2003). From the SFGs, dragons are usually connected with leaders of the country and Chinese citizens think of themselves as the descendants of the dragon. The detailed themes and analysis will be presented in the following sections.

4.1.1 Love the country and patriotism education

Love the country is the unchanged theme that has been emphasized from 1983 to 2023. The main categories related with “strong feeling of belonging, love, loyalty, respect for the country”. It enables the individual to pursue the interest of the nation above personal interest (Men, 2014). Codes related with the theme of “love the country” were commonly found in each Gala (see table 1).

Year	Names	Lyrics	Open Coding
1983	Red Army Hope	Everyone was expecting the Red Army ¹ .	1. DC: Expectation of the Red Army
1998	Enter the New Age	We sing the song of Oriental Red ¹ , We are growing stronger ²	1. DC: Theme song DC: Color red 2. VC: Stronger
2018	The New Age is Great	With the history of 5000 years ¹ , China is the great country ² ,	1. VC: 5000 years history 2. DC: Great country
2023	Expedition	I love my country ¹ from the bottom of my heart	1. VC: Love my country

Table 1: Sample codes of love the country

The theme of love the country encompasses the historical background of the country, the role of the Communist Party, and the pride associated with being a Chinese citizen. In the 1983 Gala, actress Liu Xiaoqing sang a Sichuan folk song called ‘Red Army Hope’. This song expressed the expectations of people for the Red Army and their respect towards it. This song carried a message that the Red Army is powerful, and it symbolises liberty and freedom.

Patriotic education is prominently emphasized in the selected Galas. In the 1983 Gala, a documentary film named ‘Burning of the Imperial Palace’ was presented, showing a historical event that happened in 1860. The Qing Dynasty (1616-1912) was the last feudal dynasty in China’s history, and due to the corruption and incompetence of the government in the late

19th century, the greedy and arrogance of the Western imperialist powers began to invade China. The Anglo-French forces invaded Beijing and burned down the Old Summer Palace and looted its contents. This short video attempted to present how China had struggled against the western invasions in the 19th century. In the following years, the song “*I Love you China*” was performed in 1998, by Fan Yuwen, and in 2013, by Ping An (see table 2). The lyric “*I love you my mother, I love you my homeland*” highlighted the concept that Chinese people love the motherland with all their heart. In 2018, a short video named “*Love Your Country, Love Your Home*” was presented on the stage. The main theme for this program emphasized the significance of patriotic education for young people in China.

Title: I love you China (1998)	Open Coding	Theme
I love you China, ¹ My mother ² , my homeland ³ I will sing the song to you, ⁴ I will dedicate my youth to you ⁵ ,	1. DC: Love China 2. VC: Mother 3. VC: Homeland 4. DC: Dedicating song to the homeland 5. DC: The people dedicate their life to the country	Patriotism education

Table 2: I love you China (1998)

Accordingly, by highlighting the appreciation of the country, these programs aimed to foster a sense of patriotism and national pride among the audiences and served as a reminder for Chinese people to dedicate their life to the homeland.

4.1.2 56 ethnic groups

In the 2013 Gala, Wang Weihong sang a song titled ‘*A Morin Khuur on the Deck*’. The special instrument called the *morin khuur* was mentioned several times in the lyrics, illustrating its significance as a unique ethnic instrument and a distinctive element of inner Mongolia in China. Due to the presence of the instrument, the performance presents the diversity and richness of ethnic minority cultures within China and enhances the Gala’s overall ethnic cultural representation.

In the 2003 Gala, singers with ethnic minority backgrounds performed five songs in a performance unit. Similarly, in the 2023 Gala, singers such as Alan Wu Tong and Ai Re with ethnic minority backgrounds sang the song titled ‘*My Homeland*’. These songs attempted to introduce Chinese minority customs and traditions of Chinese ethnic minorities to the audiences. They also attempted to convey a sense of national unity and national identity through the power of music.

Based on White Paper 1999: Ethnic Minorities Policy in China, the People’s Republic of China asserts that it is a united multi-ethnic state. So far, there are 56 ethnic groups identified by the Central Government. It stressed that the unity and cooperation among the various ethnic groups can safeguard China as a united multi-ethnic state (un.china-mission.gov.cn).

4.1.3 Dragon

In the 1985 Gala, Huang Jinbo sang a song called ‘*Legend of the Dragon*’, which quickly became the most popular song of the year and continues to be sung to the present day (see

table 3). In 2018, this song was performed again by four singers. This song utilizes the common symbol of the ‘dragon’ in Chinese culture and fosters national pride through this mythical creature. The dragon is an imaginary creature created by Chinese ancestors and has long been regarded as a symbol to represent power, strength and good fortune.

Title: Legend of the Dragon (1985, 2018)	Open Coding	Theme
There is a dragon in the ancient orient ¹ Its name is China ¹	1. VC: Dragon, ancient orient 2. VC: China	Dragon
There is a group of people who are living in this region ³ They are the descendant of the dragon ⁴	3. DC: Chinese people, origin 4. VC: Dragon	China

Table 3: Legend of the dragon (1985, 2018)

In addition to the emphasis on the dragon, there is a performance associated with one of the animals in the Chinese zodiac at the SFG. The Chinese zodiac is considered as an important component in Chinese culture, and it is believed to influence people’s lives and fortunes. Performing a dance or song related to the zodiac animal is seen as a way to bring good fortune for the upcoming year (Quek & Ling, 2013; Lau & Lee, 2018).

4.1.4 The color red

Color has a long history of symbolic use in China. Red was considered a “life-giving” color and this color was also considered as an identity marker to emphasize inner qualities such as bravery and dignity (Avina, 2021). In Mao’s era, people were awarded red rosettes when they performed outstanding service either in the war or in their work. The color of red is regarded as an important symbol in the SFG (see table 4). In the 1983 Gala, Liu Xiaoqing performed the song “Red Army Hope”. In this song, the color red represented China’s military and emphasized the self-sacrifice that people should make to fight for the country. In addition, the CCP used the color red to present the revolutionary spirit and featured it as the main color on the party’s flag and national flag. In the 2013 Gala, Sha Baoliang and Xu Qianya performed a song “*Beautiful China*”, in this song the color red is used as a symbol representing bravery and courage.

Title: Red Army Hope (1983)	Open Coding	Theme
The peach flower was as bright as red blood ¹ ; In April, the Red Army ² will come.	1. VC: Red blood 2. VC: Red army	The color red
Title: Beautiful China (2013)	Open Coding	
Red blood flowed in our body ¹ It represents the courage ²	1. VC: Red blood 2. DC: Red represents courage	

Table 4. The theme of color red

All of these cases mentioned above emphasized the relationship between the nation and the CCP. In short, based on the programs presented in the SFG, Chinese people should be aware that China cannot become a powerful state without the leadership of the CCP. Deng Xiaoping stated that CCP should act as the director for Chinese citizens, the CCP had the duty to make a better life for the Chinese people. The 15th NPC in 1997 officially put “Deng Xiaoping’s Theory on Building Socialism with Chinese Characteristics” into the Party

Constitution (qsttheory.cn).

The Party Constitution is the guideline for the central leader of the CCP and thus Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping should follow Deng Xiaoping's ideology, because the general outline of the Party Constitution states, "the CCP takes Marxism, Mao Zedong Thought, and Deng Xiaoping's Theory as its guiding principles" (12371.cn, 2022). While ensuring the continuity of the previous guiding ideologies (Marxism, Mao Zedong Thought, and Deng Xiaoping's Theory already present in the Party Constitution), after the 16th NPC in 2002, Jiang Zemin's Three Represents ideology, following the 18th NPC in 2012, Hu Jintao's Scientific Outlook on Development, and in the 19th NPC in 2017, Xi Jinping's Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era were successively incorporated into the party constitution.

