Security Considerations in State's Response to Secessionist Movements:

The Case of Indonesia's Responses to the Free Aceh Movement and the South Maluku Republic Secessionism

by

ARISTYAWAN Joshua Francis

51117601

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Master's Thesis:
Security Considerations in State's Response to Secessionist Movements: The Case of Indonesia's Responses to the Free Aceh Movement and the South Maluku Republic Secessionism

Abstract: Secessionism has been one of the most recurring problems for state actors in human history. States have responded differently to different secessionist movements with some affording the secessionists concessions while others responded with the use of force on different levels of violence. To better understand how the state behaves towards secessionist movements, the author uses comparative case study and the External Security Theory. To better understand the different reactions a state can have we analyze the way Indonesia reacted to two different secessionist movements: The Free Aceh Movement Case and the Republic of South Maluku secessionist movement. Showing that the same state can have completely different responses based on two variables that have been identified the likelihood of future conflict in the area and the level of support from third parties. The results of the findings showed that variations in the likelihood of future conflict and level of third-party support resulted in a different response from Indonesia.

Keywords: state, secessionism, external security, Indonesia, Aceh, Maluku

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Certification Page

I, Joshua Francis Aristyawan (Student ID 51117601) hereby declare that the contents of this Master 's Thesis are original and true, also have not been submitted at any other university or educational institution for the award of degree or diploma.
All the information derived from other published or unpublished sources has been cited and acknowledged appropriately.

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1.0. Introduction

Secessionism has been one of the most recurring problems for state actors in human history (Butt, 2017). It sparked a debate regarding the issue of security not just because of its nature as a security threat to state actors, but also the debate on how to deal with this issue (Butt, 2017). In some cases, states respond to secessionist movements with military action such as the military operations against the Free Papua Movement (Osborne, 1985) and Free Aceh Movement (Rabasa & Haseman, 2002) in Indonesia, the Moro Conflict in the Philippines (Banlaoi, 2008), the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka (Bandarage, 2009) and so on. Most of these conflicts lasted for years and sometimes even decades. The long duration of these conflict led to a high number of casualties and devastating damage both physically and emotionally to the parties involved and even took some bystanders as collateral damage.

On the other hand, there are cases where states react peacefully to secessionist movements by granting certain concessions such as allowing them to secede. One example of this is the case of the Scottish Independence Referendum in 2014 after an agreement between the UK Parliament and the Scottish Parliament

(Morris, 2013). This is an interesting phenomenon where a state is willing to engage its own people in armed conflict (Gurr, 2000) while others are less violent when trying to resolve the conflict by other measures such as diplomatic means. This brings us to the question why do states have different responses to different secessionist movements? In addition to that, why are there variations in states' response in their level of violence? This research focuses on the various degrees of violent state response on secessionism.

This research utilizes a comparative case study method in trying to analyze the state's response to secessionist movements and the reasoning behind the said response. It analyzes why states respond with force and analyze the reasoning behind the level of violence dealt with by the state towards the secessionists. This paper has two hypotheses. First, the likelihood of future conflict determines the decision to respond to secessionist movements with violence. Second, the level of third-party support determines the severity of the violence.

In analyzing the said phenomenon, this paper uses Indonesia's conflict with two different secessionist groups, the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) and the

Republic of South Maluku (RMS) as a comparative case study. This research analyzes the conflict during a specific time frame, which started at a different time but ended at the same time. The Free Aceh Movement case study is limited to the second phase of the movement. This puts the timeframe of the case study from 1989 to 1998. The Republic of South Maluku case study will focus on the 1950 invasion of Ambon by the Indonesian government

.

The author chose this time frame because it was in this period when the Indonesian government designated both regions as Military Operations Zone (Schulze, 2004; Aspinall, 2009). This research hopes that it would contribute more to the study of secessionism by contributing to another angle in viewing secessionism. Most studies on secessionism focus too much on the debate on the justification of secessionism (Buchanan, 1991), or the domestic factors as root causes of secessionism (Buchanan, 2007). This thesis, however, would like to contribute something different from the previous studies. Previous studies often neglect the host state's behaviour against the secessionists. This thesis' focus on state response and the reasoning behind said response would like to add a different

dimension to the study of secessionism as a whole.

1.1.   Research Question

There are two research questions in this research:

1. Why did Indonesia respond with force to the secessionist movements of Aceh

    and South Maluku?

2. What are the factors that influence the level of violence used by Indonesia?

The first question is the main research question of this research. Its purpose is to

find out the reason why states behave differently towards different secessionist

movements. The second question is to help guide the research further in explaining

the reason why states behave differently to different secessionist movements.

1.2.   Research Outline

The author divides this thesis into five chapters. The first chapter will be

about the background of the problem and the research question. The second chapter

will discuss the conceptual analysis and theoretical framework that of this research.

This chapter will start with the definitions of secessionism and the theories that will

be used to analyze the case study. The third chapter will be about the

operationalization of the concept and theories that were outlined in the second chapter. This chapter will talk about how said concepts and theories will be used specifically in this research and the corresponding case studies. The fourth chapter will talk about the case studies of the Free Aceh Movement and the Free Papua Movement to test the theory and the empirical analysis of the case studies according to the theory. The fifth chapter will be the conclusion

2.0.   Theoretical Framework

To answer the main question of why states, respond in a certain way to secessionist movements, the author bases this research on International Relations theories about secessionism. This thesis focuses on the external security considerations of a secessionist movement from the host state's perspective. The theoretical framework of this thesis will try to explain state behaviour against secessionist movements based on external security considerations.

The author divides the theoretical framework into two parts. The first part is talking about the definitions of secessionism according to different scholars and construct the definition that will be used for this thesis. It also includes how secessionism can be seen as a security threat by the host-state. The second part will talk about the External Security Theory that is being used for this research.

2.1.   What is Secessionism?

The term secessionism comes from the word secession, which is derived from the Latin word secessio. John R. Wood (1981) defined secessionism as a political movement in the form of a formal withdrawal of a territory from an

internationally recognized state with the purpose of creating a new sovereign state on that territory. Secessionism is different from separatism. Where separatism's aim is to merely reduce the central authority's control over a specific population and territory, secessionism aim to fully withdraw and establish its own authority (Wood, 1981).

Definitions of secessionism can be divided into two categories, restrictive definitions and permissive definitions. Restrictive definitions only included acts of secession done through the use force or at least the threat of the use of force (Pavkovic, 2015) while permissive definitions, include almost any withdrawal of territory and/or population, including voluntary decolonization movements where the colonial powers voluntarily relinquished their foreign colonial territories (Anderson, 2013; Radan, 2008).

One of the most prominent restrictive definitions of secessionism is James Crawford's (2006)". He defined it as the creation of a new state either by force or threat of the use of force without the consent of the former host state. Another proponent of the restrictive definition of secessionism is Heraclides. He defined

secessionism as an abrupt and unilateral process of territorial separation characterized by a protracted political conflict which often escalates to violence (Heraclides, 1991).

Using this definition, cases where the withdrawal was agreed, such as the dissolution of Czechoslovakia do not qualify as secession. Only cases where there was no consent from the host-state and some form of force used in the conflict can be understood as true secessionism movements such as the Balkan conflicts during the 1990s and the dissolution of Yugoslavia (Pavkovic, 2015). The absence of consent from the host-state is often associated with the use of force, which could lead to violent armed conflict. By not giving consent to the secessionists' demand for independence, the host-state is implying that they are considering the use of force to defend their territorial integrity. On the other hand, by proclaiming their independence without the consent of their host-state, the secessionists are also implying that any use of force against their cause will be viewed as an act of aggression against their right of self-determination in which they will also have the right to use force to defend it (Heraclides, 1991; Pavkovic, 2015).

Other scholars found this definition that secessionism too narrow and offered a different category of definitions that are more inclusive instead. These definitions are known as permissive definitions (Pavkovic, 2015). One of the examples of the permissive definitions is Radan's (2008). He defined secession as the creation of a new state on territory previously part of or a colony of an existing state. Some other definitions under this umbrella include Sisson and Rose's (1990) definition that secessionism or secessionist movements usually means the act of a group of people who are trying to separate themselves from a larger entity which in most cases is a state to establish their own; and, Ahsan Butt's (2017) definition, that secessionism usually comes as a physical manifestation of the self-determination where a group of people is seeking political and territorial independence from a bigger sovereign political entity. This category of definitions does not exclude cases where consent from the host-state is absent but merely expanded on the definition of secessionism, including those where consent from the host-state is present. For example, the dissolution of Czechoslovakia which did not qualify as secessionism under the previous definitions now can be categorized as secessionism.

Despite the differences in definitions, all agree that secession involves

the creation of a new state through the withdrawal of a territory and its population from an existing sovereign state (Pavkovic, 2015). Because of that, the examples used will vary according to the definitions previously mentioned. The following section will elaborate more on the different types of secessionism and their examples.

2.1.1. Types of Secessionism

According to the definitions listed above, instances of secessionism can be divided into two types of secessionism. The first one is secession from a single state where a group of people seeks to gain independence from the state they were originally a part of and without the consent of the host-state (Buchanan, 1991). This type of movement is usually motivated by ethnonationalism where a group of disenfranchised and in most cases a minority ethnic group seek to gain independence from the host state (Buchanan, 1991; Butt, 2017). In some cases, the movement could also be perpetrated by a religious group which seeks to implement a theocratic government and therefore want to secede from its secular host state (Bustamam-Ahmad & Amiruddin, 2002).

At its core, secessionism is a political process of separating from a bigger political entity. It usually starts with political manoeuvring and negotiations. This process, however, could lead to violence and armed conflict should the negotiations reach an impasse (Betts, 1998; Buchanan, 2007). Should it become a militarized conflict, then it is an intra-state conflict; therefore, secessionism can also fall under the category of civil war (Fearon, 2004). Examples of this type of secessionism include the Free Aceh Movement in Indonesia, and the East Pakistan Secessionist movement, which resulted in the creation of Bangladesh (Pavkovic, 2015).

The second one is a secessionist movement that happened and succeeded with the consent of the host-state. This type of secessionism usually has two outcomes. First, is that the original host-state still exists after the withdrawal of territory and population by the secessionists; and second, where the host-state cease to exist or at least changed into a different political entity (Pavkovic, 2015). Examples of the first outcome are the post-World War II decolonization movements where western colonial powers such as the United States, Britain, and France voluntarily relinquished their colonial territories in Asia and Africa such as the Philippines, Malaysia, and Vietnam respectively (Anderson, 2013; Radan, 2008).

Examples of the second outcome where the successful secession resulted in the dissolution of the former host-state are the dissolution of Czechoslovakia. While the secession was peaceful and happened with the consent of the host state, it resulted in the dissolution of Czechoslovakia and resulted in the creation of two new different nation-states in the form of the Czech Republic and Slovakia (Pavkovic, 2015).

From the discussion above we can conclude that while there are multiple definitions and as consequence types of secessionist movements, they all agree on one thing which is that secession involves the creation of a new state through the withdrawal of a territory and its population from an existing sovereign state (Pavkovic, 2015). This paper will focus on the first type of secessionism where a group of people with a certain ethnic and/or religious identity seek to gain independence without consent from its host-state.

Following the scholarly definitions of secessionism explained in the previous sections, this thesis defines secessionism as an ethnic-nationalist movement whose goal is to withdraw territory and population from a sovereign state to establish its own sovereign political entity (Butt, 2017; Crawford, 2006;

Horowitz, 2000). The next section will talk about why secessionism can be a security threat to its former host-state.

2.1.2. Secessionism as an External Security Threat

This section focuses on secessionism as a security threat from the host state's perspective. States view secessionism as a security threat because a successful secession will weaken the state not just unilaterally but also compare to other states in the international system (Butt, 2017). Losing a region means also losing territory, population, and natural resources, which are important variables when measuring power (Gilpin, 1983). This means that the state will lose both material variables of power such as territory, population, natural resources and immaterial variables of power such as political standing and their projection of power which will shift the balance of power unfavourably for the host-state (Mearsheimer, 2001; Waltz, 1979).

International Relations traditionally calculate state power in material terms. These material terms include military power, economic capabilities, territory size, population quality and quantity, and technological advancement (Mearsheimer, 2001; Waltz, 1979). In the international system, states are the ones who own and

control these materials variables of power. The existence of a secessionist movement and their success means that the host-state will lose control over some of the variables of power which will alter the existing balance of power. When a secessionist group succeeded in seceding from a state and attained statehood themselves, they also gain at least some of the previously mentioned variables of power (Butt, 2017). There are three reasons why a successful secessionist movement could significantly alter the balance of power.

By attaining statehood, the newly established state also gains control of a centralized mean of violence (e.g. the military) that did not have when it was a sub-state actor (Tilly, 1985). One of the common causes of an ethnic-nationalist secessionist movement is discrimination or exclusion from consideration for positions in governmental positions, including the military officer in an ethnically diverse state (Tilly 1992). This lack of representation in the public sphere will leave this ethnic group vulnerable in society. By gaining statehood and being able to run its own military, there is a possibility for the newly established state to stand up against its former host state better than when it was just a sub-state actor. Even if its military is comparatively weaker than its former host state, at least the difference

is in the degree of strength of the military power and not in the form of the armed

forces (Butt, 2017).

Second, the shift in the balance of power also occurs in the economic field.

There are two main components of this element: domestic economic policy and

foreign economic policy (Butt, 2017). In the domestic economic policy side of it,

the newly established state now has control over its economic resources and will be

able to fashion economic policies that benefit their own people which might not be

possible under the governance of their former host state, where their resources were

exploited, but they did not receive an adequate share of development (Olson, 1993).

This will not be the case if they have their own statehood with economic

nationalism in mind. It has been noted that modern nation-states are more equipped

to stay competitive in the industrial era (Gellner, 1983).

