

Doctoral Thesis

Peace for Sale: The Cost of Post-Conflict Stability
in North Maluku, Indonesia

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Graduate School of International Relations
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**Peace for Sale: The Cost of Post-Conflict Stability
in North Maluku, Indonesia**
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
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MAP OF INDONESIA



Map obtained from: <https://www.worldometers.info/maps/indonesia-physical-map-full/>

MAP OF NORTH MALUKU



Map obtained from <https://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/mapsonline/base-maps/north-maluku-province>

ABSTRACT

This is a study to examine the post-conflict political development in North Maluku, Indonesia. The country's democratic transition after the fall of President Soeharto who had led his authoritarian government (1966-98) provided an unintended consequence of erupting violent conflicts in many parts of Indonesia, for example in Aceh, Poso, Maluku, North Maluku, and Papua. 'Balkanization' of Indonesia was a concern among observers of Indonesian politics both domestic and international at that time. Two decades later, in 2020, political stability in Aceh, Poso, Maluku, and Papua' remains fragile because violence has regularly destabilized these communities. In contrast, the situation in North Maluku has been significantly conducive and stable. Why it is that the post-conflict North Maluku can maintain stability? What are the keys to the success of peacebuilding? This thesis examines these questions.

Indonesian politics scholars observed the war in North Maluku, but their attention shifted to other conflict areas when peace agreements were made in North Maluku. Thus, the post-conflict North Maluku has not been studied in-depth until today, and important questions—such as why peace has been sustained there, and what lessons can be learnt—are largely neglected in the scholarship. To fill this academic gap, my thesis investigates the post-conflict political development in North Maluku.

Mainstream peacebuilding studies in Indonesia have a tendency to evaluate the impact of peace initiatives only by observing a few years after the conflict. Such a short-term perspective is not always helpful if we want to understand deeper impact beyond superficial institutional changes. My study employs a long-term analysis of the politics of peacebuilding in North Maluku and tries to elucidate a pragmatic nature of sustained peace in the region. It is commonly understood that the post-conflict initiatives, including recovery assistances, local autonomy, and democratic elections, all contributed to the stabilization of local politics and peace in North Maluku. However, we argue that it is *not* precisely because of the intended impact of these initiatives that are expected to bring a good governance in the post-conflict North Maluku, but because of the unintended impact that has incentivized the newly emerging local political elites to exploit politico-economic opportunities being available during the post-conflict era and to maintain their intra-elite balance of power for the effective preservation of these vested interests. In other words, peace is sustained at the cost of good governance. 'Peace for sale' should be understood as the best term to identify such an irony of the post-conflict North Maluku.

要約

本研究は、インドネシアの北マルクにおける紛争後の政治発展を分析するものである。インドネシアでは、スハルト大統領による長期の権威主義体制（1966－98）が崩壊すると同時に、各地で暴動や紛争が連鎖的に勃発した。それは、アチェやポソ、マルク、北マルク、パプアなどの地方で顕著に見られ、当時はインドネシアの「バルカン化」を懸念する声さえ聞かれた。それから約 20 年が経つものの、アチェやポソ、マルク、パプアといった地方では、依然として政治暴力が散発的に発生し、地域の安定は脆弱である。一方、北マルクでは、紛争後の政治と社会は安定化の歩みを続けている。なぜ北マルクでは紛争後の安定が維持されているのか。何が、その平和構築の成功の鍵といえるのか。これらの問いに迫るのが本論文の目的である。

北マルクの紛争に関しては、これまでもインドネシア政治研究者たちが考察してきたテーマであるが、和平合意の締結を契機に彼らの関心は他の紛争地域にシフトしていった。そのため、ポスト紛争期の北マルクの政治について、本格的な調査研究がないまま今日に至っている。その結果、「なぜ北マルクでは平和が持続できているのか」、「その実態からいかなる教訓が見い出せるのか」といった重要な問いが検証されなかった。その空白を埋めるのが本研究である。

和平イニシアティブのインパクトをどう評価するか。従来のインドネシア平和構築研究の主流は、紛争後数年を経過観察して評価判断するケースが多い。しかし、そのような短期的な視点は、制度改革に伴う表面的な変化は捉えられるが、より深層部分に染みるインパクトの理解には届かない。本研究は、北マルクにおける平和構築の政治を長期的に分析し、現地で維持されている平和のプラグマティックな側面をえぐり出すものである。これまで、紛争後復興支援や地方自治権の拡大、そして民主選挙の導入といったイニシアティブが、北マルクの地方政治の安定化と平和に貢献してきたと一般的に理解されてきた。しかし、本研究で明らかにしたことは、それらのイニシアティブが期待したインパクト、すなわち「グッド・ガバナンス」の定着ではなく、むしろ「意図していないインパクト」が決定的な貢献をしている実態である。すなわち、紛争の過程で新たに台頭したローカルな政治エリートたちが、上記のイニシアティブから政治経済的利権を搾取する契機を発見し、その権益の維持と最大化には、紛争ではなくエリート間の権力均衡こそが戦略的に重要であるというコンセンサスが共有されていく力学である。それは、平和の維持とバッド・ガバナンスがトレードオフになっていることを示している。このような北マルクのポスト紛争期の矛盾と皮肉を象徴する言葉——それが「平和の売却」であろう。

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This passion for world politics has stayed with me since I was a teenager. This passion led to my decision to pursue political science and international relations at both bachelor and master's level, where I began to focus on peace, conflict resolution, and security studies. One of my dreams is to become one of the Indonesians who are expert on peace, security, and conflict resolution studies. I believe completing this PhD is a baby step closer to my dream in research and academia. This treasure that I have worked for the past five years is impossible to finish without the endless support, backing, and encouragement of excellent human beings. There are people in this world who are genuinely kind with big hearts. I am blessed to have met a few throughout my Ritsumeikan journey and during my stay in Kyoto.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATION

AMAN	Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara (the Indigenous Peoples' Alliance of the Archipelago)
AMDAL	Analisis Dampak Lingkungan (Environmental Impact Analyzes)
APBD	Anggaran Pendapatan Belanja Daerah (Regional Budget)
APBD-P	Anggaran Pendapatan Belanja Daerah-Perubahan (the Revised Regional Budget)
APBN	Anggaran Pendapatan Belanja Negara (State Budget)
BANSOS	Bantuan Sosial (Social Assistance)
BARESKRIM	Badan Reserse dan Kriminal (Criminal Investigation Agency)
BARNAS	Barisan Nasional (the National Front Party)
BAPPEDA	Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Daerah (Regional Development Planning Agency)
BAWASLU	Badan Pengawas Pemilu (General Election Supervisory Agency)
BIMM	Badan Immarah Muslim Maluku (Head of Imarat Council of Maluku Muslims)
BRIGJEN	Brigadir Jenderal (Brigadier General)
BRIMOB	Korps Brigade Mobil (Mobile Brigade Corps)
BPS	Badan Pusat Statistic (Central Bureau of Statistics)
DTT	Dana Tidak Terduga (Unexpected Funds)
DPD	Dewan Perwakilan Daerah (Regional Representative Council)
DPRD	Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah (Regional Parliament)
DPR RI	Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Republik Indonesia (Indonesia Parliament)
ESDM	Energi Sumber Daya Mineral (Energy Mineral and Natural Resources)
FKAUB	Forum Komunikasi Antar Umat Beragama (Interfaith Communication Forum)
FKAWJ	Forum Komunikasi Ahlussunnah Wal Jamaah (Communication Forum of the Followers of the Sunnah and the Community of the Prophet)

FPI	Front Pembela Islam (Islamic Defenders Front)
GBI	Gereja Bethel Indonesia (Head of Indonesian Bethel Church)
GERINDRA	Gerakan Indonesia Raya (Great Indonesia Movement Party)
GMIH	Gereja Masehi Injil Halmahera (Evangelical Christian Church in Halmahera)
GOLKAR	Golongan Karya (Functional Group)
GPM	Gereja Protestan Maluku (Protestant Church of Maluku)
HANURA	Hati Nurani Rakyat (People's Conscience Party)
HCW	Halmahera Corruption Watch
HRW	Human Rights Watch
ICG	International Crisis Group
IDP	Internally Displaced People
IRJEN	Inspektur Jenderal (Inspector General)
KAJATI	Kejaksaan Tinggi (Provincial Prosecutor's Office)
KAHMI	Korps Alumni Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam (Corps of the Alumni of Islamic Students Association)
KAPOLDA	Kepala Polisi Daerah (Chief of Regional Police)
KAPOLRI	Kepala Kepolisian Republik Indonesia (Chief of the Indonesian National Police)
KEPMEN	Keputusan Menteri (Ministerial Decrees)
KODAM	Komando Daerah Militer (Regional Military Command)
KODIM	Komando Distrik Militer (District Military Command)
KOMJEN	Komisaris Jenderal (Commissioner General)
KOPASSUS	Komando Pasukan Khusus (Special Force Command)
KOSTRAD	Komando Cadangan Strategis Angkatan Darat (Army Strategic Command)
KPK	Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi (Corruption Eradication Commission)
KPUD	Komisi Pemilihan Umum Daerah (Regional Election Committee)
KPU RI	Komisi Pemilihan Umum Indonesia (General Elections Commission of Indonesia)
LML	Lembaga Mitra Lingkungan (Environmental Partner Organization)

MA	Mahkamah Agung (Supreme Court)
MASYUMI	Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia (Council of Indonesian Muslim Associations)
MAYJEN	Mayor Jenderal (Major General)
MENDAGRI	Menteri Dalam Negeri (Minister of Home Affairs)
MENKOKESRA	Menteri Koordinator Kesejahteraan Rakyat (Coordinating Minister for People's Welfare)
MENKOPOLKAM	Menteri Koordinator Politik dan Keamanan (Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs)
MILF	Moro Islamic Liberation Front
MK	Mahkamah Konstitusi (Constitutional Court)
MUI	Majelis Ulama Indonesia (Indonesian Ulema Council)
MPR	Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (People's Consultative Assembly)
NHM	Nusa Halmahera Mining
NU	Nahdlatul Ulama (the Revival of Ulama)
PAN	Partai Amanat Nasional (National Mandate Party)
PARKINDO	Partai Kristen Indonesia (Indonesian Christian Party)
PBB	Partai Bulan Bintang (Crescent Star Party)
PBR	Partai Bintang Reformasi (Reform Star Party)
PDI	Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (Indonesian Democratic Party)
PDI-P	Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle)
PKD	Partai Demokrasi Kebangsaan (Democratic Nationhood Party)
PDS	Partai Damai Sejahtera (Prosperous Peace Party)
PERTI	Persatuan Tarbiyah Islamiyah (Islamic Education Party)
PERPRES	Peraturan Presiden (Presidential Regulation)
PGPI	Persatuan Gereja Pantekosta Indonesia (Indonesian Pentecostal Church Association)
PIB	Partai Indonesia Baru (Party of the New Indonesia)
PKB	Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (National Awakening Party)
PKS	Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (Prosperous Justice Party)
PKPB	Partai Karya Peduli Bangsa (Concern for the Nation Functional Party)

PKPI	Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan Indonesia (Indonesian Justice and Unity Party)
PMKRI	Perhimpunan Mahasiswa Katolik Republik Indonesia (Catholic University of the Republic of Indonesia)
PNI-M	Partai Nasional Indonesia Marhaenisme (Indonesian National Party Marhaenism)
POLDA	Kepolisian Daerah (Provincial Police)
POLRESTA	Kepolisian Resor Kota (Precinct Police)
POLRI	Kepolisian Republik Indonesia (Indonesian National Police)
PSII	Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic Union Party)
PP	Peraturan Pemerintah (Government Regulation)
PPATK	Pusat Pelaporan dan Analisis Transaksi Keuangan (Indonesian Financial Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre)
PPD	Partai Persatuan Daerah (Regional Unity Party)
PPDI	Partai Penegak Demokrasi Indonesia (Indonesian Democratic Vanguard Party)
PPI	Persatuan Pemuda Indonesia (Indonesian Youth Association)
PPNUI	Partai Persatuan Nahdlatul Ummah Indonesia (Indonesian Nahdlatul Community Party)
PPRN	Partai Peduli Rakyat Nasional (National People's Concern Party)
PPP	Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (United Development Party)
PT	Pengadilan Tinggi (District High Court)
RMS	Republik Maluku Selatan (Republic of South Maluku)
TNI	Tentara Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian National Armed Forces)
UMMU	Universitas Muhammadiyah Maluku Utara (Muhammadiyah University of North Maluku)
UU	Undang-Undang (Acts)
UUD	Undang-Undang Dasar (Constitution)
VOC	<i>Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie</i> (Dutch East India Company)

Chapter 1:

Introduction

This research is a study to examine the post-conflict local politics in North Maluku province, Indonesia. The province is currently in stable condition after the major conflict that happened between 1999-2001. The conflict and violence resulted in the deaths of around 3,000 people, and the approximately 250,000 internally displaced people (IDP).

The conflict in North Maluku happened in the early years of democratic transition in Indonesia, which started in 1998 when the long-term authoritarian government led by President Soeharto collapsed. It was this transition period that we simultaneously saw the outbreak of large-scale conflict across Indonesia, for example in Aceh, Poso, and Papua.

After two decades, the situation in Aceh remains unstable as former combatants easily resort to violence during local elections. Poso also remains unstable because violent radicalism continues to develop until this day. In Papua, the low-intensity conflict endures for a long time. Contrarily, the situation in North Maluku become stable. Why so? In what ways, the peace has been maintained? What is the key for the successful post-conflict political stability? This thesis is the first in-depth study that examines the post-conflict peacebuilding in North Maluku. The investigation of this research offers a full set of discussion to uncover the dynamics of conflict transformation.

Background and Significance of the Study

Indonesia is a vast nation, consists of 260 million people spread across thousands of islands. Indonesia is not only massive in terms of its geographical but also diverse in its people as it consists of more than 300 different ethnics and 200 different languages, which according to some scholars is a reason why Indonesia is prone to conflict. Under such circumstances, Indonesia experienced a regime change from authoritarianism to democratization in 1998 and this political change showed the country's vulnerable nature of national integration, as it invited violence and conflict in many parts of the archipelago.

The conflict started in Jakarta in 1998 when the hatred channeled toward Chinese Indonesians. In some other parts of Indonesia, such as in Poso and Maluku, the hatred was directed towards Christians. However, the conflicts at that time were not only racial or religious, but some were heavily linked with the separatist movements, as seen in Aceh and

Papua. Free Aceh Movement (*Gerakan Aceh Merdeka-GAM*) and Free Papua Movement (*Organisasi Papua Merdeka-OPM*) engaged in armed conflicts in these two places.

Due to the sudden emergence of local conflict, we now have an accumulation of literatures that try to understand the nature of the conflict. For example, studies related to North Maluku can be found in Aditjondro (2001a), Aditjondro (2001b), Bertrand (2004), Braithwaite (2013), Duncan (2013), International Crisis Group (2002), Klinken (2006), Klinken (2007), Mahmada, et al. (2000), Pantau Magazine (2003), Tomagola (2006), Varshney, Tadjoeeddin, & Panggabean (2004), Wilson (2008), Yanuarti et al., (2004), Yanuarti, et al., (2005), Barron, Azca, & Susdinarjanti (2012), Björkhagen (2016), Bräuchler (2009), Bräuchler (2011), Davidson (2005), Duncan (2016), Hasan (2018), and Asia Society (2000). These previous studies all focus on Maluku during the conflict.

Some other relevant studies deal with the conflict in North Maluku from different perspectives. For example, Sharp (2013) discusses the role of journalism and conflict in Indonesia and illustrates how reporting violence contributes to peace efforts. Totona (2017) examines the role of academics, identity, and representation in conflict. These works try to include the case of North Maluku.

However, there is no scholarly inquiry about North Maluku's post-conflict peacebuilding. Perhaps it is because Indonesia has regularly faced large-scale conflicts so that political observers stopped their focus on North Maluku and moved their attention to other places. For example, North Maluku's conflict ended in 2002, and scholars moved their attention to Aceh. It is understandable that any research trend can be shifted, and the post-conflict area may lose attraction of the media and academics. However, it does not undermine a scholarly significance of observing the continuous development of a local society before/during/after the conflict in order to understand how peace is destroyed and recovered from a long-term perspective. It is only through such a long-term viewpoint that we can comprehensively analyze the nature of the post-conflict peace. In other words, any peacebuilding studies that only examine the immediate post-conflict period but lack the long-term impact assessment do not really comprehend the post-war local sociopolitical transformation. This study is the first attempt to do this long-term analysis of post-conflict North Maluku in Indonesia.

Research Questions

Based on the understanding above, my study aims to answer two questions: (1) why could post-conflict North Maluku maintain so-called peace?; (2) what are the key factors which have preserved peace and stability in the post-conflict North Maluku? In examining these core questions, we also want to discuss some critical issues. For example, how were decentralisation and local autonomy significant in shaping the post-conflict situation in North Maluku? How have corruption and transparency of governance affected the process of peacebuilding in North Maluku? Who benefited from the past conflict and/or sustainable peace? How did the local elites adapt to the shift from conflict to peace in North Maluku? By examining and investigating these questions, we hope to elucidate the dynamics of peace in North Maluku and provide broader implications for other post-conflict areas in Indonesia and beyond.

Research Methods

This study employs area studies and chronological approaches in analyzing the process and dynamics of post-conflict peacebuilding in North Maluku. I also use ethnographic approaches to understand key political players. All these approaches are useful and effective as we deal with sensitive topics for the local elites, for example violence, death, and corruption, as well as traumatic experiences of the local people in North Maluku.

During the period of doctoral study from 2016-2020 that includes intensive fieldwork in 2017-2018, I talked with 180 individuals, had conducted 60 recorded interviews. My field observations covered 6 regencies/cities in North Maluku. This research could not be realized if I could not interview main conflict actors, victims, aid receivers, and local political/security elites in North Maluku. In completing this study, I have engaged in in-depth interviews, group discussions, online platform conversations. To back up my findings from the fieldwork, I gathered data from newspapers, official documents and publications related to the conflict and post-conflict situation in North Maluku. Political tensions during the fieldwork were immense. When I conducted the fieldwork in in 2017-2018, the province was in the time of pre-election campaign. The tension was high at that time. Sometimes it made me difficult to gain trust from local elites.

The places of field research were selected based on the damage suffered by each district. Besides, the places were also selected based on the number of victims and the IDP in the period of 1999-2002. These regencies and cities were: North Halmahera, Central Halmahera, West Halmahera, South Halmahera, Tidore, and Ternate. Field research in North Halmahera, South Halmahera, Ternate, and Tidore were conducted frequently. Additional trips to Jakarta,

Jogjakarta, and Padang were also made to target some sources who resided in Jakarta and Jogjakarta. Discussions with local university lecturers in North Maluku were also made to gather information which may be only available to the locals.

Apart from fieldwork, I also mobilized existing publications, reports from related NGOs, and relevant other sources such as a blog to compile, to compare, and to clarify the data that I received during fieldwork. I will introduce these relevant literatures in earlier chapters in which I rely heavily on previous works done by historians and conflict analysts.

Organization of Chapters

This thesis is divided into two main parts. The first part consists of Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 that discuss the historical background of North Maluku before and during the conflict. The second part consists of Chapters 4-7 that analyze the post-conflict developments. Chapter 8 is the concluding chapter which outlines findings and their significance. The aims of each chapter are as follows.

Chapter 2 discusses the history of North Maluku before the era of democratization in Indonesia. This chapter elaborates the importance of historical legacies related to the roots of conflict in 1999. This chapter begins by exploring how long-established local institutions or in the present day known as the sultanates shaped the lives of people in economic, social, and socio-cultural matters. The second part of this chapter addresses the pre-colonial and colonial periods. It was during the Dutch colonial period that inequality and rivalry among local communities were sharpened. The third part of this chapter analyzes the local impact after Indonesia's independence, especially under President Suharto's authoritarian 'New Order' period. We will examine how the socio-political, economic, and institutional contexts of the past created the roots of 1999-2002 conflict in North Maluku. We will raise two main questions: how has history influenced the character of North Malukan people?; what are the struggles in the history of North Maluku, which resulted in society's polarization in the present day?

Chapter 3 examines how and why the conflict erupted and spread in the Maluku islands in 1999. The conflict was deadly, and the victims were extremely high. The violence resulted in 2,789 deaths from 68 incidents. There was no single reason for the conflict outbreak, which shows how complicated the conflict was. The conflict that occurred in North Maluku can be analyzed as a series of violent incidents initiated by provocateurs and managed by a handful of elites to maintain the power of the old guards and or to seize power by the newcomers. In this

chapter, we analyze how the local elites positioned their socio-political stance to the people of North Maluku before, during, and after conflict. We ask two main questions. First, what were the root causes of violent conflicts in North Maluku? Second, why did the conflict develop and rapidly spread in North Maluku?

Chapter 4 discusses the peace settlement in North Maluku. The existing studies mention briefly about the peace process from the national context. However, in the local context, the local elites held several meetings which led to the peace agreement among the conflicting parties at the local level. These local initiatives are crucially important to understand the ‘success’ of national-level peace process, but the significance has been neglected in previous works. Thus, this chapter fills in an academic gap. We try to answer the following two primary questions. First, what was the reason that made the peace talks in North Maluku successful? Second, what were the new natures of the conflict after the peace agreement? The first part of this chapter explores the dynamics of the peace process in North Maluku, delving into the different perspectives of the Indonesian government and the locals in North Maluku. The second part of this chapter discusses the post-conflict violence and how the peace agreements made both at national and local levels were unable to stop the violence.

Chapter 5 analyzes the early years of peace in North Maluku, examining the local politics of post-conflict socio-economic recovery in 2002-2003. After the peace agreements, plenty of aid and assistance entered North Maluku. The funds aimed at two main objectives: first, to rebuild the destroyed government offices, public spaces, worship places, and people’s houses; and second, to return the IDP to their homes. The discussion in this chapter focusses on the significance of aid and grants collected domestically and overseas to rebuild the post-conflict region, and how the grants shaped the dynamics of local politics and defined the local actors who later engaged in political contestations in provincial and regency elections. Throughout the chapter, we try to reveal how post-conflict economic projects reshaped local political power in North Maluku and how corruption affected the process of peacebuilding in North Maluku.

Chapter 6 examines the post-conflict power shift at the provincial and local level that happened from 2003 to 2008. In this chapter, we argue that the main trigger of this historic power shift from traditional sultanates to ethnic-identity elites was the introduction of administrative decentralisation, which started in 2001 throughout Indonesia. This chapter asks the following questions. First, how did decentralisation impact the post-conflict political dynamics in North Maluku? Second, how have the local elites in North Maluku built and

maintained their power in the age of direct elections? We closely examine local head elections in 2003, 2008, 2013, and 2018.

Chapter 7 discusses the consolidation of political dynasty in contemporary North Maluku. What has made the political dynasty to survive in North Maluku? How has the political dynasty maintained their loyal supporters? We will examine these questions by closely investigating the period between 2007 and 2018, and identify several strategies used by two dynasties in North Maluku to maintain their political power at the provincial and regency level. The first part of this chapter examines the political dynasties developed by two families who currently control the province, i.e., Kasuba and Mus families. The second part of this chapter investigates the impact of dynasty building in post-conflict North Maluku.

Throughout the thesis, I will provide the local political analysis from a long-term perspective—not limited to the conflict and immediate post-conflict time. Without such perspective, it is difficult to identify the deeper impact of the conflict and the wider mechanism of peace-maintenance in the region. I believe it is only through this analytical approach that we can understand and highlight the irony of ‘peace for sale.’

Chapter 2

Historical Perspectives of Moloku Kie Raha: Socio-Political, Economic, and Institutional contexts

Studying the past generally allows us to learn about the socio-political, economic, and institutional context in a region, which may develop as time goes by. The roots of conflict in the present day cannot be detached from the influence from the past. Therefore, adopting a historical perspective may offer a new outlook in conflict analysis discourse. This chapter is based on fieldwork carried out in 2018 in North Maluku. It begins by first exploring how long-established local institutions shaped the characteristics of North Malukan people. The long-established institutions, also known as the sultanates, shaped the lives of people in economic, social, and socio-cultural matters, not only in private matters such as beliefs. We will elaborate the integration of indigenous people with the sultanate; hence, we briefly examine historical background of each sultanate. The second part of this chapter addresses the pre-colonization and colonization periods, and the inequality and rivalry among the community in North Maluku. Finally, the third part of this chapter analyzes the role changes during post-independence and also during Soeharto's 'New Order' period, explaining, for example, how changes in laws impacted inequality and rivalry between the Muslim and Christian communities.

Before we start main observation, let us briefly look at the position of Maluku in the broader historical context of Indonesia. The history of the North Malukan people, started long before the establishment of Indonesia as a country. Before Indonesia as it is known today existed, the region of North Maluku was controlled by the four Sultanates: Jailolo, Bacan, Tidore, and Ternate, and before the establishment of these Sultanates, the North Malukan people lived in small communities based on their ethnicities. Many socio-political issues today are a result of processes which have been unfolding over 14 centuries. For example, the hatred among Muslim and Christian communities is an accumulation of social interaction across these two beliefs for centuries.

During the colonialization (started in 17 century) and in the early years after independence (1945-), the eastern region of Indonesia consisted of two main areas, called Sulawesi and Maluku islands. The eastern region of Indonesia became an important location in the country's history, because this area attracted the Dutch and many other European countries to come for its rich spices. The Maluku islands stretched from Morotai in the North

to Tanimbar in the South. During their journeys, the Dutch and Portuguese brought three main imports: explorers, traders, and missionaries. During the colonization, the Dutch treated the Northern region of Indonesia, led by two cities - Ternate and Tidore, as the trade centre. Meanwhile, the Southern region including Ambon, Buru, Seram, and Tanimbar was considered the main centre for missionaries. Now the Southern part of Maluku has a largely homogenous in terms of religious beliefs, with a majority of Christian Protestants. However, some parts of the Southern region also have a Muslim population, and the two beliefs co-exist peacefully next to each other, because before Islam and Christian entered Maluku island as a whole, the people lived together under indigenous cultures and organized by ethnic communities.

In contrast, in Northern part of Maluku, a strong social gap and rivalry in society, especially between Muslims and Christians, have existed for ages. During the Portuguese and particularly the Dutch colonial era, most Malukan Christians were met with differential treatment by the colonisers. They enjoyed several privileges, while most Malukan Muslims suffered from the discriminatory colonial policy. For example, during the Dutch colonialism, the majority of Malukan Christians had an effortless path to literacy, and Christians had also implemented better sanitation programs. The Malukan Christians arguably lived closer in many ways to Dutch government and society. Furthermore, until the 19th century, Christianity developed swiftly and left the Malukan Muslims behind. Churches grew and organized well (Cooley, 1961; Bartels, 1979; and Kadir, 2013). Moreover, Kadir (2013) argues that for urban Ambonese, being a Christian reflected more political and pragmatic aims than religious ones. By choosing Christianity, the Malukan people believed they became more capable of transferring Dutch power (Bartels, 1979 and Kadir, 2013). For their embracing of Christianity, native Malukans received privileges beyond any other ethnicity, including Javanese, Bugis, and Buton. They were also secured from the aggression of other ethnic groups who did not embrace Christianity, because the Dutch government provided more protection and power to native Christians.

On the other hand, during the brief period of Japanese occupation in the early 1940s, most Muslims in the archipelago, including Maluku, tended to consider the Japanese as an elder brother that had come to rescue the Muslim communities from the Dutch. It was thus natural that the Christians, who had previously been favored during the Dutch colonialism and subsequently became marginalised during the Japanese occupation, experienced jealousy and abhorrence toward Muslims, with resulting tensions and conflict. As the Japanese occupation in Indonesia was a much briefer period than the Dutch, the Muslim community never adequately recovered, and was unable to confer proportionate mistreatment upon the Christian

community, especially related to educational privilege. After independence, the tensions between Christians and Muslims dissipated for some time, and a further significant shift which contributed to the current reality of the North Malukan people occurred in 2003, when they began to plan the future after the horrible communal conflict of 1999-2002.¹

Against this backdrop, we will examine how the socio-political, economic, and institutional contexts of the past influenced the roots of the country's 1999-2002 conflict. We put two main questions: how has history influenced the character of North Malukan people, and what are the struggles in the history of North Maluku which resulted in society's polarization in the present day? Guided by these questions, the chapter argues that the imbalance of treatment received at different times by both majority religious groups, Muslims and Christians, resulted in the social gap between them. Such unfair treatment has been ongoing for centuries. The establishment of sultanates in the Northern part of the Maluku islands conferred immense pride, self-respect, and self-confidence among the Muslims in the region. The social gap grew wider during the colonial era, when the Dutch disproportionately prioritized the Christian community. Such a big picture provides a historical root of violence and conflict in Maluku, 1999-2002.

Long-established Sultanates

Long before the establishment of local identities through the sultanates, the people in North Maluku lived separately along their ethnic tribes. The region of North Maluku contained several main ethnic communities: Makian, the largest; Tobelo, the second largest; and Galela, Ternate, and Tidore, the third largest. In addition to the aforementioned ethnic communities, North Maluku also hosted relatively small communities, such as Bacan, Weda, Kao, Buli, Maba, Gane, Kayoa, Togutil, and Sula. These ethnic communities are referred to throughout this thesis as indigenous peoples.²

During the 12th century when the wealth and royal family established an institution which was similar to a monarch kingdom, such indigenous peoples were invited to affiliate with the kingdom and to serve the royal family. Few indigenous communities agreed to obey

¹ Many scholars define the conflict that happened in 1999-2002 as the communal conflict or horizontal conflict. Communal conflict means as ethnic violence or racial violence which occurred between societies. Horizontal conflict refers to the battle that happened between civilian. On the other hand, vertical conflict refers to conflict between state apparatus in military or police with the civilian.

² Outside the aforementioned ethnic communities above, there are several villages called *Alifuru*. *Alifuru* is a term used by ethnic communities to define and indicate a population segment which has adhered to the indigenous culture and resisted the influences of both Islam and Christian. See Cooley (1961) for more details.

and bowed down to the kingdom, while others, especially those communities who lived deep in the jungle (e.g., Togutil), were unconcerned with the affiliation. Nevertheless, the kingdom claimed that the land belonged to the royal family, even though not all agreed to affiliate.³ These indigenous communities in the present day are known as *masyarakat adat*, or *adat* (customary law) communities, and North Maluku holds numerous *adat* communities. In the Ternate area, indigenous communities are called *soa* or *momole*; in Tobelo or North Halmahera, indigenous people are known as *hoana*; and in the East Halmahera, they are known as *sowa*. These indigenous communities previously had their own institutions similar to what we know as the present-day state. North Halmahera had ten *hoanas*; for example, *hoana* in Kao differed from those in Tobelo. Each *hoana* had an absolute authority and autonomy and could not be challenged by other *hoana*.⁴

Coley (1961), writing about the indigenous communities above, argued that before the installation of sultanates in North Maluku in the 15th century,⁵ the region which previously joined under the Maluku islands possessed two main local institutions, which he identified as ‘throne’ and ‘altar’. Throne refers to the institutions of government in the village (*soa* or *momole*), while altar refers to the institutions of village religions (i.e., churches in Christian-majority villages and mosques in Muslim-majority villages). These two local institutions regulated and controlled the way of living in each village.⁶ In practice, the growth of these two

³ Interview with Munadi Kilkoda, head of the Indigenous Peoples' Alliance of the Archipelago (*Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara* – AMAN) North Maluku chapter, 17 September 2018. AMAN assists 57 registered indigenous communities in North Maluku. Kilkoda admitted that there are thousands of indigenous communities which are not yet registered with AMAN. AMAN is a mass organisation which helps many indigenous communities across Indonesia on the issues of indigenous peoples/communities such as rights to land, forests, and the environment, and most of their cases relate to customary land (*tanah adat*).

⁴ As an example, the official territory of *Hoana* Pagu in Malifut, North Halmahera was located in approximately four districts, equal to 17 present-day villages. Each *Hoana* was led by a community chief (*Kepala Adat* or *Kepala Suku*), and *Hoana* Pagu's community chief known as *Sangaji* Pagu. They also have their own traditional homes (*rumah adat*) and official office as well. In the context of land ownership, the Sultanate of Ternate recognised the existence of private land and the existence of communal land. Examples of private land such as fields and gardens, while communal land includes forests, grasslands, markets, and graves. The Ternate Sultanate recognised three levels of land ownership: sultan land (*kaha Kolano*), *soa* land (*kaha soa*), and *cacu* land (*kaha cacu*). Sultan land belongs to the sultan and free from tax, *soa* land defined as the land which the sultan gave to communities and which cannot be sold, and *cacu* land specified as the land given by the sultan to be managed by individuals with a system of profit-sharing in the form of tokens of appreciation (*upeti*).

⁵ North Maluku is home to few oldest sultanates in Indonesia, including sultanate Ternate which was founded in 1257. However, a few scholars such as Andaya (1993) estimates that it was founded in the mid 15th century, while Amal (2002) estimates Ternate ruling family converted to Islam in the 14th century. In my interview with the indigenous community of Ternate, they claimed that the hints and historical facts showed that the organisational structure and hierarchy of sultanate Ternate had been established since the 12th century. However, at that time, the format was similar to the kingdom. Later in the 15th century, Islamic royal system and hierarchy began to be implemented in Ternate and using sultanate form of government.

⁶ Colley (1961) explained that the village in classic Maluku islands generally consists of 15 to 25 households and is identified based on the last name, which in the local language is known as *fam*. *Soa* or *momole* is an institution which oversees several *fam*. *Soa* is led by a chief or *kepala soa* (head of *soa*). The elected chief must be chosen

local institutions occurred in two different regions: the churches' growth was stronger in the Southern region of Maluku, such as in Ambon, Buru, Seram, and Tanimbar. Meanwhile, the influence of Islam was stronger in the Northern areas, such as in Ternate, Tidore, and Bacan, which later evolved under the sultanate. More details related to the sultanate will be elaborated upon later in this chapter in the exploration of the pre-colonization period.

Moreover, the affiliation of indigenous communities with the sultanate transformed the social and political context of North Maluku. Since the shift in dominance in the 15th century, the social, economic, and political hierarchy in the North Maluku was institutionalized by the sultanate. The most elite social class was determined by the title of sultan and the sultan's family, followed by the bureaucrats of the sultanates. The centre of hierarchy starts from the sultan, who has traditional authority which he⁷ accepts as a privilege of hereditary rights. The sultan economically owns everything in his territory, and those who live within the territory must pay gratitude towards the sultan. On the other hand, the sultan offers protections. To maintain connection to the people, the sultan appoints a *Sangaji* or representative of the sultanate in a smaller region.⁸

Islamic teachings arrived just after the establishment of the sultanates. The sultanates considered Islamic values very much aligned with the social practice of people in North Maluku, though no Islamic states were installed in the four sultanates. Islam arrived in North Maluku half a century before the arrival of the Portuguese and Dutch and was therefore fully incorporated within the lives of North Malukan people. However, although the four sultanates absorbed Islamic values, the permanent rivalry among them, especially between Ternate and Tidore, remained the same.

Ternate, Tidore, Bacan, and Jailolo

The four sultanates in North Maluku were considered a family. The oldest sultanate is Bacan, followed by Jailolo, Tidore, and Ternate [see Appendix 1 for the detail]. The beginning of the four sultanates is described in a mythical story in North Maluku. The story resembles

from a certain lineage or *fam*. In the Southern region of Maluku, the head of *fam* is known as *bapa raja* and the head of *soa* is known as *saniri radja patih*. In the Northern region of Maluku, the head of *soa* is known as *sangaji*.

⁷ The title of sultan can only be held by men. Every son of the late sultan has the privilege to be the next sultan, which is chosen through an *adat* process involving *Bobato* 18, an *adat* council which has 18 members.

⁸ Interview with Muhammad Amin Farouk, *Jojau* (Secretary/Prime Minister) Sultanate Ternate. The hierarchy of *Jojau* exists immediately below the sultan. *Jojau* is the one who will represent the sultanate when the sultan is unable to be present. *Jojau* is known as *Jogugu* in the Sultanate Ternate. In Sultanate Bacan, the same position is known as *Joju*.

many origin stories of kingdoms in Indonesia.⁹ The four sultanates have their own nicknames: Jailolo is known as lord of the bay (*penguasa teluk*), Tidore is known as the lord of the mountain (*penguasa gunung*), Ternate is known as lord of Maluku (*penguasa Maluku*), and Bacan is famous as lord of the cape (*penguasa Tanjung*).

There is currently limited information available on the Jailolo and Bacan sultanates, because the Jailolo sultanate has been on hiatus since the Indonesian independence in 1945, and in the 1970s, the Bacan palace was burnt, destroying all of the documents related to its sultanate. The information related to Sultanate Bacan in this chapter is based on an interview that the author conducted in June 2018. However, this section generally focuses more on the sultanates of Ternate and Tidore, because the author interviewed two representatives of these sultanates and many previous studies are available.

Structural Division of Sultanate Ternate and the Death of the Sultan Caused a Split

The establishment of the Sultanate in Ternate was initiated by an agreement among four *momole*, or indigenous communities, in the Ternate area. Before Islam entered North Maluku, the leader of local institutions was called kolano. According to the literature, the name of the sultan was first used by Zainal Abidin in the 15th century; Zainal Abidin ruled the sultanate between 1486-1500 (Muhammad, 2012).¹⁰ However, according to an interview with the

⁹ The mythical story of these sultanates was told by P. van der Crab, former resident of Ternate in 1863-1864. The story was written at *Bijdragen tot de Taal- Land en Volkenkunde van Nederlandsch Indie* in 1878 and was rewritten by Amal (2016). The story concerned a man named Jafar Sadek, who lived on the mountain. One day, Jafar was working near the river when he heard the voice of women who were bathing in the river. Jafar understood that these women were no ordinary women. Jafar found one of the angels' wings and hid it. The wing belonged to the youngest angel, Nur Sifa. Because her wing was stolen, Sifa could not fly and return to heaven. Sifa was therefore forced to live on earth. Jafar arranged everything and finally married Sifa. They had three kids: Buka, Darajat, and Sahajat. After living with Jafar for many years, one day Sifa found her wing hidden on the roof. She decided to fly back to heaven. Jafar was determined to find Sifa, even if it meant going to heaven. He was helped by a sea eagle, who brought Jafar to the heaven in the sky. There he met Sifa's father and declared that he wanted to see his wife. Sifa's father brought all of his seven daughters, who looked the same. Sifa's father said, 'please identify your wife; if you make a mistake, you will die, but if you are right, you can bring her back to earth'. Jafar was again helped by a greenfly which made a promise to him, and Jafar and the greenfly were right in their choice. Sifa's father accepted Jafar as part of the family and they stayed in heaven for some time. During their stay in heaven, Jafar and Sifa had their fourth son, Mashur Malamo. After a few years, Jafar and Sifa returned to earth and reunited with their sons. The first son, Buka, was believed to be the first leader in Bacan. The second son, Darajat, was believed to be the first leader in Jailolo. The third son, Sahajat was believed to be the first leader in Tidore, and Mashur Malamo, the fourth son, was believed to be the first leader in Ternate. However, there are differing versions of this story, and each tells a different tale. One version from Bacan said that Jafar Sadek was originally Arab and when he arrived in Maluku already had four sons and one daughter. Another version claimed that Jafar Sadek was originally from Java and when he first arrived in Maluku was a teacher of Islam. In this version, he then married a local girl and had four sons and four daughters. Another version still claimed that he was a Muslim from China and his real name was Ja Tek Su.

