

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY AND  
THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF  
CHINA, 1949-2002

By

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## Research Method

Any approach to the study of international relations is rife with difficulty. States, not only being constituted by individual people who have their own sets of complexities and choice-making abilities, themselves come in different sizes geographically, demographically, economically, or militarily. They are constituted as homogenous, heterogeneous, or democratic, authoritarian, to say nothing of the various substructures of democracies or authoritarian regimes. So then how do we begin to understand them and their behavior? From the start we have to engage in a certain level of abstraction as a means of bringing our subject into focus. In this dissertation, this is done through the investigation of a very specific research subject. Specifically, I have decided to approach an understanding of Chinese state behavior in international affairs through an analysis of historical events and texts relevant to the influence of foreign ideas and concepts in the specific foreign policy making structure of the Chinese Foreign Ministry.

This research enhances understanding of issues regarding the Chinese worldview, perceptions of foreign policy, and approaches to foreign policy making. The literature used consists of the selected works of the most influential authorities during the time period with which this dissertation is concerned (i.e. Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping, and Jiang Zemin). The writings of Mao, Zhou, Deng, and to a lesser extent Liu Shaoqi and Chen Yun, provide the bulk of theoretical and ideological discourse of importance during these periods with regard to an understanding of international relations. This is not so much the case during the Jiang era, however, but a continuation of hermeneutic analysis of the Selected Works of Jiang Zemin, maintains a uniformity of insight into theoretical and ideological trends. This ultimately provides for a richer,

defensible articulation of gained understanding with regard to the research question: to what extent has the Chinese Foreign Ministry been influenced by foreign ideas?

The social sciences more broadly have always faced the challenge of having to turn the social world into something that can be understood systematically. Put simply, social scientists are burdened with the task of taking the complexities of society, the very elements that constitute our reality, and placing them in theories or frameworks that induce understanding. This is done, presumably, to ‘know’ something about ourselves, our relations, or the behavior of others. At some point in our scholarly journey the painful realization we each come to is that anything we learn is inevitably of limited validity because, like the individuals that make up societies, societies themselves are living entities that make choices, have desires, histories, futures, and cultures. Change is always a big piece of the puzzle, and societies deal with change in different ways at different points in time.

This notion of change being an integral part of human society is a central tenet of historicist thought (Berlin, 1980; Hegel, 1977; Herder, 1966; Vico, 2002). It is through the observation of these changes, that we gain some knowledge of ‘the human’. Though the roots of historicism are firmly grounded in the philosophical traditions of German Romanticism, it has over time had a huge impact on the social sciences. The central premises of change and variety have been fundamental to sociology and anthropology, and spurred on the position that human societies can best be understood in historical terms accounting for cultural and political orientations specific to a certain time period, then placing that understanding within broader historical contexts, ultimately illuminating

trends and enhancing knowledge<sup>1</sup>. This dissertation accepts this line of reasoning, and adopts a form of historicism which calls for not only the historical and cultural roots to be explored regarding the influence of foreign ideas in China, but that which also calls for a hermeneutic appreciation of the writings of the period's most influential authorities.

This approach has not been without its critics<sup>2</sup>. Philosophically it draws its sharpest criticism from empiricism, which asserts knowledge can only be attained through direct experience<sup>3</sup>. Though this is a well-supported argument, and the base line for modern science constituting the very substance of the scientific method, it neglects a real concern: that anything outside of experience is then unknowable. Rationalism, the broader philosophical category under which historicism falls, argues in favor of the human capacity for the acquisition of knowledge independent of one's experience. The line of critique anti-historicists employ leads to a conclusion that historicism enables, or directly supports, relativism. Certainly this can be the case in more radical approaches. Just as the empiricist would not accept the critique that their position entirely dismisses any form of knowledge outside direct experience, so too does the historicist reject the label of relativism. For it is through the methods of historicism that knowledge is sought, and in this knowledge one finds definitive claims, supported by argument and evidence, ultimately anathema to relativism.

It is best to give some overview of how the field of International Relations has traditionally engaged in this kind of research, and how I have decided to execute upon my

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<sup>1</sup> For an argument in favor of this position see Johann Gottfried Herder's *Philosophical Writings* (2002, pp. 197 & 247).

<sup>2</sup> For a robust argument against historicism, see Karl Popper's *The Poverty of Historicism* (Popper, 2002).

<sup>3</sup> For example see David Hume's *An enquiry concerning human understanding; and Selections from a treatise of human nature* (1907, pp. 85–86).

own research question in this context. Historicism does not have an explicit home within the discipline of International Relations. This does not mean, however, that it is not employed as an approach to the study of international relations, or that attempts have not been made to establish a home for it within the discipline. Most prominently and contemporarily, this has been done in an essay by Robert W. Cox titled *Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory* (1986). In this work Cox highlights the challenges associated with a scientific discipline struggling to study a dynamic and changing world of nations. Constructivism and the English School of International Relations are the two traditions within the discipline that most closely relate to historicism, with the latter at times representing a marrying of constructivist world views with historicist approaches to understanding. Loosely defined, historicism, like constructivism, is concerned with an understanding of inter-subjective meanings, as well as the creation of and shifts in norms that define or make up societies. Where constructivism draws criticism at the point of defining norms, historicism clearly defines its concerns as laying squarely in the realm of cultural, political, and discursive norms that can be identified and analyzed in an historical context. Consequently there are a number of methods on which I was able to reflect, ultimately deciding on a set of three as the surest means of securing a socially scientific toolkit of appropriate rigor. Historicism is not defined by any one methodology, or set of methods. In fact, it could employ itself as a methodology, commandeering various techniques most suitable to its historical approach. Therefore, there was ample flexibility in choosing a variety of methods to employ as a means of identifying relevant answers to the research question.

Given these contexts, one arrives at the central question: what norms exist in China's foreign policy making structure, here represented by the Foreign Ministry, regarding an understanding of international relations, and how have those changed over time? This question goes beyond the standard understanding of Chinese international behavior, or practice of foreign policy as a static phenomenon. To answer these questions it was important to have a strong and broad understanding of existing international relations theory, beyond constructivism itself, for it is the other theories with which this research sought to link to influencing a Chinese worldview and behavior. Also, given that much has been written regarding Chinese international relations, a strong foundation in the existing literature on Chinese IR was paramount. A solid theoretical grounding allowed for a robust analysis of the existing literature, and to identify if, indeed, there was substance to the question, or if they resulted in a simple *'so what?'*

As mentioned, Constructivism in International Relations is concerned with inter-subjective beliefs, but these are characteristic of ideas, norms, culture, and knowledge and how these things construct and inform social life (Finnemore & Sikkink, 2001). Identifying normative behavior as it relates to Chinese foreign affairs will provide insight into the Chinese understanding of the world and its social composition; a fundamental ingredient to more fully appreciating the influence of foreign ideas in that society.

A limitation to this approach is that Constructivism does not make political predictions (Finnemore, 1996). Instead Constructivism serves as an approach to gain deeper understandings of the social construction underpinning the social reality a particular subject functions within. Constructivist research has shown how norms, or inter-subjective beliefs, have come into the global conscience through a variety of



mechanisms: norm entrepreneurs, international organizations and law, epistemic communities, speech argument and persuasion, and structural configuration (Finnemore & Sikkink, 2001). Incorporating the Constructivist knowledge base into a historicist approach then allows for broader interpretations and deeper understating of the subject at hand.

In all cases, with rising Chinese influence globally, the possibility for Chinese norms rising to the surface as valid counters to traditional international relations theories or beliefs also increases. This is not a passive possibility. The ‘rise’ of China is a very real phenomenon, evidenced in the economic capacity of the Chinese state, as well as their increased diplomatic presence and engagement across the globe; effectively creating a Chinese voice in international relations that extends beyond the concerns of the Third World.

### **How best to pursue understanding**

In order to arrange a strong methodological approach, it was important to structure the research in such a way that allowed for the use of multiple methods that then converged to create a coherent and supportable argument. In this spirit, this dissertation leveraged methodological triangulation to build a deep and robust analysis to provide sound support for the conclusions drawn. To achieve triangulation, the following three methods are employed: (1) historical analysis, (2) hermeneutic analysis, (3) and qualitative interview. Each of these will be described in kind.

### ***Historical analysis***

The history pertinent to this research is broad and diverse. Most immediately this dissertation addresses the history of the foreign affairs of the People’s Republic of China.

To do this, however, within the historicist framework outlined above, it was necessary to also account for ancillary histories. This involved tracing the genesis of the PRC's foreign policy. As this process was undertaken, it became obvious that limits were going to be necessary if the research was going to remain manageable. In practical terms this meant that an extensive treatment of Imperial Chinese history was not possible, nor was a treatment of the conceptual elements that marked so decisively imperial foreign affairs such as *tianxia* (天下) or the tribute system. Imperial Chinese cultural elements, unlike their political counterparts, did not exhibit the same quality of fading into historical memory as decisively. These, within reason, are addressed to the extent they impacted the influence of later foreign ideas.

This historical research provided the requisite perceptual understandings regarding foreign ideas, including conceptions of 'self' and 'other', and how this has evolved over time. This, in turn, will serve as the foundation on which the findings of the other two methods employed in this research are validated and supported.

China, especially the history of China, is a topic of study that has a robust base of research from which this research was able to draw. There are a number of archives with primary source materials that proved to be of great value. In particular, the Wilson Center for International Peace was especially helpful. The Wilson Center hosts a number of primary source materials, ranging from declassified diplomatic cables to intelligence reports. Marxist.org was also a valuable source of primary source materials. They have archived and made available, electronically, many works by senior CCP members that are no longer published, or otherwise unavailable. That said, China, as a subject of research, prescribes that there is a host of material out there in the Chinese language that is

ultimately cut off from this research. The weakness of this method is the necessary reliance on English language materials, which in some cases undoubtedly precluded the use of primary sources, or even insightful secondary sources. At no point, however, was there a lack of material, primary or otherwise, to draw upon.

There is a final note on historical analysis that is important to discuss, as this research ultimately falls within the interests of International Relations. There is a general acceptance that a difference exists between an IR researcher and a historian when conducting historical analysis. George and Bennett summarize this position effectively, and are worth quoting at length:

...[We] emphasized the desirability for certain research purposes of converting a purely historical account that implies or asserts a causal sequence into an analytical explanation couched in theoretical variables that have been identified in the research design. Some historians object that converting a rich historical explanation into an analytical one may lose important characteristics or 'uniqueness' of the case. This is true, and information loss does occur when this is done, and the investigator should be aware of this and consider the implications for his or her study of the fact that some of the richness and uniqueness of the case is thereby lost. But ultimately we justify the practice of converting historical explanations into analytical theoretical ones by emphasizing that the task of the political scientist who engages in historical case studies for theory development is not the same as the task of the historian. (2005, p. 225)

The methodological approach of this particular dissertation, as articulated above, stands in partial contrast to the position of George and Bennett. The position that the theoretical framework through which a history is being analyzed will inevitably dilute an interpretation of said history is flawed. Such a position explicitly condones a loss of complexity in the pursuit of theoretical development. This dissertation seeks to fold those complexities into the interpretation of history. Interestingly, as it has been alluded to, and will be further discussed in relation to hermeneutic analysis, any interpretation itself will

draw upon a theoretical position(s) to aid in the development of understanding. On this point, George and Bennett are correct, though the importance of the complexities of history remains of paramount importance. Where the ‘historians’ in their description fall short, is in their assumption that interpretation can be completely objective. This, as will also be discussed in relation to hermeneutic analysis, is not entirely possible.

### *Hermeneutic analysis*

Just as a historicist approach guides the historical analysis of this research to attain some semblance of understating of the research question, so too does this research then turn to specific texts to further validate or support that understanding. To do this, this research turned to hermeneutics for its guiding principles of interpretation. Any interpretation of text in the social sciences, historical or contemporary, must be done with a firm understanding of the frameworks through which said understanding is attained. Specifically, the approach employed in this research was informed by the epistemological, ontological, and phenomenological hermeneutics of Dilthey (1996), Gadamer (2013), and Ricoeur (1970, 2006) respectively. Interpretation of texts then becomes more than a simple exercise in close reading. It becomes a systematized technique aimed at recovering meaning from the written word in pursuit of understanding.

The word understanding poses its own set of challenges. As ‘understanding’ plays an integral role in the objective of this research, it is necessary to address briefly the discussion surrounding the use of this word in the context of textual analysis, or

hermeneutics<sup>4</sup>. Understanding is the interpretation of text leading to some knowledge, which subsequently is integrated into a broader historical whole. An important aspect of this is the distinction between knowing and understanding. Knowing can be characterized as an isolated instance, the result of a causal sequence of events that can be explained. This is framework in which the natural sciences thrive. To actually harvest meaning from that knowledge, we then have to incorporate it into a broader understanding. This could be represented simply by the example of knowing a poem, and understanding a poem. Knowing a poem, being able to recite it word for word, does not necessitate understanding. Understanding, then, exists among the disparate elements of knowing.

Additionally, to effectively interpret text, one cannot rely on an ability to gain insight into the inner thoughts of the author. Authorial intent is, therefore, not important; it is only through the reader's ability to connect it to the social contexts under which the text was written that one is able to interpret meaning (Ricœur, 2004; Zimmermann, 2015). Similarly, Iver B. Neumann in his essay *Discourse Analysis* (2008), asserts "people sort and combine sensory impressions of the world through categories (or models and principles). Language, as a social system with its own relations logic, produces reality for humans by mediating these sense data" (Neumann, 2008, p. 61). Essentially, this approach involves engaging text as a means of arresting meaning from the otherwise unnoticed.

To aid in this hermeneutic endeavor, the texts were uploaded to the Computer Aided Textual Mark-up and Analysis (CATMA) system. The University of Hamburg

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<sup>4</sup> For the most part this is a philosophical discussion, one that has not been concluded and remains very much alive. For a fuller discussion of the issue of understanding, see Donatella Di Cesare's essay *Understanding* (2015).

hosts this qualitative data analysis tool online, and requires readable text documents in order to run analytics. Chapters four, five, and six describe in detail how the texts analyzed in this research were treated in the CATMA system.

### *Qualitative written interview*

Qualitative written interviews were used to validate and support the data collected from the other two techniques employed. Jennifer Mason in her work *Qualitative Researching* (2002), states, “The term ‘qualitative interviewing’ is usually intended to refer to in-depth, semi-structured or loosely structured forms of interviewing. Sometimes the term ‘unstructured’ interviewing is used, although I consider this a misnomer because no research interview can be completely lacking in some form of structure” (2002, p. 62). The robustness of the historical and hermeneutic analysis amply prepared the foundations on which interviews were conducted. The task was to intellectually engage in effective interview sessions, teasing out of the interviewee’s experiences relevant information regarding the influence of foreign ideas in the Chinese Foreign Ministry.

The qualitative written interviews produced different data to that of the other two methods employed. The primary and present nature of interview offset the interpretive elements that dominated both the historical and hermeneutic analysis. The offsetting of the interpretive is never fully complete, however. Interpretation is always present in both textual analysis, as well as speech analysis (Gadamer, 2013, p. 164). The process of receiving primary source information through written correspondence allows for a form of cooperation in the pursuit of understanding, between the informant and the inquirer. This meant that qualitative interviewing added an integral dimension the other methods lacked. This proved effective in contextualizing the research findings.

In essence, qualitative interviewing was a very dynamic exercise, especially when it was done in the fluid environment of on going interpretive research; it was important to remain oriented in pursuit of the research question at all times. This did not preclude, however, an ability to explore and open up new directions of thought in the research. Gaps or faults in the research were explored, identified, and ultimately corrected through the interview questions.

In person interviews were preferred, but due to the nature and topic of this research, willing participants were more comfortable communicating in writing. Given these circumstances, a questionnaire<sup>5</sup> was compiled with 11 broad and open-ended questions. These questions were designed with the intent of allowing for the greatest amount of information to find its way into the participants responses.

Several attempts were made to connect with key-informants, individuals with intimate knowledge based on personal experiences of the research topic. Responses were limited, and many rejections ensued. Ultimately, there were 2 individual participants with expertise in Chinese foreign relations. The results of those interactions, however, were useful in contextualizing the trajectory of the research and the validity of the findings. The importance of the Chinese historical narrative and the thousands of years of records relevant to inter-state/kingdom relations, and the ability of early CCP to draw upon that history was repeatedly reiterated in the received responses. Additionally, it was confirmed that there was little effort to have MFA staff study abroad or have any academic training in international relations. Rather, the MFA itself is understood to be a

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<sup>5</sup> A sample of the provided questionnaire and consent forms are included as *Appendix X*

stable organization that has seen little change overtime. These findings were consistent with the results of the other methods applied in this research.

In thinking through the various types of methods available, one begins to realize the limits of research. One can have a clear question in mind, but the methods available may not always lead a researcher to a clean, clear answer. This is especially true when the research problem deals with a highly social variable. There is a certain amount of uncertainty one must come to terms with when dealing with these issues, yet offering a clear and satisfactory explanation on par with those of issues that might be more easily quantified, unforgivingly remains the onus of the social science researcher. It is the intellectual challenge, the struggle with the abstract, which makes the exercise most rewarding.



## Chronology of Major Events in Chinese Foreign Relations 1944-2002

July 22, 1944	Beginning of the Dixie Mission and formal relations between the CCP and the United States of America
August 18, 1944	Party Central Committee Issues a directive in Yenan marking the formal beginning of communist Chinese foreign relations.
October 1945	Yantai incident marks the first confrontation between the Chinese Communists and the United States of America
December 27, 1946	Chinese Communist Party signs its first trade agreement with the Soviet Union
March 11, 1947	The Dixie Mission comes to an end when the United States formally ceases its role in attempting to mediate in the Chinese Civil War
November 1948	Ward Crisis in Mukden (Shenyang)
January 26, 1949	Mikoyan visit to China
April 20, 1949	Amethyst Incident
June 30, 1949	Mao establishes the policy of 'leaning to one side' in his essay <i>On the People's Democratic Dictatorship</i> .
July – August, 1949	Liu Shaoqi secretly visits the Soviet Union
October 1, 1949	The People's Republic of China is formally established.
December to February, 1950	Mao Zedong travels to Moscow to negotiate with Stalin regarding a Sino-Soviet Treaty
January 18, 1950	The PRC formally recognizes Ho Chi Minh's North Vietnam.
February 14, 1950	The Sino-Soviet Treaty is formally signed, marking the beginning of the alliance between the PRC and the USSR.
April 17, 1950	People's Liberation Army advisors are sent to North Vietnam to provide support in the North Vietnamese resistance against the French.
May – July, 1950	Mao meets with Kim Il Sung, discusses with Stalin, and ultimately places Chinese troops on the China-Korea border.
October 18, 1950	Mao decides to enter the Korean War.

August – September, 1952	Zhou Enlai travels to Moscow for discussions with Soviet leaderships
July 27, 1953	Korean War armistice is signed. China is represented by North Korean General Nam Il.
December 31, 1953	Zhou Enlai outlines the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence in discussions with India.
April – July, 1954	The PRC participates in the Geneva Conference to work with other nations in finding a resolution to the Indochina and Korean conflicts.
September 3, 1954	Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1954
September – October, 1954	Khrushchev visits China
April 19-24, 1955	Bandung Conference
April 27, 1955	Agreement is reached with the USSR regarding nuclear technology.
August 1955	Ambassadorial level talks begin with the United States in Geneva.
February 14, 1956	The USSR and the PRC begin to experience tension after Khrushchev gives a speech that criticizes Stalin.
October 15, 1957	A secret agreement is signed with the USSR for China to receive models of a nuclear weapon.
November, 1957	Mao attends the Moscow Conference with representatives from other communist parties. The Sino-Soviet Split worsens.
1958-1962	Great Leap Forward
July – August, 1958	Khrushchev visits China for discussions on global affairs, and possible points of cooperation. Sino-Soviet Split remains evident.
August 23, 1958	Second Taiwan Strait Crisis
June 20, 1959	The USSR withdraws its support of China's nuclear program
July 18, 1960	The USSR withdraws all of the Soviet advisors that had been sent to support China.
May 29, 1962	Yita Incident; the PRC closes all Soviet consulates throughout China.
August 6, 1962	Beidaihe Meeting of 1962 where Mao begins to reassert his authority over domestic and foreign policy.
October 20, 1962	Sino-Indian War
September 1963	Mao develops his theory of two

	intermediate zones.
January 27, 1964	France and the PRC normalize relations.
October 16, 1964	China tests its first nuclear bomb.
April 27, 1965	China agrees to assist North Vietnam in its war against the United States.
May 1966	The Cultural Revolution begins.
March 2, 1969	Sino-Soviet border conflict breaks out.
July 1, 1970	China withdraws its support of North Vietnam, over disputes of doctrine.
April 14, 1971	American Ping-Pong team visits China.
July 9, 1971	Kissinger makes a secret visit to China.
October 25, 1971	The PRC is recognized in the United Nations as the legitimate representative of China.
February 21, 1972	Nixon visits China.
September 25, 1972	Sino-Japanese relations are normalized.
February 22, 1974	Mao formally proposes his 'Three Worlds Theory'.
August 12, 1978	Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship is signed.
December 16, 1978	The Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between the United States and China is issued.
December 18, 1978	Third Plenary Session of the 11th Chinese Communist Party Central Committee and reform and opening up period begins.
January 1, 1979	Sino-U.S. relations are formally normalized
January 28, 1979	Deng Xiaoping visits the United States.
February 17, 1979	Sino-Vietnam War begins
July 18, 1979	European Community designates China most favored nation status.
January 05, 1980	Military relations between the United States and China are established.
August 17, 1982	August 17 Communiqué is issued
September 1, 1982	Twelfth National Congress of the CCP is held, and an 'independent foreign policy' is declared.
September 22, 1982	British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher visits Beijing.
December 19, 1984	Joint Declaration on Hong Kong is signed.
April 13, 1987	Joint Declaration on the Question of Macau is signed.
April-June, 1989	Tiananmen Square Protests

May 15, 1989	Sino-Soviet relations are normalized.
November 5, 1991	Sino-Vietnamese relations are normalized.
December 18, 1992	Joint Statement on the Foundation of Mutual Relations between the PRC and the Russian Federation.
May 22, 1995	The Third Taiwan Strait Crisis begins.
April 26, 1996	The Shanghai Five is established; later would become the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.
July 1, 1997	Hong Kong returns to Chinese control.
November 25, 1998	Jiang Zemin is the first head of state to visit Japan
May 7, 1999	Chinese embassy in Belgrade is bombed by NATO troops.
December 21, 1999	Macau returns to Chinese control.
October 7, 2000	The United States established permanent normal trade relations with the PRC.
April 1, 2001	Hainan Island Incident.
December 11, 2001	China becomes a member of the World Trade Organization.
February 21, 2002	President George W. Bush visits China.

## Abstract

This research traces the flow of ideas in China, as viewed by the Chinese Communist Party, with regard to international affairs. It begins by articulating the historical context through which contemporary perspectives in Chinese foreign policy made their way to the eventual creation of a foreign affairs group, established in Yanan in 1944, and the formal establishment of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on November 8, 1949. The research is divided into ‘eras’ defined by the leaders who held power. These include the Mao (1949-1976), Deng (1978-1997), and Jiang eras (1997-2002), and range from year 1949-2002. Through an in-depth analysis of the selected works of these and other leaders by way of the Computer Assisted Textual Markup and Analysis (CATMA) tool, memoirs written by former ministry staff and diplomats, secondary literature on the development of the diplomatic corps, historical analysis through the use of both primary and secondary sources, as well as interviews with experts in the field, a cohesive narrative is created that demonstrates the remarkable consistency with which China has executed upon its foreign policy, as well as consistency in the theories that have guided those policies. This consistency suggests that there is a core set of foreign policy interests that have existed since the establishment of the Ministry, constituting a set of native ideas, and that a distinctly Chinese approach to understanding international relations has served as the dominant theoretical framework, leaving little room within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for foreign modes of understanding international phenomena.

## Introduction

It seems cliché to begin a dissertation with a mention of Aristotle, though the genesis of modern scientific thinking demands that I do so. It was Aristotle that posited that true knowledge was to be found in the knowing of causality (Aristotle & Ross, 1936; Falcon, 2015; Symposium Aristotelicum, 2015). Through this reasoning we have arrived at varied and competing theories and methodologies, spanning both the natural and social sciences. Causality, though telling, has come under significant scrutiny in the social sciences. This trend is important to our understanding of human society, the role of agency and choice, and the nuance surrounding the space between universality and relativism. Before venturing too far into the abyss, however, it seems prudent to begin *this* research with a question; ideally a specific question. Often times, however, arriving at ‘the’ question most pressing, involves a host of abstract and convoluted detours making one’s journey all but simple. These detours of course make up an important part of what one’s research is, how it became what it has become, and how our perspectives have been subsequently shaped. Therefore, it is import to begin with an outline of the paths I followed to arrive at my question. The questions that led to more questions, eventually placing me at the base camp of the hitherto unanswered. This research began, as with the research of so many others, with a deep curiosity and philosophical hunger to ‘know’ what it is that makes China tick; what it is that makes China different in the

minds of non-Chinese and Chinese alike. This vein of curiosity led me in an unmanageable number of directions, and ultimately to the precepts of historicism<sup>6</sup>.

In contemporary society, a modern world, where people and ideas are connected to such an extent that the lines demarcating our differences are blurred to near transparency; I found the focus had to be political. It is through international politics, I reasoned, that China is of importance to any of us at all. Certainly there are other reasons, economics being perhaps the most obvious, but it is through politics one finds the most robust competition and greatest unifying force in human society: ideas and the actions impacted by them.

Yes, ideas. It is ideas that have brought human society from dark-ages to a renaissance, to a period of enlightenment and the rejection of colonialism. Ideas have shaped not only our world, but also our reality. They have shaped how we perceive ourselves, but more importantly, they have shaped how we see the proverbial ‘other’ in relation to ourselves. We have learned from social constructivism that our ideas, our perceptions of reality, have the power to in fact shape our reality (Hopf, 2002; Onuf, 2012, 2013). This is an immensely profound realization, one whose logic raises a number of philosophical lines of inquiry begging for explanation. Such explanations, of course, are well beyond the scope of this research, but are an important point, a touch stone, on the path toward my research question.

The task, as I saw it, was to then link these themes: Chinese-ness, politics, and ideas. The challenge was plain. What new can be said of China in relation to these

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<sup>6</sup> A full discussion of my decision to conduct this research within a historicist framework can be found, rather unconventionally, among the front matter, titled *Research Methodology*.

themes? Chinese political philosophy is well researched by both Chinese and non-Chinese scholars from a number of perspectives. Chinese intellectual traditions, political and otherwise, have seen robust research and analysis, especially in the last few years. Faced with this puzzle, I turned to the big questions once again for guidance. Given the existing research on China, why does China still seem to be elusive? Again, what makes China tick, and how does it fit in a modern world? Now I was on to something. An added layer emerged: China among other nations. Chinese foreign relations came to the fore, and I approached it with great hesitation. Historicism was to provide the theoretical framework for discovery based on the notion that cultural, political, and discursive norms can be identified and analyzed in an historical context.

Certainly, I assumed, Chinese foreign relations have been researched beyond recognition. To my disappointment, however, the research I found has been narrow in methodological scope. Much of the research on Chinese foreign policy has catered to the application of international relations' theories to a sterile historical narrative, void of the cultural or intellectual context necessary for understanding. What was most often unaddressed was the socially constructed makeup of the Chinese approach to foreign policy, and explanations as to *why* it has become what it has become. Thus, more questions arose centered on themes of Chinese identity, Chinese self-perceived roles in the global community, and the intellectual traditions of Chinese foreign policy.

I was happy. I found myself on the cusp of a research question. After close consultation with my research supervisor, the next step was to significantly narrow the research, giving it a fine point so as to make the greatest possible contribution. Decidedly the research would need to be contained within a specific time period, 1949-2003. It



would need a specific subject for evaluation; ‘China’ was far too broad. Given that one of the more base concerns was with China in the context of international politics, the less researched Chinese Foreign Ministry was identified as a forum through which to analyze the research question. Finally, and most importantly, the dominant theme was defined; born out of a discussion of Chinese-ness and Chinese identity: The influence of foreign ideas in Chinese foreign policy.

I had arrived at my question: To what extent has the Chinese Foreign Ministry been influenced by foreign ideas? As with any good research question, this one is rife with nuance that will be detailed and explained in the following sections.

### **Why does it matter?**

In April 2014 *The Economist* published an article titled “The Crowning of the Dragon,” proclaiming, based on newly released economic data, that China would overtake the United States’ position of economic primacy by the year’s end; cleverly concluding “The American Century ends, and the Pacific Century begins” (J.M.F. & L.P., 2014). Without over analyzing an article that is just shy of 200 words, it is important to note the context within which these words were written. It is accepted knowledge that we are in a transitory period, one that is shaping up to be different from periods of the past. It is almost cliché to mention the end of the Cold War and the emergence of a unipolar international system, dominated by the United States, and how that framework has been thrown into a new global makeup, where China is found poised to make a challenge. This, however, ‘the rise of China’, is one of the central international relations issues with which scholars must contend. Though it is disingenuous to suggest that economics is the sole factor determining a state’s position in an international hierarchy, as is the

suggestion found in the above cited *Economist* article, it is one that is routinely monitored as a gauge of national health and strength.

The convenient and positivist nature of economic analysis lends itself well to our modern and scientific proclivities for a good reason. It represents a substantial part of the modern worldview and the contemporary system of international relations, not to mention its capacity for compartmentalization and defensible quantifiability. Auguste Comte articulated this approach in his exposition of positive philosophy (conveniently the title of his three volume work on the topic) when he wrote the famous words *Savoir pour prévoir et prévoir pour pouvoir*<sup>7</sup>, in summary of his broader point that “it is only by knowing the laws of phenomena, and thus being able to foresee them, that we can, in active life, set them to modify one another to our advantage” (1896, pp. 20–21). The risk of over reliance, however, on positive frames of analysis is the neglect of the complexities constituent of a holistic study of international relations. To avoid this pitfall wantonly applying positivist models to social research, while retaining the rigor of Comte’s purpose, this research will follow in the tradition of historicist and hermeneutic research to probe and explore the extent to which foreign ideas have influenced the Chinese Foreign Ministry. This kind of inquiry can serve as means of ascertaining a more robust appreciation for the broader hypothesis that has been made within the discipline of international relations, and the social sciences and humanities more broadly, regarding the phenomena of normative convergence occurring in our contemporary world order (Kerr & Xu, 2014; Schroeter & Schroeter, 2013).

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<sup>7</sup> Translated as ‘knowledge for foresight and foresight for power’.

It is important to note that this endeavor is not done with any intent to disprove or otherwise criticize existing theories of international relations, nor does it necessarily represent an effort to prove them in kind. Rather, the work that follows is a juxtaposed analysis of the evolution of the Chinese Foreign Ministry and Chinese foreign affairs in the context of its relationship to foreign ideas regarding international relations, subsequently reflecting on their impact on Chinese foreign policy trends.

The wealth of international relations research up to present has helped us understand that a shift in the power balance has a strong possibility of reshaping the center-periphery makeup of the international order. Essentially, with the rise of China, the Americo-European worldview that has dominated the international system is potentially at risk. Such circumstances, however, represent the unfolding of an evolving modernity, a change that has even the most uninterested among us engaging in counterfactuals, and scholars and analysts forecasting global trends in an attempt to offer comfort through clarity. For the most part, mainstream discussions on the rise of China leave something desired. Chinese foreign policy has been characterized by not only ideology (Brown, 2010; China 2020 Research Team, 2014; Hunt, 1996; N. Lu, 2000; Shi, 2014; B. Zhang, 2014) but also by pragmatism (Brown, 2010; Carlson, 2010; B. Zhang, 2014; F. Zhou, 2014). This relatively simple foundation on which Chinese foreign policy is based, has allowed for some understanding of the short-term projections of Chinese engagement with the global community, especially its immediate neighbors in Northeast Asia, but has made projecting those trends further into the near future far more difficult. As ideology is rhetorically in decline in China, pragmatism is not a stable framework from which one can effectively ‘know’ Chinese international relations behavior. By its

very nature, pragmatism evolves. It is at this juncture that scholars and analysts find it most useful to turn to existing theories to fill the gap, without fully understanding or appreciating how those theories, themselves, are understood and practiced in China. This situation does not, by default, mean that the existing scholarship is wildly off base. The risk, however, is that if such analysis continues without a deeper appreciation for the socialization process those concepts underwent in China, the mainstream frames of analysis may lead to extraordinarily misguided perspectives and an increasingly large gap between China and its outside world.

### **From whence this query was born**

Chinese foreign relations, both past and present, have been thoroughly researched. In fact, there exists a significant collection of seminal works in English on Chinese foreign policy. First among these is Michael H. Hunt's historical piece, *The genesis of Chinese Communist foreign policy* (1996). Traditionally, Chinese foreign policy has been written off as characterized by rigid isolationism left over from an imperial past coupled with the firebrand ideology of Marxist-Leninist theories. Chinese history and traditions of managing foreign relations, however, are much more complex. To understand this historical complexity, Hunt argues, is to understand more fully the calculations that carefully makeup Chinese foreign policy (1996). Historically based Chinese cultural and political experiences are relevant to Chinese foreign relations. These experiences serve as good modes for understanding the foreign relations practices and worldviews of the Chinese Communist Party, though they are often over looked by commentators and analysts who seek to compartmentalize Chinese foreign policies into digestible talking points.

## Objectives

The objectives of this research are fairly broad. This research seeks to not only assess our perceptions of reality, as they relate to international relations, but to see if those perceptions have been instrumental in shaping the perceptions of others, or in this case China. To do this, objectivity has been a central element. An ability to withdraw as far as possible from the preconceptions of political reality serve as a means to see most clearly the true constructs of our socially constructed world.

Samuel Huntington, though an avowed realist, poignantly articulated the difficulties inherent in analyzing international affairs, when not accounting for differences in historical experiences. In his work *Political Order in Changing Societies*, he writes:

A second reason for American indifference to political development was the absence in the American historical experience of the need to found a political order...they enjoyed the fruits of a democratic revolution without having suffered one. So also, America was born with a government, with political institutions and practices imported from seventeenth-century England. Hence Americans never had to worry about creating a government. This gap in historical experience made them particularly blind to the problems of creating effective authority in modernizing countries. When an American thinks about the problem of government-building, he directs himself not to the creation of authority and the accumulation of power but rather to the limitation of authority and the division of power...In many modernizing societies this formula is irrelevant. (1996, p. 7)

Huntington goes on to state that for modernizing nations the impasse on the road to effective government lies not with having elections, but rather with having organizations with the means of establishing order. To Huntington's 'American', this is taken for granted. To the 'modernizing state', this is a fundamental necessity in laying the foundation of effective government.

In a similar vein, this research seeks to highlight some of what modern society has taken for granted. It seeks to remind us that the norms of the international order, though constituting our current reality, are not by default the norms of individual societies, and that history is not linear in the sense that it is progressing according to some causal chain toward a definitive end. Likewise, this research also serves to remind us that the social construction of our realities is a participatory process, and that there is every suggestion that as participation grows and centers of influence shift, so to do the norms that we presently take for granted. The idea that human society is prone to change, and the historical elements through which change is induced, cultural and political, is itself a construction made real by our efforts to understand the past with the tools of our present.

On the surface, this kind of abstract objective may seem too distant to grasp with any scientific rigor. This is so, precisely because of the breadth of these objective statements. As we narrow the focus, however, the evidence brought to bear by way of the historical record shows to us, in very plain terms, what we find difficult to quantify at present; what that change means. One need only to look at the ways in which revolutions of the past rapidly ushered in waves of normative change that transformed societies and governments with dramatic affect; or how we can find evidence of intellectual seeds planted a century in advance, and when blossomed, brought human society to new levels of modern consciousness. Likewise, this research aims to identify and trace changes in the influence of foreign ideas in Chinese Foreign Ministry.

Though it is my position that such normative exploration is a healthy and requisite exercise in the service of a rich understanding of the current state of international affairs, I must turn back to the very specific research question and its more immediate objectives.

An analysis of the prevalence of foreign ideas in the Chinese Foreign Ministry provides us with a tangible product, or lens through which we can observe these changes. This is the most substantive and immediate objective this research has. In so far as this research is specific, it imbues upon itself certain limitations that will be drawn out in detail later.

### **Structure of this dissertation**

It is important to note at the outset that the analysis in the following chapters, with regard to Chinese foreign relations, focuses largely on the United States, the Soviet Union, Japan, Vietnam, and Taiwan. This limited focus is done both by design and necessity. The research was designed to be a manageable project. Given the outlined research objectives, it was important to begin with the most major and consequential foreign relationships that the PRC had between 1949-2002. It also happens to be, given these relationships were the highest profile, that there were sufficient primary source materials translated into English to work with. Stepping in any significant way outside of this frame would not have been appropriate for this particular study. That said, it certainly stands that a deeper understanding of Chinese foreign affairs and conceptions of international relations would benefit from doing so in the future.

To secure the research objectives with solid evidence, this dissertation is structured based on the methodology employed. Chapters three, four, five, and six are most characteristic of this approach. A combination of historical and hermeneutic analysis are used to frame and understand the normative standards of the time period said chapter addresses, allowing each of these chapters to be broken into smaller discussions leading to broader conclusions at the close of each chapter.

Employing this structural strategy, chapter one investigates one of the central ingredients of the topic at hand, International Relations. Here, both the history and the presumed purpose of the discipline are reviewed with the aim of setting the stage for appreciating the impact this discipline has had, serving as a source of foreign ideas, on the Chinese Foreign Ministry. An important point made in this chapter is the distinction between the actual history of the discipline, which was born out of a Western intellectualism grappling with the tensions between concepts of state sovereignty and imperialist expansionism, and the more commonly referred to intellectual history of International Relations which can trace some of its core concepts to ancient Greece. This distinction offers some interesting insights into the evolution of International Relations in China as a result.

Post-imperial Chinese international relations have their roots in Republican China, following the fall of the Qing Dynasty. Chapter two addresses the early development of international relations despite the absence of, or capacity for, robust international engagement as a result of a deeply fractured Chinese society. During this period, China was deeply troubled by domestic divisions, intellectual revolutions, and a budding sense of nationalism. As a result of this choppy transition to modernization, the subsequent rise of Communism, and the war with Japan, we can observe through the literature and historical accounts of the period, the formation of a worldview that will dominate Chinese foreign policy for half a century. Inherent in this process is the increasing exposure to foreign influences and ideas, most notably the United States, the Soviet Union, and Japan.



Chapter three examines the period immediately preceding the establishment of the People's Republic of China. This reorients our focus away from the republican roots of China under Sun Yat-sen and toward the China being formulated under the pretexts of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Though the philosophy between the communists and their republican predecessors was substantively different, there remained a core set of principles, Chinese principles, which carried through. Given this, the historical record seems to demonstrate a sincere reluctance to adhere to foreign ideas that had not thoroughly undergone Sinification. This is reflected in many of the CCP's foreign policy decisions during the period leading to 1949, and the earlier writings of Mao Zedong during his time in Yen-an, some of which are introduced in this chapter. It is during this time that the precursor to the contemporary Chinese Foreign Ministry comes into being, in the form of the CCP's foreign affairs office, first established in Yen-an. The whirlwind of major historical events, the surrender of Japan, the advent of the nuclear age, the beginning of the Cold War, all necessitated a trial-by-fire of the CCP in foreign affairs.

The CCP would prove itself capable, if not defiant, in the period leading up to 1949, though with rudimentary notions of international relations theory. With the establishment of the People's Republic of China on October 1, 1949, an era of authoritarian rule under Mao Zedong was forever entered into the annals of Chinese history. The authoritarian character of this period provides a fount from which we can draw insights into the intimate perspectives on foreign policy held by those who clenched the power of decision-making. Chapter four looks closely at the two greatest minds of the time, founding fathers of the modern Chinese state, and the shapers of Chinese perspectives on foreign policy that have echoed beyond their time. Mao Zedong and

Zhou Enlai wrote prolifically outlining well-reasoned and intellectually formidable frameworks for understanding the construction of the global order and China's place therein. Their work is carefully considered within the context of the historical record, as well as first hand accounts from individuals intimately involved in the Foreign Ministry. These insights offer a baseline from which this dissertation will begin to trace the influence of foreign ideas in their works, paving the way for an assessment of how these ideas influenced the Foreign Ministry.

After the death of Mao Zedong and the subsequent arrest of the Gang of Four, the Mao era came to a close. The end of the Mao era and the beginning of the Deng era marks one of the greatest turning points in modern Chinese history. Many scholars regard the political and economic reforms that were put in place during this period as the foundation from which China has been able to pursue substantive strides toward modernization. The cost associated with modernization, however, has raised many questions regarding Chinese Communism. Chapter five analyses how these reforms impacted the Foreign Ministry and foreign policy making. As in chapter four, a careful examination of the written works of Deng Xiaoping present the most authoritative articulation of Chinese thinking regarding foreign affairs. As during the Mao years, the process of foreign policy making remained highly centralized. Despite this, there are other influential sources often overlooked in research on Chinese foreign policy covering this period. Much of the decision-making in China was based on consensus among Deng's inner circle. This was even the case during the Mao period, though when it came to foreign affairs it was a circle composed of two individuals, and marked by the ultimate authority of Mao. With this in mind, two special notes are included at the end of this

research, after the appendices, which seek to account for the influential thinkers sidelined by Mao and rehabilitated by Deng, into the analysis. Specifically, the works of Chen Yun and Liu Shaoqi are addressed. Though the reforms brought with them greater openness to the outside world, in commerce and ideas, foreign policy did not see any significant upheaval. A development of note during this period is that it marked the restarting of students studying overseas.

Many of the seeds of reform planted during the Deng era would not blossom until the next generation of leadership took to the helm of government. Chapter six picks up at this stage marked by the comparatively decentralized style of government lead by Jiang Zemin. Jiang begins to structure and institutionalize theory in China. Jiang argued for the divide between theory and practice to be put aside (Jiang, 2009, pp. 20–33), and continued to carry China on into greater levels of economic development and intellectual engagement with the outside world. It is in this environment of continued reform that one can observe most clearly the influence of foreign ideas on Chinese foreign policy making, yet the core interests and theoretical understanding of international relations remained consistent with what had been established five decades prior. The culture within the government by this time had effectively transformed from the top down policy machine of Mao, to a bottom up bureaucracy based on research and recommendations more than ever before. The dissemination of foreign conceptions of international relations via bureaucrats and academics educated overseas also rises to numbers worthy of note.

The interviews conducted for this research were limited and thus used to contextualize and frame some of the broader concepts and historical perspectives. Among the two respondents, there was a strong emphasis on the role historical experience played

in the shaping of a Chinese understanding of international relations; largely represented by the humiliation suffered by the late Qing and early Republican governments. More importantly, however, it was the same historical experience that defined and solidified a core set of Chinese interests that would guide Chinese foreign policy from the time of the Qing Dynasty to Jiang Zemin's pursuit of admittance to the WTO. These core interests would include "independence, freedom, integrity of territory and sovereignty of the country, upholding of lasting international peace and friendly co-operation between the peoples of all countries, and opposition to the imperialist policy of aggression and war" ("The Common Program of The Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference," 1949). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the respondents would argue, was important for this research to the extent that it was representative of the official Chinese position; shifts in its perceptions and stated understanding of international relations would be reflective of much deeper changes in perception or understanding of international relations. Though the Ministry staff was highly educated and aware of the international situation at any given point in time, they were also highly disciplined and professional in remaining loyal to the official orientation of the leadership.

What this research ultimately concludes is that there have been shifts in tactical or strategic approach to Chinese foreign affairs, influenced by ever increasingly complex understandings of the international situation, and informed by more nuanced conceptualizations of international relations born from foreign intellectualism. These shifts in tactics have been relegated to mere pragmatism, yet this does not appear to be the case. Rather, Chinese understanding of international relations, and specifically the approach of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, appears to be defined by an unchanged

foundation of Chinese interests served by a philosophical approach to knowledge, theory and practice articulated by Mao Zedong during his years in Yanan. This was born out by the historical record, texts, and developments in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 1949 to 2002.

## Definitions

Before reaching into the research in detail, it is important to layout some definitions of important terms that will be oft referred to throughout this dissertation, and which in some cases may have a network of meaning depending on how or when they are used.

### China and ‘Chinese-ness’

In the spirit of the continued questioning of what we think we know, it seems most appropriate to now address what is China, and what is ‘Chinese-ness’. The answer to these prompts may seem obvious, but when one looks carefully it reveals itself to be most complex, a complexity that has haunted Chinese scholars and China-scholars alike. Though it is not necessary to get too deep into this debate, it is important to elaborate what these terms mean in this dissertation.