Aside from just strengthening their economy domestically, a new

independent state can also shift the balance in the international system through

foreign economic policies such as trade and membership in intergovernmental

organizations. Foreign trade is considered a variable in quantifying economic

powers of a state as it allows the allocation and gaining of resources. (Hirschman, 1969). Engaging in foreign trade also means building relations with other countries, which can affect the overall balance of power in the region (Gowa & Mansfield, 1993). By being an internationally recognized state, the newly established state is also eligible for membership in an intergovernmental organization. Gaining membership of an intergovernmental organization means that it gained some degree of international recognition, which gives it legitimacy in the international system (Bull, 1977).

The third factor of a successful secession that could affect the balance of power is the matter of population and demographics. Assuming that in the two previous categories, all states are equal, then the state with the bigger population will be considered more powerful (Mearsheimer, 2001; Waltz, 1979). A larger population means more human resources that the state can channel to increase its overall power calculations. For example, larger population base means that it will be able to build bigger military in terms of manpower, or a bigger workforce this allows work in various sectors both in war and peacetime, they can have more income from taxes, and the larger population might be an attractive potential market

for investment and capital building (Butt, 2017). A successful secession where the host-state lost a proportion of its population means that the host-state will lose human resources, which means that it will be weakened.

According to the explanations above, it can be seen why secessionism can be a security threat for their host-state. By successfully seceding and attaining statehood, the secessionists can establish themselves as a rising power and shift the balance of power in the international system through gaining control of a centralized means of violence, using economic means to establish relations with other states, and by reducing the population and consequently the human resource variable of power from the host-state. With secessionism established as a security threat to the states and acting as a rising power in the international system, it is important to understand how states behave against this phenomenon and why they behave in that way. The next section will discuss the theoretical framework of states behaviour against security threats.

2.2. Theory of Secessionism: External Threats and

Structural Constraints

In his book "Secession and Security: Explaining State Strategy Against Separatists", Ahsan Butt (2017) theorized that states' reaction to secessionist movements is influenced by how they perceive security externally. The existence of a secessionist movement as an actor which operates as a rising power and the external security implications that it brings determine or at least influence how states develop their strategy to counter or resolve them. This theory is called "External Security Theory".

This theory has its origins on Stephen Walt's Balance of Threat theory. According to it, states balance against threats posed by other actors accordingly (Walt, 1985). States calculate the threat of a rising power based on four criteria: aggregate strength which include territory, population, and economic capabilities; offensive capabilities that while related to aggregate strength is more related to the ability of the rising power to threaten the sovereignty and/or territorial integrity of other actors within an acceptable cost; geographic proximity, because states that are closer are more dangerous given that the ability to utilize military power declines the farther they are; and aggressive/offensive intentions which is heavily influenced by the state's perception towards the rising power (Walt, 1985). The state will

balance accordingly either through internal balancing, by increasing its own

capabilities, or by building alliances, otherwise known as external balancing (Walt,

1987).

The External Security Theory has three main assumptions. The first

assumption is that the actors involved are strategic and forward-thinking (Butt,

2017). This means that they are strategic in their efforts to gain as much as possible

for their own side. The second assumption is that the state has more power and

resources, be it military, organizational, or economical at their disposal compared

to the secessionists. The third assumption is that the state acts as a "unitary actor".

This means that in trying to legitimize their actions towards the secessionist group,

state actors invoke the notion that their actions represent the interest of the people

and act as if they are all united behind the decisions or strategies is adopted

(Moravcsik, 1998). By assuming that state actors are unitary also provides some

simplification since trying to incorporate all the domestic political factors are

unrealistic and takes the focus away from external security considerations.

This theory's main argument is that the international system greatly

influences the states' decision-making process in dealing with secessionist movements. Therefore, the changes that a secessionist movement brought to the international system will determine how the state will react to it as different changes will result in different behaviour from the host-state. (Baylis & Smith, 2001; Gourevitch, 1978; Midford, 1993; Rogowski, 1987). Moreover, the anarchic and self-help nature of the system means that states are always engaged in a security rivalry with the other actors which are reflected in the distribution of power. The emergence of a secessionist movement as a rising power and the potential success of the movement will result in shifts in the distribution of power which could be unfavourable and as such will be a concern to the host-state (Gilpin, 1983).

The External Security Theory uses Balance of Threat's four criteria of threat measurement in its analysis. However, since these criteria were not designed to measure the threat of non-state actors, this theory translated them into variables that can be used to explain the case of secessionism instigated by non-state actors. How the four criteria are translated into variables which relate to the case will be elaborated in the next section.

2.2.1. Independent and Dependent Variables

According to the External Security Theory, states will respond in different ways to different secessionist movements depending on the level of threat that they pose. Traditionally, states measure the threat posed by other actors using four criteria: aggregate strength, geographical proximity, offensive capabilities, and aggressive intentions (Walt, 1985). However, the state-centric perspective of Structural Realism means that it ignores the social and cultural features in a secessionist conflict where the power relation is not between state actors but state actor and non-state actor (Kratovchil, 2004). Therefore, Balance of Threat's four criteria of threat measurement will be translated into two independent variables which can accommodate the social and cultural features of the secessionists and measure the threat they pose.

The geographical proximity and aggressive intentions criteria will be translated into Independent Variable I, which is potential of future conflict. Aggregate strength and offensive capabilities will be translated into Independent Variable II, which is the level of third-party support by other states for the secessionist movement (Butt, 2017). The dependent variables in this theory will be

the state behaviour, which will be translated into the strategies adopted against the secessionist movement. The strategies that can be adopted are mainly divided into two strategies: peaceful strategies, such as negotiations and concessions; and violent strategies, such as military action and repression (Van Evera, 1994; Lustick et al, 2004; Downes, 2007; Butt, 2017).

The host-state uses these independent variables to measure the level of threat posed by the secessionist movement and respond accordingly like the concept of balancing in Structural Realism (Butt, 2017; Waltz, 1979). The state government will calculate how much threat a particular secessionist movement poses. The more it feels threatened, then the more severe the response will be (Sisson & Rose, 1990; Valentin, 2004; Downes, 2007). The following sections will elaborate more on the independent and dependent variables and how the four criteria of threat measurement are translated into the independent variables.

2.2.2. Independent Variable 1: Potential of Future Conflict

The first independent variable is the potential of future conflict with the newly established state product of the secession. The creation of a new state that

exists right next to the borders of the former state might be dangerous because first, the new state will be antagonistic or even hostile towards the former state an example of this is Eritrea – Ethiopia war in 1998, where Eritrea attacked Ethiopia over a border dispute shortly after gaining independence from the latter (Lyons, 2009; Butt, 2017). Potential of future conflict needs to be divided into two categories. First, the potential of future conflict with the newly established state, and second, the potential of future conflict with other existing states in the region that might be rivals to the host-state (Butt, 2017). This independent variable was translated from two of Balance of Threat's criteria of threat measurement, aggressive intentions and geographical proximity (Walt, 1985)

Potential of future conflict here is concerned with two types of future conflict. First is a future conflict with the newly established state and second is the potential of future conflict with other security rivals in the system. Security rivals here refers to other actors, both state and non-state actors that may pose a threat to the host state's security (Butt, 2017). How states measure the potential of future conflict with either the newly established state and/or the other security rivals in the system is based on the aggressive intentions and geographical proximity criteria.

Aggressive intentions are subjectively measured by the host-state based on parameters that are also subjective (Butt, 2017; Walt, 1987). In this theory, aggressive intentions are measured by using division of identity since secessionism in this research is defined as an ethnic-nationalist movement (Butt, 2017).

While the division of identity itself does not necessarily mean aggressive intentions, the fact that the secessionist movement is an ethno-nationalist movement means that identity is a significant part of the conflict (Butt, 2017). The aggressive intention criteria are used to measure the potential of future conflict with the non-state secessionists should they succeeded in seceding and established themselves as a sovereign nation-state by measuring them as a division of identity between the secessionists and the majority population from the host-state.

This is a reasonable consideration because there have been cases of conflicts between a newly established state with their former host-state, such as the previously mentioned case of Eritrea and Ethiopia's conflict (Lyons, 2009). Geographical proximity does not have a significant contribution in this calculation because should the secessionists succeeded in seceding; they will become a

neighbouring sovereign state to the former host-state. As such, geographical proximity is a given (Butt, 2017).

Potential of future conflict with other security rivals that might seek to capitalize on the host state's recent loss of material power variables through secessionism is measured using both the aggressive intentions and geographical proximity criteria. These are translated into the region's proneness to conflict (Butt, 2017). States that are surrounded by other security rivals that display aggressive intentions and are geographically near means that the state is in a region that is prone to conflict.

As such, the aggressive intentions of other existing actors are measured differently. Other state actors' aggressive intentions are perceived through statements, political manoeuvrings, acts of power accumulation, or through historical relations between the state actors involved (Walt, 1985). Geographic proximity also plays a part because the closer the other aggressive states are, the easier it is for them to project their power to threat the host-state.

The issue of identity and why it is important in how states calculate the likelihood of a future conflict with the secessionists has its roots on how states traditionally build the national myth that ties its population to the government. Traditionally it is based on some sort of common identity, mostly ethnic and/or religious (Brubaker, 1996). This is commonly seen in post-colonial nation-states in Asia and Africa, where national identity is commonly seen as a model of state organization (Butt, 2017).

It is rare to find a nation-state that is truly homogeneous, and in most cases, nation-states are comprised of several different groups with different identities (Brubaker, 1996). In most cases, the identity and culture of the group with the largest population and/or most cultural and political power is adopted as the national myth and identity, therefore creating the majority and minority dichotomy (Podeh, 2002; Wang, 2008). The minority groups, in this case, often find themselves being alienated or opposed to the embraced national identity (Brubaker, 1992; Greenfield, 1992).

It is important to distinguish how the states define national identity and how

the identities of the state and the secessionists compare with each other. From there, it is possible to see the relations between the two identities and whether there exists a division between them. There are three types of relationship between these identities, inclusive, indifferent, and opposed (Butt, 2017). For this research, only two types of relationship are considered. These are indifferent and opposed since an inclusive relationship between the two identities makes it unlikely that the secessionist group will consider secession.

When reviewing the indifferent and opposed relationship, the one where the two identities are opposed is considered the most dangerous and therefore have a high likelihood of future conflict (Butt, 2017). An indifferent relationship exists when the identities of the secessionists are overlapping in some parts with the national identity. This can be in linguistic, racial or religious grounds (Podeh, 2002; Butt, 2017), while on the opposed relationship the identities barely overlap or are totally different from each other (Wang, 2008; Butt, 2017). This paper focuses on ethnic and religious identity.

Another factor that influences states' strategy and decision-making process

is the region's proneness to conflict. In a region that is prone to conflict, states are engaged in security rivalries with each other. A state that just suffered a successful secessionist movement could be perceived as weak and vulnerable (Mearsheimer, 2001). Inter-state regional war depends on the condition of the region, and some are more prone to conflict than others (Butt, 2017). For example, South Asia is more prone to conflict than in South America. States in that region are twice more likely to use force against each other compared to their South American counterparts, and Middle Eastern states are also twice more violent than Western European states (Butt, 2013). The condition of the region where a state resides shapes how a state perceives security and calculate the likelihood of future conflict with their neighbours/rivals.

States that live in a region that is prone to conflict then will conclude that future inter-state conflict caused by a successful secessionist movement is likely. As a consequence, they will be more permissive in the use of force since that is the norm in their region. States located in a relatively peaceful region will be less likely to use force in dealing with secessionist movements because they have lower external threats from other existing states should the secessionist movement

succeeded (Butt, 2013). To illustrate this contrast, we can use the cases of Israel and Canada. Both are considered wealthy, liberal(sic), and democratic states and both are also dealing with secessionist movements of their own. Israel is dealing with the Palestinian movement while Canada is dealing with the Quebecois movement. At a glance, these two cases can look similar, but one important difference is the regional condition of where they are located.

After six wars, terrorisms, major armed skirmishes and confrontations, rocket attacks, and continuous Arab enmity towards it, Israel often discusses security issues as survival and existential issue (Freilich, 2012). Israel is warier of a successful Palestinian secessionist movement that will lead to the creation of a hostile Arab state in a region were already surrounded by other hostile Arab states. Canada meanwhile lives in a relatively peaceful region with no existing rival states security-wise. These considerations are what led states to use harsher means when dealing with secessionist movements as we could observe how different Israel and Canada dealt with their respective problems (Butt, 2017). While Israel decided to use force in dealing with the Palestinian movement, Canada did not. Therefore, for a secessionist conflict to not escalate in violence level it must exist under a set of

specific conditions such as the non-existence of identity divisions between the host state's dominant narrative and the secessionists', and the region where the state is located must be peaceful or at least without imminent external security threats from existing rival states while the opposite means that the host-state will use force against the secessionists. This brings us to the question of how much violence should the state use? The following section will elaborate more on what influences the level of violence used by the host-state against the secessionists.

2.2.3. Independent Variable 2: Third-Party Support for the Secessionist Movement

The first independent variable explains how states decide which strategy to adopt against a secessionist movement, whether to use violence or not. Once they decided to use violence, then comes the second question, how much violence to use? The second independent variable will explain how states make this calculation. There are various levels of violence that can be utilized by the state, ranging from beatings, torture, localized violence, to outright genocide (Butt, 2017). The severity of the response is determined by the level of third-party support. The existence of third-party support means that the movement will be strengthened. This will give them

more advantages in the upcoming conflict. It also shortens the timeframe that states have, to comfortably deal with the movement since the longer it goes, the stronger they can get and harder to deal with (Kalyvas & Balcells, 2010).

The act of adjusting the level of violence according to how much third-party support given to the secessionists can be explained using the balancing concept of Structural Realism. The aggregate strength and offensive capabilities criteria of threat measurement are used here and is translated into the second independent variable, which is Third-Party Support for the Secessionist Movement (Butt, 2017). The External Security Theory's assumption is that the state always has superior material capabilities compared to the secessionists and therefore, should have no problems in defeating them. Therefore, from an aggregate strength and offensive capabilities-wise, the secessionists possess a relatively small threat (Kalyvas & Balcells, 2010; Walt, 1985).