4.2 Family, work and leisure activities

In the early 1990s, the CCP borrowed radical Western ideas to propel its modernization agenda and economic development. The introduction of various elements of Western culture into China has had a positive impact on promoting China's global interactions. Yang (2023) argues that social-political transformation and economic development are integral components of modernization, with lifestyle changes and improvements in family economic conditions serving as a reflection of this process. The interaction with Western culture not only facilitates China's economic progress, but also influences the dynamics and relationship between family members (Jiang, 1997). In the following sections, three main themes will be explored: work and the economy, family and personal relations, and leisure activities.

4.2.1 Work and the economy

During the 1990s and 2000s, China experienced rapid economic development and actively welcomed foreign investment to establish more factories, and it promoted entrepreneurship in coastal cities like Shenzhen and Shanghai. The central government from the 1990s to 2000s aimed to establish a moderately prosperous society, and to create higher living standards and better living environments for citizens. According to the UN financial report⁸⁾, urban Chinese citizens earned an average per capita income of 1510 yuan (\approx 315 US dollars), while people in rural areas earned only 686 yuan (\approx 142 US dollars) in 1990. The central government aimed to build a wealthy and rich society after the Open-Door Policy. Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin and following leaders of China contributed their effort to promote economic growth.

In the 2023 SFG, Yue Yunpeng and Sun Yue performed a comedy sketch "*I want to change, change, change*". In this show, Yue and Sun presented their aspirations and goals for the upcoming year, with a primary focus on wealth.

Title: I want to Change, Change, Change (2023)	Open Coding	Theme
Yue: You are going to make more money in this new year ¹ , there is going to be more money in your bank balance ² .	1. VC: Making money 2. VC: Bank balance	Economy

Table 5. I want to change, change, change (2023)

With China’s economic development, programs focusing on the lives of the poor have become less common at the Gala. Instead, an increasing number of programs are focusing on the improved quality of life for ordinary people and the wealthier lifestyles in suburban areas. In 2023, a short video program was presented on the stage, highlighting the newly developed villages in China and aiming to demonstrate the narrowing wealth gap between the rich and the poor (see table. 6).

Title: The Spring Festival Gala in the Village (2023)	Open Coding	Theme
Our Gala is now starting! ¹	1. DC: The Gala in the village	Economy
It is time for the new events ² New style ³	2. VC: New events 3. VC: New style	
Man: Sure, let's go! New life ⁴	4. VC: New look	
Have a great new year and have a better life ⁷ .	5. VC: better life	

Table 6. The SFG in the village (2023)

In the 1980s, the CCP identified the development of the national economy as a key goal. In 1979, Deng Xiaoping proposed the concept of a “moderately prosperous society”. This concept refers to a society in which people’s basic needs for food and clothing are met, and social development is harmonious and stable. Deng Xiaoping believed that to achieve a moderately prosperous society, China must go through three steps: (1) the first step was to double the per capita gross domestic product (GDP) from \$250 to \$500 in the 1990s; (2) the second step was to achieve a per capita GDP of \$1,000 by the end of the 20th century; (3) the third step was to reach a per capita GDP of \$4,000 within 30 – 50 years of the 21st century. Besides, it aimed to improve the quality of education and healthcare from social development perspective. Deng Xiaoping also emphasized the importance of developing compulsory education, preserving traditional culture, protecting natural environment, promoting national unity and improving social welfare (12371.cn, 2022). In 2021, China’s GDP exceeded 100 trillion yuan (about 15.45 trillion U.S. dollars), and its per capita income hit 32,189 yuan (about 4485 U.S. dollars) (stats.gov.cn, 2022⁹), Chairman Xi Jinping announced that China had successfully achieved the goal of building a moderately prosperous society. China recognized that adopting market-oriented policies was essential to develop the economy, alleviate poverty and improve citizen’s living standards. At the same time, the CCP retained strict political control and maintained its legitimate leadership. They combined the market economy with state control, ensuring that party retains the absolute power in the country.

4.2.2 Family and personal relations

Family stories are popular topics for artists to perform on the stage. This type of programs aims to discuss the relationship between family members, husband and wife, daughter-in-law and mother-in-law, and family member conflicts. These programs aim to provide a comprehensive overview of typical Chinese families, reflecting the evolution of Chinese society and illustrating the tension between social development and the core value of traditional Chinese filial piety (Gong & Zhang, 2006; Tong, 2012).

In the 1983 Gala, the Huangmei Opera *'Back Home Together'* told the story of a fairy that helped her mortal husband to pay off his debt to the landowner, this ultimately enabled them to return home together. The main theme of this opera was to illustrate that life goals can be achieved through hard work. It emphasized the role of harmonious family in enhancing social productivity in the early 1990s.

In the 2003 Gala, Guo Donglin, Jin Yuting and Xiao Dingdang performed a sketch titled *'I am Father, You are Son'*. Unlike previous sketches, this one focused on a family story from the father's perspective and it aimed to show how challenging it was to be a father, and highlighted the pressure men felt in maintaining multiple identities as a husband and as a father in a family.

Title: I am Father, You are Son (2003)	Open Coding
<p>Son: My mother and I haven't seen your smile for ages.¹ Father: No way! Teacher, didn't you see my smile? I smile to everyone!</p> <p>Teacher: I think you might need to spend some time with your wife and son.² Father: Spending time with my son and my wife!³ </p> <p>It is easy for you to say. I am a man! I am the house owner⁴. I have a career⁵, ... (my manager) he values me as a good worker.</p> <p>If I don't go there (the restaurant) with the manager, if I don't drink. How can I receive my salary, how I raise my child, how can I pay for his tuition ...?^{6,7}</p>	<p>1. DC: Father didn't smile at all, father showed no intimacy to family (because of the long working hours)</p> <p>2. DC: Father was too busy to spend time with family</p> <p>3. DC: It's impossible for him to spend time with his wife and the son. He was busy with his work.</p> <p>4. DC: He had to work to support the family.</p> <p>5. DC: Having a job was important to him to look after his child and wife.</p> <p>6. DC: Money was important to the whole family, father had to work hard</p> <p>7. DC: Money was important, he (father) had to pay for tuitions</p>

Table 7. I am father, you are son (2003)

Since the 1990s, the Chinese government has initiated reforms aimed at transforming state-owned enterprises into private-owned companies. These reforms have resulted in the layoff of millions of workers, due to low skills (jiemian.com, 2021). In response, factory workers adhered to the factory's rules and often remained silent to secure their positions and jobs. Male workers experienced more pressure than female workers and sometimes male workers struggled to fulfill their roles as competent fathers at home. This sketch illustrated the serious issues that most ordinary Chinese families faced in the early 21st century.

In 2023, Sun Tao, Wang Lei and Yin Er performed a sketch titled *'Father and Son'*. The main theme explored the dynamics between a father and a son, as well as the son's interaction with his employer. It argued that the son had more patience when communicating with his employer compared to talking with his father. He rarely responded to his father's messages, but would promptly reply to his employer's message. It highlighted a trend where younger people are more patient and engaged in conversations with their co-workers rather than spending time with their parents.

This sketch appeared to be an extension of the narrative from 2003, suggesting that younger generations may exhibit behaviors such as impatience towards family members or their parents as they mature. They seemed to have less patience with their parents while maintaining enthusiasm with their employer. While this phenomenon is normal in the contemporary society, Chinese parents still hold the hope that their sons or daughters will be patient and dutiful toward them.

Despite the continued emphasis on financial success at the Gala, there is a greater focus on family harmony and filial piety. In 2002, the ideology of the Scientific Outlook on Development was proposed in the 16th NPC. This ideology emphasized the promotion of traditional value such as filial piety and addressing the issue of elder care as important parts in building a harmonious socialist society. In 2012, the 18th NPC passed a resolution amending the “Constitution of the Communist Party of China”, officially establishing the Scientific Outlook on Development as one of the guiding ideologies in the Party Constitution. At the 19th NPC in 2017, Chairman Xi Jinping stated that the Chinese government is responsible for promoting the construction of social public morality, family virtues, and encouraging people to express love for their parents and respect for the elders (Gong & Zhong, 2015; Y. Wang, 2018; Yang, 2014).

These shifts align with the ideology of the central government, which encourages individuals to prioritize love and fulfill their roles as dutiful sons and daughters to their parents.