¹⁰ The Sultanate Ternate was a continuation of the Ternate kingdom, which was established in the 13th century. When it was still in the form of a kingdom, the area of power was limited to Ternate island, Makian island, North

Jogugu (Prime Minister) of the Ternate Sultanate, there is reason to believe that the title of sultan was first used between 1446-1486 under the leadership of Marhum.

Since the beginning of the Ternate Sultanate's establishment in the 13th century, the official structure (*perangkat adat*) within the sultanate has been named *Dabu Se Barasi*.¹¹ In the present day, the sultanate of Ternate exhibits a dualism of leadership because it contains an additional structure called *Kolano Masoa*. For some *adat* communities, this addition is an inaccurate interpretation of *adat*, and according to a representative from one such community, this is shameful for the sultanate.

According to the *masyarakat adat* which is part of the sultanate, the process of selecting and inaugurating the sultan must begin with the aspiration of the people. Within the territory of Sultanate Ternate, there is an institution called *bobato gam (bobato dunia)* in every village, headed by *kapita* and *fanyira*. The people's aspirations are then taken to a higher traditional institution, namely *heku* and *cim* (or a group of indigenous sultanates). The request from *heku* and *cim* is subsequently brought back to *bobato dunia*, and from there, it is brought to the *bobato* 18 (royal council), after which there are still other processes which must be followed. After being sworn in, the new sultan must undergo the *kamar puji* (sacred room) ritual procession, which entails remaining silent in the sacred room in order to be tested spiritually and inwardly concerning the virtue of a sultan.

Pre-colonial and Colonial Periods

Long before the arrival of the Dutch, the Portuguese had already arrived in Moluccas in 1500. The Portuguese found Ternate, Tidore, and Halmahera to be a major source of spices. In 1522, the Portuguese began to build their first fortress in Ternate. Islam as a religion had entered the region only half a century before the Portuguese arrived. There were no Islamic ties within the society; however, Islamic values were adopted by the two main sultanates, Ternate and Tidore. The Portuguese arriving in North Maluku sought three main targets: gold, glory, and gospel. They arrived not only looking to conduct business, but also to spread the Catholic

Halmahera, and the Sula-Taliabu islands. During the 15th and 16th centuries, the sultanate began expansion to other areas including the Sultanate Jailolo. Sultanate Jailolo was the oldest kingdom in North Maluku, but after it was occupied by the Sultanate Ternate, the dynastic power in the sultanate Jailolo began to weaken. The expansion happened during the period of Sultan Baabulah (1570-1584).

¹¹ *Dabu Se Barasi* in a modern world is known as the ministry in working cabinet who serves the sultan. *Dabu Se Barasi* is appointed and can be dismissed by the sultan. Each structure of *Dabu Se Barasi* is in charge of certain affairs of the sultanate. The formal structure of *dabu se barasi* is only limited to four departments called: *Alam Makolano*, *Jiko Makolano*, and *Kie Makolano*.

teachings. The indigenous Maluku believed that the Catholic faith first arrived during the Portuguese period circa 1520. However, in some regions such as Tidore, the Portuguese approach for gospel was rejected. The gospel mission from Portugal created conflicts with the local people in Ternate and Tidore.

Wybrand van Warwijck was the first Dutchman to visit the Maluku islands in the 16th century. Warwijck was a Dutch vice-admiral, and his first visit to the Maluku islands opened a business opportunity for the Netherlands, which started to monopolise the spices in the area¹² (Clercq, 1890). On the other hand, the Spain arrived a century earlier and monopolized the sale of spices in Tidore in 1521. During Dutch colonialism in the 18th century, the area known as North Maluku today was politically controlled by three main sultanates: Ternate, Tidore, and Bacan, because only these three sultanates held formal relationships with the *Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie* (VOC), in English known as the Dutch East India Company [see Appendix 2 for the detail]. The Sultanates and the VOC signed a contract to exclusively purchase spices from North Maluku. Although the three sultanates were located on small islands, their authority and control extended as far as the islands in Raja Ampat in West Papua and to the coastal area of the eastern part of Sulawesi.

There is one previous study on local institutions which relate to the ‘altar’ although we have several previous studies discussing local institutions related to the ‘throne’ during Dutch colonialism (Colley, 1961 and Colley, 1962). Comparing the Dutch and Portuguese approaches in gospel, the Dutch approach was more adaptable and responsive, and as a result, Christianity grew stronger during the Dutch period of the 16th century. During the Dutch colonial period, there was no religious coercion. Steenbrink (2001) argues that because the religious ruling of the Dutch was believed that no area should change its religion and as a result “the Protestant church became better organized, which made the indigenous religion steadily weaker” (Cooley, 1961, p. 144).

On the other hand, in the Northern region of Maluku, Christianity first arrived in Duma, North Halmahera around 1866 through a Dutch missionary named Hendrik van Dijken. Dijken and his team intended to reach what is now known as Papua. Dijken stopped at Duma while en route to Papua, and in response to the enthusiasm displayed by the indigenous Duma people, Dijken and his team decided to stay in Duma and began to spread Christian teachings in North Halmahera instead. Dijken was known by the indigenous North Halmahera people as the

¹² F.S.A. de Clercq wrote an extensive introduction of Ternate in 1890. The book was written in Dutch, but the Smithsonian Institution Libraries Digital Edition translated the book to English. The book can be found at www.sil.si.edu/DigitalCollections/Anthropology/Ternate/ternate.pdf

pioneer of gospel (*perintis injil*). He implemented a new method of proselytism which was widely accepted by the majority of people in North Halmahera; it started from Duma and spread to Tobelo and to the east coast of North Halmahera such as Pediwang and Kao. Modern Duma communities still appreciate Dijken's effort and built a bronze statue in Duma with his likeness (See Picture 1).



Picture 1 Statue of Van Dijken in Duma, North Halmahera, author documentation.

The spread of Christianity occurred relatively quickly during the Dutch period because Christianity was introduced and propagated by the Dutch as an exercise of colonial power. Furthermore, becoming Christian during the Dutch period for many Malukan people was motivated by political and security reasons rather than religious concern. The polarization

between Muslim and Christian religious communities sharpened after colonialism, with the rise of occupational segregation and other forms of discrimination based on religion. The polarization also manifested in political dynamics and educational and bureaucratic interests.

As the spread of Christianity was particularly fast-growing in Ambon, the Southern part of Maluku, the Dutch colonial state moved its place of ruling under the administration of Ambon. As a result of this shift, the Maluku islands split into two factions. The Northern Maluku area became a majority-Muslim region, and the Southern part of Maluku became a majority-Christian region. It is since then that deep societal polarization across Maluku island has been consolidated; even predating such polarization, the community of the Maluku islands has always been divided and rich with rivalry (Steenbrink, 2001).

As a result of the intimate relations between the Dutch and the Christian community, Christians received better education and sanitation programs. In terms of wellbeing in North Maluku during the colonialism, the Christians were overall better off than the Muslims. Until 1980s, Christians continued to hold the primary and prestigious positions in the provincial bureaucracy.

Moreover, in times of resistance toward the Dutch colonialism, Muslim communities were consistently the most enthusiastic communities to join the fight against the Dutch, while some Christians remained loyal to the Dutch (Chauvel, 1990 and Kadir, 2013). For example, the Indonesian Youth Association (*Persatuan Pemuda Indonesia* – PPI), a group of youngsters which initiated the Indonesian nationalist movement during colonialism, derived from a majority-Muslim¹³ community. On the other hand, in the post-colonial period, Muslim communities were the loyalist to the Republic of Indonesia; on the contrary, few members of Christian youth who were loyal to the Dutch during colonialism, sought to form the Moluccan commonwealth under a new republic called the Republic of South Maluku. They were asking help from the Kingdom of the Netherlands. This group of Christian youth remained to seek independence after the Dutch colonialism, hence, it created a stigma in the society that the Christian community are the rebellion who seek independence instead of joining the Republic of Indonesia.

¹³ Among 13 founders and activists, only four were from Christian backgrounds. At that time, the Christian community was much stronger in the South Moluccan Council (*Dewan Maluku Selatan* - DMS). However, after independence, the majority of the people in DMS agreed to incorporate and join the Republic of Indonesia under the province of the State of East Indonesia (*Negara Indonesia Timur* - NIT). The NIT consisted of 13 autonomous regions: South Sulawesi, Minahassa, Sangihe and Talaud, North Sulawesi, Central Sulawesi, Bali, Lombok, Sumbawa, Flores, Sumba, Timor islands, South Maluku, and North Maluku. Papua was not considered a part of Indonesia until May 1963.

Post-independence and Post-Soeharto

After independence, there were some indigenous communities which still did not accept the uniting of the Southern part of Maluku with the Indonesian government. These communities were loyal to the Dutch commonwealth and believed that the Dutch had promised them an independence different from what they received (i.e., absolute independence via a new country called the Republic of South Maluku, without integration with the Republic of Indonesia).¹⁴

The hatred across religious community lines grew following the dispute after independence, as the political consolidation in Maluku was based on religious polarization. After Indonesian independence in 1945, Muslim communities tended to choose Muslim-based political parties such as Partai Majelis, Syura Muslimin Indonesia (Masyumi), Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia (PSII), Partai Persatuan Tarbiyah Islamiyah (PERTI), and Islamic Traditional Party of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). On the other hand, Christian communities leaned toward the Partai Kristen Indonesia (Parkindo). The tension between nationalist Muslims and loyalist Christians sharpened because of religious sectarian phenomena in the Soekarno era (1945-65). However, such divides lasted only until the Soeharto regime.

During the 1960s, the Indonesian government renewed the laws related to government structure from the central level to the village level. Law No.18 of 1965 specified that public officials must be elected by public vote. The public vote applied to both elections at the national level and the local level, including heads of villages. This new system dismantled the traditional system and resulted in increased tension within the community, ultimately producing a number of conflicts (Steenbrink, 2001; Kadir, 2013; Adam, 2010; and Brauchler, 2011). Many conflicts arose in particular because the function of village head was replaced by the subdistrict head (*lurah*), which was elected by the people. The role of traditional leaders was therefore diminished, including in Maluku.

Another important change arrived under the Soeharto government (1966-98). In the 1970s, the Soeharto government initiated a new law (Law No.3 of 1972) related to the mass

¹⁴ Kadir (2013) points out that after a long local political dispute, most Christian political elites decided to organise a Moluccan independence movement, known as *Republik Maluku Selatan* (South Maluku Republic – RMS). This independence movement intensified the tension between Muslims and Christians in Maluku. Both communities shared mutual suspicion of the other. RMS alleged that the Muslims assisted the Indonesian army regarding their whereabouts. The Christians reacted by igniting a fire to burn down a mosque in a Muslim village. The hatred grew among them ever since.

migration program.¹⁵ Mass migrations from Java island to the Maluku islands beginning around 1975 made the societies in the Maluku islands, especially in the Southern region, more diverse and equal. In the South, the number of Christians and Muslims became nearly equal. The migrants were relocated to the smaller islands and there they started farming and gardening, in general working harder than the locals. Within two decades, the migrants succeeded in overtaking the Christians in terms of wellbeing. The Muslims caught up to local Christians especially in regard to economic wellbeing and education level. Meanwhile, the Christian community perceived this shift as a threat to their political and educational privilege, which had been consistent ever since Dutch colonialism.

Moreover, under the Soeharto regime, President Soeharto introduced in 1977 a simplification of political parties based on Law No. 3 of 1975. As a result, only three political parties were permitted to participate in an election: Functional Group (*Golongan Karya – Golkar*), Indonesian Democratic Party (*Partai Demokrasi Indonesia – PDI*), and Development Unity Party (*Partai Persatuan Pembangunan – PPP*).¹⁶ This simplification of political parties was an attempt of Soeharto's authoritarian government to emasculate the role of political party and it dramatically changed the landscape and dynamics of local politics in Maluku. The Muslim communities' voters were divided into PPP and Golkar loyalists, while the Christian communities' voters divided between Golkar and PDI.

This change in landscape effectively disorganized the Muslim and Christian power in Maluku, though it affected the Christian community proportionally more, as the change challenged the domination of Christians in local politics and bureaucracy. Following the change, the power of the Islamic community grew stronger because entire elements of Islam in North Maluku were joined in one political party. This caused the Islamic community to catch up with the Christian community through programs and policies offered by PPP. The Muslim community was able to catch up with the Christians, and the Muslim was also assisted by the

¹⁵ According to the Soeharto government, the intra-country migration (called transmigration) program represented a strategic effort to equalise the population distribution and to increase agricultural production and was also a matter related to state security. Until 1984, there were approximately 2.5 million people transmigrated outside of Java and Bali islands. Most migrants were relocated in Lampung, Kalimantan, and also to the eastern part of Indonesia such as Maluku and Papua.

¹⁶ The 1977 election was the second election in the administration of President Soeharto. In this election, there was fusion or merging of political parties in the election. The merger based on three main ideologies such as the religious party, the nationalist party and the functional group. For example, the United Development Party (PPP) formed from a combination of NU, Parmusi, PSII, and PERTI. On the other hand, the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI) as a result of the combination of the PNI, the Catholic Party, the Murba Party, IPKI, and Parkindo. Soeharto insisted that the simplification of the political party was to maintain stability and order. Soeharto's argument was based on experience of the Sukarno era, which was politically not stable as a consequence of having many political parties.

transmigration program of the Javanese people to North Maluku initiated by the central government. This transmigration program made the number of Muslims and Christians in the Maluku islands almost equal, and for the case of North Maluku, Muslims made up the majority.

Previously before the simplification of political parties, Muslims lagged behind Christians from 1950-1970 in terms of education and social capital. Hence, after the fusion, the Muslim were therefore able to achieve equally and above Christians in 1980. This development indicated with many public official positions held by Muslims. Christians who previously held these positions felt angry and perceived discrimination, as most of the chosen officials were from Muslim-majority areas such as Kailolo and Ori (Kadir, 2013).

Moreover, in 1992, when Akib Latuconsina was installed as a new governor, he encouraged the placement of bureaucrats based on capability and competence. The subsequent governor after Akib in 1997 was also Muslim, and the continued decline of Christians' power served as a trigger for conflict to erupt.

A similar case also occurred in North Maluku, where after the implementation of law No. 3 of 1972, the Sultans in North Maluku believed that the system of government had become overly centralized, resembling the form within the Javanese kingdoms. From interviews with the Prime Minister of Tidore and *bobato dunia* of sultanate Bacan, the author analyzes that the sultanates believed that the North Maluku community confused the term government and governance and aimed to return to the traditional values and system which would unify the people, as the indigenous communities already understood the system and the values. In short, the sultanates believed that to unify the people, they need to be in charge in North Maluku. Sultanates believed that North Maluku needs a special autonomy like the one in Jogjakarta, where the sultan plays two main roles as the head of *adat* and indigenous communities and also head of province at the same time.

After the fall of Soeharto in 1998, Indonesia started political reforms towards democracy. The first symbolic event was the free democratic election in 1999. This election however raised the tension in Maluku. For the first time after many years without significant conflicts in the region, conflict erupted in 1999. Why? How? We will examine the development in the next chapter.

Summary

Let us summarize the history of North Maluku prior to the era of democratization in Indonesia. This summary is important to understand the roots conflict, which will be discussed in the next chapter.

Before the establishment of the sultanate, the North Maluku community lived under major ethnic communities, such as Bacan, Tobelo, Makian, Galela, Tidore, and Ternate. When the Islamic traders entered North Maluku, few communities tried to absorb their values in four sultanates, namely Jailolo, Bacan, Ternate, and Tidore. While several versions exist regarding the origin of the sultanate, including mythical stories, historical literature considers that the sultanate was formed by indigenous communities who tried to affiliate under one flag. The Northern region of Maluku attempted to unite the differences in ethnic identities under one flag of sultanate, while in the South, the ethnic identities were united under one belief, Christianity.

The inequalities and rivalries between North and South and between Muslim and Christian communities have existed since the sultanate golden age period. The rivalry sharpened during the colonial period, especially during the rule of the Dutch and Portuguese, who imparted preferential treatment on the Christian community. During the Dutch colonialism, the majority of Malukan Christians experienced effortless pathways to literacy, and enjoyed better sanitation programs. Hence, arguably, the Malukan Christians satisfied to the Dutch government treatment. These circumstances began to change in the post-colonial period, and during the Soeharto period, Muslims were able to match and surpass the accomplishment of local Christians, especially related to economic wellbeing and level of education.

At this time, the Christian community considered the changes a threat to their political and educational privilege, which had previously been consistent since Dutch colonialism. Moreover, changes in law through Law No.18 of 1965 and Law No.3 of 1972 further transformed the socio-political landscape in North Maluku. From a statistical perspective, the Christians in Maluku no longer represented the majority, outnumbered by migrants from Bugis, Buton, Makassar, and Java. As a result, the negative sentiment between Muslims and Christians continued to develop until conflict ultimately erupted in February 1999. We will examine the conflict in the next chapter.

Chapter 3

Understanding Violent Conflicts in North Maluku: Gold, Political Power, and Gospel

In 1998, following the fall of Soeharto's long-term dictatorship (1966-98), Indonesia experienced a regime transition from authoritarianism to democracy or known for many Indonesians as *reformasi* (political reform). Soeharto's authoritarian regime underlined the importance of stability and order, so that the country's 300 different ethnics and identities were forced to accept to live under the same nation and with the same identity. Hence, when democratization arrived in 1998, it resulted in chaos in many parts of Indonesia. One of the essences of *reformasi* was to implement regional autonomy aiming to provide opportunities for people in the regions to self-manage their lives in the economic, social and political fields. *Reformasi* was aimed to bring the government closer to the public, but ironically, the implementation of *reformasi* somehow opened an opportunity for some local elites, who had economic capital, to earn power and control the natural resources in the region. *Reformasi* also triggered several conflicts that occurred in the area.

The 1998 chaos arguably began in Jakarta, when anti-Chinese sentiment spread across Indonesia and incited hatred toward the Indonesian Chinese ethnic group. In some other parts of Indonesia, such as in Poso and Maluku, the hatred was directed towards Indonesian Christians. In Sampit and Sambas in Kalimantan, it was between ethnic Dayak and ethnic Madura. In short, conflicts erupted in many parts of Indonesia, namely in Aceh, Sambas, Sampit, Jakarta, Maluku, Poso, and Papua.¹

Varshney et al. (2004) conducted valuable research on the patterns of collective violence in Indonesia, addressing how the conflict occurred and evolved during the period 1990-2003. Their research managed to collect all of the fights, conflict, and violence that occurred across Indonesia during this time. However, the research did not touch upon the dynamic of conflicts at the local level, providing only a general overview of the roots of violence. Against the backdrop, this chapter aims to fill the academic gap in the current study of conflict, particularly the conflict that occurred in North Maluku in the period 1999-2002.

The conflict that occurred in North Maluku can be analyzed as a series of violent incidents initiated by provocateurs and managed by a handful of elites to maintain power of

¹ In Aceh and Papua, the hatred was channelled towards the separatist movement known as the Free Aceh Movement (*Gerakan Aceh Merdeka* – GAM) and Free Papua Movement (*Organisasi Papua Merdeka* – OPM).

the old guards and or to seize power by the newcomers. In this chapter, we analyze how the local elites positioned their socio-political stance to the people of North Maluku before, during, and after conflict. Below, we first examine the socio-political conditions before the conflicts. Second, we aim to understand what the victims and perpetrators/executors of the conflict thought about the local elites who played a different role during and after the conflict. It is interesting to note that the majority of the middlemen who served to bring the conflicting parties together were the same people who initiated the fighting. The third part of this chapter aims to explain the local politics and its relations to the violence in North Maluku and try to understand how and why the political elites needed to rebrand their position during and after the conflict, and finally we examine the end of the conflict.

Conflicts emerged and evolved due to the complicated factors involving the role of local actors and the impact of national politics. They were all relevant in the emergence of conflict but are often overlooked in the discussion of roots of conflict and violence in North Maluku. The author aims also to fill this gap. This chapter particularly attempts to answer the following questions. First, what were the root causes of violent conflicts in North Maluku? Second, why did the conflict develop and rapidly spread in North Maluku?

Socio-economic and Political Condition in North Maluku Before the Conflict

The socio-economic and political condition in North Maluku before the conflict can be explained in three stages: before the arrival of the Portuguese and Dutch, during the era ruled by the Portuguese and Dutch, and the period of post-independence in 1945. This section primarily focuses on the third period.

The Maluku islands consist of thousands of islands spread from Morotai in the North to Tanimbar in Western Southeast Maluku. The islands originally had two main ethnic groups, Alune and Wemale. These two ethnic groups then spread and bred new ethnic groups such as Akifuru, Togitil, Furu Aru, Ternate, Seram, Buru, Takabu, Tobelo, Banda, Rana, and Moa (Mahmada, Prasdi, Nugroho, Suhartono, & Suaedy, 2000).

However, the current population of North Maluku is a combination between the indigenous and ethnic groups mentioned above with Muslim immigrants. Most immigrants in North Maluku arrived from the island of Java due to the transmigration policy of President Soeharto made in 1972 as we saw in the previous chapter. The policy aimed to send the citizens in the densely populated areas to the least populated areas which mostly located outside of Java

island. The program primarily sent citizens in Java island to the eastern part of Indonesia. The goal of this policy was to improve the distribution of the population and to reduce overpopulation in the most populated regions.

The side effects of this policy began to manifest a few years after its implementation. The number of migrants made up about one-third of the Ambon city in the 1990s (International Crisis Group, 2002) and these migrants were primarily Muslim.² In the present days, most immigrants in the North Maluku come from Java, Bugis, Buton, and Makassar. Most immigrants have integrated with the local community, some of them also have a marriage with the locals and currently on the second and or third generation. These immigrants are known to work as a businessman in the traditional markets, and few of the second and or third generation is working as a government employee.

The transmigration policy in 1972 resulted a shift in the population composition. Previously, the Christian community dominated Maluku, but after the transmigration policy, Christian domination gradually shifted to Muslim domination. The immigrants from the transmigration program worked harder to survive; thus, the results appeared after several years, when the incomers had become the new middle class. The immigrants' economic power was now higher than those who were originally from Maluku. This shift also occurred on the educational level, as the second generation of the incomers had a better education than their parents. These shifts in economic power and educational level contributed to the demographical change in Maluku. In the beginning, there was no serious effect, but in a snowball effect, changes created further change. The conflict escalation did not happen overnight; instead, it took nearly two decades to escalate from envy to riots.

The shift in the population composition consequentially affected the shift in political power. Before democratization in 1998, the local leaders in provinces and districts were exclusively chosen by President Soeharto. During President Soeharto's administration, the majority of governors were retired or active military personnel, which made the political and security situation relatively stable.³

Honna (2010) contended that the fall of President Soeharto in May 1998 created political space for the relevance of *dwifungsi*. The post-1998 implementation of

² Aside from Java, the migrants in Maluku primarily came from Buton, Bugis, and Makassar (BBM). According to ICG (2002), between 1969 and 1999, Maluku received 97,422 transmigrants. These transmigrants were placed for agricultural projects in the rural islands of Maluku and not placed in the urban section.

³ President Soeharto's administration is officially called the New Order (*Orde Baru* – ORBA). President Soeharto established a military authoritarian polity in which the army played a twin role in national defence and politics. This role was formally known as the dual function (*dwifungsi*) of the military (Honna, 2003; Honna, 2010).

democratization encouraged civilians to actively participate in political contestation on both the legislative and executive level. During the Soeharto era, popular protests and anti-government activism were all crushed by the military and other security apparatus. When the regime collapsed and political space suddenly became open to society, Indonesia faced a domino effect of communal conflicts in different parts of the archipelago, including North Maluku.

Condition of North Maluku During the Conflict

The conflict in North Maluku occurred between 1999 and 2001. The conflict in North Maluku can be divided into four different periods with different roots of violence. The first period occurred in August 1999, and the conflict was between the Kao and Makian ethnic groups. The second phase was between October and November 1999, when riots destroyed 16 Makian villages, and the tension between two royal armies was extremely high. North Maluku is known as Maluku *Kie Raha* (Maluku and four mountains). The province was populated by four different Sultanates: Ternate, Tidore, Bacan, and Jailolo. Each Sultan had their own local army. During the conflict, two local armies fought based on Sultans' orders. The army from Sultan Ternate wore yellow dress (known as yellow troops or *pasukan kuning*) and the army from Sultan Tidore wore red dress (known as red troops or *pasukan merah*).

This second phase of conflict initiated the ethnic polarization in North Maluku between the two largest ethnic groups in North Maluku: Tobelo and Makian. The first and second phase were also influenced by the fight over land and natural resources, especially the gold mining industry in Tobelo, North Halmahera. The third phase occurred between December 26th, 1999 and March 2000; the result was 800 people dead and 200 of them from Popilo⁴. The fourth and final phase occurred from May until August 2000 and resulted in 700 deaths from the Christian community. Besides the conflicts involving two beliefs, one of the conflicts in North Maluku also happened between fellow Muslims and two royal armies which represented sultanate Ternate and Tidore. Below, we will chronologically examine the escalation of conflict 1999-2002.

Few months before the escalation of conflict in the 1999, on 9 December 1998, the government in Jakarta decided to send home thousands of local thugs from the Maluku islands

⁴ Popilo is located in North Halmahera, a village near Tobelo. Popilo previously had Muslims and Christians living next to each other. The conflict left hundreds of victims and the village is now considered a monogamy religion village. The conflict in Popilo caused the 200 deaths.

who had resided in Jakarta. These local thugs were considered brutal and tended to commit crimes. Des Alwi, a historian who has roots from Maluku, labelled these thugs as wild tigers (Mahmada et al., 2000). Not long after these thugs arrived at the port of Ambon, they began attacking small merchants at the neighboring port. The majority of these merchants were Muslim migrants from Bugis, Buton, and Makassar. The local thugs were from two of the most significant gangs and organized crimes in Jakarta: Milton group, which has a Christian background, and Ongen Sangaji group with Muslim backgrounds. Both groups had a robust connection with President Soeharto and his cronies. Ongen was known to be close to the son of Soeharto, Bambang Tri, while Milton was connected with Soeharto's eldest daughter, Siti Hardiyanti Rukmana.⁵

Aditjondro (2001), Tomagola (2006), *Majalah Tempo* (2000), and Mahmada, et al. (2000) believe that the family members orchestrated and instructed Milton and Sangaji to create riots and turbulence to ruin the national political agenda, such as elections and or investigation of corruption charges against President Soeharto. The family members allegedly aimed to ruin the national political agenda because, at that time, the public focus was about the corruption of President Soeharto. After the arrival of these thousands of local thugs, the first conflict erupted in the Maluku islands occurred in Ambon, in a night of 19 February 1999.

First Period of Conflict

The initial conflict occurred in Ambon on 19 February 1999, to coincide with the celebration of Eid al-Fitr. The conflict occurred in the Mardika traditional market. In the peaceful morning, two thugs forced the *angkot* (minibus) driver to give his money at the Batu Merah terminal, but because he had just started the trip, the driver refused to give the money. Later in the afternoon, the same driver returned to the terminal, and the same thugs returned to approach the driver while threatening with a knife. 19 February was a public holiday, and the driver had reasoned that there was no passenger today, so he had no money. In the evening, the same driver returned to the terminal and saw the same two thugs, and the driver quickly returned home to pick up the machete, he returned to the terminal and tried to chase the two young men with machetes. The young men ran to their village and shouted there was a Christian

⁵ Aditjondro (2001) and Mahmada, et al. (2000) argue that the conflicts that occurred across Indonesia after 1998 were due to the Soeharto family. After 32 years in office, the Soeharto family wanted to create instability in Indonesia if Soeharto was not the one in charge. The results can be seen in many parts of Indonesia, which was in heavy conflict post-1998, such as in Aceh, Jakarta, Sambas, Sampit, Poso, Maluku, and Papua.

who wanted to kill them. By having heard this information, the village youth was angry and decided to attack the Christian village. Since that night, the issue went wild and blamed it all on the religious motive in this conflict.

The tension in North Maluku community gradually escalated started from March 1999 when there were plenty of new people arrived in both regions, mainly from Ambon, Ternate, and Tobelo.⁶ Since the eruption of conflict in February 1999 in Ambon, there had been a phenomenon of forced mobility of the population (from hereafter referred to as Internally Displaced People-IDP). Ternate accommodated a large number of Muslim IDP who just arrived from Ambon and Tobelo. On the other hand, Tobelo welcomed Christian IDP from Ternate and also from few villages from Ambon. These IDPs spread news and information about their regions. For example, Islamic IDP in Ternate described how bad the Christian community treated them in Tobelo, while Christian IDP in Tobelo described the awful treatment of the Islamic community in Ternate. Each community had a single claim, and it made tension increase and fosters a sense of distrust between these two beliefs. The lack of trusts between two beliefs resulted in Ternate's Muslim community to conduct a sweeping against the Christian community, and it ended up poorly because some churches were burned and destroyed. Even in Tidore, a priest got killed by a mob.⁷ The same thing happened in Tobelo; the Christian community carried out destructive actions by burning of Islamic villages. Some Muslims who decided to stay in Tobelo have to hide in the forest.

After the arrival of the IDP in March 1999, the first period of conflict happened between the Kao and Makian ethnic groups over a land dispute in the Malifut district, North Halmahera. In 1999, the provincial government intended to split 27 villages in Makian Malifut district into three additional districts named Kao, Malifut, and Jailolo⁸. The decision was made as a result of the implementation of regional autonomy and the creation of a new province in North Maluku. However, this intention received a rejection from the local community, especially the indigenous community in Kao. The arrival of the IDP generated a gap of mistrust between two large communities, Islam and Christianity. The regional expansion further sharpened distrust between these two beliefs because the Makian ethnicity is a Muslim majority, and the Kao ethnicity a Christian majority. Indigenous Kao was afraid that if the district was split into three

⁶ After the 19 February 1999 incident in Ambon, the tension in the Maluku Islands raised. Many residents in Ambon, Ternate and Tobelo fled out of their cities. Christians from Ternate and Ambon fled to Tobelo and Manado. While Muslim citizens in Tobelo and Ambon fled to Ternate, Tidore, and Makassar.

⁷ Recorded interview, Abdullah Totona, 20 February 2018.

⁸ After the creation of new regencies in 2003, Kao and Makian Malifut are part of North Halmahera Regency, and Jailolo is part of West Halmahera Regency.

new districts, they (Christians) would become the minority in the new districts, including in Malifut. The Malifut district originally belonged to the Kao group, and the land was considered their ancestral land, as explained in Chapter 2.

As stated before, the local Kao residents were majority Christians while on the other hand, the Makians residents were majority Muslims. In the scope of *adat* or indigenous communities, the local Kao was a constituent of the Sultan of Ternate, and local Makians was a constituent of the Sultan of Bacan before they were forced to leave Makian because of the eruption. The first period of conflict in Malifut began with the border issues of the gold mine in Gosowong, which was located on the border of Kao village and Malifut village. Conflict over the boundaries and land use began to develop wild to conflict and ended up involving religious motive.⁹ The rivalry over land use profit and also employment opportunities played an essential role and triggered the more massive conflict.

Moreover, 18 August 1999 was the day of the official announcement and formal ceremony for the new district of Malifut. The government announced the unification of 16 Muslim villages in Malifut district. Kao, as the landowner of Malifut – which had a Christian background – opposed the decision, especially after realizing that the Malifut land had solely been considered for gold mining. In the early of 1990s, two decades after the wave of migration¹⁰ of Makian people to Malifut, gold was found in Malifut and there was a discussion to build gold mining in the area, which began the land dispute between Kao and Makian.¹¹ The Kao people claimed that the area was their land, which was temporarily occupied by Makian people. Meanwhile, Makian people thought that after two decades they had blended into the Kao society and declared that it was their land too. The gold exploration project started in 1994 and the Indonesian government formally acknowledged it in 1997 (PT Nusa Halmahera Minerals, 2014).

⁹ A gold mine is located in Kao district; currently, the mining is running by a consortium company between Australia and Indonesia under the flag of ‘Nusa Halmahera Mineral’ (NHM). NHM holds a contract for over thirty thousand hectares in Kao districts. Since the immigrants have occupied the Kao districts, the indigenous Kao who have lent their land to immigrant since 1970s felt violated from the original agreement. The indigenous Kao felt overstepped because of the land use for mining without their consent.

¹⁰ Wilson (2008) detailed the first period of conflict in Malifut, including the historical perspective. In 1975, Makian people refused to evacuate to Malifut because they believed that the government was trying to move them to less crowded and unproductive land. The government first forced the Makian to leave Kie Besi mountain and later promised them land ownership in a new location. Thus, since the very beginning, the Makian people assumed that they were being relocated to Malifut, which was government land. On the other hand, the Kao people gave their permission for a temporary visitor in their customary land for the victims of a natural disaster.

¹¹ Newcrest and PT Aneka Tambang (Antam) formed a joint venture in 1994 to explore for gold in Halmahera. In 1997, Newcrest and Antam founded PT Nusa Halmahera Minerals (PT NHM) and a working contract between PT NHM and the government of Indonesia. The struggle over land authority and jurisdiction at the location of the gold mining industry project triggered the first ethnic conflict in North Maluku.

The indigenous Kao insisted on deporting the Makians who refused to leave the customary land. On the other hand, as Wilson (2008) explained, the Makians did not recognise the customary land and considered the area to be government land. The different perceptions of the land increased the tension between the two populations. The tension intensified because the indigenous Kao gave the boundaries within the customary territorial to the land that was being occupied by the Makian ethnic group. Eventually, the disputes culminated in a Makian ethnic attack on two Kao villages. In an interview with a Kao resident,¹² Buamona admitted that the first attack was initiated from the Makians who destroyed houses and churches in Kao. The Kao Christians insist that the Makians attacked first, they never claimed Muslim attacked first. It was never about Islam. The focus of violence shifted from land dispute between two ethnicities to religious conflict to gain support from the broader Muslims in the province. In the context of Kao, it was to engage support from Christians from Ambon. The first attack between Kao and Malifut occurred on 18 August 1999, immediately after the inauguration ceremony of the new districts. The attack happened between Makian villages, Sosol, and Wangeotak.

Second Period of Conflict

The first and second periods of conflict were somehow related. Besides casualties, the first period of conflict resulted on two villages (Sosol and Wangeotak) burnt down. The Christians could not accept the destruction and burning down of Sosol and Wangeotak. The Christian community planned out a mission of revenge. Two months later, thousands of Kao attacked Malifut, driving out the entire community from their homes in Malifut. By 26 October 1999, Malifut had been completely destroyed with only mosques and schools still standing (Wilson, 2008, p. 49). After this incident, Sultan Ternate visited Kao and Malifut to stabilize the situation. Sultan thought that since Kao and Malifut were still within sultanate territory, Sultan hoped that he could control the situation.

The attack drove out the entire Makian community from Malifut, the Makian people had to evacuate their families to Ternate. During their stay in a temporary shelter in Ternate, the rumor spread among the Muslim community in Ternate that the Makian people were discharged and removed from their own houses in Malifut by the Christians. This narrative created tension in Ternate, and as a result, several members of the Christian community in

¹² Interview with Buamona, 23 February 2018.

Ternate became victims of terror and disturbance. Sultanate Ternate, as a Sultan and as a customary host for the evicted Makian, had to defuse the tension by employing the royal army to protect the Christian community in Ternate.¹³ Hence, the creation of the royal army in Ternate can be understood as the beginning and or trigger of the outbreak of conflict in the second period.

Besides, at that time, the people of Ternate were frightened by the spread of a letter known as bloody Sosol [see Appendix 3 for the detail].¹⁴ The bloody Sosol letter called on North Maluku Christians to conduct a holy war against Muslims as an act of revenge towards the Christians brothers who had been killed. The letter rose mutual suspicion on the part of Islam and Christian. Thus, causing massacres of Christians in Tidore and Ternate, and the killing of Muslims in Tobelo. Victims in Ternate and Tobelo admitted that the letter became the trigger for the more massive riots. After the end of the conflict, the victim felt that he was being used by people who wanted violence. Hasli Barondes and Abdullah Totona who also saw the contents of the letter, felt that the letter had been modified in such a way that the community was incited.¹⁵ They believe that the people in North Maluku at that time cannot write such a letter that succeeded in igniting people's anger so much.¹⁶

Moreover, Sultanate Ternate constituent was more diverse than the other three sultanates. Sultanate Ternate constituents also consisted of those who stayed at North Halmahera, which was considered the Christian majority region. Since their constituents being attacked in Ternate, the sultanate employed the royal army and aimed to make the situation more stable. In the beginning, the yellow army was being appreciated by the people in Ternate since their presence affected the situation to become controllable. However, in the long run, their presence started to annoy the people because they became arrogant. At one point, the yellow army started to replace the function of security personnel such as police and military.

¹³ The royal army of Ternate wore yellow outfits and were known as yellow troops. The people of Ternate at first had respect towards these troops until the troops became a paramilitary. They started to extort, ask for money, and randomly threaten the people. The yellow troops faced some resistance from the Sultanate Tidore royal army, which was known as red troops. The resistance resulted in the rise of cultural and social tensions between Sultanate Ternate and Tidore, the clash between yellow troops and red troops.

¹⁴ Bloody Sosol was a letter which contained full information related to the plans of Christians churches attacking the Muslim villages, and the letter was based on revenge towards the Muslim for the destruction of the Christian village. The letter was allegedly written by the head of Synod of the Maluku Protestant Church (Sinode GPM). The letter was also signed by the head of Sinode GPM, Priest S. P. Titaley. Not long after the letter was spread, Titaley denied such a letter. He claimed that he never wrote such a letter and never signed it. Titaley asked the Christian community to ignore such letter and do not attack anyone.

¹⁵ Recorded interview, Abdullah Totona, 20 February 2018.

¹⁶ Recorded interview, Hasli Barondes, 8 February 2018.