Geographically, China *is* what it *is*, with some disputes. Our concern here, however, is not landed China, but political China. The governing entity since 1949 is in all references to “China” in this dissertation, a reference to the People’s Republic of China (PRC). In certain instances this may be otherwise, like for example during the discussion of Imperial China under the Qing Dynasty or Republican China in chapter two. In these instances, however, every effort has been made to appropriately qualify to which China I am referring. Similarly, there are instances where China may reference the

Chinese people culturally or historically. Appropriate clarification is provided in these instances as well.

China culturally and historically has been undergoing an identity crisis for a number of decades. There can be a strong argument made that this crisis has been an ongoing phenomena since the fall of the Qing Dynasty in 1912. Modern China, that is communist China since 1949, has shepherded the country through a period of an ever-increasing consciousness of a global modernity. This evolution has been aggravated by the intellectual challenges to theoretical universalism, coupled with post-colonial tendencies, leading to competing claims to modernity, or alternative modernities, born out of nationalism (Dirlik, 2011). The undoing of universalism, of both theory and modernity, has led to the questioning of everything that is considered modern (capitalism, the nation-state, etc.). For communist China, an important element of the post-revolutionary period, in an effort to define and establish its identity and secure its legitimacy, has been to reclaim Chinese history. These efforts themselves, however, have also come into their own forms of intellectual resistance both within and outside China. Arif Dirlik articulates well the role of “new history” in the contemporary period<sup>8</sup>:

Calls for “new history” in our day are informed by a different globalization, one that is both postcolonial and postnational. It is informed by an urgent sense of bringing back into history alternative pasts – and alternative modernities – that were erased not just by colonial but also by national histories. It strives to rescue from oblivion cultures marginalized or even erased under the regime of colonial modernity. It seeks to bring into history the voices of the many – not just national as in the case of Liang, but global – silenced in the past. It questions not just Euro/American domination of modernity but modernity itself. And against a “new history” that placed history at the service of nation-building, it calls into question

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<sup>8</sup> Liang Qichao first put “New history” forth in 1902 in response to colonialism and concepts of modernity during that period.

the appropriateness of the nation as a historiographical unit. It is increasingly driven by a concern for political ecology over political economy. (2011, p. 4)

Though this approach to history is not the standard of practice in China, it represents an element to the ongoing efforts to reclaim Chinese history and identity. Much of this is further complicated when Chinese-ness is introduced. Chinese intellectuals have wrestled with pegging Chinese cultural/national identity to those of other nations, especially the 'West'. The irony, it is argued, is that the 'West' is no longer an external element, it has become an integral part of Chinese-ness, making the struggle to isolate Chinese-ness from Western influenced modernity, futile (Dirlik, 2011).

The debate surrounding these issues is real, and it is important. For this dissertation, however, the ways in which the Chinese Communist Party, as the governing party of China, interprets itself, or allows others the freedom to interpret these issues is the most pertinent. Through this lens we can see Chinese-ness is defined by its cultural diversity, its adherence to Marxist-Leninist-Maoist principles, and its claim to historical traditions of intellectualism found in Confucian, Taoist, and Legalist philosophy. All-in-all we find a China defined as a great power, a modern nation, a responsible member of the global community, while at the same time being unique and separate, sovereign, not to be bound by the fickle and vulnerable nature of international norms. We find, in essence, a challenge to the dominant winds of modernity. As is shown throughout this research, these themes of Chinese-ness also define how China, since 1949 to 2002, has framed its worldview more broadly. Ultimately, this allowed for the advancement toward a more modern state and foreign policy, while preserving the uniquely Chinese approach to understanding international relations based on a core set of Chinese interests.

## Nationalism

For the Chinese, nationalism is not only cultural and political; it is deeply rooted in a shared Chinese historical experience. It is closely related to, if not encompassing of the concept of patriotism. As will be seen throughout this research, it also insists upon other key concepts central to Chinese thought regarding foreign affairs like sovereignty, independence, security, and peaceful coexistence.

For a communist state, however, the concept of nationalism poses particular challenges to legitimacy. First among these is the idea that nationalism, or national identity should, in theory, disappear with the establishment of a socialist society. Nationalism, it is argued, serves particular purposes at various stages of evolution in pursuit of socialism, but at any stage is viewed with a certain level of reservation, if not outright negativity. Nationalism is either progressive or reactionary, in the Marxist's worldview. It is progressive when it affords society the will to transition from feudalism to capitalism, and reactionary when it inevitably becomes a tool of the bourgeoisie to suppress the proletariat (Dreyer, 1976). The central problem, according to Marx, is that nationalism at any stage highlights antagonisms among people, allowing for or justifying exploitation, and thus masking the underlying problems of class and production (Bloom, 1941). Marx, however, distinguishes between fondness and love for one's homeland from other forms of nationalism viewed as detrimental to the liberation of society.

This ambiguity about nationalism gave space for future iterations and distinctions of what nationalism is for a communist society. Both Lenin and Stalin took to redefining nationalism in a more positive light. Lenin, in particular, developed a very specific and nuanced definition of the nation that, according to Walker Connor, restricted it to "a



human grouping whose members share an intuitive sense of kindredness or sameness, predicated upon a myth of common descent...It does not refer to any collection of people who are conscious of their multiethnic background...Nor does it refer to a state” (1984, p. xiv). Furthermore, Connor continues by pointing to the distinction between nationalism, dedication to the nation as defined above, and patriotism, dedication or loyalty to the state (1984).

This distinction theoretically led to a softer stance toward nations, and in fact Lenin called for all nations to have the right of self-determination, even in the event that meant they would not be apart of the communist revolutionary cause (Lenin, 1974). Stalin would pair that back a bit, arguing that national minorities were doubly oppressed and therefore required the support of the proletariat in breaking free from that oppression (Stalin, 1949a). For the Soviets, Stalin’s position gave space for the creation of the Soviet Union and a central authority capable of quieting dissent.

These models and theories, from Marx to Stalin, served to shape at least the rhetoric of the Chinese concept of nation and nationalism. Mao, on the surface, appears to take a Stalinist position with regard to minority ethnic groups, yet this only holds true for rhetoric. China was different. The Qing Dynasty had expended great efforts to Sinicize its empire, and for the most part was successful (Leibold, 2007). This was in part an effort at self-preservation and the establishment of Qing legitimacy; for the Qing, as Manchus, were viewed as a foreign dynasty during that period. For the majority communists, ‘Chinese’ included both Han the minorities. It was within this context that Chinese nationalism was born and grew. Nationalism for China was progressive according to Marx, patriotism according to Lenin, and necessary according to Stalin.

Chapter Two will describe the historical events that necessitated, in the Chinese view, this conception of nationalism. It will be shown that this held true successively from the Qing to Sun Yat-sen, on down to Mao Zedong. Nationalism, this research concludes, serves as an accurate umbrella term that guides and modifies Chinese foreign policy all the way to 2002.

### **Limitations**

Historicism limits this work to a realm of exploratory research, identifying and analyzing the cultural, political, and discursive norms in an historical context in pursuit of an understanding of the role of foreign ideas and concepts in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This also means that the particular findings of this research, however, open the path for a host of additional lines of research to challenge or support what is claimed here. In particular there are three central limitations to this research that need to be clearly identified so as to aid in any pursuit of further development on this topic: restriction to English language materials, limited access to experts in China on the topic, and the necessity to end this research at the year 2002.

With regard to the limits of English language materials, this was not a roadblock for the purposes of this dissertation. There are a host of primary sources and historical documents that have been translated into the English language that have served as bedrock for this research. There is undoubtedly, however, a host of additional material in the Chinese language that would provide for further support and robustness of the findings presented here. These Chinese texts are important for future research, and may identify additional texts that are worthy of translation so they are more widely available to non-Chinese audiences. That was not something this research was able to accomplish.

More importantly perhaps, this research had limited access to key informants. As such, there was reliance on memoirs, biographies, or other personal accounts in addition to a few interviews. Future research on this topic will be better served by increased access to retired and active staff of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Despite this limitation, this dissertation was able to cobble together disparate bodies of research to draw exploratory conclusions appropriate to the research question. The evidence supports the findings presented here, yet they would be further served by additional first hand accounts in the future.

Finally, given the limitations of language and access to key informants, it was determined the research should end at the year 2002, to preserve the integrity of the methodology and structure of the analysis. There was not enough data available to the author to work with to construct a similarly styled analysis for a period beyond this point. 2002 represents the date closing Jiang Zemin's full control over both Party and government, and marks the beginning of a transition to his successor, Hu Jintao. Nonetheless, this dissertation lays the groundwork for future research, given the availability of an appropriate timeframe and resources.

## **Chapter One: History, International Relations, and the Chinese Experience**

At the core of many contemporary issues in international relations lay issues of history, born from questions about identity, purpose, and perspectives on the future. China offers us a strong example of these circumstances. Since the intervention of the West and the subsequent end to the Imperial structure of old China, the country and its people have been on a long and arduous journey securing and defining a modern China. Included in this effort is a clear understanding of where China fits within the world order, and perhaps more importantly, how the world should interact with China. As will be shown in later Chapters, the various leaders of the Communist Party each had their unique perspectives on how to best achieve this, though they each had one thing in common: China is sovereign, and nothing in domestic Chinese affairs is open to foreign intervention.

In many respects the way in which China approached a formalized study of, first, international politics and then international relations, can serve as a microcosm of the broader historical and cultural trends that have shaped Chinese identity over the years. As the title of this chapter suggests, before one can move forward, one must develop an appreciation for history and its role in China.

### **History as Identity**

History is not merely a way of understanding the past, nor is it a simple recounting of facts. Much of history, like so much else in the social world, is entirely subjective. Even in the most basic historical research, differing perspectives abound. Many times these differences get lost in the broader narrative, whether because the complexities are not

conducive to research, or for the more basic purpose of supporting a State's official position regarding past events. Additionally, to control history is to control identity (Friedman, 1992; Hess, 2010). This is one reason many post-colonial scholars throughout the former colonized world have taken such strong stances against the Euro-American approach to academics, especially in the social sciences.

Though China was never officially or traditionally colonized in the same sense as Vietnam or The Philippines, the psychological impact of having ceded spheres of influence and signed a host of un-equal treaties had a very similar effect on the collective Chinese conscious. Post-colonial theory, in Sociology as well as International Relations, asserts that there is a need for us to look closely at the epistemological and cultural foundations of knowledge in order to actually advance it (Said, 2003). In international relations, this framework takes on a more political current, looking at the epistemological foundations of power, and how the international order, and its associated norms, has a strong Western bias rooted in Western beliefs and customs. Robert Young describes this state in international relations concisely, arguing that non-Western states are in political "subordination" and "economic inequality" (R. Young, 2003, p. 4). It is unclear whether China has pursued knowingly a post-colonial approach to international affairs. It seems the post-colonial undertones stem more from an adherence to Marxist-Leninist ideologies, as opposed to a more abstract conception of center-periphery relations in international affairs. Anti-imperialism has long been the slogan of communist movements the world over.

Post-colonial theory, though likely not directly relevant to China, does offer us a glimpse into the mindset and concerns of those who have felt the sting of imperial

aggression and colonial subjugation. It also offers us an understanding of how these communities might be seeking ways of becoming whole again. For China it is clear this is done through challenging a foreign dominated narrative of history and reclaiming their identity. This endeavor, to define China through its past in terms conducive to the present and future, is not a new one. Liang Qichao, father of modern Chinese intellectualism, called for a “new history” at the beginning of the twentieth century (Dirlik, 2011). His ideas played an important role in the formation of the Chinese republic and helped inspire a number of Chinese youth during that period, including Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai (Hunt, 1996).

For Mao, and subsequently the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the Party’s sovereignty over its own history was of paramount importance, not only to the establishment of a strong and independent nation, but was critical for the cause of what he saw as truth. This truth was rooted in the concept of class struggle, and history was one of but many aspects that were subject to this style of interpretation. Mao mocked the bourgeois conception of cause and effect to the extent that it often over simplified and belittled the complex struggles the people experienced in reality, and all together neglected the struggle between classes and the more naked pursuit of liberation (T. Mao, 1961a, pp. 451–459 in “The Bankruptcy of the Idealist Conception of History”). Mao was consistent in this point and his pursuit of a pure and correct message of class struggle spilled into cultural spheres as well, culminating in his conception of art and literature in a speech given during the war with Japan at Yanan in 1942 (T. Mao, 1965g, pp. 69–98 in “Talks at the Yanan Forum on Literature and Art”). Mao writes:

We should take over the rich legacy and the good traditions in literature and art that have been handed down from past ages in China and foreign countries, but the aim must still be to serve the masses of the people. Nor do we refuse to utilize the literary and artistic forms of the past, but in our hands these old forms, remoulded and infused with new content, also become something revolutionary in the service of the people. (1965g, p. 76)

Thus, it is clear that the question of history has played an important role in China, beginning with Liang Qichao and flourishing under the CCP, as a means of unifying a Chinese communist state. Let us move a little closer now to the topic at hand, International Relations, its history, and its reception in China over time.

### **International Relations in History**

International Relations has a very short history compared to other academic disciplines, perhaps 160 years at best. A surprising realization to those that have not given the topic much thought, certainly, but less surprising when one carefully considers the period during which the ‘modern’ state system has been in existence. The modern state, or the sovereign state, was born out of the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 that ended the Thirty Years’ War. It was in this peace that the European belligerents conceded mutual recognition of territorial sovereignty of each respective party’s lands; thusly, the state was born. Prior to the creation and recognition of the sovereign state, there existed feudalism, porous borders and a weak and hierarchical conception of citizenship<sup>9</sup>. It is without question that the roots of political thought, or political philosophy can be traced to the earliest periods of human civilization. Much of what we draw on today is rooted in the ideas and writings of the ancient Greeks. It is at this point, though, that we must make

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<sup>9</sup> The concept of citizenship would not fully come into the state equation until the French Revolution and the egalitarian supremacy of the individual ‘citizen’ as the primary driver of state governance.

a distinction. Thucydides, often looked to as the father of International Relations, was actually a historian. His writings on the Peloponnesian War have served later scholars in identifying perceived truths of human behavior, societal behavior, or more relevant to our concerns here – state behavior, though it is difficult to separate the former two from the later. An actual study of international relations did not begin to occur scientifically until the late 19<sup>th</sup> century, when a relatively new player on the international scene became particularly interested in systematizing and breaking down how international society functioned. This player, of course, was the United States, which by this point had found itself pressed to keep itself from being tangled in a web of what it perceived as the corrosive international politics of the old world in Europe. This is not to suggest International Relations should be conceived of in terms separate from the European intellectual tradition, this would be a huge mistake, but if the goal is to understand the origins of the contemporary study of international relations and its impact on our present day understandings we need to more fully comprehend why we have moved toward the science and away from the philosophy.

It seems that during the early years of scholarship in international relations, there was a real emphasis on the normative qualities of international affairs, with much of the focus stemming from fields of international law and political science. Many of the questions centered on what international relations should be like, and were in many respects founded on the Judeo-Christian, Anglo-Saxon ideals of natural or God-given rights. Here we can observe the impact of the European roots of the United States, with the driving thought being founded by the Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius. What we also see, is that much of the work from this period sought to put in place boundaries within which all



states must be expected to reasonably participate. In other words, it was the question of anarchy, that had long been a central element of political discourse, and continued to be a force within the field of international relations to present day (Schmidt, 1998).

A pressing question of the time was one of the nature of the state. What is a state? Does it behave as an individual? Does it have morals? In 1864 Theodore Dwight Woolsey attempted a definition, clearly rooted in Western tradition, that personified the state and attributed it with rights. His definition, however, rings familiar in contemporary conceptions of the state, and his justification of Sovereignty continues to be an articulate and eloquent vote in favor of State's rights:

The state is a community of persons living within certain limits of territory, under a permanent organization, which aims to secure the prevalence of justice by self-imposed law. (Woolsey, 1864, p. 49)

[A State] must have an exclusive right to impose laws within its own territory, the sole regulation in general of its subjects, the sole determining power in regard to the forms of its organization. No reason can be assigned why in a group of states one should have the right to interfere in the legislation or administration of the rest, which would not give each of them the same right in turn. Nor can any reason be found why one state ought to have more rights or different rights than any other. We find it necessary for the conception of states, and for their occupying the sphere which the Author of society has marked out for them, to predicate of them *sovereignty*, *independence*, and the *equality* of each with the rest... These three attributes cannot exist apart, and perhaps the single conception of sovereignty, or of self-protection, may include them all. (Woolsey, 1864, p. 50)

The state question, and the subsequent questions of interstate relations, prompted the creation of a formal study of politics. On October 4, 1880 the first School of Political Science was established at Columbia College, now Columbia University, in New York. Roughly twenty years later at the University of Wisconsin, the first course in the United States to deal with world politics, was offered. This course was offered during the school year of 1899-1900, and was taught by Dr. Paul Reinsch who published the first book to

deal with the subject of world politics, titled *World Politics at the End of the Ninetieth Century as Influenced by the Oriental Situation* (1900). In China, during this time, the Boxer Rebellion had broken out and was coming to a close, with an Allied victory over the Qing forces and the Boxer rebels. As result of the Allied victory, the Qing court was forced to sign the Boxer Protocol in 1901. A part of that protocol stipulated that the Qing court was to create a Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (“Settlement of matters growing out of the Boxer uprising (Boxer Protocol),” 1901). The creation of the Qing Ministry of Foreign Affairs marked the beginning for China in establishing modern foreign relations in the context of an international state system, where China was ‘one among many’ and rather than ‘first among many’ (interview conducted on January 13, 2017).

Brian Schmit in his book *The Political Discourse of Anarchy* (1998) notes that Reinsch’s work was not only the first to deal with world politics, it was the only work to do so for a significant period of time. Schmit attributes this state of affairs to the fact that Political Science at the time was focused on the centrality of the State, including both internal and external relations (1998, p. 72). Furthermore, given the importance of Reinsch’s work, it marks a beginning to what we have come to appreciate as International Relations. Olson and Groom have pointed out that “his [Reinsch] work suggests that the discipline of international relations had its real beginnings in studies of imperialism, not in world order, as has so often been suggested” (1991, p. 47).

In 1895 the work *Theory of the State* by Johann Caspar Bluntschli was published in English and served as a driver of much of the subsequent debate on the subject in the proceeding years in the United States. Among many points in the book, from defining a

state, and tracing its origins through history, Bluntschli endeavors on topics of universal empire, while simultaneously defending state sovereignty. He writes:

To the universal empire the particular states are related, as the nations to humanity. Particular states are members of the universal empire and attain in it their completion and full satisfaction. The purpose of the universal state is not to break up particular states and oppress nations, but better to secure the peace of the former and the freedom of the latter. (Bluntschli, 1895, p. 32)

Though it is understood that Bluntschli knew this to be an ideal, perhaps unattainable, his marking this as such serves as an important marker in later American thinkers, and appears to bring into to question the concepts of international order or governance; perhaps most notably championed by Woodrow Wilson and the League of Nations.

In 1911, Francis Lieber outlined seven truths defining a state:

1. The state exists of necessity, and is the natural state of man.
2. The state is a jural society.
3. The state is a society of moral beings.
4. The state does not absorb individuality, but exists for the better obtaining of the true ends of each individual, and of society collectively.
5. The state, being a human society, jurally considered and organized, is the society of societies; a bond for weal and woe.
6. The state does not make right, but is founded upon it.
7. The state is aboriginal with man; it is no voluntary association; no contrivance of art, or invention of suffering; no company of shareholders; no machine, no work of contract by individuals who lived previously out of it; no necessary evil, no ill of humanity which will be cured in time and by civilization; no accidental thing, no institution above and separate from society; no instrument for one or a few; no effect of coercion, or force of the powerful over the weak; no mystery founded on something beyond comprehension, or on an extra-human base; the state is a form and faculty of mankind to lead the species towards greater perfection — it is the glory of man. (Lieber, 1911, p. 162)

Given how the study of international relations began to take shape, as a seedling within the disciplines of international law and the newfound schools of political science, we can observe in these early writings the formations of liberalist and idealist perspectives.

These perspectives were rooted in juridical conceptions of the state, and subsequently formed juridical conceptions of interstate relations.

Not all scholars at the time were personalizing the state in the same way as Lieber. They were, however, setting very clear boundaries, juridical boundaries for conceptions of the State. Stephen Leacock in *Elements of Political Science* writes:

Viewed in a purely theoretical light, every state is an absolutely independent unit. Its sovereignty is unlimited, and it renders political obedience to no outside authority; it has no organized coercive relation with any other political body. Such theoretical isolation is the prime condition of its existence as a state, and its political independence is one of its essential attributes. This is what Hobbes meant in saying that, in regard to one another, separate states are to be viewed as in a 'state of nature. (1906, p. 89)

This strict conception of sovereignty was winning the day. Imperialism was still a very real phenomenon, and the great powers of the time, the European powers, were skirting the very concept of State sovereignty they birthed at the end of a thirty-year war that consumed the continent. Raymond Garfield Gettell was among those to throw in with sovereignty:

Leaving out of consideration territory and population as the physical elements or raw materials, of which a state is composed, and combining organization and unity, the real essence of the state is found to be sovereignty. Viewed internally, this means that a state has complete authority over all the individuals that compose it; viewed externally, it means that a state is completely independent of the control of any other state. (1910, pp. 11–12)

Three years later, however, Gettell highlighted a catch to this strict conception of sovereignty in a paper submitted at the American Political Science Association (APSA) 10<sup>th</sup> Annual Meeting, writing, “The purpose of the modern state, accordingly, includes a more or less composite aim at securing order and justice for its citizens, providing for its own continued and developing existence, and promoting the progress of the world at

large” (1913, p. 60). The key phrase here being, “promoting the progress for the world at large,” which in effect introduces space for liberal and idealist conceptions of international relations. Interestingly, as will be discussed in chapter two, many of the same phenomena of the modern state were the driving forces behind events in China that led to the overthrow of the Qing Dynasty and the establishment of the Republic of China.

Detracting from idealism, it is at this same time we can observe the rise of realism. In 1903, APSA was established. It was here that the study of international relations begins to set itself apart from other studies in political science. It is also here that the debates between realism and liberalism begin to take shape. Schmidt notes that the obvious precursor to International Relations in the founding of APSA was the International Law and Diplomacy section, though he is careful to also point out that the Politics section was loosely defined and was headed by none other than Dr. Paul Reinsch, author of what was earlier noted as the first published work to deal directly with the subject of international relations. The section, it is noted, was concerned with colonial administration and affairs (Schmidt, 1998).

Among the ‘realists’, James Bryce took a firm and measured stand against the movement toward a juridical conception of sovereignty in a presidential address at the APSA Fifth Annual Meeting:

They have tried to create by efforts of thought, and to define, such general conceptions as sovereignty, the State, the origin of political right, the ground of political obligation, and so forth, following the methods of metaphysics and keeping as far from the concrete as possible. So much time and toil have been spent on these discussions, and so many of them have a kind of historical interest as revealing the ideas current three or four centuries ago that we must speak respectfully of them. But what have they given us of substantial worth? How vague and cloudy are many of the German treatises of the last sixty years on the theory of the State? They take the writer's own conceptions for realities instead of

starting from the facts and so defining the conceptions as to make them express realities. What can be more windy and empty, more dry and frigid and barren than such lucubrations upon sovereignty as we find in John Austin and some still more recent writers? (1909, p. 9)

John Austin, a British jurist and scholar, had written and lectured extensively on the juridical basis of power, the sovereign, and sovereignty in the late 1800's. His work, *The Providence of Jurisprudence Determined*, published in 1832 was often the target of critique by those who sought to steer intellectual endeavors away from the abstract and toward what they perceived to be reality based variables in theorizing the state and sovereignty. John Dewey, very pragmatically chiseled at the juridical disposition when he wrote, "The ultimate weakness of Austin's theory is that, in identifying sovereignty with a part only of the body politic, he gives (and allows) no reason why this limited body of persons have the authority which they possess" (1894, p. 41).

There is very little in terms of a single voice in the early development of the discipline of International Relations. Once the discipline stepped away from its roots in international law, and became increasingly subsumed by the scientific prerequisites of Political Science, it began to move away from moralistic rhetoric that was prescriptive, and more toward historical and behavioral variables for explanatory power that were descriptive.

Interestingly, what drove the initial development of a study of international relations, the robust emphasis on sovereignty and the state, were the unfolding events in China. The competing European interests, the Japanese and Russian increased presence, and the utter ineptitude of the Qing imperial government to assert its authority in the face of these circumstances, fueled American concern with international politics. In fact, it spurred one of the most important American foreign policies of the time, the Open Door

Policy, that still to this day serves as the metaphysical root of American foreign policy. Despite China's displacement from the intellectual center surrounding the development of International Relations, its own experiences reflected the concerns of the scholarship at the time. Chinese intellectuals knew the importance of a unified and sovereignty state, aimed at modernization and development in the emerging world order rife with imperialist ambition. The following section discusses this in more detail.

### **China and the development of International Relations**

The study of international relations was intimately tied to what was happening in China during the late 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> century. A figure not previously mentioned, Westel W. Willoughby, embodies this fact most perfectly. He was one of the founding fathers of the American Political Science Association, and is commonly referred to as the father of Political Science given the volume and the impact his writings had on the shaping of the discipline (Tolley, 2010). He was, given the times, active in matters associated with international politics and China. Later in his career, on two separate occasions he served as an advisor to the Chinese government, and wrote extensively on China regarding matters of international politics and affairs during that time, including the more widely read titles *Foreign Rights and Interests in China* (1920), *China at the Conference* (1922), *Opium as an International Problem* (1925), and *The Sino-Japanese Controversy and the League of Nations* (1935).

Despite China's role as a subject of international relations research, China, or Chinese scholars, did not have the same kind of input into the development of the discipline one might expect. As will be discussed in the Chapter Two, The early republic and subsequent Chiang Kai-shek years were so marked by internal conflict, so consumed

by the necessity of establishing a state, that there was very little room for the luxury of academic pursuits in the newly emerging fields of Political Science or International Relations. What is most important from this period is the history, and how it impacted the Chinese perceptions of international society; in particular, how it impacted the CCP's perceptions.

Given that we now understand the contours of how International Relations developed in the West, cut off from but concerned with occurrences in the East, it is paramount to now also look at how International Relations came to be studied in China. David Shambaugh, professor of political science and international affairs at George Washington University, has been instrumental in documenting how the discipline and study of International Relations has taken shape in China since 1949. In 1984 Shambaugh co-authored an article in *Political Science* with Wang Jisi titled "Research on International Studies in the People's Republic of China" (1984). At that time the concern was simple: What is the state of International Relations research in China? The time period represented a good half-decade into the reform and opening up, and it posed a topic of significant importance to ascertain where China stood in terms of its worldview and perceptions of the workings of international politics. The state of Chinese studies of international relations was promising but unimpressive. A central reason for this rested on the fact that so much at the university level in China, prior to the reforms and opening up, was based strictly on Marxist-Leninist theory. Though Shambaugh notes a number of other weaknesses in the study of international relations as he saw and experienced it during the 1980's, it is the strict adherence to Marxism-Leninism at the exclusion of all



other points of view that did the most to limit the Chinese ability to push the boundaries of knowledge in the field. Shambaugh writes:

Courses on post-Second World War international relations, theories of international relations, and Soviet, American and Chinese foreign policy are taught in these departments but, based on my experience as a student in these classes at Beijing University during 1983-85, their content is little more than officially approved, Marxist-Leninist recantations of descriptive history. Current events (e.g. since 1980) are generally off-limits and controversial periods such as the Sino-Soviet Split or the Korean War are either ignored altogether or are portrayed in a propagandistic manner highly critical of the Soviet Union or the United States. China can do no wrong in the eyes of these professors; it is always the other party which transgressed the norms of international behaviour and infringed upon the sacred sovereignty of the Chinese people. (1987, p. 301)

The state of International Relations research in the 1980's was a legacy of the pre-reform era, or the Mao years, that was dominated by adherence to the Party line, Mao Zedong Thought, and a much more conservative interpretation of Chinese Communism. Prior to 1978 the field of international studies were wholly conducted in a Marxist-Leninist framework, was in large part geared toward intelligence purposes, and reflected a certain amount of Soviet influences (Shambaugh, 2011).

It is important to note the state of education, or the theory of education, in China during the Mao years; to explain what is meant by 'adherence' to the Party line and Mao Zedong thought. Fortunately, one does not have to look far for clear explanations. Lu Dingyi<sup>10</sup> writes, "The educational policy of the Chinese Communist Party has always been that education should serve the politics of the working class and be combined with productive labour; and to apply this policy, education must be led by the Communist

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<sup>10</sup> An early member of the Chinese Communist Party who participated in the Long March, served as the chief of the propaganda department from the establishment of the People's Republic in 1949. In 1965 he was appointed Vice-Premier and Minister of Culture ("Lu Dingyi," 1996).

Party” (1958, pp. 3–4). This brings to the surface a very important theme that is repeated and that was set in stone by Mao during his years in Yen-an. In, *On Practice* (1965h, pp. 295–309), Mao outlines very clearly the important dynamic between theory and practice in the formation of knowledge. This concept served as the cornerstone of what, later, Lu emphasizes as the importance of combining education with labor.

These philosophical roots ran deep and were born out of the Marxist conception of dialectical materialism. Lu defines education as the “transmission and acquisition of knowledge” (1958, p. 4). Communists, he asserts, define and approach education based on this dialectical materialism:

We believe that pedagogy is a branch of social sciences. All the social sciences must be guided by politics, and education is no exception. People require education to wage the class struggle and the struggle for production. We believe there are only two kinds of knowledge in the world. One is knowledge of the class struggle...The other kind of knowledge is the knowledge of the struggle for production, that is, the knowledge men gain in their struggle against nature. (1958, p. 5)

Here, when we juxtapose Shambaugh’s assessment with Lu’s description, we can observe, without prejudice, the clear philosophical difference between how International Relations as a discipline developed, was taught, and was researched, with that of how the CCP sought to pursue education in all subjects including International Relations.

The inseparability of the Communist Party of China (CPC) from the PRC fuels this dynamic, and has fueled a similar dynamic in the Chinese foreign policy making structure. China, broadly, therefore has been governed by these core principles defined as:

The Communist Party of China takes Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tse-tung Thought as the theoretical basis guiding it’s thinking... Throughout this historical period,

there are classes, class contradictions and class struggle, there is the struggle between the socialist road and the capitalist road, there is the danger of capitalist restoration and there is the threat of subversion and aggression by imperialism and modern revisionism. (The Ninth National Congress of the Communist Party of China, 1969, pp. 112–114)

It is important to highlight that at each National Congress of the Communist Party of China, there are usually some revisions to the constitution, though largely the language remains unchanged. The over all theme and message, however, have remained consistent. The revisions themselves have remained consistent, as the Party has acknowledged various milestones it perceives China as having met in line with the Party's definition of socialist evolution. There are five milestones that are officially acknowledged: (1) the establishment of the first Party constitution in 1922; (2) in 1927 the constitution was revised to meet the needs of the revolution, thus expanding its provisions and articulating Party structure, including the establishment of the Central Committee, and philosophical orientation with the inclusion of guiding principle of 'democratic centralism'; (3) in 1945 Mao Zedong thought was included in the text as the guiding ideology; (4) in 1982 "leftist mistakes" were corrected, including a shift away from the proclamation that Marxist-Leninist-Mao Zedong thought were associated with the collapse of imperialism and global supremacy of Communism, opting for terms less bombastic and focused exclusively on China and her development; (5) in 2002 there was the inclusion of terms outlining the CCP as the representatives of the Chinese workers, people, and nation (X. Zhang, 2012). In the proceeding chapters there will be discussion regarding how these shifts were representative of advancements in Chinese foreign policy making, perceptions of the international community, and the internal culture of Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The ideological and subsequent theoretical shifts that took place in order to make space

for these changes represent a vital piece of the puzzle as one begins to work out the elements determining the role of theory in the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Higher education in general, from the late 1950s and the beginning of the Great Leap Forward until the late 1970s and the end of the Cultural Revolution, suffered a great deal (Shambaugh, 2011; Song & Chan, 2000; R. Yang, Vidovich, & Currie, 2007).

Programs of Political Science, especially those with an international focus, were shut down. These programs were especially vulnerable to accusations of harboring rightist or reactionary sympathies, or worse being sympathetic to foreign or imperialist ideas. In fact, the foreign policy of 'leaning to one side' has been cited as a driving force behind the educational reforms that resulted in the sidelining of many of these programs and the radicalization of the Chinese higher education system (R. Yang et al., 2007). In 1952 the Chinese model of higher education had effectively taken on the Soviet model.

Although it is fair to say that studies of international affairs and politics drew a decent amount of suspicion, and in many cases programs were shut down, this was not exclusively the case during the 20 years of turmoil in China. As previously mentioned, international studies had been leveraged for its important role in intelligence analysis both for the PRC and the CCP (Shambaugh, 2011). It becomes clear then, why programs at Renmin University, started in 1955 as the College of Foreign Affairs, and subsequently additional programs at Peking, Fudan, and Renmin University in International Politics in 1964 were deemed acceptable (Song & Chan, 2000). These programs were helped by the proposal and endorsement of Zhou Enlai, and the eventual blessing from Mao (Shambaugh, 2011). There were additional programs at other institutions, though these were more intimately tied to the direct need for intelligence. The Shanghai Institute for

International Studies for example was established in 1960, while the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS), which had under its auspices the World Economic Institute and a division on world politics, established programs for international studies on Latin America, Asia and Africa (Shambaugh, 2011). In May 1977 the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) was born from and took on the responsibility of overseeing research in the 14 departments that once made up the Department of Philosophy and Social Science of CAS (Du, 2015).

The general assessment of the first 30 years of the Chinese experience with International Relations studies is that they were dismal. The over dependence on, and narrow lens of Marxist-Leninist-Mao Zedong thought, the almost exclusive interaction with Soviet or other communist counterparts, the subsequent rejection and distrust of the broader global community, and the consequences of a series of bad domestic policies, namely the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, are all cited as reasons for its dismal state. This is not a sufficient explanation, however, and fails to recognize what China was, and what China was striving for during this period.

The domestic policies that shut programs down are the only viable explanation for the dismal state of International Relations research before 1978. One has to ask, however, what is the basis with which one is justified in making a judgment of dismalness. The CCP, as quoted earlier, had no intention of meeting the standards of the West during the Mao years. In fact, it was quite the opposite. The CCP stood in direct opposition to the West (read imperialists), and sought to pursue a completely different framework for understanding and interpreting international affairs. For this to be done, the traditional intellectual or the traditional academic institution was not the necessary vessel of

understanding. The over dependence on Marxist-Leninist-Mao Zedong Thought that is cited as being detrimental to the development of International Relations research, was in fact the source of its greatest strength and the premise on which it challenged the conventions of the great powers' intellectuals. In essence, China was functioning in and actively creating an alternate reality to that of the capitalist states of the time. This point will be revisited in different forms throughout chapters four, five, and six.

Steven I. Levin, in his essay *Perception and Ideology in Chinese Foreign Policy* (1998), argues that the early years of the People's Republic were defined by a formal ideology. Levin agrees the rigidity and uncompromising nature of ideology is only half the story. The tenets of Marxist-Leninist ideology, according to Chinese interpretations, freed the Chinese to think independently, define their circumstances, and pursue the best course of action for the preservation of the Party (Levine, 1998). Essentially, Marxist-Leninist theory was the tool with which the CCP sought to build a structure. When this formal ideology left the Chinese state wanting in areas it defined as important, Levin writes:

...[it] began to undergo a metamorphosis. While its identity-defining dimension remained, formal ideology gradually ceased functioning as a guide to action in the foreign policy arena and was increasingly transformed into a set of abstract principles and behavioral norms used to criticize the conduct of other states. (1998, p. 39)

This is true for the broader ideological bend of China as it transitioned out of the Cultural Revolution and the Mao era, into an era of what we know today as marked by great reforms.

Thus, after 1978 there was a clear shift in Chinese national priorities. There the painful years of struggle and revolution had left the country writhing with the need to

develop and to engage the world. These years, the Deng Xiaoping era, not only ushered in host of reforms that opened the country to economic advancement, it also opened a door to new ideas and ways of thinking. This continues to be a dynamic the PRC struggles to balance, yet the consequences of a reformed and ever more open communist state have been real and observable. The study of International Relations has been one area that saw great change during this time.

The leadership that had arguably done so much to stifle it, interestingly, laid the groundwork that allowed some of the greatest advancements in International Relations. Prior to Mao's death, with Zhou Enlai taking the lead, China engaged with the United States in talks that began the normalization of relations between the two nations. Specifically, the Sino-American rapprochement of 1972 lead to what has come to be known as the Shanghai Communiqué that articulated:

The two sides agreed that it is desirable to broaden the understanding between the two peoples. To this end, they discussed specific areas in such fields as science, technology, culture, sports and journalism, in which people-to-people contacts and exchanges would be mutually beneficial. Each side undertakes to facilitate the further development of such contacts and exchanges.

Both sides view bilateral trade as another area from which mutual benefit can be derived, and agreed that economic relations based on equality and mutual benefit are in the interest of the people of the two countries. They agree to facilitate the progressive development of trade between their two countries. (U.S. Department of State, 1972)

This was the key that opened China's doors during the Deng era. It also opened China to the increased involvement of U.S. government and American based philanthropic organizations, both of which would play important roles in the development of China's studies in International Relations (Shambaugh, 2011). In particular the Ford Foundation was exceptionally active in supporting programs geared toward the development of

international relations studies in China. Shambaugh notes that there was a number of U.S. based philanthropic organizations with programs aimed at building up and supporting international relations research in China during the 1980s, including: The Rockefeller Foundation, Rockefeller Brothers Fund, Luce Foundation, and the MacArthur Foundation (2011). These philanthropic organizations, including the Ford Foundation, combined their efforts to support Chinese scholarship in international studies through the creation of the Committee on International Relations Studies with the People's Republic of China (CIRSPRC) (Shambaugh, 2011). In 1993 the CIRSPRC was expanded to provide support in other countries in the Asia Pacific, thus changing its name to the Program for International Studies in Asia (PISA), which is housed to this day at George Washington University. The initial mandate, however, was:

Its initial purpose was to reduce China's isolation from international scholarship in the field of international relations by offering a program of research and study abroad for faculty and policy analysts in Chinese universities, social science academies, and research institutions... In subsequent years, CIRSPRC launched several in-country training programs in China, helped develop specialized libraries on international affairs in major Chinese institutions, and organized programs on curricular and organizational development in international studies (The George Washington University, 2015).

Chinese scholastic isolation was most effectively remedied through study abroad programs and the translation of a number of works, effectively exposing the field to a wider variety of ideas and influences. With the exception of a brief period of a conservative crackdown following the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989, lasting until 1992, the field of International Relations has continued to expand and flourish in China.

These trends within the field of International Relations in China have been marked by clear influences from overseas, and the gradual yet distinct shift away from



Marxist-Leninist-Mao Zedong Thought as the guiding light of Chinese thought on international affairs and the workings of world politics.

Despite its development and expansion, there are themes in the Chinese understanding of International Relations that have remained constant. These constants have come to be known as China's informal ideology (Levine, 1998). Levine, like the formal ideology outlined above, outlines six themes in China's informal ideology that he argues are important because they are reoccurring among a wide group of élites: (1) Both the Chinese nation and people are 'great'; (2) The modern period has been unfavorable to China, deserving correction; (3) Those that harmed China in the past must offer appropriate restitution; (4) China by virtue of its 'greatness' is central to world affairs and should be treated accordingly; (5) Chinese sovereignty is absolute and unconditional; (6) China engages the international community through virtue (1998, pp. 43–44).

From the discussion on the early development of International Relations studies in the United States, we can see a reflection of the strong emphasis from Chinese scholars of those times on national identity and sovereignty in the informal perceptions of China, carried into modern times. Likewise, what drove research in the discipline in the past, the partitioning of China into spheres of influence, the weakness of the early republic in the face of more developed colonizers, all in spite of the greatness all once attributed to the Chinese empire, also serves to feed the Chinese historical memory of its own precarious position in the global community.

In the following chapter, the foreign policy events that shaped this worldview will be discussed, from the early years of humiliation, the inability to achieve modernization in the face of external threats, and the foreign policy blunders of the early republic.

Though politically removed from the Communist Party philosophy, this period's experiences are directly related to the development of the CCP and offer an important foundation from which one may better know China.

## Chapter Two: Foreign Devils, the Qing & Republican China's Foreign Policy

In order to ascertain the extent of any dissemination of International Relations theory in the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it is important to ascertain the historical origins of Chinese foreign policy. In the previous chapter, the creation and origin of the study of international relations was discussed, both inside and outside of China. In this chapter, we seek to address the terms with which China tottered into modernity, and the avenues it sought in the early periods of that modernity to address its foreign relations.

Hunt, in *The genesis of Chinese Communist foreign policy* (1996), puts forth the argument that there are important and striking similarities between the Qing handling of foreign relations and that of the CCP. So much so that it is paramount to ascertain these in order to contextualize the practices and worldviews of the CCP in the modern period. Interestingly, there is a base similarity of interest by both the Qing and the Chinese Communists; they both wanted to unify China, to Sinicize it, and to bring shared Chinese identity to all ethnic groups within its borders; each for different reasons, however. For the Qing, as Manchus, this was to preserve their own legitimacy and claim to power. Ultimately for them, to cede some part of China's territory to foreign influence was endurable if it meant the preservation of Manchu rule in China. For the Communists, however, China needed to be united and sovereign, without exception, if it were going to survive in a modern state system. By the time of the Second Chinese Civil War and the establishment of the PRC in 1949, China was still relatively isolated and ill equipped to engage in the complexities of world politics in the capacity of a great power, as it saw befitting of itself. This realization, like that of a similar realization that settled into the

Mandarin elites of the late Qing period, drove the creation of a complex and often hard to understand foreign policy premised on an appreciation of China's own deficiencies.

### **The Late Qing: Necessity of Intellectual Revolution**

Though the Qing were adept in their foreign relations, they were unable to achieve their goals for a number of reasons. A review of the historical record demonstrates that this was not the result of the oft cited 'sleepiness' of the Qing government, but rather was directly born from a number of complex challenges China faced that were well beyond the ability of the Qing ruling class to manage at that time. On this point Hunt writes, "Beset simultaneously by external predators and internal conflict, that state suffered from an empty treasury, divided and weak leadership, inefficient institutions, ineffective personnel, and a crisis in its ideology" (1996, pp. 41–42). These 'themes' of conflict would shape Chinese approaches to foreign relations for the next century and beyond.

With regard to the Qing government, however, there were individuals that actively sought to bring China into greater communication with the West as a means of remedying some of what ailed the Qing Empire. One such individual was Xu Jiyu, scholar and governor of Fujian Province. Though there were others who produced works that helped shepherd China from ancient to modern, e.g. Lin Zexu's *Sizhou Zhi* (四洲志) (1839) or Wei Yuan's *Haiguo Tuzhi* (海國圖志) (1852), Governor Xu was the first to acknowledge the discrepancy between what Fred Drake has called "the myth of Chinese superiority and the reality of powerful alien forces" (Drake, 2008). In this, Xu was the first to openly stand for an intellectual recognition that Western influence was inevitable and beneficial to China and her development. As such he advocated a study of foreign ideas not only as a means to strengthen China, but also to position the empire to be able

to exploit foreign weaknesses to a Chinese advantage (Hunt, 1996). Xu's exploration of the 'superiority' of Western power eventually cost him his position as governor, and was sidelined as an intellectual by the more conservative literati of the time. His work, however, was not forgotten, and in later years proved to be important to the formation of the early republic. Xu's work would prove influential to thinkers and reformers such as Zeng Guofan, Guo Songdao, Xue Fucheng, Wang Tao, Kang Youwei, Liang Qichao, and Yan Sishan (Leung, 1992). Among these, Liang Qichao is the most prominent, and had a decisive influence on Mao Zedong's worldview.

The acknowledgement of Chinese weakness was an important leap toward reform, though it itself was born from the encounters and realizations of Chinese foreign relations. It is hard to conceive of a China of late Qing that did not care about the world outside her immediate periphery. This was the case, however. Han Learning dominated China, and the scholars of this tradition were steeped in orthodoxy, distinctly abstained from political discussion, relegated their intellectual pursuits to discursive endeavors, which ultimately reinforced the myth of the 'Middle Kingdom' (Fairbank & Reischauer, 1978; Feng & Bodde, 1997). These were byproducts of previous Qing policy that suppressed subversive thought, most notably under the Qianlong Emperor (Vradiy, 2009; Woodside, 2002). Han learning began to fall into disrepute as the fall of Qing Dynasty became increasingly tangible, giving space to the Statecraft School, which marked new advancements in Chinese thinking on political life (Jones & Kuhn, 1978; Vradiy, 2009).