However, external support from a third-party could change that and add to the aggregate strength and offensive capabilities of the secessionists (Butt, 2017). Therefore, in the case of a secessionist conflict, the aggregate strength and offensive

capabilities measurement are determined by the amount of third-party support given to the secessionists. The reason why third-party support is important is that as a non-state actor, the secessionists lack the conventional means that state actors must accumulate power and as such, external support plays a big part in a secessionist movement's calculation of power and threat from the host state's perspective.

There are several reasons why other states would give support to the secessionist movement. One of these reasons is irredentism (Weiner, 1971). To destabilize the host state by entrenching them in dealing with the secessionist movement or by losing territory and everything that comes with it, to shift the balance of power. Ethnic affinity (Moore & Davis, 1998; Saiderman, 1997), or a combination of any of the previously mentioned reasons (Butt, 2017). States worry about third-party support because it usually takes the form of material aid which increases the capabilities of the secessionist movement making them harder to defeat, requiring more power and violence from the state's (Kalyvas & Balcells, 2010). Aside from material help, external support also offers immaterial help to the secessionist movement. There is the political support that is brought by these external aids, which can embolden the secessionists to make more demands or fight even harder

(Grigoryan, 2015). It also gives them legitimacy since external support in any form can be perceived as international recognition of their sovereignty or aspirations. Third-party support is divided into three levels. The three levels of third-party support are limited, moderate, and high (Butt, 2017). The higher the level of support means, the more urgent the problem. This will lead the state to use higher levels of violence (Bulutgil, 2008; Mylonas, 2012).

2.3.   Dependent Variable: Varying Levels of Violence

To summarize what has been mentioned above, when developing strategies to deal with a secessionist movement, states usually have three considerations. First, the potential of future conflict should the movement is successful either against the newly established state and/or existing states. This consideration is based on two factors: the identity division between the secessionist group and the majority population of the state, and the regional proneness to violence. If the state perceives a higher probability of future conflicts, then it will be more inclined to use violence in dealing with the movement before it escalates into a bigger one in the future. In simpler words, the state will prefer to fight now where the stakes are comparatively lower to prevent future conflict where the stakes

might be higher. On the other hand, if the state does not think that future conflict is

likely, it might be more open to less violent way in trying to resolve the issue such

as negotiations and concessions (Butt, 2017).

If the state foresees any possibilities of future conflict, then it will use

violence. Once this decision is reached, the state will need to consider one more

thing that is how much violence should use to deal with the secessionists. This is

influenced by how much support from the third party the secessionists have none,

limited, moderate or high. These three levels correspond lead to the available

strategies that can be adopted: policing, militarization, and collective repression,

respectively (Butt, 2017). The flowchart below illustrates how does the External

Security Theory tries to explain state behaviour against secessionist movements.

Figure 1. External Security Theory flowchart. Adapted from "Secession and Security: Explaining State Strategy Against Separatists" by Butt, Ahsan I. (2017)

2.4. Hypotheses of the Research

From the theoretical framework above, the researcher formulated the hypotheses of this research:

1. the Indonesian government's decision to use force in response the secessionist movements of the Free Aceh Movement and the Republic of South Maluku was determined by the potential of future conflict with either the secessionists or with an existing rival state that might seek to

capitalize on Indonesia's recent loss because of the secessionism.

2. The severity of the violence applied by Indonesia is based on its perception of the level of third-party support received by the secessionists.

3.0.   Methodology

This chapter will explain the methodology of this research, which includes the operationalization of theories and concepts. It also explains the type of research and analysis methods used in this research.

3.1.   Concepts and Theoretical Framework Operationalization

This research aims to explain how external security considerations influence the state's strategies and responses to a secessionist movement. This section will present how the concepts and theories mentioned in the previous section will be operationalized in this specific research.

3.1.1. Redefining Secessionism

There have been various but similar definitions of what constitutes as a secessionist movement, as mentioned above. One of the most prominent restrictive definitions of secessionism is James Crawford's (2006)". He defined it as the creation of a new state either by force or threat of the use of force without the consent of the former host state. Other scholars found this definition that secessionism too narrow and offered a different category of definitions that are

more inclusive instead. These definitions are known as permissive definitions (Pavkovic, 2015). One of the examples of the permissive definitions is Radan's (2008). He defined secession as the creation of a new state on territory previously part of or a colony of an existing state and, Ahsan Butt's (2017) definition, that secessionism usually comes as a physical manifestation of the self-determination where a group of people is seeking political and territorial independence from a bigger sovereign political entity. Despite the differences in definitions, all agree that secession involves the creation of a new state through the withdrawal of a territory and its population from an existing sovereign state (Pavkovic, 2015). This paper focuses on a specific type of secessionist case, where the host-state does not give consent to the movement. As such, the definition of secessionism used in this research is an ethnic-nationalist movement to withdraw its territory and population from an internationally recognized sovereign state to establish their own state on the withdrawn territory without the consent of the state-host.

3.1.2. Operationalizing the External Security Theory

The External Security Theory is a theory that offers an insight into the state's decision-making process on how to respond to a secessionist movement based on

external security consideration. This theory is operationalized in this research by applying it to the case study using the two previously mentioned independent variables of the potential of future conflict and level of third-party support. This theory works in two phases. The first phase of decision-making is to decide between engaging the secessionists in negotiation and concessions or by to respond with force.

The primary consideration when deciding between those two options is calculating the likelihood of future conflict with either the secessionist movement or an existing rival state should the movement successful in seceding from the host state. Identity distance would measure the likelihood of potential conflict with the secessionists if they succeeded in establishing a new sovereign state, while regional dynamics will measure the likelihood of future conflict between the host-state with an aggressive security rival who will seek to capitalize on the host state's recent loss through secessionism. The theory applies a game theory-like calculation based on the identity division between the secessionist group and the national identity construct of the host state and the proneness to the violence of the region where the state is situated. The table below illustrates how the state views the situation.

POTENTIAL OF FUTURE CONFLICT		Identity Division	
		Indifferent	**Opposed**
Regional Dynamics	**Peaceful**	Future Conflict Unlikely	Future Conflict Likely
	Prone to Conflict	Future Conflict Likely	Future Conflict Likely

1Table 3.1. Table illustrating how states calculate the likelihood of future conflict. Adapted from "Secession and Security: Explaining State Strategy Against Separatists" by Butt, Ahsan I. (2017)

It is important to define and operationalize the concepts that it is using, such as identity distance, regional dynamics, level of foreign support, and level of violence. The following section will elaborate more on operationalizing the two concepts which form the first independent variable.

3.1.3. Operationalizing Independent Variable I: Potential of Future Conflict

This section will explain about the operationalization of the first Independent Variable, Potential of Future Conflict. The first independent variable is divided into two parts, potential of future conflict between the host-state and the secessionists if they succeeded in seceding and established their own state; and potential of future conflict with another state that may seek to capitalize on the host

state's recent loss. Potential of future conflict with the secessionists is measured through the identity division between the secessionists and the host-state, while the potential of future conflict with a rival state is based on the region's proneness to conflict (Butt, 2017).

To measure whether the identity distance between the secessionist group and the host state is indifferent or opposed, the author looks at how both groups construct their identity and see if there are any striking differences between them or not. Alexander Wendt (1994) defined identity as a collection of meanings that are attributed by a subject to itself while still taking the perspective of others. These sets of meanings are relatively stable and role-specific understandings and expectations, which would become the basis of interests.

This definition also includes the definition of ethnic identity which was defined as the idea of common provenance, kinship relations, and a sense of distinctiveness which may or may not consist of unique cultural traits (Horowitz, 1985). Some other scholars also included parameters of identity, which include language (Dwi Winarno, 2006), ethnic affiliation (Schulze, 2004), and religion

(Aspinall, 2002). As such, division of identity in this research is operationalized as the difference of identities that the secessionists and the host-state attributed to themselves. Identity is measured using the parameters of language, religion, ethnic identity, and cultural affiliation.

The parameter of language is measured through the language is spoken or used commonly by either the secessionists and the host-state are the same or not. The parameter of language is used because the language has been used before as a form to signify identity and even used as a political tool in the form of cultural imperialism (Pennycook, 1995). The second parameter used to measure identity division is religion. Religion is considered as a parameter of identity since it has been central to the formation of human experience (Davies, 1998) and, also serves as a connection that ties an individual to a group identity which can create the in-group and out-group bias that could lead to conflict (Hogg & Abrams, 1988). Even groups that are from the same religion can still view each other as different depending on the level of conservatism (Aspinall, 2002).

The third parameter is the ethnic identity. Since secessionism is defined as

an ethnic-nationalist movement, ethnic identity is an important driver in the conflict especially when it is different from the national identity construct of the host-state which in this case, Indonesia that constructed its own national identity not by ethnic affiliations but through a shared history of colonialism (Horowitz, 2000). The ethnic identity is measured through ethnic group affiliation, blood relations, and generally shared history in the group. The fourth parameter is the cultural affiliation. This parameter was chosen because of the same reason for the third reason. Since the secessionist movement is ethnically based, therefore the culture that they ascribe to is different from the culture that the Indonesian constructed. The culture here refers to customs, ideas, and social behaviour (Barker, 2004).

The second factor in calculating the potential of future conflict is the region's proneness to conflict. There are four parameters to measure whether the region is conflict-prone or not. First, is the existence of a security rival; second, history of conflict with the security rival; and third, the relationship of the host-state with the security rival, and fourth the geographical proximity (Butt, 2017).

3.1.4. Operationalizing Independent Variable II: Level of Third-party Support

The concept of Level of third-party support is operationalized in a hierarchical structure and divided into three levels: limited third-party support, moderate third-party support, and high third-party support. Limited support includes verbal support, financial support, and providing sanctuary to the secessionists. These three types of supports are considered limited or the least of third-party support that could be given to the secessionists. For verbal support, it is considered as limited third-party support because it is merely as the name suggest, verbal with no material manifestations to it (Butt, 2017). Financial support is also considered as limited support. There are several reasons why it is considered as such. First is that there are difficulties in trying to deliver financial support to an ethnic-nationalistic secessionist movement that still lives in the boundaries of another sovereign state's territory and therefore could only be done in limited numbers. Another reason is that financial support is not considered as a game-changer when talking about variables of material power unlike military aid for example since the secessionists most likely already have some amount of finances in place (Butt, 2017).

The highest form of limited support that an external power can give is providing sanctuary for the secessionists. By allowing the secessionists to move across borders and providing them physical sanctuary, the external powers are basically protecting them from the host state since the secessionists are now outside the jurisdiction of their host-state and therefore also outside the jurisdiction of said state's laws, and military which means they can avoid monitoring, persecution, arrests, and such other things (Rovner, 2011; Salehyan, 2009). However, this is also still considered as a form of limited support since providing sanctuary is only considered as a defensive move which will not add to the offensive capabilities of the secessionists. It allows the secessionists to escape the boundaries and jurisdiction of their host state should they feel threatened and therefore not considered as something that could tip the balance to be more favourable towards the secessionists (Butt, 2017).

The next level of third-party support is called a moderate level of support. This level of support includes indirect military aid. This means that the external power will provide the secessionists with military training, supplies, and equipment

(Butt, 2017). It is considered a moderate level of support because military goods and training could directly improve the secessionists' military capabilities, which could tip the balance towards their favour better than mere verbal and financial support. Supplying the secessionists with military goods and training will allow them to fare better and close the gap in military capabilities in conflict with their host state which have better access to military equipment and able to mobilize their troops in a more centralized and organized manner (Kalyvas & Balcells, 2010).

3.1.5. Operationalizing Dependent Variable: Varying Levels of Violence

Since this paper focuses on the varying degrees of violent responses by the state towards the secessionist movement, it assumes that in both cases, the use of force was the option that was chosen. The differences in the two cases studies are that the level of violence done by the state. Once the decision of using violence to respond to the secessionist group is chosen, the second step of how this theory is operationalized is determining how much violence will be used. There are three levels of violence which are translated into policies or strategies adopted by the state in response to the secessionist movement. The first level is policing. This

strategy involves the state's armed forces, which primarily will be the police force.

Policing acts might include beatings and arresting the secessionists' political leaders,

banning political gatherings and meetings, or cut off access to communication and

mass media, but no outright violence (Butt, 2017). The state might combine this

strategy with concessions to try to entice the moderate elements of the movement

(Cunningham, 2011). Violence level, however, is comparatively low.

The moderate level of violence is categorized as militarization. In this level,

the military will be involved in the region and will be the primary law enforcement

apparatus. In this level, the violent acts include using state forces in shutting down

the secessionists' population centres, mobilizing the state's military and paramilitary

forces and declaring martial law over the region (Butt, 2017; Valentino, 2004). The

highest level of violent strategy that the state could adopt is collective repression.

States adopt this strategy when there is a high level of support from external powers

for the movement. This includes indiscriminate violence, massacres, ethnic

cleansing, and genocide (Butt, 2017).   While acts of violence that could be

classified as massacres, ethnic cleansing, and genocide might also happen in the

militarization level, the difference with repression is that the state deliberately

employs these tactics as part of a coordinated counter-insurgency strategy (Butt, 2017).

3.2. Research Design

This section will explain the research design, which includes the type of research, data collection method, data process and analysis method, and the cases selected for this research. The following sections will elaborate more on the research design.

3.2.1. Explanatory Research

This research utilizes the explanatory research type. Explanatory research is defined as research that is designed to explain the position of the variables in the research and the relations between each variable (Sugiyono, 2012). This type of research aims to explain the relations between the independent variables and the dependent variables or otherwise also known as variables association and to find causal relations between the independent variables and the dependent variables (Silalahi, 2006). Through this variable association, this research tries to identify the patterns of relations between the variables and as well as the strength of said

relations and drawing the connection by using the existing theoretical framework (Black & Champion, 1992). It is widely used in researches that explain a specific topic in a more in-depth way, such as literature research, in-depth interviews, and case analysis research (Silalahi, 2006).

The benefits of using explanatory research design are that it makes it easier to understand a specific problem in a more detailed way since it is in-depth research. It is easier to use explanatory research to determine why and how a specific incident happened (Black & Champion, 1992). It is also flexible in the sources that can be used since explanatory researches often utilize secondary sources as well. These advantages will be utilized in analyzing the case studies where there are so many details that need to be understood while trying to isolate the patterns and similarities so that the comparative method has explaining power while at the same time also contrasting the differences between the two cases to show the comparison.