The people in Ternate started to become annoyed because the yellow army continually asking for money and started to sweeping migrants in Ternate, forcing them to check their ID cards and also forced them to give their money to the royal army as retribution.¹⁷ This situation forced the Sultanate of Tidore as a rival to form the same force and known as the white army. In total, the white army was more significant because they were also supported by some Ternate citizens who were angry with the yellow troops. The fights between these two royal armies resulted in the termination of the airport for several days, and it also affected the activities of the Ternate people. This battle ended with the encirclement of the Sultan's palace in Ternate by the white army, and the palace almost burned down by the mob.¹⁸ In an interview, one of the people who invaded the palace admitted that, at that time, Sultan Tidore was able to soothe the situation and the mob. Sultan Tidore announced that the initial goal of opposing absurdity and irrational actions by the yellow forces had been successfully achieved. We do not need to show violence by burning the palace down. The mob obeyed the order and command from Sultan Tidore and discharge from the palace.

Third Period of Conflict

The conflict in North Maluku was a social laboratory because it happened in several periods of conflict. To be able to spread the conflict rapidly across the province, the engineer needed strong reasons. For example, in the beginning, the elites introduced economic reasons, but it was not robust enough. Then the elites brought in local political issues, but it also did not work, but once religious belief was brought in, the conflict immediately broke out in several places. One of them was in the village called Popilo, just outside of Tobelo. The outbreak that happened in Popilo was considered as the third phase of the conflict, and it was happened from 26 December 1999 to March 2000, and resulted in 800 deaths, 200 of them from Popilo. The fourth phase occurred from May to August 2001, resulting in 700 deaths from the Christian community.

The third period of conflict occurred on 26 December 1999 to March 2000 and during the third phase was a massacre that occurred in Popilo, a small village located outside of Tobelo. The conflict in Popilo began with the spread of irresponsible and wild issues when the conflict broke out in Ambon and also when it occurred in Malifut. The issues raised tension in

¹⁷ Recorded interview, Abdullah Totona, 20 February 2018.

¹⁸ Recorded interview, Abdullah Totona, 20 February 2018

Popilo. Children immediately left school without permission when the issue developed. The issue spreading in the society was related to the plan to destroy Muslim villages as instructed in bloody Sosol letter (the local people known as *surat Sosol berdarah*). As a survivor, Barondes admitted that at that time, he did not know the letter was related to the bloody *Sosol* letter. What he understood was, there were many anonymous letters left at the gazebo where neighborhood security guards hang every night. The letter informed the men of the village to be more careful because, at times, there would be an attack from the Christians. The Christians would avenge the deaths of their people in Ambon and Tidore. At first, many Popilo residents did not believe the letters, but the letters made them more alert and paranoid. The Popilo residents were on alert because of the attitude shown by the neighboring villages of Popilo which had Christian roots. The neighboring villages were getting ready and started making the traditional weapons. The rising tension resulted in some Popilo residents were also getting ready, and some others flee out to Ternate, Tidore, and Makian.

Barondes, in an interview with the author, explained the grim situation that he had to face seventeen years ago in Popilo. The tension in Popilo ended with the siege of the mosque for three days from 24 to 26 December 1999. The Popilo Muslim community cornered and gathered inside the mosque which had been surrounded by the warrior of Christ. During those three days, arrows and stones frequently fled to the mosque. The victims who were inside the mosque tried to hide behind the walls, and some of them lay down on the floor. Most of the children lie down and hide under the bodies of the dead. Some Popilo survivors fled to the mountains, and they tried to help during the night by sending codes to the mosque through flashlights. If the code said secure and not dangerous, the victims who were still in the mosque could run towards the mountain. Barondes told the author that there were approximately 200 people dead inside of the mosque from those three days attack, including his father. The whole victims buried in mass graves located in front of the mosque as shown in a picture below.



Picture 2, Muslim mass grave located in front of a mosque in Popilo. Approximately there were more than 200 people buried here. Author's documentation.

Barondes and Udin, two survivors that author met for the interviews,¹⁹ admitted that after being able to escape from the mosque, they ran to the mountains to and met their relatives who were already there. In the mountain, few families decided to relocate temporarily to Ternate and stay at their family's house while the rest decided to move to Galela. Galela at that time was considered as the main power of the Islamic army when conflicts occurred. They wanted to move to Galela to join the Islamic forces and participate in the fight for revenge.

In Galela, they joined the Islamic forces led by Samsul Bahri Umar and Husni Amal. Some of them conducted military training in Tanjung Bongo, near Galela. The military training was monitored and assisted by some military personnel. Samsul Bahri Umar in an interview with the author,²⁰ explained that the military training contained lessons on strategy warfare, shooting practice, attack strategies and defence strategies. Umar also claimed that they got weapons from three sources; first, they borrowed the weapon from army personnel. Second,

¹⁹ Interview with Hasli Barondes and Udin, Popilo residents, 25 February 2018.

²⁰ Recorded interview, Samsul Bahri Umar, 26 February 2018.

they also dived in Galela lake and took Japanese weapons in the second world war.²¹ Third, they also got weapons from Moro fighters in the Philippines.²² These weapons were used to attack and take revenge on the Christians, including destroying Duma, a Christian village outside Galela.

Moreover, in the third period of conflict, the involvement of external parties such as Laskar Jihad made things worse for North Maluku.²³ In an interview with the commander of Laskar Jihad, Ja'far Umar Thalib, he admitted that during their warfare in Maluku and North Maluku, much military personnel who were also Muslim and from Malang helped their jihad. The military allowed them to borrow their weapons to attack the Christians, and some of them taught the Laskar Jihad member the military tactics and manoeuvres of warfare.²⁴ These military were from the army special forces (*Komando Pasukan Khusus – Kopassus*) and army strategic reserves command (*Komando Cadangan Strategis Angkatan Darat – Kostrad*).

More than ten victims who were in Tobelo during the conflict stated that there were many unidentified gunmen in the area of conflict between 1999 and 2001.²⁵ These unfamiliar faces, known as gunmen by the local people, had regular military appearances: tall, short hair, muscular, and comfortable handling a weapon. These unfamiliar faces had come and gone unnoticed from one village to another. Tomagola in Aditjondro (2001) stated that nearly 70 per cent of the victims were killed because of the military and police gunshot.

As the military involved in the conflict, arguably, the conflict in North Maluku was not a communal conflict but rather an armed conflict or state-sponsored violence. The former commander of Military Area Command (*Komando Daerah Militer – Kodam*) XVI Pattimura, overseeing Maluku, Brigadier General Max Markus Tamaela admitted that there was a small

²¹ North Halmahera people believe the story that during World War II, in the days of America destroying Nagasaki, Japanese soldiers based in Morotai were attacked by American and Australian soldiers. The most victims fell from the Japanese and the soldiers who still survived tried to keep their weapons from being captured by opponents by dropping a lot of weapons ammunition and bombs under Lake of Galela.

²² Recorded interview with Samsul, 26 February 2018. Samsul explained that he sent a team of several people to the Philippine border and tried to find the leaders of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). When meeting with MILF representatives, the team from Galela explained the situation that there was a war on Jihad in Galela, and they needed help from Muslim brothers in the Philippines. They need a supply of weapons to fight the Christians. Samsul said the MILF was helpful and assisting some of the Islamic weapons supplies in Galela. These weapons were used to attack and destroy the city of Duma. To avoid and trick the authorities, the team disguised themselves as locals who were looking for fish.

²³ The militia called Laskar Jihad (Jihad fighters) was previously known as the Communication Forum of the Followers of the Sunnah and the Community of the Prophet (*Forum Komunikasi Ahlus Sunnah Wal Jamaah - FKAWJ*). It was first established in the early 1990s after the prominent leader Ja'far Umar Thalib returned to Indonesia from his journey in Pakistan and Afghanistan. FKAWJ transformed into Laskar Jihad took place in January 2000, as a response to the failure of the Indonesian government in managing the conflict in Maluku. Laskar Jihad arrived in North Maluku approximately on the third period of conflict.

²⁴ Recorded interview, Ja'far Umar Thalib, 24 October 2018.

²⁵ Recorded interview, Yanuardi Syukur, 9 August 2017.

number of military personnel involved in the conflict (Pontoh, 2003). For example, there were some military personnel who were from Java and involved in attacking the Christian villages.²⁶ Nevertheless, the military personnel who were deployed from Bali were so much cooperative and their help was significant during the conflict.²⁷ Sosobeko explained that the military personnel from Bali taught the fighters from Duma how to survive and how to attack, some of the military personnel even showed them where the Muslim fighters camp out during the night. Besides the military personnel from Bali, mobile brigade corps (*Korps Brigade Mobil – Brimob*) of Police were also accused of favoring Christians. This statement similar to what Tempo, (1999a) reported.



Picture 3, mass grave in Duma located next to the grand church. In the third period of conflict, the majority of victims were Muslim while on the fourth period, the majority victims were Christians. Author's documentation.

²⁶ Recorded interview with Teo Sosobeko, 1 March 2018. Sosobeko was one of the former commanders in chief of the Evangelical Christian Church in Halmahera (*Majelis Pekerja Sinode Gereja Masehi Injili Halmahera - GMIH*) Tobelo named Teo Sosobeko who served as captain of Duma village (*Kapitan Desa Duma*).

²⁷ Recorded interview, Teo Sosobeko, 1 March 2018.



Picture 4, the remaining construction of the old church which was burnt down and destroyed during the conflict in 1999. Behind the debris shows a well-established grand church located next to the old one. Author's documentation.

Fourth Period of Conflict

Moreover, the fourth phase occurred from May to June 2000, and in this fourth period, the riots were linked to revenge and involved religiously motivated conflicts which resulted in attacks to Duma village. The conflict in the fourth period took multiple lives from the Christian community because of the involvement of external parties such as Laskar Jihad. Muslim troops and Laskar Jihad carried out revenge missions, reactions towards the many casualties in Popilo Village. On the fourth period, many churches were destroyed and burnt down (for example, see picture 4). Frequent attacks continued in the period of May-June 2000 and within this period, many Christian homes and churches were destroyed and burnt down. Muslim forces and Laskar Jihad destroyed remainders of Christian villages from Galela to the Duma village. Sosobeko was one of the war commanders from Christians whose job was to defend the Duma Village and several other Christian villages. At the end of May 2000, Christians cornered, and many of whom fled to the mountains and forests, including Sosobeko. Some of the Christians

were surrounded and the Muslim troops and Laskar Jihad made a decision that the Christians had to be killed, but the Samsul argued that they did it according to the Islamic law, such as they did not kill elderly, children, and women. The rests were killed in a church and the church was burnt down after the executions. The attacks took approximately 200 lives of Christians. After June 2000, the conflict effectively declined. Arguably because the conflicting parties have lost many lives, and they have fulfilled their revenge. However, small-scale conflicts remained and continued until August 2001.

The number of victims during the third and fourth period of conflict was considerably high because the length of the conflict was longer than the others, and importantly, during the conflict, for example, the people in Popilo were attacked and were killed by a combination of modern firearms and traditional weapons. Omissions carried out by security forces caused the longer duration of the conflict. The omission carried out by the authorities was also one of the reasons for the many casualties. Barondes explains that several numbers of military personnel and police officers showed their preference when the conflict broke out in Popilo. Barondes questioned the ability of several army units who were unable to confront the outburst and attacks that had taken place in Popilo. Barondes also explains the military business that occurred during the conflict. According to him, during the conflict, the military personnel offered the security guarantee to bring the family safe to the outside of Popilo and Tobelo.²⁸ Besides, to some people who want to sell their plantation products also needed to pay the military personnel some amount of money to help in guarding and deliver the products to Ternate. Many of deaths during the conflicts were also from the gunshot wounds from the military and police officers.

Moreover, based on the number of victims, the violence in North Maluku shifted the interpretation between a conflict and a war. Demmers (2012) argues that the casualty threshold determines the difference between conflict and war: when the number of annual battle-related deaths reaches the threshold of a 1,000, the conflict is defined as war. Therefore, by looking at the number of deaths in North Maluku on the table below, it is arguably safe to define the communal conflict or state-sponsored conflict in North Maluku as a war.

As shown in Table 1 below, the report of Varshney, et al. indicated that 72 incidents resulted in 2,794 deaths in North Maluku. Varshney, et al. (2004) suggests that the majority of the conflicts that occurred between 1990 and 2003 were locally concentrated. Among 28 provinces across Indonesia, North Maluku had significantly fewer conflicts but the highest rate

²⁸ Recorded interview, Hasli Barondes, 8 February 2018.

of fatalities and victims. The report stated that one of the most frequent incidents in North Maluku was stoning houses, which claimed 2,789 deaths from 68 incidents in total. The information in Table 1 below was collected based on communal violence between 1990 and 2003 in Indonesia.

Province				
	Deaths	%	Incidents	%
North Maluku	2,794	25.0%	72	1.7%
Maluku	2,046	18.3%	332	7.8%
West Kalimantan	1,515	13.6%	78	1.8%
DKI Jakarta	1,322	11.8%	178	4.2%
Central Kalimantan	1,284	11.5%	62	1.5%
Central Sulawesi	669	6.0%	101	2.4%
West Java	256	2.3%	871	20.4%
East Java	254	2.3%	655	15.3%
Central Java	165	1.5%	506	11.9%
South Sulawesi	118	1.1%	223	5.2%
West Nusa Tenggara	109	1.0%	198	4.6%
Riau	100	0.9%	165	3.9%
East Nusa Tenggara	89	0.8%	55	1.3%
Banten	37	0.3%	112	2.6%
Total 14 Provinces	10,758	96.4%	3,608	84.5%
Other 14 Provinces	402	3.6%	662	15.5%
Indonesia	11,160	100%	4,270	100%

Table 1: Collective violence in Indonesia based on provincial distribution. Data taken from Varshney et al. (2004)

To summarize this section, the author classifies that the conflict in North Maluku had four different phases. These four phases of conflicts were based on the period and the motives of conflict. The first phase was about the struggle over a land dispute between Kao ethnicity and Makian ethnicity. The land coincidentally had natural resources and gold mining projects

which had been operating since 1997. This land dispute strongly linked to the transmigration policy during the Soeharto era in 1975. The second phase of the conflict started by a revenge mission carried out by Kao ethnicity as a vengeance over the Sosol and Wangeotak incident. It was also associated with the struggle between two traditional power in North Maluku, Sultanate Ternate and Tidore. In this second period, loss due to conflict was considerably huge because there was involvement of royal armies from each sultanate. The third phase of conflict was related to an act of revenge and religiously motivated. In this third period, the attack to the Popilo village resulted in nearly 200 people dead. The fourth phase of conflict was also an act of revenge from the third phase. The Muslims community could not accept the deaths in Popilo and began planning an attack to the main base of Christian village such as Duma.

Local Politics in the Violent Conflict

As we have seen above, the period between 1999 and 2001 was a war for people who lived in North Maluku. Then, during the communal war, the local elites gathered to fight based on their ethnicity and religion. These local elites played the role of war leader, trainer, motivator, and conciliator at the same time. It is through the analysis of local politics that we can assess the elite power game during and after the conflict. Before the creation of the new province of North Maluku in 1999, Ambon was a political epicenter for the Maluku region for many years. The direct impact of democratization in 1998 resulted in the implementation of decentralization, including provincial separation between Maluku and North Maluku. Importantly, the separation of North Maluku and establishment of the new province in 1999 also resulted in chaos.

The chaos occurred because there was a chance to establish a new political power in North Maluku as it was the newest province at that time. The political elites²⁹ in North Maluku were competing to earn political power and to develop influence over the people. North Maluku also had to manage the conflict that occurred in the districts, compounding the chaos. The political elites were trying to gain an advantage by engaging followers to participate in the conflict in their regions. At that time, there were two large elite groups; first, those who had settled in the region before the province of North Maluku was created, such as Hein Namotemo, Bahar Andili, Syamsir Andili, and Sultan Mudaffar. The second group, elites who were

²⁹ Political elites here refer to the local political actors such as bureaucrats from Ambon, bureaucrats at the provincial office, regency office, districts office, sub-district head (*camat*), chief of administration village (*lurah*), and religious leaders such as clerics (*ustadz/imam*) and leaders of traditional power such as the Sultans.

originally from North Maluku but had previously settled in Ambon such as Thaib Armaiyn, Muhammad Kasuba, and Abdul Gani Kasuba. Each person in these groups competed with each other to attract attention from the people of North Maluku. It can be said that these elites were involved in igniting the more massive conflicts. Also, when the situation was starting to get calm and conducive, they were also actively involved in peace efforts. In addition to the names mentioned above, several local actors working in the provincial offices, offices of the regents, sub-districts head, and chief of the administrative village also participated in the power struggle.

Elites Manoeuvre in Local Politics

During the conflict in 1999-2001, North Maluku was effectively the youngest province in Indonesia and had only three regencies: Central Halmahera, North Maluku, and Ternate. At that time, many local districts requested the provincial government to upgrade their status and open up new regencies. With the limited budget of the provincial government, most of the requests were ignored. The former governor of North Maluku for ten years (2002-2013), Thaib Armaiyn, explained in an interview that the requests were not rejected but instead were placed on hold because other primary priorities needed immediate attention.³⁰ When the North Maluku province was created in 1999, his position was the provincial secretary.

When North Maluku had three regencies, the plan was to split these three regencies into ten small regencies. This plan triggered local elites to consolidate their power by trying to get to the people's attention, and because North Maluku was in a conflict at the same time, hence, the racial and religious sentiment was manipulated by the same elites. These elites somehow managed to exploit the socio-political and security crisis into an opportunity to consolidate their powers with the local community.

Hein Namotemo, a former regent in North Halmahera for ten years (2005-2015), was known as one of the Christian agitators, leaders, and provocateurs during the conflict in Tobelo.³¹ While there was no hard evidence of this role, this sentiment was spread among the Muslims victims. One of the victims who survived a massacre in a mosque in Popilo village explained that during Namotemo's 10-year leadership in Tobelo, he was never acknowledged and directed his attention to rebuilding the Popilo village that was destroyed during the conflict.

³⁰ Recorded interview, Thaib Armaiyn, 10 February 2018.

³¹ Recorded interview, Hasli Barondes, 8 February 2018.

Even when Namotemo once passed through Popilo village with his entourage, he did not receive a warm welcome; instead, a woman whose husband died during the conflict attempted to throw a wood beam at Namotemo. The treatment that Namotemo received was because of old grudges that continued to be stored and maintained by the people of Popilo who lost many of their family during the conflict in 1999. The hatred channeled through Namotemo whom they accused as the leader of those who killed their family. During ten years of Namotemo leadership, there was no clear evidence that he wanted to embrace victims of conflict in 1999. During his leadership, Namotemo showed that he wants to embrace the community by relying on *adat*, called *hibua lamo* or in English translated as a big house.³²

Besides Namotemo, Sultan Mudaffar Sjah played an essential role in the escalation of conflict in Ternate. As the head of Golkar's North Maluku branch, Sultan Mudaffar at that time controlled Golkar party in North Maluku. Golkar also had the most seats in the provincial parliament which made him the favorite to be selected as the governor in 2003.³³

The issue of separatist movements also cannot be avoided in the discussion of conflict in Maluku. The South Maluku Republic (*Republik Maluku Selatan*-RMS) movement, whose leaders were primarily church leaders in Maluku, triggered a political struggle. During the conflict in 1999, most of the Muslims citizen were moved to the northern part of Maluku, which later created an assumption that the southern part of Maluku would fully belong to the Christians and it would allow the RMS to get their freedom.

However, the rationale of the conflict cannot be exclusively defined with a single reason. Aside from the shift in the population (ICG, 2002) and the shift in the political situation such as the implementation of local autonomy and regional split (Braithwaite, 2013; Bertrand, 2004), the historical context such as the rivalries between Sultan Ternate and Tidore, also social gap between Christians and Muslims that has existed since Dutch colonialism as explained in the previous chapter played significant role in the conflict escalation. However, the author finds that the roots of conflict were not limited to these factors. Economic reasons should also be considered as the causes of conflict, because at that time there was also a struggle over natural resources, i.e., the fight over the gold mining industry in Gosowong. Besides, the

³² The philosophy of the *hibua lamo* is that all communities, especially in North Halmahera are brothers and emerge from a large house. The concept of *hibua lamo* will be elaborated in the next chapter.

³³ Recorded interview, Abdullah Totona, 20 February 2018. An amendment for direct elections of the President and Vice-President and also the local heads took place in 2004. Before the direct election, the nomination and selection of presidency and also local leaders must go through the parliaments. Many scholars believe that the implementation of direct elections as a significant step for Indonesia towards a consolidated democracy.

external factors such as Laskar Jihad and military involvement were also crucial to explain the length of the conflict.

The current governor of North Maluku, Abdul Gani Kasuba,³⁴ exemplifies the political struggle of this period. During the conflict, Abdul Gani Kasuba was known as a religious leader who gave blessings to the Muslims before they went to the war, which they claimed as their way of *jihad*.³⁵ Abdul Gani Kasuba taught the fighters how to perform the *jihad*. He explicitly explained the elements of *jihad* and the obligations during the fighting such as to not kill elders or children, to not touch pregnant women, and to respect the environment and not destroy it. There was also an archery training on how to use the bow and arrow during the fighting.³⁶

The violence that occurred in North Maluku was complicated by a combination of several forms of violence such as collective violence; non-physical, targeted violence; and at some point, warfare. The combination of violence in North Maluku was long rooted in people's daily lives. Arguably, those who suppress anger are more likely to become violent and when conflict erupts, the people immediately release all the anger that has been kept for a long time. The majority of conflict in North Maluku between 1999-2001 was due to collective violence, which often involved religious and racial sentiments. Even though the main trigger of conflict in North Maluku at the first period of conflict had nothing to do with religious and racial sentiments. Besides, the conflicts in North Maluku were often initiated with a regular clash between individuals, which then escalated into a colossal group clash followed by throwing stones and riots between two communities.

Summary

The conflict in North Maluku was deadly. The rates of fatalities and victims were extremely high. As seen above, the violence caused 2,789 deaths in 68 total incidents. In this chapter, we attempted to explain that there is no single reason for the conflict in North Maluku, and it showed how complicated the conflict was. Previous studies (Wilson, 2008; Duncan,

³⁴ Abdul Gani Kasuba was and is still recognised as a famous Islamic preacher and teacher, known in Indonesian as *ustaz*. From 1994 to 1999, Abdul Gani Kasuba was the vice chairman of the Indonesian Ulama Council (*Majelis Ulama Indonesia* – MUI) in North Maluku. Abdul Gani Kasuba was also elected as a member of the national parliament (*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat* – DPR) in 2004-2009 from the Prosperous Justice Party (*Partai Keadilan Sejahtera* – PKS). He resigned from the legislature in 2008 to run as a vice governor of North Maluku. In 2013, he ran for governor and won the election. In June 2018, he was re-elected for his second term as a governor.

³⁵ Jihad was one reason why the conflicts occurred in 1999; many fundamental and extremist Muslims across Indonesia decided to come and participate in the conflict in North Maluku in the name of Jihad.

³⁶ Recorded interview, Yanuardi Syukur, 9 August 2017

2013; Klinken, 2006; and Klinken, 2007) have argued that the conflict mainly was due to a single cause, which was religious reasons. However, it is not entirely true, because the conflicts in North Maluku lie somewhere between gold (money), political power struggle, and also gospel (religious belief). The involvement of the military and police in the conflict as perpetrators, also made matters worse and spread the conflict rapidly across the province. The military allowed civilians to borrow their weapons; few of the personnel even taught the civilian how to fight and carry out the guerrilla war.

We have seen the context preceding the conflict: how the tension rose and how the conflict erupted. The conflicts in North Maluku occurred in four different periods, and each period had its reason and explanation for how the conflicts erupted. The reasons ranged from a fight over natural resources and land grabbing, racial and religious divides, to the actions of the royal armies of Ternate and Tidore.

It should be also noted that the riots were the side effect of democratization and decentralization. The latter made North Maluku a new province, and because Ambon was a political epicenter for the Maluku region for many years, the separation and establishment of a new province resulted in chaos. Moreover, the chaos occurred because there was a chance to establish a new political power in North Maluku, the newest province at that time. The political elites in North Maluku were competing to capture political power and develop influence over the people.

At the same time, we should envisage the fact that the conflict in North Maluku was a state-sponsored violence because the police and army did not act when the riots erupted. Furthermore, few indications implied that the military was involved in the spread of conflict. There were many unidentified gunmen in the area of conflict between 1999 and 2001, and these unfamiliar faces had typical military appearances. Thus, it should be concluded that the conflict in Maluku was not purely a communal conflict, but rather an armed conflict or state-sponsored violence.

Chapter 4

Devotion to Coexistence: The Dynamics of Peace Process in North Maluku

Fighting in North Maluku suddenly ended in 2002 when two opposing parties became tired and decided to stop the dispute. The conflict left many inevitable deaths and injured victims. Few years after the conflict, the author still found many victims who had difficulty coping with the trauma of the conflict. Numerous children grow up without parents and keeping the hatred for the butchers is the only thing that they can do to recall memories on their departed parents. Multiple children that the author met still vividly remember the day when their parents got killed. This chapter aims to examine the following two questions. First, what was the reason that made the peace talks in North Maluku successful? Second, what were the new natures of the conflict after the peace agreement?

The structure of this chapter is as follows. The first part of this chapter explores the dynamics of the peace process in North Maluku, delving into the different perspectives of the Indonesian government and the people of North Maluku. We will discuss the Malino II agreement, which was facilitated by the Indonesian government. Moreover, we examine the peace agreement orchestrated at the local level by political elites known as the Mamuya peace agreement. Beside the Mamuya peace agreement, there was also another reconciliation, which was promoted by two traditional elites between the sultanates of Ternate and Tidore, and it was a cultural process known as *hibualamo*.

The second part of this chapter discusses the post-conflict violence and how the peace agreements made at both the national and local levels were unable to stop the outbreak of violence and maintain peace. We analyze why the peace talks were not enough and why there were so many instances of violence and attacks in a post-peace-agreement period.

Malino II Agreement



Picture 5. Map of North Halmahera.

As we have explained in the previous chapter, in early years of post-Soeharto democratic transition since 1998, Indonesia faced the large scale nation-wide political turmoil, as seen in Aceh, Jakarta, Sampit, Sambas, Poso, Maluku, North Maluku, and Papua. However, between 2001 and 2002, the optimism for stability was starting to grow because the Indonesian government initiated few peace talks in conflicting regions, including in Poso and Maluku. The first peace talks were held in Malino, at the end of 2001 to discuss the possibility to end the conflict in Poso. The agreement for peace in Poso achieved at the end of December 2001 and known as Malino I agreement. Three weeks after the signed of the peace agreement for Poso, the Indonesian government initiated the second peace talks known as Malino II agreement. The Malino II agreement aimed to discuss the possibility of peace for conflict in Maluku region.

The period after the Malino I agreement was the right momentum to hold another set of peace talks for another conflict in the eastern part of Indonesia because the conflict resulted

in a high number of fatalities and the IDP. As a result of the conflicts in the Maluku islands, more than 330,755 people, or more than 55,571 families, were forced to flee their homes (Noveria, et al. 2003). Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, the coordinating minister for political and security affairs (*Menteri Koordinator bidang Politik Keamanan – Menkopolkam*) at the time, claimed in the newspaper *Koran Tempo* on 12 January 2002 that the Malino I agreement was treated as a model for the Malino II agreement, but that the two were not necessarily the same because the conflicts were at different stages (Awaludin, 2013).

In the early meetings, one of the architects of the peace talks was Jusuf Kalla. At the time, Kalla was the coordinating minister for people's welfare (*Menteri Koordinator bidang Kesejahteraan Rakyat – Menkokesra*).¹ Kalla insisted that the peace talks should take place on neutral ground as they would not be productive and subjective if held in the conflict zones. Malino is located outside of Makassar (South Sulawesi) and was considered a rural area. At the time, cell phones did not work in Malino. There were limited distractions in Malino, which forced delegates to concentrate fully on the peace talks (Awaludin, 2013).

It took approximately 17 days for the Malino II agreement to be signed and the peace talks to conclude. As we have mentioned it earlier, the Malino II agreement began with a feeling of optimism and the reasonable drive because three weeks before, the Malino I agreement was signed and arguably the Indonesian government succeeded in reconciling the warring parties in Poso. The Malino II negotiations began with an informal pre-meeting between the central government, represented by Kalla and Yudhoyono, and conflicting parties in Ambon on 26 January 2002.

This informal meeting presented a positive effect and opportunity, and the parties involved in the conflict agreed to negotiate in Makassar on 30 January 2002. K.H. Wahab Palpoke led the Islamic group, and Rev. I.W.J Hendriks led the Christian group. Initial negotiations started between the government and each community separately. Kalla claimed the meetings were intentionally held differently. It aimed to outline the problems and the views of each party. During this meeting, both community leaders agreed that the conflict must be stopped, and criminal cases must be processed. Another critical point was that they agreed to discuss more detail in Malino, with more diverse community representatives.

¹ Kalla was selected as one of the architects of these peace talks with Yudhoyono because of two reasons: first, Kalla is well-known and respected by the people of Sulawesi in particular. Second, the conflicts in Poso and Maluku caused a large number of the IDP in several parts of eastern Indonesia such as Manado, Gorontalo, Makassar and Kendari. Kalla's position as the minister of people's welfare allowed him to deal with many elements related to the post-conflict recovery funds. Kalla was expected to be able to form policies based on the conditions that he found on the field, for example granting and distributing social assistance funds, rehabilitation funds, and few other aids and social assistance.

The community leaders agreed to come to the more significant meeting on 11-12 February 2002. The meeting aimed to stop the conflict, formulate peace, and social rehabilitation. The meeting settled with the signing of a document called the Malino II Peace Agreement. The meeting was attended by two large groups, each represented by 35 people (table 2). During the meeting, the Islamic community was led by two representatives from the Indonesian Ulema Council (*Majelis Ulama Indonesia*-MUI) in Maluku and two people from the two largest Muslim organisations (Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama). The rest of the participants (31 people) from local community leaders, which, their regions participated in the conflict.² While two people led the Christian community from the Chairperson of the Maluku Protestant Church (Gereja Protestan Maluku-GPM), two people from the Chairperson of the Catholic Church, and 31 local community leaders.³

Representatives of Muslim Community		Representatives of Christians Community	
Name	Position	Name	Position
Wahab Palpoke	Chairman of MUI's Maluku Branch	I.W.J. Hendriks	Head of GPM
Thamrin Ely	Head of Imarat Council of Maluku Muslims (Badan Immarah Muslim Maluku-BIMM)	Tonny Pariela	Academic
Nasir Rahawarin	Secretary General of BIMM	S.J. Mailoa	Secretary of GPM
Idrus Tahurey	Head of Muhammadiyah's Maluku Branch	P.C. Mandagi	Bishop of Ambon
Yakuba Karepesina	Head of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU)'s Maluku Branch	Henry Lolain	Head of Indonesian Pentecostal Church Association (<i>Persatuan Gereja Pantekosta</i>)

² Some of these community leaders were known as *Bapak Raja* (Local Kings who is also the leader of indigenous community in Ambon). These local kings were invited because their regions heavily involved in the conflict. Aside of *Bapak Raja*, others community leaders were invited from students' organisations such as KAHMI, youths, and religious organisations.

³ Similar to the reason above, these local community leaders were invited because they/their members were actively participated in the conflict.

			<i>Indonesia-PGPI</i> Maluku
Lutfi Sanaky	Secretary of The Corps of the Alumni of Islamic Students Association (Korps Alumni Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam-KAHMI)	Ricky Hitipeuw	Head of Indonesian Bethel Church (<i>Gereja Bethel Indonesia-GBI</i>) Maluku
Hasan Ohorella	Head of Amar Ma'ruf Nahi Mungkar Task Force	Simon Wenehen	Secretary Bishop of Ambon
Abdul Azis Fidmatan	Secretary of Islamic Defenders Front (<i>Front Pembela Islam-FPI</i>)'s Maluku Branch	J. Maspaitella	FKYM
Husein Toisuta	Head of FPI's Maluku Branch	Etty Dumatubun	Head of Student Union, Catholic University of the Republic of Indonesia (<i>Perhimpunan Mahasiswa Katolik Republik Indonesia-PMKRI</i>)
Daud Sangadji	Head of BIMM Ambon	Raja Waraka	Community leader of Latupati Amahai
Yusuf Laisow	Secretary of BIMM Ambon	Raja Emus Dias Ema	King of Ambon
Hasbullah Toisuta	Academic	Agus Ulahay	Crisis Center Catholics
Hadi Basalamah	Alhilai Foundation	Etta Hendriks	Head of Youths Maluku
M. Amin Polanunu	King of Wakasihu	Raja Tuhaha	Head of Latupati Saparua
Effendy Latuconsina	King of Hatuhaha	Yop Aiawila	Academic

Abd. Razzaq Opier	King of Liang	T. Leatemia	Academic
Abuya Rumakefing	Community leader of East Seram	Ipi Litaav	Academic
Abdul Karim Rahayaan	Community leader of Air Salobar	Ot Lawalata	Academic
Yunus Serang	Community leader of Banda Ely	Fileo Nova	Academic
Yusran Salman	Community leader	Alo Fatunanembun	Community leader
Larif Hatala	Batumerah	Edy Hukunala	Community leader
Djafar Tuanani	Community leader of Kailolo	Silas Ratuanak	Community leader
Taib Madura	Community leader	Brigita Renyaan	Women representative
Husein Tapitapi	Community leader of Talake	John Ruhulesin	Youth
Mahfud Rengifurwarin	Community leader of Maira	Ferry Wattimurry	Youth
Abubakar Hehanusa	Community leader of Airkoning	Emang Nikijuluw	Grassroots
Lapone Kasman Salamun	Head of Unite Celebes	Femmy Souisa	Grassroots
Hanafi	Baguala	Yanes Ricambessy	Grassroots
Usman Slamet	Kebon Cengkeh	Elvis Talapessy	Grassroots
Amir Kiat	Youth of Batumerah	Yongkie Siavaha	Grassroots
Jalil Wasahun	Youth of Diponegoro	Kris Timisela	Grassroots
Daud Sialana	Youth of Lei Hitu	Jacky Manuputi	Religious leader

Aly Salampessy	Youth or Air Besar	John Sahalesin	Religious leader
Ahmad Leawara	Youth of Salahutu	Benediktus Tawuruturun	Head of Latvuan village
Hasan Usemahu	Youth of Jl. Baru	Hengky Lattu	Civil society

Table 2. List of signatories to the Malino II agreement. Data taken from (Awaludin, 2013).

The meetings during Malino II agreement discussed four main agendas: security, social economy, law, and social politics. During this three-day meeting, they discussed further about results of the discussion at the pre-meeting in Ambon on 26 January 2002. Each representative gave their opinions and offered solutions at the same time. This joint meeting was moderated by the Indonesian government represented by Kalla, Yudhoyono, Governor of Maluku, head of provincial parliament in Maluku (*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah-DPRD*), Deputy Governor of Maluku, Governor of South Sulawesi, Commander of Military Regional Command in Maluku (*Komando Daerah Militer Pattimura-Kodam Pattimura*), Chief of Maluku Regional Police, and Ambon Mayor.

The representatives of each community agreed in many directions. In security concerns they agreed to stop the physical conflict, weapons surrender, and joint security post with the law enforcer. For socio-economic issues, the representatives agreed to, first, return the IDP to their homes as quickly as possible; second, rehabilitation of physical facilities such as housing and mosques; and third, social rehabilitation/reconciliation. In the scope of the law, violators and destroyers of public facilities must be sanctioned, and the legal means must be carried out. The results of this agreement were formulated with eleven points and they became the final draft for Malino II agreement.

The Malino II agreement consisted of 11 points:

1. End all forms of conflicts and disputes,
2. Abide by due process of law enforcement fairly, faithfully, honestly, and impartially, which is supported by communities. Security officers are obliged to be professional,
3. The Malino II agreement rejects and opposes all kinds of separatist movements, such as the Republic of South Moluccas (RMS), which threatens unity and sovereignty of Indonesia,
4. As part of Indonesia, the people of the Moluccas have the right to stay and work legally as long as they respect the local culture, laws, and orders,

5. The agreement bans and disarms illegal armed organisations, groups, or militias under the existing law. Outsider parties that disturb the peace in the Moluccas would be expelled from the Moluccas,
6. The agreement establishes a national independent investigation team,
7. The agreement calls for the voluntarily return of the IDP to their homes and the return of properties,
8. The agreement calls for the rehabilitation of mental, social, economic, and public infrastructures, particularly educational, health, religious, and housing facilities,
9. The agreement preserves law and order for the people in the area.
10. The agreement upholds positive relationships and the harmony among all believers in the Moluccas.
11. The agreement supports the rehabilitation of Pattimura University for collective progress. As a result, the recruitment system and other policies would be transparently implemented based on the principle of fairness, while the necessary standard was upheld.

During the discussion, which delivered eleven points above, the consensus was not made smoothly. Kalla admitted that one of the challenges during the peace talks was identifying the roots of conflict on the Maluku islands. Muslim representatives accused the Republic of South Maluku (*Republik Maluku Selatan*-RMS) of being a separatist organisation that caused the root of the violence on the Maluku islands. On the other hand, Christian delegates accused Laskar Jihad of being the perpetrators of violence and making the conflict spread rapidly in the Maluku islands. My field observations, however, found that these were false accusations. As discussed in the previous chapter, such claims had limited effects on the violence in Maluku.

Kalla recalled that during the 17 days of meetings that targeted at achieving peace, two elements presented difficulties.⁴ First, Christians opposed the Laskar Jihad's actions and responses towards the conflict in North Maluku, while Muslim community was considerably grateful by the support of Laskar Jihad. Second, Muslims vehemently opposed the RMS's separatist movement, while Christians were pleased by the support of RMS financially and also in manpower.

⁴ Interview with Jusuf Kalla, 9 November 2017

Importantly, the Malino II peace talks included 70 delegates from Ambon, but there were no representatives from North Maluku. Hence, the 11 points in the agreement did not discuss the North Maluku issue at all. For example, the Malino II agreement did not discuss a resolution to the struggle over natural resources between the people of Kao and Malifut. The Malino II agreement merely explained the details regarding the struggles between traditional powers in North Maluku. It included repeated solutions for religious disputes but ignored the dispute over traditional powers in North Maluku. Thus, we should understand that the Malino II agreement, which was supervised and managed by the Indonesian government, could not be considered a final solution to the problem in Maluku as it did not cover the whole region of Maluku.

However, the lack of discussion and peace talks about North Maluku at the national level did not necessarily mean that the northern region was far from peace. Local elites in North Maluku had already discussed and met several times to make an agreement and work towards peace. The local elites were led by two prominent leaders from the Muslim and Christian communities. Muslim representatives were led by Samsul Bahri Umar, and Christian delegates were led by Hein Namotemo. Both representatives were considered commanders in their community. Below, we will see how they negotiated peace.