It is important to note that the initial rise of Han learning in the 17<sup>th</sup> century was born from a strong discontent with the dominant Sung learning that was patronized by the Ming dynasty (Fairbank, Reischauer, & Craig, 1978; Jones & Kuhn, 1978). This

discontent was rooted in a Sino-centric pursuit to discredit the barbarian Ming rulers' claim to legitimacy in China, but also was spurred on by substantive realizations that the texts on which Sung learning were premised were, in fact, forgeries; forgeries that went unnoticed for thousands of years well before Ming adoption (Fairbank & Reischauer, 1978; Feng & Bodde, 1997, p. 321). The historical, philosophical, and literary record surrounding the rise and fall of various schools of learning are far too complex for a full discussion here. The most important point, however, in understanding the transition to a 'modern' China, is the increasing realization during the Qing dynasty, that the abstract and impractical plane on which these intellectual debates were taking place, was a veridical source of tangible problems for the Chinese people and state.

Wei Yuan played an important role in this respect, and was a leader in the Statecraft School ("Wei Yuan," 2014). His work *Haiguo Tuzhi* (海国圖志), commonly translated as *Notices of Foreign Countries, illustrated with Maps and Engravings*<sup>11</sup>, is attributed with beginning a process of disabusing the Chinese mind of Sino-centrism "by showing that China was in reality not the 'Middle Kingdom'" (Hao & Wang, 1978, p. 148). In another of his works, *Huang-chao jing-shi wen-bian* (皇朝經世文編), or Collection of Qing Dynasty writings on statecraft, Wei outlined an approach to statecraft concerned with China's present circumstances and emphasized pragmatic approaches to solving problems (Fairbank & Reischauer, 1978; Schell & Delury, 2013; Vradiy, 2009). The requisite quality of pragmatism in statecraft, or even the study of statecraft, would prove to be one of the most influential ideas in modern Chinese political thought. From

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<sup>11</sup> Translation from *The Chinese Repository* (Bridgman & Williams, 1850)

Mao to Jiang, the practical roots of theory in governance, served as a guide for China as she navigated world and civil wars, revolutions and an age of reform.

China's history up to the 1800's was characterized by a hierarchical and comparatively stable international order. To the Chinese this order was arranged with the Emperor, the Son of Heaven, at the center radiating civilization outward to the rest of the world (Fairbank, 1978). In practical terms this developed into the tribute system and metaphysical conceptions of *tianxia* (天下). In this sense, foreign affairs were premised on a set of agreed upon social norms that placed China at the center of Asia, and allowed for trade and the flow of technology and culture to the Chinese periphery. It was nothing like what we might conceive of as international affairs today: a set of relations premised on both political and economic agreements between two 'equal' states.

The changing world around China began to manifest itself most prominently in the Canton System. A number of issues surrounding the status of foreigners and their relationship to China began to cause real strains within an outdated Imperial order that took for granted Chinese superiority. The Opium Wars, a direct result of the Canton trade and the increasingly misunderstood relationship between China and the West, sent many of the Mandarin elites into full crisis mode. Their anxieties about the future of China began to lay the foundation for further exploring modes of foreign relations (Gilbert, 1976).

From the 1840's to around the 1880's, a system of treaties began to take shape that afforded the Qing court a more modern framework for dealing with the increasingly intrusive Westerners. Most mainstream analysis is quick to accept contemporary Chinese accounts of this period, one that condemns Western behavior as a series of ploys to

subvert China, made all the easier by way of Qing weakness and tired traditional thought. John Fairbank, however, has made a compelling argument to the contrary. Qing officials, Fairbank argues, were not as clueless as is popularly assumed. In fact, their handling of the treaty system reflects sophistication in foreign relations that thought to at once fold the Westerners into a Chinese framework while simultaneously grasping for what they though were much need changes in the old Qing order of affairs (Fairbank, 1968).

The subsequent events demonstrate that the Qing officials' attempts to maintain China's self-perceived position in the modern world were never going to be enough. The world had changed. China had not. Steadily the realization of China's current circumstances began to materialize in their scholarship and correspondence<sup>12</sup>. In 1842, the famous scholar official Lin Zexu had openly acknowledged in a letter to a colleague the superiority of Western military power. That same year Wei Yuan wrote on maritime defense, a topic that largely was a non-issue prior to the arrival of Western powers. In 1844 the policy of conciliation had taken over from the attempts to tame the western barbarians through force, as seen in the Opium Wars. By 1854 the unraveling began. Imperial edict gave essential control of Shanghai over to foreigners. Then in seemingly quick succession, in 1858 foreigners could visit Beijing without kowtowing to the Emperor, and by 1860 they could reside in Beijing (Fairbank, 1968).

The old ways were not sustaining China. The years 1860-61 saw the conscious development of a Theory of Self-Strengthening, first proposed by Feng Guifen. This 'self-strengthening' began the process of acknowledging Chinese weakness and inability to manage its foreign affairs. In the spirit of this trend, in 1862 the *Tongwen Guan* (同文

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<sup>12</sup> The material that follows draws from a series of documents translated in *China's Response to the West: A Documentary Survey, 1839-1923* (Teng & Fairbank, 1979).



館), or College of Foreign Languages was established in Beijing (Teng & Fairbank, 1979). This was closely followed by a school of foreign languages and science in 1863, established in Shanghai. Fairbank and Teng have noted that there was general distrust of the foreign teachers that were brought to China for the purposes of teaching in these foreign studies schools. The suspicion centered on the assumption that the foreigners were not sharing all the information they had (Teng & Fairbank, 1979). An outgrowth of this suspicion facilitated a program started by Rong Hong, more commonly known as Yung Wing, in 1872, which saw 120 students study in the United States and 30 in France and England (Teng & Fairbank, 1979).

It isn't until 1894 with the Sino-Japanese War and the loss of Formosa that a clear victimization of China begins to take shape. The Qing Dynasty's patience with the increasingly demanding and intrusive foreigners began to wear thin. It was beginning to wear thin for the Chinese people themselves as well. Interestingly, at the onset of visible discontent among the people, that resentment of foreigners included the Qing Dynasty, a notably foreign dynasty from Manchuria. Though the Qing had more trouble handling their unwelcome Western tenets, they had less difficulty in deflecting the discontent among the common people and focusing it on exclusively on the 'non-Chinese' foreigners (Isaacs, 2010). By around 1900, the events that unfolded as a result of this growing discontent became known as the Boxer Rebellion. The Qing approach to handling this rebellion proves to be the real beginning of the end for the dynasty, and would fuel not only Western disinterest in working with the Qing, it would open up a consciousness for the necessity of revolution among the Chinese people.

## Republican China

The early Republican era was marked by two distinct figures, both of whom played important roles in the fall of the Qing Dynasty. Though neither Yuan Shih-Kai nor Sun Yat-sen have direct relevance to the specific details of this research, their legacies played a role in shaping Chinese communist worldviews integral to our understanding of broader questions surrounding international relations, foreign policy, and the role of theory in the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The first of these figures, Yuan Shih-Kai, was an ineffectual and overly ambitious leader. His impact on China is entirely a consequence of his failures. Yuan Shi-Kai had acceded to Japan's '21 Demands' following the First World War, which many believed made China essentially subservient to Japanese rule (Lieberthal, 1995a), and briefly named himself Emperor before being completely thrown from power (E. P. Young, 1977). His weakness and ineffectualness in the face of Japanese pressure provided ample evidence to Chinese intellectuals of the time, that there was a need for more substantive changes in China if it were to regain freedom from foreign incursion.

Dr. Sun Yat-sen, the father of modern China, would play a role in pushing the Qing dynasty out of power, but more notably in building up a real sense of nationalism among the Chinese people in an effort to strengthen the emerging post-imperial Chinese state. Sun had openly opposed Yuan Shih-Kai and was in exile in Japan for much of that period, prior to returning to China to lead the new republic once Yuan Shih-Kai had been removed from power (Wilbur, 1976). Sun's impact on Chinese political thought is important in so far as it represents a substantial link in the genesis of Chinese nationalism; which under the CCP becomes a tool of propaganda in an effort to carry out

revolution. Though Sun's thought is integral, it is also lost and misrepresented in many contemporary discussions.

Sun was first and foremost a Chinese nationalist. His concern with international relations and foreign affairs stemmed from his desire to modernize China and establish an effective government that could protect the national interest. Sun spent many years in the United States, spoke English fluently, and as a result of his exposure to Western thought, began to develop a concern for the future of China (Wilbur, 1976). After a failed revolt in 1895, Sun went into exile spending most of his time in Japan. It is there that his sense of political purpose matured (Wilbur, 1976). C. Martin Wilbur (1976) offers a detailed account of the intricacies born from Sun's attempts to garner foreign support for the revolution and the subsequent strengthening of the Chinese state. The extensive amount of time Sun spent in Japan had influenced his support for a strengthened Asia, a goal that would be furthered by a stronger China (Jansen, 1967). Despite his time in the West, he viewed Western imperialism, coupled with Chinese weakness, as facilitating China's woes. Though he was heavily influenced by his time in Japan, he was resistant to becoming a puppet of the increasingly aggressive Japanese regime, a fact that caused consternation in Japan and may have fueled a growing Japanese militarism (Jansen, 1967).

Ultimately, Sun would skillfully balance foreign interests in the pursuit of strengthening and uniting China. He grew close to the Soviet Union, and for a time was very sympathetic to a Marxist conception of history and liberation. His interest in Marxism was never dogmatic, however, and was born from a sincere interest in pursuing the best options for China. He turned, abruptly from Marxism, when he came across a

treatise by an American socialist that was highly critical of the Communist International's (Comintern) trajectory (Shotwell, 1932)<sup>13</sup>. Sun's vision, if it were to be summarized, was one of pragmatism. His most lasting position on the formation of government and revolution in China came in his articulation of the 'Three Principles of the People'. These principles would be later leveraged both by the KMT and the CCP in efforts at self-legitimization. The three principles consisted of a series of lectures on nationalism, democracy, and livelihood.

After Sun's death, and the assumption of power by Chiang Kai-shek, the KMT continued to successfully navigate domestic and international politics with remarkable success; remarkable in light of the challenges it faced, including a divided and restless nation, the prevalence of foreign threats, and the immediate necessity of governance reform and economic modernization. Chiang Kai-shek's government has been often characterized as corrupt and ineffectual, yet focused historical research has demonstrated otherwise. Certainly the KMT faced many of the same challenges as the Qing government, but the republican government was making substantive efforts to establish a coherent and effectual modern government (Dikötter, 2008). The perception of corruption was born from an ad hoc system of fee-taking by the ministries as a means of financing their operations, creating a pool of funding that was both independent from the central government and unavailable to it (Strauss, 1998). KMT foreign policy, as mentioned, was born from and informed by Sun's nationalism. A lot of effort was spent on regaining and reasserting Chinese sovereignty over its territory, reducing and regaining spheres of

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<sup>13</sup> This treatise, or book, *The Social Interpretation of History* (William, 1921) is a detailed refutation of the Marxian reduction of historical processes to purely economic terms.

influence, and modernizing its financial and military capacity to function in a modern international system (Phillips, 1996). The Three Principles, theoretically, continued to make up the core of KMT policy under Chiang Kai-shek, yet particular weaknesses with regard to democracy and livelihood during the Second World War created a voice for the CCP in opposition.

The CCP, too, repeatedly referred to the Three Principles as a means to various ends, though it is not clear to what extent the principles themselves influenced CCP policies. More often than not, the Three Principles allowed for a convenient call for continued revolution. The need to take land back from the landlords, or the necessity of strong central authority in the pursuit of democracy, played well into the CCP's revolutionary narrative (Wells, 2001). From Mao Zedong to Deng Xiaoping, Chinese leadership framed the Chinese communist historical narrative as an outgrowth of the organic rise to revolution that began at the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century in response to imperial Chinese dysfunction, and Western economic imperialism.

These themes continued to unfold, and became increasingly pronounced in the following decades that made up the Second World War and subsequent Civil War that led to the victory of the CCP over the KMT. The following chapter will look at how the CCP's foreign policies began to take shape and the origins of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

## Chapter Three: CCP Experiences in Foreign Affairs Prior to October 1, 1949

Though the Chinese Communist Party was fostered in an international movement, it quickly developed a unique sense of identity. The traditional proletarian revolution was not a fit for China. Under a mainstream conception of Marxist philosophy at the time, the establishment of a communist state was to be achieved through the reclamation of power by the working classes, the proletariat, from the bourgeoisie. In China, this could not be. The proletariat in China was a remarkably small portion of the population, and was centered in larger industrial cities that the Chinese communists had lost meaningful access to as Chiang Kai-shek tightened his hold on the country. Furthermore, China had not undergone its industrial revolution, and therefore was not suited to engage in a class revolution the way Marx had originally conceived. Through the careful intellectual consideration of Mao Zedong<sup>14</sup>, it became the common people, the peasants that needed to assert their authority and establish a more equitable society. The KMT government headed by Chiang Kai-shek was perceived by the Chinese communists as not only

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<sup>14</sup> Mao's model of peasant revolution would become a defining feature of Chinese Communism, though it is important to note that Mao was not the only revolutionary at the time that came to this conclusion. Antonio Gramsci, a leader of the Italian communist party also drafted very similar conclusions to those of Mao as he considered revolution for Italy and Western Europe, and like Mao emphasized the need to appreciate the social and cultural circumstances of a society when considering revolution. This is an important comparison to make, as Mao is sometimes criticized as not actually being a true communist on the basis of his rejection of certain models of revolution in favor of others that he saw as more befitting the Chinese. A comparison between Mao and Gramsci would suggest otherwise, and would further suggest the debate surrounding revolution and communism at the time was not as unified as Leninists would have liked to assert. For a more detailed discussion on the philosophical links between Mao and Gramsci, see "Ideological Superstructure in Gramsci and Mao Tse-tung" (Todd, 1974) and "The predicament of Marxist revolutionary consciousness: Mao Zedong, Antonio Gramsci, and the reformulation of Marxist revolutionary theory" (Dirlik, 1983).

perpetuating the traditions of old China that allowed for corruption and disregard for the working classes and peasants, but one that also proved utterly ineffective during the previous century in securing the national wellbeing in an increasingly international world. Given the precariousness of the CCP's political position in their early history, especially during the Nanjing Decade, it is easily understood that early CCP foreign affairs consisted of focused and sustained propaganda, a style of foreign affairs defined by their Marxist ideology as refined by Leninism and Stalinism, and dominated by the realities of the war with Japan. Securing a sympathetic ear in the foreign press was seen as paramount (Mikoyan & Mao, 1949a), and among the surest ways of putting external pressure on the KMT.

A breakthrough came for the communists in 1936 when Edgar Snow accepted an invitation from Mao Zedong to visit the communist camp (Porter, 1997)<sup>15</sup>. The results of that encounter were recounted in Snow's famous book originally published in 1937, *The Red Star Over China* (1968). For many China watchers in the West, it marked an important turning point. It confirmed the wellbeing of Mao, as well as the reform minded, anti-Japanese vigor that the communists wanted to project to the outside world. Additionally, in 1937 several more foreign journalists were able to visit the communist camp in Yen-an, including Agnes Smedley and James Bertram. In September 1937 Bertram conducted a series of interviews with Mao Zedong that would eventually make

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<sup>15</sup> Edgar Snow was joined on the journey to the communist camp by George Hatem, later known as Ma Haide, who played an important role in China both during the war with Japan and the civil war, as well as after the establishment of "New China". A detailed account of Snow and Hatem's 1936 journey to the communist camp can be found in *The People's Doctor*, by author Edgar Porter.

their way into the Selected Works of Mao Zedong (Huang, 2008, p. 56)<sup>16</sup>. In this interview one can observe a foreshadowing of Chinese communist foreign policies. The experience of resisting Imperial Japan shaped the Chinese worldview until the reform policies of Deng Xiaoping began to take hold in the 1980's. In the interview with Bertram, Mao lamented the Chinese inability to heed the communists' warnings against Japanese intentions:

Before the war broke out, the Chinese Communist Party warned the whole nation time and again that war with Japan was inevitable, and that all the Japanese imperialists' talk of a "peaceful settlement" and all the fine phrases of the Japanese diplomats were only so much camouflage to screen their preparations for war. We repeatedly stressed that a victorious war of national liberation cannot be waged unless the united front is strengthened and a revolutionary policy is adopted. The most important point in this revolutionary policy is that the Chinese government must institute democratic reforms in order to mobilize all the people to join the anti-Japanese front. (T. Mao, 1965a, p. 47)

In a later period, not too long after Mao gave this interview, one could have easily replaced Japanese Imperialists with American Imperialists, and had a sense of the Chinese view of the international order until the late 1970's. The 'united front' domestically meant mobilizing the masses and having cooperation with the KMT in opposition to the Japanese, yet in later years this concept would develop into a united communist front, composed of China and The Soviet Union and her satellites, in opposition to the Western capitalist states lead by the United States.

Another characteristic reflected in later foreign policy and understood early on by Mao was the power of global public opinion, the perception of strength and of

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<sup>16</sup> There is a discrepancy between the date given by Huang Hua and that printed in some copies of the *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, Volume 2. The former notes the encounter took place in 1937 while the latter records the interview as occurring in 1933. Given that subsequent publications of Mao's selected works have included the 1937 date, not the 1933 date, that is the date used here.



consistency. Mao describes to Bertram one of the successes in the war of resistance with Japan as being “the sympathy of world public opinion. Those who once despised China for her nonresistance now respect her for her resistance” (T. Mao, 1965a, p. 49). Outside one brief and unelaborated reference to a “positive foreign policy” (T. Mao, 1965a, p. 50) Mao has little else to say regarding foreign affairs. It isn’t until a few years later, as engagement between the CCP and the Americans begins to pick up, that the communist government starts to systematically consider its foreign affairs.

It has been suggested that the beginning of a systematized foreign affairs mechanism, with the establishment of a foreign affairs department, occurred within the CCP as early as 1936 under the direction of Bo Gu (Hunt, 1996). Though this is factually accurate, it is also misleading. Bo Gu was a member of what was known as the 28 Bolsheviks, a group that was ‘purged’ during the Rectification Campaign. Much of what these Soviet trained intellectuals initiated within the Party was either put to an end or was completely overhauled, as was the case with the Central Party School.

In support of their efforts and to train capable cadres, the communist base housed the Central Party School (CPS). Alan Liu provides a history of the origins of the CPS in the Soviet Union, originally based in Moscow at the Sun Yat-sen Communist University. The CPS moved to China around 1933, first in the Jiangxi base area and then in Yanan where it stayed until 1947 (A. P. Liu, 2009). The curriculum was heavy on Marxist-Leninist theory, covering topics such as Philosophy, Political Economy, Socialism, Political Work, Publicity Work, and Guerilla Warfare (Huang, 2008, p. 57; A. P. Liu, 2009). The school played an important role in shaping the ideological and theoretical perspectives of the soon to be established foreign affairs professional corps, as many of

those involved in the early foreign relations of the CCP were either educated at the CPS or served as instructors there. This was the case both with Huang Hua<sup>17</sup> and Zhang Wentian<sup>18</sup>.

Between 1941 and 1947, in conjunction with the Rectification Campaign<sup>19</sup>, the CPS underwent a shift in its pedagogy (A. P. Liu, 2009). The Rectification Campaign itself was Mao's response to the dogmatism of the Soviet trained intellectuals, known as the '28 Bolsheviks', headed by Wang Ming (Cheng, 2009, pp. 65–70; Dillon, 2012, pp. 238–240). In three of Mao's works he outlines his purpose for the Rectification Campaign, one on May 1941 titled *Reform our Study* (1965f), another *Rectify the Party Style of Work* on February 1, 1942 (1965e), and finally *Oppose Stereotyped Party Writing* on February 8, 1942 (1965d).

In *Reform our Study* Mao defines a line between Marxism-Leninism and the Chinese Revolution. In Mao's mind, the latter came before the former. This will become an important distinction later that will lead to the idea of communism with Chinese characteristics. Mao starts by describing how "meager" the understanding of Marxism-Leninism was at the beginning of the revolution (T. Mao, 1965f, p. 17). He outlines the only path to the success for the revolution, which he viewed as being achieved through the marrying of "the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution" with the "universal truth of Marxism-Leninism" (T. Mao, 1965f, pp. 17–18). This notion of rooting theory in

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<sup>17</sup> A student of the CPS, later to be active in communist Chinese relations with the U.S. Army observer group, commonly known as the Dixie Mission, and eventually the Minister of Foreign Affairs between 1976 and 1982.

<sup>18</sup> Served as an instructor at the CPS while Huang Hua was a student there, later to become the Ambassador to the USSR and the first Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of the newly established People's Republic of China.

<sup>19</sup> Also known as the Rectification Movement

practice was not only sustained during Mao's era, but also survived as one of the central tenants of the CCP's worldview.

In Mao's perspective, not only was there a distinctly Chinese aspect to the revolution, the antecedent to Marxism-Leninism in China, but there was also a disadvantage among many of those who studied abroad. Mao writes:

For several decades, many of the returned students from abroad have suffered from this malady. Coming home from Europe, America or Japan, they can only parrot things foreign. They become gramophones and forget their duty to understand and create new things. This malady has also infected the Communist Party. (T. Mao, 1965f, p. 20)

To Mao, foreign theories and ideas had to be tested against a Chinese reality, a reality that would be defined and perpetuated by the Chinese Communist Party alone.<sup>20</sup> The other two talks, *Rectify the Party's Style of Work* and *Oppose Stereotyped Writing*, followed the same lines of analysis and reasoning. Of these, *Rectify the Party's Style of Work* was delivered on the opening day of the CPS in 1942. For Mao, there was no room for disunity among the cadres, and the Rectification Campaign secured the loyalty and unity of the Party for the next several decades, well after the establishment of the People's Republic of China (Cheng, 2009; Dillon, 2012).

The CPS was shutdown in 1947 as a result of the raging civil war, not to be reopened until 1949 and the establishment of the PRC.

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<sup>20</sup> It should be noted that Mao perspective did not preclude the participation of individuals who had a foreign education. Both Zhou Enlai and Zhu De, Mao's closest counterparts and the two highest ranking and regarded officials in the CCP, both studied overseas; the former in Germany and the latter in France. Mao's emphasis, then, is understood as being placed on one's ability to recognize the unique Chinese characteristics of the revolution and to carry out the business of the revolution accordingly.

Given the variance in the philosophy between Mao and the 28 Bolsheviks, and the fact that it was Mao's vision, secured through the Rectification Campaign, that came to define communist China, one must look to the Party under Mao for the formal beginning of communist China's systematized foreign affairs. Huang Hua, former Minister of Foreign Affairs for the PRC, notes in his memoirs that foreign affairs were the purview of Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, and Zhu De<sup>21</sup> (2008). Formal systematization, through the creation of a foreign affairs office under the Party's Central Military Commission, came in direct response to the U.S. Army Observer group, also known as the Dixie Mission, which had been embedded within the communist camp to aid in the anti-Japanese effort, on July 22, 1944 (Mikoyan & Zhou, 1949). Huang Hua and George Hatem were both assigned to the foreign affairs office, along with Ke Bonian, Chen Jiakang, and Ling Ching. The office Director was Yang Shangkun. On August 18, 1944 the Central Party Committee issued a directive stating:

The arrival of the American army personnel in our boarder region and bases behind enemy lines marks the beginning of their actual contact with us, and they have some initial understanding of the new democratic China. We should regard this as a development of our united front in the international arena and the beginning of our work in foreign relations. (as cited in Huang, 2008, p. 76)

Zhou Enlai later, in response to a request from Mao, drafted *The Directive of the Central Committee Concerning Work in Foreign Relations*, which in part states:

Our foreign policy is guided by the idea of forming an international united front, the crux of which is joint resistance against Japan and pursuit of democratic cooperation while expanding our influence. We must be firm concerning our national stand, but oppose such erroneous concepts as excluding or fearing

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<sup>21</sup> In later years, as evidenced in a number of Soviet Russian documents, it is clear that that Liu Shaoqi played an integral role in foreign affairs, to the extent that he was involved in inter-Party relations.

anything foreign or fawning on everything foreign. While strengthening our national self-respect and self-confidence, we must also learn from the strong points of others and be adept at cooperating with others. (as cited in Huang, 2008, p. 76)

The messages being sent through these two directives are very different from messages that were sent just a few years earlier during the Rectification Campaign. That is not, of course, to say that they are in any way inconsistent.

### **One thing's end is another's beginning**

Between 1944, with the communists' establishment of foreign affairs offices, and 1949, which saw the establishment of the People's Republic of China, there was a storm of major foreign policy events that took place involving the CCP. During this period the civil war would reach its climax, ultimately leading to a communist victory, and the CCP would be tested at every turn regarding their ability to remain independent of the foreign powers' interests in China. The negotiations surrounding the formalities regarding who would accept the surrender of the Japanese, whether it would be the communists or the KMT, should not go unmentioned as it represents the final major role the United States would play in China as a mediator during the civil war. On March 11, 1947 the Dixie Mission formally came to an end (Carter, 1997). This marks a point in communist Chinese foreign relations history that forever changed its relationship with the United States. The lead up to the American withdrawal saw many changes in the United States' policy toward the Chinese communists. The initial group, lead by General Stillwell, represented some of the best China specialists the United States had among its official ranks. Their advice to cooperate and work with the communists in China came at a time when ideological divides were too bold to lend themselves to any form of pragmatic policy choices. In fact, several of those involved in the Dixie Mission, after returning to

the United States, endured a stigma, suspicion, and harsh treatment for many years after (Carter, 1997). The United States' policies toward China increasingly reflected the growing consensus that Communism was a threat<sup>22</sup>. Furthermore, in 1945 President Truman formally outlined U.S. policy toward China, removing the communists from American consideration, and went so far as to reduce them to an “autonomous army” that “should be eliminated” (Truman, 1945).

### **The unraveling**

A major factor contributing to the devolution of relations between the United States and the CCP, beyond the overt American move to dismiss the Chinese communists, was born from the CCP leadership's sense of abandonment and betrayal. Huang Hua notes in his memoirs that a letter was sent by Zhu De to Admiral Ernest King, followed by another letter sent from Mao to President Roosevelt, both of which presumably requested further American support in achieving a reasonable solution to the civil war (2008, p. 86). The validity of this claim is unconfirmed, though the information was shared with Huang by John Colling and Herbert Hitch<sup>23</sup> when they visited China after liberation (2008).

Unfortunately Huang does not provide any documentary reference to these letters, and there is no record of a letter of this nature being sent from Mao to President Roosevelt in State Department records for the year 1945, though the seemingly informal channel that it was passed through could account for that fact. There is at least one instance where Mao sent a letter to President Roosevelt on November 10, 1944 and received a response after the president's return from the Yalta Conference, dated March 10, 1945. The former

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<sup>22</sup> The withdraw of the Dixie Mission and the end of any real cooperation between communist China and the United States coincides with advent of the second Red Scare and McCarthyism in the United States.

<sup>23</sup> Both were a part of the Dixie Mission.

expresses a tone of hopefulness and remarks on the “traditional and deep-rooted friendship” shared between China and the United States (Perkins et al., 1967b). The latter’s letter is very telling of the US position regarding the status of the Chinese government. President Roosevelt begins by addressing Mao as “Mr.,” and later states in the brief letter, “It is my sincere hope that you and President Chiang Kai-shek will work together harmoniously to achieve internal unity” (Goodwin, Fine, Cassidy, & Prescott, 1969). This is rife with nuance that was most certainly not lost on Mao and the CCP leadership. First, in Mao’s correspondence with then Ambassador Hurley, he was traditionally referred to by the title “Mr. Chairman” (Perkins et al., 1967a). The hopes expressed for internal unity are clear that said unity would be under “President” Chiang Kai-shek, further distancing the United States from the communist camp. Either way, Huang notes that neither letter he refers to in his memoirs received a response, suggesting it was the United States that was turning a cold shoulder toward the CCP, furthering the substantiality of the CCP’s claim that they were abandoned. Though it is not possible to ascertain the sincerity of such feelings, it is important to take note that individuals close to the leadership at the time have recorded the situation as such (Huang, 2008).

This is further supported by the explicit writings of Mao himself and propaganda put out by the Party furthering Mao’s thought. There is a sharp shift from the language of the 1944 spirit of cooperation and hopefulness that resonated in the foreign affairs directives of that time, as earlier discussed. By April 24, 1945, after relations with the United States had begun to grow cold, Mao began to define communist China’s foreign policy in *On Coalition Government* (T. Mao, 1965b). Mao believed, as was central to the communist position, that the communists represented the will of the people, a democratic

response to the reactionary KMT. As such, he writes from a perspective that affords the Communist Party a voice representative of China, not the Communist Party alone. Mao defines what he saw as central to the confidence that was built up in agreements such as the Atlantic Charter, Yalta Conference, or the Tehran Conference (1965b). Each of these agreements prioritized the right of self-determination through a democratic process; language that also reinforced the right to the sovereignty of a people to engage in self government without the interference of foreign powers (United States, 1950, pp. 1-2-25-34).

Most interesting about what Mao has to say in *On Coalition Government* regarding foreign affairs, consists of two related statements. First, he highlights the good will of the Chinese people toward the Soviet Union, earned through their renunciation of the unequal treaties in favor of equal treatment, during the period of the early Republic led by Sun Yat-sen. After effectively defining China as a communist state, as communism in his mind represented the true will of the people, and drawing China in close quarters with the Soviet Union, Mao completes his policy framework by contrasting the closeness with the Soviets with a word of warning to the United States and the United Kingdom. He writes:

We ask the governments of all the allied countries, and of the United States and Britain in the first place, to pay serious attention to the voice of the Chinese people and not to impair friendship with them by pursuing foreign policies that run counter to their will. We maintain that if any foreign government helps the Chinese reactionaries and opposes the Chinese people's democratic cause, it will be committing a gross mistake. ( T.Mao, 1965b, p. 307)

There are two 'warnings' here, the first against meddling in internal Chinese affairs generally, the second against specifically meddling in the Chinese civil war by providing



assistance to non-communist entities, i.e. the KMT. Though this clearly is a direct warning to the Western powers, and the United States and the United Kingdom in particular, it is structured in a passive tone. The initial warning signals an impaired friendship, while the seemingly sharper of the two warnings is left in a cloud of ambiguity, not directly calling out a particular government for helping the KMT. There is no doubt, however, that this is a response to the United States' continued support of Chiang Kai-shek and the KMT.

The language used, suggesting an impaired friendship, is curious coming from an individual who otherwise is understood as having internalized the abuse and humiliation China suffered at the hands of the Western powers. Why then would there be any suggestion that friendship existed at all? Perhaps it could be chalked up to diplomatic language, but the context suggests more. As mentioned, it is clear this is a statement geared toward the United States and Great Britain, with more emphasis on the United States given its subjugation to the graver second warning. This being the case, one can infer that there was a sense of friendship, or at least the hope of friendship, on the part of the Chinese communists with the United States, and then by extension the other Western powers. One is reminded that though the United States was not blameless in the unequal treatment of China earlier in the 20<sup>th</sup> century, its efforts toward fairness through policies such as the Open Door Policy were designed in the hopes of restraining naked Imperialism<sup>24</sup> (Elleman, 2015). This lends itself to support the suggestion that Mao and

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<sup>24</sup> There is robust debate on this point, and is stated here as such merely to highlight that the shared history between China and the United States was not as confrontational as it was with other states like Japan, the United Kingdom, or Tsarist Russia.

the leadership of the CCP were indeed beset by some sense of abandonment or betrayal when the United States trended closer toward Chiang Kai-shek.

As will be discussed in chapter four, the warnings Mao offers in *On Coalition Government* will be foundational to Chinese foreign policy after the establishment of the PRC, and will continue to be well into the years following Mao's death. These warnings are particularly important during the first three decades following the establishment of the PRC, as China drew clear lines between its 'friends' and those with whom friendship had been impaired. This gives China flexibility in its foreign policy orientation, where those with whom China was unfriendly can become friends, and friends can likewise fall from grace. This basic structure is the root of what is often referred to as Chinese foreign policy pragmatism.

### *Yantai Incident*

By October 1945, the CCP's foreign policy convictions were put to the test. The war with Japan had officially come to an end, though the internal division between the KMT and the CCP regarding who would accept surrenders led to further confusion. The disagreement regarding who could accept surrenders from the Japanese ultimately prolonged the fighting between the communists and remaining Japanese troops who had decided to only offer their surrender to nationalist forces (Phillips, 1996). During this prolonged fighting, the communists were able to capture a number of ports, including Yantai<sup>25</sup> (Phillips, 1996). On October 6, 1945 American ships sought to dock in the

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<sup>25</sup> The most exhaustive account of the Yantai incident identified during this research can be found in *Yenan and the Great Powers: The Origins of Chinese Communist Foreign Policy, 1944-1946* by James Reardon-Anderson, Columbia University Press 1980

Yantai<sup>26</sup> port. An official account from the United States Marine Corps identifies the U.S. mission as being a mission to “investigate the conditions at that port” (Shaw, 1968, p. 6). The accounts of what happened vary among sources, with some initial accounts claiming that the CCP threatened the Americans, which led to their ultimate withdraw; while others describe a more sober encounter involving clear communication and cooperation that led to the American determination to withdraw lest they were viewed as interfering in the civil war (Reardon-Anderson, 1980; Shaw, 1968; Westad, 1993). The latter of these two accounts has been corroborated by both Chinese and American sources and is generally accepted as the more accurate account of events (Huang, 2008; Reardon-Anderson, 1980). The Yantai Incident rarely makes it into broad accounts of Chinese history. The event itself is superficially insignificant. There was no military confrontation between the PLA and American troops or vessels. Furthermore, it did not intrinsically alter the CCP-American relationship. As noted, by December 1945 President Truman would formalize the deep divide between the communists in China and the United States, a divide that was already well established. Yantai is important for a couple of reasons. One, it confirms that despite the CCP’s distaste for the American support of Chiang Kai-shek, it did not necessarily view the occupying American troops as a direct threat to Chinese sovereignty. At this point, the central mission of the American forces, after all, remained the removal of remnant Japanese forces in China. As the civil war heated up and the American presence in CCP occupied territory threatened the communist position, the Yen’an government was not timid in reminding the United States not to involve itself in internal Chinese affairs. The Americans troops stationed in China, it should be noted,

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<sup>26</sup> Yantai was formerly known as Chefoo.

likewise had little interest in getting involved in the civil war (Reardon-Anderson, 1980). The Yantai incident, as a formal and official exchange regarding a disagreement of position, marks the beginning of the CCP foreign affairs offices, on behalf of the leadership, asserting Chinese sovereignty to a foreign power. This would continue to be a role the Foreign Ministry of the PRC plays after its establishment in 1949, and continues to be the PRC's position with regard to its conflict with the ROC government in Taiwan, which the PRC views as an internal Chinese affair.

### **Never trust a bear to do anything except bite**

It is prudent to mention something that was occurring between the Soviet Union and the Chiang government around this same time. Earlier in 1945 on August 14, the KMT and the USSR entered into the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance. While the details surrounding the negotiations and the reasons for Soviet involvement in the treaty are only marginally related to this research the CCP's response is pertinent. The treaty not only rhetorically weakened the CCP's position in China; it also afforded the USSR extraterritorial rights in China reminiscent of the spheres of influence that existed earlier that century. Additionally, it secured the independence of Outer Mongolia from the rest of China. This point in particular was especially disconcerting to the CCP, and Mao in particular. In an interview with Edgar Snow on July 23, 1936, Mao stated, "When the people's revolution has been victorious in China, the Outer Mongolian republic will automatically become a part of the Chinese federation, at its own will" (T. Mao, 1990, p. 83). The Soviets either missed or ignored the Chinese position regarding Outer Mongolia, but more importantly missed the CCP's own understanding of its revolution. As discussed earlier, the Chinese revolution was Chinese first and communist second, and in

the case of Mongolia Mao reveals how Chinese foreign policy mixed Marxism-Leninism with traditional conceptions of Chinese nationalism. For the Soviets to bite away pieces of China, even if it was doing so from the KMT, was a level of interference in internal affairs unacceptable to the CCP leadership. The treaty fueled suspicion within the ranks of the CCP and with Mao himself that the USSR had not shed all of its Imperialist inclinations (Goncharov, Lewis, & Xue, 1993). Interestingly, the CCP endorsed the treaty at the time, though did so begrudgingly. This is evidenced in a conversation that occurred during Anastas Mikoyan's visit to China in 1949, in lieu of Mao travelling to Moscow. It is reported during that visit that Mao brought up the annexation of Outer Mongolia. Following that conversation it is also reported that other CCP officials "kept asking me [Kovalev] about this [Outer Mongolia] constantly" (Goncharov, 1991, p. 69). Mao reportedly would bring the issue of Outer Mongolia up at meetings completely unrelated to the topic (Goncharov, 1991). It would not be until August 11, 1964 in an interview with Japanese socialists, when the issue would resurface publically in the context of the Sino-Soviet split. When asked about his thoughts on the Kurile Islands and Japan's position that they are returned by the USSR, Mao found opportunity to mention Mongolia. In fact, it opened his response, and was direct. He stated:

The places occupied by the Soviet Union are very many. In accordance with the Yalta Agreement, the Soviet Union, under the pretext of assuring the independence of Mongolia, actually placed that country under its domination. Mongolia covers an area much greater than that of the Kurile Islands. When Khrushchev and Bulganin were in China in 1954 we raised this question, but they refused to speak to us about it. (T. Mao, c.1990s)

In fact Mao's recollection was corroborated a little over a week later after giving this interview. Minutes from a meeting on August 19, 1964 of the Central Committee of the

Communist Party of the Soviet Union note Khrushchev and some of his colleagues confirming Mao's account.

*Khrushchev*

[...] Mao Zedong used to say...—we talked about this back in 1954, when a party delegation visited Beijing. They said then, how do you look at this, Mongolia used to be a part of the Chinese state [?] I replied then, yes, this is so, but now Mongolia is an independent state, it will hardly want to accede to China. In general, this is the Mongolian question. And, he says, what do you think about this? I remember that [Andrei] Gromyko was there. I said, what can we say?—they will hardly want this.

*Andropov*

It was said that they had become used to independence.

*Khrushchev*

This was all.

*Andropov*

[We] even refused to discuss this question.

(As quoted in note 14 in Radchenko, 2007, p. 347)

These examples, both occurring many years after the current period being discussed, highlight a tension that existed from the moment the Soviet Union decided to pursue separating Outer Mongolia from China. Certainly the USSR had its reasons for pursuing such a policy, whether it was imperialist inclinations or prudent hedging against a potential future rival, but such an inquiry is well beyond the purpose here. It also highlights the tendency, one that will be reinforced repeatedly over the years, of communist China not forgetting or forgiving perceived encroachments on its sovereignty, even when it comes to its closest allies. Finally, it demonstrates how the CCP was able to restrain its convictions in the interest of pragmatic policy approaches that would arguably better secure China. This approach to territorial disputes, one that finds China waiting for the proper moment to address the issue, is another tactic that repeats itself throughout

CCP foreign policy history. Given that these territorial issues, to China, are on a level of consideration on par with the natural rights of the state, there is no real political theory to contend with. Rather, national pride and a sense of retribution guide those strategies.

### **Unraveled and then divided**

Despite the efforts of the CCP, United States, and other Western powers to put on the airs of cooperation, the period following the end of the Second World War proved not to be the right environment for such cooperation to occur. The Cold War had officially begun, and China, her people and her civil war, found itself at the center of a global struggle for hegemony between the United Soviet States and the United States of America. The struggle for hegemony was not framed in the context of US superiority to the USSR or visa versa. Rather, the lines were drawn ideologically, with both camps accusing the other of suppressing the true will and freedoms of the people, or being warmongers. Though Truman had already signaled to China that the CCP fell on the wrong side of that line, it was not until March 5, 1946 that China and the world officially knew that the stage had been set for a global struggle that would continue until the fall of the Soviet Union nearly half a century later in 1991. On March 5, 1946 Winston Churchill gave a speech at Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri entitled *Sinews of Peace*. It was in this speech that Churchill coined the term 'iron curtain' to describe the divide between the West and the East, between Communism and Capitalism. To Churchill and Truman, who was present at the speech and also spoke briefly, this was truly a divide between authoritarianism and democracy (Churchill, 1946).

And so the lines were drawn. In August 1946 Mao gave an interview to the American journalist Anna Louise Strong, calling the US government out for its support

for the nationalist government. Seemingly more important in the interview, however, was the issue between the Soviet Union and the United States. The issue of repression versus democracy, the very same that Churchill identified in *Sinews of Peace*, was turned on its head in Mao's mind. The United States was the leader of the reactionaries in the West, exploiting people and suppressing their will, while the Soviet Union was at the helm of the communist states that represented progress and democracy (T. Mao, 1961b). At the center of this framework was the "vast zone" that lay between the United States and the Soviet Union (T. Mao, 1961b, p. 99). This intermediate zone would be the stage on which the global struggle for progress would be carried out, well before direct conflict between the two superpowers could occur. This would later become Mao's concept of three worlds to be discussed in the next chapter.

In the interview with Strong, Mao made a clear effort to distinguish the American people from the American reactionaries. He repeatedly frames the American people in a shared condition with the rest of the world's oppressed peoples, and by implication the Chinese people. Up to this point Mao had proven himself a shrewd propagandist, and he knew the power of public opinion. It was in this interview where Mao made his famous "paper tiger" comment (T. Mao, 1961b, p. 100). Though Mao's concept of the paper tiger is commonly deflected or critiqued by reducing it to mere propaganda designed to compensate for material or technological inferiority (Powell, 1965), there is more to the idea than meets the eye. Mao was well aware of the destructive power of atomic weapons, and certainly found them terrifying. What he understood better, however, were the limits that fear placed on their use. It was not just China who needed to fear these weapons; it was the whole world. The Soviet Union was well aware of the U.S. effort to



develop the atomic bomb, and through an established intelligence-gathering network, was aware of the successful tests the United States carried out before their delivery in Hiroshima and Nagasaki (Radzinsky, 1996). Nonetheless, Stalin feared their destructive capabilities and felt “blackmailed” by the United States in the post war period (Goncharov, 1991, p. 52). In Mao’s calculation conquest and subjugation were necessary to stem the flow of revolutionary progress around the world, things that atomic bombs alone could not do. He clarifies this when he said “war is decided by the people, not by one or two new types of weapon” (T. Mao, 1961b, p. 100). For China to survive in this new world, as it was a part of the intermediate zone between the United States and the Soviet Union, it would need unity and resolve both domestically and in its foreign policy.

As the pretenses fell away and ideological lines were drawn, the CCP and the Soviet Union grew closer. For both, it seems more out of necessity rather than a common vision. The CCP-Soviet relationship has hitherto been unaddressed in detail for a reason. As this research’s ultimate focus is on the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the origins and the channels of official foreign relations are of the most relevance. The Soviet Union, up until the establishment of the PRC, recognized the Nationalist government as the legitimate government of China. As such, their dealings with the CCP prior to that point were almost entirely clandestine. This proved to be another sore spot for the CCP, especially when the Soviet diplomats followed the Nationalist government to Canton as the communists crossed the Yangtze River and took Nanjing<sup>27</sup> (E. Zhou & Trudeau, 1973, p. 4). On December 27, 1946, however, the USSR and the CCP took a step toward

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<sup>27</sup> The American mission and Ambassador, Leighton Stuart, remained in Nanjing and hoped to establish communication with the CCP. The significance of which was not lost in the mind of Zhou Enlai (E. Zhou & Trudeau, 1973, p. 4).

acknowledging their already assumed cooperation with the signing of their first ‘trade’ agreement (Goncharov et al., 1993, pp. 12–13). The agreement was less of an economic arrangement as it was a military one. It set conditions through which the Soviet Union would supply the CCP with war materiel.<sup>28</sup>

### *The Ward Crisis*

It was in the midst of this point in history that the civil war was in its most vicious throws. A few months after the CCP-Soviet agreement for war materiel, the Dixie Mission officially came to a close on March 11, 1947. Meaningful and sustained dialogue between the Americans and the Chinese communists would not happen again until the 1970s. As the communists made significant territorial gains throughout the northeast of the country and made their way south, they had to make decisions regarding the status of foreign consulates in China. These foreign missions had formal relations with the KMT, so it was necessary to make a determination whether these consulates would be allowed to function within communist held territory. These decisions did not come easily to the Party, and it quickly became obvious that despite the establishment of an official foreign affairs office within the CCP, the Party was better at war than diplomacy. This was most apparent in November 1948 when the Red Army entered the city of Mukden, now Shenyang. A series of diplomatic correspondences housed in the US State Department archives demonstrate that the foreign diplomatic corps, Americans included, did not know what to expect after the Red Army took the city. Then Consul General Angus Ward thought it best to stay in Mukden and explore opening up channels of communication with the communist leadership there (Goodwin, Prescott, & Cassidy, 1973). What

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<sup>28</sup> This agreement was kept secret and was not known to exist by the United States (United States Central Intelligence Agency, 1948)

happened next has come to be known as the Ward Crisis, and demonstrates either how ill prepared the communists were at the time to balance both the war and foreign relations, or how incredibly clairvoyant the CCP leadership was in pressing the Americans to their purposes. There are a few accounts of what happened, one in official documents from the U.S. government, and others from Soviet sources close to the CCP leadership. It appears, from the record, that shortly after the PLA took the city, contact with the U.S. Consulate was established but not furthered until the arrival of the communist mayor (Goodwin et al., 1973). Once the mayor arrived, relations with the consulate were amiable and professional. Consul General Ward notes that his discussions with the mayor on November 9, 1948, signaled the CCP's desire to have them in the city. Due to the on going civil war, the banking system was in tatters. During their discussion the mayor even suggested the communists would tend to the consulate's basic financial needs were they to have trouble getting money from the United States (specifically document 738 in Goodwin et al., 1973). Additionally, the mayor noted the absence of American businessmen in the city, whereupon the Consul General Ward cited the war with Japan and the subsequent civil war as having taken its toll on the businessmen's resolve to remain. The mayor responded that it was their hope to welcome them back (specifically document 738 in Goodwin et al., 1973). Similarly, the U.S. consulate in Hong Kong had been in contact with CCP representatives there, who assured them that relations with the communists would be amiable and cooperative (Goodwin et al., 1973).