For this thesis specifically, because it utilizes many different sources, the explanatory research type's flexibility on sources is highly useful. The explanatory research's characteristics also makes it very useful in doing a comparative case

study method. The two case studies used in this thesis have similar circumstances but have different end results. The explanatory research's advantages can be used to compare these two cases and measure the independent variables to explain the differences in the dependent variable.

There are, however, also several disadvantages of using explanatory research design. First, is that the number of samples or case studies used are few, which means it might not have the representativeness power as other research designs (Black & Champions, 1992). Second, the explanatory research can sometimes generate too many information and interpretations which might seem more relevant while actually they are not relevant. This could lead to a wrong conclusion of unfocused research results (Sugiyono, 2012). This thesis tries to minimize these pitfalls by basing the research on a specific research question and theoretical framework. This research also only uses valid sources that came from trusted publications or government documents. More on data collection method will be explained in the next section.

3.2.2. Data Collection Method

For this research, the author uses mainly secondary source data. Secondary data is defined as data that was collected by someone else for another primary response (Smith et al, 2011). Because of time, security, financial, and geographical constraints, it is hard to acquire primary data or interviews from people who are directly involved in the cases that are going to be used in the research. Secondary sources are also used because it is easier to verify the validity of secondary sources especially those who have been published in peer-reviewed journals, databases that have been recognized by International Institutions and books that were published by legitimate publishers.

The author uses alternative sources that are reliable such as legal documents, government policy papers, writings from other scholars who are experts in the field, databases collected for internationally recognize systems, official statements and reputable newspaper articles. This method is used to collect and process data on theoretical perspectives and scholarly writings regarding the cases. This method has one limitation; however, where some of the writings might be out of date or do not apply to real-world conditions.

This was obtained from Jstor under the search of Maluku and Aceh, information about the intensity and regional instability was obtained from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program from the Department of Peace and Conflict Research. News articles were obtained from Kompas, Jawa Pos and other Indonesian newspapers on its archive section. Governmental information and reports are taken from the Ministry of Communication and Information website under publicly available documents and research.

3.2.3. Analysis Method: Qualitative Analysis Method

This research uses qualitative approach because it is the most suitable for this type of research. That is because this research mainly uses data obtained from secondary sources such as documents or other forms of information. The qualitative approach was selected because of the flexibility it allows in its application. It uses causality when trying to explain cases (Mahoney & Goertz, 2006) that align with the research's questions of why states respond differently to different secessionist movements and what are the factors that influence the level of violence used by the state. This is because the main objective of qualitative research is to explain the results of individual cases (Lincoln & Guba, 2000).

The qualitative approach is also chosen because the author feels that it could better explain the nuances and the context of the problem than a quantitative approach. This is because qualitative approach uses a narrow scope to avoid a generalization of results. The author also chooses this approach because most of the data is in qualitative form and also from secondary sources. By using the qualitative approach, it is easier to process the data and resources collected in the available time (Mahoney & Goertz, 2006).

3.2.4. Comparative Case Study Methodology

This research aims to understand why variations in external security considerations result in different state's responses towards secessionist movements. That is why this research uses two cases of secessionist movements as a comparative case study research to understand this phenomenon better. The case study methodology is used when researching a social phenomenon and when the research question is a why and/or how question (Yin, 2003). The case study methodology is a study that is associated with different other approaches such as ethnographic studies, participant-observation, focused on a case or phenomenon, and qualitative in nature with the purpose of understanding a group of similar units.

Another definition of case study is that it is empirical research that tries to find the connection between a phenomenon and its real-life context (Yin, 2003). Comparative case study methodology uses the compare logic by comparing between the two cases and taking note of the similarities to justify why these two cases are chosen while also highlighting their differences and contrasts to explain the phenomenon (Lincoln & Guba, 2000). This methodology, however, also has its disadvantages since it is mostly a small N-study which aims to delve deeper into specific cases, it has problems with representativeness.

3.2.4.1.   Case Selection

Because this research aims to see different state behaviour towards different secessionist movement, the author chose a state that has experienced multiple secessionist movements. The reason for this decision is that by choosing cases that happened to the same state will have more explaining power to explain the hypotheses that the different state behaviour and level of violence were influenced by the secessionist movement implication on security considerations. Therefore, the author chose to use the cases of the Free Aceh Movement and the Republic of South Maluku secessionist movement. The reason why these two cases are chosen is that

while both happened in Indonesia, the Indonesian government responded differently. The Free Aceh Movement had experienced a more violent response with violations of human right and widespread torture that lasted for decades compared to the Republic of South Maluku Movement which ended quickly and with a relatively minimal number of casualties.

4.0. Case Studies and Analysis

This chapter will present the two case studies used in this research. The first part of this chapter will present the Free Aceh Movement case, and the second part will present the Republic of South Maluku case. The author divides the case study sections into four parts. The first two parts will discuss the independent variables of this research, the potential of future conflict and level of third-party support.

Potential of future conflict, as defined here, take into consideration the differences in identity between the secessionists and the Republic of Indonesia. Therefore, it is essential to understand how Indonesia constructed its national identity. President Sukarno constructed the Indonesian national identity not on ethnic or religious lines but through the common struggle for independence from the Netherlands and the oppression the society experienced during the colonial period regardless of ethnic or religious affiliation, and the use of a single language the Bahasa Indonesia (Dwi Winarno, 2006). Sukarno summarized these three points into the Indonesian national ideology of Pancasila.

The third part will cover the dependent variable of the research, which is

Indonesia's response to the secessionist movements. From these two case studies,

the author will highlight how the differences on the independent variables resulted

explain the differing results for the dependent variable, specifically the level of

violence doled out by Indonesia. Finally, the fourth part will summarize the analysis

and the findings of each case.

4.1. Case Study 1: The Free Aceh Movement Secessionist Movement

This research's primary focus is the second phase of the Free Aceh

Movement secessionist movement. Mainly known as the Military Operation Zone

(Daerah Operasi Militer) period starting from 1989 until 1998, when the New Order

Regime of Indonesia's authoritarian president Suharto ended (Aspinall, 2009). This

period is known as the worst in terms of the level of violence inflicted by the

Indonesian government. The Free Aceh Movement claims that it is a continuation

of the independence fight against Dutch colonialism that started with the Dutch's

invasion of the Aceh Sultanate in 1873.

According to them, Aceh was never a part of Indonesia, to begin with, and

the Indonesian leadership illegally incorporated Aceh territory into Indonesian

territory (ASNLF, 1976). The following sections will analyze the case with the framework proposed by the two independent variables of Potential of Future Conflict and Level of Third-Party support and then analyze if they explain the severity of the Indonesian government's response towards the Free Aceh Movement secessionists.h

4.1.1. Independent Variable I: Potential of Future Conflict

This section will discuss the first decision that a state has when dealing with a secessionist movement whether to engage in negotiations and concessions or use force. Using the theoretical framework explained in the previous chapter, states calculates the potential of future conflict with either the secessionists should they be successful, and/or with other existing security rivals in the region. There are two sub-sections of this analysis

The first sub-section reviews the identity division between the secessionists and the Indonesian national identity. This sub-section will illustrate how the Indonesian government perceive the threat posed by the Free Aceh Movement secessionists and measure the likelihood of future conflict with them

should they succeeded. The second sub-section will review the potential of future

conflict with other existing security threats such as rival states or other secessionist

movements, which may try to capitalize on Indonesia's loss from the secessionist

movement. This is measured as the region's proneness to conflict, which includes

how Indonesia perceived the aggressive intentions and the threat they posed based

on their geographical proximity to Indonesian territories and interests.

4.1.1.1 Identity Division between the Free Aceh Movement and Indonesia

There are two major divisions of identity between the Acehnese people and

the majority Javanese people of Indonesia. First, the nationalist construct of the

Free Aceh Movement is ethnic-nationalism as opposed to the civic-nationalism

construct advanced by the Indonesian government (Schulze, 2004). The

independent variable measures ethnic-nationalism through blood ties, religion and

a category of a sub-ethnic group called suku. According to this construct, a true

Acehnese must be someone whose family has lived in Aceh for several generations,

is a Muslim, and belongs to one of the nine Suku of Aceh. These nine Suku are

Aceh, Alas, Gayo, Singkil, Tamiang, Kluet, Anek Jamee, Bulolehee, and Simeuleu

(Kell, 1995). This Acehnese identity manifested itself in the form of the Acehnese language, history, and culture (Schulze, 2004). In trying to establish ethno-nationalism, di Tiro created an Acehnese calendar that replaces the existing Indonesian calendar. This calendar erased every Indonesian and non-Muslim national holiday and replacing them with other events celebrating Aceh history and culture such as Cut Nyak Dien and Teuku Umar day, Teungku Cik di Tiro day, and Iskandar Muda day (di Tiro, 1982).

Di Tiro views this Pancasila as an artificial construct. He argued that the majority Javanese created it as a form of cultural imperialism towards the other groups of people who are living in the archipelago that shared no common shared history aside that they were all colonized by the Dutch (di Tiro, 1995). He further claimed that this notion of national identity is something that the Javanese forced upon the non-Javanese people. According to di Tiro, Indonesia is a nation that never was since it had no historical legitimacy, unlike Aceh whose historical legitimacy of statehood can be traced back several hundred years going back to the pre-colonial era (Aspinall, 2002).

The second identity division between the Acehnese people and the Javanese majority of Indonesia is in the Acehnese's strict adherence to fundamental Islam (Aspinall, 2009). Islam has always been the main component of the Free Aceh Movement's ideology not simply as a political movement but also as a reflection of Acehnese culture and identity. At its inception and during the latter period in the 1980s and 1990s, the Free Aceh Movement's articulated its vision for an independent Aceh as the revival of the Sultanate of Aceh of old (Schulze, 2004). In his own words, di Tiro (1982) said that the move would bring about the "re-establishment of the historic Islamic State." The Free Aceh Movement was also heavily reliant on the mosque network as a grassroots tool for spreading propaganda and recruitment (HRW, 1999).

In its propaganda, the Free Aceh Movement often presented its fight in Islamic terms. The movement condemned the impious behaviour of the secular/moderate Javanese-led Indonesian rulers, promised the implementation of sharia law and an Islamic base to an independent Aceh (Aspinall, 2002). There have been instances of Free Aceh Movement commanders implementing sharia law in their fiefdoms such as the mandatory wear of the Islamic head veil commonly

known as hijab or jilbab in Indonesia for women (Schulze, 2004). In addition to

that, Islam serves as a unifying element between the nine different suku of Aceh. It

is also used to differentiate between the devout conservative Acehnese Muslim from

the syncretistic moderate/secular Javanese majority Indonesian (Schulze, 2004).

From Indonesia's perspective, the Free Aceh Movement's pursuit of

independence is a threat to its sovereignty (Robinson, 1998). The secessionist

movement does not only threaten Indonesia's territorial integrity but also challenged

the Indonesian national identity construct, symbolized in the Indonesian national

ideology of Pancasila. Crafted by Indonesia's first president, Sukarno and later

developed even further under Suharto's authoritarian New Order regime. Jakarta

under the New Order regime was obsessed with the idea of national unity, which it

seeks to achieve through centralism and uniformity (Sukma 2004).

Since Suharto rose to power in the late 1960s, his regime has implemented

a centralistic policy that imposed uniformity across the whole country without

paying attention to Indonesia's more heterogeneous demographic composition. The

creation of a single Indonesian identity has been the main objective of the regime.

The government used policies such as the transmigration program to achieve this objective (Sukma, 2004). This program offered land and money for Javanese people to move out of Java Island to the other major islands such as Sumatra where Aceh is and settle there. This program was developed by the central government to integrate all ethnic groups into a single group of people, which is the people of Indonesia (Fearnside, 1997).

The Indonesian government hoped that through this program, the various ethnic group inhabiting Indonesia would gradually integrate. The loss of their heterogeneity will result in a homogeneous society, which is defined by their Indonesian national identity construct, as stated by the Indonesian minister of transmigration at the time (Barber, 2000). Many non-Javanese people who are native to the other islands view this program as another instance of Javanization by the central government. Another instance of this effort to construct this national identity is by using language. Indonesia developed a national language called Bahasa Indonesia since its independence from Dutch colonial rule as a way to unite the different ethnic groups which have their ethnic language living in the archipelago. The New Order regime took this to a new level by requiring it to be

the mandatory language to be used in education, offices, and daily life in general (Sukma, 2004).

While ethnic languages are never banned, the central government relegated its status from language to dialect, which Acehnese people interpret as another form of cultural imperialism by the Javanese (Aspinall, 2002). In addition to Javanese migrant settlers, the centralistic Indonesian government under the Suharto regime also aimed to mould the local political institutions according to its construct of national identity which is mainly based on Javanese culture and norms at the expense of Aceh's cultural identity (Sukma, 2004). As mentioned before, there is a great divide between the identity of the Acehnese people vis a vis Indonesia's national identity construct. This division of identity made Indonesia very wary about a future conflict with Aceh as an independent state should it be allowed to secede.

4.1.1.2. Region's Proneness of Conflict and Existing External Security Threats

When the Free Aceh Movement first broke out in 1976, it was still

recovering from the 1965 General Suharto's anti-communist coup that ended Indonesia's first president Sukarno's regime and the three years of military confrontation with Malaysia that lasted from 1963 to 1966. It was also simultaneously still fighting against the Free Papua Movement, which started in 1969 (Bell et al, 1986). Indonesia also just annexed East Timor from the Portuguese in 1975 and were still engaged in an armed conflict with the Fretilin until 1978 (Bertrand, 2004). From Indonesia's perspective, the regional condition at the time was violence-prone with existing security rivals and a history of conflict in the region. As a region, Southeast Asia was quite unstable during the post-World War II (Hoogervorst, 2018).