Local Context: Mamuya Peace Talks

As we saw in the previous chapter, the conflicts were involving gunfights, explosives, and direct attacks between Christians and Muslims in North Maluku, especially in North Halmahera until peace talks were finally held between the two conflicting parties. The first meeting was military-sponsored meeting, but this meeting was only attended by the Christians, as Muslims refused to attend. One of the Muslim commanders, Amal, said that Muslims and Christians before this meeting had several initiatives to meet on a small group, but Muslims were often betrayed and killed.⁵ So this time, Muslims refused to meet. After this meeting, Hein Namotemo, one of the commanders from the Christian side, started writing letters to Samsul Bahri Umar, a respected leader from the Muslim side. In the letters, both leaders explained the situations of both parties. Namotemo explained the situation of the Christians in Tobelo, and Umar described the situation in Galela, one of the Muslim hideouts in North

⁵ Interview with Husni Amal, 28 February 2018.

Maluku during the conflict. These letters were treated as the initial groundwork for building trust between Muslims and Christians [see Appendix 6, 7, and 8 for the detail].

Moreover, in the first set of letters, Namotemo listed the families who survived the conflict in order to let the Muslim community know that the Christian sides of their families were safe in Tobelo. Umar did the same thing, and some of the IDP from the Muslim community requested Umar to ask Namotemo whether certain individuals survived or were killed during the fights. During this period, both parties admitted that they were having difficulties mapping who had initiated the first fight. The Christian community believed that they were attacked by the Muslims first, and the Muslim community believed the reverse.



Picture 6. Mamuya peace agreement, third meeting. The author collected this picture from Samsul Bahri Umar.

Umar admitted that he and Namotemo exchanged letters⁶ several times. In the beginning, they aimed to build trust. The stories they told in their first letters were about the situations in both IDP camps. They shared their difficulties in visiting the Muslim and Christian

⁶ Interview with Namotemo, 24 February 2018. Confirmed by Samsul Bahri Umar, 26 February 2018. The author requested to see one of many examples of these letters to Namotemo and Umar, but they claimed that they do not know the location of these letters. However, the author found few copies of these letters from a priest named, SS Duan.

camps. It was also mentioned that the plantation products that belonged to Muslim in Christian camps were ready to be sold, and Muslims also shared the damages caused by the conflict to the houses of Christians in their villages. At one point, they also shared the injustices committed by the military officers who were supposed to protect civilians.

For example, for security reasons, several Christian families had to pay military officers to guide them from their hideouts in Muslim camps to Christian camps. The Muslims shared that they had to pay a certain amount of rupiah (up to 10 million rupiah, equal to almost US\$800 today) for security protection in order to be able to sell the plantation products in the borders between the Christian and Muslim camps.

These hardships following the conflict and during the evacuation made both parties realize that they had to do something. They had to agree on a ceasefire and begin peace talks in order to reach a consensus that would benefit both parties. Hence, the initial plan for talks was set in Mamuya, one of the villages located in the middle, between the Muslim and Christian IDP camps. It was picked as a neutral place. Both parties invited Sultan Bacan, Gahril Aydan Syah, at that time he was also the regent of North Maluku (before it became a province).

The first meeting was held on 11 October 2000 in Mamuya football field and the meeting was attended by 30 Christians and 10 Muslims. The Mamuya peace agreement consisted of three important meetings which held regularly after October 2000. Umar explains that the number of participants multiply each meeting, and during the third meeting on 24 December 2000, 600 people attended the meeting from both communities, as well as the Vice President Megawati Sukarnoputri and other officials from the national and regional governments.

Timeline of reconciliation efforts in local context	
After the declaration of civil emergency on 27 June 2000, several local reconciliations were held as follow:	
Military-sponsored meeting	9 August 2000, the military Banteng Raiders Unit 401 held a meeting with the Christians. The meeting was held on a military vessel and failed to invite the Muslim leaders because many of Muslim oppose this meeting.
First Mamuya meeting	11 October 2000 facilitated by the military and the district government. The meeting was attended 30 Christians and 10 Muslims. Christians led by Hein Namotemo and Muslim Led by Samsul Bahri Umar.

Second Mamuya meeting	18 November 2000, 200 Muslims and Christians attended, facilitated by military and district government. Dialogue took place, each Muslims and Christians were looking for their family.
Third Mamuya meeting	24 December 2000 attended by 600 Muslims and Christians. Vice President Megawati also participated in the meeting.
Smaller follow-on meetings	30 December 2000 (Gura village, Tobelo), 2 January 2001 (Gamsungi, Tobelo), 11 January 2001 (Togawa, Galela), 26 January 2001 (Togawa, Galela), 19 February 2001 (Tobelo), 10 March 2001 (Gura, Tobelo), and 7 April 2001 (Gamsungi, Tobelo). The meetings discussed the return of the IDP to their homes and meetings often held at the military facilities and military protection
Halmahera Bakudapa	20-31 January 2001, Tobelo. A meeting of 200 Muslims and Christians, initiated by Halmahera Community Resilience Organisation (<i>Lembaga Ketahanan Masyarakat Halmahera</i>).
Hibualamo peace declaration	19 April 2001, Tobelo. The meeting held at <i>hibualamo</i> soccer field. A cultural procession followed by the signing of peace declaration.
Galela statement of principle	A meeting between Muslims and Christians in Togawa, Galela on 30 June 2001 [See Appendix 5 for the detail].
Declaration for a new region	12 January 2002, held in <i>hibualamo</i> soccer field, to underline the need of a new district in North Halmahera as a result of the implementation of local autonomy in North Maluku.

Table 3. Timeline of reconciliation in the local context in North Halmahera. Information on this table obtained from Barron, Azca, & Susdinarjanti (2012) and interviews with Banari (27 February 2018), Namotemo (24 February 2018), and Umar (26 February 2018), SS Duan (27 February 2018), Liputan 6 (2002), and Azca (24 October 2018).

During the peace talks, the Vice President Megawati visited North Halmahera twice to observe. In an interview,⁷ Umar admitted that, in front of Megawati, he confessed that the conflict in North Maluku was difficult to resolve because of the involvement of the military and police officers in the conflicts. Umar said that the two conflicting parties had been

⁷ Recorded interview, Samsul Bahri Umar, 26 February 2018.

infiltrated with security officers who were acting as provocateurs. For example, most of the incidents during the peace talks between the white army and red army were sponsored by the security officers. Before the peace talks, there was a clear separation between the white army and red army. This separation was based on region, and the separation line was guarded by the police and military officers. In reality, however, the white army was able to attack the red army, and vice versa. Moreover, the security officers did not only act as provocateurs, but they also played roles in the training camps of both conflicting parties. Umar admitted that a few of the active and retired military officers trained the white army in Galela. The role of the security forces was considered significant during the conflict because several officers were directly involved. In another interview with Sosebeko, he made a similar claim and underlined the significant role of Laskar Jihad in killing Christians, especially after the peace talks.⁸

Local Context: Reconciliation and Hibualamo

After the visits of Vice President Megawati, the situation in North Maluku gradually became more conducive. The involvement of the security apparatus from the TNI or Polri, as we mentioned earlier, significantly diminished. However, after the conflicting parties signed the local peace agreement, a new tension emerged in Maluku due to the arrival of Laskar Jihad.⁹ The arrival of Laskar Jihad made the circumstances unstable. The majority of the conflicts caused by Laskar Jihad were in Maluku, not North Maluku. As seen in the previous chapter, Laskar Jihad attacked areas with certain characteristics; for example, the majority Christian region, or the Christian camps were the main target of Laskar Jihad. Due to these attacks, Mamuya peace agreement that was signed and agreed at the local level between Muslims and Christians, started to fluctuate. Therefore, there was a proposal from the indigenous leaders in North Maluku to convene adat reconciliation, which aimed to remove the boundaries created by religious differences.

In the early stage of peace negotiations, the conflicting parties considered that the primary roots of conflict and violence in North Maluku was due to religious belief. Hence, in the beginning, they were trying to build a peace agreement based on the reconciliation of religious leaders. Second, the peace agreement considered as a commitment made between the

⁸ Recorded interview, Theo Sosebeko, Tobelo, 1 March 2018. Theo Sosebeko was one of the commanders from the Christian Army (*Laskar Kristus*) in Tobelo. While Namotemo was considered as Christian leader during the conflict, Sosebeko was known as the head of Christian Army. Sosebeko explicitly stated that the military officers from Bali helped Christians while the military officers from Malang assisted the Muslims.

⁹ See chapter 3 for more details.

conflicting parties and also external party such as the government. For that reason, the local elites from both conflicting parties agreed to use *adat* as the final and binding as a peace solution.¹⁰

At the beginning, reconciliation processes were initiated by NGOs which held peace workshops and promoted peace education targeted at adults and children (Duncan 2016). These NGOs invited trauma experts from Java to talk to the people about the importance of forgiveness and reconciliation as part of the healing process. Then, public officials followed by mentioning the importance of peace and reconciliation in North Maluku in public ceremonies and speeches.

After the peace agreement was agreed, small-scale conflicts still occurred in the Tobelo villages. These small-scale conflicts have never involved a religious dispute but rather to the post-conflict social economy. Hence, the Tobelo ethnic community believed that to end all of the disputes with the involvement of *adat*.

For the majority of people in North Maluku, *Adat* is a sacred value which must be maintained, despite your religious beliefs. Hence, the implementation of *adat* (a local tradition) values, called *hibualamo*, in North Halmahera has been viewed as a promising approach. For example, in North Halmahera, located in the northern part of North Maluku, the *hibualamo*¹¹ practice was used to strengthen the communication of the local people. The *hibualamo* is a remembrance or memory recollection, followed with an *adat* procession and concluded by the signing of a customary document (*dokumen adat*) which serves to reconcile the conflicting parties regardless of the religious background. The customary document is known as *hibualamo* declaration of peace [see Appendix 4 for the detail].¹² This cultural approach was considered successful because during the conflict, people violated the law or disregard the armed forces but not the practice of *adat*. With the practice of *hibualamo*, they became less prone to violating an *adat* oath and suffering the consequences, which included illness and death.

¹⁰ Interview with Jesaya Rahaguna Banari, Tobelo, 27 February 2018. Even though during the signing of *hibualamo*, official governments observed the process and also sign the *hibualamo* peace agreement.

¹¹ *Hibualamo* is translated into English as a large house. *Hibualamo* is a traditional house of North Halmahera, and the function of the traditional house is that it serves as a place to gather to solve problems with customary rules (*hukum adat*), as an identity of a village, and as a place to discuss common interests. Hence, based on an interview with Banari, *hibualamo* was significant to binding the peace agreement because they treated this matter as a family business.

¹² The *hibualamo* declaration of peace is a peace declaration of indigenous people of Tobelo, North Halmahera. This declaration was signed by indigenous leaders and consisted of sixteen articles which involved the confession of conflicting parties, recognized the impact that conflict had on the society, and agreed to end all of the hatred and conflict, especially within the indigenous territory.

Hibualamo contains the universal values of humanity such as *O Dora* (maintaining affection between people); *O Diari* (the importance of upholding the value of truth); and *O Adili* (the principle of justice in social life).¹³ These are values in *adat* which are important to unite conflicting parties. *Adat* was able to break through the boundaries created by religious ideology. Hence, the universal values of *hibualamo* were considered as a final solution to resolve conflicts in North Halmahera.

The *hibualamo* peace declaration was immediately welcomed by the conflicting parties. However, it should be noted that the local elites were determined to reach peace early because they looked at the opportunity presented at that time, including the distribution of aid funds from outside of North Maluku, reconstruction of destroyed infrastructure, and the upcoming elections for the regional heads. It is very likely that the local elites looked at these opportunities presented for them at that time; hence, they wanted to have peace early and used *adat* as a cover/package.

Moreover, there were two primary motivations that drove local elites' efforts to achieve peace and start the reconciliation process in North Maluku as soon as possible. The first was the goal of creating the current province of North Maluku. Although the North Maluku province was legally established in October 1999, the new province did not truly go into effect due to the conflict. During the conflict period, from October 1999 to November 2002, North Maluku was led by several acting governors.

Steadiness and reliability were needed in the new province. This need led the local elites to try to achieve peace in the shortest possible time. The elites made many attempts to restore the peace that existed before the conflict to North Maluku. After the local elites from both the Muslim and Christian communities held three meetings in Mamuya as explained above, they began conducting an *adat* procession. As a result of this *adat* procession, in April 2001, after the meetings in Mamuya, Tobelo Christians and Muslims signed a declaration of peace and made a customary oath (Duncan, 2013, p. 112-115).

Moreover, the *hibualamo* declaration of peace and the customary oath peace agreement appeared exclusively to the people from Tobelo ethnicity, while even though the warring parties in North Halmahera consisted of various ethnicities. Even though that this procedure was exclusively to the Tobelo ethnicity, the process was observed by the Head of District (*Camat*) Hein Namotemo, Chairperson of the GMIH Synod Rev. Aesh, Infantry Battalion

¹³ Interview with Jesaya Rahaguna Banari, Tobelo, 27 February 2018.

Commander 742 Major Ruliansyah, Marine Commander Let-Col M. Alpan and the Governor of North Maluku, Abdul Muhyie Efendi.

After the signing of *hibualamo* and Mamuya peace agreement, discussions among citizens about peace and the social construction of North Maluku have focused on restoring inter-religious social relations through religious leaders in a forum called *Forum Kesatuan Umat Beragama* (FKUB – interfaith communication forum). FKUB initially made a joint program that involved young people at the junior and high school levels. Joint programs such as camps, gatherings, in the early days of the conflict aim to foster young generation on religious harmony respecting each other, respecting fellow human beings. This interaction between fellow students made communication between ethnics and religions smooth. FKUB aimed that communication and continual meetings between young people can eliminate old wounds caused by conflict. After the FKUB meetings, they realised discrimination related to the privilege of Islam in terms of spreading religion. FKUB meetings aimed to close the gap between Islam and Christians in North Halmahera.

By April 2001, two peace agreements of *hibualamo* and Mamuya peace agreement were signed. The two warring parties started to reach an agreement to end the war immediately. The focus began to shift on two main issues: first, rebuilding the region that was destroyed as the damage from conflict; and second, on returning the IDP to their homes.

Violence in the Midst and Post-peace Agreements

In the midst of peace talks, and to maintain the absence of violence, both parties began to refrain from attacking each other. However, that did not mean the conflict ended on its own. Small-scale conflicts remained.

The violence in the midst and in post-peace agreement period was led by those who were displeased with the peace agreements. Abdul Gani Kasuba, a prominent *ulama* in North Maluku, was one of the people who was not satisfied with the peace agreement. Moreover, Abdul Gani Kasuba claimed that during the peace talks, besides the ones held in Mamuya, Muslims and Protestant Church of Maluku (*Gereja Protestant Maluku-GPM*) continually gathered to build harmony and peace.¹⁴ However, Abdul Gani Kasuba argued that the meeting was just a lie, behind the agreement, they had planned a strategy to keep attacking Muslims. In fact, during the peace talks, while Muslim refrained on attacking Christians, Christians kept

¹⁴ Suara Hidayatullah (2000).

attacking the Muslim villages. For example, there were attacks on villages near Kao, North Halmahera where a small number of Muslim IDP were hiding. The arrival of Laskar Jihad members boosted the number of Muslim crowds and they at the same time also managed to attack on several Christian villages near Galela.

Furthermore, during the early years of peace, Abdul Gani Kasuba was one of conservative leader who rejected the concept of peace and continued the dispute due to casualties on the part of Muslims. This argument often was supported and backed by radical groups which at that time performing *jihad* in North Maluku such as Laskar Jihad. As a preacher, Kasuba believed that it was more critical to support Muslim in North Maluku to devoted to the *sharia* rather than to promote a peace agreement. Kasuba argued that the practice of tolerance in North Maluku often deviated from the rule in *sharia*. Kasuba alleged Christian priests were using the practice of tolerance to plummet the Muslims into following some of their teachings. As a result, the *sharia* boundary was violated. For example, some Muslims would accept to be a committee of church activities during Christmas.¹⁵

An example of violence committed by the Kasuba crowd along with Laskar Jihad was the attack on Islamic villages that were still controlled by Christians near Galela. Although Kasuba did not have a large number of troops, the Kasuba group continued to fight. Perhaps what Kasuba did between 2000-2002 was to attract the attention of the oppressed Muslim community. Kasuba finally tasted the results of defending and voicing oppressed Muslims because in 2004 Kasuba was elected as a member of the national parliament representing North Maluku.

The post-peace agreement violence took place also because of negligence from the security forces such as the military. It is widely suspected that the military had somewhat different intentions during this period. Arguably, the military involvement in post-peace agreement attacks was caused by the issues internal to the military.

One of the examples of the negligence of the military which later caused post-peace agreement violence was its blessing and approval for the Laskar Jihad's safe arrival to the Maluku islands between May 2000-June 2001. Laskar Jihad members arrived in the provinces of Maluku and North Maluku in the beginning of peace talks. It is important to note that President Wahid ordered the military to prevent and block the Laskar Jihad from reaching the Maluku islands. Wahid said, "whether they want to do *jihad* or *jahit* (sewing), Islam and or Christian, arrest them all" (Mahmada, et al., 2000).

¹⁵ Suara Hidayatullah (2000).

Major General TNI Sudi Silalahi, the commander of the East Java military command at the time, refused to arrest the Laskar Jihad members. He stated that as citizens of Indonesia, they had the civil right to travel anywhere as long as they are not breaking the law (Mahmada, et al., 2000). Sudi claimed that the military had conducted sweeping. They examined the members who wanted to leave for Maluku from Surabaya,¹⁶ and no weapons were found. As mentioned above, the Laskar Jihad members arrived in Maluku and North Maluku from May 2000-June 2001 and shortly after the Laskar Jihad arrived in Maluku, members immediately carried out attacks in several places using weapons such as swords and machetes. Laskar Jihad attacked on places that were considered the bases of the Christian community at the time.

After the arrival in North Maluku, members of the Laskar Jihad disperse to many remote villages and initiated their agenda. In an interview, Jafar Umar Thalib, the prominent leader of Laskar Jihad, admitted that at the beginning, the members tried to observe the area while recruiting locals who still displeased with peace agreements.¹⁷ Before departed to North Maluku, the members of Laskar Jihad were trained in a National United Training. Jafar Umar Thalib admitted that the military personnel were involved in this training.¹⁸ The purpose of training was to exercise physically and mentally; at the same time, they taught various martial arts and war theory (Hasan, 2006).

The arrival of Laskar Jihad members was convenient to support Abdul Gani Kasuba agenda which was against the peace agreement; hence, the arrival of Laskar Jihad members was welcomed with open arms, especially by Abdul Gani Kasuba and his followers.¹⁹ Jafar Umar Thalib was against the peace agreements because the settlement offered no advantages for Muslim people who had been victimised, even killed during the conflict.²⁰ Jafar Umar Thalib admitted that one of Laskar Jihad's main objectives in North Maluku was to seek vengeance on Muslim victims during the conflict. Hence, not long after arrived in North Maluku, they launched attacks on Christian villages which rose the tension after the peace. On 26 April 2002, Laskar Jihad and few militant Muslims attacked Soya village. "Hundreds of marauders wearing camouflage and unidentified black uniforms attacked the village by

¹⁶ The majority of Laskar Jihad members who were going to the Maluku islands were departed from the port in Surabaya. Members who were better off financially took the flight to Maluku from Jakarta.

¹⁷ Recorded interview, Jafar Umar Thalib, Yogyakarta, 24 October 2018. Jafar Umar Thalib just died recently on 25 August 2019 due to heart attack in Jakarta.

¹⁸ Recorded interview, Jafar Umar Thalib, Yogyakarta, 24 October 2018. Hasan (2006) explains about the military training extensively.

¹⁹ Abdul Gani Kasuba and Jafar Umar Thalib did not know each other before. However, Jafar Umar Thalib knew Abdul Gani Kasuba's younger brother, Muhammad Kasuba. In the 1980s, Jafar Umar Thalib and Muhammad Kasuba went to Pakistan to study.

²⁰ Recorded interview, Jafar Umar Thalib, Yogyakarta, 24 October 2018.

blowing up mortars and shooting at civilians. As a result, 12 people were killed, dozens were injured, and dozens of houses were destroyed” (Arjon, 2020).²¹

However, overwhelming flow of aid and assistance following the peace agreements gradually resulted in changes of priority to many people in North Maluku, including those who were still fighting. The local fighters stop fighting, and many sought to distribute aid to their loyal followers. For Laskar Jihad members, Jafar Umar Thalib claimed some of them return home, some of them stay in North Maluku to start a family.²² According to local former fighters,²³ some of Laskar Jihad members who were thirst for blood, were looking for a new arena to kill, and they headed to Poso, Central Sulawesi.²⁴

Summary

The process of achieving peace in North Maluku was a complex one influenced by political dynamics and different security landscapes at both local and national levels. Numerous people wanted peace for North Maluku; however, there were also many entities who wanted to maintain the unstable situation. This chapter has analyzed the dynamics and different stages of the peace process in North Maluku. These different stages of peace have led to dual perceptions of peace in terms of the people’s awareness in North Maluku. The perception at the national level is represented in the Malino II agreement. In the Malino II agreement, the government gathered 70 delegates from Ambon. According to the government, peace across all of the Maluku islands was accomplished through this agreement. However, the reality was different from what the Indonesian government claimed and implied. Those who fought in North Maluku were not aware of the Malino II agreement, and hence, the Malino II agreement was considered exclusive only to the people in Maluku and Ambon.

The previous study about peace in North Maluku regularly mentioned the importance of Malino II agreement. However, what we encountered on the field, stated otherwise. The author argues that Malino II agreement has little or nothing to do with the peace in North Maluku. Instead, the people in North Halmahera initiated their peace initiatives a year and a half earlier than Malino II agreement. The peace began in Mamuya, a small village outside of

²¹ This information collected from a report released by *Tempo* (6 May 2002).

²² Recorded interview, Jafar Umar Thalib, Yogyakarta, 24 October 2018.

²³ Recorded interview, Samsul Bahri Umar, Galela, 26 February 2018. Recorded interview, Husni Amal, Galela, 28 February 2018.

²⁴ As explained in Introduction (Chapter 1), during this period, Indonesia was dealing with plenty of religious conflicts, including the one in Poso.

Tobelo. The peace talks were held in three different meetings: 11 October 2000, 18 November 2000, and 24 December 2000. In the third meeting, Muslims and Christians signed a peace agreement. After these meetings, the conflicting parties held a few smaller follow up meetings which discussed the return of the IDP. The peace talks in Mamuya were led by two local elites: Samsul Bahri Umar and Hein Namotemo.

After the conflicting parties signed the Mamuya peace agreement, few minor incidents that involved violence remained in North Halmahera. Especially after the peace agreement was agreed, small-scale conflicts occurred in the Tobelo villages. Hence, the Tobelo ethnic community tried to end all of the disputes with the involvement of *adat*. Local elites such as Hein Namotemo initiated another peace talks, which involved Tobelo *adat*. Many people appreciated these cultural approaches to conflict resolution.

After the signings of Mamuya peace agreement and *hibualamo*, the target of peace and social construction started to be focused on the inter-religious social relations through FKUB. FKUB initiated a joint program which involved young people from Christians and Muslims schools. This program aimed to intensify the interaction of the youths between two beliefs. FKUB also aimed to eliminate old wounds caused by the conflict.

Achieving sustainable peace was challenging work for everyone because numerous people wanted to maintain the unstable situation in North Maluku. For example, the presence of members of Laskar Jihad in the conflict zones during the period of peace talks helped spread the conflict to new areas that were previously safe. However, this situation did not last for long because the majority of conflicting parties agreed in two agreements, i.e., Mamuya and *hibualamo*.

In the early years of peace, there were huge number of buildings and houses that were destroyed and mosques and churches that were burnt down. The destruction of many buildings soon resulted in a massive inflow of assistances and funding directed to North Maluku. Importantly, the overwhelming flow of aid and funds to North Maluku produced new dynamics because the warring elites became busy to manage the usage of funds, such as social assistance funds, IDP funds, and unexpected funds. The discussion of how the funds were able to stabilize the situation in North Maluku will be discussed comprehensively in the next chapter

Chapter 5

Rebuilding North Maluku: Vortex of Aid, Infrastructure Projects and Corruption Practices

After the peace agreement was reached in 2001, much work needed to be done to rebuild the province of North Maluku. Many houses, buildings, and places of worship that were destroyed during the conflict needed immediate repairs to help eliminate the collective trauma suffered by the community. This chapter mainly discusses the early years of peace in North Maluku, examining what happened in 2002-2003. The early period of peace is defined as the first 12-month period following a formal agreement between warring parties. As we saw in the previous chapter, the peace agreement did not necessarily end the violence, but after its signing, most of those involved in the conflict commonly understood that peace was the goal. Additionally, during this period, nearly 250,000 IDP desired to return to their homes and start their lives again.

The discussion in this chapter focuses on three main points: first, the impact of decentralization in rebuilding North Maluku; second, the significance of aid and grants collected domestically and overseas to rebuild the post-conflict zones; and third, how the grants shaped the dynamics of local politics and defined the local actors who later engaged in political disputes in provincial and regency elections. This chapter aims to answer the following questions. First, how did post-conflict economic projects reshape local political power in North Maluku? Second, how did the grants support peacebuilding in North Maluku? Third, how did corruption affect the process of peacebuilding in North Maluku? Fourth, what forms of corruption were evident in the post-conflict situation? The answers to these questions illustrate how corruption have affected peacebuilding in North Maluku.

Academic discussions tend to subscribe an assumption that corruption negatively affects the process of reconciliation and peacebuilding (Doig and Tisne, 2009; Mauro, 1995; Rose-Ackerman, 1999; and Uslaner, 2008). Such an assessment is not limited to the academic discussion but also widely shared by civil society organizations, which tend to insist that corruption accelerates harmful situations in post-conflict communities. In this chapter, we will see a unique development that massive corruption has somehow led to stabilize the post-conflict society in North Maluku and this in turn has ironically smoothed the way for the peacebuilding process there. A permissive attitude towards corruption in the early years of

peace assisted the local elites and their loyal supporters in shifting their attention from violence to capital accumulation. In examining these, we focus on the corruption related to aid provided by the Indonesian government known as the social fund (*Dana Bantuan Sosial—Bansos*) and the IDP fund (*Dana Pengembalian Pengungsi*). Additionally, North Maluku received approximately Rp 1.1 trillion (equal to USD 129 million in 2003 currency) based on Presidential Instructions No. 6 of 2003.

Also, in the early years of the peace period, there was a nation-wide implementation of decentralization policy aiming to strengthen local autonomy, and it resulted in the splitting of regional administration at the local level (provinces, regencies, and cities) in many places. With this, the commencement of new regencies and cities could also be seen in North Maluku. The regional splitting resulted in the diversification of focus among the local elites. Their focuses were, first, to end the conflict, second, to oversee peace settlement, and third, to lobby regional parliamentarians to win political contestation as regional heads (i.e., governor, regents and mayors). Hence, these political circumstances raise questions such as: how did the local actors manage the regional budget in the early years of peace? How did they seize the opportunity to build the provincial capital, which was constructed on vacant land? How did the regional splitting (*pemekaran wilayah*) stabilize the situation in North Maluku? Budgets for these and other projects were based on aid and assistance, and they created plenty of opportunity for corruption because of the lack of supervision from the central government.

Overwhelming Flow in Aid and Assistance

When aid was flooding the region, it attracted the local elites who wanted to control the funds. That type of control meant they could distribute the help to their constituents. Madjid Abdullah, the former vice governor of North Maluku, admitted that for three years the North Maluku Provincial Government received Presidential Instructions funds for post-conflict rehabilitation reaching Rp 1.1 trillion.¹ That money was used for the rehabilitation of damaged government buildings and houses of worship, as well as community economic empowerment.

In an interview, former Governor of North Maluku, Thaib Armaiyn claimed that, at the beginning of the peace period, the focus of development projects was on government buildings

¹ President Megawati Soekarnoputri in September 2003 signed a Presidential Instruction (Inpres) No. 6 of 2003 related to the acceleration of development recovery of Maluku and North Maluku in post-conflict. This Inpres instructed national and provincial leaders to coordinate policies for accelerating the recovery of post-conflict Maluku Province and North Maluku Province in the economic, political, security, development, people's welfare, and rehabilitation programs.

and houses of worship such as mosques and churches.² Armaiyn explained that the government building was needed to maintain services to the people, and the re-construction of houses of worship was intended to eliminate trauma wound in the community because the conflict destroyed many houses of worship.

Another focus was on returning the IDP, building houses that were destroyed, and improving the local economy. Many parties criticized these plans because of the return of the IDP and rehabilitation of people's homes should be priorities of the government instead of building public facilities such as houses of worship and government offices. During the period 2002-2003, what local governments showed was a mismanaged development focus and priorities. Notably, it was as a result of the provincial government that used the top-down approach instead of the bottom-up approach during the peacebuilding period. Moreover, the provincial government initiated large-scale projects such as building government buildings and houses of worship, because these projects could attract more money (both aid and assistance) to North Maluku.

In 2015, Thaib Armaiyn was sentenced to a two-year prison and a Rp 150 million subsidiary three-month fine. The former governor of North Maluku was proved to have committed corruption in the 2004 North Maluku Provincial Unexpected Fund (*Dana Tidak Terduga - DTT*) budget of Rp 6.916 billion (equal to USD 812,000 in 2004 currency). Armaiyn used the Revised Regional Budget (*Anggaran Pendapatan Belanja Daerah-Perubahan-APBD-P*), which was designed to be used for essential purposes such as civil emergency, for the fictitious need of official travel. In an interview with the author, Armaiyn admitted that he took the money, but he denied that money went into his own pockets. Armaiyn claimed that during 2003-2004, when North Maluku began to rebuild from the scratch, the police and military needed a significant sum for security purposes.³ The newly created province did not have sufficient funds at that time so Armaiyn said he diverted the money to the police and military. He also claimed that the people of North Maluku know about this and said that he was sacrificed.⁴

Moreover, the conflict in North Maluku caused large numbers of the IDP. Comparing to the other conflicts which occurred at the same time in Indonesia, the IDP in North Maluku

² Recorded interview, Thaib Armaiyn, 10 February 2018.

³ Recorded interview with Thaib Armaiyn, 10 February 2018.

⁴ During the interview, Armaiyn stated that the North Maluku people supported him in this allegation. Armaiyn claimed that many people were waiting and cheered for him outside of the prison when he was released. However, during his administration, it was widely known that he was abusing his power and installed his daughter as the head of North Maluku Development Planning Board (*Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Daerah-Bappeda*). His daughter later was also proved to have committed corruption.

was the largest. As we can see on the table 4 below, North Maluku had approximately 132,571 IDP. North Maluku IDPs were located in many places such as North Sulawesi, Papua, East Java and Central Java. Religious factors determined the preferred areas to which the IDP wanted to go. For example, Muslim IDP from villages in Galela, Jailolo, Sahu, Bacan, Kao, and Wasile sought refuge in Ternate, Malifut, Morotai, and Tidore in North Maluku where the majority of the population was Muslim. Some of these Muslim IDP were from transmigrant's villages, so some of them returned to their original areas such as Central and East Java. On the other hand, Christian IDP fled to North Sulawesi and Tobelo—predominantly Christian areas.

Shelter area	Number of Internally Displaced People (IDP)	
	Households	Number of people
Jailolo	5,087	21,087
Sahu	1,539	6,314
Ibu	850	3,645
Loloda	2,711	10,451
Gane Barat	819	4,367
Gane Timur	2,015	7,736
Morotai Selatan	1,604	7,385
Morotai Utara	1,072	4,970
Galela	2,235	10,527
Tobelo	7,164	27,695
Kao	973	4,385
Makian/Malifut	1,242	7,216
Kayoa	420	2,156
Bacan	1,417	6,714
Obi	1,710	6,624
Sanana	237	1,299
Halmahera Tengah	4,101	22,105
Tidore	397	1,971
Tidore Utara	323	1,516
Tidore Selatan	184	1,095
Oba	89	550
Oba Utara	217	2,808

Weda	487	2,980
Patani	291	1,498
Maluku Utara	31,095	132,571

Table 4. The spread of the IDP in North Maluku. Data taken from (Noveria, et al., 2003).

Displacement led changes in livelihoods among the IDP. For example, the IDP from Halmahera typically had a farming background, and the majority of the IDP from Ternate were government employees. After moving to an IDP camp, they were forced to change their livelihoods to survive and earn lower wages for jobs such as motorcycle taxi driver, security guard, and domestic helper. As a result, these changes and their accompanying uncertainties fueled their desire to return home immediately and return to their previous jobs. Many farmers in Halmahera were away from their copra plantations for too long, leaving their copra gardens untended.⁵ A majority of the IDP longed to return home while small numbers of them wanted to start over in their new region and forget the past. The Indonesian government also sought to return the IDP to their areas of origin. Besides avoiding social conflicts between permanent residents and the IDP, the government also believed the best place for IDP to continue living in the future is in their home areas. However, this decision was not accompanied by careful planning, meaning tasks such as healing from trauma and the importance of reconciliation before the IDP returned to their areas of origin were left unaddressed. To bring the IDP back to their homes, the Indonesian government allocated plenty of funds from its budget.

In 2002, after the signing of the peace agreement, a program to return the IDP was one of President Megawati's priorities. According to Noveria (2003), the IDP repatriation program in North Maluku Province focused on three IDP centers: the Tobelo district (*kecamatan*) and its surrounding areas, which accommodated IDP from Galela and southern Morotai; Ternate, which became an IDP shelter for people from Tobelo; and Manado, which became an IDP centre for people from Ternate. Ideally, the return of the IDP to their homes was carried out simultaneously so that all families who were separated could reunite immediately. Therefore, coordination between regions and instructions from the central government were essential in this IDP return program.

⁵ In some cases, I found that the IDP who still had families at the place of origin asked their families to take care of their copra plantations, and they were willing to share the profits. For example, in interviews in Galela, the former combatants said that they have families who moved to Ternate during the conflict in 1999. During the conflict, each of them were responsible for more than three copra plantations owned by their extended families. During the harvest period, they paid the military officers to guard the copra from Galela to Ternate.

Before the IDP returned to their homes, meetings were conducted between the parties involved in the dispute. The aim of the meeting was to give the warring parties an opportunity to forgive each other, eliminate past grudges, and accept co-existence with others. However, this implementation of the later was not in line with facts from the field, because when the IDP return to their homes, they live in a village in which one religion predominates. For example, when Muslim IDP in Ternate return to their homes in Galela, they live in a village that is majority Muslim. To develop the values of tolerance and forgiveness, there must be a shared place that becomes a medium of interaction between the two warring parties. Living in a homogeneous village is not such a place. At the regency/city level, the Indonesian government proposed forming a reconciliation team known as a team of 30,⁶ consisting of religious and *adat* (local customary) elements. However, in practice, the reconciliation team could not be effective because their time was taken up by rebuilding their homes and lives that were destroyed by the conflict. A few years later, this team of 30 became the prototypes of the so-called Interfaith Communication Forum (*Forum Komunikasi Antar Umat Beragama* — FKAUB).⁷

Assistance Funds for the IDP

The conflict in 1999-2001 left many significant problems; one of them was the problem of the IDP who spread in several neighboring provinces. The Indonesian government and provincial governments believed that three programs should be implemented to solve the IDP problem; they were relocation, empowerment, and returning the IDP to their homes. However, the latter became the priority because, according to the Thaib Armaiyn,⁸ the best place for the IDP was their original homes. Armaiyn claimed that the desire from the IDP to return to their homes was also immense.

Arguably, there were several reasons that resulted in the local governments and the IDP to prefer the third option, even though the third option needed a tremendous cost. The option

⁶ The task of the reconciliation team was formulating an agreement that will be implemented to the conflicting parties and playing a role in solving problems in the community. Besides, this team also acted as a liaison between the government and the community. Thus, the problem in the community was not immediately conveyed to the authorities but resolved first through the reconciliation team.

⁷ FKAUB is a forum formed by the local community and facilitated by the government in order to establish, maintain and empower religious communities for unity. One of the tasks is to maintain a regular dialogue among religious and community leaders, especially if there are problems related to religious matters in Indonesia. Representatives of each religion were assigned as members of this FKAUB.

⁸ Recorded interview, Thaib Armaiyn, 10 February 2018.

to return home for the IDP required a high cost because North Maluku IDPs were scattered in several provinces such as North Sulawesi, Maluku, Southeast Sulawesi, South Sulawesi and Papua. Besides, each returning the IDP would also be given an additional fee to restart their lives. Local governments also managed significant funds for the IDP, so this option could be considered a 'friendly' option for all parties involved. Another reason for the IDP to prefer returning home than settling in a new area was that there were asset ownership issues such as agricultural lands and plantations in their home.

To help the IDP return home, the Indonesian government created an IDP assistance fund, which was intended to cover relocation costs as well as provide the IDP with initial capital to reorganize their lives. According to the data, in 2001 the North Maluku provincial government received state budget funds totaling Rp 119 billion to repatriate the IDP. However, until the end of the 2001 fiscal year, the provincial government had disbursed only Rp 87 billion, and therefore, the remaining Rp 32 billion for 2001 were declared forfeited and returned to the central government treasury. Sinyo Hari Sarundajang, the former acting governor of North Maluku, admitted that the difficulty in disbursing the remaining 2001 state budget funds occurred because the formal structure of regional apparatuses had not yet been established. In this case, the governor was referring to the North Maluku Provincial Social Service Department.⁹ Additionally, systems and standard operating procedures, including a model of supervision to implement the return of the IDP, had not yet been established.

The flood of aid and assistance to the Maluku islands brought with it the opportunity for corruption. For example, the former head of the Maluku Province Social Welfare Office, Venno Tahalele, was named as a suspect in a corruption case involving Rp 35.5 billion. The charges included providing deductions for income tax, value added tax, contractor profits, and transportation. The deductions were not allowed, according to the regulations of the Ministry of Social Affairs. Local officials such as Tahalele pocketed these tax reductions to the detriment of the state.

During the trial, it was revealed that the evidence seized by the prosecutor included a document outlining an agreement between the head of the Social Welfare Office and the aid distribution contractor. According to the Ministry of Social Affairs provisions, Rp 35.5 billion designated for the IDP must be handed over directly to the IDP without intermediaries. Every family should receive approximately Rp 4 million. As a result of the deductions noted above,

⁹ At this time, the North Maluku Province was only established and not yet effectively running, so that majority funds flowed through the parent province, Maluku Province.

the assistance received by victims was only Rp 500,000 to Rp 2.5 million per family. The corruption came to light when an aid recipient protested receiving a different amount of aid than other recipients had received.