Roughly a week later on November 15, 1948 the consulate received word that the Central Party Headquarters had issued a directive to surrender any radios with sending capability, raising a number of questions for the consulate regarding the status of their

own radio. A meeting made by the consulate the following day with the mayor as well as with the head of the Military Control Committee was abruptly cancelled indefinitely. By November 18, 1948, consulate Mukden was able to squeeze a plain language message out to the U.S. consulate in Shanghai notifying them of the seizure the former's radio. After that point the consulate went silent, the consul general and staff were placed under house arrest, and an already growing tide of anti-communist support within the U.S.

government and the State Department in particular, suddenly had their whipping boy. It would be more than a year before the crisis came to an end, after the establishment of the PRC (Goodwin, Prescott, Cassidy, & Fine, 1978). The Americans would not forget Mukden, and it served as an important point of contention when the U.S. negotiated trade relations with communist China, and even then they ultimately decided not to recognize the PRC as the government of China (Prescott, Cassidy, & Fine, 1974a, 1974b).

Several questions arise from this incident. Why was there a sudden shift in the approach in dealing with the Americans? Also, why drag it out for more than a year? The answers to these questions are not easily answered. An account given by Ivan Vladimirovich Kovalev, Stalin's personal representative to Mao, suggests he planted a seed in the ear of the CCP suggesting that the consulate "had a powerful radio station and also served as an American-Kuomintang intelligence-gathering center" (Goncharov, 1991, p. 65). Based on his recommendations of blockading the consulate, limiting staff movement, and taking control of the radio station, the CCP took action. He also notes the Soviet distaste for the Chinese communists' tendency to "treat the Americans too gently" (Goncharov, 1991, p. 66). Kovalev's account seems plausible, but it does not match with the hitherto consistency in the policies that were crafted by Mao and Zhou.

The more likely explanation, and one that is wholly consistent with Chinese foreign policy behavior post-October 1, 1949, suggests there was a lot more foresight than the Soviets give the CPP credit for. On January 31, 1949 Mao had a conversation with Anastas Mikoyan, where he elaborated on his belief that in being recognized by the United States the new China would be opening itself up to attack (Mikoyan & Mao, 1949a). He further stated that he did not want to hurry the establishment of diplomatic relations, but rather preferred to delay them in order to bide time and gather their strength (Mikoyan & Mao, 1949a). The following day, on February 1, 1949 Mikoyan recorded a conversation he had with Zhou Enlai. Zhou, perhaps unsurprisingly, gave a similar appraisal of the situation though he markedly announced that Mukden was designed to drive the United States, as well as the French and British with them, out of China (Mikoyan & Zhou, 1949). In the end, whether the ordeal was the result of poor policy planning or thoughtful consideration, to the ultimate analysis it is a distinction without a difference. By the end of January 1949 the CCP had made a decision to forcefully remove itself from mainstream state behavior and forge its own path forward.

#### The Amethyst Incident

In concert with this line of argument, the CCP's choice to allow the Red Army's direct assault on the British frigate Amethyst can be understood in a similar context to their decision to isolate consulate Mukden. The frigate was headed to Nanjing on routine duties; though at some point along their journey the ship came under fire from the PLA's artillery (Spence, 1990, p. 511). The quarrel lasted for a total of 103 days and claimed the lives of 22 British (Gray, 1999). Here again, one is confronted with asking why events unfolded as they did, and why they went on for so long. The British had made at least two

attempts to rescue their ship, and had they been successful the event would have come to a close. Like Mukden, the Amethyst incident was a statement. China had changed, and the CCP intended to exercise China's sovereign rights to their full extent.

### **Chinese independence**

Chinese proactivity in exercising its sovereignty wasn't only in the context of its relations with Western powers. Routinely, Mao had sought to separate the Moscow trained intellectuals from the ranks of the Chinese Party, and despite consulting with the Soviet Union on various issues, and with Stalin in particular, there was no disillusionment on either side regarding the CCP's firm position on Chinese sovereignty. The Americans were even well aware of this dynamic. In a report produced by the Central Intelligence Agency on the situation in China in 1948, the analysis states "the Chinese Communist Party appears to operate independently of Soviet directives," and that the USSR could not dominate China as it did the satellite states of Eastern Europe, in particular because "of the vast size of China and its disorganization, strong regional tendencies, and the Chinese proclivity for anti-foreignism" (United States Central Intelligence Agency, 1948, p. 14).

### ***Nanjing 'Peace' Negotiations***

The relationship between the Soviet Union and China toward the end of the civil war is perfectly captured in an exchange that occurred between January 9 and January 15, 1949. On January 9, the Soviets had been approached by the Nationalist government and asked to serve as mediators in a proposed peace negotiation between the KMT and CCP. The following day Stalin sent word to Mao notifying him of the KMT's proposal and suggesting two responses, one from the USSR and one from the CCP. In these responses it is clear the CCP would be committing to negotiations, though on terms distasteful to

the KMT (Stalin, 1949b). Quickly after this message was sent, on January 11, 1949, Stalin sent another message to Mao clarifying that despite the CCP would be agreeing to the negotiations, the terms would be too strict for the KMT to possibly consider accepting (Stalin, 1949c). Two days later, the Soviet representative to the CCP, Terebin<sup>29</sup>, cabled Stalin reporting that Mao was firm in his response that he was against the USSR mediating and that the CCP would negotiate with the KMT (Orlov, 1949). Mao understood that the KMT was close to collapse and would likely agree to any terms for a cease-fire in order to recollect their strength.

That same day, Mao cabled Stalin. In his message he cautioned against the USSR even suggesting negotiation might be an option. He reasoned that such a position would only warrant further attacks from the KMT and Americans, accusing the CCP of being warlike. The message explicitly recommends a response for the Soviet Union to deliver to the KMT regarding their proposed peace proposal. The proposed response is short and to the point; its central message is that the Soviet Union has no business in the internal affairs of China (Z. Mao, 1949). Stalin quickly followed this with a response of his own the following day on January 14. His response was very long and thoughtful, justifying the Soviet position, but acknowledging the USSR's inability to direct the actions of the CPP (Stalin, 1949d). There is a bit of a gap in the records at this point. It appears that Mao responded by telegram that same day or the following, but what was said is not clear. Stalin's response, however, to that telegram is available. It was a brief yet clear response. It reads:

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<sup>29</sup> Terebin was his alias. His real name was Andrei Orlov.

We have just received your last short telegram, which shows that we now have unanimous opinions on the issue of the Nanjing peace proposal and that the Communist party of China has already started its “peace” campaign. This, the matter is now closed. (Stalin, 1949e)

On January 18, the Soviet Union responded to the KMT in clear accordance with Mao’s insistence that foreign powers not be involved. In part it reads:

The answer of the Soviet government notes that the restoration of China's integrity as a democratic peace-loving state is the affair of the Chinese people itself and that this integrity could be probably best achieved by the direct negotiations between the internal forces of China, without foreign interference. (Stalin, 1949f)

The CCP in every instance, whether it was with the Americans or the Soviets, asserted the sovereign right of the Chinese to determine the outcome of issues related to China. In the case of the Soviets’ perception of China, Mao’s strong headedness and the CCP’s self-reliance impressed Stalin, and it was around this time that he began to accept the prospect of having to deal with a communist China that was a partner and not a subordinate (Goncharov et al., 1993).

#### *Anastas Mikoyan & Liu Shaoqi: United but separate*

In the spirit of furthering the CCP-Soviet relationship, over the next year there was an exchange of official visits designed to pave the way for a future visit by Mao to Moscow (Dillon, 2012; Goncharov et al., 1993). There were two visits in this vein, one by Anastas Mikoyan to China beginning on January 26, 1949, and the other by Liu Shaoqi to Moscow in July 10, 1949. The visit by Anastas Mikoyan was an exploratory one. Mikoyan was there to listen to Mao and report back to Stalin on the status of the Chinese communists (Hunt, 1996; Mikoyan, 1958). Mikoyan later recounted his experiences in China. Two important characteristics of Mao appear to have had an impact on the Soviet



understanding of Mao and communist China more broadly. As before, the Chinese were clearly uncomfortable with foreign interests on Chinese soil. This surfaced in the context of Port Arthur. Port Arthur, like Outer Mongolia, had been handed over to the Soviet Union by the KMT in the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance. The Soviet claim to Port Arthur had its roots in the Yalta Conference, where they were awarded the concession by Japan after that country's defeat (Ishii, 1990; Roosevelt, Stalin, & Churchill, 1945). By this point in time, however, the Soviet Union seemed to have a grasp of the Chinese proclivity for anti-foreignism and insisted on its return to China. Mao insisted that it was not necessary to return this port right away, petitioning instead to keep the Soviet presence until such a time communist China was strong enough to keep foreign enemies at bay. Stalin agreed to this arrangement, but was sure to reinforce his position that communist China could opt to have the port returned immediately (Mikoyan, 1958; Mikoyan & Mao, 1949b). Regarding Mao's position, Mikoyan notes that he "thought that, maybe, he is doing it for tactical reasons"(Mikoyan, 1958).

In contrast to Mikoyan's exploratory visit, Liu's visit to Moscow was substantively driven. When Liu's work in Moscow ended, nearly five weeks had passed. He had secured a significant amount of support from the Soviet Union, including loans, technical advisors, student exchange agreements, war materiel specifically for the purpose of taking Taiwan, and meaningful trade agreements (Hunt, 1996). It is reported that Stalin, though agreeing to warplanes and ships for the CCP, stopped short of actually promising Soviet support in the retaking of Taiwan (Goncharov, 1991). This was a point of contention, and Liu ultimately withdrew the request during a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Interestingly,

what happened immediately after Liu withdrew his request regarding Taiwan, leads to an early understanding of the strong emphasis the CCP placed on unity within the Party, among the Chinese<sup>30</sup>. Following Liu's withdrawal of the Taiwan issue, Gao Gang, then head of the local Party in Northeast China and close ally of the Soviet Union, stood up and proclaimed that Manchuria should join the ranks of the Soviet Republics of the USSR (Goncharov, 1991). He apparently received applause from those who were present, though it seems Stalin noticed Liu was seething with anger, where upon Stalin stood up and addressed Gao as Comrade Zhang Zoulin (Goncharov, 1991). According to Kovalev, this was impactful because Zhang Zoulin was a "bandit who became dictator of Manchuria through the support of the Japanese and who was later killed by them when he tried to go over to the side of the Americans" (Goncharov, 1991, p. 54). Though Kovalev had his historical facts wrong on the specific details regarding the life of Zhang Zoulin<sup>31</sup>, the purpose with which Stalin called Gao by that name certainly was not lost on those who were present at the meeting. That apparently put to rest Gao's proposal, elements of which had already been settled between Mao and Stalin months before. A few years later Gao would be subject to the first significant purge in the PRC.

### Experience gives rise to Theory

The years following the Long March, the Yanan Years, followed congruently by the war with Japan and the second civil war, proved to be among the most formative for the

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<sup>30</sup> The unity referenced here was born out of efforts connected to the rectification campaign aimed at the 28 Bolsheviks in 1942.

<sup>31</sup> Zhang Zoulin was actually a warlord who took over control of Beijing and later moved on to Manchuria where he did benefit from the support of the Japanese troops there. He was ultimately assassinated by Japanese, where upon his son took command of his troops and changed allegiance to the KMT. A more a more detailed account of Zhang Zoulin can be found in Jonathan D. Spence's *The Search for Modern China* (1990), or *Modern Japan: A Historical Survey* by Mikiso Hane and Louis G. Perez (2013).

Communist Party in China. The isolation and awareness of being on the edge of complete destruction impelled the leadership to think locally about China alone, and to let all other pretenses fall away. In this the CCP found its strength. This chapter, covering a period from the beginning in Yenan to the establishment of the PRC on October 1, 1949, demonstrates exactly to what extent the foundations for the PRC's foreign policy were laid during these trying times.

The historical record shows that despite the Party's trial by fire, they managed to navigate issues of international importance with a level of authority necessary in establishing a sovereign state. There are three central themes that came to the surface in this research: (1) survival, (2) sovereignty, and (3) independence. It immediately becomes clear that none of these themes are exclusive in relation to the others. The CCP, at every turn, made an appraisal of foreign relations premised on these three themes. Traditional accounts of Chinese foreign policy history stop short of highlighting these foundational elements to early CCP foreign relations behavior. As such, less informed analyses are coaxed to claims of grand plans of world domination, or the Chinese communists' hope for the fall of Western capitalism and perseverance of a Chinese model around the world. Though this debate will be discussed in more detail in the following chapter, it is important to note here that at the earliest stage, before the CCP could make a claim to the whole of China, nothing could be further from the truth. Despite demonstrating formidable savvy in achieving their foreign policy goals, the CCP until late 1948 proved to be mostly reactive in their approach. As the communist victory over the nationalists was apparent, only then did the Party pursue firm stances on its principles. Even then, it did so within reason.

While the drive for survival led to a greater understanding of pragmatic approaches to foreign affairs, this does not present the whole picture. Often Chinese policies are described as ‘pragmatic’. What has been revealed here, and will be further uncovered in chapter four, is that what appears to be pragmatism is actually a decision making process rooted in Mao’s theory of knowledge and conception of contradiction. Though this often led to ‘pragmatic’ choices, pragmatism itself was not a central consideration. Rather it was the dialectical relationship between theory and practice in pursuit of the abovementioned three themes that was most central. In this point lies an important distinction that helps explain the perceived inconsistencies of future Chinese policies under communist rule.

Survival also meant sovereign. If a communist China was to survive, it had to assert itself politically and territorially. Politically the CCP had no friends. The Chinese Party was born in the fires of a revolution that was concerned with the wellbeing of China and her people, not with dogmatic purity<sup>32</sup>. Marxism-Leninism itself was a means of achieving that wellbeing, and was one that allowed the Chinese need for equality, sovereignty, and development to be satisfied on Chinese terms. Through the Rectification Campaign in 1942 and the ousting of the 28 Bolsheviks from power within the Party, Chinese Communism signaled early on that they would be on guard against excessive foreign influence even when that influence came from their closest partners. Additionally, in asserting itself on issues regarding the Nanjing Peace Negotiations proposed in 1949, or driving successful negotiations during the visit of Mikoyan to

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<sup>32</sup> A full discussion of the this point, please refer to *Chapter Two: Foreign Devil’s and Republican China’s Foreign Policy* in this volume.

China, or Liu to Moscow, further reinforces the assessment that political sovereignty was understood as integral to China's survival.

Territorially, China opted to pursue a consistent policy of 'softer' negotiations with the Soviet Union, while simultaneously asserting Chinese political independence. Whether it was the Yantai or Mukden Incident, the encounter with the United Kingdom and conflict with the Amethyst frigate, or pushing back on the Soviet Union with regard to its position on Outer Mongolia and Port Arthur, a consistent message was sent: China, Communist or otherwise, is sovereign. If it were to survive, if it were to be sovereign, Mao and the CCP leadership acknowledged through their behavior that China was also prepared to be independent. There were areas where the Party found they could press foreign powers for cooperation, and there were areas where they could not. Ultimately, the CCP was abandoned by the changing tide in U.S. policies and aversion to Communism, while at the same time left to acknowledge that their closest ally was just as likely to become their bitterest rival.

In recognition of these circumstances, on September 29, 1949 at the First Plenary Session of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, the Party laid out in explicit terms its foreign policy orientation:

*Article 54.* The principle of the foreign policy of the People's Republic of China is protection of the independence, freedom, integrity of territory and sovereignty of the country, upholding of lasting international peace and friendly co-operation between the peoples of all countries, and opposition to the imperialist policy of aggression and war.

*Article 55.* The Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China shall examine the treaties and agreements concluded between the Kuomintang and foreign governments, and shall recognize, abrogate, revise, or re-negotiate them according to their respective contents.

*Article 56.* The Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China may, on the basis of equality, mutual benefit and mutual respect for territory and sovereignty, negotiate with foreign governments which have severed relations with the Kuomintang reactionary clique and which adopt a friendly attitude towards the People's Republic of China, and may establish diplomatic relations with them. ("The Common Program of The Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference," 1949)

Here, we see in definitive terms the making of a Chinese worldview and a theoretical understanding of international relations. These core ideas of security, independence, territorial integrity, sovereignty, peace, cooperation, and anti-imperialism not only defined the Chinese worldview at the time, they represented the clearest statement of Chinese interests that would guide its foreign policy.

Through the historicist approach applied to this chapter and chapter two, one can identify the experiential roots of perceptual understandings in China regarding international affairs. This is represented by the vacillation between seeking engagement with foreign ideas and concepts of governance, and the outright distrust of those same pursuits. The echoes of the failings of the Qing government and the Republican weakness turned the CCP toward a more ideological nationalism presumably informed by both class and geographic identity. By the time of the establishment of the Common Program, these developments had condensed into clear conceptions of self and other, and were articulated in that document, which established the roots of future normative behavior. Though these events and circumstances seem varied and disparate, when viewed in the context of identifying cultural, political, and discursive norms relevant to Chinese understandings of international relations, one is able to create a foundation from which to carry further analysis in proceeding chapters with regard to the pervasiveness, or lack thereof, of foreign ideas and concepts in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

After the establishment of the People's Republic of China on October 1, 1949, Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai would continue to dominate Chinese foreign policy. In the next chapter, an analysis of both of the written works of Mao and Zhou will be carried out while juxtaposing their thought with the actual foreign policy events between the years 1949 to 1976. By these means, an attempt is made to identify continuity or shifts in this worldview. Through a historical survey, it is hoped that any shift in this worldview can aid in understanding whether that shift was the result of internal or external influences, and ultimately if those changes in perception had an effect on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

## **Chapter Four: International Relations Theory and the Foreign Ministry During the Mao Zedong Era**

The Mao Zedong era of foreign policy is marked by several of modern China's most momentous historical events. It was during this period that China began to formulate clear and distinct approaches to foreign policy, rhetorically grounded in Marxist-Leninist ideology, yet thoroughly Chinese in application. This gave rise to notions of Chinese *realpolitik* or Chinese pragmatism in the practice of international affairs.

The literature focusing on Chinese foreign policy during this period tends to focus on two things: (1) the practical application of Chinese pragmatism, through the study of historical events and documents pertaining to foreign affairs; and (2) a direct reading of Chinese communist ideology. These methods have been useful in piecing together a general understanding of a Chinese approach to foreign relations, and much of the existing literature relevant to this period will be leveraged throughout this chapter so as to build and sustain a consistent narrative guiding the findings of this research. What the research presented here demonstrates, however, is that the dominant approach to understanding Chinese foreign policy of this period tends to neglect the social and historical front-matter of the story of Chinese foreign affairs, which has been presented in chapters one through three of this dissertation.

It is important to make one note regarding pragmatism in foreign affairs, which further substantiates the need for the research presented in this chapter. Often, the term pragmatism is applied to styles of foreign policy that lack or appear to lack a defined theoretical, ideological, or policy compass to guide behavior. Furthermore, a pragmatic approach to foreign affairs suggests a certain fluidity of state interests, interests that are



changing or insufficiently defined from the outset. A pragmatic approach to foreign affairs also opens the door to suggestions that the individual interests of the policy makers themselves seep into the process and are not entirely reflective of state interests at any given point in time. What all of these varied definitions of ‘pragmatic’ foreign policy have in common is that they consist of an element of inconsistency. What this research revealed, however, is that there is remarkable consistency within the Mao Zedong era and beyond.

Given that there is cause to argue against the dominant notion of Chinese realpolitik for the period leading up to October 1, 1949, then there is cause to apply the central research question to the period under review in this chapter: What role, if any, did foreign ideas play in the Chinese Foreign Ministry during the Mao Zedong era? The short answer to this question is, *very little*.

To elaborate on that answer, this chapter will be broken into three main sections. First, a summary of the structure of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs will be provided. This summary will focus on three themes central to answering the proposed question: (1) who made foreign policy decisions; (2) how did they arrive at those decisions; (3) finally, what were the possible avenues through which foreign ideas may have entered this structure?

Second, the pre-October 1, 1949 selected works of Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai were analyzed so as to create a baseline from which subsequent analysis could be carried out. This baseline established a set of native ideas regarding international relations, which dominated the culture and structure of the pre-PRC foreign affairs arm of the CCP. This process of analysis involved leveraging the findings from chapters 1-3 to inform and

guide the analysis of Mao's and Zhou's texts respectively. The exclusive focus for in-depth analysis on the works of Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai in this chapter is premised on the findings that it was, in fact, these two individuals that were making the decisions regarding foreign affairs prior to October 1, 1949.


The selected works themselves were chosen on the basis that they are the most comprehensive set of source material that exists in the English language, which can provide any insight into the thought and philosophy of foreign affairs of these two leaders. It should be pointed out, however, that they are also the seminal readings available in the Chinese language.

To separate specific keywords and phrases, the texts were uploaded to the Computer Aided Textual Mark-up and Analysis (CATMA) system. The University of Hamburg hosts this qualitative data analysis tool online, and requires plain text documents in order to run analytics. The analytics produced, were then downloaded into an excel spreadsheet, creating the space necessary to compare the data to the findings from chapters 1-3. Through this approach, a baseline for this research was identified and articulated.

Subsequent analysis provided in this chapter will continue with the hermeneutic analysis of Mao and Zhou's selected works. These dates ranged from October 1, 1949 to 1975. The findings from these texts were compared to the findings from the pre-October 1, 1949 texts. This comparison identified some interesting differences in vocabulary and clear shifts in focus. With regard to foreign policy, these shifts were subtle but evident.

Third, a historical overview of this period guided by existing literature on Chinese foreign policy, as well as a set of memoirs of former Ministry of Foreign Affairs staff

was used to contextualize these shifts in language. Through these methods, it is concluded that there were specific, though isolated, areas in Chinese theoretical conceptions of international relations that appear to have been influenced by foreign ideas. The memoirs were used to try and corroborate, through textual accounts of individual experiences in the Ministry, these shifts in focus or thought, thus drawing a more direct line to the ministry itself. At a certain level, a direct line to the ministry is already established through the thought of the leadership, especially during the Mao Zedong era. This becomes a far more important feature of the research when observing similar trends during the Deng Xiaoping era, and the subsequent Jiang Zemin era. Though the leadership maintained significant control over foreign policy during these periods as well, there was significant diversification that took place in the foreign policy making process in the two preceding eras after Mao covered in this research. *Figure 4.1* offers a concise overview of what factors were found to have played into the creation and evolution of international relations theory in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.



**Figure 4.1:** Constituent factors for the creation and evolution of ideas in the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

### **The structure and organization of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs under Mao Zedong**

It is common belief that the centralization of power and authoritarian characteristics of both the CCP and the PRC is indicative of the way in which decisions were made in foreign policy during the period this research addresses. One reason for this belief lies in the fact that the foreign policy decision-making process was largely shrouded in secrecy. We do know the basic structure of foreign policy making in China, and have disparate accounts of how decisions were made. This structure has remained largely unchanged since the founding of the PRC, though there is reason to believe that the mode by which decisions are made has undergone some shifts. Those changes will be addressed in kind in subsequent chapters.

One challenge in building an understanding of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the complimentary foreign policy making process, is that there is very little

literature on these topics. A book by Lu Ning, *The Dynamics of Foreign-Policy Decisionmaking in China* (2000), has served as the basis for much of the world outside the elite inner circle making foreign policy decisions; providing some authoritative understanding of Chinese foreign policy making with regard to the organizational structures, both formal and informal. This text will be routinely referenced throughout the proceeding chapters. Additionally, there are a handful of other peripheral works that have touched on the topic of the Foreign Ministry. Of particular interest to this chapter, a book by Kuo-kang Shao, *Zhou Enlai and the Foundations of Chinese Foreign Policy* (1996), brings to bear a number of Chinese source material that offers insight into how the Foreign Ministry operated under Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai. Shao's work is particularly important because he sheds light on what central authority in Chinese foreign policy making looked like. Finally, historical memoirs by Huang Hua and Ma Jisen were referenced to further build up the narrative and provide first hand experiences with the culture of the Foreign Ministry, and gain insights into the role of ideas therein.

During the Mao era, strong central authority in foreign policy was the only order of business. There was no question as to who made the final decisions. It was Mao. This is nuanced, however. Zhou was the PRC's first Premier (from 1949-1976), first Foreign Minister (from 1949-1958), and held several other important positions until his death in 1976. Zhou Enlai is often considered the moderating force to Mao Zedong's unending revolution. He was by all measures the pragmatic voice to Mao's idealism. This personal dynamic played a vital role in how policies were made between 1949-1976.

Before digging into the specifics surrounding the personal dynamics between Mao and Zhou, it is important to lay out the structure of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as where the ministry fits in the broader foreign policy decision making process.


**Table 4.1:** Department structure of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China<sup>33</sup>

<b>Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China</b>	
General Office	办公厅
International Organizations and Conferences	国际司
Foreign Affairs Management	外事管理司
Policy Planning	政策规划司
International Economic Affairs	国际经济司
External Security Affairs	涉外安全管理司
Arms Control	军控司
Personnel	干部司
Asian Affairs	亚洲司
Treaties and Laws	条约法律司
Bureau for Retired Personnel	离退休干部局
West Asian and North African Affairs	西亚北非司
Boundary and Ocean Affairs	边界与海洋事务司
Administration	行政司
African Affairs	非洲司
Information	新闻司
Finance	财务司
European and Central Asian Affairs	欧亚司
Protocol	礼宾司
CCP Committee (CCP Overseas Work Bureau)	机关党委 (部党委国外工作局)
European Affairs	欧洲司

<sup>33</sup> Table 3 is adapted from information found on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs website (“Departments,” n.d.)

Consular Affairs 领事司
Department of Services for Foreign Ministry Home and Overseas Offices 服务中心
North American and Oceanic Affairs 北美大洋洲司
Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan Affairs 香港澳门台湾事务司
Bureau of Archives 档案馆
Latin American and Caribbean Affairs 拉丁美洲和加勒比司
Translation and Interpretation 翻译司

The ministry itself is led by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and on whole is subordinate to the Central Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group and the State Council Foreign Affairs Office; The Politburo and the Politburo Standing Committee; as well as the Paramount Leader and their inner circle (N. Lu, 2000, p. 185). This construction is visualized in *Figure 4.2*:



**Figure 4.2:** The relative position of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs within the decision-making structure<sup>34</sup>

<sup>34</sup> This information was adapted from information found in Lu (2000) and Ma (2004).



With this visualization in hand, it seems fair to assume that the Ministry does not actually have a lot of say in foreign affairs. In fact, the functions and division of the work of the ministry appears to be more administrative than strategic. It is only through observing how this chain of command comes to life in practice, that one gains real insight into the importance of the ministry, even during the Mao Zedong era.

It is important to note that the structure, for the most part, has remained unchanged since the establishment of the PRC in 1949. Many of the offices were added as the work of the ministry became more complex. This complexity was a result of the PRC's increased engagement with the outside world, and the continued build up of relations with foreign countries. Xiaohong Liu has noted that one of the biggest differences that exists between the Ministry established in 1949 and its more contemporary structure, is that the various departments were divided into sections instead of divisions, and the General Office was the largest office, which handled personnel, logistics, protocol, cryptography, and other secretarial duties (see note 30 in 2001, p. 12).

With regard to *Table 4.1*, it is also important to note that this decision making structure has also gone relatively unchanged. The key exception would be the Central Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group (FALSG), which was established in 1958. The FALSG was established as a way to cultivate future leaders. Though this group plays a prominent role in foreign policy decision-making, it is not listed on any organizational charts outlining the governing bodies or structures of the PRC (Miller, 2008). Instead, this information is cultivated from various press releases and references to the FALSG. The Hoover Institute's *China Leadership Monitor* has been keeping this information updated and available.

### **The Foreign Ministry from 1949-1966**

Previously in chapter three, it was described how a foreign affairs group was established in Yanan as early as 1944<sup>35</sup>. Subsequently, the PRC was formally established on October 1, 1949. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, however, was not officially established until November 8, 1949. Ma Jisen notes that despite this, the Ministry was operational as early as October 5, 1949 (2004), bridging the periods prior to and after the establishment of the PRC.

With regard to the work and culture of the Foreign Ministry between 1949-1966, it is clear that Zhou Enlai's philosophy and approach dominated. Little work, if any, was ever done without his oversight and approval. This is not to suggest that Mao did not have influence or authority over the Ministry, quite the contrary. In fact, what this demonstrates is the amount of confidence and trust Mao placed in the capability of Zhou Enlai to secure the interests of New China on a global stage.

The central concern of the Foreign Ministry during this early period was establishing a baseline of operations. Zhou Enlai, from the outset of CCP relations with the outside world was deeply concerned with professionalism. He sought to ensure that the work the Ministry produced was of the highest quality, and that the staff itself was as disciplined and more educated than the People's Liberation Army. This was often referred to as 'building a new kitchen' (Keith, 1989). The 'new kitchen' was paramount in overcoming the servile style of diplomacy China had hitherto been subjected. To combat this servility, Zhou would highlight diplomatic work as being akin to military work, describing the diplomatic work of the Ministry as war in peacetime (Ma, 2004). This

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<sup>35</sup> See Chapter 3.

distinct characteristic of the Foreign Ministry made it of paramount importance in Zhou's view that the requirements of discipline and intellect were non-negotiable.

Huang Hua describes Zhou's vision in his memoirs as manifesting itself in the form of a rigid protocol (2008). Huang writes, describing how his own approach to his work as Foreign Minister after Zhou's death, "Premier Zhou Enlai had often said that there should be no carelessness in foreign affairs...We had to attach special importance to asking for instructions beforehand and submitting reports afterwards" (2008, pp. 284–285).

A part of this 'making a fresh start' by 'building a new kitchen', were other strategic choices in early Chinese foreign policy approaches. Two additional catch phrases became important to understanding early Chinese foreign policy: 'leaning to one side' and 'cleaning house before inviting guest over' (J. Chen, 2001; Garver, 2016; Keith, 1989; T. Mao, 1965c). These all went hand in hand and reinforced the ideas that China needed to retreat from the world, heal its wounds, and gather its strength with the support of trusted allies.

Accounts of Mao's concerns regarding the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are less detailed, though Mao himself is arguably the architect of many of the above catchphrases. This is in part because, as already mentioned, he placed the bulk of the responsibility on Zhou Enlai. He did have one overreaching requirement, however, that is recorded in a number of sources. The Ministry should only be composed of trusted cadres, and absolutely no former KMT diplomats, regardless of their experience or professionalism,

were allowed to a part of the new Ministry (Huang, 2008; X. Liu, 2001; Ma, 2004).<sup>36</sup> A few of the former KMT diplomats were allowed to share their expertise as researchers associated with the Research Institute of International Relations. Otherwise, the make-up of the MFA staff was largely drawn from the military, or the small number of individuals that had been a part of the foreign affairs group established in Yenan. In subsequent years, closer to the beginning of Cultural Revolution, recruitment became focused on students deemed to have exemplary political credentials (Huang, 2008; Ma, 2004).

The founding staff of the Ministry consisted of a small group of intellectuals. These individuals had foreign language expertise, many had studied overseas or at top universities in China, and they had strong revolutionary credentials. By all measures these were the right people to take up the task of establishing a foreign affairs structure for the PRC. Their fitness for the position is reflected in the rate by which China quickly established relations with various states. At the formal establishment of the PRC on October 1, 1949, the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Romania, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Mongolia, East Germany, North Korea, Yugoslavia and Albania immediately recognized New China. By December 1949, relations were established with Burma and India (Wang, 1977)<sup>37</sup>. In 1950 the number grew exponentially: Pakistan, Great Britain, Ceylon, Norway, Denmark, Israel, Finland, Afghanistan, Sweden, Switzerland, North Vietnam, the Netherlands, and Indonesia had established relations. From this point until 1955, we see a clear break in activity. This is the period of the First Indochina War and the Korean

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<sup>36</sup> It is important to note that this has also been attributed to Zhou Enlai in some sources, while others have attributed it broadly to both. In either event, it is consistent with where Mao tended to focus his concerns.

<sup>37</sup> Note that the proceeding dates are largely drawn from Wang Gungwu's work *China and the World Since 1949* (1977) unless otherwise noted.

War, both of which come to a close in 1954 and 1953 respectively. From 1955 we can observe foreign engagement recommences with the establishment of relations with Yugoslavia (now formal diplomatic relations) and Nepal. In 1956, Egypt, Syria, and Yemen are added, while in 1958, Cambodia, Iraq, Algeria, Morocco and Sudan. In 1959, relations with Guinea are established. Between 1960 and 1965 there is a clear focus on Africa with relations being established with Ghana, Mali, Somalia (1960), Tanganyika (1961), Uganda, (1962), Kenya, Burundi, Tunisia (1963), Congo, Central African Republic, Zambia, Dahomey, and Malawi (1964), and finally Mauritania (1965). The only exceptions during this period are Cuba (1960), Laos (1962), and France (1964).

Between 1964 and 1966, political tensions in China began to rise. In 1966, the Cultural Revolution would be announced and the Foreign Ministry would suffer a great deal until it officially came to an end in 1976. Between 1965 and 1970, the MFA was essentially paralyzed. During this time, China only received recognition from one state, South Yemen, while its relations with a number of the states it had worked to establish were being gravely undermined by the turbulence that was sweeping over China. Of these 53 countries with which China had relations, there would be some kind of dispute between the period of 1965 and 1970.

### **The Foreign Ministry from 1966-1976: The Cultural Revolution**

It cannot be overemphasized how important this period is in the history of modern China. As such it is necessary to give a brief overview of what the Cultural Revolution was, before going into specifics regarding the MFA.

### *The Cultural Revolution*

The Cultural Revolution was born from the ashes of Mao's failed economic policies carried out during the Great Leap Forward<sup>38</sup>. The purpose was ostensibly to purge any remaining or resurgent capitalist forces that were deemed threats to the revolution. Included in these notions of dangerous forces were elements of traditional Chinese culture, which metastasized into what came to be known as the Four Olds: old ideas, old customs, old culture, and old habits.

The Great Leap Forward had left China and Mao bereft of credibility on a number of fronts, most painfully, perhaps, regarding China's credentials as a leading Marxist-Leninist state (Garver, 2016). This turmoil also coincided with the Sino-Soviet Split, which exacerbated China's need to reassert itself. It was pressured externally by the United States and increasingly by the Soviet Union, and internally Mao felt his power base falling out from underneath him (Whiting, 1995). The Cultural Revolution then, served as a power proxy to reestablish and restore Mao to preeminence. What happened, however, was something quite different. The Cultural Revolution instead served to highlight the internal differences within the CCP, and a wave of mass mobilizations to criticize and destroy anything and everything 'anti-revolutionary' was unleashed on Chinese society. The MFA and Chinese foreign policy would both suffer deeply as a result.

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<sup>38</sup> The Great Leap Forward was essentially Mao's response to the Soviet model of economic development put forward in their five-year plan. The idea of the Great Leap forward centered around mass mobilization, similar to tactics used in the resistance to Japan and revolution against the KMT, though this time it would be done in pursuit of industrialization. For a more detailed account of the Great Leap Forward, see *The Great Leap Forward and the split in the Yenan leadership* (Lieberthal, 1995b).

### *The Foreign Ministry*

Structurally, we know that the ministry consisted of loyal cadres, and that the order of command left little room for independent thought. Discipline of a military grade was seen as the ideal characteristic of MFA staff, and the work was monitored and approved of at the most minute levels by the most senior leaders. This was possible to the extent that, as was previously mentioned, China during this period only had relations with 53 states, and as Ma (2004) describes, there just was not a lot of diplomatic activity with those states early on.

Despite the hierarchical nature of the MFA, and the micro management style of the leadership, the ministry did play an important role in information gathering and making recommendations, however limited in scope those recommendations may have been (Huang, 2008; N. Lu, 2000; Ma, 2004). From the beginning of the Cultural Revolution in 1966, however, the ministry essentially had no contributions to make. Between 1966 and 1970, ideas that existed outside of Mao Zedong Thought were not viable ideas in the Foreign Ministry. This was especially true for any ideas that could be construed as foreign. Foreign included Soviet ideas, as the USSR and Khrushchev were nearly on par with the United States in terms of warranting Chinese animosity and distrust.

Foreign 'ideas' did not just come in the form of political ideology or theories; rather they included more intimate parts of daily life. There are accounts of diplomats or their spouses being criticized for wearing western style clothes to banquets in the Western countries where they were stationed (Ma, 2004). Another account describes Chinese students, inspired by the call to join in on the Cultural Revolution, vandalizing

the garden of the Ambassador's residence in Cairo because it contained ancient Greek statues (Huang, 2008).

It is important to keep in mind that all of the foreign diplomatic envoys were individuals who had strong political and revolutionary resumes, and were deeply loyal to the Party, and Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai personally. The 'weakness' that arose in their credentials as a result of the Cultural Revolution, was that they had been educated in the old system, or in some cases overseas. This made even these respected individuals vulnerable.

To ensure that corrupting influences would not make it into the halls of the Foreign Ministry, the staff was tasked with revealing and criticizing anything reactionary or revisionist. The Foreign Minister, Chen Yi, a decorated revolutionary considered one of the founding fathers of New China ultimately fell victim to the craze to criticize anything that might be perceived as the minutest transgression.

Chen Yi had been a contributing architect to the established ideas of Chinese pragmatism. As Foreign Minister, following Zhou Enlai, he had carried out his duties with a very similar worldview. With the onslaught of the Cultural Revolution and Mao's push for a more overt agenda of world revolution based on Mao Zedong Thought, Chen Yi found himself in the crosshairs. Despite his ultimate demise, removal from power and loss of favor (from Mao not Zhou), he continued to express his hope that China would return to a balanced and pragmatic approach to foreign affairs. As early as the late 1960's Chen Yi had advocated pursuing talks with the United States. His staff was reluctant to push such a recommendation, though to ease their concerns he vowed to take full responsibility for any backlash (Ma, 2004). By 1972 when Mao had been forced to



realize the amount of damage the Cultural Revolution had done to both society and the organs of government, he sent word to Chen Yi to inform him that he was back in good graces. By then, however, Chen Yi had been very ill and had lost his hearing by that point. He died that same day, never receiving the message from Mao (Ma, 2004).

The Cultural Revolution did not officially end until Mao's death in 1976, and the overthrow of the 'Gang of Four'<sup>39</sup>. For the Foreign Ministry, however, things began to return to some normalcy in 1970. At that time, the effort to reestablish relations with the rest of world came into full swing once again, and in 1972 the secret negotiations with the United States, as advocated by Chen Yi, had begun. Despite the anomaly the Cultural Revolution represents in terms of Chinese foreign policy and the operations of the MFA, it also allows us, in retrospect, to infer out what was viewed as normal behavior. The speed with which the MFA returned to its duties as they had been carried out before the beginning of the Cultural Revolution highlights that there existed a core set of beliefs and ideas within the Ministry. Tested by fire, they persisted once things calmed down

We can also see, given the inward focus, the 'building of a new kitchen' and 'cleaning house', as well as the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution, that there was no room in the MFA for foreign ideas or conceptions of international relations. This was a new revolutionary Ministry with little to no real ties to the power structures of global politics.

### **The Selected Works of Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai**

As it has been demonstrated that the MFA was dominated by the personalities of Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, it is now necessary to specify what ideas these two leaders

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<sup>39</sup> The Gang of Four, led by Mao's wife Jiang Qing, was found to be responsible for much of chaos that characterized the Cultural Revolution.

established in international affairs. To aid in this endeavor, the selected works of Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai were uploaded to CATMA and a set of analytics were run on the texts to pull out key words, rates of frequency, as well allowing for a more in-depth look into how key words were used in relation to other words. This level of analysis helped to guide and inform more targeted analysis carried out on writings with particular relevance to foreign affairs, or a Chinese worldview more broadly.

The analysis in this section works from the foundations established in the previous three chapters. Specifically, it draws upon a set of ideas in foreign policy that emerged over time: from the end of the Qing Dynasty to the establishment of the PRC in 1949. These ideas were concentrated into a set of keywords that were then applied to the texts reviewed below. The original set of key words is as follows: ‘independent’, ‘freedom’, ‘territorial integrity’, ‘peace’, ‘cooperation’, ‘equality’, ‘respect’, ‘negotiate’, ‘imperial’, and ‘sovereignty’. The *Common Program*, quoted at the end of chapter three, identifies these terms as central. In addition to this foundational set of keywords, additional words drawn from the official statement of main functions as presented by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China so as to ensure the practical aspects of the work of the MFA was properly accounted for in any findings. These words include: ‘diplomacy’, ‘security’, ‘interests’, ‘state’, ‘culture’, ‘trade’, ‘political’, ‘global’, ‘regional’, ‘negotiation’, ‘treaties’, ‘State Council’, ‘national security’, and ‘international law’. Finally, based on the findings from chapters one, two, and three, a few additional words were selected to pull out for analysis: ‘power’, ‘foreign’, ‘overseas’, ‘abroad’, and ‘international’. Where variations of these words were also found to be relevant, those variations were considered for analysis. For example,

where ‘political’ may have taken the form ‘politics’, or where ‘regional’ may have been rendered ‘regionalism’ as a result, those terms were appropriately considered.

Overall, the tables below summarize the amount of data that was separated from these texts

**Table 4.2:** Summary of source data gleaned from CATMA for pre-October 1, 1949 selected works of Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai

Pre-October 1, 1949 Selected Works of Mao Zedong	Pre-October 1, 1949 Selected Works of Zhou Enlai
<b>1,382</b> pages of plain text	<b>398</b> pages of plain text
<b>22,531</b> unique words	<b>10,865</b> unique words
Of each of these words: <b>827,156</b> frequencies	Of each of these words: <b>168,840</b> frequencies

**Table 4.3:** Summary of source data gleaned from CATMA for post-October 1, 1949 selected works of Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai

Post-October 1, 1949 Selected Works of Mao Zedong	Post-October 1, 1949 Selected Works of Zhou Enlai
<b>333</b> pages of plain text	<b>494</b> pages of plain text
<b>11,045</b> unique words	<b>12,115</b> unique words
Of each of these words: <b>217,802</b> frequencies	Of each of these words: <b>208,466</b> frequencies

Using the set of key words above, a query was run in CATMA to identify how often those words appeared, and in what form. For example, ‘independent’ was placed in the query as both ‘independ’ and ‘Independ’ so as to catch any related vocabulary related to or important for analysis. This was done for the entire list of 28, what are called here, base words. For the phrase ‘territorial integrity’ it was placed in the query verbatim. The word ‘state’ drew too many homographs; it was restricted the exact word ‘state’ to avoid pulling in unrelated results. The code used to construct this query appears at the end of this research in *Appendix I*.

### The Selected Works of Mao Zedong

The Selected works of Mao Zedong are treated according to those works written prior to October 1, 1949 and those written after. As already stated, this was done to identify any differences that may have arisen after a formal MFA was established and regular foreign relations or international interaction occurred.

The selected works of Mao were chosen for this work because they represent a body of work that was officially compiled by the central government and published by Foreign Languages Press. It is understood, then, that this work represents both Mao's position and the official PRC position on issues of foreign affairs and theory. Volumes one through five, ending in year 1957, were used for this research. There are additional volumes that were published after the texts analyzed in this research, which include works published well into the 1970s, but these were not used. These later texts, which claim to constitute volumes six through nine, are generally made up of excerpts from other publications and were compiled by Maoists in northern India, and therefore do not reflect the consistency in composition and authority of Chinese perspectives found in volumes one through five.

It should be noted that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Party Research Literature Center of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China compiled a set of works and speeches by Mao in a volume called *On Diplomacy*, first published in 1998 (Z. Mao, 1998). There is a separate set of analysis that was run on this text in particular, but was conducted as a supplement and not a part of the core analysis. Given that similar texts were not available for any of the other author's, i.e. Zhou Enlai or Deng Xiaoping, it was concluded that to include this volume would have skewed the analysis

when comparing between authors or leadership eras. By limiting the core set of analysis to the official selected works, an appropriate level of consistency and quality was achieved.