Figure 2. Map illustrating the geographical proximity of Indonesia, Malaysia, and Aceh

First, Indonesia at the time was involved in a territorial dispute with Malaysia. The dispute started in 1967, when both Indonesia and Malaysia included two islands in their territorial map (Haller-Trost, 1995). Both islands are located in the Celebes Sea, North-East of Borneo island. In 1979, Malaysia included both islands in their archipelagic base points and later in 1991 started building resorts and conducted tourism activities on the islands. This resulted in Indonesia's complaint, which escalated the tension between the two countries even more (Djalal, 2013). The dispute later escalated to a dispute of sovereignty over the whole Ambalat block, which is the name of the area where the two islands are located (Rosenne, 2003). The Ambalat block is well-endowed with natural resources, especially gas and oil, which explains why both countries claimed sovereignty over it (Druce, 2016). While this is a relatively low-key territorial dispute with no military hostilities, however, the history of antagonism between the two countries dating to the 1960s during the Confrontation period was likely pondered by the Indonesian point of view when calculating the region's conflict proneness (Jones, 2002).

The bigger threats to Indonesia's security, however, came from within its borders. In the 1970s, Indonesia was fighting two armed conflicts aside from the Free Aceh Movement case. First, it was fighting the Free Papua Movement, another secessionist movement that started in 1969 (Bell et al, 1986). Second, it just recently invaded East Timor, which was formerly a Portuguese colony in 1975 (Bertrand, 2002).

Up until 1962, the West Papua region was still under the Netherlands administration. After they withdrew from the region in 1962, Indonesian authorities entered and imposed Indonesian rule over West Papua (Gordon, 2002). Before they left, however, they were preparing the West Papuans for independence (Bell et al, 1986). Since the Colonial Administration promised the West Papuan people independence, they refused to be integrated into Indonesian territory, which led to conflict.

With the backing of the United States of America, Indonesia and the Netherlands negotiated and eventually agreed to temporarily hand the West Papua region to the United Nations under the New York Agreement on 15th August 1962

(Chauvel, 2004). The agreement stipulated that West Papua will be under UN

jurisdiction until it was ready for a referendum to determine its future (Gordon,

2002). The referendum was done in 1969, which resulted in West Papua formally

integrated into Indonesian territory. This event, however, led to some dissatisfaction

amongst the pro-independence West Papuan culminating in the formation of the

Free Papua Movement who later engaged in sporadic, armed skirmishes with the

Indonesian authority in the region (Chauvel, 2004).

The second external security threat was the East Timor pro-independence

faction, known as the Fretilin (Taylor, 1990). In 1975, Indonesia annexed East

Timor after the Portuguese withdrew from the region (Bertrand, 2002) under the

pretext of anti-colonialism (Schwarz, 1994). This concern was publicly stated by

the Head of Special Ops and close advisor to President Suharto, Major General Ali

Murtopo when he stated that "an independent East Timor could be used as a base

for foreign powers to enter Indonesia." (Schwarz, 1994). On December 7th 1975,

Indonesia launched a military operation to annex East Timor and managed to

capture the region by December 17th 1975. While Indonesia managed to impose

control on the region, it couldn't fully gain the loyalty of the people. The Fretilin

was still actively engaging the Indonesian army stationed there, albeit in a sporadic, low-violence manner (Taylor, 1991).

From the explanations above, we can see that when the Free Aceh Movement's second phase began, Indonesia was situated in a region that it perceived as prone to conflict. It was simultaneously engaged in a territorial dispute with Malaysia, fighting a secessionist movement in West Papua, and in the process of annexing and imposing rule over East Timor which was formerly a Portuguese colony. Along with the already existing identity division between the Acehnese identity of the Free Aceh Movement and the Indonesian ideology of Pancasila. Therefore, the Indonesian government viewed that potential of future conflict as likely.

4.2. Independent Variable 2: Foreign Support for the Free Aceh Movement

Once the Indonesian government decided to respond to the secessionist movement with violence, then the second step is determining how violent the response will be. The level of violence will be determined by the level of support received by the movement. The level of support, however, is subjective to the host state's perception

and might not be entirely accurate (Butt, 2017). After the first phase of the movement was successfully quelled by the Indonesian government in 1979, most of the leadership were either killed or fled to Sweden while the majority of the fighters fled to the neighbouring Malaysia which has a big Acehnese diaspora community (Schulze, 2004). Hasan di Tiro himself fled to Malaysia and stayed there for a while before leaving for Sweden (Missbach, 2012).

During the ten years period between the end of the first phase in 1979 and the start of the second phase of the movement in 1989, di Tiro was trying to consolidate his forces and gaining foreign support for the Free Aceh Movement's cause (Schulze, 2004). In 1985, di Tiro managed to secure the support of Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi for the Free Aceh Movement. At the time, Gaddafi and Libya's foreign policy was to support nationalist movements under his Mathaba Against Imperialism, Racism, Zionism and Fascism. Between 1986 and 1989, Free Aceh Movement fighters were sent to Libya to receive military training in tactics, strategies, and weapons training (Aspinall, 2009). There were also allegations that Libya also provided funding for the secessionist movement, but it is still unclear whether it is true or not (Aspinall, 2009).

From Indonesia's perspective, however, the Free Aceh Movement's most dangerous support comes from Malaysia. While Malaysia always denied any involvement or supporting the Free Aceh Movement (Thio, 2006), Indonesia, on the other hand, was always suspicious of Malaysia (Tan, 2000). While it is unclear whether Libya provided financial support for the Free Aceh Movement or not, it is clear that the secessionist group received funding that comes from Malaysia in the form of regular donations from the Acehnese Malaysian diaspora (Schulze, 2004). While these donations did not come from the government of Malaysia itself, the Indonesian government, however, views this as an example of Malaysian support towards the movement since the people who donated are Malaysian citizens and the Malaysian government did not do anything to stop it (Thio, 2006).

Aside from financial support, the Free Aceh Movement also used Malaysia as a safe haven to recruit more fighters and procure weapons. For some period, the Free Aceh Movement tried to avoid dealing with the Indonesian government by recruiting Acehnese Malaysians living in Malaysia (Hastings, 2010). This was done before the start of the second phase of the movement. The Free Aceh Movement

also used Malaysia as a transit hub before sending its recruits to Libya for military training(Aspinall, 2009). The movement also procured some of its arsenal from Malaysian territories or from the South Thailand separatist group, which were then smuggled through Malaysia and into Aceh (Tan, 2000).

Indonesia's perception of Malaysian support for the secessionists was strengthened in 1991 when Free Aceh Movement fighters fled to Penang to avoid the Indonesian military crackdown and Malaysia refused to extradite them back to Indonesia (Thio, 2006). This incident, combined with the known fact that Free Aceh Movement recruits and weapons also came from or through Malaysian territories led Indonesia to believe that Malaysia was involved or at least supported the movement (Tan, 2000), especially since the Acehnese people are ethnically closer to the Melayu people of Malaysia than the Javanese majority of Indonesia and that Malaysia is also closer to the Acehnese people in their practice of fundamental Islam. In 1999, Indonesia even publicly accused Malaysia of getting involved in the movement by directly supporting it (Tan, 2000; Thio, 2006).

This accusation was stated publicly by then Indonesian Minister of Internal

Affairs, Suryadi Sudrija. When asked about foreign support for the Free Aceh Movement during a press conference in 1999, he said: "We know that the secessionists are smuggling their weapons and recruits from Malaysia and that Malaysia is directly supporting the secessionists' movement and we ask them to stay out of the business of Indonesia." (Straits Times, 1999). From Indonesia's perspective, while Malaysia did not officially commit its military to the Free Aceh Movement, the existence of Acehnese Malaysian in their ranks and the lack of response or crackdown from Malaysian government was interpreted as a high level of foreign support which later led to Indonesia's violent response. This sentiment might also be compounded by the tumultuous history between the two countries.

4.3. Dependent Variable: Repression During Military Operations Zone Period

The second phase of the secessionist movement started immediately after the trainees returned from Libya in 1989. The Free Aceh movement started their assault through sporadic attacks on Indonesian police and military posts, raiding weapons cache, arsons, the assassination of police and military personnel, government informants and others (Aspinall, 2009). Some of these attacks include the 28th of May 1989 shooting that killed the 15th Tiro sub-district commander and

another soldier, the 20th of April 1990 attack on a military company that was

stationed in Bulong Blah Ara village in northern Aceh in which the Free Aceh

Movement managed to kill three soldiers and take twenty assault rifles, and the 28th

of May 1990 raid on a military base in the same village and managed to take more

weaponry from the base (Koto, 2006).

The Indonesian government retaliated by enforcing their military presence

by sending more troops to the region and initiated military operations to eradicate

the Free Aceh Movement while also designating the region as a Military Operations

Zone (Sukma, 2004). By designating the region as a Military Operations Zone,

Aceh is basically under martial law. The Indonesian government increased its

military presence from 6000 troops to 12000 troops in 1989 (Pane, 2001). This is

done because the governor of Aceh at the time, Ibrahim Hasan requested the central

government's assistance in dealing with the secessionists. Under the Military

Operations Zone designation, the Indonesian military conducted counter-

insurgency operations while being supported by local police since at the time the

Indonesian police force is structurally under military command. The military

operation is codenamed Operation Red Net (Schulze, 2004). In trying to eradicate

the movement, the Indonesian military deployed repressive strategies such as armed

raids, house to house searches in areas that are suspected of sheltering members of

the movement and burning the houses of the villagers suspected of protecting

members of the Free Aceh Movement (Amnesty International, 1993).

One central component of Indonesia's military strategy in Aceh is the

inclusion of civilians in the operations. The Indonesian government called this a

strategy of civilian-military cooperation officially known as Sishankamrata which

an abbreviation of Sistem Pertahanan is dan Keamanan Rakyat Semesta or People's

Total Defense and Security System (Rabasa & Haseman, 2002). While this strategy

is based on Article 30(1) of Indonesia's constitution which says that every citizen

has the right and obligation to participate in any efforts to defend the nation, in

practice this strategy is mostly used in a way that violates the rights of Acehnese

civilians. One of the most notorious examples of this is the Fence of Legs strategy

implemented by the Indonesian government during military operations into

territories that are controlled by the Free Aceh Movement.

This strategy recruits Acehnese civilians and forces them to sweep through

an area unarmed ahead of the armed military force. This strategy is adopted to flush out the secessionists while inhibiting them from returning fire, basically making the civilians a shield for the military behind them hence the name Fence of Legs (Amnesty International, 1993). According to Amnesty International (1993), this practice violates the rights of the civilians while also violating international law regarding rules of engagement where the Indonesian military deliberately put non-combatant civilians in the front lines of a dangerous military operation. This strategy was also implemented previously by the Indonesian government in East Timor (Taylor, 1991).

Another main strategy of the Sishankamrata is the formation of vigilante and night patrol groups made up of local civilians under the command and supervision of the military. The military recruits 20 or 30 locals from villages suspected of sympathizing or supporting the secessionists. These civilian vigilante groups are used as attack dogs by the military and refusal to join, or underperformance in identifying, capturing, and killing alleged members of the Free Aceh Movement will result in punishments such as public torture, arrests, and executions (Amnesty International, 2013). According to a local military commander,

this strategy was implemented because these civilians, especially youths, are the ones who know the members of the movement best (Rabasa & Haseman, 2002).

One of the most notorious vigilante groups called the Laskar Rakyat, or People's Militia was established in August 1990 in Idi, Eastern Aceh was said to have recruited around 1500 people in the span of a few months. The military armed these recruits with edged weapons such as knives, bamboo spears, and machetes. They also gave them basic military training. These recruits were told to go and "hunt" for the secessionists (Amnesty International, 2013). Aside from repressive military strategies, the Military Operations Zone period is also rife with allegations of blatant human rights violations done by the Indonesian military. These allegations include extrajudicial executions, arbitrary detentions and forced disappearances, tortures and ill-treatment of civilians, unfair political trials, and overall impunity (Amnesty International, 1993). When confronted with these accusations, the commander of the military operations in Aceh Major General H. R. Pramono responded "We don't need lessons from other nations about human rights. We have our own values. They have a liberal state. Ours is a Pancasila state. It's different" (Amnesty International, 2013).

4.3.1. Extrajudicial Executions: Shock Therapy and Deterrence

Despite the refutations of the Indonesian government regarding violations of human rights in Aceh, many reports by human rights watch groups and testimonies of a survivor of the Military Operations Zone period confirmed their existence. One of the central features of the Indonesian government's counter-insurgency campaign in Aceh is the extrajudicial executions of Acehnese civilians and suspected Free Aceh Movement members (Rabasa & Haseman, 2002). These extrajudicial executions could be carried out either by the military or by the civilian vigilante groups with the approval of the military (Aspinall, 2009) and are mainly divided into two types, public executions and secret killings in which the decomposing and often mutilated corpse was later be left in public as a warning for others (Schulze, 2004).

Up until 1993, at least around 2000 civilians, including both children and the elderly fell to these extrajudicial executions with around 1200 victims in 1990 alone (Amnesty International, 1993). This number later rose to an estimated total of 12000 by the end of the military operations in 1998 (Amnesty International,

2013; Schulze, 2004). These corpses were later dumped into mass graves spread all around the Aceh region.

Majority of the victims are civilians who are suspected of being involved with the Free Aceh Movement and mostly in the Aceh Pidie, Northern Aceh, and Eastern Aceh region. The main objective of these executions is to intimidate the local population into cooperating with the military in tracking down the secessionists (Kell, 1995). Some executions, however, are done as retribution for casualties from the Indonesian military or by failing to obey military commands. Some Free Aceh Movement fighters were also executed on sight by the military when they were supposed to be taken into custody (Kell, 1995).

Considering the timing, methods, and techniques employed in the killings accompanied with public comments made by the military officers involved in the counter-insurgency operations, it seems that these extrajudicial executions are political killings that were done deliberately as part of the military's counter-insurgency strategy (Amnesty International, 2013). This assumption is based on patterns of similar human rights violations such as the Mysterious Shooting cases

(Penembakan Misterius/Petrus) and political killings in other parts of Indonesia. Another example such as previous counterinsurgency campaigns in East Timor suggests that this practice is a common policy of the Indonesian government at the time when facing challenges to its authority (Colombij, 2002).