Housing Assistance

Besides government offices and public facilities, private houses and places of worship suffered the most damage. Therefore, after the IDPs were returned to their places of origin, the central government began providing housing assistance to them. The implementation of this program varied; in Central Halmahera, for example, the regency government assisted in the form of prefabricated houses. In other places, assistance was given in the form of materials for housing construction. Other stimulants included paying workers and laborer's their wages through the local district head.

The Indonesian government's IDP repatriation fund included a financial aid package of Rp 176 billion, with Rp 500,000 (approximately USD 50) earmarked for each family. Additionally, the provincial government allocated a budget to help the IDP rebuild houses that were destroyed during the conflict, designating Rp 7.5 million for each family. In an interview with the author, several IDP said they received only Rp 500,000 from the government and, after they returned to their houses, the government also gave them a limited number of materials for reconstruction. For example, in Popilo village, an IDP said he received only 25 bags of cement, 50 iron sheeting, bricks, sand, plywood, nails, and wood. However, no money was given. The differences in types of assistance between Central Halmahera and Tobelo were due to the policies of each regency/city. These policies were made based on agreements with the IDP. For example, the IDP in Central Halmahera refused to return to their area of origin before the damage to their homes was repaired and until their homes were ready to be occupied.

Additionally, the victims claimed they should have received another Rp 3.9 million. One victim said he had to sell some of his building materials for Rp 800,000 because he needed cash more than the supplies.¹⁰ When the victims arrived from the IDP camps, all they received was Rp 500,000 in food allowance and materials mentioned above. They were not aware of the additional assistance that the government claimed to have distributed.

Moreover, providing housing assistance to the IDP raised new problems. First, it caused social jealousy among residents who were not displaced. For some of the IDP, receiving

¹⁰ Interview with Hasli Barondes and Udin, Popilo residents, 25 February 2018.

housing assistance allowed them to have houses in better condition than before the conflict. Second, some of the IDP had beautiful houses before the conflict but afterwards, almost all of them had houses of the same type because of the government assistance.

Importantly, this housing assistance was also used by certain people as an opportunity to earn benefit from the IDP. For example, many families who left their homes to stay at temporary camps in the neighboring provinces and regencies were fooled by unsavory characters benefitted from the chaotic situation. In some cases, the IDP who moved temporarily received several phone calls from individuals who reported that their house had been burnt down and offered to buy their land cheaply.

Kompas (2008) shared stories about the misfortunes and the fate of the IDP. One story was about the Lesomar family, who had a house in Ubo-ubo, Ternate. During the conflict, the family was separated. Lesomar fled to Bitung, North Sulawesi, while Lesomar's father fled to Tual, Maluku. In Tual, the father was contacted by someone who reported that the family's house had burnt down. Then, his father received an offer to purchase their land for Rp 11 million with a down payment of Rp 9 million. A few months after their family reunited back in Ternate, they discovered that their house was still intact but was occupied by someone else.

The same scam also was perpetrated on Simon Rumangun, an IDP from Ubo-ubo. In the IDP camp in Bitung, many people came to tell Rumangun that his family's home in Ternate had burnt down. Rumangun claimed that many of the IDP sold their houses cheaply because they needed money to pay for living expenses in the IDP camp. When Lesomar and Rumangun returned to Ternate, the government placed them in a former warehouse known as *Gudang Bimoli*.

A Legitimate Concern with Fairness

The post-conflict distribution of fund was another problem. In the case of North Halmahera, the authority to distribute this large fund was entrusted to local elites who held public positions such as Namotemo (before elected as the regent of North Halmahera, he was district head or *camat* in Tobelo). Coincidentally, the local elites who were holding this public office were also the same elite that led a conflicting party in the 1999-2002 conflict. There was a high probability that these local elites would priorities aid funds for their groups. Hence, this practice was dangerous in maintaining peace in North Maluku because the victims of conflicts and the IDPs were not coming from a particular group.

There was another concern about this practice; if the funds are maxed-out, there is a possibility for the conflicting party to return to the conflict. Local elites could also use the legitimate concern of fairness linked to the distribution of funds as a significant boost of material to keep their loyal supporters happy. Hence, it should be noted that this fund distribution process managed by the same elites during the conflicts could set a dangerous precedent for those who lean towards violence. When their funds began to run out, there was a high possibility that these people quickly returned to violence. The post-conflict funds also attracted the local elites who wanted to monopolise the funds and use it for their benefit. The elites exploited the funds as an opportunity to attract sympathy and gain influence from the people for the sake of their political campaigns. These funds could be used as leverage and to attract their loyal supporters.

These are developments not only seen in North Halmahera. Murid Toni Rio explains that, during the conflict, the local elites were not only passive to wait for aid to arrive.¹¹ Rather, these local elites actively sent out proposals to several institutions in Jakarta to ask for funding and assistance. During the conflict, Murid and two other journalists (Herman Oesman and Kasman Hi Ahmad) sent out proposals for funding and several agencies agreed to help them. Murid claimed that their organisation received around 250 million rupiahs during the post-conflict period. They used the funds for their groups (fellow journalists and activists) and the funds were used to buy basic needs (mainly foods) to the IDP in Ternate. Moreover, with this funding, Murid, Kasman and Herman are well-known in the Ternate community. Currently, Murid and Herman are lecturers at the University of Khairun, Ternate. On the other hand, Kasman was a former Chancellor of the North Maluku Muhammadiyah University in Ternate. Kasman also ran as a candidate for regent in North Halmahera. Kasman was ranked second, under Hein Namotemo.

The New Capital City, Territorial Splits, and Infrastructure Projects

Two essential policies significantly affected the peace. First was the decision to move the provincial capital from Ternate to Sofifi, and second was the implementation of regional autonomy in North Maluku (Tempo, 1999b and Kompas, 2010b). Moving the capital from Ternate to Sofifi arguably would affect economic behaviour of the people of North Maluku.

¹¹ Recorded interview with Murid Toni Rio, 5 March 2018. Murid is a lecturer at Ternate State Islamic Institute (*Institute Agama Islam Negeri Ternate*/IAIN Ternate) and the University of Khairun. In the early years of peace, he was a journalist and an activist.

As discussed in the previous chapter, Ternate was the centre of trade and government centre in North Maluku. During the conflict, Ternate was one of the worst affected areas after Tobelo. Many public and private facilities were destroyed in Ternate, and many victims died from attacks in Ternate. Besides, Ternate was a temporary place for Muslim IDP. Hence, all of the reasons made Ternate a place of melting-pot of hatred, trauma, and also fear that was not entirely disappeared from the people of North Maluku.

The relocation capital city was one of the agreements made between the Sultanate of Ternate and Tidore during the conflict as explained in Chapter 3. Tidore felt that Ternate had dominated the trade and handled the provincial governance for the last several decades since Indonesian independence. At the beginning, the Sultanate of Tidore proposed the island of Tidore as a candidate for new capital, but this proposal was rejected by many parties, especially Ternate and other areas on Halmahera Island. Tidore Island is remote and far from other cities. Subsequently, the Sultanate of Tidore decided Sofifi as the new capital. Sofifi was chosen because of the city located in the middle of Halmahera Island.

Moreover, the formal decision to relocate the capital to Sofifi was made after peace talks at the national and local levels. At that time, the government officials offered two solutions to end the conflict in North Maluku. First, they suggested that the capital cities be moved away from the conflict zones, and second, they proposed the use of the military to secure the conflict zones. Des Alwi, who once headed up a special delegation to end the crisis in Maluku, suggested that one solution would be to move the capital from Ambon and Ternate.¹² Both cities experienced the disastrous results of the deadly conflict between 1999 and 2001. In March 1999, the Indonesian police reported that 18 mosques, 18 churches, 3,544 houses, 338 shops, one cinema, 11 government offices, and three hotels were destroyed in Maluku and North Maluku. Public services were lacking because of the destruction of many government buildings, and the conflict escalated rapidly. Moving the capital city, which later became the central hub of the government and economy, was seen as a step toward burying the past.

However, the relocation of the capital of North Maluku from Ternate to Sofifi in the North Oba district, Tidore, remained uncertain in the early years of the peace period. Development and repairs of infrastructure—such as government buildings, roads, electricity,

¹² The relocation of the capital of North Maluku Province from Ternate to Sofifi was officially finished on August 4, 2010. It was postponed long after the deadline which was set to move on 2006. The official transfer was carried out by President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. The relocation of the capital of the North Maluku Province as stipulated in Law No.46 of 1999 concerning the Expansion of the Province of North Maluku was due to several factors such as the economy and public security. Sofifi is located in the centre of Halmahera and expected to become a city hub for other regions. It was expected that agricultural products would be evenly supplied to other small districts and regions in Halmahera once the capital of North Maluku Province moved to Sofifi.

and telecommunications—lagged. The provincial government had been working on the project since 2003 and planned to finish it in 2005. However, in 2004, only 50% of the governor’s offices were suitable for occupancy.¹³ No electricity or telecommunications facilities were operable yet. Since the provincial government employees had to relocate to Sofifi as well, employee housing also had to be built.¹⁴ Due to these delays, the official relocation finally took place in August 2010.

One side effect of the relocation of the capital city was that the price of land in Sofifi increased dramatically from Rp 5,000 per square meter to Rp 30,000. A majority of the sales were to speculators who offered to buy plantation lands located near the capital. Sofifi is located in the centre of Halmahera island, which can be reached by speedboat in one hour from Ternate at a rate of Rp 50,000 per person.¹⁵

Besides relocating the capital, the implementation of regional autonomy also led to the expansion of comprehensive districts and sub-district (*Kelurahan*) areas. As shown in the table 5 below, with the creation of new regencies in 2003, on average, each regency had less than ten districts. Currently, there are more than fifteen districts in each regency and South Halmahera regency with the highest growth from nine to thirty districts. This increase of district administrations led to the spread of opportunities to gain power at the lower levels such as districts and sub-districts or villages. This expansion of the districts was intended to accommodate the power of the local elites who were involved in the 1999-2002 conflict. Each local elite was persuaded to hold a position as the head of districts and sub-districts to maintain the peace at the local level.

Regencies/Cities	Number of districts/ <i>kecamatan</i>	
	2003	Present
North Halmahera	9	17
South Halmahera	9	30

¹³ Interview with Herman Oesman, 4 February 2018. Interview with Abdullah Totona, 20 February 2018. Interview with Rosydan Arby, 20 February 2018. Interview with Gunawan, 25 February 2018.

¹⁴ After long overdue, a total of 96 official housing units belonging to the civil servants of the North Maluku provincial government were finally inaugurated by the Governor of North Maluku, Abdul Gani Kasuba on 13 September 2018. This project has been postponed for more than 12 years.

¹⁵ In 2014, the North Maluku Provincial Government issued a free ferry policy for employees living in Ternate. This policy enabled employees to remain in Ternate instead of moving to Sofifi. As per the schedule, the ferry belonging to the provincial government brought employees from Ternate to Sofifi at 06.00 and returned from Sofifi to Ternate at 15.00. There are many reasons for employees not to move permanently to Sofifi. One of them is that they have built permanent houses in Ternate and do not intend to build more houses in Sofifi. Secondly, Sofifi has not become an attractive magnet for employees and their families because Sofifi still lacks public facilities, ranging from education, health, to recreation.

Sula Islands	6	12
East Halmahera	4	10
Tidore Islands	5	3

Table 5. The comparison of districts in North Maluku regencies between 2003 and present. Author's documentation.

The establishment of several new regencies in North Maluku province provided unintended impacts towards the process of peacebuilding in North Maluku. It made some areas that were severely damaged by the conflict more stable because the local elites there were preoccupied with power struggles in the new territory. Also, new regencies automatically required more funds from the Indonesian government besides the aid and assistance, as illustrated in the previous section. These funds were managed by elected leaders so that almost all local elites were fighting to lead the new districts.

For example, in North Halmahera Regency, the first Regent Hein Namotemo was allegedly abusing his authority with corruption by taking regional budget funds from 2004-2010 to reach billions of rupiah. The corruption was conducted by marking up the salaries of civil servants, community development funds from the mining company PT. Nusa Halmahera Mining, and the salaries of civil servant candidates.¹⁶ Hein Namotemo was also accused of doing corruption before serving as North Halmahera Regent. During his duty as Head of Fisheries and Maritime Affairs of North Halmahera Regency, he was accused of corruption and embezzlement, but the case was not investigated up by the police.¹⁷

In an interview, Hein Namotemo explained that corruptions that happened after the conflict was an administrative error and did not have malicious intentions for corruption. Namotemo said, as a new regency, many financial procedures were foreign and unfamiliar to the regional civil servants so that there were many leaks in the management of regional budgets.¹⁸ It was nothing but a justification for committing corruption because this happened in the first five years of the formation of North Halmahera regency. Namotemo implicitly stated that he allowed corruption to occur for five years so that the local elite who were also the main actors in the conflict would benefit financially in the administrative error.

¹⁶ This allegation originates from the findings of national anticorruption non-governmental organisations (NGO) called LIRA (*Lambung Informasi Rakyat*) based on information from their local representative in North Halmahera.

¹⁷ Interview with Fany D., a local journalist in Tobelo, North Halmahera. 24 February 2018.

¹⁸ Interview with Namotemo, Tobelo, North Halmahera, 26 February 2018.

Blunders in the administration of regional government also happened with the effortless concession of mining permits. Many customary lands in North Halmahera granted mining permits to the national and international companies. The effortless concession of mining permits in North Halmahera during 2003-2004 became a model for mining permits in other districts in North Maluku. According to the Indonesian Forum for Environment (*Wahana Lingkungan Hidup-WALHI*) and several local NGOs, there were around 24 mining licenses that were suspected problematic and linked to the issue of corruption in the regional and provincial levels.¹⁹

Rebuilding the Conflict-torn Province with Corruption

As a former conflict area, North Maluku earned huge aid funds with minimal supervision, which resulted in vast opportunities for corruption. From 2002 through 2003, there seemed to be an understanding between local elites and law enforcement that investigating the issue of corruption can lead to new violence and conflict in society. In fact, in North Halmahera, questions about corruption resulted in community tensions and the use of violence was able to hinder or delay investigations into corruption related to the use of post-conflict funds.

When North Maluku started its post-conflict rebuilding, the country's powerful anti-corruption agency, named Corruption Eradication Commission (*Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi—KPK*) was yet established as it began working in 2004. KPK is located only in Jakarta and does not have regional branches. At that time, its personnel were also limited. Hence, the corrupt practices were essentially uncontrollable in North Maluku. Besides the violence directed at the investigators, the investigation stalled because of the suspected corrupt bribed the local branch of the prosecutor's office; the judge was targeted as well. As a result, numerous corruption cases remain uninvestigated at this date.²⁰

However, the impunity for grand corruption only remained until late 2007. The shift to intolerance in corruption practices began when numerous corruption investigations were

¹⁹ Recorded interview with Mahmud Ici, Head of North Maluku Alliance of Independent Journalists (*Aliansi Jurnalis Independen-AJI*), 17 September 2018. Recorded interview with Munadi Kilkoda, head of the Indigenous Peoples' Alliance of the Archipelago (*Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara-AMAN*), 17 September 2018. Interview with Siti Barora, member of Environmental Ally Association (*Lembaga Mitra Lingkungan-LML*), 10 September 2018.

²⁰ In 2007, the provincial prosecutor's office launched a corruption investigation into whether a high-ranking official allegedly skimmed off funds during the creation of the provincial parliament office. Suspicion of corruption in the provincial budget for 2006 was Rp 9 billion at first, but the amount massively increased to Rp 47 billion and to Rp 57 billion. The investigation into this corruption had impact on the stability of North Maluku because, after the violence ended in 2002 it returned again in 2007-2008, especially during the election process.

initiated by the KPK, police, and the provincial prosecutor's office. First, there was a new initiation to investigate an allegation of corruption in the misuse of regional budget. Second, we saw the case of investigating corruption in the construction of the main road in the Sula Islands Regency. Third, there was an investigation to the alleged corruption in the construction of Morotai Regional General Hospital. Fourth, the case of corruption in misuse of the budget allowance for school principals and supervisors at the Youth and Sports Education Department in East Halmahera Regency was revealed.

The local elites were reacted by fighting back and using violence as a political strategy so that their corruption cases would not be investigated. The use of violence worked effectively in the past to deflect investigation into corruption, and they hoped that it would work again this time. However, the use of violence was not as immense as before because this time, the religious sentiment was not involved. The riots were often linked and initiated by loyal supporters who received the funds during the early post-conflict period. The counterwork of local elites towards corruption investigation typically took the form of mass demonstrations that led to violence; for example, the destruction of public facilities and official residence by Molotov cocktails as shown in the picture below.



Picture 7. Molotov cocktail attacks to the residence of head of Ternate's High Court (*Pengadilan Tinggi-PT*) and to the Mayor's office in Ternate. Picture from Erwin Syam/Malut Post.

There was also the case that local elites intentionally protected officials in the regency government who were convicted for corruption. In the period 2002-2003, there were twelve civil servants convicted in corruption who have not been fired until now. These twelve officers were not fired because they still had family relations with the local elites who led the district in North Halmahera. According to the Chief of North Maluku Provincial Police, Brigadier General Achmat Juri,²¹ until today, there are about thirteen corruption cases reported by the public, which allegedly involved officials and former officials in the local government, as well as businessmen in North Maluku. From the thirteen cases, ten cases were transferred to the Prosecutor's Office, two cases are still under investigation, and one case in administrative procedure. These cases include the alleged misuse of funds to expand the 6.5 km connecting road using the South Halmahera regency's budget. Then there were reports of allegations of misuse of budget funds: at the Bobong Airport; the Sula Islands Grand Mosque with the suspect Ahmad Hidayat Mus; and the procurement of the Department of Energy and Mineral Resources of North Maluku Province.

Clearly the corruption became a powerful instrument for post-conflict elites to consolidate their power and it effectively facilitated the new form of elite power-sharing in North Maluku. It is an irony that corruption, not democratic accountability, played an important role in the making of elite power-sharing and helped stabilize the situation, especially in the early years of post-conflict.

The peace agreements both at the local and national levels—the Mamuya accord and the Malino II peace agreement, which were discussed in the previous chapter—did not specifically mention power-sharing as a strategy for post-conflict solutions. However, the assessment among local elites proved just the opposite: Power-sharing became one of the unwritten settlements between the two parties in the conflict, making the peace in North Maluku delicate and temporary.²² The sharing of power could help to promote and ‘buy out’ the peace among the warring parties.

Several commanders during the conflict later became local elites and leaders. Muhammad Albar was a key person on the Muslim guerrilla front known as Galela-Tobelo. During the conflict, Albar was an intermediary for Ternate businessmen running projects in

²¹ Interview with Achmat Juri, Chief of North Maluku Provincial Police, 21 February 2018.

²² Interview with Herman Oesman, 4 February 2018. Interview with Kasman Hi. Ahmad, 7 February 2018. Interview with Yanuardi Syukur, 9 August 2017. Interview with Agus Salim Bujang, 14 February 2018. Interview with Hasli Barondes, 8 February 2018.

North Halmahera. For the past two decades, Albar's social status has risen and he currently owns a large agricultural company and other businesses. Another commander was Zadrak Tongo-Tongo; known as one of the leaders of the Christian guerrillas, he became a member of the provincial parliament in 2004 and then a member of the regency parliament in 2009. Benny Doro, acknowledged as one of the bravest leaders among the Christian guerrillas, became a security leader for PT. Nusa Halmahera Mineral (PT NHM), a gold mine in North Halmahera. Lastly, Abdul Gani Kasuba²³ is a Muslim preacher who helped organise recruitment and transportation of *jihadists* to Tobelo. Abdul Gani Kasuba is the current governor of North Maluku. The rise of these figures cannot be simplified as a traditional outcome of political patronage and networking; arguably, the roles they played in the post-conflict period also determined their access to jobs and networks.

The economic benefits few elites achieved were based on the dominance and control of natural resources in their area. For example, in the North Halmahera, Benny Doro managed to become part of a mining company under PT NHM. Zadrak Tongo-Tongo, who has been a member of the local parliament for the past two decades has political power and influence to grant mining permits in several locations in North Halmahera. For example, among the Mede Village, Ruko Village, and Popilo Village, there is a sand mine and its permission is explicitly given to Ruko Village which is dominantly inhabited by Christians.²⁴ Popilo residents who are Muslim are banned from mining sand in the Mede River. It is strongly suspected that the permission in the sand mining business is controlled by the Head of the North Popilo Village, Alfred Bitjara (Alfred is the family of Benny Bitjara or known as Benny Doro).

Economic injustice has also been apparent in Muslim villages. In the Galela area, only Muslims are entitled to manage sand mines and geothermal water tourism. Christians cannot participate in the management of tourist sites and mines. This political and economic apartheid has been supported by local elites.

Summary

²³ During the conflict, Abdul Gani Kasuba was known as a religious leader who gave blessings to the Muslims before they went to the war, which they claimed as their way of *jihad*. Abdul Gani Kasuba taught the fighters how to perform *jihad*. He specifically explained the elements of *jihad* and the obligations during the fighting such as not to kill elders or children, not to touch pregnant women, and to respect the environment and not destroy it. There was also an archery training on how to use the bow and arrow during the fighting.

²⁴ Interview with Hasli Barondes, 8 February 2018.

This chapter discussed the early years of peace, examining what happened in 2002-2003. During this period, North Maluku received overwhelming flow in aid and assistance to help rebuild North Maluku after years of conflict. The conflict that happened in 1999-2002 destroyed many houses and public facilities such as hospitals, schools, and holy sites such as mosques and churches. It is reported that until March 1999, 18 mosques, 18 churches, 3,544 houses, 338 shops, a cinema, 11 government offices, and three hotels were destroyed. The conflict also resulted in approximately 132,571 people being relocated from their houses and families. Displacement led to changes in livelihood among the IDP, and Ternate and North Halmahera were two districts which had most IDP.

The Indonesian government allocated Rp 119 billion to help the IDP to return home. Besides the IDP's fund, the government also allocated Rp 176 billion for the IDP repatriation fund to help the IDP to build their houses destroyed during the conflict. North Maluku also received approximately Rp 1.1 trillion for the acceleration of development recovery of Maluku and North Maluku in post-conflict especially in the economic, political, security, development, people's welfare, and rehabilitation programs. In North Maluku, these aid relieved tensions in society. The aid could help improve people's capacities to withdraw from fighting and find peaceful solutions to their problems.

However, the overwhelming flow of aid to North Maluku created unintended consequences, namely the region's dependency on the aid. Post-conflict funds were used to silence those who were considered a major risk to peace in the area. This set a dangerous precedent for those who leaned towards violence. When their funds began to run out, these people quickly returned to violence to ensure a continuous supply of support. The post-conflict funds also attracted the local elites who wanted to monopolise the funds. These funds could be used as leverage and to attract their loyal supporters to remain in the patronage network.

Moreover, the overwhelming flow in aid and assistance in conflict zone created a 'friendly' environment, which was ideal for corruption since the conflict zone had weak administrative institutions as well as broken legal-judicial systems, causing a lack of capacity to investigate and enforce prohibitions of corrupt behaviour effectively. In North Maluku, the massive influx of aid and assistance was exploited by the local elites who were leaders/commanders during the conflict. Moreover, impunity for grand corruption in the early years of peace played an essential role in stabilizing the situation. Feeding the local elites who were previously the commanders with aid and assistance and allowing them to distribute the assistance as they like, somewhat helped to reduce tension in the early years of peace. However, this practice, in the long run, could undermine democratic governance. In this sense, we could

say that the peace was built on the cost of democratic deficit. In a few years, this practice would lead to the creation of local kings since they could maintain their loyal supporters using the money from the assistance, as we will see in the following chapters.

North Maluku's local elites were also using past trauma as an excuse to move the capital city for infrastructure projects. Moving the capital city was seen as a step toward burying the past. However, this presented only a short-term solution and would relocate the problem, not end it. The project to move the capital remained uncertain in the early years of peace, and development of infrastructure—such as government buildings, roads, electricity, and telecommunications—lagged. This project started to kick off in 2003 and planned to finish it in 2005. But the official relocation took place in 2010, five years behind schedule. With this delay, we saw how officials and local elites were able to seek profits.

We also examined how corruption flourished when laws and institutions were not fully functional. Bribery, nepotism, embezzlement, extortion, and selling influence could thrive in the early years of post-conflict. KPK was established in 2002 but it became active since 2004. In North Maluku, the anti-corruption only came in late 2007 and early 2008 when numerous corruption investigations were initiated by the KPK, police, and the provincial prosecutor's office. The local elites were fighting back and using violence as a political strategy so that their corruption cases would not be investigated. The violence worked effectively in the past to deflect investigation into corruption. Local elites viewed this approach as an opportunity to exploit economic benefits. Muhammad Albar, Zadrak Tongo-Tongo, Benny Doro, and Abdul Gani Kasuba are examples of local elites who used this approach to expand their political and business networks. The roles they played in the post-conflict period allowed them to grow access to jobs and network for business and politics.

Chapter 6

Democratic Elections and Local Power Shifts: The Decline of Traditional Power and the Birth of Political Empire

Introduction of direct election for the presidency in 2004 was a significant political reform aiming to deepen the country's democratization in the post-Soeharto era. It was Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono who won the first direct presidential election. In order to accelerate the democratic deepening at the local level, political elites introduced the system of direct regional heads elections by amending the existing law. With this change, not only the presidency but also local government heads such as governors, regency heads, and mayors were popularly elected, and their elections started since 2005. This amendment created a fundamental change at the local level, and its impact reached more than 500 regencies across Indonesia.

This chapter examines the post-conflict power shift, triggered both by the introduction of administrative decentralization in 2001 and the introduction of direct local heads elections since 2005. How did decentralization impact the post-conflict political dynamics in North Maluku? How have the local elites in North Maluku built and maintained their power in the age of direct elections? We are going to investigate these questions in this chapter. First, we look at the practice and dynamics of decentralization and local autonomy in North Maluku. We then discuss the direct local elections that brought major shifts in the political structure. Finally, we analyze the emergence of new political power in North Maluku.

Decentralization and Local Autonomy in North Maluku

Democratic reform marked by the resignation of President Soeharto in 1998, became an inspiration to introduce decentralization in Indonesia as the country had been dominated by the highly centralized authoritarian regime. With the decentralization policy, as mandated by Law No.22 of 1999 and Law No.32 of 2004, local governments gained autonomy to manage their economic policies and budget allocations. Through regional autonomy, the local governments were expected to implement development projects that were more in line with the unique characteristics of the region. For the people in North Maluku, regional autonomy became a hope for the post-conflict society.

Furthermore, the implementation of decentralization boosts the enthusiasm of local elites to participate actively in electoral politics, including the sultans. Some elites started their political career by joining in a political party, while the sultan already established his political career early by supported the Party of Functional Groups (hereinafter referred to as Golkar Party) during the President Soeharto regime. In the early years of decentralization, those who were actively involved in electoral politics were divided into three main groups. They were the elites who fought during the conflict, the local actors who controlled/managed the aid assistance, and the sultans. In addition to Sultan Mudaffar, President Soeharto's former minister, Abdul Gafur was also interested in becoming the governor of North Maluku. Besides, there were also local bureaucrats such as Thaib Armaiyn and Madjid Abdullah.

Moreover, the struggle over power in North Maluku started after the establishment of North Maluku as a province in 1999, and it was a competition between Sultan Mudaffar Sjah and Bahar Andili, a bureaucrat who held several important public positions there. Between 1999-2001, these two elites had several disputes as they attempted to wield political influence over the people. Mudaffar was the direct representative of the sultan of Ternate while Andili was strongly supported by the sultan of Tidore. Therefore, the disputes between these two elites were strongly linked to the conflict between two sultanates.

In terms of political representation, Mudaffar was a member and also a head of his party's regional executive board (i.e., Golkar Party's North Maluku Provincial Branch), while Andili was the elite of the United Development Party (hereinafter referred to as PPP). Besides the competition among two sultanates, disputes between elites in North Maluku in the early years of decentralization could be interpreted as competition of Muslim conservatives represented by Sultanate Tidore, Andili, and PPP against nationalist/secular progressives from Golkar Party and Mudaffar (Bubandt 2004).

However, Mudaffar lost his influence on majority of North Maluku people after the encirclement of the Sultan's palace in Ternate by the white army, and the palace was almost burned down by the mob as seen in Chapter 3. After the encirclement, the tension lessened. In regard to the political competition in North Maluku, it was no longer between Mudaffar and Andili because Andili died not long after and Mudaffar lost the respect of the people of North Maluku.¹

¹ There are many rumours surrounding the death of Bahar Andili. One was that he was poisoned, others said his death was caused by magic and a supernatural power sent by the sultan and Andili's political enemies. No medical or police reports were prepared upon Andili's death, but the family stated that Andili died due to health reasons (a heart attack); he was also known to be a diabetic.

After the death of Bahar Andili in September 2001, the political competition was between new players: Abdul Gafur and Thaib Armaiyn. Gafur was a minister during Soeharto's presidency, leading the ministry of youth and sports affairs in 1983-1988; he was also part of the People's Consultative Assembly (*Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat*–MPR)² from 1972 to 2009. Armaiyn had a more local background; he was a civil servant who spent his life in North Maluku. Armaiyn was a mayor of Ternate in 1982-1991 and was also the North Maluku administration's regional secretary before it became a province.

The involvement of Gafur in the competition to become the governor of North Maluku invited negative reactions especially from democratization activists. Gafur was considered part of Soeharto regime. According to indigenous people of Ternate,³ it was clear that Mudaffar supported Gafur's nomination, simply because they both came from Golkar Party, and Mudaffar (through his trustee) also assisted Gafur's campaign. Conversely, Armaiyn was from Makian, an island not far from Tidore. Early on, the sultanate of Tidore supported Armaiyn but later refused to endorse his nomination for governor because Armaiyn rejected the suggestion that Soasio, the capital of Tidore, become capital of the province of North Maluku.

North Maluku regional head elections started in 2001, took place in 3 rounds, and concluded at the end of 2002. The election was considered as one of Indonesia's most protracted elections, and the process was tiring, time and energy consuming. The practice of money politics and the central government intervention made this first election for North Maluku time-consuming. In 2001, Indonesia had not installed a regional autonomy and had not yet held direct elections that came later in 2004. In the first round, in July 2001, the North Maluku's local parliamentarians elected the pair of Abdul Gafur and Yamin Tawary (Kompas, 2002). However, these results were cancelled by the same parliament because of alleged money politics. Gafur was proven to have bribed two members of the parliament, Mohammad Safin from the Golkar Party and Muksin Sudara from the PPP.

In the first round, the central government did not have a stance on the local parliamentary decision; hence, the parliament held re-election on March 7, 2002. Thaib Armaiyn and Yamin Waisale won this re-election. In this second election, thousands of people organized a demonstration and demanded that Gafur and Tawary to be appointed as governors of North Maluku. However, the Ministry of Home Affairs cancelled the results of the second

² People's Consultative Assembly or in Indonesian known as *Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat* (MPR), During the Soeharto era, the MPR was the highest state institution. The MPR consists of members of the parliament (People's Representative Council, or Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat-DPR) plus representatives from the provinces and societies. MPR's role at that time was to elect the president and vice president.

³ Interviews with *masyarakat adat* Ternate and Bacan, 17 February 2018.

round of elections because when the elections were held in the parliament, members who voted were considered not enough or not quorum.

In the third round of election, Thaib Armaiyn and Prof. Madjid Abdullah were elected as a Governor and a Deputy Governor of North Maluku for the period 2002-2007 (Tempo, 2003). The election was conducted on 28 October 2002, In the election, Armaiyn and Abdullah were supported by Golkar Party and Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (hereinafter referred to as PDI-P) Armaiyn defeated the pair of Sujud Sirajuddin-Madjid Abdullah. In this election, the pair of Thaib Armaiyn and Madjid Abdullah earned 22 votes from the 45 members of North Maluku parliament (Tempo, 2003). Gafur was not happy with the result and filed a lawsuit at the Jakarta State Administrative Court against the decisions of the Minister of Home Affairs, Hari Sabarno and North Maluku provincial parliament. Gafur demanded the Minister of Home Affairs to suspend/postpone the implementation of the election for the Governor and Deputy Governor of North Maluku. He lost the lawsuit, and in November 2002, Armaiyn and Abdullah inaugurated as the governor and the vice governor of North Maluku.

Moreover, Armaiyn's inauguration as the new Governor of North Maluku in November 2002 could be understood as the dawn of the transfer of traditional power to new leadership through a democratic system. The former traditional power which controlled North Maluku and was dominated by the four sultanates for centuries started to disappear from this period of 2002.

After the provincial legislative body elected the governor in 2002, North Maluku fully started to enjoy the age of decentralization. The expanded powers granted to local governments were designed to improve the quality of public services at the local level and to promote greater participation in governance. From a political perspective, decentralization was believed to improve the quality of democracy. However, in reality, what we saw in North Maluku was the emergence of novel forms of identity politics. Before decentralization, those who were close to the sultans were considered one step ahead of others during political contests because they had the blessing of the sultan. This was a valuable electoral boost and served as important social capital during political contests since sultan as an indigenous leader had loyal supporters. However, since 2002, the blessing of the sultan was no longer fundamental because of open competition among the elites in the age of democratic election. The blessings from sultans were just considered a bonus for a candidate to attract loyal indigenous people, especially elderly and those who had emotional attachments towards the sultan. The role of sultan in the community greatly diminished since sultan had no longer power to control the budget, hence, sultan could not provide subsidies in form of money.

While the role of sultans declined, we saw a growing significance of identity politics based on local ethnicities, with the majority being Makian, Tobelo Galela, and Ternate. These identities became prominent during election campaigns. Makian candidates started to use Makian language; the same could be found for Tobelo and Ternate candidates. The same strategy was employed to choose a running mate in the election. This transition of power took place between 2002-2006 and it was marked by the excessive use of ethnic identity in political campaigns, government campaigns, slogans, and posters, and sometimes the use of discrimination and violence towards certain ethnicity (Kompas, 2010a).

In tandem with the rise of ethnicity politics in the age of decentralization, we saw the worsening corruption in North Maluku. Decentralization enhanced the opportunity for corruption in local governments. It was partly a consequence of having plenty of infrastructure projects in the regions. For example, the designation of Sofifi as the capital of North Maluku resulted in many infrastructure projects in the city, including provincial government offices, official residences, schools, health facilities, roads, and the port. These projects all cost a great deal of money, making them prone to corruption.⁴

Another serious problem after decentralization in North Maluku was the lack of supervision, both from the central government and also from the watchdog communities. To achieve a high-quality local autonomy, tight supervision and sharp criticism from the civil society were needed. Without strong civil society institutions, it is difficult to achieve practices of good governance (Usman, 2002). To some extent, the quality of democratization relies on critical thinking from the activists toward local government policies. In the case of North Maluku, the local government embraced the civil society and invited them to collaborate on several government projects. These collaborations somehow affected the independence of civil society and watchdog organizations. The same situation occurred with journalists and a few student organizations in North Maluku. The provincial government invited them to collaborate on some projects, which negatively affected to their independence.

Elections and Violence

After the peace agreement in 2002, violence continued to break out every five years, especially during the elections for provincial and regencies' leaders. Conflicts emerged and disappeared in the years 2003, 2007, 2013, and 2018. Although there have not been as many

⁴ See chapter 5 for more details.

casualties as there were during the conflict between 1999 and 2002, this periodical violence has raised regional tension and created a tense atmosphere for some time. The violence occurs during periods of elections, starting during the candidates' nominations and extending throughout the campaign period, the mandatory three-day 'quiet period', voting day, and the vote count. Tensions have remained steady during the legislative election.

For the past ten years, politically, North Maluku has been controlled by two families: Kasuba and Mus family. They are initially from two different ethnic groups, Kasuba from the majority of the native ethnic group called Tobelo Galela and Mus family from the immigrant ethnic group named as Bugis, Buton, and Makassar. On the political environment, the two families are coming from the opposite background. Mus family has strong ties to the Golkar party.⁵ On the other hand, Kasuba family members have raised as cadres, sympathizers, and supporters of Justice and Prosperity Party (hereinafter referred to as PKS).⁶

These backgrounds mentioned are considered compatible to the geographical, social, and political circumstances in North Maluku and became their main selling points in every election (at the provincial and regency level) for the past ten years.

According to the 2018 statistics from the North Maluku Central Bureau of Statistics, the total population of North Maluku is around 1.2 million. Around 20% of the population in North Maluku are Tobelo Galela. Around 9% of the population are Ternate; 8% are Makian; 7% are Tidore; around 7% are Bugis Buton Makassar; around 7% are Sula; and around 4% are Javanese. The rest of the population comprises other small ethnic groups such as Patani, Loloda, Kao, Bajo, and Chinese. The elections of governors and legislators in North Maluku have been determined by ethnic majority support. Hence, frequently, the candidates from ethnic majority often win the political competitions.

Regencies/Cities	Population in 2017
West Halmahera	114,502
Central Halmahera	52,813
Sula Islands	99,196
South Halmahera	227,280
North Halmahera	187,104
East Halmahera	90,070

⁵ Golkar party is known as a large-secular-nationalist political party in Indonesia.

⁶ PKS is known as an Islam-based political party.

Morotai Islands	64,001
Taliabu Islands	51,928
Ternate	223,111
Tidore Islands	99,337
Total	1,209,342

Table 6. Population of North Maluku in 2017. Source: North Maluku Statistic (*Badan Pusat Statistic-BPS Malut*)

As explained above, the struggle for power in the post-conflict North Maluku began in 2002 and intensified through 2003 when another campaign started for the general elections in April 2004. At the time, the campaign revolved around a socio-political battle between ethnic groups in North Maluku. For example, in the 2004 legislative election, the ethno-political battle was between the Makian, Ternate, Tobelo Galela, Bugis Buton Makassar, and Tidore ethnic communities.⁷ The majority of Ternate, Togale, and Tidore representatives won the legislative elections and were elected as members of parliament.

North Maluku's First Direct Gubernatorial Election in 2007

The year 2007 marked North Maluku's first ever direct local election. The election was an open competition between four pairs of candidates (for governor and vice-governor).⁸

⁷ From the author's observation, the voters in North Maluku often determine their representatives based on their ethnicity and personality rather than the political parties. In 2004, many small parties had their representatives at the provincial and even more at regencies' level. However, this phenomenon mainly happened in 2004 and 2009 elections. Since the 2014 election, many local elites switched and changed their political parties to the bigger ones such as Golkar, PDI-P, and Gerindra.

⁸ The four pairs of candidates were Abdul Gafur/Abdurrahim Fabanyo; Thaib Armaiyn/Abdul Gani Kasuba; Anthony Charles Sunarjo/Amin Drakel; and Irvan Edyson/Ati Ahmad.