### *CATMA – Selected Works of Mao Zedong*

The full query results for the *Selected works of Mao Zedong* pre-October 1, 1949 can be seen in *Appendix II*. The data shows a high frequency for the base words including ‘political’, ‘imperial’, ‘power’, ‘peace’, ‘negotiate’, ‘international’, ‘foreign’, ‘state’, ‘cooperation’, ‘independent’, ‘region’, ‘culture’, ‘interests’, and ‘freedom’; all with frequencies  $\geq 100$ .

To visualize and summarize this data, a word-cloud was generated (*Figure 4.3*):



**Figure 4.3:** Word-cloud generated based on the keyword query results from CATMA for the Pre-October 1, 1949 Selected Works of Mao Zedong (generated using wordclouds.com.)

The top ten results included: political, imperialism, power, peace, region, state, imperialist, foreign, interests, and imperialists. Both the words political and imperialism tower over all the other results, with frequencies of 1217 and 688 respectively. In the case of political, it was most frequently used in combination with the word power, to create the phrase ‘political power’ a total of 189 times. Imperialism interestingly connects differently in the text. It was most commonly connected in the left context with the words ‘against Japanese’, and in the right context, ‘and the Kuomintang’. The phrase ‘Japanese imperialism’ appeared 233 times, while the word ‘Japanese’ had a total frequency of 1019. ‘Japanese imperialism’ was the most frequent context in which both the words ‘Japanese’ and ‘imperialism’ occurred.

One quickly gets the sense from this analysis that the texts, with regard to foreign affairs as defined by the keyword query applied, are deeply concerned with the on going war. The war against the Japanese and the ongoing political and military conflict with the KMT clearly take center stage. This is supported by the data for the word ‘war’, which appeared second in frequency with the left context ‘civil’, just after ‘the’. One also can observe the high premium placed on peace and the state in relation to these terms.

The query results for the *Selected works of Mao Zedong* post-October 1, 1949 can be seen in *Appendix III*. Keeping in line with the previous analysis, roughly 10% of the highest frequency was used to determine the range between the top results. This data shows a high frequency for the base words including ‘state’, ‘political’, ‘cooperation’, ‘imperialism’, ‘power’, ‘peace’, ‘freedom’, ‘region’, and ‘culture’; all with frequencies  $\geq 30$ .

To visualize and summarize this data, a word-cloud was generated (*Figure 4.4*):



**Figure 4.4:** Word-cloud generated based on the keyword query results from CATMA for the Post-October 1, 1949 Selected Works of Mao Zedong (generated using wordclouds.com.)

The top ten results for these texts included: co-operatives, co-operative, state, political, co-operation, imperialism, Political, interests, imperialist, and imperialists. The change in focus and tone is jarring, but appreciable. There is much less variety of vocabulary in the top ten results, and the results that were generated had a strong domestic orientation. The terms used in the query were specifically selected to be focused, but broad enough to provide relevant insight into the texts. Here we can see the results of that design.

The words ‘co-operatives’, ‘co-operative’, and ‘co-operation’ are largely used in the context of domestic agricultural policy, as are ‘state’ and ‘political’ used in largely domestic contexts. The contexts of the word ‘interests’ are especially telling in that its left context is most often ‘the’ while its right context is equally as frequent when stating

‘of the peasants’ or ‘of the state’. Again though, interests take on an almost exclusively domestic tone.

Words in the top results with clear reference to foreign affairs include ‘imperialism’, ‘imperialist’, and ‘imperialists’. Mao demonstrates a negative tone in this respect. These words, though referencing foreign entities, are used in the context of the revolution, and tend to reference a guarding against outside influences that might disrupt that revolution. Imperialism in these texts is no longer largely associated with Japan. Rather, it is used more often in combination with ‘feudalism’ and ‘revolution’. In this way, even ‘imperial’ takes on domestic contexts.

This is exactly inline with realities on the ground in China during this period, much of which is discussed later in this chapter in a historical survey of the period. The pre- and post-October 1, 1949 data confirm the desire of Mao to consolidate power for the state, the need for stability, to turn inward before going out to the world, and an overall negative view or suspicion of things foreign.

### *Selected Works of Mao Zedong: Broader Analysis*

The Selected Works of Mao Zedong should be required reading for anyone who is seeking to broaden or deepen their understanding of Chinese foreign policy. Mao, in a very nuanced way, lays out the theoretical concepts that guided Chinese foreign affairs and worldview; in some cases he did so without directly mentioning foreign affairs, and it only becomes evident through a close understanding of both his writings and the way China pursued its interests during his tenure. There are specific texts that will be highlighted here to build a deeper understanding of the broad analysis provided in the previous section. Many of these texts were written early in Mao’s revolutionary years



before and during the years in Yen-an, but as time progressed one can observe how his thoughts develop and condense into a definitive worldview and foreign policy perspectives.

So much of Mao's writing took place during WWII and the civil war with the KMT that ultimately ended with the CCP victory and the establishment of the PRC in 1949. Unsurprisingly then, Mao had a deeply militaristic outlook regarding how organizations should be structured, organized, and how they should execute their responsibilities. As has been documented in this research, the MFA was itself treated as a military style organization to the extent it operated in peacetime. This, however, did not mean Mao was adverse to constructive criticism. In *On Correcting Mistaken Ideas in the Party*, composed in 1929, Mao signals his position on the structure and organization of the Party and the relationship between hierarchy and criticism (1965h). Mao clearly had a strong preference for an organization to be able to constructively criticize itself, within limits. Once a decision was made, however, it had to be faithfully executed regardless of any prior position on an issue. He describes this dynamic as the pitfalls of ultra-democracy, where the main body of an organization deliberates and sends recommendations to the top leadership. This, in his view, was a flawed approach and consequence of the "petty bourgeoisie's individualistic aversion to discipline" (T. Mao, 1965h). Mao preferred a top down structure. This style is evidenced in the accounts earlier referenced with regard to the culture and operations of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Early on, when formulating an understanding of China's position in the world, Mao appreciated the need for internal national strength and unity. In his work *The Tasks*

*of the Chinese Communist Party in the Period of Resistance to Japan*, written on May 3, 1937 (T. Mao, 1965h), Mao draws a clear link between domestic health or vitality and national effectiveness in foreign affairs. At this early stage, Mao had already begun to frame the relationship between domestic and international affairs in terms of contradictions. Domestically, Mao writes, there is a “contradiction between feudalism and the masses” and internationally a “contradiction between China and imperialism” (T. Mao, 1965h, p. 263). This foundational concept would hold true throughout his five volumes of work. Importantly, his early notion of contradiction appears to have been born from a very basic notion of opposites, good and bad. In 1935 Mao wrote *On Tactics against the Japanese Imperialists*, where he quotes Mencius as saying “in the Spring and Autumn Era there were no righteous wars,” (1965h, p. 170). To a contemporary reader with no background in classical Chinese history, this is an obscure reference that is easily overlooked. In fact, however, it provides important insight into a concept of just and unjust war that played a vital role in how Mao conceived of China’s fight against imperialism. The Spring and Autumn Era was marked by wars purely in pursuit of power. This, for Mao, was unjust; and the pursuit of power alone was not an appropriate way to engage and resolve contradiction.

There are two texts that stand above the rest when one begins to understand the philosophical roots guiding Chinese foreign relations; *On Practice* and *On Contradiction*, both written in 1937 (T. Mao, 1965h). All developments in Chinese understanding of international relations and foreign policy can be understood through a reading of Mao’s philosophy in these two works, though neither is directed specifically at Chinese foreign relations.

In *On Practice*, Mao develops a theory of knowledge that was fully applicable to the ability of a state to ‘know’ the state of the international situation at any given point in time. Mao argues that an individual’s knowledge is formed through their engagement with the completeness of social practice, and that such knowledge is distinctly marked by that individual’s station in society. This, for Mao, applies to states as well and serves as the foundational concept of what became his Three Worlds Theory; a theory that posited an international order composed of an intermediate zone between two superpowers, that qualified and limited the range of behaviors all states could engage in (T. Mao, 1961b). This, to Mao, was the realm of practice. It provided a foundation for knowing the state of the international order, and knowing China’s station in that order.

This station, however, is not permanent, and like social practice changes. To account for this, Mao proposed an incremental nature of knowledge:

If a man wants to succeed in his work, that is to achieve the anticipated results, he must bring his ideas into correspondence with the laws of the objective existential world; if they do not correspond, he will fail in practice. After he fails, he draws his lessons, corrects his ideas to make them correspond to the laws of the external world, and can thus turn failure into success... (1965h, pp. 296–297)

This process, from perception to understanding, is described as connecting the phenomenal with the rational. When one moves from “the perceptual stage of cognition” (T. Mao, 1965h, p. 297) to the conceptualization of the totality of a phenomena, one arrives at a rational stage of knowledge. To explain this concept in practical terms, Mao gives an assessment of the cognitive process the American observer group went through from when they arrived in Yen’an to when they left. In this example, Mao ascribes to his theory of knowledge a distinct application to foreign relations. Likewise, he considered how this theory shaped the Chinese worldview and understanding of its place in the

international order: “Similarly with the Chinese people’s knowledge of imperialism. The first stage was one of superficial, perceptual knowledge, as shown in the indiscriminate anti-foreign struggles...” (1965h, p. 301). He argues that in the second stage of knowledge of imperialism for the Chinese people, it was revealed that China’s internal contradictions are what allowed imperialism the space and opportunity to harm China.

On the surface, this theory seems to justify pragmatic behavior. Mao, however, is very clear that the pursuit of knowledge has to be purposeful, and should lead one to change the subjective and objective worlds. In fact, he writes harshly on this point criticizing pragmatism:

...vulgar ‘practical men’ respect experience but despise theory, and therefore cannot have a comprehensive view of an entire objective process, lack clear direction and long range perspective, and are more complacent over occasional successes and glimpses of truth. If such persons direct a revolution, they will lead it up a blind alley. (1965h, p. 303)

Understanding of Mao’s position on this point, gives much deeper meaning to Chinese foreign policy behavior that has traditionally been regarded as solely pragmatic, without properly reading into the purpose of certain behaviors.

The ability to change the subjective and objective worlds, is a bold statement, but was one that certainly guided Mao’s foreign policy. At the core of this desire to change the subjective and objective worlds, was Mao’s concept of contradiction. Just as Mao had attributed China’s complacency with feudalism as the root cause of imperialist adventurism on Chinese sovereign territory, he notes that external causes only become operative through internal causes (T. Mao, 1965h, p. 314). Change then happens as a result of what he calls the “inner laws of development” (T. Mao, 1965h, p. 314). An appreciation of this point sheds light on why China decided to turn to focusing on internal

security and stability before fully engaging the international community after the establishment of the PRC.

According to Mao, this contradiction is both universal and absolute. Furthermore, it is only through an appreciation of this fact that one can properly attain knowledge. In other words, one engages in practice and develops theory under the guiding principle of the resolution of contradiction, and that contradiction is universal and absolute. Absoluteness does not mean uniformity. Mao writes “Qualitatively different contradictions can only be resolved by qualitatively different methods” (1965h, p. 321). In this, Mao elaborates the particularity of contradiction and the necessity of understanding both sides in pursuit of a totality of comprehension. By these means alone, can one begin to pursue a methodology of resolution.

In social spaces, Mao concludes, contradiction is resolved through struggle. Struggle may involve conflict, and thus it may be antagonistic. Other times it may not be either of these, conflictual or antagonistic. He was keen to reiterate his earlier point that one formula does not solve all problems:

Some contradictions are characterized by antagonism, others are not. In accordance with the concrete development of things, which were originally non-antagonistic develop into antagonistic ones, while others which were originally antagonistic develop into non-antagonistic ones. (T. Mao, 1965h, p. 344)

With the benefit of hindsight, one cannot help but read these words and see the foreshadowing of the Sino-Soviet split and the Sino-American rapprochement. It is also important to note that hindsight places new meaning on Mao’s work *On the International United Front Against Fascism* in 1941, where he argues for uniting with rivals in favor of a common cause against a mutual foe (1965g).

Beyond these two works, there is little in terms of the development of theoretical perspectives that would be as meaningful to the development of a Chinese understanding of international relations. In other works like in the 1938 *On the Role of the Chinese Communist Party in the National War* or the 1939 *Interview with a New China Daily Correspondent on the New International Situation*, Mao reiterates the need for the resolution of internal contradictions if China is going to be successful in foreign affairs (T. Mao, 1965i). In 1941 Mao echoes *On Practice* and *On Contradiction* in *Reform Our Study* when he argues that intellectual endeavors should emphasize the practical needs of the revolution and the need for a totality of understanding and appreciation of international conditions (T. Mao, 1965g).

This is not to say that there were no substantial contributions beyond these two texts. When reading Mao's works one quickly becomes cognizant of the connection he makes between warfare and politics. It is in this connection, that one finds Mao's other significant contribution to the Chinese understanding of international relations. In 1938 Mao wrote *On Protracted War*, where he discusses "fighting for perpetual peace" and "the object of war" (1965i, pp. 148 & 155). Perpetual peace, he thought, was the result of the unfolding of history and the collapse of capitalism, giving way to the rise of socialism. This ideological conception of international events for China, however, meant very little. Mao did not place China at the center of this trend; he made it clear China was not the cause or the impetus for the rise of socialism, nor was it the cause or impetus for the collapse of Capitalism. China's concerns then, were as they should have been, domestically focused if there was to be successes abroad. This is an elaboration on his earlier theories made in *On Practice* and *On Contradiction*.

Mao goes further here, though. He notes that “politics is war without bloodshed while war is politics with bloodshed” (T. Mao, 1965i, p. 153). The objective of war, and by deduction of politics as well, “is specifically to ‘preserve oneself and destroy the enemy’ (to destroy the enemy means to disarm him or ‘deprive him of the power to resist’, and does not mean to destroy every member of his forces physically)” (T. Mao, 1965i, p. 156). This reinforces a highly tactical conception of foreign affairs.

With regard to cooperation, Mao clearly takes the position that cooperation is good to the extent that it does not hasten the loss of one’s purpose. In 1938 Mao wrote on *The Question of Independence and Initiative within the United Front* (1965i):

...the independent character of the parties and classes and their independence and initiative within the united front should be preserved, and the essential rights should not be sacrificed to co-operation and unity, but on the contrary must be firmly upheld within certain limits (1965i, p. 215)

Cooperation that led to amalgamation was not cooperation at all, for Mao. This baseline requisite for cooperative relations would not only inform China’s diplomatic interactions with the international community, but would be the very premise on which the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence<sup>40</sup> rested.

It was Zhou Enlai, however, who drafted the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. There is agreement between the writings of Mao and Zhou to the extent that it is evident each was aware of where their ideas fit within the broader strategic context of securing China’s interests.

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<sup>40</sup> See “Historical Survey: 1949-1976” in this chapter.

### **Selected Works of Zhou Enlai**

In the same fashion as above, the *Selected Works of Zhou Enlai* were analyzed with the assistance of CATMA. This analysis allowed for useful comparisons to be made with the works of Mao Zedong. This also allowed for a distinct and clear picture of what foreign policy ideas dominated and informed the MFA between 1949 and 1976. Zhou Enlai, during this period served as the Minister of Foreign Affairs until 1958, and subsequently served as the most senior cadre with direct oversight of foreign affairs under Mao Zedong.

Zhou Enlai's *Selected Works* were divided based on their being written prior to or after October 1, 1949, the same model applied to that of the *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*. The two volumes of works by Zhou were neatly divided according to this scheme, with the texts in volume one comprising those written before October 1, 1949 and those in volume two comprising those after October 1, 1949.

### ***CATMA – Selected Works of Zhou Enlai***

The keyword data for the *Selected works of Zhou Enlai* pre-October 1, 1949 can be seen in *Appendix IV*. This data shows a high frequency for the base words including 'political', 'peace', 'power', 'negotiate', 'interests', 'imperial', 'international', 'foreign', 'cooperation', 'independent', 'trade', and 'state'; all with a frequency  $\geq 30$ .

To visualize and summarize this data, a word-cloud was generated (*Figure 4.5*):





**Figure 4.5:** Word-cloud generated based on the keyword query results from CATMA for the Pre-October 1, 1949 Selected Works of Zhou Enlai (generated using wordclouds.com.)

The top ten results included: political, Political, peace, power, negotiations, interests, imperialists, imperialism, International, and foreign. The word ‘political’ towers over all the other results, with a frequency of 380. It was most frequently used with a right context of ‘power’ (frequency of 44), ‘parties’ (frequency of 42), or ‘work’ (frequency of 38), accounting for approximately 33% of the word’s use in the text. The word ‘Political’, however is almost exclusively used in the construction ‘Political Consultative Conference’, accounting for 65% percent of the word’s use in the text. The word ‘interests’, in its most frequently used construction ‘the interests of the’, had a balanced distribution between the words ‘people’, ‘workers’, ‘country’, ‘Chinese’, ‘masses’, and ‘whole’. Furthermore, ‘whole’ was equally followed with a right context of ‘nation’ or ‘people’. Each of these constructions with the word ‘interests’ demonstrates a strong

national focus. It is important to note that it does not appear in combination with the word ‘party’ in Zhou’s writings, suggesting some distance between the Party and China in terms of the origin of China’s interests. ‘Imperialism’ connects differently from that of the writings of Mao. It was, like Mao, most commonly connected in the left context with the word ‘against’, but with an equal distribution between the adjectives ‘British’ and ‘Japanese’. ‘International’ is almost exclusively used in the construction ‘Communist International’ in reference to the organization, commonly referred to at the Comintern. The word ‘foreign’ has a well-rounded distribution of uses and contexts in Zhou’s writing, most commonly appearing with a right context of ‘affairs’, ‘aggression’, ‘aid’, ‘countries’, ‘policy’, and ‘settlement’. These uses, though not as negative as Mao, still reflect the condition of struggling against foreign incursions in China.

From this analysis one can observe some distinct differences between the tone and context of the works of Mao. Zhou’s writing is more balanced, operational, and less philosophical. Interestingly, Zhou’s work also appears less ideological and more focused on the needs of China and less with the needs of the Party. This distinction, politics as serving the interests of the nation, certainly would be a dominant theme in Chinese foreign policy under Zhou’s supervision.

The keyword data for the *Selected works of Zhou Enlai* post-October 1, 1949 can be seen in *Appendix V*. This data shows a high frequency for the base words including ‘state’, ‘political’, ‘foreign’, ‘peace’, ‘imperial’, ‘power’, ‘culture’, ‘international’, ‘interests’, ‘trade’, ‘cooperation’, ‘respect’, ‘region’, ‘State Council’, ‘abroad’, ‘diplomacy’, ‘independent’, ‘freedom’, and ‘equality’; all with a frequency  $\geq 20$ .

To visualize and summarize this data, a word-cloud was generated (*Figure 4.6*):



**Figure 4.6:** Word-cloud generated based on the keyword query results from CATMA for the post-October 1, 1949 Selected Works of Zhou Enlai (generated using wordclouds.com.)

The top ten results included: state, political, foreign, peace, imperialists, power, culture, International, interests, and State. Among these there is a balanced distribution of frequency. The biggest shift from the pre-October 1, 1949 texts can be seen in the use of the word ‘state’. It did not appear in the list of top ten words in those texts<sup>41</sup>, yet appears with the highest rate of frequency in the post-October 1, 1949 texts. Additionally, unlike what was seen in Mao’s texts, Zhou uses the word state in largely economic contexts; in combination with words like ‘capitalism’, ‘financial’, ‘plans’, ‘policy’, and ‘sector’. Similarly, the word ‘power’ was often found in economic or development contexts, most frequently appearing with a left context of ‘state’, ‘purchasing’, or ‘electric’.

<sup>41</sup> In fact, the word ‘state’ appears last in the listing of words in terms of frequency, when measured according to the scaled employed in this research.

The word ‘political’ also takes on very different contexts and tones in Zhou’s post-October 1, 1949 texts. In these, the word appears to be used in a much more diverse way. It is not dominated by any single context, or set of contexts. The most frequent combination it is used in, 19 times out of a total of 173, is ‘political consciousness’. This is understandable in the broader text and historical record, as Zhou Enlai is often considered a sober statesman who took a very practical approach in the pursuit of achieving a socialist state. Political consciousness plays an important role realizing this goal.

The word ‘foreign’, too, takes on more diverse uses. It appears most often with a right context of ‘countries’, ‘languages’, ‘policy’, ‘relations’, and ‘trade’. The shift is definitively away from a negative connotation and toward one of opportunity. Again, we see the invocation of economic contexts with the use of the word ‘trade’. Importantly, the construction ‘foreign policy’ is almost exclusively used in the phrase ‘foreign policy of peace’. Such a construction is well within an accepted understanding the foreign policy agenda Zhou oversaw, yet it is telling that his use of the phrase ‘foreign policy’ would be so clearly defined in these textual terms. Related to this point, the word ‘peace’ appears with a left context of ‘world’, constructing ‘world peace’. This phrase was not seen in Zhou’s pre-October 1, 1949 texts.

The remaining words: ‘imperialist’, ‘International’, ‘interests’, ‘State’, and ‘culture’ appear to be used in largely the same manner as their uses in the pre-October 1, 1949 texts, though some begin to exhibit shifts. With the exception of ‘imperialists’, all begin to show signs of use in contexts relating to economics and development, as well as opening up to the outside world. ‘State’ begins to reference the ‘State Planning

Commission’, a commission specifically tasked managing a centrally planned economy, in addition to the ‘State Council’ and other references to science and technology. Also, ‘interests’ begin to be described in incremental terms, like ‘immediate’ or ‘long-term’, signaling an increased level of logistical thought and sophistication in the pursuit of national interests. Integral to these national interests it is not only the development of the state, economy, and science and technology, but also ‘culture’. One begins to see clear references to Chinese culture, national culture, and the interplay between these, education, and development.

What is most interesting about the results from the query run on Zhou’s post-October 1, 1949 texts, however, is the emergence of the word ‘globalism’. It was only used a total of three times, all within the same piece in 1952, in the essay entitled *Our Foreign Policies and Our Tasks* (E. Zhou, 1989). The use of the term does not signal a major shift in Chinese foreign policy, but it does signal a more nuanced and informed understanding of international relations. To grasp the importance of this, one has to look to the origins of the word globalism. According to the Merriam-Webster Dictionary, the word globalism’s first known use was in 1943. The Oxford English Dictionary cites this use in a work called *The war for man's soul* (Jackh & Dorpalen, 1943). Additionally, it seems to first have appeared in the United States, with the word predominately used in American English texts. *Figure 4.7* below shows the Google Books Ngram Viewer results for the word ‘globalism’:



**Figure 4.7:** Google Books Ngram Viewer results for the word ‘globalism’, <http://books.google.com/ngrams>

The word globalism was itself a new term, and one that was not widely in use at the time. It did capture the essence of increased economic and political integration in the post war period, which was different from imperialism in important ways. The ability and willingness to move away from a characterization of this international phenomena simply as imperialist suggests an acute awareness of intellectual developments abroad, and an ability to deal with those developments in a manner consistent with Chinese interests.

### *Selected Works of Zhou Enlai: Broader Analysis*

Prior to October 1, 1949 Zhou Enlai’s writings are very limited with regard to foreign policy. This is, of course, unsurprising considering the circumstances and the overarching concern of the war against Japan and subsequent civil war against the KMT. All references to foreign policy are in either of these two contexts<sup>42</sup> during this time, until September 1949 when he offered a statement on the then draft Common Program. He wrote, “We must guarantee national independence, freedom, sovereignty and territorial integrity, support long-term international peace and friendly cooperation between the

<sup>42</sup> See Zhou’s discussion of U.S. aid to the KMT for an example (E. Zhou, 1981, pp. 298–299)

peoples of all countries and oppose the imperialist policies of aggression and war” (E. Zhou, 1981).

There were other important texts, however, that signaled the kind of leader in foreign affairs he would be after the establishment of the PRC and what worldview he would adopt in understanding international relations. With regard to the organization and methods of political work within the armed forces Zhou favored:

...a flexible approach, taking into account the different histories and organizations of army units, their different customs and composition, the relations between their officers and men and various complex factors such as the social, economic and political conditions and ethnic composition of each region (1981, p. 119).

His statement here on the approach to the organization and methods of political work is echoed by earlier accounts given by Ma Jisen in her volume on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Zhou notably treated the MFA like a peacetime military unit, deeply responsible and disciplined. Despite this rigidity, Zhou repeatedly alludes to the importance of being able to account for and understand a diverse set of perspectives and relations in social, economic, and political spheres. This holistic approach to knowledge is very similar to Mao’s discussions on grasping totality in his theory of knowledge expounded in *On Practice*. Zhou, however, expresses his similar views in less philosophical and more practical terms.

A prime example of Zhou’s approach to expressing complex theories of knowledge or understanding in concise and articulate forms can be seen in his personal outline titled *Guidelines for Myself*, which he wrote on March 18, 1943. There are seven items in total, each with distinctly deep meanings despite being simply stated. Each, also, appears to reference some aspect of Mao’s philosophy outline in *On Practice* and *On*

*Contradiction*. In particular, Zhou writes “study diligently, grasp essentials, concentrate on one subject rather than seeking a superficial knowledge of many” (1981, p. 144). Similarly, he continues, “combine study with work and keep them in proper balance according to time, place and circumstances; take care to review and systematize; discover and create” (E. Zhou, 1981, p. 144). One of these guidelines stands apart from the rest when considering Zhou’s broader approach to international relations when he writes “in so far as possible, make the most of my strengths and take concrete steps to overcome my weaknesses” (1981, p. 144). Zhou would again allude to this interplay between strengths and weaknesses in *On the Sixth Congress of the Party* on March 3 and 4, 1944, clearly citing Mao’s theory of contradiction highlighting the importance of paying “attention to making use of the contradictions among enemies to increase our own strength” (1981, p. 205). In his capacity of directly overseeing foreign affairs for New China, Zhou would repeatedly prove adept at this strategy.

Post-October 1, 1949, Zhou seems to take on a lot with respect to paving the way toward strengthening and stabilizing China. This is also evident in the CATMA results, with the diverse and balanced range of vocabulary Zhou employed. He spoke extensively about the need to improve and strengthen China’s economy. One way to do this was through foreign aid, though he reiterates that any aid must be provided on the premise of equality and mutual benefit; ultimately, however, China would need to be responsible and dependent upon itself, not others, in its pursuit of development. Other important ways to strengthen the economy was through foreign trade, and the acquisition and learning of foreign science and technology. Zhou mentions these approaches to repeated through the text, from 1949 to 1975 with remarkable consistency. In many ways Zhou was laying the



intellectual groundwork and defense for later reforms that would take place under Deng Xiaoping.

Unlike with Mao, Zhou does not offer any deep philosophical approaches to understanding China's approach to foreign policy. Much of what he does mention with regard to foreign policy, is premised on the Common Program. One area where Zhou did go a step further than Mao was in his discussion of patriotism and nationalism. Zhou expressed deep appreciation for the kind of nationalism that had developed in China under communist leadership, and he acknowledged the important role it played and would continue to play in helping China develop into a modern state. That said, he warned against the potential development of étatism. A devolution to such a state would lead to aggression abroad and the suppression of minorities, signaling that China "will have gone astray" (E. Zhou, 1989, p. 72). Zhou's concern highlights the deeply rooted non-expansionist nature of early Chinese foreign policy.

Non-expansionist, perhaps, but China still had regional interests. In particular, China had a longstanding preference for non-Asian powers to keep out of Asian affairs, especially when it involved China at any level. In 1950 Zhou stated this position in clear terms:

Anyone who attempts to exclude the nearly 500 million Chinese people from the United Nations or who ignores and violates the interests of this one-fourth of mankind, imagining that any Far Eastern problem that directly concerns China can be solved arbitrarily without China's participation, will certainly meet disaster (1989, p. 47)

This statement was also a direct response to the UN involvement in the Korean Peninsula, a full discussion of which is given in the proceeding part of this chapter.

Despite the tough talk regarding the defense of Chinese interests, Zhou's rhetoric and tone is overwhelmingly peaceful. He consistently refers to Chinese foreign policy as a foreign policy of peace. Zhou was confident in this approach, as opposed to one of antagonism because he believed that China could "surpass imperialism through peaceful competition" (1989, p. 94). In this he eagerly defended China's ability to work with all that would treat her on the basis of equality, in the pursuit of mutual benefit, and sustain mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty. Or as he very simply stated "it is our policy to reciprocate, for it is impolite not to pay a man back in his own coin" (E. Zhou, 1989, p. 96).

Zhou also cautioned against thinking about the world in binary terms. He often elaborated on the virtues of learning from foreign countries, especially with regard to culture and technology. He expressed deep appreciation for internationalism in opposition to globalism; the former being the political economic and cultural cooperation among nations, while the latter was premised on the more ambiguous 'free flow' of political, cultural, and economic ideas that introduced an element of competition. Like Mao, Zhou believed that China could change the international environment it found itself thrust in and subject to for more than a century preceding. Zhou writes "it is wrong to think that the world is simply divided into two camps and that there is nothing we can do to improve it" (1989, p. 99).

With this understanding of the thought of both Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai firmly in hand, a turn to survey the PRC's foreign policy historical record with regard to this period further demonstrates the consistency of foreign policy perspectives, despite the appearance of instability or disorder. This will be explained in the following section.

## Historical Survey: 1949-1976

The Mao Zedong era can be divided and understood in three periods, roughly: 1950's, 1960's, and 1970's. These three periods not only are conveniently divisible by decade, but also have been the source of some debate with regard to foreign policy.

The first period, from the establishment of the PRC in 1949 to roughly the beginning of the Korean War in 1950, highlight the preference of both Zhou Enlai and Mao Zedong to seek stability and recognition for the newly established People's Republic of China. This is not only demonstrated through the accounts of how the MFA conducted its work during this period, nor only through the expressed views of both Mao and Zhou as seen in their written works; but also through the actual practice of foreign policy.

### 1949-1960

At the outset of the establishment of the People's Republic on October 1, 1949, China faced a very grave international predicament. Officially a state, China was now a player in the broader power struggle that was unfolding between the United States and the Soviet Union. In June of 1949, Mao had already made clear that China would 'lean' toward the Soviets (see "On the People's Democratic Dictatorship" in T. Mao, 1961a, pp. 411–424), though there is some suggestion that this was not a given (Lieberthal, 1995a). With the PRC marking its place in Cold War international politics, Mao Zedong moved decisively to secure China's relationship with the USSR. After just two months from the establishment of the PRC, Mao left for Moscow. This was the first time Mao had ever left Chinese soil.

In his discussions with Stalin, Mao made it very clear that he was placing Chinese interests at the forefront of his diplomatic pursuits. Mao pursued a renewed treaty with

the Soviet Union, leading to the ‘Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance’ being signed on February 14, 1950 (Vyshinsky et al., 1950). Mao also asserted that China would be selective in deciding which countries to engage with diplomatically (Stalin & Mao, 1949; Stalin, Mao, Molotov, & Zhou, 1950). This early sign of how China would cautiously approach its foreign relations was articulated by both Mao and Zhou two years later as ‘setting up another kitchen’ (see “Systematically and Completely Destroy Imperialist Domination in China” Z. Mao, 1998, pp. 62–63), or ‘making a fresh start’, and ‘cleaning house before inviting guests over’ (see “Our Foreign Policies and Our Tasks” E. Zhou, 1989, pp. 94–102). These official positions are also supported by earlier accounts given in this chapter regarding the nature of the work of the MFA during the early years of the People’s Republic. Additionally, the CATMA analysis carried out on Mao and Zhou’s *Selected Works* further reflects this point with the overall tone of the texts taking on a strong domestic focus, concerned with stability and political consciousness.

Early on, it appears that Mao and Zhou, but in particular Liu Shaoqi, placed immense importance on inter-Party relations with other communist states. This is evidenced by the quick engagement with North Vietnam in its resistance to French colonialism. Beijing held secret meetings with Ho Chi Minh and by January 18, 1950 had formally recognized Ho Chi Minh’s government. Ultimately, China provided substantial support to North Vietnam during the war for independence in Indochina (Luo, 1992).

Similarly in 1950, China geared up to support other communist parties’ on its boarder, and in crisis. Between May and October, 1950 China had been in talks with Kim Il Sung’s North Korea. Mao moved a significant number of troops to the China-Korea

boarder along the Yalu River, and by October officially entered PLA troops<sup>43</sup> into the conflict (Goncharov et al., 1993; Z. Mao, Stalin, Zhou, & Roschin, 1950; Roshchin & Mao, 1950). The Korean War seems to have highlighted for Mao the deeply complicated nature of international politics, and the importance of correctly gauging the political importance of war and conflict (Hunt, 1992). Throughout the Korean War, China and the Soviet Union remained in close communication. In 1952, Zhou Enlai travelled to Moscow and met with Stalin to discuss issues of ongoing Sino-Soviet engagement as well as the overall distaste on all sides for the war to be a protracted one any more than it already had been (Stalin & Zhou, 1952; Stalin, Zhou, & Mao, 1952; Stalin, Zhou, & Molotov, 1952). After three years of war, in 1953 an armistice was signed.

The Korean War, in terms of Chinese foreign policy, marks a turning point. It is after the stalemate and the subsequent signing of the armistice that China began its long journey toward the normalization of relations with the rest of the world. In some sense, it was the willingness and ability of New China to manage multilateral relationships and actively support its allies and interests, even if that meant the use of armed force (Kuznetsov, 1953), that afforded China a spot at the negotiating table in Geneva in 1954. This represents a distinct determination and dedication to shucking off an image of weakness, and taking charge of a Chinese identity and future. More importantly, however, as demonstrated through the CATMA analysis, both Vietnam and Korea were ‘just wars’. Neither veered into Zhou’s fear of wanton étatism, and were extraordinarily focused in scope and purpose. Furthermore, both experiences demonstrated how capable the PRC was early in its statehood to execute upon Mao Zedong thought, which

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<sup>43</sup> It is important to note that Chinese army on the boarder with Korea was referred to as the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army, not officially the People’s Liberation Army.

demanded that ideas be brought into correspondence with practice, and that different contradictions demand a fresh assessment of proper methods of resolution.

Following through on rhetoric was not only done in the sphere of military or armed resistance. Importantly, Chinese foreign policy wanted to extend a softer hand out to the rest of the world that afforded China the dignity it expected to receive. Most notably, this ‘dignity’ developed into an articulate worldview, or philosophy of international relations, known as the ‘Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence’. The five principles include: “mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence” (H. Zhang 1906-1972 & Raghavan, 1954). These principles were first formally articulated in 1953-1954 in discussions with India. This is of some note because, unlike North Vietnam or North Korea, India was not a communist state. The language used in the five principles would come to play a central role in how China sought to engage all other states with which it established relations; language that distinctly left out revolutionary bluster.

The five principles should be seen, however, as nothing new. The main tenets of respect for sovereignty, non-aggression, and equality all echo stated positions of both Mao and Zhou prior to 1953, and in fact prior to 1949. Additionally, they echo a set of grievances with the international order that Chinese intellectuals had been calling out since the May 4<sup>th</sup> Movement. By 1954 these principles had been internalized, and were to make their way to Europe via the Geneva Conference.

From April – July 1954, China participated for the first time in high-level international negotiations in Geneva. China took this opportunity very seriously, and the

importance of their first appearance on a global stage was to be led by Zhou Enlai himself. The conference was convened to discuss resolutions to the conflicts in Korea and Indochina, both of which China had been strategically involved. At the conference, the Chinese delegation put forth language aimed at resolving the conflict in Indochina that fell just short of explicitly stating the five principles (Vietnam Group of the Chinese Delegation, 1954). The Chinese insisted on the sovereign rights of each state to resolve their own internal conflicts without the interference of foreign powers, and when appropriate, or necessary, neutral parties could serve as observers for elections in resolving certain issues. The Chinese proposals, despite being widely considered by the members of the conference to be sincere proposals, were rejected wholesale by the United States (Bailey, 1992). Ultimately, no agreement was reached with regard to Korea during this conference.

The Geneva Conference set the stage for formal and open meetings with the United States about a decade later. The Geneva conference again highlights that despite the propaganda and anti-American rhetoric, to say nothing of the genuine distrust of the United States (E. Zhou, 1954), the Chinese were willing to talk and negotiate. In fact, it has been suggested that China was eager to use the Geneva Conference to establish contact with Western powers and begin the process of re-establishing itself as a power on an international stage (J. Chen & Shen, 2009).

Hitherto it would appear as if China was again the victim of, or at least an unwitting participant in a dog-eat-dog international order where the strong were the only parties worthy of strategic consideration. It appears that China was actively trying to change this structure, into one that they envisioned empowering weaker states to stand up

for themselves. Certainly this line of thought appears to be best suited with regard to the Chinese reaction to the conflict in Indochina, though to a lesser extent with regard to conflict in Korea. Their participation in the Geneva Convention, and the proposal therein the Chinese delegation made, furthers this notion. The 'Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence' were making some headway in terms of promoting a concise theory of Chinese foreign relations.

In August of 1954, however, the Chinese made a miscalculation. The aggressive push to overcome repression, colonialism, and establish international relations on peace and equality ran counter to unsettled domestic issues. The problem of a separate Chinese government in Taiwan, one that laid claim to being the legitimate government of all of China, remained a clear and festering wound from the previous 30 years of bloody conflict. In some sense, by virtue of the Republic of China (ROC) being a functioning government, diplomatically recognized by the majority of the world, and occupying territory off the mainland of China proper, made the Taiwan issue an international one. The PRC saw the issue differently. It was, and only was, a festering domestic wound; unfinished business that needed to be resolved. This urgency was heightened by the fact that there were suggestions that the ROC and the United States were going to sign a security treaty, which clearly undermined the PRC's position on national sovereignty (Chinese Communist Party Central Committee (CCP CC), 1954; Kapitsa, Malenkov, & Zhou, 1954).

The United States and the ROC did sign a mutual defense treaty, and the PRC did ultimately bombard and invade ROC controlled territory. For a number of reasons, however, the leadership found it best not to pursue a full occupation of Taiwan proper.



Mao had bet on the United States playing a more aggressive role in the defense of ROC held territory off the main island (J. Chen, 2001). When that level of support for the ROC from the United States did not materialize, it became more difficult for the PRC to message their assault purely as a defense of their sovereign right as an independent state securing its territory. Instead it appeared the PRC was going to look like an aggressive invader, taking land from people who had fought to remain separate from the communist state. The course of foreign policy was quickly corrected at the Bandung Conference in 1955, largely in response to greater Asia's concern of an all out war between the United States and China (Chang & Di, 1993). It is important to note that the PRC continued to view Taiwan as a domestic issue, remnants of an incomplete civil war, and insisted that the conflict with the United States was an international issue. This created the space for future policies that stabilized, to some extent, the Taiwan issue so long as the world was willing to recognize Chinese sovereignty over the island, and that the PRC was the legitimate government of China. The nuances of this policy would not be fleshed out until much later, but the stage was set early on during the first Taiwan Strait Crisis.

The turmoil of the Taiwan Strait Crisis overlapped with two other significant events in Chinese foreign policy: the rise of Nikita Khrushchev and the Bandung Conference. In 1953, Stalin had died and the Soviet Union was under new leadership. The new Soviet leader, Nikita Khrushchev, visited China in 1954 soon after taking up his position. Though the early encounter between Mao and Khrushchev seemed on the surface to get off to a good start, their relationship would deteriorate rapidly. This rapid deterioration coincided with a number of actions China saw the Soviets taking, that to them, especially Mao, were revisionist and had gone counter to the shared narrative

communist states were actively pursuing. In particular, Khrushchev was keen on a softer stance toward the United States and was highly critical of Stalin (Yudin & Mao, 1956). Mao saw both of these issues as a direct critique of himself. Mao had openly favored Stalin's approach, and was actively involved in a dispute with United State's, most notably over Taiwan that questioned the very legitimacy of the PRC. This dispute between China and the Soviet Union wouldn't reach its peak until the 1960's, though between then and 1955, China and the Soviet Union would have two very high profile disputes.

One of those disputes would occur in 1957 when Mao traveled to Moscow to attend the Moscow Conference. The conference itself was designed to set the course for continued cooperation among communist states for international struggle. Presumably, however, the Soviet Union had other goals for the conference as well, having just announced successful tests of intercontinental ballistic missiles (Zagoria, 1961). International Communism had gone through a rough patch during 1956 with the Hungarian Revolution and the October 1956 Revolution in Poland<sup>44</sup>. Much of what unfolded during these two revolutions is well beyond the scope of this research, and in particular falls less within the realm of foreign relations as it does within intra-Party politics. That said, there are elements of the 1956 Hungary and Poland crises that provide insight into the tensions of the 1957 Moscow Conference, and the coming peak of the Sino-Soviet split.

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<sup>44</sup> For a robust discussion of the these two events see "The Soviet Union and the 1956 Crises in Hungary and Poland: Reassessments and New Findings", by Mark Kramer (1998).

The MFA played a minor role in the issues of Hungary and Poland. Much of the conflict centered on the role the Soviet Union should play in either Poland or Hungary. For the Chinese leadership, both crises arose from the Soviet's unwillingness to engage other communist states on equal terms, and instead chose to treat 'junior parties' as children to the Soviet parent (S. Liu, Peng, & Gomulka, 1960). Despite, or because of the amount of influence the Chinese communists had within the international communist camp, the CCP chose to follow events closely and to choose their words and positions carefully (China. Embassy (Hungary), 1956a, 1956b, 1956c; China. Embassy [Hungary], Hao, & Nagy, 1956; China. Foreign Ministry, 1956). The Chinese proposed the adoption of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence with relations among communist partners, yet this was rejected by the USSR and its satellite states on the basis of communist states having more intimate relations than those of standard international relations. Therefore, it was argued, the Five Principles were inappropriate to the extent they did not properly account for that intimacy (S. Liu et al., 1960). Clearly there was a difference in vision. China saw other communist states as its natural partners, but still viewed them as the 'other' and as sovereign. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, viewed itself as a leader of intimately tied nations each committed to the revolution despite national sovereignty.

The Moscow Meeting in 1957 occurred under the dark cloud of this simmering intra-Party dispute. Although there were clear tensions, all parties, including the Chinese, made a real effort to maintain unity within the conference (Bušniak & Mao, 1957; Z. Mao, 1957). Discussion, however, brought to the surface a greater set of differences, this time over strategy in international affairs. The PRC was under a lot of pressure from the United States and subsequently was eager to push back. The USSR was not interested in

increasing antagonism toward the West. Thus, the conference ended with both China and the USSR increasingly suspicious of the other's position and unsure of how well that position may be in their individual national interests.

In Asia, however, China did make significant progress in promoting its vision of international relations at the Bandung Conference. Similar to the increasing dispute with the USSR and the build up to the unsettling of the international communist block, the Bandung Conference likewise took place during a time of turmoil, the first Taiwan Strait crisis. In contrast, however, Zhou Enlai proved adept at reassuring his Asian counterparts that the region would not be embroiled in another war. Additionally, the Five Principles that China was eager to establish as a normative frame for its foreign relations was warmly received (Pu, Zhou, & Nu, 1954; E. Zhou, Nu, & Kyaw Nyein, 1954). In fact, the concluding declaration of the conference includes the Five Principles ("Final Communiqué of the Asian-African Conference, Held at Bandung from 18–24 April 1955," 2009).

Like so much else, however, a painful mixture of successes and complications marks this period. Between 1955 and 1958, China had many foreign policy successes. The Chinese perception of having achieved victory in Vietnam and Korea, the invitation and successful participation in the Geneva Conference, the articulation and establishment of Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, and the Bandung Conference. This was all balanced by the crises, though: Taiwan, Poland, Hungary, and the death of Stalin marking major shifts in Soviet policy, and a minor border dispute with Burma (United Nations Department of Political and Security Council Affairs., 1956).

Up until 1958, the Soviets and the Chinese had come to several agreements on cooperation and assistance, including nuclear assistance (“Request by the Chinese leadership to the Soviet Leadership for Help in Establishing a Chinese Nuclear Program,” 1956). This was all again stymied in August 1958 with the advent of the Second Taiwan Crisis. To understand this crisis, however, it is important to take a few steps back and place it in the proper context. As discussed earlier, China and the Soviet Union were beginning to see cracks in their relationship, or at least diverging means and ends. What Mao saw take place in Poland and Hungary, alerted him to China’s own vulnerabilities. For him, there was a need for the people to have their continuous revolution. Likewise, any weakness placed China at the mercy of and potential subjugation to the USSR. In this sense, China had to play a heavy hand in foreign policy. It had to keep the Soviet Union both close and at arms length, and it had to shore itself up domestically.