4.2.2 Leisure activities

4.2.2.1 Opera

In the 1983 Gala, five Beijing Opera performances were presented on the stage. Since then, there has been at least one opera program included in the Gala every year. Beijing Opera is undoubtedly one of the most renowned opera genres in China. However, it is also important to note that there are numerous other types of opera in China, such as Kunqu Opera.

In feudal China (475 BCE - 1840), the majority of the lower classes had limited opportunities for education due to political and economic constraints imposed by the government. Watching traditional Chinese operas became a way for these people to gain knowledge about history and society. Traditional Chinese operas incorporated local dialects and languages, it provides a channel for the audiences to understand what is moral and what is immoral (Wang, 2011). For example, in the 1998 SFG, Han Zaifen performed a Huangmei Opera -- “Picking Bamboo Shoots”, the play tells a story of a bamboo farmer who misunderstand a pigweed farmer of stealing bamboo. After the misunderstanding is cleared up, the farmer apologizes to the pigweed farmer and gives her a basket of bamboo. Opera has emerged as a pivotal tool for the Chinese SFG in showcasing Chinese characteristics. These operas typically draw from traditional folktales and ancient Chinese stories, offering audiences the opportunity to delve into Chinese history and develop a sense of morality through these captivating performances.

Year	Type of opera
1983	Huangmei Opera, Beijing Opera
1988	Beijing Opera, Huangmei
1993	Chuan Opera, Beijing Opera
1998	Yu Opera, Huangmei Opera, Heibei Bangzi ¹⁰⁾
2003	Beijing Opera, Huangmei Opera
2008	Beijing Opera, Yu Opera, Yue Opera
2013	Beijing Opera
2018	BeijingOpera, Yue Opera, Huangmei Opera, Gan Opera
2023	Yue Opera, Wu Opera, Pu Opera, Puxian Opera

Table 8. Type of different operas

4.2.2.2 Food

As the Chinese saying goes ‘people cannot survive without food’. Chinese culture places great importance on the act of eating, and in the 2013 Gala, the music band Legend of Phoenix presented a song titled ‘*the Taste of China*’. This song introduced a variety of dishes from different regions of China, providing the rich diversity of Chinese cuisines.

The performance featured Chinese delicacies such as dumplings, steamed buns, emphasizing that Chinese cuisine stands apart from Western dishes due to differences in ingredients, cooking methods and flavors. It underlines the idea that food is a central element of Chinese culture and a source of pride for the nation.

In the 2023 Gala, Da Zhangwei and Zhang Ruoyun performed a song titled ‘*Have fun! It is time for dinner!*’. This song introduced different cooking techniques in the lyrics, emphasizing the happiness associated with food.

The Taste of China (2013)	Open Coding
Please try food from Lu, Chuan, Yue, Min ¹	1. DC: Lu- Shandong cuisine, DC: Chuan- Sichuan cuisine, DC: Yue – Guangdong cuisine DC: Min – Fujian cuisine
Please try dishes from Su, Zhe, Xiang, Hui ²	2. DC: Su -Jiangsu cuisine DC: Zhe – Zhejiang cuisine DC: Xiang – Hunan cuisine DC: Hui – Anhui cuisine

Table 9. The taste of China (2013)

The song’s lyrics artfully mentioned four quintessential Chinese cooking techniques: stir frying, braising, boiling, and deep frying. These culinary methods were linked to emotions and life attitudes, with lines like “stir frying your happiness, braised my joy; boiled all the annoyance, deep frying all the gossips.” This lyrical approach emphasized the integral role of food in the Chinese culture.

These programs not only represent the significance of food in Chinese culture but also convey the message that Chinese people are no longer suffering from starvation. According

to historical records, China has experienced approximately 1828 major famines in its history, with most of them being caused by “natural phenomena, sometimes exacerbated by human activities” (Brown, 2012, p. 34). The famine happened from 1959 to 1961 was unique, because this famine stemmed from human factors. In 1958, Chairman Mao launched a campaign to outproduce Great Britain and the US. Mao set up an unrealistic goal for Chinese people to achieve in a year, the fanatical push to meet the goal led to widespread fraud in the country, resulting not in record-breaking output but a severe famine. As food reserves in the country diminished, citizens especially peasants began dying in droves in 1960. This serious famine culminated Chinese to have fear of hunger (Brown, 2012). The memory of past famines cast a shadow, influencing Deng Xiaoping’s ideology of “Moderately Prosperous Society”, where having enough food played a central role from 1980s.

It was not until 2021, when Xi Jinping announced that China had achieved a moderately prosperous society. The content about food in the SFG has changed from demonstration of food categories to the impact of food on people’s life and spirits.

4.2.2.3 Flowers

Flowers also hold a significant place in the construction of the SFG. The song “Jasmine”, considered one of the most representative Chinese folk songs in China’s musical history (Rydholm, 2005). In the 2013 Gala, both Song Zuying and Celine Dion sang the song ‘*Jasmine Flower*’. This song played a prominent role in important ceremonies including those marking China’s sovereignty over Hong Kong and Macau in 1997 and 1999. Furthermore, this music serves as the meeting’s theme song for the Central Committee of Communist Party of China.

In 2004, during Hu Jintao’s leadership, the concept of a “harmonious socialist society” was introduced, emphasizing the promotion of national cohesion. The song ‘*Jasmine Flower*’ aligns with the theme of harmony (see table 14), making it an enduring symbol of Chinese culture and societal values. People have developed a deep affinity for jasmine flowers, further solidifying its representation of Chinese identity (Rydholm, 2005; Liu, Ning & Zhu, 2015).

Jasmine Flower	Open Coding
What a pretty Jasmine flower ¹	1. VC: pretty Jasmine flower
Nice to see you and nice to smell ²	2. DC: the flower is nice to smell and people enjoy to see the flower
Praiseworthy scent, and white as well ³	3. VC: praiseworthy scent, white
You are what I would like to pluck ⁴	4. VC: would like to pluck
Giving other people with luck ⁵	5. DC: bring luck to people
Oh what a pretty Jasmine flower ⁶	6. VC: pretty flower

Table 10. Jasmine flower (2013)

4.2.2.4 Martial arts

In the 1998 Gala, Zhao Lirong and Gong Hanlin performed a sketch titled “*Kungfu*”. This performance delved into the life of an ordinary marital arts instructor, serving the dual purpose of introducing Chinese traditional martial arts to the audience and establishing a connection between Kungfu and cultural identity.

From a historical perspective, Kungfu has played an important role in reshaping China's image. It dispelled the perception of China as the "sick man of East Asia" and presented their physical strength, achieved through rigorous exercising (Hu, 2013).

From a political perspective, since Xi Jinping came to the power in 2012, there has been a renewed emphasis on China's global status as a great power. This shift also signaled China's willingness to face challenges from Western powers (Wood & Dickson, 2017), reflecting two forms of contemporary nationalism in China: one based on national pride and the other involving assertiveness in foreign affairs.

The essence of martial arts encompasses two aspects: the promotion of physical health and the ability to defend oneself against external threats (Hu & Guan, 2021)

Title: Kungfu (1998)	Open Coding
Zhao: .. my baby, Kungfu is our Chinese culture, everyone should know it ¹ . Gong: I know it! (Mom). Zhao: You should be a dauntless and fearless person in the world through practicing Kungfu ² . Come on everyone, let's practice ³ . (Children on the stage started to practice Kungfu)	1. VC: Chinese culture 2. VC: Dauntless and fearless person 3. DC: Everyone should do it

Table 11. Kungfu (1998)

4.2.2.5 Fables

Chinese fables were frequently mentioned in the song and sketches. In the 1998 Gala, Jiang Tao and Gao Feng performed a song titled *'The Foolish Man Who Removed Mountains'*, which featured lyrics referencing a well-known Chinese fable.

"Yugong"¹¹⁾ is a main character in this fable, he wished to remove the mountains (Wangwu mountain and Taihang mountain) with hoes and baskets with his family members. The gods in heaven were impressed with his hard work and helped him to remove the mountains. Mao Zedong used this story in a speech to demonstrate his strong assertion to bring revolution to the country with perseverance, hard work and an unwavering dedication to following the guidance of the CCP (Lawrance, 2004, pp. 134-104).