Picture 8. An example of the 2007 North Maluku gubernatorial election ballot paper. Picture from Erwin Syam/Malut Post

During the registration period, five individuals registered as candidates for governor; however, one candidate failed because he did not have enough support of a political party. The Sultan of Ternate, Mudaffar Sjah, with his partner Rusdi Hanafi, did not meet the 2007 gubernatorial election administrative requirements. The Regional Election Commission (hereinafter referred to as KPUD) eliminated the pair from the candidacy because the party nominators did not reach the 15% threshold requirement.⁹ The Sultan's main supporters were from an indigenous community; they were disappointed and dissatisfied with the decision of the provincial KPUD. They started violence and clash with the police as they could not accept the KPUD's decision (see pictures 9&10 below). Conflicts and physical clashes between the Sultan's supporters and security forces broke out during the initial stages of the elections. The conflict continued throughout the registration period and spread widely after the voting period.

⁹ The threshold requirement at that time was the minimum support of 15% seats at the local parliament to be nominated as a regional head (governor/regency/mayor).



Picture 9&Picture 10. This incident happened on 22 August 2007. Police officers from the Mobile Brigade shot an indigenous community (loyal supporter of the Sultan of Ternate) that was violent during the clash between the traditional masses and the police. The violent lasted for two days and destroyed several public facilities in the city, including the Sultan Baabullah airport. Pictures from Erwin Syam/Malut Post.

The 2007 gubernatorial election in North Maluku was a battle of forces in politics and collaboration with the use of identity politics based on ethnicity. Thaib Armaiyn, who was backed by the PKS, the Democratic Party (*Partai Demokrat*, chaired by President Yudhoyono), the Reform Star Party (*Partai Bintang Reformasi-PBR*), the Crescent Star Party (*Partai Bulan Bintang-PBB*), the Concern for the Nation Functional Party (*Partai Karya Peduli Bangsa-PKPB*), and the National Awakening Party (*Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa-PKB*) was a former governor from Makian, South Halmahera. Armaiyn expected to have the support of the Makian ethnic group, one of the three major ethnic groups in North Maluku. Armaiyn's deputy, Abdul Gani Kasuba, relied on support from the Tobelo and the Galela ethnic groups, two large ethnic groups. They also received the political support of the Sultan of Ternate, which had the potential to gain votes from the people of Ternate.

Meanwhile, Gafur-Fabanyo, who were backed by the Golkar Party, relied on the support of the traditional masses from the Central Halmahera and East Halmahera regions. They were believed to have the support of Tidore, Patani, Weda, and Gane groups. They also received support from Syamsir Andili,¹⁰ who was known to have a close relationship with immigrants from Gorontalo, Buton, Bugis, and Java. The third pair, Anthony Charles Sunarjo-Amin Drakel, who were supported by PDI-P, a party chaired by ex-president Megawati Sukarnoputri, relied on the support of the ethnic group Sanana and several voters in the Halmahera Island, especially those living in remote areas. The last pair, Irvan Eddyson-Ati Achmad, who were supported by the Prosperous Peace Party (*Partai Damai Sejahtera-PDS*),

¹⁰ Syamsir Andili was the former mayor of Ternate from 2000-2010. Syamsir Andili is a younger brother of Bahar Andili.

the Indonesian National Party Marhaenism (*Partai Nasional Indonesia Marhaenism-PNI Marhaenism*), the Freedom Party (*Partai Merdeka*), the Party of New Indonesia (*Partai Indonesia Baru-PIB*), the Indonesian Justice and Unity Party (*Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan Indonesia-PKPI*), the Indonesian Democratic Vanguard Party (*Partai Penegak Demokrasi Indonesia-PPDI*), and the Indonesian Nahdlatul Community Party (*Partai Persatuan Nahdlatul Ummah Indonesia-PPNUI*), relied more on the traditional masses from Galela and Morotai (Kompas, 2009). The 2007 gubernatorial election accelerated ethnic identity politics in North Maluku. Since then, these dynamics became a new normal which could lead to dynastic politics based on ethnicity.

On 3 November 2007, the provincial KPUD decided that the winners of the 2007 election were Thaib Armaiyn and Abdul Gani Kasuba. The recapitulation of votes according to the provincial KPUD were as follows:

- Anthony Sunarjo-Drakel received 76,117 votes (15.88%).
- Thaib Armaiyn-Abdul Gani Kasuba received 179,020 votes (37.35%).
- Abdul Gafur-Abdurrahim Fabanyo received 178,157 votes (37.17%).
- Irvan Edyson-Ati Achmad received 45,983 votes (9.59%).

In an interview with the author, former chairman of the provincial KPUD of North Maluku, Rahmi Husein, explained that the decision to elect Thaib Armaiyn and Abdul Gani Kasuba as Governor and Deputy Governor of North Maluku caused problems because the controversy over the vote-counting affected three districts, namely Jailolo, Ibu Selatan, and Sahu Timur, all sub-districts located in West Halmahera Regency.¹¹ Husein claimed that the KPUD accused the regency KPUD of ballooning votes and vote-rigging.

This controversial decision caused a disturbance from the grassroots communities to the Minister of Home Affairs. The national-level Election Commission (hereinafter referred to as KPU RI) invited Rahmi Husein as the chairperson of the North Maluku KPUD to the KPU RI office in Jakarta for clarification. However, Husein refused to come and to answer to the KPU RI. As a result, the KPU RI had to deactivate two officials of the provincial KPUD:¹² Husein was stripped of his post as the chairman of the North Maluku KPUD, and Nurbaya Soleman lost his role as a provincial KPUD member. The KPU RI installed Mukhlis Tapitapi to replace Husein. The KPU RI claimed that Husein and Soleman were dismissed because they

¹¹ Recorded interview, Rahmi Husein, 6 February 2018.

¹² Recorded interview, Rahmi Husein, 6 February 2018.

breached the oath of the office. Moreover, the two KPUD officials were deemed as not complying with the instructions of the KPU RI in resolving the North Maluku election dispute.

Following Husein's deactivation, the KPU RI took over the tasks of North Maluku KPUD. On 20 November 2007, the KPU RI recalculated the results in Jakarta. After the plenary meeting on 22 November 2007, the KPU RI decided that the winners of the 2007 elections were the pair of Abdul Gafur and Abdurrahim Fabanyo, who got 181,998 votes. The other candidates received the following number of votes:

- Thaib Armaiyn-Abdul Gani Kasuba achieved 170,029 votes.
- The Anthony-Amin pair obtained 73,610 votes.
- The Irvan-Ati pair earned 45,983 votes

Candidates	KPUD Results (3 November 2007)	KPU RI Results (20 November 2007)
Anthony Charles Sunarjo/Amin Drakel	76,117 (15.88%)	73,610
Thaib Armaiyn-Abdul Gani Kasuba	179,020 (37.35%)	170,029
Abdul Gafur-Abdurrahim Fabanyo	178,157 (37.17%)	181,998
Irvan Edyson-Ati Ahmad	45,983 (9.59%)	45,983

Table 7. Comparison between KPUD results and KPU RI results. Source from KPUD North Maluku



Picture 11. Abdul Gafur and Abdurrahim Fabanyo when they climbed to the police car to conduct political speeches in front of thousands of supporting masses. In their speech Abdul Gafur and Abdurrahim Fabanyo responded to the decision made by the KPU RI and Gafur guaranteed his supporters that he is going to be the next governor. Gafur loyal supporters gathered to celebrate the decision made by the KPU RI which elected Gafur-Fabanyo as the winners of the 2007 gubernatorial election. Pictures from Erwin Syam/Malut Post.

Thaib-Kasuba opposed the KPU RI's decision and raised a dispute in the Supreme Court of Indonesia. At the same time, Thaib-Kasuba also disputed the KPU RI's decision to deactivate Husein and Soleman. On 22 January 2008, during the dispute hearing, the panel of Supreme Judges chaired by Paulus Effendy Lotulung decided to recalculate the vote in three sub-districts in West Halmahera Regency, namely Jailolo, Ibu Selatan, and Sahu Timur (Nazriyah, 2008).

The Supreme Court judges also ruled out the KPU RI's decision, which had presented Abdul Gafur and Abdurrahim Fabanyo as the winners. Moreover, the judges also saw the KPU RI's takeover of the tasks of the provincial KPUD as judicially flawed. With these decisions made by the Supreme Court, all of the KPU RI's decisions concerning the determination of regional heads and the deactivation of the performance of the provincial KPUD were cancelled.

Furthermore, the Supreme Court decided to cancel the recalculation of the results released by the KPU RI. They also commanded the provincial KPUD (led by Husein) to conduct a recalculation of the votes in the West Halmahera region. On 11 February 2008, the provincial KPUD, led by Rahmi Husein, re-counted the votes in the sub-districts of Ibu Selatan, Sahu Timur, and Jailolo in Jakarta. Abdul Gafur and Fabanyo were declared as the winners in

these three sub-districts, but overall, the North Maluku election was won by Thaib Armaiyn and Abdul Gani Kasuba.

However, the chairman of KPU RI, Abdul Hafiz Anshary considered the re-counted votes by Husein illegitimate because Husein had been dismissed from the office. At the same time, Anshary instructed Husein's replacement, Tapitapi, to organise a vote recount and named Gafur and Fabanyo the winners. As a consequence, there were two sets of recalculation results, and thus, two governors were elected at the same time.

As a result of these dual results, the Minister of Home Affairs requested a Supreme Court judgment on 26 February 2008 regarding the dual decisions made by the provincial KPUD and the KPU RI. Husein explained that the Ministry of Home Affairs was looking for the Supreme Court to legitimize the decision of the provincial KPUD and validate that they were following the rules before installing Armaiyn and Kasuba as the winners.¹³ On 10 March, the Supreme Court issued a judgement in response to the Minister of Home Affairs' request. In its answer, the Supreme Court assessed that the recalculations conducted by Rahmi Husein and concluded that they had met civil procedural law procedures.

After the results from the Supreme Court were released, the Ministry of Home Affairs transferred the decision to the provincial parliament so that the provincial parliament could install the elected governor based on the Supreme Court's decision. However, on 16 April, the provincial parliament held a plenary meeting in Ternate and decided to recommend Gafur and Fabanyo to be appointed as Governor and Vice Governor of North Maluku based on the recalculation conducted by Acting Chairman of the KPUD, Mukhlis Tapitapi. This decision was somewhat different to the recommendation sent out by the Minister of Home Affairs to the provincial parliament. However, on the same day, 15 others provincial parliament members who had not been present at the plenary meeting in the morning, held a separate meeting and recommended that Armaiyn and Kasuba be elected as governor and vice governor. In short, the electoral process that took place between 2007 and 16 April 2008 resulted in two decisions from provincial KPUD and two recommendations from the provincial parliament. The debate turned into a legal battle in the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court. This legal battle lasted until the end of September 2008.

After a lengthy legal process, the Minister of Home Affairs finally installed Thaib and Kasuba as elected governor and vice governor on 29 September 2008. Tensions rose between the supporters of both parties, and general tensions in North Maluku increased. The interests

¹³ Recorded interview, Rahmi Husein, 6 February 2018.

of the elite and the battle for power made both supporters increasingly emotional. Supporters of Armaiyn-Kasuba, who were mostly civil servants, welcomed the Supreme Court's decision (Picture 12 below). They celebrated happily on the streets and honored Armaiyn-Kasuba's victory by cutting off their hair (Picture 13 below). Meanwhile, Gafur-Fabanyo supporters were disappointed, and a number of their campaign leaders set fire to several parts of the city of Ternate (Picture 14 below).

The disputes in the North Maluku during the 2007 gubernatorial election were caused by the legal vacuum that resulted from the different interpretations by the election commissions (both KPU RI and provincial KPUD). the gubernatorial election in 2007 was also a battle of influence between the local and national levels. Nationally, it was a legal battle between the KPU RI and the Ministry of Home Affairs at the Supreme Court and Constitutional Court. The KPU RI tended not to fulfil the Ministry of Home Affairs' wishes and to protect the KPU's independence. Meanwhile, the Ministry of Home Affairs tended to favor Armaiyn-Kasuba because this pair was supported by parties that constituted the coalition government under President Yudhoyono, namely Democratic Party, PKS, and PKB. Armaiyn was also the chairman of the Democratic Party's North Maluku branch. It was thus understandable that the Ministry of Home Affairs chose to ensure the strength of government parties in the Eastern region, including North Maluku.



Picture 12&Picture 13. Civil servants' celebrations in front of the North Maluku Governor's office on 2 June 2008. They celebrated the victory of Thaib Armaiyn and Abdul Gani Kasuba when the Minister of Home Affairs announced it on 2 June 2008, based on MA's decision. This picture also shows several Civil Servants celebrated the victory of Thaib Armaiyn and Abdul Gani Kasuba by shaving their heads in front of the North Maluku Governor's office shortly after the announcement by Minister of Home Affairs, Mardiyanto. Pictures from Erwin Syam/Malut Post.









Picture 14. Disappointed Gafur-Fabanyo supporters burned down motorcycle taxi waiting spot. Picture from Erwin Syam/Malut Post

The Battle of Two Families in the North Maluku in the 2013 and 2018 Elections

After the first direct local head election in 2007, North Maluku conducted the second direct election in 2013. The gubernatorial election in 2013 involved six pairs of candidates aiming to win the second direct election in North Maluku (see table 8 below). The 2013 gubernatorial candidates were more diverse in terms of their origins. In the 2013 gubernatorial election, the Tobelo ethnic group was represented by Abdul Gani Kasuba, Sahrin Hamid, and Hein Namotemo. The candidates from Tidore ethnic group were represented by Syamsir Andili, Muhammad Natsir Thaib, Malik Ibrahim, and Hasan Doa. On the other hand, the Kayoa ethnic group was represented by Muhajir Albaar and Ismail Arifin. Namto Hui Roba and Benny Laos represented the ethnic Chinese. The ethnic Buton was represented by Ahmad Hidayat Mus. This diverse ethnic representation was closely related to political-economic dominance in North Maluku, and it was also characterized by a campaign method that relied heavily on identity politics.

North Maluku Governatorial Election 2013

Ballot Numbers	Candidates		Former Position	Party Alliance
1	Nominee:	Namto Hui Roba	 Former Regent of West Halmahera 2006-2016	The Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (<i>Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan-PDI-P</i>), the Regional Unity Party (<i>Partai Persatuan Daerah-PPD</i>), the National Front Party (<i>Partai Barisan Nasional-Barnas</i>)
	Running mate:	Ismail Arifin	 Former Head of the West Halmahera Regional Planning and Development Agency	
2	Nominee:	Muhajir Albaar	 Former Regional Secretary of North Maluku	Democratic Party (Demokrat), Crescent Star Party (PBB), and National Mandate Party (PAN).
	Running mate:	Sahrin Hamid	 Chairman of National Mandate Party of North Maluku	
3	Nominee:	Ahmad Hidayat Mus	 Former Regent of Sula Islands 2005-2015, Chairman of the Functional Groups Party of North Maluku	Party of Functional Groups (Golkar), People's Conscience Party (Hanura), United Development Party (PPP), Prosperous Peace Party (PDS), Concern for the Nation Functional Party (PKPB)
	Running mate:	Hasan Doa	 Former Regent of Central Halmahera 2002-2007	







4	Nominee:	Syamsir Andili		Former Mayor of Ternate from 2000-2010	Great Indonesia Movement Party (Gerindra)
	Running mate:	Benny Laos		Businessman, the current Regent of Morotai Islands	
5	Nominee:	Abdul Gani Kasuba		Former Vice Governor of North Maluku 2008-2013, Governor of North Maluku 2013-2018, and a Muslim preacher	Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), Republika Nusantara Party (RepublikaN), Democratic Nationhood Party (PDK), National Awakening Party (PKB), Indonesian Justice and Unity Party (PKPI), National People's Concern Party (PPRN)
	Running mate:	M. Natsir Thaib		Former Regent of East Halmahera 2003-2005	
6	Nominee:	Hein Namotemo		Former Regent of North Halmahera 2005-2015, leader of Christian community during peace talks	Independent
	Running mate:	Malik Ibrahim		Former head of the Ternate city Planning Agency	

Table 8. Candidates for North Maluku gubernatorial election in 2013.

Ethnic configuration in North Maluku is dispersed. For example, as you can see the map above, the Tobelo and Galela ethnic groups are not only dominant in North Halmahera regency and Morotai island, but also the majority in South Halmahera regency, partly in the north of East Halmahera regency and minority in Central Halmahera regency. While the ethnic Makian and Kayoa are also spread not only in the Makian and Kayoa islands, also distributed in Ternate, Sofifi, Malifut districts in North Halmahera, and partly in West Halmahera, on the other hand, the Tidore ethnic group is concentrated in the Tidore Islands, Maitara, Central and East Halmahera while the Buton ethnic group controls the Taliabu region. The ethnic Ternate centered on the Ternate Islands, and the ethnic Sula spread across Sanana, Mangoli, and several locations in Taliabu.

The signs of conflict due to political ethnicity reflect the failure of local political parties in developing institutions for democratic political contestations. In the 2013 gubernatorial election, six governor candidates had their approach in giving a message to the ethnicity they were targeting. The pair of Kasuba-Thaib always conveyed the opportunity to unite the three most significant ethnic groups in North Maluku, Tobelo, Galela and Tidore if their partners win. The pair of Mus-Doa candidates also succeeded in playing ethnic sentiments as they excelled in Sanana, Mangoli, Taliabu, Patani, and Gebe. The excessive use of identity politics meant that political parties at the local levels were not decisive in political contestations. The central figure became more dominant rather than political parties in North Maluku's local politics. The strength of figures from majority ethnic backgrounds with an advantage of financial strength determined the voters' choices.

In the 2013 election, Mus-Doa was the wealthiest pair of candidates and they widely took a vote-buying approach towards the voters in his campaign. From several interviews with the voters in three most populated region in North Maluku such as North Halmahera, South Halmahera, and Ternate, the voters admitted that Mus-Doa were the only generous candidates compared to the other five candidates during 2013 elections. They often gave money to the people during their visits.¹⁴

On the other hand, Namotemo-Ibrahim excessively used political ethnicity in their campaign. Namotemo introduced what was known as the traditional clothes movement. During the campaign, Namotemo targeted voters who are of the Togale ethnicity. Even their picture on the paper ballots, Namotemo-Ibrahim wore the traditional clothes of the Togale. This was

¹⁴ Interviews with (1) Kamarullah, Labuha, 8 March 2018, (2) Totona, Ternate, 20 February 2018, (3) Arby, Ternate, 20 February 2018.

quite different from other candidates, who wore proper uniforms, such as suits. The Andili-Laos pair instead wore the Barcelona football team shirt on their picture on the ballot papers, playing on the sentiments of the people of North Maluku, the majority of whom love football and support Barcelona.

Moreover, the first round of gubernatorial election was won by Ahmad Hidayat Mus and Hasan Doa with 163,684 votes or equal to 28.50% support. The runner up was Abdul Gani Kasuba and M. Natsir Thaib with 123,689 support or equal to 21.54% votes. Since there were no candidates who reached a minimum 30% of votes, then the two candidates who got the most votes competed again in the second round of the election. In the second round, Mus-Doa repeatedly outperformed the vote result by winning 268,661 support or equivalent to 50.97% of the votes, whereas Kasuba-Thaib received 258,459 support or equal to 49.03%. The Kasuba-Thaib candidate did not accept the results of the vote count and sent a claim to the Constitutional Court. During the trial, Kasuba-Thaib made an objection about the systematic fraud that allegedly occurred in the second round. Moreover, Mus and Doa won the first round due to split of support within Tobelo Galela voters. As a majority ethnic in North Maluku, voters from Tobelo Galela ethnicity are the biggest, and during the first round of the election, three candidates had Tobelo background. They were Sahrin Hamid, Abdul Gani Kasuba, and Hein Namotemo.

In addition, this election also heavily involved religious propaganda, introduced by Kasuba and Thaib. They always conveyed that their main source of strength was prayer (*doa*) because they were one of the destitute pairs in the 2013 election. Moreover, in the second round of the election, when the election was close between Kasuba-Thaib and Mus-Doa, Kasuba claimed that this second round was a battle of money versus prayer (*Doi vs Doa*; *doi* refers to money in the North Maluku language).

Number	Candidates	First round		Second round	
		Votes	%	Votes	%
1	Namto Hui Roba Ismail Arifin	66,018	11.49%	-	
2	Muhajir Albaar Sahrin Hamid	53,230	9.27%	-	
3	Ahmad Hidayat Mus Hasan Doa	163,684	28.50%	258,747	49.59%

4	Samsir Andili Benny Laos	79,246	13.80%	-	
5	Abdul Gani Kasuba M. Natsir Thaib	123,689	21.54%	262,983	50.41%
6	Hein Namotemo Malik Ibrahim	88,471	15.40%	-	

Table 9. Results of the 2013 North Maluku election. Sources KPU North Maluku

After going through the trial process, the Constitutional Court cancelled the vote count of the provincial KPU in North Maluku. Besides, the Constitutional Court also ordered the Provincial KPU to manage re-vote and replace all the chairmen and members of the District Election Committee in seven districts (South Mangaoli, South Taliabu, North Taliabu, West Taliabu, Northwest Taliabu, Lede, and Tabona) and four polling stations. Besides, the Constitutional Court also ordered re-voting in aforementioned seven sub-districts and four polling stations. The results of the second round in these places were automatically cancelled. Because some results in the second round were cancelled, Kasuba-Thaib excelled in the temporary vote count with approximately of 20,000 votes.

During the re-voting in Taliabu regency, Mus-Doa won 22,108 support, and Kasuba-Thaib received 5,627 votes. In the final vote count, KPU announced Kasuba-Thaib as the winner with the total support of 262,932 votes or equal to 50.41% and Mus-Doa won 258,747 votes or equal to 49.59%.

Dates	Events
1 July 2013	Six pairs of candidates competed in North Maluku 2013 gubernatorial election
12 July 2013	The plenary meeting of the recapitulation of the results of the North Maluku gubernatorial election decided that the election would take two rounds because no candidate reached 30% of the valid votes in the first round. Candidates who advanced to the second round were Mus-Doa and Kasuba-Thaib.
31 October 2013	The second round of the elections was projected to be held in mid of August, but it was postponed until 25 September 2013. However, due

	to the budget issue of 38 billion rupiah that could not be disbursed, the National Election Committee decided to postpone the election again until 31 October.
17 November 2013	After completing the counting for votes in the second round, the provincial KPUD named Mus-Doa as the winner in a plenary meeting.
18 November 2013	The pair of Kasuba-Thaib complained of the election results to the Constitutional Court because they considered there was a violation during the second-round election, particularly in eight districts in the Sula Islands Regency. Kasuba-Thaib's attorney accused the Mus-Doa candidate of systematic cheating because they had evidence that there was a change in the vote-counting in eight villages in the Sula Islands District.
16 December 2013	The Constitutional Court decided the provincial KPUD to conduct re-election in seven sub-districts in West Sulabesi District, Sula Islands Regency
27 January 2014	In the re-election, Mus-Doa won, but in total accumulation, Kasuba-Thaib won the election.









Table 10. Chronology of the 2013 gubernatorial election in North Maluku

The gubernatorial election in 2013 was the first political battle between Kasuba and Mus families which have maintained power in two regencies of North Maluku. Since 2005, Kasuba families have controlled South Halmahera regency, and Mus families have secured political power in Sula and Taliabu Islands regencies.¹⁵ Additionally, as we can see, the gubernatorial election in 2013 can be deemed as a medium/instrument/mechanism which strengthens the practice of political dynasty in North Maluku. The gubernatorial election in 2013 was also considered as the shift in the power structure at the provincial level. Previously, the political power at the provincial level was controlled by the three most significant ethnic communities, Tobelo, Galela, and Makian. In the post-2013 era, the political power at the provincial level has no longer been managed by the ethnicities, but rather, by the relatives and families of local oligarchs displayed by Kasuba and Mus families.

¹⁵ Taliabu Island regency was previously a district (*Kecamatan*) under Sula Island regency. The regional expansion in 2012 resulted as the creation of Taliabu Island as a new regency.

Five years later, North Maluku had another gubernatorial election. The 2018 gubernatorial election was held on 27 June 2018 and considered as a rematch between Abdul Gani Kasuba and Ahmad Hidayat Mus. Besides having to deal with Ahmad Hidayat Mus, Abdul Gani Kasuba also had to face his own younger brother, former South Halmahera Regent, Muhammad Kasuba.

Table 11. Candidates for North Maluku gubernatorial election in 2018.

North Maluku Gubernatorial Election 2018					
Ballot Numbers	Candidates			Former Position	Party Alliance
1	Nominee	Ahmad Hidayat Mus		Former Regent of Sula Islands 2005-2015, Chairman of the Functional Groups Party of North Maluku	Party of Functional Groups (Golkar) and United Development Party (PPP)
	Running Mate	Rivai Umar		Former Chancellor of Khairun University	
2	Nominee	Muhammad Kasuba		Former Regent of South Halmahera 2005-2015, a Muslim preacher	Great Indonesia Movement Party (Gerindra), Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), and National Mandate Party (PAN)
	Running Mate	Madjid Husein		Former Regional Secretary of North Maluku	
3	Nominee	Abdul Gani Kasuba		Former Vice Governor of North Maluku 2008-2013, Governor of North Maluku 2013-2018, and a Muslim preacher	The Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (<i>Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan</i> -PDI-P) and Indonesian Justice and Unity Party (PKPI).
	Running Mate	M. Al Yasin Ali		Former Regent of Central Halmahera 2007-2017	
4	Nominee	Burhan Abdurrahman		Current Mayor of Ternate 2016-2021	National Democrats (Nasdem), National Awakening Party (PKB), Crescent Star Party (PBB), People's Conscience Party (Hanura), and Democratic Party (Demokrat)
	Running Mate	Ishak Jamaluddin		Former Chancellor of Muhammadiyah University of North Maluku	

Moreover, in the 2018 gubernatorial election, Abdul Gani Kasuba made a controversial political decision. He did not follow the orders of his political party (PKS) which nominated Muhammad Kasuba as a candidate for governor of North Maluku. Abdul Gani Kasuba left PKS and approached PDI-P to support his nomination as a governor for the second term. The nomination of Abdul Gani Kasuba in the 2018 elections was also problematic because beside PDI-P, PKPI also supported him. The nomination from PKPI became problematic because on 5 January 2018, PKPI expressed support and signed a nomination letter for the pair of Burhan Abdurrahman-Ishak Jamaluddin. Burhan-Ishak registered as a pair of candidates for the North Maluku gubernatorial election on 8 January with letters of support from several parties, including PKPI. On 10 January, the last day of the registration period, PKPI changed its decision and supported Abdul Gani Kasuba-Yasin Ali instead. Hence, the KPUD received double nomination letters from PKPI. In an interview with the head of KPUD, Somadayo explained that the law stated that KPUD has to accept the first submitted nomination letter, in this case, Burhan-Ishak.¹⁶ These letters were signed by the same person, the chairman of PKPI, Hendropriyono. Three other candidates disputed this matter to the North Maluku General Election Supervisory Agency.

In an interview with the author, the chairperson of the provincial KPUD, Syahrani Somadayo explained that, according to law, the provincial KPUD could not accept Abdul Gani Kasuba's registration.¹⁷ As a result of this decision, Somadayo also admitted that there was intimidation from the Director of the General Criminal Investigation of the North Maluku Regional Police. The threat was in a meeting which essentially commanded the provincial KPUD chairperson to accept the registration of a candidate from the PKPI (Abdul Gani Kasuba's registration). The local police threatened to look for problems of KPUD and would prosecute the provincial KPUD if their request not fulfilled. In an interview with the North Maluku Police Chief,¹⁸ they denied this and stated that the North Maluku Police remained neutral in the election. Since the threat was made in a private meeting, there was no further evidence for this issue.

The North Maluku Bawaslu had investigated the dispute on the nomination letter issued by the PKPI party. In an interview with the head of North Maluku Bawaslu, Muksin Amrin explained to the author that, from the preliminary investigation, dualism over nomination letter was caused by the head of PKPI's North Maluku branch, Masrul H. Ibrahim and the secretary

¹⁶ Interview with Syahrani Somadayo, Ternate, 16 February 2018.

¹⁷ Interview with Syahrani Somadayo, Ternate, 16 February 2018.

¹⁸ Recorded interview with North Maluku Police Chief Brigjen Pol Achmat Juri, 21 February 2018.

of PKPI's North Maluku branch, Yahya Soamole.¹⁹ Amrin guaranteed that after the internal investigation concluded by the Bawaslu, Bawaslu will forward the case to the police.²⁰

The North Maluku gubernatorial election in 2018 was an extremely tight race between Mus and Abdul Gani Kasuba. However, the political campaigns in 2018 were not as intense as 2013. The electoral campaigns were not intense because the public attention was split into few different issues, such as Ahmad Hidayat Mus' status as a suspect in a corruption case by the Commission Eradication Corruption and the issue of a graft case involving the issuance of 27 irregular mining permits in North Maluku. Despite the status as a suspect in a corruption case, Mus still managed to win the first round of the 2018 North Maluku gubernatorial election.

There were some factors that contributed to the result of the first round. First, the people of North Maluku were apathetic about Mus's corruption case because this allegation was a repetition of a case that first revealed during the 2013 gubernatorial election. In the 2018 gubernatorial election, voters in North Maluku changed their attitudes towards the allegation. During the 2013 election, Mus campaign was also ruined with the allegation of corruption cases which was previously handled by the Regional Police and Attorney General's Office. However, this allegation somehow disappeared after the election. Therefore, the apathy of the community towards the issue of corruption could be understood because the community felt that the issue of corruption against one of the candidates was only a black campaign that came out during the elections.

Second, the reason for Mus' triumph in the first round despite his status as a suspect of corruption was due to his rapport relationships with loyal supporters. Mus was known to be generous and often gave money to society. Besides, for the past five years, Mus' family was continuously managing political momentum through Alien Mus as Chairman of the North Maluku provincial parliament. Alien is Hidayat Mus' younger sister. Thus, she could maintain the political momentum for Mus family as the opposition of the Governor of North Maluku in the legislative domain.

Third, we could argue that Mus and Umar were able to win the first round of election due to lack of rational and critical voters in North Maluku. Often, besides ethnicity, many voters choose candidates depending on money given by each candidate. In fact, there were massive money-distributing campaigns in multiple villages in North Maluku.

¹⁹ Interview with Muksin Amrin, 15 February 2018.

²⁰ On the 29 March 2018, Ibrahim and Soamole named as suspects by the police.

Fourth, the division of the Tobelo ethnic votes should be noted. Abdul Gani Kasuba had to share the vote with his younger brother Muhammad Kasuba who also participated in the political contestation in the 2018 election.

After the election on 27 June 2018, KPUD finished the recapitulation process on 7-9 July and the provincial KPUD named Mus-Umar as the winner. Mus-Umar received 176,993 votes, and Abdul Gani Kasuba-Ali received 169,123 votes.²¹ However, the pair of Abdul Gani Kasuba-Ali did not accept the KPUD's decision and complained to the Constitutional Court. After going through several trial processes, the Court asked the provincial KPUD to conduct a re-voting because the recapitulation results from KPUD were invalid. The Court ordered the KPUD to conduct re-voting in six villages in West Halmahera.

According to the Court, there were some serious frauds. Some voters voted more than once, and some voters were not registered. After the re-voting, on 16 December 2018, the provincial KPUD announced Abdul Gani Kasuba-Ali as the winner of 2018 gubernatorial election. Abdul Gani Kasuba-Ali's triumph was predicted because in the re-voting, Muhammad Kasuba's supporters would divert their votes to Abdul Gani Kasuba. Abdul Gani Kasuba received an abundance of votes from supporters of Muhammad Kasuba which made him win this contestation. In the final result, Abdul Gani Kasuba-Ali received 176,669 votes or equal to 31.79% and Mus-Umar received 175,749 or equal to 31.62% (see table 12).

Number	Candidates	Number and Percentage
1	Ahmad Hidayat Mus Rivai Umar	175,749 (31.62%)
2	Muhammad Kasuba Madjid Husein	63,902 (11.50%)
3	Abdul Gani Kasuba M. Al Yasin Ali	176,669 (31.79%)
4	H. Burhan Abdurrahman Ishak Jamaluddin	139,365 (25.08%)

Table 12. Final results of the 2018 gubernatorial election in North Maluku election.

²¹ The author gathered this data from the official document published by the North Maluku Provincial Election Commission.

From 2007, 2013, and 2018 elections, we can draw some conclusions. The practices of democracy in North Maluku through direct local head elections provided several lessons. First, incumbents had advantages that other candidates could not have, since they were able to create "unfair circumstances" using their official power. Since 2007, 2013 and 2018 elections, the incumbent always won the final contestation (in court). Although the results released by the North Maluku General Elections Commission (KPUD) were often different, when the incumbents appealed to the national level, they always won and succeed in changing the result of the Regional Election Commission.

Second, the use of ethnic identity in the campaign became a major electoral weapon for all candidates. Especially candidates from the ethnic majority, they have exploited their large ethnic numbers to get full support. Since 2007, the regional election winners in North Maluku have always been from the majority ethnic group. 2007 was won by the pair of Armaiyn and Abdul Gani Kasuba which was a combination of Tobelo and Ternate ethnicities. In the 2013 election, Abdul Gani Kasuba succeeded in winning the elections through the Constitutional Court ruling that decided the re-election in several places. This time, Abdul Gani Kasuba partnered with Thalib, and the pair was a mixture of ethnic Tobelo and Tidore. In the 2018 election, Abdul Gani Kasuba won the competition and he partnered with Ali to form a pair of combination between Tobelo ethnic group with Tidore and Central Halmahera.

Third, every election in 2007, 2013, and 2018, the electoral authority tended to side with one of the candidates. This problem could be seen in the vote-counting released by the KPUD, followed by the intervention from the central level, and re-elections in several locations. These re-elections succeeded in changing the final election results. For example, the results of the 2007 elections changed three times.

From the observation of gubernatorial elections since 2003, we should note that peace process and settlement in North Maluku was just a temporary answer. The local elites who fought during the conflict agreed to end the violence, just because they saw a bigger opportunity under the implementation of local autonomy. The local elites managed to gather their loyal squad during the conflict, and it later became their loyal political supporters. Moreover, since the election in 2013, gubernatorial candidates have been very diverse. This diversity is closely related to political fragmentation and consolidated ethnic politics in North Maluku. It is ironic that the post-conflict introduction of regional autonomy and direct local head elections has contributed to the deepening of social cleavage, and it is against this backdrop that we find the rapid transformation of local political power from traditional sultanates to ethnic political bosses.

Summary

In the post-conflict North Maluku, the violence continued to break out every five years, particularly during the elections for provincial and district leaders. Violence emerged and disappeared every five years, as seen in 2003, 2007, 2013, and 2018. In the period of pre- and post-independence of Indonesia, the four sultanates in North Maluku were considered as symbolic representatives of the closest identity to the people in North Maluku.

Even though they were considered as a symbol of the people in North Maluku, the dispute between them happened all the time. The disputes remained consistent and unresolved until the modern era. During Soeharto's New Order era, sultans' political privileges were rescinded. They were no longer automatic regional rulers because Soeharto directly appointed governors during his 32 years. Thus, in the post-Soeharto democracy period, the sultans were attracted to participate in political contestation, and fought over political influence in North Maluku. Hence, the implementation of local autonomy, which was later followed by direct local head elections, was seen as an opportunity to reclaim their political power.

However, the direct elections resulted in the emergence of primordial ethnic identity politics rather than the consolidation of power by traditional sultanates. The sultanate Ternate tried to remain power. However, the community's response to the sultanate was not like it used to be. Even though the traditional elites controlled the local legislative bodies at the beginning, when they started to compete in the direct elections for local heads, they always lost the game, like in the Ternate city mayoral election in 2005, and gubernatorial elections in 2007.

The violence that happened in 2003-2004 and 2007-2008 was also provoked by the failure of the Sultan Ternate to run for the gubernatorial election contest. The sultan was not eligible to run as a governor because he was not able to collect enough political support from the political parties.

In 2007, North Maluku had its first direct election for governor, and it turned to be a full battle of identity politics based on ethnicity. It was through the process of a direct election that we saw the pattern of power consolidation led by two local families, namely Kasuba and Mus. Every time, in the elections of 2007, 2013, and 2018, electoral fraud became prominent, and the results were always controversial. While the 2007 election was as the re-battle between two old guards, the 2013 and 2018 gubernatorial elections were the re-battle between two new

political empires in North Maluku, i.e., the competition between the Kasuba's family and the Mus' family. In the next chapter, we will examine their power consolidation until today.

Chapter 7

Political Dynasty Domination and Equilibrium of Peace

As North Maluku has succeeded to hold numerous direct local head elections since 2007, there is a growing perception that political stability has been gradually consolidated in the region's post-conflict era. In fact, in the sphere of local security, the province remains steady, with no severe conflict occurred. This chapter analyzes consolidation of local political power in the post-conflict North Maluku and illustrates how economic opportunity exploited by local elites has contributed to the maintenance of equilibrium of peace.

Below, we will investigate how local elites in North Maluku have successfully maintained their power in the age of direct elections. It is in this process of power consolidation that we see the domination of a political dynasty in North Maluku. What has allowed the political dynasty to survive the democratization process in North Maluku? How has the political dynasty maintained their loyal supporters? We will investigate these questions. We mainly explore the period between 2007 and 2018.

New Political Dynasty and its Practices in North Maluku

Between 2004-2013, the family of Thaib Armaiyn and the ethnic Makian controlled the political dynamics in North Maluku. Armaiyn installed his daughter Vaya Armaiyn as the head of the regional development agency (*Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Daerah-Bappeda*). However, in 2007, as we saw in the previous chapter, Abdul Gani Kasuba became vice governor and he started to mobilise ethnic Tobelo Galela in North Maluku bureaucracy. As a result, the local political institutions were controlled by both Makian and Tobelo Galela ethnicities.¹

During his five years as vice governor, Abdul Gani Kasuba and his family built a political network in South Halmahera Regency.² Meanwhile, his nephew, Bahrain Kasuba was also serving as Chairperson of the South Halmahera Regency parliament (2009-2014). The

¹ Makian and Tobelo Galela are the two most populous ethnicities in North Maluku.

² South Halmahera is the most populous regency in North Maluku. As a vice governor in 2007-2013 and with his brother, Muhammad Kasuba, led the most populous regency, Abdul Gani Kasuba, Muhammad Kasuba, and the rest of Kasuba family started building the connections, consolidating their loyal supporters, and expanding their power in the regency and North Maluku province.