Using Poland and Hungary as a teaching moment, Mao launched a two domestic initiatives, one often referred to as the Hundred Flowers Campaign<sup>45</sup>, the other the Great Leap Forward<sup>46</sup>. Both of these campaigns created additional space between the USSR and China. In particular, the Great Leap Forward marked a decidedly different course for

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<sup>45</sup> The Hundred Flowers Campaign was designed as a means of cultivating ideas and critiques for New China, to improve the efficiency of policies and the state as a whole. There was an enthusiastic response to this campaign, which resulted in significant criticism of the central government. Within a year, the Hundred Flowers Campaign had been ended, and a new Anti-Rightist Campaign had begun to silence and punish those who had dared to speak out during the Hundred Flowers Campaign. For an introductory account of these campaigns, see *China: A Modern History* (Dillon, 2012); a more detailed treatment can be found in *Literary Dissent in Communist China* (Goldman, 1967)

<sup>46</sup> The Great Leap Forward was an economic plan designed toward collectivization of agriculture and industrialization. This program was to place China the fast track to socialist society and represented a marked shift away from the Soviet model (Lieberthal, 1995b; Manning & Wemheuer, 2014).

China from that of the Soviet Union (Rogov & Mao, 1958). Neither of these attempts, however, proved successful. Both either unleashed significant criticism of the central government, as was the case with the Hundred Flowers Campaign, or significantly made the people suffer famine and doubt the capacity of the leadership to lead the country to a socialist society, a consequence of the failure of the Great Leap Forward (Malile & Chen, 1961; Zeneli & Zhou, 1961). It is in this environment that the Second Taiwan Crisis breaks out.

The Taiwan Crisis of 1958 can be understood as a shoring up of domestic confidence in the state through igniting national fervor in its favor, or simply seeking to settle unfinished business with the KMT. In terms of foreign policy, however, it did not seem to make a lot of sense. Zhou Enlai had made a significant effort to ease the worries of the region about the outbreak of a war, and the entire foreign policy apparatus was committed to an image of peace and non-violence. On a separate front, however, it made sense. How far would the United States go to defend Taiwan? Also, how far would the Soviet Union go to defend China? Ultimately, the answers received on both counts were 'not that far'. The brevity of the crisis suggests there was not a whole lot of commitment to the endeavor, or at least no real belief that Taiwan was going to be successfully taken over by the communists. The Soviet reaction to the event, for China, forced them to reveal their true colors. For Mao it was obvious, the Soviets did not trust China and preferred to keep the Chinese a step or two behind the Soviet Union. By 1959, the Soviet Union decided to withdraw its support of the Chinese nuclear program (Communist Party of the Soviet Union Central Committee [CPSU CC], 1959), and by 1960 Khrushchev decided to withdraw all of the several thousand Soviet advisors who had been sent to

support China (Khrushchev, 1960; “Note, the Soviet Embassy in Beijing to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China,” 1960).

### 1961-1970

The 1960’s revealed the uncertainty that existed in China, both an uncertainty about its present and its future, domestic and foreign. It was during the 1960’s that China turned inward and sought to reestablish its ideological footing. This is the period when Sino-Soviet relations hit rock bottom, the Sino-Indian War, China developed its first nuclear weapon, the Vietnam War broke out, and the Cultural Revolution reached its most corrosive levels. Despite this, the 1960’s really pave the path forward for China’s future foreign relations. From the chaos, clarity appears to have been achieved.

Interestingly, the foreign policies of the 1960’s seem to be the caricature that has come to dominate the popular idea of what the Maoist era was like. This caricature often sets one up to discuss the dramatic reforms that Deng Xiaoping brought about. What this kind of analysis fails to realize is how limited the radical policies of the 1960’s were, and how they were not so much a break from previous goals or interests, but were rather consistent with them. The CATMA analysis allowed a clearer vision of how the domestic focus, inward turn, and suspicion of the international community broadly defined, was a sincere effort to preserve the integrity and momentum of the revolution. The revolution was the foundation on which China was to secure stability and a prosperous future. Likewise, the texts foreshadow China’s response to the failure of the policies of this period, demanding reevaluation and correction. Though, where most analysis concludes that reevaluation and correction suggests a rigid pragmatism, the textual analysis

presented in this chapter demonstrates that it was a deeply ingrained philosophical construct that informed these decisions.

The first major foreign policy event of this period took place in 1962 in the western province of Xinjiang. For sometime, this area bordering Soviet controlled Central Asia had been the site of a subtle struggle for influence between the PRC and the USSR. The Soviet Union had a long-standing policy of granting soviet citizenship to peoples living along the boarder regions, which oftentimes placed those individuals in Chinese territory. Once the Soviets had decided to withdraw support for Chinese development by recalling all their advisors in 1960, it was vitally important for China to keep whatever talent it could retain. There had been a steady flow of Soviet citizens leaving China for other parts of Soviet controlled Central Asia that the PRC did not mind initially. Sometime between 1961-1962, however, the number of people leaving China greatly increased and ultimately the PRC began to refuse exit visas and demanded those who had left illegally be repatriated to China. This led to a revolt in Yita, today Yining, where Party, government, and military buildings were attacked and burned<sup>47</sup>. It is unclear what caused this revolt. The Soviets blamed the Chinese for staging the ordeal by giving a mass of people false hope of leaving China and then pulling back their promise (Luthi, 2008). The Chinese likewise blamed the Soviets, citing their aggressive distribution of Soviet passports in spite of the Chinese (Luthi, 2008). Regardless of who was at fault, the PRC took swift and severe action against the Soviet Union. All Soviet consulates in the PRC were closed down, as well as other official Soviet missions, leaving only the embassy in Beijing.

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<sup>47</sup> For a detailed treatment of the Yita Incident and it origins, see *The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World*, by Lorenz M. Lüthi (2008)



The relationship between the Soviet Union and the PRC would only get worse, and grew increasingly cold in 1962. During that same year, hostilities between China and India broke out regarding some borderlands along the Himalayas. Initially, the Soviet Union withheld any support of the PRC in the conflict. This included even the most basic verbal support. The Soviet Union did eventually side with its large communist neighbor, but the initial silence registered in China (Benediktov & Namboodiripad, 1962).

The Sino-Indian War, or border dispute, itself is quite telling. Until 1962, India was one of those countries with which China had made great diplomatic progress. As a non-aligned, post-colonial state, India was a natural and friendly neighbor for the PRC. A rebellion in Tibet a few years prior in 1959, however, put the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence to the test. The PRC's claim to Tibet was not refuted by India, though the acceptance of the Dalai Lama and other refugees fleeing Tibet after the revolt created an air of suspicion in Beijing as to the role India may have played in inciting the ordeal<sup>48</sup> (Jian, 2006). Additionally, China's renewed interest in Tibet revealed a number of other issues that hitherto had not been central to Sino-India relations; the borderlands along the Himalayas, specifically those that connected Tibet to Xinjiang.

Both India and China attempted to resolve the issue through dialogue, but there was a clear break down in discussions. India acknowledged previously existing disputes over the boarder with Tibet (Eekelen, 1967). These disputes were then taken up by China. Additionally, India proposed taking up the 'McMahon Line' that marked the boarder between India and China. This was rejected by Beijing on the grounds that the McMahon Line represented a British colonial interpretation of border and was therefore invalid

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<sup>48</sup> It is important to note that there is no evidence that India had any part in inciting the revolt in Tibet.

(Eekelen, 1967). The outbreak of hostilities ended roughly one month later when China reached the edge of its claim and declared a ceasefire.

After 1962, there is a bit of pause in Chinese foreign affairs with regard to major events. It is not really until 1965, when China agrees to assist North Vietnam in its resistance to the United States, that we see a major foreign commitment by the PRC (Ho, Mao, & Toa, 1965). Again, this is for a number of reasons. One, China was struggling with the aftermath of a failed economic policy, the Great Leap Forward. Additionally, Mao's leadership had increasingly been put into question. In fact, previously in 1962 at the 7,000 Cadres' Conference, Mao had engaged in self-criticism and took responsibility for the failing economy (Lieberthal, 1995b). Much has been made of this time, when Mao retreated from the scene leaving things to Liu Shaoqi. It is all speculation, however. A popular interpretation suggests that Mao was cunning enough to lure his political enemies out into the open by depriving them of his presence (Garver, 2016). This strategy, presumably, culminates in the Cultural Revolution where Mao proceeds to purge his enemies. Though the record does show that Mao was indeed cunning, this kind of account is over simplistic and fails to account for the other dominant characteristic of Mao: he was a thinker. The self-criticism he delivered at the 7,000 Cadres' Conference and his retreat from the scene were necessary for him to appropriately grapple with his theories, with his revolution. In terms of foreign policy, we get a sense of this from his writing of the theory of two intermediate zones previously discussed, penned in 1963.

The cogs of foreign affairs did still turn, however. 1964 saw the PRC and France normalize their relations. This was the first major Western power with which China had established relations, and was done by France independent of its Western allies (United

Nations. Department of Political and Security Council Affairs., 1964). In a document from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs discussing the establishment of relations with France, one also notices a new trend in Chinese tone. There is an exceedingly high estimation of China on the international stage and the role that China played (China, Foreign Ministry, 1964).

Later that same year, 1964, China successfully tested its first nuclear bomb. Though this is not directly a foreign policy issue, it did have real consequences globally. For one, as discussed, it was done without the support of the Soviet Union. Of course the initial seeds of information were shared with China when relations were still warm, but by this time those days had passed. It demonstrated to the world a level of both competence and capacity on the part of the PRC leadership. This may have been one of the sources of increased estimations of Chinese power and presence on a global stage domestically, but there were other developments taking place within China that were also fueling those redefined calculations. Ultimately, this placed the Sino-Soviet relationship on a level of higher sensitivity. China could now claim a renewed sense of place among the great powers, and make its voice heard in an international community dominated by Western powers. By achieving this technological milestone, China was pursuing its long held goal of equality with other nations, including the Soviet Union.

In 1966 the Cultural Revolution officially began. As earlier discussed in this chapter, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was consumed by these events and the Foreign Minister, Chen Yi, himself would fall victim to chaos that took over the country. Though the Cultural Revolution saw China turn inward and focus on itself and its own reforms and future, to such a narrow extent that even foreign affairs work at overseas missions

became microcosms of events back home, that chaos gave birth to a more stable orientation for Chinese foreign policy in subsequent years. Again, the narrow and inward focus that beset China during the Cultural Revolution did wreak havoc on the PRC's diplomatic relations. It did not, however, fundamentally change the core goals of what Chinese foreign policy was designed to achieve, nor did it fundamentally change the ideas or theories that were predominant in and informed the MFA.

It was during the darkest period of the Cultural Revolution, however, that saw the Sino-Soviet split reach its lowest level. There had been several unofficial incidents that involved students rebelling against Soviet interests and propaganda that was condoned by Mao, which furthered tensions between the neighbors. These tensions came to armed conflict on March 2, 1969 with the outbreak of the Sino-Soviet border war. The Chinese border with the USSR had been a tense point for a number of years already. As earlier mentioned, the advent of the Sino-Soviet split highlighted this tension in a number of regions, most notably Xinjiang. In 1969 the conflict centered around Zhenbao Island in the Amur river running along the Soviet border in the northern most part of China, formerly known as Manchuria. The Soviet Union had control of the island as a result of treaties signed by Czarist Russia. The PRC consistently held that those treaties were unequal treaties at the time of their signature, and insisted that those lands be returned to Chinese control (Burr, 2001). As to why this erupted into an armed conflict at this particular time remains open to speculation, though recent evidence has led some to argue that the conflict was initiated by the Chinese as a signal to the United States that China was officially split from the Soviet Union (Chi-Kwan, 2012; K. Yang, 2000). The dispute ended with the status quo in tact.

The claim that border disputes with the USSR was at least in part an effort to signal to the United States that China was willing to reassess Sino-American relations, is an enticing one, though difficult to substantiate. Adding more circumstantial support in favor of this position, however, that same year Zhou Enlai and other leaders began to place pressure on Ho Chi Minh's North Vietnam and their ties to the Soviet Union, even going so far to criticize the Vietnamese for sending a large number of people overseas to study (Kang & Zhou, 1969). By 1970, China had withdrawn its military and logistical support for North Vietnam in its fight against the United States (Zhai, 2000). The timing and consistency between the Soviet border dispute and the withdrawing of support for North Vietnam, seen as a soviet agent in Southeast Asia, lends additional circumstantial support to the idea that China was equally sending a message to the United States.

### 1971-1976

The final years of the Mao Zedong era saw China achieve a renewed sense of stability in foreign affairs that would guide the trajectory of all PRC foreign relations going forward. It was in this brief period that relations between China and its two most significant and influential rivals, Japan and the United States, were either normalized or set on track to be normalized. Again, taken in isolation, the historical events of this period lead one to believe the Chinese leadership to be pragmatically oriented and opportunistic. When understood in combination with the CATMA analysis, and broader readings of the texts of Mao and Zhou, one arrives at a richer understanding. In particular, in the period between 1971-1976 reflected not only Mao's broader philosophy of knowledge, but also Zhou's ability to successfully translate those ideas into more intellectually accessible

frameworks. This period demonstrates Zhou's emphasis on flexibility and holism, and the rejection of dogmatic, binary conceptions of international politics.

This began notably in 1971 when Zhou Enlai invited the American Ping-Pong team to China. Zhou found it especially important to begin the official dialogue with the United States on non-political terms. There were people within China, within the MFA itself even, that thought it inappropriate to have a sports team visit China before American communists (Gao & Zhou, 2007). Zhou and Mao felt otherwise. There was a lot of care taken in the preparations leading up to the actual visit by the American Team. As a result of the Cultural Revolution, the Chinese team had not competed in an international event for several years prior to 1971 (Xu, 2008). It happened that the next international competition was going to be held in Nagoya, Japan that year. This gave cover for both the Chinese and American teams to 'happen' upon one another and develop contacts (Xu, 2008). The American team was ultimately invited to China. The whole exchange neutralized both Chinese and American domestic suspicion of one another through a friendly sporting encounter.

Later that same year Kissinger made a secret trip to Beijing, by way of Pakistan, and the Sino-American rapprochement was underway. Diplomatic relations with other states rapidly picked up during this time, and by October 25, 1971 the PRC officially assumed the Chinese seat at the United Nations (China, Foreign Ministry, 1970). Four months later, in February 1972, Nixon made his historic trip to China.

It would be another six year before Sino-American relations are formally normalized; yet China's welcoming of Nixon in 1972 laid the groundwork that would ensure future normalization ("Joint Communiqué between the United States and China,"

1972; Kissinger, Mao, Nixon, & Zhou, 1972). Following closely on the heels of Nixon's visit, Sino-Japanese relations were normalized in September that same year.

China had gone from being a new state with a new foreign service and a handful of relations, to a nuclear power broadly recognized in the international community seen by other major powers as a significant player in international politics. China had asserted its sovereignty in spite of the two super powers, the Soviet Union and the United States, and had articulated a foreign policy not founded on ideology, but rather a set of core principles it had come to understand as vital to a nation through its painful experience as a semi-colony and state torn apart by conflict. Through all of these tribulations, we can see consistency in purpose. The means changed, for sure. The ends, however, remained the same

## **Chapter Five: International Relations Theory and the Foreign Ministry During the Deng Xiaoping Era**

The state of international affairs China faced during the Deng Xiaoping era was in many ways different from the preceding three decades. China had been situated on the international stage as an influential player; they had achieved recognition in the United Nations and held a permanent seat on the most powerful organ therein, the Security Council. Finally, China had made clear to the world that it was going to pursue its interests in the best ways China saw fit, pragmatically and without practical regard for ideology. This was clearly evidenced by its high profile disputes with its ideological counterparts in the Soviet Union and Vietnam, all the while demonstrating a willingness to cooperate with nations like the United States or those of Western Europe.

It is in these contexts that Deng Xiaoping was able to actively carry on an agenda toward reform and opening up of the country. The proverbial ‘new kitchen’ had been built and the ‘house’ had been cleaned. Deng’s era would be one where ‘guests’ would be invited to reengage a New China with a renewed sense of purpose and direction. For Deng, this sense of purpose and direction was defined by the pursuit of technology and modernization through commercial engagement. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs would play an important role in these endeavors, just as its role grew increasingly bureaucratic and its influence waned over an ever-complex field of foreign relations.

### **The structure and organization of the Foreign Ministry under Deng Xiaoping**

Where as the fragility of the Chinese state from 1949 until the death of Mao in 1976 in many ways necessitated strong central leadership in foreign affairs, by 1977 and the transition of power these dynamics had changed. China was by then an independent party



in the international community. Deng understood that this would require a set of changes to how China thought about international affairs and approached solutions to challenges in pursuit of national interests.

The Foreign Ministry itself did not undergo significant changes, though certain aspects of its work and the decision-making process did. One of the biggest changes occurred at the very top. The structure of the decision making process under Mao, placed Mao at the apex of the hierarchy. Under Deng Xiaoping, however, this shifted away from a single individual making the final decision on foreign policy issues. The Political Bureau and the Small Leading Groups retained their place, and the Paramount Leader was in practice replaced by the Paramount Leader and his inner circle. This, to a very small but important extent, decentralized foreign policy decision making and paved the way forward for increased input from foreign policy experts into the process. For Deng this inner circle at the very top included Chen Yun, and by 1989 would begin to include Jiang Zemin (N. Lu, 2000). This structure then also played a role in the cultivation of the next generation of leadership.

Final decisions in foreign policy fell to the leader and his inner circle, but input and consideration was afforded to the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau. Unlike under Mao, where the entities lower down in the hierarchy were either leveraged as channels of information or acted as additional layers of approval lending credibility and heft to decisions made at the top, Deng initiated the Standing Committee more deeply into the process placing increased responsibility on that organ to make decisions. It's important to highlight that as a consequence of the Cultural Revolution, the Leading Small Group structure was abolished. For foreign affairs, a Leading Small Group did not

reappear until 1981 as a result of Deng's reorganization (Miller, 2008). The director of the Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group under Deng was Li Xiannian<sup>49</sup> until 1988 when Li Peng then held the position.

The MFA's role then was to provide all necessary information to the leadership so they could make the most informed decisions. On the surface this appears as a negative for the MFA. While Zhou led it, the Ministry had a direct line to the top leadership. Subsequent to the changes enacted by Deng, that line had been effectively cut. On the surface this is true, but in practice Deng's reorganization of the process allowed the Ministry more freedom to do its work. As earlier discussed, under Mao the Ministry was limited in what it could and could not do. There were channels for dissent internally, but no sure way for that information to make its way to the top leadership. Additionally, the ministry was resigned to micro-management at every level. It seems clear from the fragility of China at that stage that a strong case can be made in support of how Mao and Zhou managed foreign affairs. Ultimately, however, Deng found it prudent to further institutionalize MFA work by clearly defining its role in the hierarchy, thus allowing for a range of input at lower levels to filter their way to the top. Though the MFA lost its direct line to the paramount leader, it retained a direct link to the Director of the Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group (N. Lu, 2000). Within this structure, the MFA mission was focused to include "all political, legislative (including NPC), judicial, and humanitarian interactions with foreign countries" (N. Lu, 2000, p. 12).

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<sup>49</sup> Note that Geng Biao initially held the position of Director until the 1982 Party Congress when Li Xiannian was appointed to the position. Li's tenure officially began in 1983 as a result of that appointment (Miller, 2008).

The generation of information in the MFA, the formulation of policy perspectives, was done through the work of the Fourth Division of the Information Department, or ID4D (N. Lu, 2000). This was true during the Mao era and continued under Deng, but was different in one important way. Under Mao the publications that MFA produced were all done in house, both research and writing. Under Deng, however, this changed for the less classified of the two publications, *Xin Qingkuang*. This publication was primarily produced internally, but accepted external contributions, some of which had an effect on policy (N. Lu, 2000).

There appears to have been a residual distrust of MFA staff that had been educated overseas; a hold over from the Mao years. Lu Ning writes of those who had a Western education “were retained at the home office rather than posted abroad” (N. Lu, 2000, p. 45). Though it appears some uneasiness remained, it was at a different level to what was seen during the Mao era, most especially during the Cultural Revolution. Foreign education was prevalent, however, for foreign language experts. This finding was corroborated in correspondence for this research with experts on Chinese foreign policy. Foreign education was not viewed as a strength, and there remained limited preference for political loyalty.

The changes that took place in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its complimentary foreign policy decision-making process mirror the increasing complexity in China’s international affairs. While under Mao and Zhou the ministry found itself comparatively isolated from the world, Deng appears to have made the determination that China needed to become more open bureaucratically, rhetorically, as well as in its foreign

policies. The following section of this chapter will address the rhetorical shifts associated with these changes.

### **The Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping**

In the same fashion as the seven previous volumes of work by Mao and Zhou, the *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping* were analyzed with the assistance of CATMA. This analysis allowed for useful comparisons to be made between the three leaders. This also allowed for a distinct and clear picture of what foreign policy ideas dominated and informed the MFA between 1977 and 1993. Deng Xiaoping, during this period, served as a core leader guiding China through a set of reforms and opening up in a similar way to how Mao and Zhou guided China from revolutionary resistance to an established state. In this role, Deng exercised definitive authority over foreign policy and continued to define and articulate a Chinese worldview in the face of a rapidly changing international environment to that faced by Mao and Zhou. Despite these circumstances, and the significant reforms that took place in China, there appears to be consistency in foreign policy perspectives and a steady understanding of where Chinese interests lay.

Deng Xiaoping's *Selected Works* were divided based on their being written prior to or after October 1, 1949, the same model applied to that of the *Selected Works of Mao Zedong* and *Zhou Enlai*. The three volumes of works by Deng were separated according to this scheme, with the texts in volume one and part of volume two comprising those written before October 1, 1949 and those in the other part of volume two and volume three comprising those after October 1, 1949.

Overall, the tables below summarize the amount of data that was separated from these texts:

**Table 5.1:** Summary of source data gleaned from CATMA for pre-October 1, 1949 selected works of Deng Xiaoping

Pre-October 1, 1949 Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping
<b>103</b> pages of plain text
<b>5,467</b> unique words
Of each of these words: <b>62,813</b> frequencies

**Table 5.2:** Summary of source data gleaned from CATMA for post-October 1, 1949 selected works of Deng Xiaoping

Post-October 1, 1949 Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping
<b>1,144</b> pages of plain text
<b>12,858</b> unique words
Of each of these words: <b>421,686</b> frequencies

### *CATMA – Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping*

The keyword data for the *Selected works of Deng Xiaoping* pre-October 1, 1949 can be seen in *Appendix VII*. This data shows a high frequency for the base words including ‘political’, ‘power’, ‘interests’, ‘imperial’, and ‘region’; all with a frequency  $\geq 10$ .

To visualize and summarize this data, a word-cloud was generated (*Figure 5.1*):



**Figure 5.1:** Word-cloud generated based on the keyword query results from CATMA for the Pre-October 1, 1949 Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping (generated using wordclouds.com.)

The variety of words used is far more limited when compared to that of either Mao Zedong or Zhou Enlai. This is likely a consequence of the limited amount of texts included in the pre-October 1, 1949 body of work, reflective of Deng’s more junior position within the governing hierarchy at the time. Nonetheless, we see a clear imbalance in focus on things ‘political’, with a frequency of 161. The next word on the list, ‘power’, was used less than half as frequently, 55 times. The phrase ‘political power’ appears a total of 40 times, making up the majority of uses of the word ‘power’. Other comparatively frequent uses of the word ‘political’ include ‘political leadership’ and ‘political offensives’.


Much like Zhou Enlai, the word ‘interests’ was used to define the interests of the ‘people’, ‘masses’, or ‘Chinese’. Again it was not used in the context ‘interests of the

Party’, further demonstrating that there was a foundational understanding that the politics, though dominating the strategic and rhetorical focus, was qualified by and subservient to a set of native interests. This is reinforced by the use of the word ‘culture’, framing a sense of preserving those interests, in a Chinese context, and opposing feudalism and colonial influences.

Imperialists, imperialism, and regions are used in largely the same fashion as they were used in the works of Mao and Zhou. The base word ‘imperial’ continued to be qualified in large measure by ‘Japanese’ or associated with Chiang Kai-shek, while ‘region’ was used in military contexts, and not yet in terms of international affairs.

The keyword data for the *Selected works of Deng Xiaoping* post-October 1, 1949 can be seen in *Appendix VIII*. This data shows a high frequency for the base words including ‘political’, ‘state’, ‘foreign’, ‘power’, ‘interests’, ‘international’, ‘peace’, ‘respect’, ‘trade’, ‘abroad’, and ‘region’; all with a frequency  $\geq 60$ . These results, though more limited, are similar to the results from the query run on the post-October 1, 1949 texts of Zhou Enlai.

To visualize and summarize this data, a word-cloud was generated (*Figure 5.2*):



**Figure 5.2:** Word-cloud generated based on the keyword query results from CATMA for the Post-October 1, 1949 Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping (generated using wordclouds.com.)

The top ten results included: political, state, foreign, power, interests, international, Political, peace, respect, and trade. Like was seen with both Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, there appears to be shift toward more administrative and logistical concerns with regard to the contexts these words are used. Deng's top results are again very similar to those of Zhou Enlai, though with less variety. In terms of how the words constructed in both left and right contexts, however, there was evidence of new developments. The word 'political' for example, like Zhou's use of the word, was used often in combination with 'consciousness', and a similar word 'awareness'. What we begin to see through Deng's writings, however, is a right context of 'stability' and 'structure'. Furthermore, 'political stability' and 'political structure' appear to qualify the word 'power', a word that broadly took on administrative contexts in the text. 'Interests' as well, while continuing to be




constructed with words like ‘of the’ – ‘country’, ‘masses’, and ‘people’ –begin to see ‘interests of the ‘Party’; again signaling an interest in structure and stability. ‘Respect’ also fits into this category of use.

Discussion of things with clear reference to things foreign continues to have increasingly positive connotations in Deng’s writings; a trend we see begin in Zhou’s post-October 1, 1949 texts. Trade appears most frequently with the left context of ‘foreign’, while ‘international’ appears with a right context most often of ‘situation’, ‘affairs’, or ‘environment’. ‘International environment’ was further constructed almost exclusively with ‘peaceful’, ‘favourable’, ‘excellent’. ‘Peace’ for the first time, appears most frequently, by far, with a left context of ‘world’, suggesting the idea of peace for China was increasingly understood in a global context. The word ‘foreign’ had predominantly economic constructs, with words like ‘trade’, ‘investment’, ‘capital’, or ‘funds’.

While these top results are interesting and telling in their own right, it is again here, like with Zhou Enlai and the word ‘globalism’, among the rest of the results that one can observe more significant shifts. In Deng’s post-October 1, 1949 works one begins to see the reemergence of the base word ‘hegemon’. Hegemon appeared three times in Mao’s pre-October 1, 1949 texts, but increased in use under Deng. It appears that the willingness to conceptualize ‘imperialism’ in more complex terms, such as ‘globalism’ in Zhou’s writings, took full root in Deng’s works. The base word ‘imperial’, one will notice, drops completely from the listing of top results in Deng’s post-October 1, 1949 texts. It had appeared in all top results, including Deng’s own pre-October 1, 1949 texts, up to that point. Furthermore, it appears to have been replaced by the base word

‘hegemon’, which appears as ‘hegemonism’ 49 times and ‘hegemony’ 21 times, before ‘imperialism’ that appeared 21 times.

Within Deng’s writings, the word ‘hegemonism’ first appears in *Speech at a Plenary Meeting of the Military Commission of the Central Committee of the CPC* in 1977 (Deng, 1995a). Unlike ‘globalism’, however, ‘hegemonism’ or ‘hegemony’ had an extensive history in communist writings; perhaps most notably in the those of Antonio Gramsci. Even when looking at the Google Books Ngram Viewer results for the word ‘hegemonism’ between the years 1940-1983, the texts where the words appears are almost exclusively in works on or about communist states, or written by communist presses. There was, nonetheless, a clear spike in the use of the term beginning in the early 1970’s (see *Figure 5.3*).



**Figure 5.3:** Google Books Ngram Viewer results for the word ‘hegemonism’, <http://books.google.com/ngrams>

The displacement of the word imperialism in favor of hegemonism would have had important implications for Chinese foreign policy. While imperialism has distinctly militaristic or colonial overtones as a means of domination, hegemony can invoke images of cultural, economic, and political domination by means other than military force or

colonization. This difference would ultimately necessitate an alternate approach to facing China's challenges abroad through cultural, economic, and political strength.

In tandem with the emergence of 'hegemony' in Deng's works, we also see the emergence of the phrase 'national security'. This term had its origin in the United States, where it is cited for the first time in a Senate hearing in 1945 and had worked its way to general acceptance by 1947 when it was included in the National Security Act of that year in U.S. legislation (Romm, 1993). Joseph Romm (1993) notes that by the 1970's, the term had taken on distinctly non-military aspects and included things such as the economy, energy, and demographics. He writes that national security became about "maintain[ing] access to foreign markets and avoid[ing] industrial stagnation" (Romm, 1993, p. 2). Two instances the word appears in the Deng's work are in reference modernizing the PLA in 1981, and the PRC's policy of one country, two systems in 1984.



**Figure 5.4:** Google Books Ngram Viewer results for the word 'national security', <http://books.google.com/ngrams>

In Deng's adoption of this term, he demonstrates that China was undergoing an increased sense of the complexity of Chinese interests and the means of securing those interests, as well as rudimentary awareness of how the term was understood overseas. It wouldn't be until the Jiang texts that we see this term take on a level of nuance and complexity on par

with the how it was used in English language literature. By 1981 the term in English-language texts was on the rise, and by 1984 was nearing its peak (see *Figure 5.4*).

### *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping: Broader Analysis*

As the CATMA results suggest for Deng's pre-October 1, 1949 texts, there was very little discussion of foreign affairs. Certainly there was no theorizing by Deng with regard to international relations at this early time. Of the three mentions of things foreign, two of them described how China needed to be on guard against, what Deng describes as, servility or subservience (1995b). In this, Deng expresses a common sentiment or understanding of China's position in the international community that had been expressed since the decline of the Qing dynasty, and was formally pushed back against with the writing of the Common Program in September 1949 when the CCP premised its foreign policy on equality and mutual respect.

In Deng's post-October 1, 1949 texts, one continues to see intimate references to China's humiliation; so much so that it seems to play a distinct role in how Deng approached China's role in an international community and his heightened sensitivity to any notion that a foreign power might be attempting to meddle in China's internal affairs. This arises in some interesting ways throughout the texts, but perhaps most familiarly with regard to human rights. In 1979, we see the issue of human right first emerge in the context of Deng's rejection of them on the basis that reactionary forces in China were leveraging human rights as an issue to incite American involvement in China's domestic affairs. Ultimately this led to a lengthy discussion of how Chinese, at home and abroad, should conduct themselves with regard "for both national and personal dignity in their

contact with foreigners” (Deng, 1995a, p. 185). He attributed China’s past subjugation to its inability to be unified and flexible:

We must show foreigners that China’s political situation is stable. If our country were plunged into disorder and our nation reduced to a heap of loose sand, how could we accomplish anything? The reason imperialists were able to bully us in the past was precisely that we were a heap of loose sand. (Deng, 1994, p. 197)

The idea that the China was politically stable, and that the international community was aware of, or at least perceived stability in China also factored prominently in Deng’s foreign policies. He often used references to how foreigners perceived China, whether they agreed with certain policies or not, as evidence of being on the right path. This was an interesting approach, especially with regard to highlighting disagreements on policy approaches that may have existed, and created room for avoiding the trap of hyper-normalization that occurred during the Great Leap Forward.

Throughout Deng’s writings one notices the deep similarity with those of Zhou Enlai. National strength and security, he routinely argued, was premised on China’s ability to learn from the rest of the world and successfully apply what was learned to a Chinese reality. Technology and science, two factors that did not threaten a Chinese identity but rather transcended national borders, were at the center of his reforms. Like Zhou, Deng advocated for the continued preserve of Mao Zedong thought, though with a keen understanding that Mao advocated continuous revolution and a reevaluation of reality. This gave Deng breathing space to retain Maoist theory, which it appears he genuinely agreed with, while at the same time rejecting the notion that China could only progress based on dated words spoken or written by Mao under circumstances very different from what Deng faced.

In 1978 Deng clarified his take on the interplay between Mao Zedong's and Zhou Enlai's respective intellectual legacies. Mao, he argued, defined the philosophy and context, and Zhou filled in the substance. This is captured in Deng's call to approach policy at all levels, "proceeding from present realities and making use of all favourable conditions" (1995a, p. 139); clearly rooted in Maoist philosophy and defined by Zhou's advocacy of robust application and practice.

This all fit into a much broader scheme of economic reforms that Deng envisioned and pursued for China that required it be increasingly open to the rest of the world. Consequently this meant Deng continued to advocate the dismissal of the notion that China should reject everything foreign, while at the same time battle forces that called for increased liberalization. Deng was careful to not stoke the flames of étatism, which he argued manifested themselves in the form of national arrogance and hegemony. To avoid this trend, he insisted countless times that Chinese foreign policy would remain consistent to that inherited from Mao and Zhou (Deng, 1995a, p. 123).

Deng seems to advocate a contradiction: progress through commitment to the past. His ideas, including those in foreign policy, however, did just that. He insisted that China remain faithful to the Four Cardinal Principles while making a strong argument in favor of modernizing China's ideological and theoretical perspectives in the social sciences:

For many years we have neglected the study of political science, law, sociology and world politics, and now we much hurry to make up our deficiencies in these subjects. Most of our ideological and theoretical workers should dig into one or more specialized subjects. All those who can should learn foreign languages; so as to be able to read important foreign works on the social sciences without difficulty. (Deng, 1995a, p. 188)

This, however, did not mean Deng advocated political change or changing Chinese foreign policy.

Beyond opening up, Deng was extraordinarily consistent with previous Chinese foreign policy and worldviews. The one area where there was a shift, was in his increasing characterization of Chinese interests in global terms. Even then, however, he did so within a Maoist framework, forever assigning China to a third world identity despite the progress it was to make in development.

### **Historical Survey: 1977-1993**

In a similar style, foreign affairs in the Deng years also reflected a continuation of what had begun during Mao's tenure, both practically and philosophically. It is common to underline the economic reforms that took place under Deng, or the opening up of China to the world. In terms of foreign policy, however, these reforms seem less obvious. Tone plays an important role in interpreting foreign policy, and in this sense Deng's leadership did usher in some welcomed calm. As described earlier in this chapter, Deng's reforms systematized and institutionalized foreign affairs to an even greater extent than under Mao, in large measure to better cope with the ever-complex nature of Chinese foreign affairs as relations increased and expanded. If one were to look exclusively at the unfolding of historical foreign policy events, it may seem that Deng had very little in common with Mao or Zhou. This research, however, couples the history with the texts, or as called for by the historicist methods of Vico and Herder, a marrying of *a priori* with *a posteriori* knowledge. Deng Xiaoping's writings demonstrate a deep commitment to both Mao and Zhou's framework of theory and practice, and his behavior and reforms reflect this commitment, as will be shown. The emergence of hegemony in robust discourse

demonstrates nuance in understandings of foreign policy, while adhering to a set of underlying concepts and interests articulated by Deng's predecessors in both word and deed.

With the death of Zhou Enlai and Mao Zedong, followed by the short lived tenure of Hua Guofeng, China did not engage in any major foreign policy events until 1978. In that year Ministers of Foreign Affairs Sunao Sonoda of Japan and Huang Hua of China signed the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship. Later that year in October, Deng Xiaoping would travel to Japan as Vice Premier for a formal exchange of the instruments of ratification of the treaty (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, n.d.). The treaty itself was reflective of and consistent with similar agreements China had participated in previously. This, like the others, included an explicit reference to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence ("Treaty of Peace and Friendship Between Japan and the People's Republic of China," 1978). A key element of this treaty stipulated that neither country would seek hegemony in the Asia Pacific, nor would they support hegemonic behavior of any other power. For China this was an insurance policy not only against the potential rise of Japanese power, as well as the more immediate threat of U.S. influence in the Asia Pacific aided by Japanese compliance with American interests, but also any other party that sought hegemony in the region, including the Soviet Union.

China continued to pursue cooperation with the United States and Japan despite the perception from their communist counterparts that their behavior was tantamount to betrayal at a minimum, and bordering on full abandonment of Marxism-Leninism at worst ("East German Report on the Eleventh Interkit Meeting in Poland, June 1980,"



1980). Interestingly, the CATMA analysis warns against interpreting this as purely real politic or pragmatism. In both the works of Zhou and Deng, it is demonstrated that China's interests were always described in Chinese terms, not those of the Party. Therefore, it is inaccurate to frame China's turn toward the United States as an abandonment of Communist principles or interests, when those interests were never the primary concern to begin with. On December 16, 1978, China and the United States agreed to formally reestablish diplomatic relations. Taiwan was clearly the hinge on which relations between the United States and China pivoted, and the nuanced wording allowed China to extract a significant concession from the United States regarding its long held Taiwan policy ("Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between the People's Republic of China and the United States of America (December 16, 1978)," 1978). Sino-U.S. relations were formally normalized on January 1, 1979.

In both instances of Sino-Japanese relations and Sino-American relations, the Deng government demonstrated through practice that it remained committed to the cultural, political and discursive norms of Chinese foreign policy outlined in by Mao and Zhou during the previous generation of leadership. This included continued pursuit of relations based on the proclaimed Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. Within Sino-Japanese relations this was explicitly stated, while Sino-American relations echoed those principles through practice and balance in the trilateral relationship of U.S.-ROC-PRC. Here, China was willing to allow for continued U.S. economic and cultural engagement with Taiwan in exchange for explicit U.S. commitment to assuring China's core set of interests would not be violated. This consistency in practice further suggests that there

was little influence in Beijing, and within the MFA in particular, regarding foreign ideas or theories of international relations. Rather, a steadfast approach to Mao and Zhou's program of foreign affairs continued.

The Chinese willingness to engage with its rivals as a potential source of strength became most clear during the Third Plenary Session of the 11<sup>th</sup> Chinese Communist Party Central Committee. During this session, the CCP made it clear that the goals of foreign policy were considered to be on track and that they would continue to develop accordingly. Specifically the committee stated:

The plenary session discussed the international situation and the handling of foreign affairs, reaching the view that the foreign policy of the Party and the government was correct and successful... The session points out that our country has achieved new and important successes in developing the international united front against hegemonism and in developing friendly relations with countries in all parts of the world... the conclusion of the China-Japan Peace and Friendship Treaty and the completion of the negotiations for the normalization of relations between China and the United States are important contributions to peace in Asia and the world as a whole. (Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, 1978)

Despite the high level of optimism, there remained cautionary references to the dangers of war and the need for boosting attention to issues of national security. Certainly, this was harkening back to the 'Four Modernizations' proposed by Zhou Enlai in 1963, which, as has been demonstrated, would find their way into the cannon of Deng Xiaoping Theory. The emphasis on national security can be interpreted as a call to arms in the modernization of the PLA in an effort to challenge the power of both the United States and the Soviet Union; that is, in fact, a common assessment. The call to focus on national security did not happen in a vacuum, however. The normalization of relations with the United States suggests that China was in the midst of changing gears. Taiwan, Chinese

territorial integrity, and sovereignty remained of central concern. A push for non-antagonistic relations with the United States was an element, not an anomaly of that pursuit of security. This is explicitly stated in the communiqué released on December 22, 1978:

The plenary session holds that the normalization of relations between China and the United States further places before us the prospect of the return of our sacred territory Taiwan to the embrace of our motherland and the accomplishment of the great cause of reunification. (Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, 1978)

Beyond the optimism expressed, there is little outstanding suggestion that China was under the assumption the return of Taiwan to the mainland was going to be quick. It is described as a ‘prospect’ and spoken of clearly in the future tense. It marked the laying of a careful and thoughtful groundwork for the achievement of China’s long held goals in foreign and domestic policy. Here again it is prudent to harken back to the results of the CATMA analysis as a reminder of the development of Zhou’s diverse references to a ‘foreign policy of peace’ and the pursuit of ‘world peace’. These concepts were further refined and nuanced by Deng in his qualifying a ‘favorable international environment’ as essential. Therefore, Deng’s behavior should not be viewed as conciliatory, rather it was strategically informed by philosophical principles. In fact, Huang Hua notes in his memoirs that Deng Xiaoping, during negotiations regarding the normalization of relations with the United States expressed understanding of the American position on Taiwan. This understanding, however, he insisted needed to be placed in the context of China’s rights as a sovereign state (Huang, 2008). Deng also reportedly referenced the Japanese treaty as a model and example of how China was eager and willing to establish friendly relations with the United States, but that Taiwan would not be a negotiated

casualty of those efforts (Huang, 2008). In this, Deng acknowledges the Taiwan issue reaches a level of international concern, but is quick to remind foreign parties that ultimately, at its core, Taiwan was a Chinese matter alone. Taiwan is the most important issue where China has managed to assert sovereignty over an issue that evolved into being an issue of international concern.

This shift in how China approached its foreign relations is in clear contrast to the Mao years, but does not demonstrate a break from how China viewed and understood the world. The shift represented a move from antagonism to charm; charm based on mutual interests and cooperation. Most importantly here, one can observe how reads the ‘international situation’ and reviews and revises its policies accordingly. This is a clear demonstration of the continued influence of Mao’s philosophical treatise *On Practice*; the need to observe and interpret reality as a means of keeping theory relevant and functioning, while in pursuit of foundational interests or goals. This under Deng, continues to be the theoretical premise on which Chinese foreign policy thrived at the level of the central government, and by inference the MFA.

By January Deng was in Washington securing China’s new relationship and reassuring it’s both the American and Chinese people that cooperative relations were in the national interests of both states. He engaged with President Carter and his team, the United States Congress, and around 2,000 members of the media (Huang, 2008). He seems to never have passed up an opportunity to mention the friendship between China and the United States, and their people, and first establishes the concept of ‘one China, two systems’ in this air of goodwill (Huang, 2008). From the outset, the trip to the United States was designed to serve the development of China into a modern economy and state

despite the objections of Moscow (“Teng’s Great Leap Outward Moscow watches warily as China’s Vice Premier starts a historic U.S. visit,” 1979).

The stressing of goodwill with Japan and the United States was vitally important for another reason. By February the Sino-Vietnam War broke out, and strategically China was feeling vulnerable. The Sino-Soviet Split had not healed over and Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia was seen with great suspicion (C. Chen & Xinhua News Agency, 1979). In fact, in November of 1978 the Soviet Union and Vietnam had signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation that was, at a minimum, a tool to contain China<sup>50</sup> (Elleman, 2001), and was timed in a clear response to the Sino-U.S. rapprochement. China needed the support of the United States, or at least their passive acceptance of China’s action against Vietnam. This was a bitter pill for China to swallow; it still viewed the United States as a hegemonic power just as much as it considered the Soviet Union to be of the same order. In Deng’s view, however, it was a necessary step in the pursuit of Chinese national security and adherence to the principle of non-hegemony (Kissinger, 2012).

The war was short lived and ended in March of that same year, 1979. Vietnam did not leave Cambodia and on the surface it appeared China had been defeated. Rather, the Vietnam conflict is an example of China’s willingness to apply various degrees of pressure and hold out for the long run in pursuit of its foreign policy goals. The Chinese intention was never to persuade Vietnam to leave Cambodia purely through the use of violence, despite Deng’s understanding that it would have been possible (Kissinger,

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<sup>50</sup> In 1989 in discussions with then President George Bush, Deng would repeatedly state his understanding that the Soviet Union was attempting to “encircle” China. Vietnam was a part of this strategy, as was Mongolia, North Korea, India, and Afghanistan (Deng & Bush, 1989).

2012). Instead, China's long-term goals involved putting pressure on the Soviet Union in making it suffer by way of the tools it had initiated to secure for itself, just the opposite. China maintained a large army on the border with Vietnam, periodically threatened renewed engagement, and pressured Vietnam through diplomatic channels regionally. This left Vietnam with a heavy financial and political burden to bear, one that it was not capable of bearing on its own and that was inevitably borne by Soviet aid to Vietnam (Kissinger, 2012).

It is easy to jump to the conclusion that China's relations with Vietnam during this period are in clear contradiction to its stated Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. Yet, as the historical evidence presented above suggests, one arrives at a very different set of understandings. First, China's limited military engagement and reliance on other forms of political and economic pressure are entirely consistent with the Five Principles. This is especially true when placed amongst the further context of China's perceived encirclement by the hostile interests of the Soviet Union. That China did not resort to full on belligerence in securing its interests, further lends credence to the position that Deng's government actively pursued its interests by way of predominantly non-violent means. Again, consistent with precedence set by the previous leadership.

China's pursuit of security continued to make progress on the economic front in 1979, when both the European Community and the United States extended most favored nation status to the PRC. Economic development being a central pillar to the goals Deng had in mind for the strengthening of China, this was certainly welcomed and sought for development.

Soon thereafter, China and the United States established military relations. This is a good place to pause for a moment, because though the relationship between the United States and China was clearly healing, it appears a bit out of place for either country to jump toward increased intimacy with regard to security. That is what happened, however, and each arrived at similar calculations given world events at the time. It is important to remember that this point in history was still deep within the Cold War. A Third World War at a minimum, and potentially a devastating nuclear war were very real prospects world leaders had to consider. At the end of December 1979, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. Alarm bells went off both in Beijing and Washington. For China, this was concerning on multiple fronts. First, it represented a hegemonic move by the Soviet Union on China's border. Additionally, it came on the heels of China's conflict with Vietnam, largely fueled by Beijing's concern over Soviet puppeteering in Indochina. Finally, further Soviet control in Central Asia was a real threat to Chinese access to trade and resources to its west. By January 05, 1980 China and the United States both found it appropriate to declare their establishment of military relations.