Title: The Foolish Man Who Removed Mountains (1998)	Open Coding
It is difficult to get out of the mountain ¹ It is more difficult to pave the road ²	1. DC: Difficulty in making connection 2. VC: Pave the road

Table 12. The foolish man who removed mountains (1998)

Thereby, in the context of China, these old stories symbolize the roots of the nation and by exploring these fables, descendants can connect with their ancestors, develop a sense of identity, and comprehend the unique qualities that set them apart from others.

Furthermore, the knowledge of these stories and folktales fosters national confidence and instills a sense of pride in the greatness of the country (Eminov, 1975; Tuohy, 1991).

4.3 Geopolitical

Sustaining national unity is an important internal policy in China, as emphasized in the

songs and sketches of the Gala. The performance aims to deliver the message that a united China is crucial for protecting its citizens and promoting economic development.

This perspective resonates with the argument put forth by Wang (2003) who argues that the most significant threat to China’s development and unity arises not from external superpowers but from internal conflicts. Through its efforts to foster a sense of solidarity among the Chinese people, the Gala seeks to promote the idea of unity and underscore the importance of a cohesive nation.

Geopolitical identity is categorized into two aspects: internal geopolitical identity, which primarily focuses on ethnic groups and issues related to Taiwan, and international geopolitical identity, which focuses on China’s international relations with foreign countries.

4.3.1 National unity: Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan

In the 1993 SFG, four singers graced the stage, each representing different regions: Xie Xiaodong from mainland China, Luo Wen from Hong Kong, Su Rui from Taiwan and Wu Qixian from Singapore. This performance aimed to convey the message: people from Taiwan, Hongkong and the Chinese diaspora shared a common sense of belonging – they consider themselves with Chinese identities.

In the 2018 Gala, “*I am Home*” was presented by three Taiwanese actors and two actors from mainland China. This sketch narrated the story of a Taiwanese family returning to mainland China to visit their relatives. Through the dialogue in this performance, the idea of self-identity was expressed through the concept of homeland. It encouraged individuals to embrace their Chinese identity, irrespective of their nationality or place of birth. The central Chinese government has constantly sought to foster a sense of belonging to mainland China and encourage the embrace of Chinese identities among people living in Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan. This aligns with the CCP’s broader objective of promoting national identity and unity.

Title: I am Home (2018)	Open Coding
N: That button is the only token I brought out of my hometown ¹ , it not only represents my childhood ² memories, but also a nostalgia hidden in my heart.	1. VC: hometown DC: hometown: where they come from 2. VC: childhood memory DC: the author experiences homesick

Table 13. I am home (2018)

After 1997 and 1999, Hong Kong and Macau were return to China respectively. The Chinese government and the CCP expressed the desire for the reunification of Taiwan with the mainland. However, the disputes between mainland China and Taiwan have persisted, because Taiwan considers itself a separate country, known as the Republic of China, with its own leadership and party. The State Council of China announces that Taiwan is an inalienable part of China’s territory. Chinese leadership and official stance are based on the “One-China” policy, which state that both People’s Republic of China and the Republic of China are one country with the name “China” (english.www.gov.cn¹²). In the 2022 NPC, President Xi stated a preference for peaceful reunification but also made it clear that China does not “renounce the use of force”. This stance has raised concerns about the increasing

likelihood of China using military force to ‘reunify’ Taiwan.

In short, the disputes between Taiwan and China extends beyond territorial issues, they represent a historical and ideological conflict between two parties: the CCP and Kuomintang. In terms of Chinese identities, they encompass not only a connection to the geographical territory but also a sense of affiliation with the CCP (Zhao, 2004).

4.3.2 International relations

Since the start of the Open-Door Policy, the Chinese government has dedicated its effort to establishing relationships with countries around the world. In 2013, “The Belt and Road Initiative” project was launched, the aim of this project was to build a connection across Eurasia. It attempted to build an imagined community that all countries in the world can benefit from each other and promote regional development (Li & Li, 2015)

While globalization is a well-established concept describing the interconnectivity of nations globally, China’s approach goes beyond mere participation in the globalized world. It seeks to establish its own “community of shared destiny”. It reflects the fact that China’s international status has been greatly improved over the past four decades.

As previously mentioned (see 2.4), Deng Xiaoping initiated the Open-Door Policy in 1978. While this policy led to significant economic growth and increased liberalization in the country, it also brought issues such as inflation and government corruption. Chinese university students began to reassess this situation and advocated for greater human rights, economic reforms and personal freedoms. In response to these demonstrations, the Chinese authorities reacted with a strong show of force to suppress the protests. Men (2014) from the Party School of the Central Committee of CCP stated that Deng reconsidered the situation and proposed the ideology of building socialism with Chinese characteristics, emphasizing the need for China to develop its own economy through its own exploration rather than solely adopting success stories from other countries.

In the 2023 Gala, Chinese singers and foreign singers from countries along the “Belt and Road” performed a collection of songs titled ‘*Belt of Flowers, Road of Songs*’. While the “Belt and Road” initiative is often associated with large-scale infrastructure projects, such as railways and hydropower plants, the inclusion of “flowers” in the title represents the harmonious relationships between China and other countries involved in the Belt and Road project.

Each song in this collection represents a different country. For example, “The Beautiful Bengawan Solo” presents the river in Indonesia and the song of “The Son of Piraeus” highlights the beauty of Greece. Through these songs, the Gala strengthens diplomatic ties and fosters a sense of unity in the midst of globalization. Overall, the inclusion of these songs in the Gala illustrates China’s commitment to developing global collaboration and strengthen the cultural diversity in the world, or at least places where it has significant investments. This program reflects Xi Jinping’s ideology that China has become a super power in the world, and China has an ability to support other countries.

4.4 Natural environment

China experienced rapid economic development from 1978–2008 (see in 4.2). Simultaneously,

it caused significant damage to the ecological environment. After the 17th NPC in 2007, Hu Jintao explicitly introduced the ideology of “ecological civilization” and officially positioned environmental protection as a central task for China’s development. In 2008, the State Environmental Protection Administration was upgraded to the Ministry of Environmental Protection and became a constituent department of the State Council (later named the Ministry of Ecology and Environment of the People’s Republic of China in 2018 (mee.gov.cn, 2019)). One of its responsibilities is to supervise China’s environmental protection and promptly address pollution issues. After the 18th NPC held in 2012, Chairman Xi Jinping emphasized the importance of ecological civilization construction and environmental protection. Central government agencies issued the “Integrated Reform Plan for Promoting Ecological Progress.” The central idea of this document is to show respect for nature, stating that “development is good only when it is green, circular, and low-carbon” (gov.cn, 2015).

In the 2018 SFG, Lü Jihong and Zhang Ye performed a song titled “*The Mountains Laugh, the Waters Laugh and the People Laugh*”. The lyrics include phrases like “no more yellow sand blocking the sun” and “beautiful flowers bloom in the desolate mountain valleys”. This song showcases the achievements of environmental protection in China up to the year 2018. It is also the only performance among the sampled SFGs that depicts improvements in the ecological environment.

5. Discussion and Conclusion

From a media perspective, the purpose of the SFG is to entertain audiences of various ages while also serving an educational function. Therefore, the content selected for the Gala needs to be easily understandable and conveyable.

Moreover, as previously discussed, the CCP wields significant influence over television content selection. As presented throughout this paper, SFGs continuously presents different themes of performances through various CCP ideological sources (Maoism, Deng Xiaoping Thought and etc.) across time.

The structure of CCP ideologies undergoes constant evolution, with certain themes remaining unchanged from 1983 to 2023, notably the recognition of the motherland, and the representation of the symbol dragon, the color red and unity of 56 ethnic groups. This suggests that the CCP ideologies primarily revolve around patriotism, allegiance to the CCP, and a strong sense of national belonging. Other themes, such as work and economy, family and personal relations, leisure activities, national unity, and natural environment undergo shifts driven by changing times, particularly influenced by CCP ideologies and China’s economic development.