Kasuba family was and still is in full control of the South Halmahera Regency. South Halmahera is among the most significant voter enclaves in North Maluku. This area consists of a majority of people from the Makian, Bacan, and Tobelo Galela (Togale) ethnic groups. Today, after 10 years of Muhammad Kasuba leadership in South Halmahera (2005-2015), Bahrain Kasuba is continuing the legacy in the leadership role in the South Halmahera region. In the upcoming election in December 2020, Muhammad Kasuba's eldest son, Bassam Kasuba is also running as one of the candidates to be the next leader in South Halmahera. Bassam as a candidate of a vice-regent, paired with Usman Sadik, a former journalist.

Besides South Halmahera, the practice of political kinship networking or political dynasty making was also visible in Sula Island. Sula Island is one of the poorest regencies in North Maluku. Sula Island is located in the southern part of North Maluku. Geographically, Sula Islands is closer with Ambon, Maluku and Banggai, Central Sulawesi. Sula Islands regency is known under the domination of Mus Family. The head of Mus Family is Ahmad Hidayat Mus. Unlike majority of the Kasuba family members who are preachers, Mus family members are mostly businessmen. The family-owned hundreds of hectares of plantation farm and also owned a timber company. Ahmad Hidayat Mus was the regent of Sula Islands regency between 2005-2015. Ahmad Hidayat Mus was also known as the political opponent of Kasuba family at the provincial level.

Controversies are surrounding the Mus and Kasuba families' histories of building their political power in North Maluku. Many of these controversies are related to the issue of corruption. These families hold extensive influence over several public policies. In North Maluku, the creation of the new province has resulted in the development of new districts and sub-districts, with the elections of governors, heads of districts and sub-districts, and mayors. As a result, vast sums of money, billions of rupiahs, changed hands (Wessel, 2005).

Moreover, the implementation of decentralization opened up opportunities for the local government to regulate natural resources, local products, and tax collection. These regulations have been handled by local politicians, who sometimes give special treatment to businesspeople, granting them access to wealth. These practices have then enabled local elites to become influential local figures, as we will see in the case of Kasuba and Musa families who have built their political dynasty in the post-conflict North Maluku. Below, we will examine each family for their political and business activities in details.

The Kasuba Family Networking



Graphic 1. Core figures of Kasuba family.

The Kasuba family is originally from a small village between Tobelo and Galela. However, the majority of Kasuba family were born and grew up in a small village in South Halmahera called Bibinoi. It takes approximately an hour to reach Bibinoi from one of the ports in Babang, Labuha, the capital of South Halmahera. For the past four years, Bibinoi can be reached using the main roads from Babang for about thirty minutes. Abdul Gani Kasuba and Muhammad Kasuba were born and grew up in a small village; they are Kasuba's second generation. However, at the educational level, they are considered as the first generation in

Bibinoi who completed a study from foreign educational institutions. Abdul Gani Kasuba obtained his degree from Madinah University in Saudi Arabia. Moreover, Muhammad Kasuba is the first doctorate from Bibinoi, he went to International Islamic University, in Islamabad, Pakistan, for his bachelor's and master's degrees. On the other hand, Bahrain Kasuba is Kasuba's third generation.

Since Abdul Gani Kasuba and Muhammad Kasuba graduated from Islamic universities, hence, the title of Islamic preachers (Islamic teachers/scholars or known as *ulama* in Indonesia) attached to them automatically. Besides, Kasuba family has a close tie to Al-Khairaat, one of the most important Islamic institutions in the eastern part of Indonesia. From the data that the author collected, Kasuba family own an educational institution in North Maluku and using the curriculum from Al-Khairaat.³ Majority of Kasubas born and raised as Prosperous Justice Party (*Partai Keadilan Sejahtera*-PKS) cadres, sympathizers, and prominent supporters. The loyal voters of Kasuba family normally come from an Islamic background and from Tobelo Galela ethnicities. Besides their main activities as a politician, Kasubas especially Abdul Gani Kasuba and Muhammad Kasuba, often visit the mosques in North Maluku. They are regularly teaching/giving a sermon to the people of North Maluku. By using this regular meeting with Islamic voters in every mosque in the region, Abdul Gani Kasuba and Muhammad Kasuba have been able to maintain their loyal supporter for more than a decade.

Abdul Gani Kasuba and Muhammad Kasuba are considered as senior politicians in North Maluku. Muhammad Kasuba started his career as a politician in 1999 when he was the parliament member of Maluku province represented the North Maluku regency from Justice Party (Later this party merged and transformed into Prosperous Justice Party).⁴ After the establishment of North Maluku as a new province, Muhammad Kasuba went back to North Maluku. In the 2004 general elections, he won the seat as a North Maluku provincial parliament member. A year after, Muhammad Kasuba decided to run as a regent candidate for South Halmahera regency. He won the election and became a regent for ten years.

On the other hand, Abdul Gani Kasuba started his career as an Islamic preacher, visited the majority of villages in North Maluku. As an Islamic preacher, his name is quite familiar within the North Maluku society. After completed his study in Madinah, Saudi Arabia, Abdul Gani Kasuba led the Al-Khairaat institution in North Maluku. During the conflict in 1999,

³ For example, in Ternate, Kasuba family-owned schools called Nurul Hasan. The schools are available for all levels such as elementary, junior high, and senior high. The schools adopted Islam-based curriculums and national curriculums at the same time. The schools are called Nurul Hasan integrated school (*Islam Terpadu Nurul Hasan*). In South Halmahera, the family owned a medical vocational school named SMK Kesehatan Nurul Hasan.

⁴ At that time, North Maluku was a regency and as a part of Maluku province.

Abdul Gani Kasuba was a vice president of Indonesia Ulama Council for North Maluku. As discussed in chapter 3, during the conflict, Abdul Gani Kasuba led the Muslims warfare and often initiated *Jihad* invitation among North Maluku Muslims to fight during the conflict.

Besides Abdul Gani Kasuba and Muhammad Kasuba, Bahrain Kasuba was also elected in 2015 as the Regent of South Halmahera.⁵ Before taking on his current position as the regent, Bahrain Kasuba was the deputy of the head of the regional parliament of South Halmahera from 2004-2009 and the head of regional parliament from 2009-2014. He headed the regional parliament at the same time that Muhammad Kasuba controlled the executive division.

During the first five years of Muhammad Kasuba leadership in 2005-2010, he implemented what populist policies such as free education and free healthcare in South Halmahera regency. During his leadership, Muhammad Kasuba also extended his political influence by allocating regional budget to hired and selected Islamic clerics. He aimed to have one Islamic cleric to be an *imam* in each village mosque. This policy was intended for expanding Muhammad Kasuba's political power across South Halmahera. By selecting and appointing these Islamic clerics, Muhammad Kasuba was able to oversee, expand, and maintain his loyal supporters as far as village level.

Furthermore, by having full support from the Prosperous Justice Party and his nephew Bahrain Kasuba in the regional parliament, Muhammad Kasuba's rule was smooth without any significant challenges from the regional parliament. Hence, Muhammad Kasuba was able to secure and consolidated his political power in South Halmahera and won the election for second term in 2010.

Interestingly, in 2010, Muhammad Kasuba stumbled into a corruption case. He was considered a suspect because when the government of South Halmahera bought a Halse Express vessel, its value was estimated at only Rp. 6 billion. However, in the payment detail, the total was listed as Rp. 14.6 billion. Muhammad Kasuba was suspected of causing the state losses equal to Rp. 8 billion.

This case initially arose in 2006. As time went on, the investigation into the case became stagnant due to a lack of willingness on the part of the prosecutors to investigate. Two years later, the investigation was never completed. The Provincial Attorney General's Office had been reluctant to investigate due to pressures from Kasuba loyalists who easily mobilized mass

⁵ Muhammad Kasuba led the South Halmahera between 2005-2015. In 2018 election, he competed with his brother Abdul Gani Kasuba in a gubernatorial election. In 2019, Muhammad Kasuba was also running in the national legislative election. Between 2010-2015 while Muhammad Kasuba was the head of the regent in South Halmahera, his nephew, Bahrain Kasuba was the head of regional legislative. Kasuba's have dominated the South Halmahera regency in executive and legislative level.

demonstrations. For two years, Muhammad Kasuba had never been summoned for an investigation by the Provincial Attorney General's Office. In 2008, the Provincial Attorney General's Office investigator issued a warrant to stop the investigation because no state loss was found in the audit results of the Maluku Representative of National Audit Board in Ternate.

Name	Position	Year	Total Wealth
Abdul Gani Kasuba	Lawmaker (DPR RI)	2003	Rp582,500,000
	Deputy Governor	2009	Rp882,375,668
	Deputy Governor	2010	Rp1,413,591,029
	Governor	2014	Rp2,307,031,000
	Governor	2016	Rp4,543,704,421
Muhammad Kasuba	Regional Parliament Member	2005	Rp301,033,051
	Regent (<i>Bupati</i>)	2009	Rp1,200,000,563
	Regent (<i>Bupati</i>)	2011	Rp1,466,385,140
	Regent (<i>Bupati</i>)	2014	Rp1,948,985,140
	Regent (<i>Bupati</i>)	2016	Rp4,055,909,418
Bahrain Kasuba	Regional Parliament Member	2003	Rp21,400,000
	Regional Parliament Member	2015	Rp171,400,000

Table 13. Wealth of Kasuba family. Data collected by author from Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK).

However, the Halmahera Corruption Watch (HCW), a local civil society organisation, filed a pretrial hearing on the issuance of the warrant above on the alleged corruption case by Regent Muhammad Kasuba. They won the lawsuit. The Ternate district court finally issued a judgment, labelled 01/Pid.Pra.Tipikor/2012/TTE, and ordered the Attorney General to cancel the warrant and make Muhammad Kasuba a suspect. Muhammad Kasuba is also suspected of being involved in a corruption case related to the social assistance budget between 2006 and 2008. He is suspected of practicing negligence in the use of the social assistance budget, which includes subsidies and grant funds. In an interview with the author,⁶ Kasuba insisted that he was innocent. His argument was based on the report of the examination results by the BPK of North Maluku. Kasuba claimed that he never committed corruption and did not misuse the state budget.

⁶ Recorded interview, Muhammad Kasuba, 12 September 2018.

During his ten years of leadership as the Regent of South Halmahera, Muhammad Kasuba appointed many civil servants as non-permanent employees for the South Halmahera regency. This was a way of maintaining loyal supporters. As of 2011, there were approximately 3,000 total non-permanent employees in South Halmahera. Meanwhile, data from the South Halmahera Regional Personnel Agency in 2011 demonstrated that the number of civil servants in South Halmahera was 1,352. Statistically, during Kasuba leadership, the number of temporary employees was almost twice the number of civil servants in South Halmahera.

Muhammad Kasuba's policy of appointing the immense of non-permanent employees was a waste of money because many non-permanent employees were high school graduates in South Halmahera and they received salaries of around Rp 600,000 per month, while those with diplomas and bachelors earned salaries of Rp 700,000 per month. Clearly, Muhammad Kasuba's non-permanent employees' policy was an approach to maintain the support of his voters. Kasuba's non-permanent employees' policy not only wasted regional budgets, but it had a direct impact on deficits in regional budgets as well.

It was also important to understand why Muhammad Kasuba appointed his wife, Rosdiana Djoisangaji Kasuba as the head of the general section and equipment of the Regional Secretariat of South Halmahera Regency. The position is strategic because it manages all operational budgets of the South Halmahera Regent. This position is closely related to her husband as a Regent and prone to conflicts of interest.

Muhammad Kasuba also appointed his family members to strategic positions in South Halmahera. For example, the Section Head at the Regional Budget Financial Revenue Service was Muhammad Zaki, Muhammad Kasuba's nephew. Muhammad Kasuba also installed another nephew, Dahrun Kasuba, as Secretary of the District Head and the District Head in South Halmahera.

Bahrain Kasuba's leadership was not much different. Continuing the previous policy of maintaining a large number of non-permanent employees, Bahrain also appointed his family to important positions. For example, Dahrun Kasuba was chosen as Secretary of the Village Community Empowerment Service. This was a new institution responsible for organizing and controlling village funds. Additionally, Bahrain appointed his cousin Abdillah Kamarullah as Head of the Regional Personnel Agency, a department that regulates and arranges positions of civil servants in South Halmahera. Following in the footsteps of Muhammad, Bahrain also appointed his second wife, Nurlaila Muhammad, as Head of the South Halmahera Education Office.

After five years leading the South Halmahera regency, Bahrain Kasuba had a plan to compete in another election for the second round of leadership in 2020. However, Bahrain Kasuba did not have enough political support from the political parties. The election rule requires a candidate to have support of more than 6 seats in the regency parliament. Two parties, Gerindra and PKPI, support Bahrain Kasuba (Antara News, 2020). These two parties have five seats in the parliament. Previously, the Berkarya Party supported Bahrain Kasuba, and Bahrain Kasuba had six seats from the political parties and met the political parties support as a requirement to register as a candidate. However, the dispute of the Berkarya Party at the national level led to a change in support (Republika, 2020). Hence, Bahrain Kasuba lost support from the Berkarya party and could not fulfil the requirement to apply as a candidate. The Berkarya party turned their support to Muhammad Kasuba's son, who is also running in the regent election in December 2020. Bassam Kasuba is the eldest son of Muhammad Kasuba, and he is running as a vice-regent of South Halmahera. Bassam received supports from numerous political parties such as PKS, PKB, PDI-P, PAN, PSI, Berkarya, and PKPI (Halmahera Raya, 2020 & Kieraha, 2020).

In the contrary, as a religious teacher and religious leader, Abdul Gani Kasuba rarely exposed to negative headlines related to corruption. However, Abdul Gani Kasuba's practices are similar to Muhammad Kasuba and Bahrain Kasuba. Abdul Gani Kasuba often gave the positions of heads of provincial offices to their closest relatives. However, after the 2018 gubernatorial election, Muhammad Kasuba's elder brother, Abdul Gani Kasuba, was accused of corruption in a case related to the mining licenses that he granted during his leadership. Currently, there are approximately 27 mining licenses on disputes because related to the corruption case.

The Provincial Government of North Maluku in 2016 allegedly issued twenty-seven mining permits without following procedures as specified in the mining law. Three environmental organisations such as Friends of the Earth (*Wahana Lingkungan Hidup-Walhi*) in North Maluku,⁷ the Alliance of Indigenous Peoples of the Archipelago (*Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara-AMAN*),⁸ and the Environmental Partner Organization (*Lembaga Mitra Lingkungan-LML*)⁹ insisted that the twenty-seven of mining permits that have been issued are problematical.

⁷ Recorded interview, Mahmud Ici, Friends of the Earth, Ternate, 17 September 2018.

⁸ Recorded interview, Munadi Kilkoda, AMAN, Ternate, 17 September 2018.

⁹ Recorded interview, Siti Barora, LML, Ternate, 10 September 2018.

In their opinion, from the twenty-seven, only one mining permit is legal and in accordance with the Law No. 4 of 2009 on Mineral and Coal, Government Regulation (*Peraturan Pemerintah-PP*) No.23 of 2010 on the implementation of mineral and coal mining business activities, and ministerial regulations of energy and mineral resources (No.25/2015) concerning delegation of authorities to grant permits in the mineral and coal mining sector. From interviews that author conducted in North Maluku, majority of activists, journalists, and academics, widely suspected that these mining permits are heavily linked and related to the election campaign and financial support from the mining companies for the incumbent governor.

Moreover, the data that author collected shows that, from the twenty-seven mining permits that were found suspicious, four of them were issued to PT. Halmahera Jaya Mining, PT. Budhi Jaya Mineral, CV. Orion Jaya, PT Kieraha Tambang Sentosa. These mining permits were mostly about the expansion of product operations and an approval to switch from exploration to production operation. These companies were also linked to several national mining companies in Jakarta, owned by conglomerates.

Liputan 6 (2017) reported about this mining permits issue and found that several mining permits issued did not have environmental impact analysis (*Analisis Mengenai Dampak Lingkungan-AMDAL*) documents and some of the mining locations are located in the border dispute between the North Halmahera and West Halmahera. Moreover, Sahril¹⁰ questioned the mining permits that the governor signed. Sahril suspected that the mining permit drafting was based on manipulated documents. Sahril argues that the 27 mining permits were signed under the former head of Department of Energy Mineral and Natural Resources of North Maluku (*Dinas Energi dan Sumber Daya Mineral-ESDM*), Rahmatia.

However, Rahmatia shared to Liputan 6 (2017) that she was not aware of these 27 mining permits. She claimed that she only signed one mining permit during her leadership as the head of department. Sahril suspects that the 27 mining permits were drafted by the head of ESDM, Sarifudin Manyila but it was seemingly approved by Rahmatia.¹¹ Abdul Gani Kasuba as a governor when this issue of mining permits came to the attention of the public, admitted that he signed the 27 mining permits, but he also stated that if there was a mistake about the

¹⁰ Sahril is the Secretary of Commission III, North Maluku Provincial Parliament.

¹¹ It is widely suspected that Rahmatia was replaced because she refused to issue the mining permits. Hence, Rahmatia was replaced by Sarifudin. However, under Sarifudin administration, he granted 27 mining permits, but the document was prepared and “signed” by Rahmatia, the former head of ESDM. Hence, many people questioned the legality of these permits. It is widely suspected that these permits have something to do with Abdul Gani Kasuba governorship campaign finance.

process of these mining permits, then we could revoke the permits easily.¹² In an interview, Mahmud Ici from Walhi explained to the author that, recently, the gateway for the corruption in North Maluku is mainly from natural resources. The corruption practices in the natural resources sector that Mahmud discovered, adopting different strategies such as a revision in spatial layout, the relaxation of AMDAL requirements, changes in the land function, even by 'hijacking' the rules.¹³

From observations above, we can elucidate the way Kasuba family has maintained his power for the past fifteen years by using political power, infrastructure projects, and family relations to hold high-rank positions at provincial and regency levels. Members of Kasuba family are often linked to corruption cases. Interestingly, the dynasty is not always united within. In 2018 election, Kasuba family was split into two because Abdul Gani Kasuba and Muhammad Kasuba, two senior politicians in the family competed in the same gubernatorial election. Bahrain Kasuba supported Abdul Gani Kasuba and the rest of the family including those who support PKS, leaned into Muhammad Kasuba. It is important to note that this kind of intra-dynasty contestation is not to undermine the influence of the family, but it rather contributes to the diversification of political players in the family and helps consolidate the dynastic patronage network in North Maluku.

The Mus Family and its Political and Business Networking

¹² The public reported the issue of the permits to the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) and requested KPK to investigate this corruption allegation. In an interview with the author, the head of KPK, Laode Muhammad Syarif, admitted that one of the highest corruption cases of regional leaders was issuance of permit, especially mining permits. Recorded interview, Laode Muhammad Syarif, Jakarta, 26 October 2018.

¹³ Recorded interview, Mahmud Ici, Friends of the Earth, Ternate, 17 September 2018. Ici also wrote on Mongabay (2019) about the untouchable corruption cases of mining industry in North Maluku.



Graphic 2. Core figures of Mus family.

Mus family is well known in the Sula island, especially about their generosity to the people of Sula. However, the approaches are rather different from Kasuba family. As explain above, Kasuba family members are familiar within the society because they are Islamic preachers. However, Mus family members are mostly businessmen.

Ahmad Hidayat Mus was born in a family of immigrants from Buton, Sulawesi. As an immigrant family, Ahmad Hidayat Mus' parents built a plantation company in the Sula area. Before serving as Regent of the Sula Islands, Ahmad Hidayat Mus continued the family business, and at the same time, he also established a timber company.

The author's interviews with several Sula residents clearly found that, after becoming a politician, Ahmad Hidayat Mus is known for his generosity. Once during a campaign, Ahmad Hidayat Mus distributed money to the public through a helicopter. Arguably, one of Ahmad Hidayat Mus' ways to maintain relations with its voters was through his generosity. Besides, Ahmad Hidayat Mus also regularly held meetings with his supporters while inviting orphaned children and the poor. Ahmad Hidayat Mus public image has been good even though he has been suspected of corruption numerous times.

Before becoming a local head in 2005, Ahmad Hidayat Mus was once a member of the provincial parliament. After serving as a Regent of Sula Islands, Ahmad Hidayat Mus began to expand his power by giving government positions to his family. He began to build a political dynasty by associating his families in local electoral politics. For example, in 2009-2014, Ahmad Hidayat Mus' wife, Hj. Nurohmah Mus was elected as one of the national parliament members as a North Maluku representative affiliated with Golkar Party.

In 2013, the government-led Financial Transaction Reports and Analysis Center (PPATK) named Ahmad Hidayat Mus as one of the ten regional heads who had unusual activities in their bank accounts because there was a significant increase in Ahmad Hidayat Mus' wealth of 23 billion over eight years. Ahmad Hidayat Mus was in that list along with Tutut, former governor of Banten and Nur Alam, former governor of Southeast Sulawesi. Ahmad Hidayat Mus, Tutut, and Nur Alam are currently in prison because they were convicted of corruption.

The corruption practices by Ahmad Hidayat Mus started when he was a Regent in the Sula Islands. Many development projects in the Sula Islands were carried out by direct appointment without work proposal/auction, particularly for road constructions. *Majalah Tempo* (2013) once exposed several development projects such as road construction on Mangole Island with a budget of Rp. 167.2 billion, construction of the Gela-Lede road with a budget of Rp. 105.1 billion. Most of the direct appointments for these constructions were also primarily carried out by family and close friends.

An example was the construction of the Sanana Grand Mosque. The contractor for this project was Ahmad Hidayat Mus' uncle, Munawar Tjiarso Menge. Currently, the government anti-corruption agency is investigating this case, and Ahmad Hidayat Mus is a suspect of carrying out fictitious land cost reimbursement in the construction of the grand mosque project. This project started in 2006 and planned to be completed in 2009. However, until 2014, the project was not completed while the budget run out. In addition to the direct appointment

without work proposal/auction, Ahmad Hidayat Mus is also a suspect for many fictitious projects work (Tempo, 2013).

Here are a few examples of fictitious projects during Ahmad Hidayat Mus leadership in the Sula Islands. The first is the village road construction project in Falabisahaya-Auponhia-Mangoli-Waisakai in 2006-2009. It is reported that local people were unaware of the construction of roads in this village. Moreover, PT. Mega Buana Mangole, a company which was directly appointed by Ahmad Hidayat Mus to work on this project, was not clear about its existence. The company details seemed bogus and fictitious. Second, the construction of a bridge that connects the village of Tikong and the village of Lede was also the case. Ahmad Hidayat Mus directly appointed PT. Mandiri Wahana Lestari as the contractor for this project. However, the company was considered fictitious because the office address provided did not match the existence. The company that works on this bridge is a company managed by Ahmad Hidayat Mus' brother, Zainal Mus.

	Corruption Cases	Total	
1	Road construction project in Falabisahaya-Auponhia-Mangoli-Waisakai (150KMs)	Rp 167.2 billion	2006-2009 Regional Budgets
2	Road construction project in Auponhia-Dofa (20KMs)	Rp 6.9 billion	2007 Regional Budget
3	Enhancement of road construction Falabisahaya-Auponhia	Rp 1.6 billion	2008 Regional Budget
4	Road construction project in Gela-Tikong-Lede (80KMs)	Rp 105.1 billion	2006-2010 Regional Budgets
5	Road construction project in Malbufa-Wainib Sirtu (15KMs)	Rp 5.6 billion	2006 Regional Budget
6	Road construction project in Dofa-Waisakai (100KMs)	Rp 106.8 billion	2006-2010 Regional Budget
7	Road access Fuata	Rp 2.6 billion	2009 Regional Budget
8	Waikolbota bridge	Rp 1.1 billion	2009 Regional Budget
9	Sanana Grand Mosque	Rp 23.5 billion	2006-2009 Regional Budgets

Table 14. Mus family corruption cases. Data taken from Tempo (2013).

North Maluku Police and the provincial District Attorney have investigated the corruption case of Mus's family. In 2013, Ahmad Hidayat Mus' younger brother, Zainal Mus was sentenced to five years in prison for corruption in the construction of the Waikolbota bridge. However, Ahmad Hidayat Mus was free in the trials. Every time during the examination of corruption cases in North Maluku, Ahmad Hidayat Mus remains untouched. Examination of the Ahmad Hidayat Mus case coincided with the 2013 gubernatorial election. Ahmad Hidayat Mus repeatedly argued that this case was a political lie because of his candidacy as a governor of North Maluku.

Moreover, it is widely suspected that Ahmad Hidayat Mus remains untouched because he has maintained close relationship with several police generals at the Indonesian National Police. When investigated by the North Maluku police in a corruption case in 2012, Febriyan and Nurgianto (2013) reported, Ahmad Hidayat Mus threatened the police officers to be removed from their posts if they try to link corruption case with him. Ahmad Hidayat Mus' intimidation was not a bluff, because he said that the North Maluku Regional Police Chief was transferred because the Chief was about to investigate him in the corruption case.

A few days after initiating the investigation, the North Maluku Regional Police Chief, at that time, Brigadier-General Affan Richwanto was transferred/released from his post as Head of North Maluku Regional Police. Several journalists and anti-corruption activists that the author met admitted that Ahmad Hidayat Mus was close to several generals at the National Police, one of which was Commissioner-General Fajar Prihantoro. Besides, Ahmad Hidayat Mus reportedly was close to the Head of the Criminal Investigation Agency, Commissioner-General Sutarman (he later became the Chief of the Indonesian National Police). Due to this good rapport to the police generals, Ahmad Hidayat Mus' corruption cases halted.

Name	Position	Year	Total Wealth
Ahmad Hidayat Mus	Regent (<i>Bupati</i>)	2005	Rp7,633,906,000
	Regent (<i>Bupati</i>)	2010	Rp36,771,963,348
	Regent (<i>Bupati</i>)	2013	Rp35,212,963,348
Along Mus	Regional Parliament	2015	Rp1,300,000,000
Zainal Mus	Regional Parliament	2015	Rp1,195,807,458

	Regional Parliament/Candidate for Regent of Banggai Islands	2016	Rp1,519,794,393
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Table 15. Wealth of Mus family. Data collected by author from Corruption Eradication Commission (*Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi-KPK*).

The suspicion that Ahmad Hidayat Mus is involved in corruption is reasonable because Ahmad Hidayat Mus' wealth has increased dramatically from 2005 to 2018 (As we can see from table 15 above). In addition to executing the development projects in the Sula Islands, Ahmad Hidayat Mus also actively involved families as public officials in Sula and Taliabu Districts. Ahmad Hidayat Mus' younger brother, Aliong Mus, is the current Regent of the Taliabu Islands. Zainal Mus, Ahmad Hidayat Mus' brother is the current Regent of the Banggai Islands. In 2011 Zainal Mus had to serve for two years in jail for the case of illegal logging in Taliabu Island. As explained above, he was also sentenced for corruption in Waikolbota bridge project and when he was about to be executed, Zainal Mus escaped and was on the wanted list. Later, Zainal was arrested in a hotel in Jakarta.

Ningsi Mus, Ahmad Hidayat Mus' younger sister, was installed as the Head of Education Office in Taliabu. Citra Mus, the younger sister of Ahmad Hidayat Mus, is the head of the general section and equipment of the Regional Secretariat. Meilan Mus is a member of the Taliabu parliament. Maya Mus is a member of the North Maluku provincial parliament. Alien Mus is a member of the national parliament affiliated with Golkar Party. Alien Mus also served as Chairman of North Maluku branch of Golkar Party.

Together with appointing their families as the head of departments, the Mus family adopted the process of regional expansion as a mechanism to expand their political power. During his leadership as a Regent of Sula Islands between 2005-2015, Ahmad Hidayat Mus submitted a proposal for a regional expansion to the provincial parliament of North Maluku. This proposal later was accepted by the provincial parliament, and then the proposal was proposed to the Indonesian parliament. In 2012, the Indonesian parliament accepted this proposal and granted the request for regional expansion.

As a result, part of the Sula Islands region led by Ahmad Hidayat Mus became a new regency called the Taliabu Islands Regency. The new regency needed a new leader, hence, Ahmad Hidayat Mus through his power as the leader of the Golkar Party in North Maluku, appointed his younger brother Aliong Mus to run as a candidate of regent in the direct elections for Taliabu Islands Regency. In 2015, due to robust socio-political connections and strong financial support by Mus family, Aliong Mus won the election and became the first regent of

the Taliabu Islands. In the 2020 election, Aliong Mus seeks for a second term in Taliabu Islands Regency.

Ahmad Hidayat Mus' achievement in regional expansion inspired other regional heads, such as Muhammad Kasuba, the Regent of South Halmahera. At the end of Muhammad Kasuba's leadership, he wanted to follow what Ahmad Hidayat Mus was doing in the Sula Islands by planning a regional expansion for the Obi Islands. Unfortunately, the final decision towards the proposal was delayed in the Indonesian parliament. Until now, the Obi Islands is not officially authorized to become a new regency and remain as a part of South Halmahera territory. It is widely suspected that at that time Muhammad Kasuba aimed to nominate his son as a candidate for the Obi Islands if the area was officially authorized to be a new regency.

Moreover, to preserve power at the provincial and regional level, it is essential to secure support from the national political elites. For example, at the national level, Ahmad Hidayat Mus also had a business relationship with Aburizal Bakrie, a national-level business tycoon and former chairman of Golkar Party. Between 2016-2017, when Golkar Party was led by Setya Novanto, the relationship between Ahmad Hidayat Mus and Novanto was considered intimate. Novanto installed Ahmad Hidayat Mus as the head of the Golkar Party's election department responsible for the eastern Indonesia.

Ahmad Hidayat Mus was also suspected to conduct a money laundering by establishing a horse racing club. The Ahmad Hidayat Mus horse racing club was named Taliabo Club. He once bought a racehorse named Red Silenos for Rp 500 million (Tempo, 2013). Taliabo club owned by Mus family is said to have hundreds of luxurious horses distributed in many horse racing clubs in Indonesia. Ahmad Hidayat Mus' horse racing club developed a new connection with one of the police generals, Brigadier General Machmud Arifin. Ahmad Hidayat Mus has assisted Arifin in organizing the 2012 Kapolri Cup by lending his horses to Arifin and also contributing funds of Rp 350 million for the event at the same time (Febryan & Nurgianto, 2013).

The Impact of Dynasty Building in Post-conflict North Maluku

From the examination above, we can understand how two families have consolidated their political power in post-conflict North Maluku. Consolidation of their political power was possible due to the opportunity presented by democratization, especially in the implementation

of decentralization and direct elections. What are the common patterns and differences we can find in these two dynasties that have dominated the local political economy?

It is now safe to say that local politics in North Maluku are controlled by two families and associated local oligarchs, including regional officials and wealthy people. Their power consolidation is a result of the direct local head elections that have required candidates to prepare a huge amount of electoral finance. Who can afford it? Only those who have a strong network in the local politico-business community can do so, and in the case of North Maluku, two powerful families we have examined above show their capacity to be the new local oligarch in the age of democracy.

The ability of Kasuba and Mus to maintain their power at local level has also been boosted by the network they have developed to the political party elites at the national level. In the case of Kasuba family, Abdul Gani Kasuba and Muhammad Kasuba were board members of PKS at the national level. On the other hand, Ahmad Hidayat Mus was close to the former chairman of Golkar Party, Setya Novanto. Ahmad Hidayat Mus was also well connected with the patron of Golkar Party, Aburizal Bakrie and the former party treasury, Idrus Marham. Such close relationship to the political parties' leadership at the national level has allowed the two families to maintain their power in the provincial and regency politics for a rather longer period. The families have obtained blessing from the party's national leadership to nominate anyone including their families in the provincial/regency elections. This close ties with the national leadership were missing in the previous local elites in North Maluku, hence, they could only maintain the political power in a relatively short time.

Moreover, with the pieces of evidence as mentioned above, we can see that the rise of political dynasty has helped the local elites to consolidate their power and capitalize/exploit the economic power and resources at the same time. Consequently, the attempts to preserve politico-economic power of political dynasty has significantly reduced the incentive to go back to conflict. With the rise of political dynasty, the conflict in North Maluku can be prognosticated; it only erupts during the election.

When in power, the local elites would view this opportunity as a chance to exploit the economic benefits by controlling the local natural resources. Each family has focused and concentrated on their territory and since then, the regional balance of power has been formed in North Maluku. In some way, this balance of power has contributed to political stability in the post-conflict North Maluku.

Furthermore, we could identify a commonality in sustaining patronage networks between the Kasuba and Mus families. For example, Mus and Kasuba families have held

extensive influence on the local civil servants. When they are in power as the regional leader, they appoint their families as the head of a department, especially a department which allocates immense regional and national budgets such as education, or a department which associates with extensive projects such as energy, mining, public works, housing, social welfare, and transportation.

The two families also have a difference in approaching grassroots. The Kasuba family has associated with Islamic teachings, values, and traditions. The family has visited the mosque to deliver a sermon and missionary endeavor. On the other hand, as a businessman family, Mus owns plantation and timber companies in several locations in North Maluku. The Mus family maintains loyal supporters by being generous to the people. It is this difference in the two families' approaches to grassroots that could effectively avoid direct confrontation at the grassroots level and maintain the elite-level balance of power in the post-conflict North Maluku.

The external dynamics has also contributed to the success of political dynasty building, which has resulted in the stability of North Maluku. The weak oversight by the watchdog institutions and law enforcement agencies, as well as the ineffective role of regional civil society are clearly the factors that have helped empower Kasuba and Mus families.

In sum, such a combination of internal and external dynamics has brought dynastic stability that leads to a peace equilibrium in North Maluku. The irony is that the permissive actions towards the enduring corruption have contributed to the decline in political motivation to use violence in seeking profits, and this in turn can be assessed as a significant factor that has incentivized two dynasties to maintain the power balance and political status quo.

Summary

This chapter discussed the post-conflict evolution of political dynasty in North Maluku and examined the process of how Kasuba and Mus families have preserved their political power in the region. The consolidation of political dynasty started to emerge in two regencies in North Maluku, i.e., South Halmahera and Sula Islands. The Kasuba family has dominated South Halmahera regency, and Mus family has controlled the Sula Islands regency. South Halmahera is the most populous regency while Sula Islands is one of the poorest regencies in North Maluku.

The first part of this chapter examined the Kasuba family that has maintained power for almost two decades. The Kasuba family is well-known in North Maluku because it embraces Islamic preachers. They have travelled across North Maluku to give a sermon and Islamic teachings. Most of politicians in the Kasuba family are raised as the Islam-oriented PKS (Prosperous Justice Party) members and cadres. Two prominent leaders from Kasuba family are Abdul Gani Kasuba and Muhammad Kasuba. Abdul Gani Kasuba was a national parliamentarian from PKS. He was the Vice Governor of North Maluku in 2008, and also won the elections to become the governor in 2013 and 2018.

On the other hand, Muhammad Kasuba was the first regent of South Halmahera regency, and he led the regency between 2005-2015. To be able to maintain his power, Muhammad Kasuba implemented populist policies such as free education and free healthcare in the regency. He also extended his political influence by allocating regional budgets to hire and select an Islamic cleric for each mosque in South Halmahera. With this, he was able to oversee, expand, and maintain loyal supporters as far as the village level. Besides, during his leadership, Muhammad Kasuba also hired numerous non-permanent employees as regional government officials, as well as appointing his family members to command specific departments in South Halmahera, including his wife, Rosdiana Djoisangaji.

Interestingly, the dynasty is not always united within. In 2018 election, Kasuba family was split into two because Abdul Gani Kasuba and Muhammad Kasuba, two senior politicians in the family, competed in the same gubernatorial election. Bahrain Kasuba supported Abdul Gani Kasuba and the rest of the family including those who supported PKS, leaned into Muhammad Kasuba. It is important to note that this kind of intra-dynasty contestation was not to undermine the influence of the family. Instead, it contributed to the diversification of political players in the family and helped consolidate the dynastic patronage network in North Maluku.

The second family we examined in this chapter was the Mus family. While the Kasuba is known as Islamic, the Mus family members are dominated by businessmen, and they are well-known for their generosity. The Mus family's political network and tremendous business resources have been managed by Ahmad Hidayat Mus. He was the regent of Sula Islands in 2005-2015. During his leadership as a regent, many development projects (mainly the road construction projects) in the Sula islands were carried out by direct appointment without proposal/auction. We have seen how the Mus family has continuously and heavily linked to nine gigantic corruption cases. During the 2018 election, Ahmad Hidayat Mus was named by the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) as a suspect of corruption for infrastructure

projects in the Sula Islands while he was the regent in 2012. Before the KPK investigated the corruption case, the law enforcement institutions such as regional police or the provincial prosecutor's office were not able to name Ahmad Hidayat Mus as a suspect. He remains untouched because he has maintained a close relationship with several police generals at the Indonesian National Police.

From our observation, we can now identify how the rise of the political dynasty has helped the local elites to consolidate political power and exploit economic resources at the same time. The two families have successfully built their respective political dynasty without resorting to violence. To large extent, it was due to the post-conflict environment where massive economic opportunities were so attractive for local power elites to stop conflict and develop political stability conducive for economic rent-seeking activities. Sustaining such an environment quickly became a 'shared value' among local power elites. Under these circumstances, the two families have used different patronage resources to build up their own dynasty in different territories of North Maluku in a way to avoid direct confrontations both at the elite and grassroots levels. The resulting balance of power between the two dynasties in North Maluku has seriously undermined the quality of local governance that involves transparency and accountability in the region's administrative management, but it has effectively boosted the elite incentive to stabilize the society and maintain peaceful environments for everyday politico-economic activities. It is nothing but an irony that the post-conflict peace in North Maluku has been enabled and sustained at the very cost of local dynasty building that has eroded local democratic institutions and minimized the practice of good governance

Chapter 8

Conclusion

This study is about post-conflict development in North Maluku, Indonesia. The whole thing started after the fall of President Soeharto in 1998. The change in the national political landscape brought many unintended consequences including violent conflicts in many parts of Indonesia. Comparing to other post-conflict regions in Indonesia, such as Poso and Aceh, the security situation in North Maluku has been significantly conducive and stable for the past two decades. The existing studies have focused on the conflict in Indonesia but often neglected the analysis on the post-conflict recovery, because the country has been too busy with violent conflicts. For example, in the case of North Maluku, the conflict stopped in 2001-2002, and the majority of scholars moved their attention to another conflict zone, for example Aceh where the conflict escalated in 2003. Equivalently, the previous scholarly works on the topic of North Maluku were limited to studies of what happened during the conflict. A few existing pieces of literature on the discussion of post-conflict in North Maluku were also insufficient because they focused mainly on Ambon, the capital of Maluku province at that time.

My study aimed to fill this academic gap of post-conflict development in North Maluku. This study used a chronological approach to elaborate the process and the dynamics of post-conflict peacebuilding. The study of a post-conflict society is an effort to deal with a gradual change in the society over a long period of time. Hence, this study started with the historical point of view aiming to analyze the roots of the conflict. Then, our examination moved into the situation during the conflict and subsequently to the post-conflict dynamics. My study attempted to analyze the post-conflict development comprehensively by investigating three aspects, namely socio-economic recovery, democratic practices, and new local power formation.