The first reported killings were as early as 1989 right after the Free Aceh Movement launched their first assault and the reports continue to come in intermittently up until early 1990. Things intensified late 1990 when the military increased its presence in the region by replacing the Regional Military Commander of KODAM I Major General Joko Pramono with Major General H. R. Pramono and the special deployment of 6000 counter-insurgency troops on President Suharto's order (Amnesty International, 1993; Schulze, 2004). The deployment of these special troops coincided with the emergence of patterns of widespread mysterious killings in the region, especially in Eastern Aceh areas such as Sigli, Pidie, and Peureulak (Amnesty International, 1993).

These extrajudicial executions in Aceh bear similar features. The corpses are usually dumped and left in public places such as main roads, plantations, rice

fields, or next to a river as a warning for others to not join the secessionist

movement. Their corpses showed that most of them were imprisoned before

murdered. Their thumbs and sometimes feet were tied with a specific type of knot

that is commonly used by the military and were shot to death at close range

(Amnesty International, 1993; Rabasa & Haseman, 2002). The corpses also showed

signs of torture, such as beatings by a blunt instrument. These beatings were so bad

that some corpses could not be identified. Their families and relatives did not claim

many of these corpses out of fear of retribution (Human Rights Watch, 1999). Most

of the corpses who were unidentified were dumped in Eastern and Northern Aceh,

which were the base of the secessionist movement (Amnesty International, 2013).

Some examples of these killings include the discovery of three corpses with

one still in a sack under rubber trees by the side of the main highway near the village

of Seumadam in Eastern Aceh between 12 and 16 September 1990. Four more

corpses were left to be discovered by the public in the area in the next four weeks

with all of them exhibiting signs of torture and bludgeoning to the head and face

with heavy instruments before executed (Amnesty International, 1993). In mid-

September 1990, eight more corpses were discovered in one spot near the village

of Juli in northern Aceh. On 19 September 1990, a corpse with mutilated genitals was discovered in the village of Halaban in North Sumatra area close to Southern Aceh. Villagers later found another corpse with a slit throat and a hole in the head in Perapen village also in North Sumatra area nine days later. In mid-October 1990, a male corpse of unknown age was found beneath a bridge near the Halaban village. His big toes and knees were still tied together, and his ears cut off while his head was pierced with a sharp instrument (Colombij, 2002). These are examples of those who were killed and later left in public places.

More victims were killed with a gunshot and then dumped into mass graves spread across the region, some of which allegedly contained hundreds of dead bodies. The Indonesian government and military acknowledged the existence of at least one mass grave but disputed the number of dead bodies inside (Amnesty International, 1993). On 12 September 1990, a group consisting of 56 prisoners were executed by the Indonesian military at Bukit Panglima in northern Aceh. According to eye-witness testimonies, the prisoners were told to get off the trucks and stand on the edge of the ravine before executed with a gunshot to the head. The bodies were allowed to fall into the ravine. Another eye-witness also reported a

similar case where people from the village of Sidomulyo in northern Aceh were executed then dumped into the ravine and their bodies covered using mowing equipment (Amnesty International, 2013). When asked about the existence of these mass graves, Major General H. R. Pramono responded that the grave exists, but the number of corpses inside could not be determined (Amnesty International, 1993).

The killings, executions, and intimidation through corpse display in Aceh are similar to previous mysterious killing campaigns carried out by the government in other parts of Indonesia between 1983 and 1986 (Brown, 2003). While the government initially denied any responsibility in these killings and blaming them on gang war, President Suharto later revealed in his autobiography in 1989 that these killings were carried out by the government. The president justified that the targets were criminals and that the killings were intended as shock therapy for the criminal elements and as a deterrence so that the public will not commit a crime (Suharto, 1989). This strategy was later repeated in Aceh with the same intention and using the same methods as well. While the government never admitted their involvement in the killings in Aceh, they had given public statements that seemed to condone and even encourage these extrajudicial executions and killings as part of the strategy against the secessionists (Amnesty International, 1993). When the

commander of the military operations in Aceh, Major General H. R. Pramono was asked about whether these killings were intended as shock therapy, he responded with "As a strategy, that's true. But our goal is not bad. Our goal must be correct. We only kill them if they are members" (Amnesty International, 1993). Therefore, it is logical to assume that the extrajudicial executions are part of a deliberate and coordinated counter-insurgency strategy.

4.3.2. Intimidation through Arbitrary Detention and Forced Disappearances

Another repressive strategy that the Indonesian military employed in Aceh is arbitrary detention and forced disappearances. Since the military operations began in 1989, at least 1000 people and potentially, even more, have been held in isolated secret detention centres in Aceh and North Sumatra region for some periods ranging from a few days to more than a year (Amnesty International, 1993). The Indonesian government implemented this strategy as part of political and military intelligence gathering operations where civilians were arrested and interrogated for information. This strategy also served to intimidate potential political opponents (Brown, 2003). These arbitrary detentions often also led to further human rights violations such as

torture, extrajudicial executions, and forced disappearances. Many of the political detainees disappeared in custody, and they have likely been killed. While some reappeared later on, but the majority of them are still missing (Amnesty International, 1993; Schulze, 2003).

These arbitrary detentions and forced disappearances in Aceh follow a general pattern. First, the suspects are picked up by the military at their residence and arrested without any warrants. Sometimes the suspects can number up to the whole population of a village. These arrests are usually not announced, and the location of the detention facilities was also kept secret (Amnesty International, 2013; Schulze, 2004). Relatives were not allowed to contact or visit the detainees. Whenever the relatives inquire about the whereabouts of the detainees, they were always told that the person in concern is either no longer in custody or have been transferred to another military camp. There were almost no public registers about the detainees, and both the military and police were reluctant to assist in locating these detainees. Some of these relatives also found themselves being interrogated and intimidated by the authorities (Kell, 1995).

To justify these mass detentions, the Indonesian government invoked the issue of security and that it is needed to restore law and order in the region (Amnesty International, 1993). The secretive nature of the arrests and the unacknowledged location of the detention centres mean that the detainees have effectively disappeared and are vulnerable to further human rights violations including torture and extrajudicial executions since they are deprived of any legal counsel as well. While both the military and police have been reported to be involved in these arbitrary detentions, the most notorious offenders are the Indonesian special counter-insurgency force, the Kopassus. Amongst the Acehnese people, there was a saying that if the police or the military arrest you, then there will be a 50-50 chance of returning but if the Kopassus arrests you then you will be gone forever (Conboy, 2003).

These detentions are not just repressive but also inherently unconstitutional. Under Indonesia's Code of Criminal Procedure, arbitrary arrest and detentions are not allowed. According to the Code, every arrest has to come with a warrant unless they are caught in the middle of committing a crime. In Article 18 of the Code, the relatives of the detainees must also be given a copy of the said warrant. In Article

54, only police officers can make the arrest. The article also specified that unless

the detainees are charged with something, they have to be released after a specific

period. During the duration of the arrest, the detainees also have the right for legal

counsel of their own choosing on every stage of the investigation as stipulated in

Article 55 of the Code (Amnesty International, 1993).

These laws, however, were often ignored by the Indonesian government

during the Military Operations Zone period in Aceh. Under the notion of

maintaining national security, the authorities often practised unacknowledged

detentions and forced disappearances toward suspected Free Aceh movement

members. During the Military Operations Zone period, the military took over law

enforcement responsibilities from the police. This means that the military is doing

arrests, interrogations, and detentions. In these cases, the arrests were mostly made

without any warrants, and the relatives of the detainees were not notified of these

arrests (Herbani, 2014). The detainees were also held for an extended period of time

without any official charges and are isolated from the outside world with no legal

counsel provided for them. This made them vulnerable to torture and giving

statements under duress (Amnesty International, 2013). These practices are legally

justified by the Anti-Subversion Law that was originally issued as a presidential

decree. This law allows the detention of alleged subversives for one year, which

could be extended indefinitely (Herbani, 2014). The problem with this law is that

the definition of subversion according to this decree is very vague and subjective to

the interpretation of the military officers in the field which effectively gave them

unlimited authority in the region (Amnesty International, 1993).

Examples of these forced disappearances include the disappearance of Drs

Mahdi Jusuf and four others during detention. Drs Mahdi Jusuf was a businessman

and a local political party official who disappeared in March 1991 after being

detained and questioned for his wife's employer's alleged link to the Free Aceh

Movement (Amnesty International, 2013). He was removed from his cell at

Lhoknga Detention Center on March 4th along with four other people and was never

seen again. It is likely that he was executed or tortured to death. The Indonesian

government, however, denied that he had ever been detained at all. Drs Mahdi Jusuf

was first arrested on February 7th, 1991 when military authorities came to his house

to interrogate his wife about her employer's alleged connection to the secessionists.

He refused to let them take her away and was arrested instead. He was reportedly

seen at a military base in Banda Aceh. When his relatives came to inquire about his arrest, they were turned away and shortly thereafter, they started to receive threats believed to come from the local military authorities (Amnesty international, 1993).

Another example of this is the disappearance of Abdurachman bin Samad, who was an alleged supporter of the secessionist movement. He disappeared from his cell in early 1992. He was accused of supplying weapons and financing the Free Aceh Movement. He was sentenced to 17 and a half years of prison for subversion on May 27th, 1991. During a regular prison visit by a prison fellowship organization, they discovered that he was missing, and the prison officials said that he was already transferred to the military base in Lhokseumawe. However, the military authorities in Lhokseumawe denied that he was in their custody. He remains missing until now (Amnesty International, 2013). These two examples are just the tip of the iceberg, and there are still more missing people whose whereabouts are still unknown today. While many people remain missing today but some resurfaced or survived to tell the tale of how the authority tortured them, which will be elaborated more in the next section.

4.3.3. Widespread Torture and Ill-Treatment of Detainees as Modus

Operandi

During the Military Operations Zone time period, torture and ill-treatment of detainees were commonly practised by the military as a mean of investigation and interrogation. While the Indonesian Criminal Code and Code of Criminal Procedure prohibited these practices, it is again ignored by the military and authorities in Aceh. These tortures include gagging, beatings, electrocution, dehumanizing acts such as stripping, sexual violence and rape (Herbani, 2014). The beatings were usually targeted to the head, shins, and torso using blunt objects ranging from fists, wood, and metal bars. Aside from beatings, the military also burned some body parts of the detainees using lighted cigarettes, slashing with sharp objects such as razor and knives, wounded the detainees with firearms, pouring water through the nose similar to waterboarding, drowning them in fetid water, upside-down suspension, placing a heavy object on the knees and other joints of the detainees, genital mutilation, and rape (Rahmani, 2001).

The military also employed some psychological torture as well by using isolation, sleep and food deprivation, and faked executions. When confronted about

this, a military spokesperson responded that beatings do occur, but it's not really

torture (Amnesty International, 1993). To justify these unlawful practices, the

Indonesian government used the Anti-Subversion Law to supersede the Criminal

Code and Code of Criminal Procedure, which increases the detainees' vulnerability

to torture and ill-treatment. While the numbers of victims could not be determined,

it is estimated that at least 16,000 people including children were disabled because

of the tortures, 100 women were raped, and more were victims of sexual violence

(Djuli, 1999).

In addition to torturing the detainees, Indonesian authority was reported to

conduct ill-treatment and other forms of harassment towards civilians both in their

homes and in public places especially in areas thought to be the Free Aceh

Movement base. These ill-treatments include threats, beatings, night raids on

civilian homes, house-burnings, and occasional rape (Amnesty International, 1993).

Those responsible for both the torture of detainees and ill-treatment of civilians are

mostly military officials ranging from low to high ranking officers. These incidents

are mostly concentrated in areas suspected to be secessionist base in the districts of

Pidie, Northern Aceh, and Eastern Aceh. However, there are also reports about the

torture and ill-treatment of suspected Free Aceh Movement members and civilians

in the districts of Aceh Besar and Central Aceh (Djuli, 1999).

One such case is the torture of Drs Adnan Beuransyah. He was a journalist who

was convicted of subversion and subsequently sentenced for eight years by the

military in 1991. During his trial, he testified that he was tortured during pre-trial

detention by soldiers of the Sub-District Military Command (KOREM/012) post at

Lampineung, Banda Aceh (Amnesty International, 1993). He testified that he was

stripped to his underwear and handcuffed before being shoved into a room where

he was beaten and kicked until he was unconscious. He was then forcefully woken

up and beaten again until he had difficulty to breathe. This torture went on for about

an hour before he was moved to another room. He was blindfolded then beaten

again using a wooden block. His hair and nose were burnt with cigarette butts, and

he was electrocuted on his feet, hands, and genitals until he lost consciousness

(Amnesty International, 1993). He was tortured for three days while being forced

to confess to the allegations which he later did. Drs Adnan Beuransyah later said

that he admitted to all the allegations just to stop the tortures.

Another case of torture by the military is the torture of Syaifulah. He was an Acehnese who was working in Jakarta but went to Medan to visit his parents where he was subsequently arrested under the suspicion of being a supporter of the Free Aceh Movement. He was detained at a military base in Medan in 1990. According to the testimony of his cellmates, Syaifulah was taken from his cell and had his hands tied behind his back and his eyes covered before taken out of the room and moved to a yard near the cell. There the others can see Syaifulah being beaten and kicked with soldiers wearing combat boots and forced to drink urine (Amnesty International, 1993). He was also stripped naked and had his genitals squeezed with a pair of metal pliers. He was never returned to his cell and remains missing. The Indonesian government denied that Syaifulah was ever detained (UN Special Rapporteur, 1993).

The previously mentioned cases of tortures are just examples to illustrate how severe the tortures and human rights violations that the Indonesian government and military committed in Aceh during the Military Operations Zone period. As mentioned before, tortures and ill-treatment are commonly practised by the military as a deliberate and coordinated strategy to suppress the secessionist movement. The

sheer amount of a number of victims and how geographically widespread the cases are, reflect how organized this repressive strategy was. The comments and statement made by public and military officials imply that these acts of repression are part of a coordinated counter-insurgency strategy by the Indonesian government.