Deng Xiaoping, the leader of the new generation after the Great Cultural Revolution, proposed “Deng Xiaoping Theory”, emphasizing the development of socialism with Chinese characteristics, guided by Marxism and Maoism. The key ideologies of this theory include ensuring CCP’s leadership; advancing economic development and living standards, promoting national unity, and proposing “One Country, Two Systems” for peaceful reunification. In the 1983, 1988 and 1993 SFGs, the main ideology for program producing was to emphasize the economic development, attracting foreign investment and patriotic education.

In 2000, Jiang Zemin introduced the “Three Represents”, defining the central leading role of CCP in China, with the central goal of promoting economic development on the mainland of China. Additionally, with the return of Hong Kong and Macau, the CCP has started to pay attention to the Taiwan issue, they hope to achieve national reunification as soon as possible. From 2000, there has been an increase in SFGs focusing on the theme of national reunification and programs related to geopolitical issues.

From a socio-economic perspective, as China’s economy shifted from state-owned to private ownership, many people faced lay-off due to a lack of technical skills or bankruptcy. In order to secure the jobs, people had to spend more time in the workplace, and less time to accompany family members, resulting in an escalating conflict between family and work. The 2003 SFG “*I am Dad, You are Son*”, reflected this economic struggle, the conflicts between family and work was increasingly intensifying.

In 2007, at the 17th NPC, Hu Jintao introduced the ideology of Scientific Outlook on Development, promoting harmony in individuals and societal development. From 2008 to 2012, China’s rapid economic development was a center point of SFG programs, emphasizing family harmony and national progress.

After 2012, Xi Jinping became China’s top leader, “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era” has become a prominent ideology. This emphasizes patriotic education, nationalism, China’s role as a global power and environment protection. In 2020, Xi announced the achievement of a moderately prosperous society and China’s status as an economic powerhouse. Therefore, since 2020, the SFGs present the image of China with a focus on economic prosperity in the world and national unity.

This study only analyzed how are changes in the ideological stance of the CCP reflected on the SFG. While it highlighted that the changes in the composition of SFG programs were influenced by the CCP’s ideological shifts and economic development, patriotism, allegiance to the CCP, and a strong sense of national belonging had not changed three decades. These fundamental themes constitute the core points of CCP’s ideology.

Moreover, the themes of family, leisure activities, geopolitical and natural environment were influenced by CCP ideologies and China’s economic development. The composition of these themes may change overtime. In future research, there is a need to further explore how ideologies are constructed through the TV dramas or newspapers by considering the audience’s perspective or analyzing elements of stage design. This will likely provide a comprehensive understanding of how CCP ideologies are portrayed.

Note

- 1) Midea: *meidi* 美的 : a Chinese electrical appliance manufacture.
- 2) *Douyin*: short video sharing platform in China
- 3) *Kuaishou*: short video sharing platform in China
- 4) New Four Modernizations: *sige xiandai hua*, 四个现代化 : it is an ideology proposed by Deng Xiaoping, this ideology aims to promote China’s economic development.
- 5) The Three Represents: this term originally proposed by Jiang Zemin, the official translation of “三个代表” (*sange daibiao*) from the CCP official documents was “The Three Represents”(CCP Central, 2018).

- 6) The concept of revolution in the CCP has several meanings depending on the context. (1) Marxist-Leninist revolution, it establishes a socialist state and overthrow the capitalist system, (2) Cultural revolution: it happened between 1966-1976, it aims to purge elements within the party and ensures the CCP's ideological purity. There are other revolutions, such as economic reforms and western ideological adaptation.
- 7) Main theme song refers to the song that praises the Communist Party, praises the Red Army and praises the leadership of the central government.
- 8) UN Financial Report: <https://china.un.org/en/126447-un-china-40-years-1979-2019>
- 9) National Bureau of Statistics of China
http://www.stats.gov.cn/sj/zxfb/202302/t20230203_1901393.html
- 10) Hebei Bangzi is a genre of Chinese opera from the northern province of Hebei.
- 11) Yugong Yishan 愚公移山, The Foolish Old Man Who Removed the Mountains: a Chinese fable from the *Liezi*.
- 12) 2020. Basic factors about Taiwan, The State Council of the People's Republic of China
https://english.www.gov.cn/archive/202007/28/content_WS5f1f8c45c6d029c1c2636d06.html

Reference

- Avina, A. (2021). Colour me revolutionary. *British Journal of Chinese Studies*, 11:91–113.
- Bai, R., & Song, G. (Eds). (2014). *Chinese Television in the Twenty-First Century: Entertaining the Nation* (1st ed.). Routledge. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315798103>
- Bandura, A. (2002), Social cognitive theory in cultural context. *Applied Psychology*, 51: 269-290. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1464-0597.00092>
- Brinton, C. (1953). *The Shaping of the Modern Mind*. New York.
- Brown, C. D. (2012). China's Great Leap Forward. *Education about Asia*, 17(3), 29–34. <https://www.asianstudies.org/publications/eaa/archives/chinas-great-leap-forward/>
- Gong, G., & Zhong, F. (2015). Goujian shehui zhuyi hexie shehuilun de fazhan guocheng [The development process of building communism and a socialist harmonious society]. *Xue lilun [Theory Research]*, 21, 5-6. doi:CNKI:SUN:LBYT.0.2015-31-004. 龚国学 & 钟发远 (2012). 构建社会主义和谐社会理论的发展过程. *学理论*, 31, 5–6. doi:CNKI:SUN:LBYT.0.2015-31-004
- CCP Central Literature Research Office. (2014). *Shibada yilai zhongyao wenxian xuanbian*, [Selected Important Works since the 18th Party Congress], Vol. 1. Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe. [Beijing: Central literature Press] 十八大以来重要文献选编 (上), 北京: 中央文献出版社
- CCP Central. (2018). *Shenhua dang he guojia jigou gaige fangan*, [“Decision on Deepening Reform of Party and State Organisations”]. Xinhua, [Xinhua News]. “深化党和国家机构改革方案” http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2018-03/21/content_5276191.htm#allContent
- Charmaz, K. (2006). *Constructing Grounded Theory: A Practical Guide through Qualitative Analysis*. London: Sage Publications.
- China Daily. (2019). *Xuexi qianguo* [Learn More to Make your Country Stronger], *Zhongguo ribao*, [China Daily]. 学习强国, 中国日报, <http://govt.chinadaily.com.cn/s/201904/11/WS5d0373fb498e12256565db21/xue-xi-qiang-guo-xuexi-qiangguo-learn-more-to-make-your-country-stronger.html>
- Cong huanjing baohubu dao shengtaibu – kuapai yinianjian*. [From Ministry of Environmental Protection to the Ministry of Ecology – the name released in a year]. 从环境保护部到生态部—挂牌一年间. (2019, April 18). *Zhonghua renming gongheguo shengtai huanjing bu*. [Ministry of