We started our examination with central questions: why could post-conflict North Maluku maintain so-called peace? What are the key factors which have preserved peace and stability in the post-conflict North Maluku? In investigating these two core questions, we looked closely at two families who are in control of the current politico-economic realms of North Maluku. As we saw in Chapters 6 and 7, these families have formed a balance of power in North Maluku in a way to sustain the local stability for the past fifteen years. With this development in mind, our main discussion in this thesis is that the consolidation of dynastic

power in North Maluku through the medium of democratic elections has significantly contributed to the peacebuilding in the region at the cost of building a good governance exemplified by political transparency and accountability. In other words, the peace has been maintained by establishing two political dynasties who share the perception that the current power equilibrium is beneficial for both sides in dominating political influence and seeking economic interests. It is nothing but a consequence of this powerful elite capturing of local politico-economic resources that has incentivized these elites to maintain peace in the region. ‘Peace for sale’ should be understood as the best term to identify the irony of the post-conflict North Maluku. Before illustrating broader implications of this study, let us overview our discussions in each chapter below.

Overview

In Chapter 2, we examined the historical roots of North Maluku’s conflict. We highlighted that the roots of conflict could be found in competitions among local communities that had existed since 15th century. Historically, the northern part of the Maluku islands has been under Islamic values since the arrival of Islamic teachings in Maluku in the 15th century. The initiative to adopt Islamic values was made by traditional institutions called the sultanate. The northern part of Maluku was known under the influence of four sultans, and they were Jailolo, Bacan, Tidore, and Ternate. At the same time, the southern part of Maluku remained under the influence of Christians. The inequalities and rivalries between Muslim in the north and Christians in the south were formulated ever since. The spread of Christianity occurred relatively quickly during the Dutch period because Christianity was introduced and propagated by the Dutch as an exercise of colonial power. We learned that the polarization between Muslim and Christian communities sharpened after colonialism, with the rise of occupational segregation and other forms of discrimination based on religion. However, the situation began to change significantly during the Soeharto regime (1966-1998). Muslims were able to match and surpass the Christians. Thus, we concluded, the shift in socioeconomic and political landscape was perceived as a threat to the long-standing Christian privilege and created a new inequality which was sharpened after the fall of Soeharto in 1998. The negative sentiment between Christians and Muslims that had been cultivated for years continued to develop until the conflict erupted in February 1999.

Chapter 3 examined how and why the conflict erupted and spread in Maluku islands in 1999. The conflict was deadly, and the victims were too high. The violence resulted in 2,789

deaths from 68 incidents. We found that there were several reasons for the conflict outbreak, contrary to major previous studies that only highlighted the religious reason. The tension in North Maluku gradually escalated after the incident in Ambon, which also resulted in forced mobility of the population. We concluded that the conflict in North Maluku did not have a single explanation, but the roots lie somewhere between gold (money), political power struggle, and gospel (religious belief). We found that the reasons ranged from a fight over natural resources, land grabbing, racial and religious divides, and the violent actions taken by royal armies of two sultanates, Ternate and Tidore. We also learned that the involvement of security forces, such as the military and police, and the role of external parties such as Laskar Jihad during conflict made the conflict worse. These unfamiliar faces came unnoticed from one village to another to share combat plans to attack the enemy.

Chapter 4 focused on the peace settlement in North Maluku. We analyzed the dynamics and different stages of the peace process. The existing studies have simply described the success of Malino II agreement initiated by the Indonesian government in February 2002. However, we learned that long before the peace discussion at the national level, the people in North Maluku initiated their peace initiatives in a village named Mamuya. The peace talks were held in three different meetings in the late 2000. These meetings were led by two local elites: Samsul Bahri Umar and Hein Namotemo. After the initiative in Mamuya, a few local peace talks were held across North Maluku. From the document we discovered, Christians and Muslims signed a statement which agreed to end the violence between them in June 2001 in Galela. In order to strengthen the Mamuya peace agreement, Namotemo also initiated a peace initiative at the level of *adat*. The *adat* level peace initiative was crucial as the people in North Maluku had respected the traditional and customary initiatives to tie the local community together.

Chapter 5 examined the post-conflict social recovery. The local war destroyed buildings and houses, including mosques and churches. The destruction of many buildings resulted in a huge amount of assistance and funding being directed into North Maluku. The overwhelming flow of aid and funds to North Maluku ironically produced an elite incentive for political stability because the warring elites were busy to manage the usage of funds, such as social assistance and the IDP funds. Our analysis also revealed that the overflowing of aid was also followed by the misuse and the exploitation of aid assistance in a way to enrich post-conflict local elites. How did post-conflict economic projects reshape local political power in North Maluku? How did corruption affect the process of peacebuilding in North Maluku? What were forms of corruption in the post-conflict situation? These were the questions we examined in

this chapter. Our answers to these questions illustrated how corruption affected and ironically support peacebuilding initiative in North Maluku. We found that these funds were managed by the same elites who led Muslims and Christians during the conflict. Hence, we argued that the post-conflict funds were used to silence those who were considered a risk to peace. We found that this set a dangerous precedent for those who lean towards violence. When their funds began to run out, they quickly returned to violence to ensure a continuous money supply. It should also be noted that the immediate post-conflict North Maluku could only provide a minimal administrative accountability, and this environment was ideal for corrupt practices in the form of broken legal and judicial systems. Importantly, the elite capturing of recovery funds was incentivized by the nation-wide introduction of local autonomy, which effectively allowed a provincial government to manage its budgets, determine administrative areas, and select local heads. This local autonomy initiative resulted in the elite fighting for power at the provincial and regency levels and they exploited the post-conflict recovery funds to gain support from the people for the sake of their political campaigns.

Chapter 6 examined such elite fighting conducted through local heads elections. The early-stage competition was between Sultan Mudaffar Sjah and Bahar Andili. We identified this competition as the rivalry between the two sultanates of Ternate and Tidore. But soon after this, the political landscape changed to the rivalry between ethnic identities. Traditional sultanates could no longer enjoy blind loyalty of grass-roots people who were now more easily mobilized by new political elites who provoked ethnic identities. It was in this process that two new players, Abdul Gafur and Thaib Armaiyn, emerged in the local electoral politics and they maneuvered the rivalry between two majority ethnicities in North Maluku, i.e., Makian and Tobelo.

Chapter 7 examined the evolution of such an ethnic identity politics to dynastic power consolidation in North Maluku. We learned that the results of the 2005 regional head elections showed the start of new dynasty building led by the Kasuba family who controlled South Halmahera and by the Mus family who controlled Sula Islands regency. Our investigation for the Kasuba family indicated that, to be able to maintain power, the family implemented populist policies such as free education and free healthcare in the regency. Muhammad Kasuba when he was the regent, used regional budgets to hire Islamic clerics for each mosque in South Halmahera. He aimed to oversee, expand, and maintain his loyal supporters as far as the village level. Appointing his family members to lead specific departments in South Halmahera was also a strategy of the family to dominate the government operations. On the other hand, the Mus family has not employed religious approaches but inclined to emphasize business talents

in governing North Maluku. During Ahmad Hidayat Mus leadership in Sula Islands, his family actively involved in several infrastructure projects. We found that Mus family has regularly linked to nine gigantic corruption cases. However, the family members remain untouched for years because he has developed a close relationship with several police generals at the national level.

Contributing to the Scholarship

Let us conclude this study by illuminating its scholarly contributions. First, my study should be located in the field of area studies with its focus on the local post-conflict political change in Indonesia. The growing literatures on the post-conflict local politics in Indonesia have focused on the cases of Aceh, Papua, West Kalimantan, Poso and Ambon, but the study of North Maluku has never been published before. Thus, this thesis should be recognized as the first in-depth study examining North Maluku's local politics in the post-conflict period.

Second, this study advanced our understanding of the politics of peacebuilding in Indonesia, by providing the analysis of how post-conflict recovery funds/assistances and introduction of democratic institutions (e.g. direct elections, local autonomy) contribute to the making of local political stability and peace, *not* because of their expected power to bring reconciliation and reform society, but because of their unintended impact of stimulating the emergence of new local elites and incentivizing them to sustain political stability in order to preserve politico-economic benefits, with a clear result of deteriorating good governance. In other words, the so-called peace is maintained at the cost of democratic politico-economic management. We developed this argument by investigating the case of North Maluku, but its implications should not be limited there. In fact, our argument may provide an alternative answer to a common question of why peace is not stable in places like Aceh, Poso, and Papua. It is widely argued that legacies of conflict days have not been solved in these places, hence the peace is vulnerable there. However, we may offer a new approach of analyzing the elite power-balance and politico-economic interest distribution as a key factor determining the sustainability of post-conflict peace. In this sense, my study is expected to have a contribution to the scholarship of Indonesian politics at large.

Third, even beyond Indonesia, the analysis developed in this study may provide a new framework for examining post-war local politics in different places in Southeast Asia, for example Mindanao in the Philippines and Southern provinces in Thailand, where the local


politics suffers deficit of stability for long time. Why so? Many have tried to identify violent actors as the major source of instability, but my study encourages us to look at the nature of local elite contestation in gaining politico-economic interests there and link it to the state of peace. Doing so may illustrate a different logic of peace and conflict in contemporary Southeast Asia, and it may also lead to a government's policy initiative that aims to tame local powerful actors by showing how peace is 'profitable' for them, even at the costs of justice, democracy and good governance. If such pragmatism is prominent in North Maluku, there is no reason to believe that it can be applicable only to the region. Therefore, we do hope that this study can be a future reference for the peacebuilding initiatives to other post-conflict regions in Indonesia and beyond.

Appendices


Below are appendices collected during the field trip in 2018. The appendices that we collected mostly consist of documents, such as:

1. A graphic of confederation arrangement of *Moloku Kie Raha* (This information obtained from Tim Peneliti P3M STAIN Ternate, 2012).
2. A graphic which illustrates the structure of the Dutch colonial government bureaucracy when they were in North Maluku (This information obtained from Tim Peneliti P3M STAIN Ternate, 2012).
3. Bloody Sosol letter (English translation of this letter taken from Duncan, 2013, pp. 183-187).
4. Peace declaration of Indigenous' people (*Masyarakat Adat*) of Tobelo. This information obtained from Jesaya Rahaguna Bahari and a priest named SS Duan.
5. Statement of principle between Muslim Galela and Christian Galela, this information obtained from a priest named SS Duan.
6. Letter from Ir. Frans Manery to Roke Saway and Samsul Bahri Umar. This letter collected from Samsul Bahri Umar.
7. Agreement between elites in Tobelo-Galela in thoughts. This information collected from Jesaya Rahaguna Bahari, a priest named SS Duan, and Samsul Bahri Umar.
8. Letter from Samsul Bahri Umar to Hein Namotemo as a response to the letter from Manery. This letter obtained from Samsul Bahri Umar.

Appendix: 1. Confederation arrangement of *Moloku Kie Raha* (Tim Peneliti P3M STAIN Ternate, 2012)



Appendix: 2. The structure of the Dutch colonial government bureaucracy in North Maluku (Tim Peneliti P3M STAIN Ternate, 2012).



Appendix 3. Bloody Sosol letter (English translation of this letter from here after taken from Duncan, 2013, pp.183-187).

No: 028/SGT/CSIS/VII/1999

Attachment: 1 (one) file

Nature: Very Secret

Re: Plan for the revenge invasion of Bloody Sosol

To the Honorable Head of the Halmahera Synod in Tobelo

A. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

Prosperous greetings in the love of our Lord Jesus Christ

We have received your letter, and we and the team consider the situation serious. In anticipation of regional autonomy, it is essential that the Synod of Halmahera develop independent working programs, for when all working relationships, both internal and external between us (Ambon and Halmahera) will be separated. Thus, there is a need for more intelligent thinking in the relation to the Bloody Sosol incident. These has arisen a war of words between regional officials from North Maluku and Central Halmahera over establishing the basic framework for the provincial capital. This moment must be used to achieve our objective, namely:

- to inhabit / to occupy as a whole the area around the provincial capital.

Thus, the Tobelo, Galela, Kao, and Sahu ethnic groups which have long been ignored and regarded as the lowest ethnic groups by other ethnic groups in North Maluku and Central Halmahera, can, little by little through a long-term program, take over governance process.

Awaken the noble mission of The Shepherd reconciling the world in the love of the Lord Jesus Christ. Seen from a geographical perspective, North Maluku and Central Halmahera are flanked by Central Maluku (Ambon), North Sulawesi (Manado), and Irian Jaya, which are generally known as majority Christian. Thus, our plan to welcome the new province will become more real from year to year. Queries by the church have noted that North Sulawesi is ready to release Sangir-Talaud to North Maluku. Through traditional historic and cultural ties, as well as the love of Jesus Christ, this issue will find support from the regional government of North Maluku.

Thus, our brothers and sisters from Sangir-Talaud will find space more easily on the mainland of Halmahera, this will be the root that gives rise to young warriors of Christ who are skilled in the use of weapons of hunting and warfare and have pure minds and are full of bravery to support the Tobelo, Galela, Kao, and Sahu ethnic groups. When the time comes two major powers will arise namely:

- The Indigenous Warriors of Christ
- The Migrant Warriors of Christ

The other ethnic groups in North Maluku/Central Halmahera will have difficulty standing up to the strength of the two aforementioned groups. (According to Muslim sources and the Butonese, Bugis, and Makarase in Ambon).

B. STRATEGY FOR THE RETURN INVASION OF BLOODY SOSOL

In our meetings with the Warrior of Christ from North Halmahera that are currently in Ambon, we decided the following:

1. To arm/gather great strength from Christian areas, from every subdistrict down to every small village, including the isolated tribes who should be approached by the church with biblical language.
2. The war has to be framed as one about ethnicity/borders.
3. Arm the Kao Muslims in whatever way possible and as subtly as possible (to be supported with funds).
4. Immediately announce the cost of war operations (reserve funds of approximately 400,000,000 rupiah).
5. In the near future two flat-bottomed transport ships will be dispatched to Kao Bay and two tuna fishing boats to Sidangoli Bay.
6. The attacks will be carried simultaneously according to instructions.
7. Mosques, schools, and government offices should be guarded so they are not burnt down.
8. The war will be fought with methods aimed at expulsion, kill those who resist as sadistically as possible.
9. The elite warriors at the Theological University of Ternate will take an active role in the war.

C. GOALS

The Makian tribe is an indigenous North Moluccan ethnic group that mostly inhabits coastal parts of Halmahera, they have a high level of brutality, they are smart, hard workers, brave, and very fanatic Muslims.

Concentrate all power in every way possible, the warriors of Christ must defeat them through expulsion and murder in mainland Halmahera.

Make war and kill them in the most sadistic ways possible in order to cause mental depression and war trauma, but do not kill small children, women, or the elderly so we do not lose sympathy. Start checking identity cards on the Trans-Tobelo highway and explain why with the sympathetic language to other ethnic groups so they understand the difference between ethnicity and tribe, religion, race, and class (*Suku, Agama, Ras, dan Antargolongan* – SARA) so it will be clearer in the later wars.

The attack will be accurate because it will be supported by bomb experts and strategic experts and tools and other equipment that will arrive with flat-bottomed transport ship under the guise of selling used cars. Two tuna fishing boats are already prepared in front of Gamdehe village in Sidangoli Bay with the excuse that they are broken, at any time they can be used for unexpected needs.

By adhering to the pattern of war set out in the points of part B (war strategy) then:

- The Makianese ethnic group will not find support from other Muslims in North Maluku/Central Halmahera.
- The Muslim community that we have long known as a unified power will be torn asunder by the strength of its own ethnic groups.
- The Makianese ethnic group, the Islamic giant of North Maluku and Central Halmahera, will be defeated by our multi-ethnic coalition, tied together by our Christian faith. This process will create a new giant that will rise with the face of the indigenous ethnic

groups of Halmahera with the blood of Jesus the Savior, who is coming at the third millennium to complete the golden triangle of Maluku, North Sulawesi, and Irian Jaya, which has always been conducive to the work of the church.

- The defeat of the Islamic giant of the land of Halmahera (Malifut) will be a barometer for other ethnic groups to open a front in a new war, which will have these effects:
 1. The Ternatean, Tidorese, Bacan, and Sanana ethnic groups will be stunned and frightened by seeing the giant of Christ running rampant.
 2. Other Muslim ethnic groups will be reluctant and scared to enter North Halmahera.

Thus, be confident and commit to undertake this noble mission.

Jesus Christ is always with us as we enforce justice and enlarge his community of believers on earth.

Ecumenical greetings

In the name of Governing
Council of S.G.T-C.S.I.S.
Head of the Maluku Synod
(SEMI TITALEY)

Appendix: 4. Peace Declaration of Indigenous' people (Masyarakat adat) of Tobelo
DEKLARASI DAMAI MASYARAKAT ADAT TOBELO
PADA HARI KAMIS TANGGAL 19 APRIL 2001
DI LAPANGAN HIBUA LAMO TOBELO

NASKAH DEKLARASI DAMAI

Atas berkat rahmat Tuhan Yang Maha Esa, dan dengan didorongkan oleh keinginan yang tulus dari masing-masing pihak, maka kami masyarakat Adat Hibua Lamo Tobelo Islam dan Kristen sepakat bahwa pada hari ini, Kamis tanggal 19 April 2001 jam 10.00 WIT, setelah terjadi pertikaian yang telah mengakibatkan berbagai pengorbanan dan kerugian yang tidak ternilai harganya baik harta beda, maupun nyawa, serta penderitaan yang sungguh berat, di atas perkabungan dan kesdihan yang dalam, maka kami sepakat meletakkan senjata dan menghentikan permusuhan ini, serta mengadakan perdamaian sekali untuk selama-lamanya, dengan ketentuan sebagai berikut:

Pasal 1

Kami semua sepakat dan berjanji bahwa tidak akan ada lagi permusuhan dan pertikaian di Wilayah Adat Hibua Lamo khususnya Kecamatan Tobelo. Apabila ada orang atau kelompok orang yang merancang kejahatan terhadap orang lain (kelompok agama lain) dan melakukannya, mereka akan korban dan kalah di mana saja karena perbuatannya itu.

Pasal 2

Kami semua sepakat dan berjanji, untuk tidak saling menghina, melecehkan, dan mempermalukan orang lain atau kelompok agama lain, baik langsung maupun tidak langsung. Kami juga sepakat untuk saling menghormati dan menghargai orang lain kelompok agama lain, untuk menjalankan ibadahnya, serta saling melindungi baik umatnya maupun tempat ibadahnya masing-masing, dan hidup berdampingan secara harmonis, aman, dan utuh dalam persaudaraan sejati

Pasal 3

Kedua belah pihak sepakat untuk tidak melakukan percakapan secara rahasia atau sembunyi-sembunyi baik perorangan maupun kelompok, dan tidak mengadakan pembicaraan jarak jauh dengan menggunakan alat telepon, HT, SSB, dan lainnya untuk merencanakan dan membicarakan kejahatan terhadap pihak lain. Apabila kedapatan ada yang melakukan hal ini, akan ditindak secara tegas dan adil oleh pihak yang berkompeten, bahkan jika perbuatannya itu dilakukan dua sampai tiga kali, maka orang tersebut harus keluar dari wilayah Tobelo.

Pasal 4

Kami sepakat untuk tidak lagi mengungkit-ungkit masa lalu yang hanya membenarkan dan/atau mempersalahkan pihak tertentu, tetapi perlu mengenang masa lalu untuk tidak akan terulang lagi sampai selama-lamanya.

Pasal 5

Kedua belah pihak sepakat untuk pemulangan Pengungsi dilakukan secara selektif dan bertahap.

Pasal 6

Setiap tamu dari luar atau pendatang yang bukan penduduk Tobelo, harus melapor kepada Kepala Desa atau Ketua Lingkungan setempat

Pasal 7

Apabila terjadi perbedaan pendapat, baku marah, atau berkelahi antar warga masyarakat, dilarang dan tidak dibenarkan mengikutsertakan golongan agama atau kelompok lain untuk terlibat dalam persoalan tersebut. Barang siapa yang menggunakan simbol agama dalam setiap persoalan yang terjadi, akan ditindak secara tegas oleh pihak yang berkompeten

Pasal 8

Kedua belah pihak sepakat untuk saling menolong, dan melakukan pekerjaan Bersama, mencari nafkah bersama baik di darat maupun di laut, dan tidak saling mencelakakan satu dengan lainnya

Pasal 9

Kedua belah pihak sepakat untuk tidak lagi menggunakan istilah “merah” bagi umat Kristen dan “putih” bagi umat Muslim, serta tidak lagi menggunakan istilah atau ungkapan “laskar Kristen” bagi umat Kristen dan “laskar Jihad” bagi umat Muslim, maupun “Acan” bagi warga Muslim dan “Obet” bagi warga Kristen

Pasal 10

Kedua belah pihak sepakat bahwa Pemerintah dan Aparat Keamanan maupun POLRI adalah wakil-wakil Allah di dunia ini, untuk menjalankan dan menegakkan keadilan, kebenaran, dan kejujuran dalam menjalankan tugasnya sebagai pengayom dan pelindung rakyat, diberikan kepercayaan untuk melaksanakan tugasnya sesuai peraturan perundangan yang berlaku. Karena itu maka setiap anggota Pemerintah, TNI, dan POLRI, diminta dapat bersikap netral dan adil, berbicara, dan berperilaku secara santun, sopan, dan berwibawa dalam menjalankan tugasnya

Pasal 11

Kedua belah pihak juga sepakat untuk menghargai dan menjunjung tinggi Pemerintah, TNI, dan POLRI, serta bersikap santun dan sopan kepada Pemerintah, Aparat Keamanan, maupun POLRI yang sedang menjalankan tugasnya.

Pasal 12

Kedua belah pihak sepakat untuk selalu bersatu dan bersama-sama dalam berbagai kegiatan baik menjaga kantibmas di desa masing-masing, maupun menentang pengacau yang datang dari luar wilayah Tobelo

Pasal 13

Kedua belah pihak sepakat, bahwa setelah penandatanganan surat kesepakatan ini, dan setelah Pengungsi kembali ke desa asalnya, maka semua harta benda dan kekayaan yang masih ada, tidak boleh diganggu gugat oleh siapapun yang bukan haknya.

Pasal 14

Apabila setelah penandatanganan surat kesepakatan ini, lalu terjadi pelanggaran baik sengaja maupun tidak sengaja terhadap pasal-pasal dalam kesepakatan ini, harus bersedia mengganti seluruh kerugian yang ditimbulkannya, serta harus mempertanggung jawabkan perbuatannya di hadapan pengadilan sesuai hukum yang berlaku

Pasal 15

Penandatanganan kesepakatan ini, dilakukan secara sadar dan pikiran yang waras, tanpa ada paksaan dari pihak manapun juga

Pasal 16

Kesepakatan ini dinyatakan mulai berlaku pada saat ditandatangani oleh kedua belah pihak. Apabila di kemudian hari terdapat kekeliruan dalam kesepakatan ini, akan dilakukan perbaikan sebagaimana mestinya.

Demikian surat kesepakatan ini dibuat dan ditandatangani oleh kedua belah pihak, dan disaksikan oleh pejabat-pejabat instansi terkait pada hari, tanggal, bulan, dan tahun seperti tersebut dibawah ini.

Dibuat dan disepakati di Tobelo
Pada hari Kamis, tanggal 19 April tahun 2001

TOKOH MASYARAKAT KRISTEN

TOKOH MASYARAKAT MUSLIM

- | | |
|---------------------------|-----------------------|
| 1. ZAKEUS ODARA () | 1. ABTAR SYAFI () |
| 2. BERNARD BITJARA () | 2. JUSUP RACHMAD () |
| 3. ZADRAK TONGO-TONGO () | 3. AMAN TARIMA () |
| 4. NAHOR LUTUNANI () | 4. MUCHLIS BABA () |
| 5. PDT. S.S. DUAN MTH () | 5. M. DJEN NURDIN () |
| 6. JOSEPH BARANI () | 6. RONO ETEKE () |

SAKSI-SAKSI:

CAMAT TOBELO

KETUA SINODE GMIH

HEIN NAMOTEMO, MSP

PDT. A. NAESH, MTH

Appendix: 5. Statement of principle between Muslim Galela and Christians Galela

PERNYATAAN SIKAP BERSAMA ANTARA WARGA MUSLIM GALELA DAN WARGA KRISTEN GALELA

Atas izin dan kuasa Tuhan Yang Maha Esa dan didasari oleh rasa keikhlasan yang sama, kami pada hari ini: Sabtu, tanggal 30 Juni 2001, bertempat di Gedung MTQ Togawa Galela menyatakan kesepakatan sebagai berikut:

1. Kami semua sepakat bahwa tidak ada lagi pertikaian dan tidak saling mengganggu, serta tidak melakukan lagi tindak kejahatan yang dapat menimbulkan kerugian pada kelompok agama lain.
2. Kedua belah pihak sepakat untuk tidak mengungkit masa lalu dengan ucapan kata-kata seperti Acang, Obet, Merah, dan Putih, yang hanya menimbulkan kebencian dan dendam, tetapi masa lalu dijadikan pelajaran untuk tidak terulang lagi bagi anak cucu kita karena membawa kesengsaraan dan penderitaan.
3. Kami semua sepakat bahwa warga Kristen Galela kembali ke Galela secara keseluruhan dan tidak dalam bentuk paket (per keluarga).
4. Kami semua sepakat bahwa pengembalian warga Kristen Galela ke Galela dan pengembalian warga Muslim Tobelo ke Tobelo dalam satu hari bersamaan, sebagai upaya menciptakan rasa Keadilan yang sama diantara kedua belah pihak.
5. Kami semua sepakat bahwa tehnik Pengembalian warga Kristen Galela ke Galela dan warga Muslim Tobelo ke Tobelo diserahkan kepada pihak Pemerintah Daerah Propinsi Maluku Utara dan Pemerintah Daerah Kabupaten Maluku Utara.
6. Kami semua sepakat bahwa hal-hal yang dapat mengganggu ketentraman kehidupan beragama seperti miras, binatang ternak, ditertibkan serta pembina kerohanian adalah asli putra Halmahera.
7. Kami semua sepakat bahwa warga Muslim dan warga Kristen yang masih diasuh oleh kedua pihak akan diatur dan di koordinasikan pada Pemerintah setempat.
8. Kami semua sepakat bahwa barang siapa dengan sengaja atau tidak disengaja melanggar hasil kesepakatan damai, diserahkan kepada pihak yang berwajib untuk ditindak sesuai hukum yang berlaku.
9. Kami semua sepakat bahwa hal-hal yang belum diatur dalam kesepakatan ini akan diatur sesuai dengan kebutuhan di Desa masing-masing.

Dibuat di : Galela
Pada tanggal : 30 Juni 2001

YANG MEWAKILI MASYARAKAT MUSLIM			YANG MEWAKILI MASYARAKAT KRISTEN		
NO	NAMA	DESA	NO	NAMA	DESA
1.	SAHRUL TIONI	JERE	1.	KAFIN KALOLI	MAMUYA
2.	JALAL MAJID	SALUTA	2.	ELGIUS LEFARA	SEKI
3.	HANAFI RAJIUNA	MALOLEO	3.	MATHEIS WADUI	TOGAWA
4.	A. RAHMAN KONGAHA	SALIMULI	4.	MATIUS SABANA	SOAKANORA

5.	M. FADEL H. MUTALIB	DODOGO	5.	YUSUP PUNI	BALE
6.	NURDIN UMAR	BOBISINGO	6.	ISAK DAILANGI	SOATOBARU
7.	RUSDI ABD SALAM	LALONGA	7.	M.P. FIKA	DOKULAMO
8.	M. ALEMAN	LIMAO	8.	YAN SANIA	NGIDIHO
9.	KADIM BIRAMASI	NGIDIHO	9.	SET MUSA	SALIMULI
10.	MUIS TARATE	GOTALAMO	10.	FRIT ETHA	DUMA
11.	HALIM JANGAOPA	DUKULAMO	11.	TOMAS TINUNGKI	PUNE
12.	MASUL PAJI	SOATABARU	12.	RUMPUS PALLI	ROKO
13.	YASIN WILUDU	ORE	13.	RUT MANONDO	MAKETE
14.	TAMRIN LEGO	IGOBULA			
15.	SAMIUN BASIR	SOAKONORA			
16.	H. HURIA TARATE	TOGAWA			
17.	USNADI SIBOSO	SEKI			
18.	ASRI RAMLI	SOASIO			
19.	UMAR CANABA	PUNE			
20.	KUBAIS SERANG	MAMUYA			
21.	TAHA H. DAHLAN	TOWEKA			
22.	AHMAD PILO	KOOR KADES			
23.	ALWI LEMON	FPMG			

SAKSI-SAKSI:

TOKOH AGAMA ISLAM GALELA

KETUA MPW GALELA

DRS. SAMSUL BAHRI UMAR

Pdt. S. DUNGIR

CAMAT TOBELO

CAMAT GALELA

Ir. HEIN NAMOTEMO

DRS. AHMAD SALAWANE

WAKIL BUPATI KDH TK II

DAN YONIF 742/SWY

A MOCH SAID

MAYOR INF. RULIANSYAH

KETUA DPRD TK I MALUKU UTARA

KOMANDAN SATPAMWIL II

RUSTAM KONORAS, S.H.

LETKOL DIDIT SATRIO

**SEKWILDA TK I
MALUKU UTARA**

DRS. H. THAIB ARMAIYN

Appendix: 6. Letter from Ir. Frans Manery to Roke Saway and Samsul Bahri Umar

Untuk
Pa Roke Saway/
Pa Samsul

Di Galela

Dengan hormat,

Terlampir kami kirimkan konsep kesepakatan pokok-pokok pikiran masyarakat Tobelo dan Galela. Sangat diharapkan Pak Roke dan teman-teman dapat membaca dan merubah/mempelajarinya agar kiranya ditandai/diperbaiki dan dapat ditanda tangani bersama

Terima kasih atas
Perhatian saudara-saudara
Tobelo, 06/10/2001

Ir. Frans Manery

Catatan: mohon konsep ini dapat dikirimkan kembali ke Tobelo.

Appendix: 7. Agreement between elites in Tobelo-Galela in thoughts.

KESEPAKATAN PARA TOKOH TOBELO-GALELA YANG DITUANGKAN DALAM BENTUK POKOK PIKIRAN DAN LANGKAH-LANGKAH UPAYA REKONSILIASI DI MALUKU UTARA

PENDAHULUAN

A. LATAR BELAKANG

Tragedi kemanusiaan yang terjadi di Maluku Utara umumnya dan Halmahera Utara khususnya sudah berlangsung sejak Bulan Agustus 1999 yang lalu, dan sampai saat ini belum dapat diselesaikan secara baik oleh berbagai pihak. Disadari bahwa upaya-upaya untuk rekonsiliasi telah dilakukan, namun belum memberikan hasil yang diharapkan bersama.

Semua kegagalan yang dialami ini, disebabkan karena disamping kajian merumuskan masalah yang tidak tepat, sehingga solusi pemecahan masalah dan langkah-langkah pemaksaan kehendak dari pihak-pihak tertentu yang berkepentingan, sehingga upaya bakubae yang dilaksanakan Maluku Utara selalu tidak berjalan seperti yang kita harapkan.

Dari pengalaman yang telah diuraikan secara singkat diatas, maka upaya lain yang akan dicoba untuk mempertemukan kedua kelompok yang bertikai ini melalui pendekatan kekeluargaan dibawah payung budaya adat Halmahera yang dianut dan diyakini selama berabad-abad lamanya sampai saat ini, walaupun pada beberapa waktu yang lalu, sekelompok orang yang tidak bertanggung jawab, telah memaksakan kehendaknya dan mampu memporakporandakan sendi-sendi kehidupan sosial yang harmonis yang telah terpelihara sejak lama, hancur berantakan. Karena itu, melalui upaya kebersamaan masyarakat Halmahera mencoba menjembatani pertikaian ini dengan pendekatan bakudapa masyarakat Islam-Kristen yang diawali dan dimulai dari Tobelo Galela sebagai upaya uji coba secara sporadic, yang jika berhasil, akan dilanjutkan ke wilayah-wilayah lain, dan pada gilirannya akan dilakukan secara menyeluruh di Maluku Utara melalui perdamaian yang abadi.

B. TUJUAN

Tujuan yang ingin dicapai dari upaya rekonsiliasi ini adalah “Menemukenali Jati Diri dan Budaya Adat Manusia Halmahera yang Sesungguhnya, menuju Halmahera yang damai dan utuh, untuk membangun masa depan secara bersama, memasuki Milenium Baru” di Maluku Utara

C. IDENTIFIKASI MASALAH

Mempelajari masalah yang menyebabkan terjadinya tragedi kemanusiaan di Maluku Utara umumnya dan di Halmahera Selatan khususnya, sampai saat ini menurut pemahaman dan kajian kami di lapangan, dapat diidentifikasi sebagai berikut:

Diawali dengan Kelompok pemuda pelajar dan Mahasiswa Makian Kayoa (Makayoa) menghimpun masa dan melakukan demo di depan Kantor Bupati Maluku Utara pada awal Bulan Agustus 1999, yang intinya memprotes kebijakan Pemda Maluku Utara yang memindahkan masyarakat Makian ke Malifut pada Tahun 1975, yang dimotori oleh beberapa tokoh muda yang menghujat Pemda pada waktu itu. Setelah itu mereka (Makayoa)

menurunkan timnya ke Malifut untuk mensosialisasikan PP No. 42 tahun 1999, serta membuat persiapan pengresmian Kecamatan Makian Malifut. Sementara masyarakat dari lima (5) desa Kecamatan Kao (Sosol, Wangeotak, Gayok, Balisosang, dan Tobobo) menolak bergabung dengan Kecamatan Makian Malifut. Selanjutnya kronologis peristiwa tragedi kemanusiaan yang terjadi dapat dijelaskan:

- Terjadinya penyerangan, pembakaran rumah dan pengusiran oleh masyarakat Makian di Malifut, terhadap penduduk asli masyarakat desa Sosol dan Wangeotak kecamatan Kao, pada tanggal 18 Agustus 1999, karena perbedaan pendapat dan keinginan yang berbeda terhadap batas wilayah Kecamatan Makian Malifut yang baru menurut PP. No. 42 tahun 1999.
- Kemudian pada tanggal 24 Oktober sekelompok masyarakat Malifut pergi ke Kao untuk menyerang masyarakat Kao, sehingga pada tanggal 25 Oktober 1999, masyarakat Kao kembali membalas dan membakar rumah-rumah penduduk Malifut, serta mengusir mereka sehingga demi keselamatan, mereka harus mengungsi ke Ternate. **Perlu dijelaskan bahwa tragedi ini bukan antara orang Islam Makian Malifut dengan orang Kristen Kao tetapi yang lebih benar adalah antara etnis Makian di Malifut dengan etnis Kao.**
- Pada tanggal 25 Oktober 1999, setelah pengungsi Malifut tiba di Ternate, permasalahan inti tentang batas wilayah Desa/Kecamatan Makian/Malifut dan pertikaian antar etnis, secara serius dirobah ke masalah agama, yang dimulai dengan pelemparan dan penghancuran rumah-rumah penduduk warga Kristen di Ternate. Pengalihan perhatian oleh kelompok masyarakat Makian/Malifut di Ternate dari persoalan etnis ke persoalan agama belum mampu mempengaruhi umat Islam dari etnis lain (bukan Makian) yang ada di Ternate.
- Oleh karena pengalihan pokok persoalan ini gagal, maka pada tanggal 30 Oktober 1999 beredar surat kaleng, yang berusaha merekayasa negative dan memprovokasi masa Muslim di Ternate dan Maluku Utara, seakan-akan surat itu dari Ketua Sinode GPM Ambon yang ditujukan kepada Ketua Sinode Halmahera, yang diberi judul **“Pembalasan Sosol Berdarah”** dengan berbagai alasan kepalsuannya. Dengan surat palsu ini, mulai terlihat ada gejala yang nampak bahwa sebagian kecil umat Islam mulai terpengaruh.
- Peristiwa tragis yang cukup menghebohkan adalah ketika surat palsu itu dibawa ke Tidore pada tanggal 3 November 1999, dan diminta ketua Klasis GPM di Soasio Tidore harus mengklarifikasi surat tersebut, dengan cara dipanggil paksa dari rumah kediamannya. Pada waktu itulah pembunuhan dan pembakaran rumah penduduk dan rumah Gereja dibakar oleh masa Muslim di Soasio Tidore. Dengan peristiwa ini membuktikan kepada semua orang bahwa kelompok orang yang tidak bertanggung jawab mampu mengalihkan perhatian dan juga mampu mempengaruhi masa Muslim yang ada di Tidore dari masalah batas wilayah ke masalah agama. Akhirnya umat Kristen yang ada disana dipaksa harus keluar dari Tidore.
- Kemudian pada tanggal 6 November 1999, peristiwa yang sama terjadi di Ternate yang mengakibatkan semua rumah penduduk Kristen dan rumah Gereja dibakar dan dihancurkan sedangkan masyarakat Kristen akhirnya diungsikan keluar Ternate.
- Tanggal 7 November 1999 masyarakat Muslim Makian menyerang umat Kristen di desa Lola Kecamatan Payahe Kabupaten Halmahera Tengah, dan membakar rumah penduduk dan rumah Gereja serta membunuh umat Kristen yang ada disana.
- Tanggal 9-12 November 1999 terjadilah lagi penyerangan umat Muslim Makayoa terhadap umat Kristen yang ada di desa Yehu, Gita, Siokona, Payahe, Akelamo, Roi, dan Papaceda Kecamatan Payahe Kabupaten Halmahera Tengah, dan membakar rumah penduduk dan rumah Gereja serta membunuh umat Kristen disana.

Appendix: 8. Letter from Samsul Bahri Umar to Hein Namotemo as a respond to letter from Manery

Yth. Pa Hein
Di Tobelo

Singkatnya kami sampaikan bahwa dengan rasa hormat kami tokoh-tokoh Galela menyampaikan bahwa pada point identifikasi masalah barangkali kita pertimbangkan untuk tidak terlalu dipertajam sampai menyinggung pada berbagai peristiwa. Karena sejak awal kita bicara pada tahap Mamuya I, bahwa segala peristiwa yang terjadi ~~tidak-bicarakan~~ sesungguhnya kita tidak tau dari mana dan apa sebab. Sehingga kami minta apa yang diikuti adalah upaya untuk kita bicara proses hari ini dengan melupakan berbagai peristiwa yang terjadi

Teman di Tobelo

07/10/2001

Samsul Bahri Umar

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