It is also important to note that according to the reports of Uppsala Conflict Data Program which records battle-related deaths during the second phase of the Aceh conflict has its first battle-related death on the 1st of May 1989 and from that point of time, there was a period of vacuum where no hostilities occurred. The second battle-related death registered on the 8th of September 1990 with a maximum estimate of 136 battle-related deaths by the end of 1990 (Petterson et al, 2019). It is important to note that Amnesty International reported that conflict-related deaths in 1990 were 1250 deaths.

This number includes both battle-related and non-battle related deaths. This allows us to interpret the difference as civilian deaths related to the repression operations. This includes unexplained death in custody, para-military related ones

and general violence against the civilian population by the warring parties. This tells us that around only 10% of all deaths during 1990 can be related to direct military confrontation. By the end of the conflict in 1998, Amnesty International (2013) reported that the total number of casualties from the Acehnese side was roughly around 12000. However, the Uppsala Conflict Data Program reported that by that time, there were only 155 battle-related deaths (Petterson et al, 2019). This means that roughly only 1,3% of the deaths during the Military Operations Zone period were battle-related deaths, and the rest are civilian casualties that were subject to repressive counter-insurgency strategies implemented by the Indonesian government.

4.4. Conclusion of the Free Aceh Movement Case

From the findings above, several points need to be highlighted. First, there is a stark identity division between the Free Aceh Movement and the Republic of Indonesia. The Acehnese people identity construct, which is composed of ethnic and religious identity, is in opposition to the Indonesian secular Pancasila identity construct (Schulze, 2004). The Acehnese people defined Acehnese identity through ethnic affiliation while the Indonesian national identity, disregard ethnic identity

and instead used a shared history of colonialism and struggle for independence to unite all the different ethnic group inhabiting the Indonesian archipelago (Aspinall, 2009).

As there is a clash between ethnic identity and national identity, the difference is also viewed in the language that both people use. The Acehnese people under the Free Aceh Movement identified the Acehnese tribal language as their official language and consequently as part of their identity. The Indonesian government, on the other hand, promoted the Bahasa Indonesia as a single national language and as part of the Indonesian identity (Dwi Winarno, 2006). The difference in the identity held by both the Free Aceh Movement and the Indonesian government means that the Indonesian government viewed that there is a potential of future conflict with the secessionists if they successfully seceded (Butt, 2017).

Aside from the potential of future conflict with the secessionists, another consideration from the Indonesian government is the potential of future conflict with existing security rivals such as Malaysia, the Free Papua Movement secessionists, and East Timor that Indonesia just annexed in 1975 and have not

gained full control yet. If the Free Aceh Movement successfully seceded, from Indonesia's perspective it may lead to these security threats getting encouraged to try to capitalize on Indonesia's loss and lead to more conflict with these existing security threats. The table below illustrates how the considerations are made in the case of the Free Aceh Movement Case.

POTENTIAL OF FUTURE CONFLICT		Identity Division	
		Indifferent/None	Opposed
Regional Dynamics	Peaceful	Future Conflict Unlikely	Future Conflict Likely
	Prone to Conflict	Future Conflict Likely	==Future Conflict Likely==

2Table 4.1. Table illustrating Indonesia's calculations of Potential of Future Conflict in the Free Aceh Movement case

With the ongoing territorial dispute with Malaysia and also the ongoing armed conflict with the Free Papua Movement secessionists and the Fretilin in East Timor as a perceived security rival, it can be said that the regional dynamic of the region is conflict-prone (Butt, 2017). Combined with the existing identity division between the Acehnese ethnic-nationalist secessionist movement and the Indonesian national identity construct, then Indonesia will view that future conflict with both the secessionist group and existing security rivals such as Malaysia, the Free Papua

Movement, and East Timor is likely. Since future conflict is likely with both the Free Aceh Movement secessionists and the other existing security threats, Indonesia cannot afford to let the movement be successful. As such, Indonesia chose to respond to the Free Aceh Movement with the use of violent force.

 After deciding to use violence to respond to the Free Aceh Movement secessionists, the Indonesian government must decide on the severity of the violence. According to the External Security Theory, the second independent variable of the level of third-party support is used to determine the severity of the violence (Butt, 2017). In the case of the Free Aceh Movement, the Indonesian government perceived that the secessionists received a high level of third-party support, especially from Malaysia (Tan, 2006).

In 1985, di Tiro managed to secure the support of Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi for the Free Aceh Movement. Gaddafi provided military training and equipment for the Free Aceh Movement fighters (Aspinall, 2009). Providing military training and equipment; however, only amount to moderate level of third-party support (Butt, 2017). The Indonesian government, however,

perceived that Malaysia provided a high level of third-party support to the secessionists. As mentioned in the previous sections, this perception of high-level support was publicly stated by the Indonesian Minister of Internal Affairs, Suryadi Sudrija (Straits Times, 1999). This perceived high-level of Malaysian support towards the movement came from the fact that aside from smuggling weapons through Malaysia, the Free Aceh Movement also recruited many Acehnese Malaysian and other Muslim that sympathized with their cause in Malaysia and the Malaysian government did not do anything to stop that (Tan, 2006). The Indonesian government saw this ignorance as a deliberate act of support for the movement.

With the perceived high level of third-party support from Malaysia, the Indonesian government reacted with the highest level of severity possible. The Indonesian government adopted a counterinsurgency strategy that, according to the External Security Theory can be categorized as repression. The strategies implemented by the Indonesian included acts that violate human rights such as extrajudicial executions, arbitrary detentions and forced disappearances, tortures and ill-treatment of civilians, unfair political trials and unethical military tactics such as the Wall of Fence tactics and the *Sishankamrata* strategy (Amnesty

International, 1993). The overall scale and the level of organization of the acts of

repressions coupled with public statements from high-ranking military officials

mean that everything was part of a coordinated counter-insurgency strategy with

only 1,3% of deaths during the conflict were attributed to battle-related deaths while

the rest are civilian deaths.

From the explanations above, we can see that the perceived high-level of

third-party support received by the secessionists resulted in the Indonesian

government to adopt a strategy with the corresponding level of violence as well.

The collective and organized repressive counter-insurgency strategy that claimed

the lives of a thousand Acehnese seemed to confirm the External Security Theory's

explanation on state behaviour against secessionists are based on the level of third-

party support it received. To prove whether this is the case, the author will use a

second case in which the circumstances are slightly different and see whether it will

make a difference to the resulting dependent variable.

4.5. Case Study 2: Republic of South Maluku Secessionist Movement

The Republic of South Maluku (Molucca) or the RMS is a secessionist

movement that emerged from the Southern Maluku region which is part of

Indonesian territory. This movement declared independence from Indonesia on

April 25th, 1950. At the time, Indonesia was not a unitary state as it is today but was

a federation of states under the name of Republic of the United States of Indonesia

or better known in Indonesia as Republik Indonesia Serikat (RIS) and the Maluku

regions were part of State of East Indonesia, one of the United States of Indonesia's

constituents. The movement is a Protestant Malukan ethnic-nationalist movement

which seeks to gain independence from the Muslim Javanese dominated Indonesia

(Chauvel, 1990).

While the movement itself still exists today as a government in exile in the

Netherlands, the armed conflict has ended lasting from 1950 to 1963 the most

decisive battle was the invasion of Ambon in 1950 where the movement was

decisively defeated in a single military operation and then retreated to the nearby

Seram island to engage in a low violence guerrilla warfare for the next 13 years

until 1963 before escaping to the Netherlands in 1966 after their leader and

president Chris Soumokil was captured and later executed by the Indonesian

government (Bertrand, 2002).

4.5.1. Independent Variable I: Potential of Future Conflict

This section will discuss the first decision that a state has to choose when dealing with a secessionist movement is whether to engage in negotiations and concessions or use force. Following the theoretical framework explained in the previous chapter, how states calculate this is based on the potential of future conflict with either the secessionists if they succeeded in seceding, and with other existing states in the region. This discussion will be divided into two sub-sections.

The first sub-section will discuss the identity division between the secessionists and the Indonesian national identity. This will illustrate how the Indonesian government perceive the threat posed by the RMS secessionists and measure the likelihood of future conflict with them should they succeeded in seceding. The second sub-section will discuss the potential of future conflict with other existing states or in this case colonial powers who occupy territories in the region, namely the Dutch and British colonial powers. This will be measured as the region's proneness to conflict, which will include how Indonesia perceive the aggressive intentions of the colonial powers and the threat they posed based on their

geographical proximity to Indonesian territories.

4.5.1.1. Identity Division between Republic of South Maluku and Indonesia

There are two major divisions of identity between the Maluku people and the majority Javanese people of Indonesia. First, the nationalist construct of the Republic Maluku Selatan (RMS) is ethnic-nationalism as opposed to the civic-nationalism Pancasila national identity construct created by the Sukarno-led Indonesian government (Chauvel, 2008). Republic of South Maluku's ethnic-nationalism is defined through ethnic group affiliation, language, and religious belief (Cribb & Kahin, 2004). In addition to that, the Maluku people also saw themselves as culturally more European than Indonesian (Bartels, 1990). This is because the Maluku people had different colonial experience compared to the mainland Javanese people.

The Maluku region was the main producer of nutmeg and clove, which were very valuable during the colonial period. That is why the colonial administration desired to strengthen their grip on the region and subjected the Maluku people to

radical social and cultural changes. Part of these changes was the effort to spread

Christianity towards the Maluku population and later when the spice trade became

less important, the incorporation of the Maluku people to the Dutch Colonial Army

known as KNIL and as lower-level administrators of colonial rule (Bouman et al,

1960). Converting to Christianity also allowed the Maluku people with access to

Western education which gave them better schools, higher literacy rate, higher

fluency in Dutch and other languages, and more prominent positions in the colonial

bureaucracy (Ellen, 1983).

These cultural assimilation efforts were so effective that the Maluku people

identified themselves as Europeans at least culturally and wanted to become

European at least in a lifestyle-sense (Kraemer, 1958). This does not mean that they

desired to be European per se, but they wanted to be recognized as the European

counterpart of the indigenous people in the colonial territories while at the same

time also distinguishing themselves as a class above the other Indonesian

indigenous people, namely the Javanese (Bartles, 1990). Examples of these are how

the Maluku people at the time revered the flag of the Netherlands and had pictures

of the royal family in their houses, and their use of Dutch in their daily lives (Bartels,

1990). This self-identification as Dutch even led to the adoption of the derogatory term "Black Dutch" given by their Muslim Javanese counterpart because of their loyalty to the Colonial Government and perception as collaborators as a source of pride and legitimacy as, European (Chauvel, 1990).

Aside from their self-identification as Dutch, the division of identity between the Maluku people and the Javanese majority Indonesian population lies in their physical appearance, ethnic group affiliation, language, and religious beliefs. Physically, the Maluku people are dark-skinned with curly hair because they are part of the Melanesian group of people while the Javanese people are Austronesian with fairer skin (Taylor, 2003). Linguistically, the Maluku people are also quite different from their Javanese counterpart. Aside from the Dutch language, The Maluku people also have their own language which is derived from Malay-Polynesian while the Javanese-majority Indonesian speaks Bahasa Indonesia which was the official state language derived from an amalgamation Melayu, Arabic, and Sanskrit (Ellen, 1983). Some tribal groups also speak Ambonese, but since the Maluku people were western educated and were also incorporated into administrative and military positions by the colonial administration, they mainly

spoke in Dutch fluently while the Muslim Javanese majority of Indonesia did not (Ellen, 1983).

The most divisive identity division between the Maluku people and the Javanese Indonesian, however, lies in their religion. As mentioned before, the majority of Indonesians are Muslims, and that also includes the Javanese majority while the Maluku people are Protestant Christians. Christianity became the most significant marker of the Maluku people's self-identification as European because it is the one identity overlaps that they have with the Dutch colonialists (Kraemer, 1958). It also served to distinguish themselves from the rest of the indigenous population who were either Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists, and animists. According to the Maluku people at the time, being a Christian Maluku also put them above the non-Christians and subsequently, other ethnic groups, including the Javanese as well (Bartels, 1990). This created an even bigger chasm socially between the Christian Maluku people and the rest of the Muslim majority Indonesian especially when the Indonesian National Revolution started in 1945.

During the Indonesian National Revolution in 1945, the Indonesian were

trying to create a national identity to unite the different ethnic groups from the archipelago against the Netherlands (Reid, 1974). During an independence struggle, it is common to draw upon symbols and idioms that distances the oppressed from the oppressor as much as possible and unite the different but mostly Muslim Indonesian ethnic groups (Ellen, 1983). Therefore, during the struggle, the Indonesians drew upon the exact opposite of the colonial identity, which includes Christianity.

The Indonesian National Revolution and subsequently the Indonesian national identity construct, while secular in nature was rife with Islamic home-grown symbolism and idioms where the Arabic word "Allahuakbar" which means "God is Great" and is one of the most commonly associated words with Islam was used as a rallying call by Indonesian commanders (Frederick, 1982). Despite the secular nature of the Indonesian national identity construct, Islam is still held by the majority of Indonesians and as such, still plays a large role in the formation of national identity and culture of Indonesia. The usage of Islamic elements in the formation of Indonesian national identity created a stark identity division between the Protestant Maluku people and the Indonesian population especially with the

majority of Muslim Javanese people (Ellen, 1983)

.

The usage of Islamic symbols and idioms during the Indonesian National Revolution, as well as the clear identification of the Maluku people with Christianity and Dutch identity, stoked the fears of the Maluku people of being overwhelmed by the Muslim majority Indonesian (Chauvel, 1990). As part of the decolonization of Indonesia, a societal change was happening, especially in the religious component of the government. Rather than living under a Christian Dutch ruling elite, the minority Maluku people will live under a predominantly Muslim government which were already hostile to them because of their history of supporting the colonial rule.