- Ecology and Environment of the People's Republic of China]. 中华人民共和国生态环境部. From https://www.mee.gov.cn/xxgk/hjyw/201904/t20190418_700166.shtml
- Cui, Y. (2009). Chinese Television as a Medium of National Interpellation: Diasporic Responses to the CCTV Production of the Spring Festival Gala. [Doctoral Dissertation]
- Dang de shiwuda: ba jianshe you zhongguo teseshehuizhuyi shiye quanmian tuixiang ershiyishiji* [The 15th National Congress of the Communist Party of China: building socialism with Chinese characteristics in the 21st century] 党的十五大：把建设有中国特色社会主义事业全面推向二十一世纪. (2021, April 1). Qiushiwang [Qiushi Website]. 求是网. From http://www.qstheory.cn/2021-04/01/c_1127282461.htm
- Dong, J. X., (2010) The Beijing games, national identity and modernization in China, *The International Journal of the History of Sport*, 27:16-18, 2798-2820, DOI: 10.1080/09523367.2010.508275
- Eminov, S. (1975). Folklore and nationalism in modern China. *Journal of the Folklore Institute*, 12(2/3), 257–277. <https://doi.org/10.2307/3813929>
- Feng, D. Z. (2016). Promoting moral values through entertainment: a social semiotic analysis of the Spring Festival Gala on China Central Television. *Critical Arts*, 30:1, 87-101, <https://doi.org/10.1080/02560046.2016.1164387>
- Gao, J. (2006). Migrant transnationality and its evolving nature: A case study of mainland Chinese migrants in Australia. *Journal of Chinese Overseas*, 2(2), 193-219. <https://doi.org/10.1163/179325406788639598>
- Gong, H. L., & Zhang, H. Y., (2006), Gongzuo jiating chongtu yanjiu zongshu [An overview of the conflict between family and work], Xinli kexue [Study of Psychology], 宫火良, 张慧英. 工作家庭冲突研究综述[J]. 心理科学, 2006(1):124-126.
- Guo, Z. (1991). *A History of Chinese Television*. Beijing: People's University Press.
- Herman, E. S., & McChesney, R.W. (1997). *The Global Media: The New Missionaries of Corporate Capitalism*. London: Bloomsbury Academic. Retrieved June 4, 2023, from <http://dx.doi.org/10.5040/9781472596772>
- Hong, J. H., (1998). *The Internationalization of Television in China: the Evolution of Ideology, Society, and Media since the Reform*. Westport, CT and London: Praeger.
- Hu, T., & Guan, T. (2021). “Man-as-Nation”: Representations of Masculinity and Nationalism in Wu Jing’s Wolf Warrior II. *SAGE Open*, 11(3). <https://doi.org/10.1177/215824402111033557>
- Hu, Y. (2013). The Double Meaning of “the Sick Man of East Asia” and China’s Politics. In: *Rural Health Care Delivery*. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg.
- Hughes, C.R. (2006). *Chinese Nationalism in the Global Era* (1st ed.). Routledge. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203482001>
- Knight, N., (2003), Imagining globalisation: The world and nation in Chinese communist party ideology. *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, 33:3, 318-337, doi: 10.1080/00472330380000211
- Jiang, B. (1997). The cultural tradition of China and modernization. in Wang, M. Y., Yu, X., and McLean, G. F (Eds). *Chinese Cultural Traditions and Modernization*. The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy.
- Lau, H. T., & Lee, R. (2018). Ethnic Media Advertising Effectiveness, Influences and Implications. *Australasian Marketing Journal*, 26(3), 216–220. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ausmj.2018.05.014>
- Lawrance, A. (2004). *China Since 1919: Revolution and Reform: a Sourcebook*. Psychology Press. Routledge.
- Li, X., & Li, J. (2015). “Yidai yilu”yu zhongguo diyuanzhengzhi jingji zhanlue de chonggou. [“One Belt and One Road” and the reshaping of China’s geopolitical and Geo-economic Strategy]. *Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi*. [World Economics and Politics].10, 30-59.李 晓 & 李俊久. (2015). “一

- 带一路”与中国地缘政治经济战略的重构. *世界经济与政治*, 10, 30–59.
- Lieber, A. The Chinese Ideology: Reconciling the Politics with the Economics of Contemporary Reform. *Journal of China Political Science*, 18, 335–353 (2013). <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11366-013-9259-x>
- Liu, C., An, N., & Zhu, H. (2015). A geopolitical analysis of popular songs in the CCTV Spring Festival Gala, 1983–2013. *Geopolitics*, 20(3), 606–625. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14650045.2015.1039118>
- Liu, J. (2013). *Signifying the Local: Media Productions Rendered in Local Languages in Mainland China in the New Millennium*. Leiden; Boston: Brill.
- Liu, W. (2007, November 6). *Red Song Gala: A TV Revolution*. China Daily. From http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2007-11/06/content_6234853.htm
- Lü, X. (2009). Ritual, television, and state ideology: rereading CCTV's 2006 Spring Festival Gala. In Y. Zhu & C. Berry (Eds), *TV China* (pp. 111–125). Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.
- Martin, F. & Lewis, T. (Eds). (2016). *Lifestyle Media in Asia: Consumption, Aspiration and Identity*. London: Routledge.
- Men, H. H., (2014). China's national identity in transition: Domestic and international perspectives (1982-2012), *Social Sciences in China*, 35:2, 189-207, DOI: 10.1080/02529203.2014.900895
- Miles, M., & Huberman, A. M. (1994). *Qualitative Data Analysis*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications
- Modongal, S. (2016). Development of nationalism in China. *Cogent Social Sciences*, 2:1, DOI: 10.1080/23311886.2016.1235749
- Krickel-Choi, N & Chen, C. C., (2023) Defending the islands, defending the self: Taiwan, sovereignty and the origin of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute as ontological security-seeking, *The Pacific Review*, DOI: 10.1080/09512748.2023.2166978
- Pan, Z. & Chan, J. M. (2000). 'Building a Market-based Party Organ: Television and National Integration in the People's Republic of China', in D. French and M. Richards (Eds) *Television in Contemporary Asia*, pp. 232-263. New Delhi: Sage.
- Qing, S. (2020, January 25). *Changes and Controversies in the 37 Years of the Spring Festival Gala*. 37 Kr. <https://www.36kr.com/p/1725039706113>
- Quek, G. C., & Ling, P. (2013). McDonald's apology over a pig toy: A cultural territorial clash. *Australasian Marketing Journal*, 21(4), 228–233. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ausmj.2013.08.002>
- Rydholm, L. (2005). China Central Television's Spring Festival Gala: entertainment and political propaganda, *NIAS Nytt: Copenhagen*, 3:8-10
- Saldana, J. (2015). *The Coding Manual for Qualitative Researchers*. Newcastle upon Tyne: Sage.
- Schneider, F. (2012). *Visual Political Communication in Popular Chinese Television Series*. Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill. <https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004221499>
- Shambaugh, D. (2007). China's Propaganda System: Institutions, Processes and Efficacy. *The China Journal*. 57: 25–58.
- Shen, C., & Xu, Y. (2021). Bainian dadang de lilun wuzhuang: huigu yu zhanwang. [The theory of a century-old party: reviews and prospects]. *Dangdai Zhongguo yu Shijie*. [Contemporary China and World]. (03), 79-88. doi:CNKI:SUN:DDZS.0.2021-03-012. 沈传亮 & 徐莹. (2021). 百年大党的理论武装：回顾与展望. 当代中国与世界 (03), 79-88. doi:CNKI:SUN:DDZS.0.2021-03-012.
- Shisijie quanguo renda yicahuiyi zai jing bimou xijiping fabiao zhongyao jianghua* [The First Session of the 14th National People's Congress Concludes in Beijing, Xi Jinping delivered an important speech] 十四届全国人大一次会议在京闭幕 习近平发表重要讲话. (2023, March 13). *Quanguo renmin daibiao dahui* [National Public Congress] 全国人民代表大会. From <http://>