These relations did not mean much the first two years. The United States continued to sell arms to Taiwan, an issue that plagued the Sino-U.S. relationship despite the progress that had been made. Furthermore, the United States still restricted its arms sales to the PRC. This may have been a defensible position in the United States, but for China it was a sign of distrust. China, it should be remembered, was highly suspicious of the Soviets even under Stalin when it came to that country's unwillingness to transfer material or expertise to China in its pursuit of development. This suspicion was no different when it came to the United States. Some of those tensions were eased in 1982,

when on August 17 the United States and China signed an additional Joint Communiqué. This time, the United States agreed to phase out its arm sales to Taiwan, which initially allowed the relationship between the states to continue down a path of cooperation (“Joint Communiqué of the People’s Republic of China and the United States of America,” 1982).

The rapid and sustained healing of relations between the United States and China through the 1970’s into the 1980’s was undoubtedly a core element of Chinese interests. China could not, however, allow itself to be overcome by this newfound ‘friendship’. To do so would certainly have indicated a clear break with long held conceptions and orientations in Chinese foreign relations. During Deng’s trip to the United State in January 1979, he routinely made sure to insert the caveat that the PRC would not rule out the use of force against Taiwan. A subtle reminder that cooperation between the United States and China can proceed, but that there was a clear line dividing what was open to negotiation from issues that were definitively off the table in China’s view. In a similar vein, though thoroughly more official, China moved to assert its independence in foreign policy during the Twelfth National Congress of the CCP on September 1, 1982, just a few weeks after the August 17 Communiqué.

In Deng’s opening speech at the Twelfth National Congress of the CCP, he declared:

...both in revolution and in construction we should also learn from foreign countries and draw on their experience, but mechanical application of foreign experience and copying of foreign models will get us nowhere. We have had many lessons in this respect. We must integrate the universal truth of Marxism with the concrete realities of China, blaze a path of our own and build a socialism with Chinese characteristics - that is the basic conclusion we have reached after reviewing our long history. (1994, p. 14)



What is interesting about this is that it reveals a level of uncertainty within China at the time. This uncertainty arose from the change in strategy; again, from antagonism to cooperation. What is not evident at first, however, is that the ends are ultimately the same. China was still independent, sovereign, and seeking development. Deng's position, his goals, was exactly the same as those expressed in the Common Program of September 1949<sup>51</sup>. This speech served to reassure the ruling elite and the Chinese people alike that these foundational principles that guided Chinese thought in foreign policy remained fully intact. Furthermore, his renewed approach was an artful application of Mao's philosophy of practice informing theory. He state in very clear terms in reference to these points:

China's affairs should be run according to China's specific conditions and by the Chinese people themselves. Independence and self-reliance have always been and will always be their basic stand. While the Chinese people value their friendship and cooperation with other countries and other peoples, they value even more their hard-won independence and sovereign rights. No foreign country should expect China to be its vassal or to accept anything that is damaging to China's own interests. We shall unswervingly follow a policy of opening to the outside world and increase our exchanges with foreign countries on the basis of equality and mutual benefit. At the same time, we shall keep clear heads, firmly resist corruption by decadent ideas from abroad and never permit the bourgeois way of life to spread in our country. We, the Chinese people, have our national self-respect and pride. We deem it the highest honour to love our socialist motherland and contribute our all to her socialist construction. We deem it the deepest disgrace to impair her interests, dignity or honour. (Deng, 1994, pp. 14–15)

Again here we see the conjuring of images national respect and honor, independence, sovereignty, and self-reliance; though now it is couched in a frame of friendship and cooperation rather than ideological or militant posturing. While this vociferous demonstration of *On Practice* unfolded, Deng also signals that foreign models and

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<sup>51</sup> See chapter three for the discussion on the 'Common Program'.

interests cannot define the ‘practice’ piece of the equation. Though this was an element of Mao and Zhou’s approach as well, it became increasingly important to place it in explicit terms in an era of increasing international interaction. Thus, a government entity like the MFA cannot be understood to have been significantly influenced during this time by foreign ideas. On the contrary, there may have been an acute awareness of non-Chinese understanding of international relations as a means of securing China’s own set of core interests based on the realities the country faced.

This kind of rhetoric and approach to foreign policy proved extremely successful. Between the end of 1982 with the visit of British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and 1987, the groundwork for the return of both Hong Kong from the British and Macau from the Portuguese was laid. The intricacies of these negotiations reinforce and are consistent with prior Chinese behavior. The British had concerns over a loss of freedoms, both political and economic, in Hong Kong once it was to transition to the PRC. Again, much like with Taiwan, China afforded the West nuanced concessions while firmly asserting its sovereignty over any and all domestic issues. Both Joint Declarations signed between China and the United Kingdom, and China and the Republic of Portugal are reflective of this Chinese position (“Joint Declaration of the Government of the Portuguese Republic and the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Question of Macau,” 1988, “Joint Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Question of Hong Kong,” 1984).

This string of foreign policy successes continued in 1989 as the Sino-Soviet rapprochement took decisive turn for the better. On May 15, 1989 relations between the

two communist states were formally normalized. According to an information note from Romanian Ambassador Miculescu to the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in which he recounts a discussion with the Director of the Bureau for USSR and East-European Socialist Countries, Dai Bingguo, of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He recounts that the Chinese were satisfied with the calming of relations with the Soviet Union, but that they were explicit and unrelenting in voicing their grievances over their treatment by both Czarist and Soviet Russia. Importantly, this ill treatment extended to how the Soviets treated the KMT, the Yalta Conference, and the severing of Outer Mongolia from Chinese control (Miculescu, 1989). This is yet another example of an opportunity where China found it necessary and appropriate to put forth in clear terms its claims to territory and sovereign authority, and aggressively pursue resolution to past grievances of the Chinese people, with no regard for whether or not the PRC itself had standing (Deng & Gorbachev, 1989). Again, Qing borders were seen as Chinese borders and the PRC intended to claim all that was lost by the Chinese.

The normalization of relations with the USSR nonetheless led to progress on other fronts. Also during 1989, Vietnam began to withdraw from Cambodia, and by 1991 with the conclusion of the Vietnam-Cambodia War, both were able to normalize relations. Most accounts of this period suggest that China reevaluated its position in Southeast Asia, and felt it necessary to normalize relations with Vietnam given its reengagement with the region and the world (Morley & Nishihara, 1997; Nguyen, 2013; Womack, 2006). This is true, and economic factors were an incentive for China to pursue normalization, but it is not the core reason. As has been shown, the Vietnam-China conflict appears to have been about Cambodia. Superficial analysis confirms this. China's

concern over Cambodia, however, really rested in its broader relations with the Soviet Union. Vietnam being an ally of the USSR was a threat to China, especially as it pursued an Indochinese federation. The timing of Vietnam's withdraw from Cambodia may have been coincidental, but there is little to suggest that China would have been open to normalization if it were not for the prior normalization of relations with the Soviet Union.

Just over one month after Sino-Vietnamese relations were normalized, the Soviet Union collapsed. There was no effort by the Chinese to save their communist counterpart, no sense of ideological camaraderie or nostalgia. Within a year the new president, Boris Yeltsin would visit China and sign the *Joint Statement on the Foundation of Mutual Relations between the PRC and the Russian Federation* ("Overview of Sino-Russian Bilateral Ties," n.d.). The swift willingness of China to accept that its once ally and long time rival had exited the historical stage, is a testament to the strategy and vision of Deng's foreign policy objectives. The year 1992 not only marked the end of an old relationship with China's neighbor to the north and new relationship with the Russian Federation, it also marked the end of the Deng Xiaoping era. The Soviet Union had failed, yet the People's Republic remained. In fact, it was thriving.

What was presented in this chapter, through both an analysis of the texts and the historical survey, begins to highlight some of the common threads between the foreign policies and practices of different leaders and their Ministry of Foreign Affairs. One can observe that there were indeed shifts in strategy, yet this does not suggest pragmatism was the defining guide. At the outset of Deng's tenure, the Sino-Soviet Split remained a concern, and Deng's own economic reforms would give rise to further questions regarding the future of political freedoms in China. Deng's style was very different form

Mao's. Despite evolving Chinese circumstances, however, the core interests of China remained consistent, as did the cultural, political, and discursive norms that defined foreign policy making. This was seen most clearly in the textual analysis. It was shown, both through rhetoric and practice, a continued commitment to a philosophical approach to knowledge of international relations, set out by Mao and continued by Deng, which explicitly allowed for engagement with foreign knowledge, but required that it be placed in Chinese contexts. Ultimately, this appears to have limited the impact of non-Chinese ideas or theories of international relations in the MFA. Rather, based on Deng's political reports, one sees the consistent approach to the assessment of the international situation that allowed for the continuous revitalization and relevance of Chinese theories of international affairs. This consistency is compelling, but perhaps less so to the extent that Deng was among the first founding generation. His degree of separation from Mao and Zhou is significantly smaller than his successors. As we will see in the following chapter, constancy will continue to be a defining characteristic despite rapidly changing circumstances.

## **Chapter Six: International Relations Theory and the Foreign Ministry During the Jiang Zemin Era**

In 1989 Deng Xiaoping established the idea of “core” leaders in China (Deng, 1994). In doing so he established Mao Zedong and himself as the first and second-generation core leaders, respectively. His purpose, though, was not to state the obvious: that he and Mao had wielded significant power both within the CCP and PRC structures. Rather his purpose was to secure the idea that governing should be collaborative, cooperative, and deal in consensus. To do this it needed to have a core (Miller, 2016). The governing structure needed a manager. Deng proclaimed, in 1989, that, following his own stepping down, Jiang Zemin was to be that core leader; the third generation.

Beginning in 1993, Jiang Zemin, who had started his political career in Shanghai, had reached the pinnacle of political power in China. He was at the head of the government, the Party, and the military. He had earned respect from the Party elders, notably Deng Xiaoping and Chen Yun, for his leadership in Shanghai and his subsequent involvement in the handling of the 1989 student protests in Tiananmen Square.

Jiang’s era was marked by increased stability for China on the international stage. Despite real tensions with the then sole super power, the United States, Jiang continued to employ a cooperative tone in foreign policy that allowed for both disagreement and engagement. Jiang’s government proved especially adept at this, and Jiang himself looked to establish his mark on Chinese thought through the development of his own theories. Notably, as will be seen, Jiang’s worldview, which was ultimately supported and perpetuated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was entirely consistent with the previous two generations of leadership.

### **The structure and organization of the Foreign Ministry under Jiang Zemin**

Unlike under Deng Xiaoping, the role and position of the MFA in relation to the center of power was significantly altered under Jiang Zemin. This, however, was not a direct result of Jiang's own preferences, but rather represented the shifting winds of power at the very top. As noted earlier, Deng tried to cement Jiang's position as the leader with his overt approval of him taking the leading role. This worked to the extent that it afforded Jiang some space to build consensus around his policy goals. In large measure, however, this limited the range of policy options Jiang could pursue in comparison to his predecessors.

For the MFA in particular, the greatest change came in the way it received its directives. In an interview David Lampton conducted with a senior official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the official notes that under Jiang the centers of power were indeed fractured. This meant that directives may have made their way to the Ministry from the Minister of Foreign Affairs or from the Foreign Affairs Office of the State Council. In either case, it was not guaranteed that either party was aware the other was issuing particular directives, and in most cases those directives would have been the same, but often with very different tones; the Foreign Minister tended to prefer softer messaging, while the State Council was more terse (Lampton, 2014, pp. 186–187).

This fracturing of power also materialized in the boarder realm of foreign policy. It is often noted that during Jiang's tenure, he had a particularly difficult time exercising his leadership over the PLA (Lam, 1995, 1999; Lampton, 2014; Li, 2001). This proved particularly true with regard to foreign policy. During the 14<sup>th</sup> Party Congress which ran from 1992-1997, a political report was issued that designated to the PLA responsibility for the preservation of territorial integrity, the safeguarding of the socialist system in

China, and the ability to partake in China's socialist construction (Lam, 1995, p. 196). As seen in previous chapters, these were traditional goals of Chinese foreign policy, which under previous generations of leadership had been under the strict control of the paramount leader and carried out by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This worked in the past because Mao and Deng exercised definitive authority throughout the system, including over the PLA. With Jiang the dynamic was different, and led to some inter-ministerial tension.

This fracturing of power was a result of the 'transactional' leadership style Jiang employed, or was forced to employ given the style of Chinese governance that relied upon consensus building. Given Jiang was a part of the generation that was not among the founding leadership, his connections, both personal and professional, were limited. With regard to the PLA, for example, he did not have the same personal relationships with the generals that Deng or Mao had, and certainly did not command the same kind of respect from them. A senior Chinese diplomat is quoted as saying:

Deng Xiaoping could say mostly blunt things to military generals and the newer leaders cannot. Deng never minced words and they [the generals] listened. With Jiang, it is different; he needs to be much more suave and persuasive— directly admonishing them would be avoided. This doesn't mean that the military is out of control. (as quoted in Lampton, 2014, p. 165)

This dynamic was further exacerbated by global events at the time.

The 1990's saw the collapse of the Soviet Union and the outbreak of the Gulf War. These events were interpreted in China, and by Jiang in particular, as necessitating an increased focus on the modernization of China's foreign and security policy structure (interview conducted on January 13, 2017). For Jiang, the collapse of the Soviet Union reiterated the importance of having the military under the control of the Party (Lam,



1995). This would allow for continued dynamism and centralization in the conduct of both security and foreign policy, an requisite to securing long standing Chinese interests of sovereignty and territorial integrity. This makes sense in the context of the 14<sup>th</sup> Party Congress earlier mentioned. The Gulf War, on the other hand, demonstrated the importance of technology in modern warfare. If the PLA, and the Party more broadly were going to ensure the continued pursuit of long standing foreign policy goals, there needed to be a renewed focus on bringing the PLA into an increasingly modern position with regard to materiel (Lam, 1995).

The reorientation of focus within China on security as opposed to economics and foreign policy, represented a break from Jiang with Deng Xiaoping. Structurally and operationally, this led to a sidelining of the MFA in many issues that had a direct effect on foreign policy. An example cited by both military and foreign affairs officials in China is the handling of the Hainan Island Incident<sup>52</sup>, where a U.S. spy plane collided with a Chinese fighter jet, killing the Chinese pilot and forcing the Americans to make an emergency landing on Chinese territory on Hainan Island. Both officials noted the fault-lines between bases of power with regard to foreign policy and security issues caused real confusion and miscommunication during the incident (Lampton, 2014, p. 176).

Another factor contributing to the diversification of foreign policy actors was the reliance of Jiang on advisors and the ever-expanding influence of think tanks and research institutes. Bonnie S. Glaser and Phillip C. Saunders outline in the article “Chinese Civilian Foreign Policy Research Institutes: Evolving Roles and Increasing Influence” (2002), the direct connection many of the foreign policy institutes had to the

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<sup>52</sup> Discussed in more detail later in this chapter under the section “Historical Survey: 1994-2002”.

top leadership. One in Shanghai, it was found, had direct access to Jiang Zemin himself. They also pointed out that the MFA also began to engage the expertise of these institutes, tasking the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences with research projects.

None of these developments in the handling of or structuring of foreign policy is to say that they were good or bad. For this research, however, it becomes increasingly difficult to infer from the record where the status of Chinese ideas lay in comparison to others that may have begun to emerge as a part of the mainstream, given the increasing level of contact with foreign scholarship and third party institutes within China doing research on international relations.

There is one official publication, however, that does provide some insight into what the Ministry of Foreign Affairs took as its core theoretical compass. *Mao Zedong On Diplomacy* (Z. Mao, 1998) was published in 1998, in the midst of what has been described above as a distancing of the MFA from the centers of power at a level not seen under previous leaders. This publication was compiled by The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Party Literature Research Center under the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. It is useful, then, because the selection of texts gives some indication of what the Ministry, at least in part, found most important – not entirely separating itself from the language and tone characteristic of Mao’s other works.

### **CATMA Analysis of *On Diplomacy***

To highlight these qualities, and to get some sense of how *On Diplomacy* fit with the other texts discussed in this research, the same query used in the CATMA analysis for the other texts was applied. *Figure 6.1* visually summarizes of the CATMA query results for *On Diplomacy*. The full results can be found in *Appendix V*.



**Figure 6.1:** Word-cloud generated based on the keyword query results from CATMA for Mao Zedong On Diplomacy (generated using wordclouds.com.)

This text, like the *Selected Works*, were pulled from a body of speeches and written essays produced by Mao Zedong, specifically on issues of diplomacy or foreign affairs; though this time after his death, and specifically with the contribution of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs during Jiang’s tenure. Given that these texts were specifically selected based on their relevance to diplomacy, it is unsurprising to find a large number of results with comparatively balanced frequencies. Additionally, the frequent appearance of words like ‘imperialism’, ‘imperialist’, and ‘imperialists’ is unsurprising based on their prominence in Mao’s *Selected Works*. What is interesting though, is that the results appear more in line with the findings from the analysis of Zhou Enlai (see chapter four). The balance and word choice leans more toward the practical application of diplomacy

rather than an ideological one. What we will see in the next section, analyzing the selected works of Jiang Zemin (volumes I & II), is that the results of the CATMA query also demonstrate a similar similarity. The MFA may have found itself in a changing political environment after the death of Deng Xiaoping and under the leadership of Jiang Zemin, but the record seems to point to the ministry retaining and sustaining a Mao Zedong – Zhou Enlai inspired theoretical and practical worldview despite the changing political environment.

### **The Selected Works of Jiang Zemin**

In the same fashion as the ten previously analyzed volumes of work by Mao, Zhou, and Deng the *Selected Works of Jiang Zemin* were analyzed with the assistance of CATMA. This analysis allowed for useful comparisons to be made between the three generations of leaders. This also allowed for a distinct and clear picture of what foreign policy ideas persisted, dominated, and informed the MFA between 1994 and 2002. Jiang Zemin, during this period, also served as a core leader, yet in a very different way from Mao and Deng. Jiang's authority over the mechanisms of government was, at best, weak during the beginning of his tenure in power. He did successfully, however, consolidate his control over the three pillars of power (Party, government, and military) and would exercise definitive influence over foreign policy. Jiang continued to define and articulate a Chinese worldview in line with precedent, in the face of a rapidly changing international environment to that faced by the prior generations of leadership. Among these changes, Jiang endured a period of contention with the PLA that sought to approach Chinese foreign policy through a much narrower lens (Lam, 1999). Despite these circumstances, and the significant advancement that took place in China's international stature, it

appears that Jiang and the Foreign Ministry were able to maintain consistency in foreign policy perspectives for Chinese national interests.

It was not necessary to divide Jiang Zemin's *Selected Works* based on their being written prior to or after October 1, 1949, according to the same model applied to that of the *Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, and Deng Xiaoping*. There are a total of three volumes in the collection of *Selected Works of Jiang Zemin*, yet only the first two volumes were available for this research. To run the analytics applied through the CATMA query, an electronic version of searchable text was necessary. This was not available for the third volume of Jiang's works. The first two volumes, however, finish in the year 2000 and therefore provide the vast majority of the texts applicable to the period under consideration in this dissertation.

Overall, the table below summarizes the amount of data that was separated from these texts:

**Table 6.1:** Summary of source data gleaned from CATMA for the selected works of Jiang Zemin

Selected Works of Jiang Zemin	
	1,225 pages of plain text
	17,602 unique words
	Of each of these words: 538,831 frequencies

### *CATMA – Selected Works of Jiang Zemin*

The keyword data for the *Selected works of Jiang Zemin* can be seen in *Appendix IX*. This data shows a high frequency for the base words including 'political', 'international', 'state', 'interests', 'foreign', 'region', 'power', 'cooperation', 'security', 'peace', 'culture', 'trade', 'independence', 'sovereignty', 'State Council', and 'respect'; all with a frequency  $\geq 90$ .

To visualize and summarize this data, a word-cloud was generated (*Figure 6.2*):



**Figure 6.2:** Word-cloud generated based on the keyword query results from CATMA for the Selected Works of Jiang Zemin (generated using wordclouds.com.)

The top ten results included: ‘political’, ‘international’, ‘state’, ‘interests’, ‘foreign’, ‘regions’, ‘power’, ‘cooperation’, ‘security’, and ‘peace’. The results show that Jiang’s high-level, broader message is entirely consistent with those of his predecessors. There is a sense of increased complexity, however. Jiang makes use of the word ‘political’, for example, in diverse ways. Emphasis is predominantly placed on constructions like ‘political stability’, ‘political restructuring’, ‘political work’, ‘political disturbances’, and ‘international political and economic order’. From these constructions one can observe the similarities between the focus and tone to those texts of Deng Xiaoping in particular,

but also to those of Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai. It shows that Jiang too was concerned with domestic stability.

The results also suggest that Jiang was concerned with maintaining a stable international environment. The constructions most frequently associated with ‘international’ included in the left context words like ‘new’ and ‘peaceful’, while the right context most frequently appeared with words like ‘affairs’, ‘community’, ‘competition’, ‘economic’, ‘environment’, ‘hostile’, ‘political’, ‘relations’, and ‘situation’. Similarly, the word ‘peace’ most frequently appeared with a left context of ‘world’, constructing ‘world peace’. This construction was most often found with a right context of ‘and development’, ‘and security’, or ‘and stability’. These constructions were further qualified with a far left context of ‘safeguard’ or ‘safeguarding’. This highlights the concern with international stability.

The concern with stability spills over into other words as well. For example, ‘security’ is – unsurprisingly – domestically focused. The majority of references to ‘security’, at some point in the syntactical constructions that contained the word, included a reference to ‘stability’. The major left contexts of ‘country’s’, ‘economic’, ‘international’, ‘social’, and ‘state’ all fit this characterization, with the exception of ‘social’. In a similar vein, there was a sharp rise in the use of the term ‘national security’ that only briefly emerged in the writings of Deng Xiaoping<sup>53</sup>. The use of the term exhibited complexity and nuance for the ways in which Jiang used it. In this sense, it appears that China was beginning to mature in its definition of and discussions about

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<sup>53</sup> Note that there was one use of the term in all five volumes of Mao Zedong’s texts and one in all three of Liu Shaoqi’s texts. Both of these instances the term had a very limited use and didn’t begin to meet the conceptual robustness that later uses of the term would invoke.

national interests. The word 'interests' also continued to be used predominantly to describe those of the 'people' or the 'country'. The word 'state' also fits these broader concerns with stability, while including frequent references to state 'sovereignty'.

The word 'power' further exhibited a theme of stability. The most frequent left context for 'power' was 'state' and 'political'. It also, however, appears to begin to show a significant use describing international affairs. The construction 'power politics' was almost exclusively used in combination with the phrase 'opposition to hegemonism and'.

The writings of Jiang through the lens of this query do show the distinct economic concerns that Deng demonstrated, and exhibited more balance. His use of 'foreign' appears mostly with the right context of 'policy'. Often times 'foreign policy was further qualified as 'independent foreign policy'. Other constructions that included the word foreign did have an economic focus, like 'capital', 'exchange', 'investment', and 'trade'; again though there was a balance with words like 'country', 'affairs', and 'relations'. 'Cooperation' too took on more balanced use, describing both economic and political circumstances.

Beyond the top set of query results, we see other changes in the texts of Jiang from those of his predecessors in four important areas: 'sovereignty', 'territorial integrity', 'globalization', and 'international law'. With regard to 'sovereignty' and 'territorial integrity', Jiang shows a significantly increased use of these words. The word 'territorial integrity' appeared 25 times in these texts, and 23 of those times it was used in the construction 'sovereignty and territorial integrity'; intimately tying the two concepts together. 'Sovereignty' was used five times as often as it was in Deng's texts. The




understanding of the increased use of these words is best served by looking at the other two words being discussed here: ‘globalization’ and ‘international law’.

‘Globalization’ does not appear in the texts of Mao, Zhou, or Deng, while ‘international law’ only appears twice in the texts of Deng. These references to international law by Deng were in a passive context<sup>54</sup>, or, in the case of negotiations with Margaret Thatcher over Hong Kong, being rejected on the grounds that “sovereignty was not negotiable” (1994, p. 91). ‘International law’ only appears four times in Jiang’s texts, but does so in a way that demonstrates a deeper appreciation for the concept. For example, in commenting on efforts at international disarmament efforts, Jiang states: “...requiring other countries to scrupulously abide by treaties while placing domestic laws above international law and doing whatever one pleases – such actions are based on double standards and make a mockery of international disarmament efforts...” (2012, p. 306). Globalization, on the other hand does not appear in any of the other texts. This is unsurprising, perhaps, given the term did not gain popularity until the 1980’s (Feder, 2006), and did not take on its broad contemporary meaning until that time as well. One can see from Jiang’s works that the term ‘globalization’ was well integrated in Chinese policy circles as early as 1996. This corresponds well with trends within English language literature (see *Figure 6.3*).

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<sup>54</sup> See for example Deng’s speech, “Emancipate the mind, seek truth from facts and unite as one in looking to the future” in the *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping*, Volume II, when he said “we should intensify our study of international law” (1995a, p. 156).



**Figure 6.3:** Google Books Ngram Viewer results for the word ‘globalization’, <http://books.google.com/ngrams>

The emergence of the ‘globalization’ further demonstrates the Chinese capacity to observe and adapt to changing international trends. The rise of the use of the word ‘globalization’ was coupled with a comparative decline in the use of the word ‘hegemonism’ and ‘hegemony’. This implies that China was reinterpreting the dynamics of international power. This reinterpretation of the dynamics, as seen, necessitated a reaffirmation of China’s traditional national interest of sovereignty and territorial integrity in an increasingly interconnected world, governed by international norms and law.

### *Selected Works of Jiang Zemin: Broader Analysis*

A deeper reading of the works of Jiang Zemin reveal a deep set of similarities between Jiang and his predecessors. Jiang makes use of citing precedent with regard to foreign affairs, and upholding the thought and philosophies of both Mao and Deng. Jiang showed continued concern for the continued economic development of China as a means of achieving its goal of becoming a socialist state with Chinese characteristics, just as Deng did. Likewise, he expressed concern over the effects of China’s opening up and a desire to adhere to the Four Cardinal Principles. Similarly, Jiang continued to reiterate the need to

establish friendly relations with countries around the world premised on the principle of mutual benefit (Jiang, 2009). The foundational core of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence echoed throughout Jiang's texts.

Jiang's adherence to foreign policy precedent, however, did not limit his ability to leave his mark. While effectively holding on to Mao's philosophy, and Zhou and Deng's approaches, Jiang began to call for China to actively participate in changing the international order. Though this had been a goal, certainly, of his predecessors, it shifted under Jiang from a passive pursuit to an active one:

In view of past experience and present reality, we advocate the establishment of a peaceful, stable, just and equitable new international order on the basis of the principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression and noninterference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. Such a new international order would include an economic order based on equality and mutual benefit. (Jiang, 2009, p. 233)

It is important to note that there was the addition of the caveat of economic order.

International peace and development increasingly went hand-in-hand in the Chinese perspective; a perspective largely in agreement with standard international beliefs at the that time.

A central aspect to China being successful in pursuing this goal, was through the cultivation of knowledge. Like Zhou and Deng before him, Jiang cautioned against the blind rejection of foreign knowledge, while in the same breath cautioning against the blind adherence to it as well (2009, pp. 115–127). Jiang appears to have a deep understanding of Mao's philosophy set out in *On Practice* and in *On Contradiction*. Jiang, in his later writings especially, echoes Mao in his advocacy for study and the pursuit of knowledge as a means of shaping one's subjective and objective worlds. In this

way, one will be able to establish a correct worldview. The ability to integrate a diverse set of knowledge was, in his view, vital to this process. He expresses a need to grasp a holistic view of the international situation, and that to do so China needs to be able to leverage a diverse set of knowledge for distinctly Chinese purposes. To elaborate this, at one point he cites the Chinese writer Lu Xun who strived to “never passively accept humiliation from foreign powers and to courageously fight for national honor” (Jiang, 2009, p. 161). Despite this unwavering nationalistic position, Jiang points out, Lu Xun was one of the foremost contributors to Chinese culture through the introduction of foreign literary and theoretical works through his ability to adapt them to Chinese contexts (2009, p. 163). This is yet another example of a subsequent generation of leadership applying Mao’s philosophy of knowledge.

In foreign policy, Mao’s philosophy of knowledge developed into a theoretical understanding of international relations, which allowed the Jiang government to follow developments in the international situation. This method not only accounted for issues on a case-by-case level, but also more importantly made an effort to articulate a holistic assessment of international political trends. This assessment would ultimately inform a Chinese approach to foreign policy based on the current understanding of China’s position in the international order. Jiang continued the tradition of the leadership giving reports on the international situation. The development of rhetoric that continued to make use of words like ‘hegemony’, suggests that there was some consistency in the Chinese assessment of international relations, yet the more robust use of the word ‘globalization’ also points to some changes in that assessment as well. These two words alone are

indicative of a transition from a more passive approach to one of increased engagement and involvement in international politics. The historical record also supports this claim

As the CATMA results demonstrated, Jiang does show concern over domestic stability and security, and an intense rejection of the slightest hint of foreign intervention in Chinese domestic affairs. A close reading of the text reveals an increased level of push back on some international norms that Jiang was convinced were designed to create an opening for expanded foreign involvement in Chinese affairs. In particular, Jiang showed particular concern over the issue of human rights. Much of this comes together in the following section that gives a historical overview of the period and helps to contextualize the environment in which Chinese foreign policy continued to take shape.

### **Historical Survey: 1994 – 2002**

The Jiang era was characterized by an increasingly engaged China with the international community, both economically and politically. The textual analysis above reflects a more complex world, domestically and internationally. This complexity sees the expanded use of the word political, increased emphasis on stability beyond domestic contexts, and a newly perceived need to distinguish Chinese political independence from the rest of the world while maintaining cooperative relations. Just as Deng transitioned from frames of imperialism to hegemonism, Jiang moved still further toward a framework of globalization. This period in history was marked by the decline of Communism around the globe, most notably the fall of the Soviet Union, and put to the test many of China's long standing approaches to international affairs geared toward securing continued Chinese development and prosperity. In some ways, these events found China tying their economic sovereignty to those of other states, while relentlessly insisting on continued

political independence. Comparatively speaking, the Jiang era was quite short and was marked by a completely new style of leadership and foreign policy decision-making, as previously discussed. China had begun to experience the effects of opening up, and to show signs that China was fully competent in engaging the international community in a way that was inline with international norms and standards of practice while maintaining the fundamentals of an independent foreign policy. This period also saw the history of Chinese international relations from the Mao and Deng eras begin to bear fruit with the peaceful return of Hong Kong and Macau to Chinese control.

As earlier discussed, the fracturing of power over the conduct of foreign policy decision-making led to real challenges for the MFA. This materialized very early on during Jiang's tenure, on May 22, 1995 during the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis. The build up to the crisis involved Jiang being personally snubbed by the Taiwanese president, Lee Teng-hui, after Jiang had gone to great lengths to propose a mild policy of negotiations aimed at the future reunification of Taiwan with the mainland. Jiang had put forward an 'Eight-Point Proposal'. The proposal laid a common foundation from which it was believed Taiwan would come to the negotiating table. First, Jiang insisted on the acceptance of there being one China. On the surface this may seem like a non-starter, yet as shown in chapter two, republican China, and the later Republic of China, had long advocated a one China policy. In this context, then, the first point was entirely reasonable. The second point too was reasonable to the extent that it involved Jiang conceding quite a bit to Taiwan; it conceded that Taiwan was free to engage internationally as it pleased in economic relations, but would need to refrain from political relationships. The third point continues to advocate for negotiations on any

topic, including the very form those negotiations should take. Fourth, Jiang beseeched Taiwan for a peaceful resolution to the longstanding hostilities, going so far as to say that “Chinese should not fight Chinese” (“Jiang Zemin’s Eight-Point Proposal,” 1995). Fifth, Jiang clearly stated that political disputes between the ROC and PRC would not undermine a flourishing commercial and economic relationship between Taiwan and the mainland. The Sixth, seventh, and eighth points advocated finding common historical and cultural ground to bring both sides closer in dialogue, conceded the value of Taiwanese concerns and the role of political parties there, and invited Taiwanese political leadership to travel to the mainland to open up dialogue. In fact, Jiang even suggested that it wouldn’t have to be official from the outset, and suggested that it could instead be a side meeting in another setting if that was preferred by Taiwan (“Jiang Zemin’s Eight-Point Proposal,” 1995). This was clearly a more moderate approach to Taiwan than that of the previous generations of leadership, and as such drew significant criticism from more hawkish elements of the PLA (Lam, 1999).

The moderate approach of Jiang’s policy to Taiwan continued the nuanced balance of an issue that was deeply held domestically as an internal Chinese matter, but also clearly accounted for special international nature of the dispute. The way in which Jiang continued to foster rhetoric that defined Taiwan as Chinese, built on a precedent of political and cultural norms that had been set out by the previous generations of leadership. It is tempting to attribute this development to the continued warming of relations between China and the United States. The United States had for decades advocated a maintenance of the status quo and the peaceful negotiation and resolution of outstanding political disputes between the ROC and PRC. The CATMA analysis earlier

in this chapter also supports this position, given the rhetorical concern with cultivating a stable international environment; a concern born from both Zhou and Deng's similar conceptions of how to pursue China's interests. China's reaction to subsequent events, however, after President Lee snubbed the proposal, suggests something more complex.

The snubbing of an otherwise moderate proposal was not the ultimate driving force, however, behind the crisis; rather, it was a pretext. On May 22, 1995 the United States issued a visa to the President Lee so he could make a trip to his alma mater at Cornell University. Then U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher had previously stated in clear terms to the then Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs, Qian Qichen, that a visa was likely to be issued, but that it did not represent a break in U.S. policy regarding one China (Christopher, 1998). Regardless of U.S. intentions, the visa issue became the breaking point for Jiang and the MFA's milder approach to Taiwan affairs. Leaders in the PLA quickly moved to criticize Jiang, who, along with Minister Qian, would have to make self-criticism over the issue (Lam, 1999). The momentum over Taiwan relations had gone over to the PLA, and consequently so had some of China's most important foreign relations.

From 1995 to 1996, the PLA conducted military exercises in the Taiwan Strait. This coincided with Taiwanese presidential elections, and the exercises began to sow concerns within Taiwan. People began to flee Taiwan, worried where events were leading, and the exercises appeared to threaten commerce (Garver, 2016; Tyler, 1996). This was a particular concern for Japan, and created significant tension with the Japanese government as well. Though the U.S. response was measured, it evolved into a tit-for-tat in military escalation. Once the Taiwan presidential elections had ended, so did the



confrontation. Yet, the U.S. willingness to engage in a tit-for-tat on the issue was a cautious reminder to Chinese leadership that it would need to reconsider the PLA's antagonistic foreign policy approach. Certainly it was well appreciated that Taiwan was a domestic issue, yet it was one that needed to be tended to with nuance and care. Sources have cited the Taiwan crisis as, at least with matters clearly regarding foreign policy, a pivot back to the MFA and away from the PLA (Garver, 2016). Even during the crisis there was open and frank dialogue between the United States and China, with a U.S. department of Defense team led by Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Joseph Nye visiting Beijing to engage in open dialogue with PLA leadership.(Kan, 2014; Kozaryn, 1995).With this in mind, it should be noted that there was not another crisis at this level during Jiang's tenure.

At first pass, the Taiwan crisis poses some interpretative challenges for this research, but it is important for several reasons. The primary challenge rests in the fact that the issue had both domestic and international implications. This was especially true when the United States decided to make a more overt military presence in the region in response to the PLA demonstrations. On the surface, the PLA response seemed more in line with prior Chinese foreign policy than any alternative approach may have been. Yet it is precisely because the top leadership in China became uncomfortable with this approach, that one is reminded that military demonstrations were never meant for a foreign audience. When it clearly became a foreign policy issue, it precisely when the leadership grew uncomfortable with it, and began considering a scenario where events grew out of control. The preference to pivot back to the MFA further supports the previous findings of this research that, even during a complex domestic issue with

international implications, the MFA was viewed as a bastion of professional consistency in foreign affairs; consistency characterized by a then tradition of a Chinese understanding of international relations defined by Mao, Zhou, and Deng. This may have been seen as too moderate by the PLA, whose mission had since its inception been narrowly focused on defense and security, but was seen as the source of an otherwise successful history of foreign policy by the leadership.

Though there was not a crisis at this level is not to suggest that there were not crises of other degrees. The course correction that took place in Chinese foreign policy after the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1995-1996, however, demonstrates the consistency in Chinese foreign policy perspectives that advocated dialogue and pursuit of mutual prosperity. Though relations with Japan had also suffered as a result of the Taiwan incident in 1995-1996, by 1998 Jiang would be the first head of state from the PRC to visit Japan. The visit itself was slated to be a milestone in the Sino-Japanese relationship that had been positively evolving from the Mao years through Deng Xiaoping. Though the trip was not the success it was hoped to be (Kristof, 1998; Sato, 2001), it did mark a small step toward improved relations; there were distinct disagreements, in particular over the wording of an apology over war time behavior by Japan, there was constructive dialogue. The ability, even the desire for dialogue on the premise of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence on issues that were deeply sensitive in China represents a consistency in practice that also suggests there was little to no significant influence of foreign ideas in the foreign policy making apparatus, and by association, on the MFA itself.

Relations with the United States, too, continued to improve. Jiang made a trip to the United States in 1997, where both sides came to an agreement on important issues related to regional peace and cooperation, non-proliferation, trade, and the environment among others. In fact it was reported that Jiang and Clinton engaged in a lengthy closed door debate about human rights (Lyle, 1997). U.S. President Clinton reciprocated with a trip of his own to Beijing in 1998, where the relationship was further strengthened. Interestingly, the human rights debate that had started during Jiang's trip to Washington escalated to a new level during Clinton's trip to Beijing. The two leaders held a televised debate on the topic in which both side laid out their positions with extraordinary candor; Jiang ultimately making the argument that Chinese circumstances were different from the United States', and that an issue such as human rights needed to serve the interests of the state in order to serve the interests of the people (Broder, 1998a, 1998b). Similar to the approach toward Japan, and contrary to what was seen during the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1995-1996, Jiang and the MFA prioritized dialogue over confrontation.

In 1999, the United States armed forces under NATO made an egregious error in bombing the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade in present day Serbia (Myers, 2000). Naturally, within China, there were angry anti-U.S. demonstrations. The U.S. quickly took to efforts to clear the air with their Chinese counterparts, though Chinese leadership at all levels were largely unresponsive (Albright & Woodward, 2005). Jiang himself refused to take any phone calls from President Clinton (Dumbaugh, 2000). Dialogue did resume relatively quickly and by the end of 1999 a settlement had been reached; the U.S. would pay damages to the families of embassy workers that lost their lives and for damages to the Chinese facilities in Belgrade, while the Chinese paid for damages to the

U.S. embassy in Beijing during the protests (Dumbaugh, 2000). One year later, on October 7, 2000, China and the United States established permanent normal trade relations, signaling continued cooperation in spite of the deep challenges the relationship faced the year before.

A similar dynamic unfolded in 2001 as well. The U.S.-China relationship was damaged when a U.S. spy plane and a Chinese fighter jet collided with one another off the coast of Hainan island. The Chinese pilot died and the U.S. service men were forced to land on PRC territory where they were taken into Chinese custody (“Interview with Lt. Shane Osborn,” 2001). Though in the end it was confirmed to be the Chinese pilots fault for the collision, the fractured centers of power and communication channels within Jiang’s government meant that the MFA and Jiang himself were receiving inaccurate information as events were unfolding, ultimately demanding from the United States an apology (Lam, 1999). This proved to be more awkward, once it was revealed to the Chinese leadership that the collision was actually caused by the Chinese pilot. The U.S., however, issued a nuanced apology that allowed the Chinese to accept and release the U.S. service men (Montgomery, Tapper, & Lindsey, 2001). That same year, just eight months later, China acceded to the WTO with the full support of the United States. It has been suggested that the previous efforts in the United States to establish permanent normal trade relations with China were in effect an effort to lay out U.S. support for China in the WTO (Prime, 2002). Both the U.S. bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade and the Hainan Incident demonstrate how Jiang pursued a foreign policy that kept China out of prolonged diplomatic disputes, and instead opted to aggressively pursue channels of cooperation as a means of better securing Chinese interests. Jiang’s

ability to move past Belgrade and Hainan in favor of an opportunity to further strength China's economic development by way of ascension to the WTO highlights this strategy, very much in line with the practice of his predecessors. As earlier cited, this also appears to reflect the advice Jiang was getting from the MFA. The MFA had disagreed with the PLA's approach to both Taiwan and Hainan, ultimately prevailing in facilitating a more moderate approach to Chinese foreign relations reminiscent of Mao, Zhou, and Deng's grounded understanding of how to strategically achieve China's core set of interests.

Although Sino-U.S. relations and China's accession to the WTO dominated this period, it was also historically significant for another reason. In 1996, culminating in 2001, China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan established what came to be known as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) (Kalra & Saxena, 2007). China's pursuit of this is perhaps the clearest demonstration of Jiang's hopes of establishing a new world order earlier discussed. The SCO established cooperation between the six participant nations on the basis of a set of principles that, almost verbatim, echoed Zhou Enlai's Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence ("Charter of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization," 2001). Though the organization did not do much during its opening years, it represented a successful push by the Chinese to begin the process of not just establishing closer bilateral relationships of regional interest with other states on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, but also to do so at a multilateral level; and to do so in a strategically important part of China's periphery.

The broad strokes of Jiang's foreign policy can be seen as entirely consistent with the precedent set by the founding leadership of Mao and Zhou, through to Deng, though we also begin to see a new sense of Chinese comfort with and command of international

engagement. Jiang took steps to globalize China at its very core. In the 1990's, Jiang advocated for the opening up of the Central Party School to interaction not only with regular universities in China, but also institutions overseas in an effort to increase the quality of research and education of Party cadres (A. P. Liu, 2009). These cadres would be a central element to the make up of the MFA. Therefore, this is one reason one does not see major shifts in an approach to foreign affairs under Jiang's leadership, because it would appear that there were few players in foreign policy circles that had any meaningful education outside the ideological training they would have received from the CPS. Furthermore, among the leadership of the MFA, both at the Minister and Vice-Minister level, only one during Jiang's tenure had any experience studying abroad. That individual, Yang Jiechi, served as Assistant-Minister from 1995-1998, and Vice-Minister from 1998-2001. He studied for a brief period, 2 years, in the U.K. split between two universities, the University of Bath and the London School of Economics ("Who is who - Databases - Yang Jiechi," n.d.). The other three individuals who held the title of Vice-Minister or Minister, Li Zhaoxing, Tang Jiaxuan, and Dai Bingguo respectively had no overseas education, completing all their studies at Chinese universities early in their careers. What is more, the leadership of the leading small group for foreign affairs during Jiang's tenure did not have any overseas experience, with the exception of Jiang's foreign Minister Qian Qichen who had spent some of his early higher-level education in the Soviet Union. Among the Leading small group, only Liu Shuqing had any particular academic training in Diplomacy, a credential he received from Renmin University during the Mao era; a time when the international politics course at Renmin University, as

earlier discussed in this dissertation, was saturated with ideology and showed little resemblance with any international standard for the study of international relations.

Through an analysis of the Jiang era one can get a sense of the prevalence of Mao Zedong thought, even among this first generation of leadership to have a level of separation from the Mao period. We can see from the tension that is cited between the foreign policy outlook of the MFA and that of the PLA, the MFA continued to serve as a stalwart supporter of the Mao-Zhou-Deng model of foreign affairs and theoretical approach to understanding the international situation. There is little evidence from the historical record to support an idea that foreign ideas played any meaningful role in the outlook of the MFA during Jiang's tenure. This position is further reinforced by the educational background of the MFA leadership itself, all of whom had strong ideological educations with no international experience outside of ideological training, save Yang Jiechi.

This chapter showed how Jiang faced rapidly changing domestic and international circumstances. In foreign policy, increased economic success and political stability gave more room to exercise assertiveness and move on new initiatives. Internally, however, changes also brought new challenges, with the rise of alternative sources of foreign policy. Though Jiang had the endorsement of Deng, he still needed to consolidate his authority, which may have limited Jiang in his own political pursuits. To maintain control, the authority of precedent, as received from Mao, Zhou, and Deng may have been his greatest political asset. Under these circumstance, one can observe in the textual analysis important intellectual and rhetorical links that tie the Mao, Deng, and Jiang eras together. Jiang, however, successfully leveraged this heritage to reinterpret and adjust

Chinese foreign policy in important ways given the contexts in which he found himself.