- www.npc.gov.cn/npc/c2/kgfb/202303/t20230313_424430.html
- Silverstone, R. Ed. (2005). *Media, Technology and Everyday Life in Europe: From Information to Communication*. London, Routledge.
- Song, G. (2022). *Television Chineseness: Gender, Nation, and Subjectivity*. University of Michigan press
- Stake, R. E., (1995). *The Art of Case Study Research*. London: Sage Publications Ltd.
- Sun, W. (2007). Dancing with chains: significant moments on China Central Television. *International Journal of Cultural Studies*. 10(2): 187–204
- Tong, X. (2012), Pingheng gongzuo he jiating de geren: jiating he guojiacelue, [How to balance between work and family, the strategy of family and nation], *Jiangsu Shehui Kexue*, [*Jiangsu Social Science*], 佟新. 平衡工作和家庭的个人, 家庭和国家策略[J]. *江苏社会科学*, 2012(2):83-91
- Townsend, J. (1988). Nationalism Chinese Style. *The Antioch Review*. 46(2): 204–220
- Tsang, S. & Cheung, O., (2022) Has Xi Jinping made China's political system more resilient and enduring? *Third World Quarterly*, 43:1, 225-243, DOI: 10.1080/01436597.2021.2000857
- Tuohy, S. (1991). Cultural metaphors and reasoning: Folklore scholarship and ideology in contemporary China. *Asian Folklore Studies*, 50(1), 189–220. <https://doi.org/10.2307/1178190>
- Wang, H. (2022). From Court Fools to Stage Puppets: Country Bumpkins in the Skits on CCTV's Spring Festival Gala, 1983–2022. *The China Quarterly*, 250, 552-571. doi:10.1017/S0305741022000091
- Wang, M. (2022). Between the past and the future: the rise of nationalist discourse at the 1983 CCTV Spring Festival Gala. *Inter-Asia Cultural Studies*, 23(2), 203-219. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14649373.2022.2064615>
- Wang, S. (2011). Dui zhongguo chuantong xiqu yu zhongguo lunli daode guanxi de jidian sikao. [Some thoughts on the relationship between traditional Chinese opera and Chinese ethics and morals]. *Xue Lilun*. [*Theory Research*]. 33, 138–139. doi:CNKI:SUN:LBYT.0.2012-33-064. 汪思红. (2011). 对中国传统戏曲与中国伦理道德关系的几点思考. *学理论*, 33, 138–139. doi:CNKI:SUN:LBYT.0.2012-33-064.
- Wang, Y. (2003). *China's Economic Development and Democratization* (1st ed.). Routledge. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315260464>
- Wang, Y. (2018). Lunxijinping de jinglao aiqin sixiang [An analysis of Xi Jinping's Thought on respecting the elderly and loving the family]. *Hubei Gongcheng Xueyuan Xuebao* [Journal of Hubei Engineering University]. 38(02), 5–9. 王玉德. (2018). 论习近平的敬老爱亲思想. *湖北工程学院学报*, (38)02, 5–9.
- Wang, X. Y. (2003). *Rushidao yu weijin xuanxue xingcheng*. [*Confucianism, Buddhism, Taoism and the Development of Wei-jin Metaphysics*]. Zhonghua shuju. [Zhonghua Book Company]. 王晓毅. (2003). 儒释道与魏晋玄学形成. 中华书局.
- Wei, R. (2000). China's television in the era of marketisation. In D. French & M. Richards (Eds.), *Television in Contemporary Asia* (pp. 335–346). New Delhi: Sage.
- Weile "baituo pingqiong he luohou" – tanxun deng xiaoping de chuxin. [In order to "get rid of poverty and backwardness" - exploring Deng Xiaoping's original intention]. 为了“摆脱贫穷和落后”——探寻邓小平的初心.(2022, August 26). Zhongguo gongchandangyuan wang [Chinese Communist Party Network] 中国共产党党员网. From <https://www.12371.cn/2022/08/26/ARTI1661486038107301.shtml>
- White Paper 1999: Ethnic Minorities Policy in China*. (1999, September 1). Permanent Mission of People's Republic of China to the UN. From http://un.china-mission.gov.cn/eng/gyzg/xi-zang/199909/t19990901_8410838.htm

- Wong, L. (2018). *Transpacific Attachments: Sex Work, Media Networks, and Affective Histories of Chineseness*. Columbia University Press. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7312/wong18338>
- Yang, L. J. & Lim, K. C. (2010). Three waves of nationalism in contemporary China: Sources, themes, presentations and consequences. *International Journal of China Studies*, 1(2), 461-485
- Yang, H. (2014). Hexiesheshui shiyuxia de xiaowenhua jiangou yu chuancheng [The construction and inheritance of filial piety culture from the perspective of harmonious society]. *Xue Lilun* [Theory Research], 28, 24–25. doi:CNKI:SUN:LBYT.0.2014-29-013. 杨浩. (2014). 和谐社会视域下的孝文化建构与传承_杨浩. 学理论, 28, 24–25. doi:CNKI:SUN:LBYT.0.2014-29-013
- Yu, H. Q. (2009). *Media and Cultural Transformation in China*. New York, NY: Routledge.
- Zai shengbuji zhuyao lingdao ganbu tigao goujian shehuizhuyihexieshehui nengli zhuatiantaohui shang de jianghua [Speech at the seminar on improving the ability of major leading cadres at the provincial and ministerial levels to build a harmonious socialist society] 在省部级主要领导干部提高构建社会主义和谐社会能力专题研讨班上的讲话. (2005, February 19). *Zhonghua renmin gongheguo kexue jishubu* [Ministry of Science and Technology of the People's Republic of China] 中华人民共和国科学技术部., Retrieved, 2006, December 22. From https://www.most.gov.cn/zxgz/jgdj/djyw/200905/t20090518_69322.html
- Zhang, L. (2017). Oushi shunba kara miruchugokuno bunkaseisaku [An analysis of Chinese cultural policy through the CCTV Spring Festival Gala]. *ICCS Journal of Modern Chinese Studies*, 10(1), 1–16. 張玲. (2017). 央視春晚から見る中国の文化政策. *ICCS Journal of Modern Chinese Studies*, 10(1), 1–16.
- Zhang, L., & Qiu, J. (2019). Cong “yangshi chunwan” kan gaigekaifang yilai zhudao jiazhiguan yu shehui sichao de bianqian. [Change of trends of social thoughts since the reform and opening from the perspective of CCTV New Year's Eve Entertainment]. *Shehui zhuyi hexin jiazhiguan yanjiu* [Studies on Core Socialist Values]. 05(04): 44-53. 张丽丝&邱吉. (2019). 从“央视春晚”看改革开放以来主导价值观与社会思潮的变迁. *社会主义核心价值观研究*. 05(04): 44-53.
- Zhao, B. (1998). Popular family television and party ideology: the Spring Festival Eve happy gathering. *Media, Culture & Society*. 20(1): 43-58.
- Zhao, B. (1999). Mouthpiece or money-spinner? The double life of Chinese television in the late 1990s. *International Journal of Cultural Studies*, 2(3), 291–305. <https://doi.org/10.1177/136787799900200301>
- Zhao, S. (2004). *A Nation-State by Construction: Dynamics of Modern Chinese Nationalism*. Stanford University Press.
- Zhao, Y. X. (2021). Chongfan 90 niandaizhi xiagangchao, tiefanwanzasuihou,yidaigongren de chenfu he miming. [After the “Iron Rice Bowl” was smashed: A generation of workers in 90s]. (赵蕴娴, 2021年8月19日, 重返90年代之下岗潮, 铁饭碗砸碎后, 一代工人的沉浮与迷茫) <https://www.jiemian.com/article/6485827.html>
- Zhongzhongzhongyang guowuyuan yinfa <shengtai wenming tizhi gaige zongti fangan> The Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and the State Council issued the “Overall Plan for the Reform of the Ecological Civilization System”. 中共中央国务院印发《生态文明体制改革总体方案》. (2015, September 21). *Zhongguo zhengfu wang*. [Chinese Government Website] 中国政府网. From https://www.gov.cn/guowuyuan/2015-09/21/content_2936327.htm

“Spring Festival Gala of People’s Republic of China” Performances Referenced

1983

Pan Hongjun [Red Army Hope](1983年春节联欢晚会, 盼红军),

<https://tv.cctv.com/2009/11/11/VIDE1355603383429675.shtml>

Fuqi shuangshuang bajiahuan [Back Home Together], 夫妻双双把家还,

<https://tv.cctv.com/2009/11/11/VIDE1355603313884257.shtml>

Huoshao yuanmingyuan [Burning of the Imperial Palace], 火烧圆明园 53:5 - 58:27,

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KcnzfUhGc6g>

Beijing opera:

Zuo zhai daoma [Steal the horse], 坐寨盗马, <https://www.bilibili.com/video/BV1Bq4y1C72o/>