The most powerful finding of this research, however, is the consistent application of the same interpretive lens each leader used to secure a core set of Chinese interests. This inheritance, it seems, was not only the purview of the leaders themselves, but was institutionalized through the work of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.



## Conclusion

The findings of this research were at times in agreement with the larger body of literature regarding Chinese foreign policy, and at others not entirely so. Part of this dynamic stemmed from the focus of the research. Prevalent ideas in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, as indicated in chapter four, appear to be influenced by human resources, both the international and domestic political environments, political leadership, and the organizational structure of the Ministry itself.

With regard to these four components to the make up of ideas in the MFA, it has been demonstrated that over time, as each of these elements experienced changes or turnover, Chinese foreign policy approaches adjusted in kind. This, in part, is the often-cited source of Chinese pragmatism. What this research has also revealed, however, is that this phenomena was far from the basic application of pragmatism, and represented, rather, a deeply internalized application of Maoist philosophy to understanding international relations.

To fully appreciate this, it was necessary to begin this dissertation at the most basic level: history and its role in China. Chinese historical perspective runs very deep, and an injustice experienced one or two centuries earlier can serve as a source of wisdom in the present. In this sense, history also served China as means of reclaiming its future. Early modern Chinese thinkers advocated this; like Liang Qichao in his push for new history. This intellectual tradition directly influenced Mao and Zhou. Ultimately, Mao's use of history, mocking the simplistic cause and effect model, sought to awaken a revolutionary spirit in China necessary to propel it into modernity and toward a socialist state.

In terms of International Relations theory and a history thereof, it was demonstrated that China was simultaneously influenced by, yet intellectually independent from the Western-grounded tradition. Early studies of International Relations in the west were born from political science and international law. It was originally concerned with mostly moralistic elements surrounding questions of the state and sovereignty; concerns born from the dominant model of international affairs at the time, imperialism. Central to the early development of scholarship in international relations at the time was the carving up of China into spheres of influence, creating a crisis of notions of sovereignty in an empire that was understood to be a respected and sovereign political entity. With time, however, the discipline evolved to become more scientific, turning to history and behavior as pertinent variables for analysis.

It was discussed in chapters two and three the distinct similarities in the strict interpretation of sovereignty during the development of IR as a discipline to that of the Qing Dynasty, Republican, and then Communist China. The strict interpretation of sovereignty was revealed to have carried through all way to 2002 and the close of the Jiang Zemin era. This revelation and assessment suggests the CCP's insistence that foreign powers not involve themselves in issues it considers domestic, cannot be reduced to a simplistic assertion that China fears or prefers to deflect on certain topics it finds unfavorable. Rather, the commitment to Chinese sovereignty runs very deep and cuts across political lines. The CCP was just as willing to reprimand the Soviet Union for taking advantage of the KMT in negotiations involving Chinese territory as it was to rebuke the United States for promoting human rights in China.

We saw that the issuance of the *Core Programme* in September 1949 proved to be the defining document that would lay out, in clear terms, what Chinese interests were. Those interests cut across ideology, and were central to China regardless of whether or not China was republican or communist. To secure those interests, China needed a method of knowing or understanding the international situation in order to appropriately engage with the world. It is in this context that Mao's *On Practice* and *On Contradiction* became so important. It seems that Mao's philosophy laid out in these two texts is often over looked or under appreciated, in part because they are not concerned with the concrete elements of foreign affairs; rather, they are abstract philosophies of knowledge. This is precisely why, however, they are of central importance to understanding Chinese foreign policy broadly, and with regard to this research, how they came to dominate international relations theory in the MFA. We know for certain that early studies of international relations in the PRC, under Mao, were overwhelmingly premised on Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought. As time proceeded, we only see Mao Zedong Thought, and in particular his ideas set out in *On Practice* and *On Contradiction*, remain as theoretically relevant or as providing any explanatory frame to Chinese foreign relations behavior. Quickly, a context begins to take shape in which Maoist philosophy was used to understand and ultimately secure an inherent core of Chinese interests: independence, freedom, territorial integrity, peace, cooperation, equality, respect, and sovereignty.

In Chapter three it is shown that the CCP clearly has a grasp of what the Qing Dynasty lacked. The CCP was focused on resisting foreign aggression and internal division, they understood the dangers of a weak domestic economy, of weak institutions,

of self-interested bureaucracy, and the absence of a unifying ideology or sense of nationalism. These were all elements shared in common with the Republic of China, especially as represented by the leadership of Sun Yat-sen. These early experiences and qualities, which framed the CCP's foreign policies, demonstrate that the Chinese revolution was Chinese before it was Marxist-Leninist. For Mao and the early leaders this was entirely consistent with their brand of ideology. For if Marxism-Leninism was going to succeed in China, it needed to be secured in Chinese reality. This again reveals the deeply consistent application of Mao's conception of rooting theory in practice and understanding and exploiting contradiction in pursuit of larger goals.

On the practical side, it was during this pre-1949 period that the CCP became acutely aware of the capriciousness of international affairs, that their weaknesses could very quickly lead to their demise, and that their interests in political survival were at times served by caution and at others, firmness. It was in these uncertain times where the precursor to the MFA was born. It was under a military command structure, long headquartered in Yen'an under the direct supervision and ideological guidance of Mao and Zhou. This early ministry was geared toward and tasked to engage in dialogue and cooperation in common pursuits with the CCP's foreign partners in the United Front. Ideologically, these partners were anathema to the CCP, yet the foreign affairs office was able to effectively and cooperatively engage with them in pursuit of both the Party's and the country's interests. This ability would be a feature of the MFA after the establishment of the PRC, even during some of China's most contentious periods domestically and internationally. The MFA appears to remain consistently true to the founding principles and theories that were established as its guide as early as Yen'an.

The consistency in theoretical perspectives that dominated Chinese foreign policy, and the MFA in particular, is born out in chapters four, five, and six. The structure of the MFA, the sources of its power, and the policy preferences of the leadership continued to evolve, yet the core philosophy and interests remained the same. These phenomena were reflected both in the historical record and in the texts of Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping, and Jiang Zemin.

The *Selected Works* of Mao, Zhou, Deng, and Jiang were analyzed using the CATMA system and in conjunction with a broader reading of each of the texts. What was revealed was not what was initially expected. First, there appeared to be little room for foreign theories to influence the MFA, despite the high level of education of its workforce and the heightened exposure to foreign intellectual traditions. As mentioned, throughout changes in leadership the ministry appears as a bastion of consistency. This is reflected in part in the consistency in the leadership's commitment to the core principles and theories in their writings that would have set the agenda for the MFA itself. It is important to note again that Mao and Zhou set this groundwork. Chapters four through six analyzed in detail the results of the CATMA query results, based on a query constructed through the development of a set of key terms through the analysis carried out in chapters one through three, as well as additional terms drawn from the official mission statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. When the top results from the CATMA queries are placed in proximate position to one another, one can plainly observe the similarities among the language used by the leadership:

**Table 7.1:** Top CATMA query results for *Selected Works* of Mao, Zhou, Deng, and Jiang in proximate positioning

<p><b>Mao Pre-1949</b>  ‘political’, ‘imperial’, ‘power’, ‘peace’, ‘negotiate’, ‘international’, ‘foreign’, ‘state’, ‘cooperation’, ‘independent’, ‘region’, ‘culture’, ‘interests’, and ‘freedom’</p>
<p><b>Mao Post-1949</b>  ‘state’, ‘political’, ‘cooperation’, ‘imperialism’, ‘power’, ‘peace’, ‘freedom’, ‘region’, and ‘culture’</p>
<p><b>Zhou Pre-1949</b>  ‘political’, ‘peace’, ‘power’, ‘negotiate’, ‘interests’, ‘imperial’, ‘international’, ‘foreign’, ‘cooperation’, ‘independent’, ‘trade’, and ‘state’</p>
<p><b>Zhou Post-1949</b>  ‘state’, ‘political’, ‘foreign’, ‘peace’, ‘imperial’, ‘power’, ‘culture’, ‘international’, ‘interests’, ‘trade’, ‘cooperation’, ‘respect’, ‘region’, ‘State Council’, ‘abroad’, ‘diplomacy’, ‘independent’, ‘freedom’, and ‘equality’</p>
<p><b>Deng Pre-1949</b>  ‘political’, ‘power’, ‘interests’, ‘imperial’, and ‘region’</p>
<p><b>Deng Post-1949</b>  ‘political’, ‘state’, ‘foreign’, ‘power’, ‘interests’, ‘international’, ‘peace’, ‘respect’, ‘trade’, ‘abroad’, and ‘region’</p>
<p><b>Jiang</b>  ‘political’, ‘international’ ‘state’, ‘interests’, ‘foreign’, ‘region’, ‘power’, ‘cooperation’, ‘security’, ‘peace’, ‘culture’, ‘trade’, ‘independence’, ‘sovereignty’, ‘State Council’, and ‘respect’</p>

This consistency, as well as the consistency observed in the broader query results as shown in *appendices II-IX*, requires additional analysis. Therefore, to garner meaning from the results meant that a broader reading of the texts was required. Using the combination of these two analytical approaches produced a result that compelled this research to conclude that there did indeed exist a significant level of consistency in the way successive generations of leadership from 1949-2002 conceptualized and prioritized foreign affairs, and that the lens through which they did so was premised on a Chinese intellectual tradition of interpreting international relations and not one based on a foreign intellectual tradition. This finding had significant implications for the research

question as to the role and extent of foreign ideas in the MFA, given the structure and nature of decision-making in that organization.

Second, this research found that in China, theory is indeed informed by practice. This is different from pragmatism. A Chinese theory of international relations is one that understands the world to be of our making, to be born from our practices and perceptions. Thus, Chinese foreign policy strategies shifted with time to reflect certain conditions, yet always in accordance with the core principles of foreign policy as they evolved from the *Common Program* to the *Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence*; this approach to knowledge that defined the MFA's dominant theory of international relations was guided by an unchanging set of interests.

During the Jiang Zemin era, however, there was an observed increase in the number of foreign policy actors in China. This created a real tension between the preservation of the precedence set by previous generations of leadership, and the preservation of the theory-practice dynamic premised on a core set of interests that had been the successful model of Chinese foreign affairs. The increased say of the PLA, for example, appears to have temporarily narrowed a broader set of Chinese interests to simply territorial integrity and unity. This created the illusion of shifting interests, though we see through the actions of the MFA and the writings of Jiang himself that there was a commitment to a more consistent approach, and a deep alignment with the traditional interests and theory of international relations set out by Mao and Zhou.

To sum up, through an analysis of leaders that ultimately shaped and determined foreign policy, and the historical record associated with the foreign policy of Mao, Deng, and Jiang, this research finds that there existed a core set of basic principles that guided

Chinese foreign policy between the years 1949-2002. This finding would argue against the common position that Chinese foreign policy was largely pragmatic during this same period. The establishment of the *Common Principles* in September 1949, and the consistency with which those ideas and terms defined the way Chinese leadership talked about and executed upon foreign affairs, as evidenced by the hermeneutic and historical analysis applied to the texts and events addressed in this research, offers a new and compelling argument in favor of understanding Chinese conceptions of international relations in more definitive terms. Though it was observed that each generation of leadership approached foreign policy by way of different strategies, the core principles that guided those strategies remained consistent. This was found to be attributable to Mao's philosophy of knowledge laid out in *On Practice*, and to some extent in *On Contradiction*.

Furthermore, this research sought to address how these conceptions of international relations were affected by the reforms and opening up China experienced between 1949-2002, and to ascertain to what extent foreign conceptions of international relations played a role in a Chinese understanding of international politics. This objective was motivated by the historicist orientation adopted at the outset of the research, which held that these phenomena could best be understood in historical terms accounting for cultural and political orientations specific to the time period at hand, then placing that understanding within broader historical contexts, ultimately illuminating trends and enhancing knowledge. Specific attention was paid to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs through the employment of a mixed research methodology in service to this historicist approach. The methodology produced analysis through a developed understanding of the



structure of the MFA, a review of memoirs, biographies, autobiographies, historical events and a CATMA supported analysis of the writings of Chinese leaders. In this way, it was concluded that the MFA exhibited little to no significant influence from foreign conceptions of international relations. The limited exposure of MFA staff and leadership to overseas education, or the study of international relations in particular, coupled with the emphasis on ideological training rooted in Mao Zedong thought left little space for foreign ideas to take root. Rather, it appears from the findings of this research that the appearance of Chinese trends toward more engagement and mainstream international behavior, as compared to what was seen during the Mao era, was less the result of China being influenced by the international order, and was rather more a result of the Chinese institutional ability to understand the international environment and how best to pursue its core set of interests at any given point in time. Thus, though basic principles remained consistent, the policy choices associated with those principles have gradually shifted in tandem with how China itself perceived shifts in the international environment, as well as how it perceived China's position in the international order relative to those interests.

Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, and Deng Xiaoping were all apart of the founding generation of leadership that created New China. Their perceptions were shaped by their common experiences in war and revolution. In this sense, it may not be surprising to see some commonality among them. Jiang, however, was different. Yet, the roots that seem to have taken to the ground during the Mao years appear to have been strong, and despite the changing nature of leadership under Jiang, and the comparative decentralization of power within the PRC, foreign policy and an understanding of international relations remained consistent under the combined care of Jiang himself and his MFA.

This research lays out a framework through which future research should take place, to test to what extent the observed consistency in Chinese foreign policy extended beyond 2002 to present day. If there is consistency, it could suggest renewed ways of interpreting Chinese behavior in foreign affairs. If there is not the same level of consistency, however, such findings would also be telling. As China grows economically, politically, and militarily, shifts in how China defines its interests and understands the international environment will define how it behaves in relation to those interests and understandings. The findings presented here for the period between 1949-2002, offer a stable and positive outlook, yet they need to be applied to a more contemporary period in order to realize their full import.



## Appendix II: CATMA Query Results for Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Pre-October 1, 1949

### CATMA Query Results for Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Pre- October 1, 1949

Phrase	Frequency
political	1217
imperialism	688
power	547
peace	469
Region	406
state	371
imperialist	343
foreign	336
interests	286
imperialists	241
culture	196
Political	184
international	180
negotiations	175
freedom	169
co-operation	150
cooperative	148
independent	143
cooperatives	128
powers	121
powerful	117
politically	102
politics	96
respect	95
regions	94
trade	93
independence	91
region	71
treaty	59
co-operatives	56
peaceful	53
abroad	52
International	48
secure	45

equality	40
Cooperative	39
co-operate	39
cooperation	33
Treaty	32
regional	30
treaties	29
Peace	28
independently	28
foreigners	27
diplomatic	26
co-operative	26
respects	23
Imperialism	23
sovereignty	20
security	19
negotiate	18
State	18
overseas	16
respectively	16
freedoms	15
territorial integrity	15
Foreign	14
imperial	14
respective	14
cooperate	14
Imperialist	13
Trade	13
securing	12
peacefully	12
internationalism	11
secured	10
co-operated	10
co-operating	9
Culture	9
political-organizational	9
sovereign	8
respected	8
politician	8
cooperative's	8
traders	7
politicians	7
globe	6
Internationally	6
internationally	6

Freedom	5
Independence	5
Politically	4
powerless	4
foreign-style	4
Imperialists	4
diplomacy	4
Cooperatives	4
securely	4
peace-loving	4
imperialisms	4
cultures	4
freedom-loving	3
Negotiations	3
internationalist	3
foreigner	3
foreign-owned	3
peace-time	3
hegemony	3
Powers	3
Power	3
negotiated	3
peace-preservation	2
Independent	2
internationalists	2
International's	2
trades	2
Region's	2
Equality	2
Sovereigns	2
Imperial	2
Politics	2
Interests	2
Co-operative	2
negotiation	2
negotiating	2
respectfully	2
cooperated	2
respecting	1
imperialist-minded	1
secures	1
peacetime	1
foreign-made	1
powerfully	1
Treaties	1

Cooperation	1
cooperating	1
Overseas	1
political-worker	1
cooperative-controlled	1
region—Chu	1
imperialist-Kuomintang	1
Co-operating	1
Security	1
tradesmen	1
Powerful	1
Co-operation	1
region's	1
diplomats	1
respectful	1
traded	1
cooperates	1
Total	8494

### Appendix III: CATMA Query Results for Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Post-October 1, 1949

#### CATMA Query Results for Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Post-October 1, 1949

Phrase	Frequency
co-operatives	384
co-operative	223
state	220
political	178
co-operation	110
imperialism	91
Political	46
interests	45
imperialist	41
imperialists	41
power	39
peace	37
foreign	34
freedom	34
region	33
powerful	32
culture	31
respect	28
Co-operative	28
international	28
regions	28
trade	24
politically	23
independent	22
cooperatives	18
security	17
independence	17
politics	14
abroad	14
secure	14
peaceful	13
powers	12
cooperative	12
negotiations	12



State	11
Co-operatives	11
freedoms	11
traders	9
peace-loving	9
respects	8
diplomatic	8
Region	8
cooperation	6
trades	6
Co-operation	6
Internationally	6
peace-time	4
equality	4
respectively	4
State Council	4
Peaceful	3
foreigners	3
Culture	3
Imperialism	3
co-operated	2
internationally	2
peaceloving	2
Cooperatives	2
Treaty	2
co-operate	2
securing	1
Security	1
global	1
treaty	1
peacetime	1
peacefully	1
International	1
overseas	1
regional	1
globe	1
co-operating	1
internationalist	1
Politics	1
co-operatives2	1
Trade	1
Cooperative	1
Respect	1
Freedom	1
Power	1

respected	1
negotiation	1
secured	1
co-operates	1
Imperialist	1
Politically	1
Total	2103

## Appendix IV: CATMA Query Results for Selected Works of Zhou Enlai, Volume I Pre-October 1, 1949

### CATMA Query Results for Selected Works of Zhou Enlai, Volume I Pre-October 1, 1949

Phrase	Frequency
political	380
Political	114
peace	111
power	99
negotiations	71
interests	53
International	49
imperialists	49
imperialism	47
foreign	42
co-operation	34
independent	33
independence	31
trade	31
state	31
freedom	29
imperialist	28
peaceful	23
abroad	23
politically	21
international	20
respect	18
co-operate	17
region	16
regions	15
Peace	13
powers	12
negotiate	9
Security	9
respects	9
independently	8
regional	8
overseas	7
politics	7

culture	6
Region	6
diplomatic	6
Trade	6
co-operated	6
Politically	6
negotiating	5
equality	5
foreigners	5
co-operating	5
Treaty	5
sovereignty	4
respectively	4
politicians	4
powerful	4
Independent	3
freedoms	3
internationally	3
International's	3
powerless	3
co-operative	3
diplomacy	3
peacefully	3
Internationally	3
negotiation	3
cooperation	3
territorial integrity	2
Foreign	2
secure	2
respected	2
treaties	2
peacetime	2
peace-loving	2
trades	2
Internationa	2
security	2
Internationale	2
Regional	1
Region206	1
cooperation475	1
Negotiations	1
negotiations509	1
Independence	1
foreign-dominated	1
respective	1

State	1
imperial	1
freedom-loving	1
Imperialism	1
treaty301	1
imperialism's	1
cooperate	1
treaty	1
internationalism	1
Culture	1
cooperatives	1
politician	1
Co-operate	1
cooperating	1
Total	1621

## Appendix V: CATMA Query Results for Selected Works of Zhou Enlai, Volume II Post-October 1, 1949

### CATMA Query Results for Selected Works of Zhou Enlai, Volume II Post-October 1, 1949

Phrase	Frequency
state	288
political	173
foreign	114
peace	76
imperialists	75
power	72
culture	70
International	70
interests	63
State	61
Political	58
trade	54
co-operation	50
international	46
respect	46
regions	43
peaceful	43
region	41
imperialism	37
co-operatives	36
State Council	35
abroad	32
diplomatic	32
independence	30
powerful	30
imperialist	29
independent	27
co-operative	26
freedom	25
equality	23
powers	22
politically	20
Region	16
politics	16

sovereignty	16
co-operate	14
negotiations	13
imperial	13
security	11
independently	11
secure	11
territorial integrity	11
Culture	10
Trade	9
overseas	9
regional	9
respected	8
negotiate	8
foreigners	7
treaty	7
respects	7
cultures	7
internationalism	6
peace-loving	6
diplomacy	6
Peaceful	6
Foreign	5
co-operating	5
cooperation	5
cooperatives	5
negotiation	5
peacefully	4
Overseas	4
trades	4
Politically	4
Co-operatives	3
internationally	3
State Council's	3
secured	3
co- operativization	3
globalism	3
Co-operative	3
Security	3
Treaty	3
Internationally	3
treaties	3
respectively	2

respective	2
cooperative	2
Imperialist	2
Regional	2
Power	2
Diplomacy	1
negotiating	1
Peace	1
Imperial	1
negotiated	1
imperiali	1
respectable	1
diplomats	1
Independence	1
cooperated	1
co-operatively	1
co-operated	1
global	1
Diplomatic	1
International's	1
Negotiations	1
region's	1
traders	1
Power-generating	1
political	1
Power-generating	1
Powers	1
Imperialism	1
Independent	1
cooperate	1
internationalist	1
peace-time	1
Politics	1
negotiators	1
Imperialists	1
foreign-language	1
Freedom	1
Total	2202



## Appendix VI: CATMA Query Results for Mao Zedong on Diplomacy

### CATMA Query Results for Mao Zedong on Diplomacy

Phrase	Frequency
imperialism	238
peace	218
foreign	207
diplomatic	134
international	118
imperialist	113
imperialists	106
independence	104
treaty	97
political	76
negotiations	72
power	67
state	64
Treaty	57
trade	56
cooperation	56
interests	51
powers	46
State	46
Foreign	46
Security	45
peaceful	44
independent	43
overseas	35
powerful	32
sovereignty	32
freedom	31
respect	30
International	29
Political	28
peace-loving	25
Imperialism	23
treaties	22
regions	18

negotiate	18
abroad	18
culture	17
peacefiil	17
security	17
foreigners	16
Cooperation	15
equality	14
politically	13
cooperate	12
region	11
State Council	11
Peace	10
politics	10
negotiation	9
Trade	8
cooperative	7
respects	7
Independence	7
imperial	7
powerfiil	6
territorial integrity	6
peacefully	6
cooperated	5
hegemony	5
global	5
internationally	5
Internationally	5
Peaceful	5
negotiating	5
peacefid	4
Imperialist	4
independently	4
Imperialists	4
respectively	4
cooperatives	4
negotiated	4
Culture	3
politician	3
sovereign	3
secure	3
peaceftd	3
respective	3
Powers	2
respected	2

powerfid	2
foreigner	2
State	
Council	2
Freedom	2
internationalism	2
Peacefiil	2
diplomats	2
Negotiations	2
Treatyof	2
powerless	2
cultures	2
secured	2
freedom-loving	2
Region	2
independ	2
ForeignMinistry	2
Overseas	2
peaceflil	2
internationalist	2
peacefxil	1
ForeignAffairs	1
respecting	1
Diplomacy	1
imperialism—of	1
freedomof	1
politicalcounselor	1
treaty—a	1
treatywould	1
internationahsm	1
securing	1
freedoms	1
PoliticalActions	1
Independent	1
independenceand	1
diplomaticstruggle	1
national security	1
Negotiation	1
interestsfrom	1
ForeignLanguages	1
imperialism—the	1
Tradewith	1
Imperial	1
imperialism's	1

territorial integrity	1
Cultureas	1
peacefuhy	1
TreatyVcan	1
foreignreactionaries	1
independence-loving	1
peacefulmeans	1
peace-time	1
interestsof	1
securityof	1
peacefUenvironment	1
foreignws	1
peacefilly	1
PoliticalConsultativeConference	1
sovereignrights	1
CooperationAdministration	1
politick	1
politicalparty	1
Treatygranting	1
internationd	1
respectively—aU	1
Respecting	1
Politics	1
peacefiiUy	1
cooperating	1
Diploma	1
internationalrevolutionary	1
negotiation—let	1
ForeignCorrespondents	1
powers—Germany	1
powers—Britain	1
diplomat	1
Independents	1
Foreignnewspapers	1
equalityand	1
ForeignJournalist	1
CooperationAdmimstra	1
globe	1
traderepresentative's	1
DiplomaticRelations	1
foreignaid	1
peacefulinternational	1
peaceable	1
Regionin	1

independencemovement	1
securitydepartments	1
imperialik	1
politicalencouragementin	1
Politically	1
diplomacy	1
Independ	1
Total	2869

## Appendix VII: CATMA Query Results for Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Pre- October 1, 1949

### CATMA Query Results for Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Pre- October 1, 1949

Phrase	Frequency
political	161
power	55
interests	45
culture	18
politically	12
imperialists	11
imperialism	11
regions	10
powerful	9
trade	9
respect	7
co-operate	6
region	6
Political	6
Politically	6
security	5
politics	5
independence	4
Region	4
peace	3
co-operation	3
foreign	3
independent	3
state	3
international	2
respectively	2
tradesmen	2
respected	2
co-operative	2
freedom	2
co-operatives	2
respecting	2
respectful	1
powers	1

tradesmen's	1
secured	1
culture-a	1
overseas	1
negotiate	1
imperialist	1
securing	1
peaceful	1
co-operating	1
foreigners	1
freedoms	1
Interests	1
co-operated	1
Co-operatives	1
independently	1
Imperial	1
Total	439

## Appendix VIII: CATMA Query Results for Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Post-October 1, 1949

### CATMA Query Results for Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Post-October 1, 1949

Phrase	Frequency
political	665
state	271
foreign	222
power	181
interests	175
international	174
Political	107
peace	104
respect	88
trade	84
abroad	72
State	71
regions	65
State Council	51
hegemonism	49
cooperation	48
politics	47
powers	47
peaceful	45
powerful	42
foreigners	41
politically	39
culture	37
security	34
region	31
sovereignty	26
trades	25
independent	24
independence	22
freedom	22
hegemony	21
imperialism	21
regional	21
co-operation	20



imperialists	18
internationally	18
respects	16
diplomatic	16
independently	14
Peaceful	13
respective	11
co-operatives	11
Trade	11
overseas	11
Foreign	11
negotiations	11
secure	10
co-operate	10
foreign-funded	8
cooperative	8
cooperate	8
Region	8
respectively	7
respecting	7
secured	7
global	6
International	6
respected	6
co-operative	5
Security	5
hegemonists	5
co-operating	5
peace-time	4
Peace	4
imperialist	4
co-operated	4
treaties	4
equality	4
Culture	4
treaty	4
cooperating	3
cooperatives	3
Foreigners	3
negotiate	3
politicians	3
Internationally	3
cooperated	3
State Councillors	3
territorial integrity	3

diplomats	2
Respect	2
Politically	2
peace-loving	2
national security	2
Imperialism	2
internationalism	2
foreign-owned	2
hegemonist	2
peacefully	2
Power	2
international law	2
Hegemonism	2
peacetime	2
negotiation	2
Treaty	2
foreign-invested	2
Politics	1
Hegemonists	1
securities	1
respectful	1
sovereign	1
foreigner	1
globe	1
Independence	1
Cooperation	1
cultures	1
traders	1
diplomacy	1
Regional	1
Diplomacy	1
Hegemony	1
cooperates	1
imperial	1
negotiators	1
freedoms	1
Internationalism	1
Diplomatic	1
negotiating	1
Total	3379

## Appendix IX: CATMA Query Results for Selected Works of Jiang Zemin, Volumes I & II

### CATMA Query Results for Selected Works of Jiang Zemin, Volumes I & II

Phrase	Frequency
political	937
international	661
state	576
interests	461
foreign	410
regions	290
power	290
cooperation	287
security	256
peace	231
region	221
politics	218
culture	182
peaceful	154
trade	151
State	149
independence	147
regional	126
sovereignty	122
State Council	113
respect	110
Political	102
powerful	102
independent	95
politically	88
powers	86
global	80
abroad	78
equality	62
negotiations	60
diplomatic	59
freedom	51
hegemonism	47
globalization	41

overseas	39
International	38
Peaceful	31
Trade	25
territorial integrity	25
Security	24
national security	24
Treaty	24
imperialism	22
cooperate	21
Region	20
Foreign	20
peacetime	19
internationally	18
sovereign	17
independently	17
secure	16
respective	16
region's	14
respects	14
cooperative	14
Peace	14
diplomacy	14
cultures	13
treaty	13
respecting	13
negotiation	13
securities	12
hegemony	12
freedoms	12
treaties	11
imperialist	11
respected	11
respectively	11
Regions	11
Diplomatic	10
Cooperation	10
Regional	9
globe	7
cooperating	7
peacefully	7
foreigners	7
imperial	7
Hegemonism	7
Internationally	6

Politically	6
Culture	6
Respect	6
securing	5
peace-loving	5
negotiating	5
international law	4
negotiate	4
diplomats	4
Politics	4
overseas-funded	4
negotiated	4
Global	3
foreign-oriented	3
Interests	3
cooperatives	3
trades	3
imperialists	3
State Council's	3
cooperated	3
secured	2
foreign-funded	2
diplomatically	2
internationalization	2
Freedom	2
peacekeeping	2
cooperates	1
foreign-trade	1
cooperators	1
Powers	1
hegemonic	1
politicians	1
region15	1
Equality	1
diploma	1
overseasinvested	1
cultured	1
internationalizing	1
internationalized	1
region5	1
region.They	1
Hegemony	1
peaceloving	1
internationalize	1
securely	1

politicized	1
Imperialists	1
political ly	1
diplomat	1
globally	1
Foreigners	1
Globalization	1
respectful	1
Power	1
Peace-loving	1
Negotiations	1
internationall	1
International ly	1
peaceoriented	1
respectfully	1
politicization	1
powerless	1
Securities	1
Securing	1
independence.Today	1
trademarks	1
Diploma	1
politically.In	1
imperialistic	1
Overseas	1
Globally	1
overseas-invested	1
Imperial	1
foreign-national	1
Total	7890

## Appendix X: Informed consent and written interview

### **Informed Consent:**

**“International Relations Theory in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China”**

**Christopher Robichaud**

**PhD Candidate, Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University**

**Beppu, Japan**

**chriro14@apu.ac.jp**

### **Project Description:**

This research traces the flow of ideas in China, as viewed by the Chinese Communist Party, with regard to international affairs. It begins by articulating the historical context through which contemporary perspectives in Chinese foreign policy made their way to the eventual creation of a foreign affairs group, established in Yanan in 1944, and the formal establishment of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on November 8, 1949. The research is divided into ‘eras’ defined by the leaders who held power. These include the Mao (1949-1976), Deng (1978-1997), and Jiang eras (1997-2002), and range from 1949-2002. Through an in-depth analysis of the selected works of these and other leaders, memoirs written by former ministry staff and diplomats, secondary literature on the development of the diplomatic corps, historical analysis through the use of both primary and secondary sources, as well as interviews with experts in the field, a cohesive narrative is created that provides insight into the role of imported or ‘foreign’ ideas versus ‘native’ ideas or theories prevalent in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

### **Procedure and Risks:**

This is a written interview. Please do not use personal identifiers in your responses. This is to ensure your anonymity. You may respond as you see fit; to as much or as little as you like. You can decide not to answer any question you choose. You may to withdraw your consent and discontinue participation in this project at any time without prejudice. Your written responses will become the property of this research.

If you so choose, your responses will be kept anonymous and your identity will be concealed in any publications or reports containing your provided responses.

*There are no known risks associated with participation in the study.*

### **Benefits:**

It is hoped that participation in this study will provide greater insight into a Chinese worldview, and the evolution thereof. Additionally, it is hoped that this research can be informative, in broad terms, to a Chinese and non-Chinese audience alike regarding how ideas are shared, interpreted, and disseminated in the context of international affairs.

### **Cost Compensation:**

Participation in this research will not involve any costs or payments to you, the respondent.

### **Confidentiality:**

All information collected as a result of this questionnaire will be kept confidential until you, the respondent, sign a release waiver (see the following document). No publications or reports produced with your responses will include identifying information without your signed

permission. If you agree to join this study, please fill in and sign (electronically) your name on the following page (page 2). The questionnaire begins on page 3.

If you have any questions concerning the project procedures or other matters, please feel free to contact me by email (provided above).



## INFORMED CONSENT FOR INTERVIEWS

“Foreign Ideas in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China”

I, \_\_\_\_\_, agree to be interviewed for the research project currently entitled “Foreign Ideas in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China” which is being produced by Christopher Robichaud of Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University.

I certify that I have been informed regarding the confidentiality of information collected for this research, and the anonymity of my participation. I have been given satisfactory answers to my inquiries concerning procedures and other matters related to my participation. Additionally, I have been informed that I may withdraw my consent and/or participation in the research at any time without prejudice.

I agree to participate in one or more written interviews for this research. I understand that the interviews and related materials will be completely anonymous, and that the results of this study will be published, in part or whole, in a PhD dissertation.

I agree that any information resulting from this research may be used in any way thought most appropriate for the larger body of research more broadly.

\_\_\_\_\_ *By initialing here (electronically), I also agree to be identified by name in the project and related materials. (if not initialed, your contribution will remain anonymous)*

\_\_\_\_\_  
Signature of Interviewee

\_\_\_\_\_  
Date

*If you cannot obtain satisfactory answers to your questions, or have comments or complaints about your treatment in this study, contact:*

Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University, Academic Office

Phone: +81-977-78-1122

*Or email:*

Professor YAMAGAMI Susumu

[yamagami@apu.ac.jp](mailto:yamagami@apu.ac.jp)

## Written Interview

“International Relations Theory in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China”

*Please type your responses in the spaces below the questions. Feel free to append any additional information you feel is appropriate or relevant.*

*These questions are designed to be open ended and broad enough to solicit any thoughts you may have related to the topic of the research. Please do not hesitate to elaborate in as much detail as you see fit.*

*Thank you for your participation!*

*Christopher Robichaud*

--

1. What role does the Foreign Ministry play in shaping a Chinese worldview, if any?

1a. Has this changed over time? Why?

1b. Is the ministry more or less influential? Why?

2. What would be your interpretation of ‘native’ Chinese ideas or theories in foreign policy?

2a. Have these ideas or theories undergone any change, using eras of political leadership (Mao, Deng, Jiang) as a reference? What was the cause of those changes, if any?

3. In reference to *question 2*, are these ideas or theories prevalent in the Foreign Ministry? Do they affect the work of the Ministry? Why or how?

4. Are there any examples of ideas/theories, prevalent in the Foreign Ministry, that are clearly not ‘native’ ideas or theories?

- 4a. How might these be explained in the context of eras of political leadership (Mao, Deng, Jiang)?
5. Are there examples of ideas/theories, prevalent in the Foreign Ministry, that are more difficult to label 'native' or 'foreign/non-native'?
- 5a. . How might these be explained in the context of eras of political leadership (Mao, Deng, Jiang)?
6. To what extent are Foreign Ministry diplomats and staff trained or educated overseas?
- 6a. Has this changed overtime?
- 6b. How has this affected the culture or worldview of the Ministry?
7. To what extent is the Ministry aware of alternative worldviews, and to what extent do they engage with them?
- 7a. Does this impact their work? How or why?
8. How centralized is the work of the Ministry, or the foreign policy decision-making process more broadly?
9. What defines or constitutes the Ministry's worldview, and how has this changed over time?


10. Political leadership, human resources, organizational structure, and political environment (domestic and international) are suggested avenues through which ideas are formed and distributed throughout the Ministry. What is your reaction to this claim? How would you build on or reshape it?

11. Any other general or specific thoughts on the role of adopted ideas (native or foreign) or theories into the Foreign Ministry?

## Appendix XI: Special Note on Liu Shaoqi

Liu Shaoqi was one of China's most prominent political leaders during the Mao Zedong era. He was, for a time, considered to the successor to Mao. He took part and had a lot of say in international affairs, yet his influence and participation appears to be limited to inter-Party relations. He was, arguably, the most ideologically driven among the founding leadership, including Mao and Zhou. He would lead Mao's 'Great Leap Forward' and ultimately express concern over its effectiveness and make an attempt to correct China's economic course. Despite this, as the de jure leader of China at the time, he took the official blame for the 'Great Leap Forward'. By the 1960's Liu was seen by Mao as his greatest rival, and during the Cultural Revolution Liu would be purged. Ultimately, Liu died in prison in 1969.

Despite his fall from grace, this special note applies the same hermetic analysis to the Liu's selected works (S. Liu, 1984, 1990) to observe how they compare to the results of the other leaders analyzed in this research. The full results of the CATMA query results can be found at the end of this note. The following word clouds summarize the results of these queries, divided by texts written before October 1, 1949 and those after:



**Figure 8.1:** Word-cloud generated based on the keyword query results from CATMA for the pre-October 1, 1949 Selected Works of Liu Shaoqi (generated using wordclouds.com)



**Figure 8.2:** Word-cloud generated based on the keyword query results from CATMA for the post-October 1, 1949 Selected Works of Liu Shaoqi (generated using wordclouds.com).

These results showed that there was indeed very little in these texts with regard to original thought in foreign relations. Liu echoes much of what either Mao or Zhou establish in their writings. From the word-clouds above, one can observe that Liu was more heavily focused political issues. A deeper reading reveals that those issues dealt mostly with the Party and the status of China's pursuit of socialism.

In the pre-October 1, 1949 texts, Liu's international concerns are centered on inter-Party affairs, while his references to acquiring foreign knowledge, are largely related to the reading and understanding of Marx and Engels. The post-October 1, 1949 texts do show a broader concern for foreign affairs in the more mainstream sense, not exclusively inter-Party relations, though this too is qualified by his position within the

government. The necessity to report on matters to the People's Congress, for example, required an update on the international situation and the status of Chinese foreign policy. These always reflected theories and policies defined by Mao and Zhou.

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CATMA query results follow on the next page.  
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**CATMA Query Result for Selected Works  
of Liu Shaoqi, Volume I  
Pre-October 1, 1949**

Phrase	Frequency
political	277
interests	215
power	93
trade	89
state	46
peace	45
independent	44
politically	43
imperialism	37
respect	36
co-operation	35
independence	34
foreign	34
independently	30
powerful	30
imperialists	29
Trade	26
imperialist	20
freedom	18
co-operate	17
co-operative	17
international	16
Political	15
International	15
peaceful	13
regional	9
culture	9
co-operatives	8
region	8
Region	7
powers	7
secure	7
Politically	5
respective	5
respects	5
sovereignty	4
equality	4
negotiations	4

co-operated	3
security	3
negotiate	3
Freedom	2
abroad	2
respectively	2
co-operating	2
regions	2
overseas	2
securing	1
culture35	1
State	1
Imperial	1
imperialist-run	1
cooperating	1
Internationale	1
cultured	1
traders	1
imperial	1
cooperated	1
trade-union	1
negotiated	1
politic7a2	1
Peace	1
sovereign	1
freedoms	1
power.But	1
interests195and	1
Foreign	1
politics	1
respected	1
Treaty	1
internationally	1
Co-operatives	1
cooperate	1
powerfu	1
International127	1
secured	1
trades	1
Total	1407

**CATMA Query Result for Selected Works  
of Liu Shaoqi, Volume II  
Post-October 1, 1949**

Phrase	Frequency
state	572
political	197
co-operatives	194
interests	169
power	86
trade	64
co-operative	62
politically	50
foreign	47
imperialists	46
imperialism	45
peace	42
international	41
peaceful	41
freedom	38
respect	36
powers	33
culture	27
cooperatives	24
co-operation	24
Political	22
security	22
imperialist	22
State	21
independent	20
independence	20
powerful	18
trades	18
co-operativization	15
regions	11
co-operate	11
politics	9
secure	9
region	9
respects	8
State Council	7
equality	7
respective	7

independently	6
abroad	6
Co-operatives	5
regional	5
freedoms	5
peace-loving	5
cooperation	4
internationally	4
respectively	4
tradesmen	4
Trade	4
Culture	4
negotiation	4
negotiate	3
Politically	3
diplomatic	3
negotiations	3
traders	2
Treaty	2
imperialistic	2
territorial integrity	2
cooperate	2
co-operated	2
Co-operative	2
sovereignty	2
Security	2
foreigners	2
peacefully	2
diploma	1
respected	1
overseas	1
sovereign	1
co-operating	1
Freedom	1
Politics	1
internationalism	1
trade's	1
internationalist	1
national security	1
Imperialism	1
co-operative's	1
diplomas	1
cooperated	1

power-generating	1
respecting	1
powerfully	1
Region	1
cooperative's	1
cooperative	1
politicians	1
negotiating	1
Peaceful	1
Internationally	1
cooperativization	1
Total	2214

## Appendix XII: Special Note on Chen Yun

Chen Yun is widely considered the father of China's economic reforms that came to characterize Deng Xiaoping's wider program of reform and opening up. He, like Deng, was one of the founding members of New China and held a place within Deng's inner circle that he consulted when making final policy decisions on a range of issues. It is not possible to say with any certainty what extent Chen Yun influenced Deng era foreign policy. His program of economic reforms certainly had an impact on how China pursued its foreign relations, but to what extent Chen Yun advocated certain policy approaches remains unaddressed.

This special note applies the same treatment to Chen Yun's *Selected Works* (Y. Chen, 1997, 1999, 2001) as the other texts treated in this research. It was determined, that like the Selected Works of Liu Shaoqi, they did not constitute a significant contribution to an understanding of Chinese foreign policy that would make it important to discuss as a part of the main body of this dissertation.

The complete findings from the CATMA query can be found at the end of this note, and are again divided between those texts written before October 1, 1949 and those written after. To summarize these findings a word-cloud was generated for each:



**Figure 9.1:** Word-cloud generated based on the keyword query results from CATMA for the pre-October 1, 1949 Selected Works of Chen Yun (generated using wordclouds.com).



**Figure 9.2:** Word-cloud generated based on the keyword query results from CATMA for the post-October 1, 1949 Selected Works of Chen Yun (generated using wordclouds.com).

One can observe from the above that the texts of Chen Yun are centrally concerned with issues of the state and trade. A closer reading of the texts, reveals a similar conclusion. The texts of Chen Yun do not comment on foreign policy directly in any way. All references to things foreign have to do with issues concerning finance or commerce. In fact, one does not find the kind of advocacy for the pursuit of foreign technology or the knowledge there of, as was seen in the works of his contemporaries, Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping.

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CATMA query results follow on the next page.

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**CATMA Query Result for Selected Works  
of Chen Yun, Pre-October 1, 1949**

Phrase	Frequency
political	199
trade	91
interests	86
Region	57
power	47
region	39
politically	39
Political	36
respect	33
foreign	33
imperialists	31
peace	30
regions	22
state	20
independently	19
powerful	19
co-operate	17
imperialism	16
politics	15
secure	15
co-operation	14
independent	13
Trade	12
cooperation	12
freedom	11
imperialist	10
security	9
independence	9
powers	7
co-operatives	6
abroad	6
negotiations	6
cooperate	5
culture	5
negotiated	5
international	5
co-operative	5
peaceful	4

trades	4
equality	4
negotiating	4
traders	3
respectively	3
secured	3
respects	3
co-operating	3
tradesmen	3
Politics	2
regional	2
negotiate	2
Co-operation	2
securing	2
cooperated	2
politician	2
respected	2
interests-the	1
culture-who	1
respecting	1
foreign-made	1
internationally	1
political- minded	1
regions11	1
cooperatives	1
Security	1
politicians	1
treaty	1
Freedom	1
Independent	1
Politically	1
Total	1068

**CATMA Query Result for Selected Works  
of Chen Yun, Post-October 1, 1949**

Phrase	Frequency
state	754
foreign	193
cooperatives	192
power	157
State	135
regions	127
trade	118
political	112
cooperative	75
interests	66
State Council	56
trades	36
abroad	34
Political	32
region	32
international	29
Trade	29
imperialists	24
secure	20
respect	19
Foreign	16
regional	13
cooperate	13
politics	11
security	11
culture	10
powers	10
imperialism	10
imperialist	9
cooperation	9
respective	9
Cooperatives	8
independently	8
foreigners	7
peaceful	7
independent	7
Trade34	6
powerful	6
International	6

Region	5
respectively	5
overseas	5
equality	5
traded	4
treaty	4
peace	3
trade-by-trade	3
diplomatic	3
Regions	3
cooperativization	3
independence	3
region11	3
respects	3
traders	3
cooperated	3
State Council's	2
regions11	2
Power	2
freedom	2
negotiation	2
diplomacy	2
negotiations	2
politically	2
cooperates	2
independ	1
negotiate	1
interests-the	1
peacefully	1
Trade24	1
Foreigners	1
peacetime	1
regions-for	1
regions70	1
imperialism303	1
Equality	1
Independent	1
hegemony	1
global	1
cooperating	1
foreigner	1
co-operate	1
imperialistic	1
Imperialists	1
State Council152	1

co-operative	1
sovereignty	1
co-operation	1
cooperati	1
regions40	1
Politics	1
trade-and	1
Trade's	1
peaceable	1
State Council48	1
State Council24	1
negotiated	1
Total	2524

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