Kongchengji [The Empty City], 空城计,

https://www.bilibili.com/video/BV1jT4y1y7o3/?spm_id_from=333.788

Bawang bieji [Farewell to My Concubine], 霸王别姬,

https://www.bilibili.com/video/BV1Gb4y1n7Wc/?spm_id_from=333.788

Niugao zhaoqin [The Marriage of Niu Gao], 牛皋招亲,

<https://tv.cctv.com/2009/11/11/VIDE1355603333589766.shtml>

- 1985

Longed chuanren [Legend of Dragon], 龙的传人, <https://www.bilibili.com/video/BV1k44y1s7Gi/>

- 1988

Beijing Opera:

Shan Xiongxin [Shan Xiongxin], 单雄信,

https://www.bilibili.com/video/BV19R4y1V7MF/?spm_id_from=333.788

Baolongtu dazuo zai kaifengfu [Baozheng is in the Kaifeng], 包龙图打坐在开封府,

https://www.bilibili.com/video/BV1iL4y1G7P6/?spm_id_from=333.788

Huangmei opera

Qing xin Chun [Best wishes to the Spring Festival], 庆新春,

https://www.bilibili.com/video/BV1nZ4y1k7N7/?spm_id_from=333.788

- 1993

Huijia [Go Home], 回家, <http://tv.cctv.com/2009/11/11/VIDE1355604212649486.shtml>

Chuanju opera:

Shediao [The Eagle Shooting], 射雕, <https://www.bilibili.com/video/BV1Ft411y7aD/>

Zuogong [Sitting in the Palace], 坐宫,

https://www.bilibili.com/video/BV1yr4y1n7cQ/?spm_id_from=333.337.search-card.all.click

- 1998

Zoujin xinshidai [Enter to the New Age], 走进新时代,

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9OR0Sxe9MUU>

Gong fu [Kungfu], 功夫, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r3qAx_rvk08

Wo ai ni zhongguo [I Love You China], 我爱你中国,

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5zlGUQ-IR4E>

Yugongyishan [the Foolish Man who Removed Mountains], 愚公移山,

<https://www.bilibili.com/video/BV1VD4y1x7rp/>

Lanju jingxiu [The Collection of Different Operas], 兰菊竞秀,

<https://www.bilibili.com/video/BV12W4y117Rm/>

Da zhucao [Picking Bamboo Shoots], 打猪草, <https://www.bilibili.com/video/BV1gi4y1S7Fd/>

- 2003

Shaoshu minzu zuge [Collected songs of minority ethnics], 少数民族组歌,

<http://tv.cctv.com/2009/11/11/VIDE1355602614753444.shtml>

Wo he baba huan juese [I am Father, You are Son], 我和爸爸换角色,

<https://v.qq.com/x/page/t0329tf2y0i.html>

Liyuan nao xinchun [The Collection of Operas], 梨园闹新春,

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8dcn8ms9cjs>

- 2008

The Spring Festival Gala in 2008, <http://tv.cctv.com/2012/12/16/VIDA1355599238854227.shtml>

Xiquilianchang-Chazi yanhong [The Collection of Operas – Drunken Beauty], 戏曲联唱-姹紫嫣红,

<https://tv.cctv.com/2009/11/11/VIDE1355602978510472.shtml>

- 2009

Song ni yiduo dongfang moli [An Oriental Jasmine], 送你一朵东方茉莉,

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nNvzuGYTRD8>

- 2010

The Spring Festival Gala in 2010, <http://tv.cctv.com/2012/12/17/VIDA1355675187521921.shtml>

- 2013

Wo ai ni zhongguo [I Love You China], 我爱你中国,

<https://tv.cctv.com/2013/02/10/VIDE1360486982785489.shtml>

Meili zhongguo [Beautiful China], 美丽中国, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DYkVv5S3Cb8>

Jiabanshang de matouqin [A Morin Khuur on the Deck], 甲板上的马头琴,

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tPfkZVAll4>

Zhongguoweidao [China Taste], 中国味道, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XiQSyuS6JVM>

Molihua [Jasmine Flower], 茉莉花, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iTSdS9-riKU>

Yinglai chuanse huanrenjian [Welcome to the Spring] 迎春春色换人间,

<https://tv.cctv.com/2013/02/10/VIDE1360474568955538.shtml>

- 2014

The Spring Festival Gala in 2014,

<http://tv.cctv.com/2016/11/02/VIDAZV3k3FMIPQoNi9hTGBXdw161102.shtml>

- 2015

The Spring Festival Gala in 2015, <http://tv.cctv.com/2015/02/05/VIDA1423098962941704.shtml>

- 2018

Zanzan xinshidai [The New Age is Great], 赞赞新时代, <https://www.dailymotion.com/video/x7qrr2l>

Long de chuanren [Legend of Dragon], 龙的传人,

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hDRukkhSeGw>

Jiaguó xingwáng [Love Country, Love Home], 家国兴旺,
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2iFghFfyOqs>
Huí jiā [I am Home], 回家, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3owDjwepM10>
Shèngshì líyuánměi [The Beauty of the Opera], 盛世梨园美,
<https://tv.cctv.com/2018/02/15/VIDEkvDq9D08B8Bqd79E2HDk180215.shtml>
shānxiào shuǐxiào renhuānxiào [The Mountains Laugh, the Waters Laugh and the People Laugh],
山笑水笑人欢笑.

- 2020

The Spring Festival Gala in 2020, <https://chunwan.cctv.com/2020/index.shtml>

- 2023

Lǜshuǐ qīngshān [Lucid Waters and Lush Mountains], 绿水青山,
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IIOX9j7kYOQ>
Yuǎnzhēng [Expedition], 远征, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mync2jGmaZc>
Yīdāifānhuā, yīlùgē [Belt of Flowers, Road of Song], 一带繁花一路歌,
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0lbwFGjHxGw>
Wǒ de Biàn Biàn Biàn [I want to Change Change Change], 我的变变变,
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ew9wb2Avjqs>
Cūnwǎn [The Spring Festival Gala in the Village], 村晚,
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BClahsXgWrc>
Wǒ de Jiāxiāng [My Hometown], 我的家乡, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=U3aQQkAGhe0>
Fù yǔ zǐ [Father and Son], 父与子, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mu7rHW23-7I>
Kāifàn, kāifun [Have Fun, It Is Time for Dinner], 开饭, 开fun!,
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zm1tdNUz9kE>
Huáicǎi Líyuán [The Beauty of the Opera], 华彩梨园, https://www.iqiyi.com/v_2civvyic8zk.html

(JIAO, Ran, Doctoral Program in International Relations, Graduate School of International
Relations, Ritsumeikan University)

中国共産党における「イデオロギー」の表現： 『春節聯歡晚会』から見た中国の自己イメージ

この論文は、中国で非常に人気のあるテレビ番組である『春節聯歡晚会』（春晚）を事例に、現代中国におけるイデオロギーの変化を研究している。春節は中国で最も重要な祭りであり、毎年その時期に上映される『春晚』は最も広く視聴者を集める番組である。過去40年間において『春晚』の内容は大きく変化してきたが、中心的なテーマ（政治宣伝）自体はほとんど変わっていない。その関係で、この番組に含まれる情報は視聴者に自国について公式な知識・認識を持たせるという意味で、中央当局による中心的思想を一般の人々に広く伝えるための政治宣伝の手段として機能している。また、『春晚』は公式メディアとして中国の社会経済的発展のあり方とグローバリゼーションに埋め込まれた中国の現状をよく反映する番組でもある。

この研究は、中国共産党のイデオロギーの変化とそれが春晚でどのように表現されるかという関係を探るものである。この研究では、1983年から2023年までの歌とスケッチを対象に、質的な内容分析を研究方法として使用している。これにより、CCPのイデオロギーの立場がSFGでどのように表現されているかをより詳細に調査するための時系列的で社会的に影響された枠組みが明らかにされている。

この研究の結論としては、国家への忠誠心と中国共産党への感謝が春晚に反映される中心のテーマであると結論づけられている。労働と経済、地政学、自然環境のテーマは、変化するイデオロギーの影響を受けつつ常に進化している。特に、2012年に習近平主席が権力を握って以来、地政学や自然環境の発展に関連するテーマは春晚プログラムの重要な構成要素となっている。

(シュウゼン, 立命館大学国際関係研究科博士課程後期課程)