The opposite identity between the Dutch-Christian identity that the Maluku secessionists held and the albeit secular but still heavily influenced by Islam Indonesian national identity, led the Indonesian government to view the secessionists as having aggressive intentions and therefore, have a high likelihood to be antagonistic if it succeeded in seceding from Indonesia especially since Sukarno himself perceived that this secessionist movement was propagated by the

Dutch (Puar, 1956). The Maluku people's self-identification with European Christian identity has significant cultural value. Historically, the Dutch were considered as the enemy by the Indonesians and as such puts it into direct opposition with Indonesia's national identity. This led Indonesia to believe that future conflict with the secessionists was likely (Chauvel, 1990).

4.5.1.2. Region's Proneness to Conflict: Geopolitics and Colonial Presence in the Southeast Asia Region

This section will discuss the second part of the first independent variable, potential of future conflict with existing powers in the system. The discussion will mainly discuss Dutch colonial forces as Indonesia's rival in the region and the relations between the two parties, which included the history of armed conflict and diplomatic struggle. The perceived hostility and aggressive intentions of the colonial forces, along with the geographical proximity of the two parties led Indonesia to believe that should the RMS succeeded in seceding, it might present an opportunity for the Dutch to capitalize on Indonesia's recent loss and reconquer Indonesian territories again. This section will also slightly touch upon the presence of British colonial forces in Borneo and other territories which included present-

day Malaysia, Brunei Darussalam, and Singapore as another security threat because of Indonesia's strict anti-colonial/western views at the time and the fact that the British forces were geographically close to Indonesian borders.

When the Republic of South Maluku proclaimed its independence from Indonesia in 1950, Indonesia was a newly established state itself and surrounded by colonial powers that it perceived as hostile to it (Burgess & Pinder, 2007). To give context, Indonesia unilaterally declared its independence at the end of the Second World War in 1945 from Japanese rule and proclaimed itself as the Republic of Indonesia. This independence, however, was under threat from the Netherlands who wanted to reclaim the region, which was part of their colonial territories for over 350 (Ricklefs, 2008). This led to a four year long(1945-1949) armed conflict between the Indonesian nationalists and the colonial forces(Anak Agung, 1995).

The Netherlands viewed Indonesia's declaration and independence movement as a Javanese ethnic-nationalist movement and did not consider it as a nation-wide movement. Therefore, they were confident and determined to regain control of the Indonesian territories (Ricklefs, 2008), especially the natural

resources-rich outer islands such as Sumatra and Maluku region. This led to a full-blown independence war between the Indonesian and the colonial forces. During the duration of the conflict, Indonesian and Colonial leadership engaged in several negotiations and agreements namely the 1946 Linggarjati Agreement (Kahin, 1962), the 1947 Renville Agreement (Ide Anak Agung, 1973), the 1949 Roem-Roijen Agreement (Feith, 2008), and the 1949 Dutch-Indonesian Round Table Agreement in Den Haag (Ricklefs, 2008). The purpose of these agreements was to end the armed conflict and discuss the matter of sovereignty over territories, the Indonesian leadership under Sukarno viewed them as a Netherlands ploy to slowly regain control of Indonesian territories (Ricklefs, 2008). This perception of aggressive intentions was based on their willingness to use force to regain control of Indonesian territories before the start of the conflict in 1945, but engaged in negotiations because of their weakened state after the Second World War, and even then the Colonial forces still mounted armed attacks against Indonesian forces in between the previously mentioned negotiations and agreements (William & Robert, 1993).

The Indonesian also perceived the agreements as disproportionately benefit

the Dutch, which fueled their perception that the agreements were simply ploys to stall and regain control of their former territories. For example, the Linggarjati Agreement in 1946 only acknowledged the Republic of Indonesia's rule over the islands of Java, Madura, and Sumatra and that the Republic will become a part of a bigger federal United States of Indonesia along with the State of Borneo and the Great Eastern State which is comprised of the Eastern Dutch Indies colonial territories (Ricklefs, 2008). The United States of Indonesia which was also known as the Dutch Indies was to become a part of the Netherlands-Indonesian Union along with the Netherlands, the Netherlands Antilles, and Suriname with the Dutch Monarch as the head of state (Kahin, 1952; Ricklefs, 2008)

After the agreement was signed, the colonial administration started establishing more federal states to become the constituents of the United States of Indonesia such as the East State of Indonesia which included the spice-rich, Dutch-supporter Maluku region. This means that the Republic of Indonesia will be outnumbered in terms of political power in the parliament and also surrounded by what it perceived as Dutch puppet federal states (Ide Anak Agung, 1995). While in February 1947, Republican leadership fully ratified the agreement, when the Dutch

ratified the agreement on March 1947, it was a different version of the agreed terms

(Ricklefs, 2008). There were also disagreements on the implementation of the

agreement, including the transfer of sovereignty over the West Papua territories.

Dutch co. The Dutch reneged on that deal, and the Indonesian Republican

leadership did not accept this (Kahin, 1952). On July 1947, the Dutch cancelled the

agreements and commenced a military assault codenamed Operatie Product on the

Republican territories of Java and Sumatra with the intent on regaining control over

those territories (Ricklefs, 2008).

Figure 3. Map of the United States of Indonesia according to the Linggarjati Agreement with the
Republic of Indonesia in control of the islands of Java and Sumatra

.

This back and forth of armed conflict and negotiations between the

Republican leadership and Dutch colonial administration continued until 1948. Up

until this point, control over Republican territories changed several times either

through military campaigns or agreements such as the Renville agreement between the Republic of Indonesia and the Dutch. (Fischer, 1959). This agreement was disproportionately favourable to the Dutch. They managed to recapture the majority of Java Island through this agreement which agreed on a territorial line called the van Mook line to divide the island of Java between the Republic of Indonesia and the Dutch forces.

According to the image below, the red areas are under the control of the Republic of Indonesia while the rest are under Dutch control. While the Republican managed to control some major cities, they were surrounded by colonial territories and forces. They were also isolated from food-producing regions and as such is cut from their supply line resulting in the scarcity of food, clothing, and ammunition for the Republican forces (Kahin, 1952). While initially, the Republican leadership under Sukarno rejected the agreement, they were forced to accept because of the ammunition shortages that they suffered at the time. They were also worried that the Dutch might launch another major military operation similar to Operatie Product, which managed to recapture some parts of Java island in 1947 (Ide Anak Agung, 1995). The circumstances meant that the Republican forces could not afford

another major military attack since they did not have the resources necessary to mount a defensive effort (Ricklefs, 2008). However, the truce did not last long, and the armed conflict soon began again due to mistrust between the two parties (Reid, 1974).

Figure 4. The van Mook line dividing Java island between the Republic of Indonesia and Dutch forces according to the Renville Agreement.

In 1948, the Republic of Indonesia suffered two major rebellions. First, is the Darul Islam rebellion in May 1948, which aimed to establish an Islamic theocracy in Indonesia (Van Dijk, 1981). Second, is the Communist rebellion instigated by the Indonesia Communist Party (PKI) and the Indonesia Socialist Party (PSI) (Kahin, 1952). The colonial forces soon launched a second military offensive codenamed Operation Kraai or more commonly known as the Second Dutch Military Aggression in trying to reclaim the Republic-controlled territories

(Zweers, 1995). This operation managed to capture Indonesian leaders such as President Sukarno, Vice President Hatta, and ex-Prime Minister Sutan Sjahrir; and reclaimed the island of Java entirely (Kahin & Kahin, 2003).

While it was a successful military operation where the Dutch managed to achieve their objectives, they were condemned by the international world and was forced to halt the operation and agree to a ceasefire, however the conflict still continued in the form of guerilla warfare until May 7 with the signing of the Roem-Roijen Agreement, the release of Indonesian leadership, and the subsequent Round Table conference which will transfer sovereignty of the former Dutch Indies territories over to the United States of Indonesia with the exception of the West Papua (Ricklefs, 2008). This means that the Dutch still has a foothold in the region and more importantly, at close geographical proximity to Indonesian territories. Seeing this as a threat, led Sukarno to initiate political manoeuvring to replace the Colonial-sponsored federal states form which the Republican leadership always views as a colonial divide and conquer strategy with a unitary state form under the new Republic of Indonesia (Kahin, 2003).

Colonial presence in West Papua which is still a contested territory between Indonesia and the Netherlands along with their history of conflict led Indonesia to believe that a successful secession by the RMS will encourage the Netherlands to try to reconquer Indonesian territories again (Puar, 1956). This concern is not unreasonable since they already tried something similar before during the Darul Islam and Communist rebellion in 1948 (Ricklefs, 2008). Aside from the Dutch, the presence of British colonial powers in present-day Malaysia, Brunei Darussalam, and Singapore also added more tension to the region. Indonesia's strict anti-colonialism/western view at the time meant that they view any presence of colonial forces in the region is problematic to their security.

The presence of Netherlands colonial forces which are hostile to Indonesia and are determined to reclaim their former territories means that the region is prone to conflict. Combined with the stark division of identity between the secessionists and the Indonesian's national identity led the Indonesian to believe that it is best to deal with the secessionists using force. The question is, how much violence should they use? The next section will explain what determines Indonesia's level of violence in dealing with the RMS secessionist movement.

4.5.2. Independent Variable 2: Dutch Support for the RMS Secessionist Movement

This section will discuss what determines the level of force that is being used by Indonesia against the Republic of South Maluku secessionists. The Indonesian government responded to the Republic of South Maluku secessionist movement with a military operation with a level of violence that corresponds with the militarization level of violence according to the External Security Threat theory used in this research. How a state determines how much violence is used is based on how much third-party support the secessionists have which in this case will refer the Colonial support for the Republic of South Maluku secessionist movement.

While there are limited records of financial or military support by the Dutch towards the Republic of South Maluku secessionist movement, Indonesia still viewed the movement as a colonial ploy to regain a foothold in Indonesian territory. Especially since this movement is a response to the Republic of Indonesia's political manoeuvre to change the federal-state form to a unitary state form (Ellen, 1983). This is based on the fact that the two previous rebellions that Indonesia suffered

before the start of the Republic of South Maluku conflict, the Andi Azis rebellion and the Westerling rebellion were perpetrated by Colonial Army more commonly known as KNIL, whose soldiers refused the dissolution of the federal state into the unitary state Republic of Indonesia (Puar, 1956).

The armed forces of the Republic of South Maluku secessionists were comprised of around 4000 Christian Maluku KNIL soldiers that were under Dutch command (Chauvel, 1990). When the colonial administration transferred sovereignty of the Dutch Indies territories, the KNIL soldiers were supposed to be demobilized and then incorporated into the Indonesian Armed Forces. However, the Christian Maluku KNIL soldiers refused to do so out of fear for retribution for their participation in KNIL military operations against the Republic of Indonesia, and also because of their Christianity (Ellen, 1990).

In an official statement put out by the Minister of Information Yusuf Abdullah Puar in 1956, the Indonesian government perceived an external threat by the Dutch through their support to the Republic of South Maluku secessionist movement. According to the Indonesian government, the Dutch were responsible

to demobilize the KNIL armed force and deliver the discharged soldiers to the Indonesian authority to be incorporated into the Indonesian Armed Forces as agreed in the Round Table Discussion. However, they did not demobilize KNIL as agreed, and the KNIL soldiers that were stationed in Ambon later became the backbone of the Republic of South Maluku's armed forces (Puar, 1956).

Another incident that also led the Indonesian government to believe that the Dutch supported the secessionist movements is regarding the transfer of weaponry and military equipment (Puar, 1956). The Dutch were supposed to deliver the KNIL weaponry and military equipment to the government of Indonesia when they left Indonesian territories, however they failed to do so and just left them in the care of the existing KNIL soldiers that they were supposed to demobilize (Chauvel, 1990; Puar, 1956) The fact that the secessionists' armed forces are comprised of ex-KNIL soldiers with Dutch weaponry and equipment that they left behind gave Indonesia reason to believe that the movement was supported by the Dutch (Chauvel, 1990).

This perception is echoed by public statements made by Indonesian officials during the conflict. Sukarno blamed the Dutch for deliberately leaving

their weaponry and equipment for the secessionists to use when they were supposed to deliver them to the Indonesian National Army when they leave (Puar, 1956). These accusations were publicly stated by the Indonesian president, Sukarno in his speech when addressing the public during the Independence Day celebrations on 17th August 1951. In his speech, Sukarno said "…this secessionist conflict is one of the two ways that the Dutch tried to impede our revolution. Even though the KNIL were supposed to be demobilized, the Dutch did not do that and let them join the South Maluku secessionists." (Puar, 1956).

The Indonesian government also accused the colonial forces of providing logistic support for the secessionist leader Soumokil when he travelled from Makassar to Ambon to avoid arrest by the Indonesian government for his involvement in the Andi Aziz rebellion. Before he can be arrested for his involvement in the rebellion, Soumokil escaped from Makassar to Ambon by using a Dutch bomber plane (Puar, 1956). The Dutch also admitted to transporting Soumokil from Makassar to Ambon by using their plane but denied any involvement in the movement (Chauvel, 2008). However, due to the involvement of KNIL soldiers under Dutch command in the Westerling and Andi Aziz rebellion,

the Indonesian government concluded that the Republic of South Maluku secessionist movement is another ploy to regain control over Indonesian territories or at least supported by the Dutch due to their cultural closeness and the Maluku people's historical loyalty to them (Puar, 1956).

The Republic of South Maluku, at the time, recognized that engaging the Indonesian military head-on will put them on a disadvantage and will need international recognition and support for it to survive. Therefore, it established diplomatic and trade relationship with the Dutch in Dutch New Guinea in present-day West Papua, another region which was being contested by the Dutch and the Indonesian (Chauvel, 1990). Dutch military officials and Maluku people who were residing in the Dutch New Guinea also provided the secessionists with military intelligence and tactical advice while also providing arms and ammunition for the secessionists (Chauvel, 1990).

Despite the limited records of material support given by the Dutch government to the secessionist movement, Indonesia at that time believed that the

movement was a Dutch ploy or at least supported by the Dutch as part of a strategy

to regain control of Indonesian territory (Chauvel, 2008; Puar, 1956). The fact that

the secessionists' armed forces are made up of ex-KNIL soldiers that were

supposedly under the command of the colonial administration and therefore their

responsibilities to demobilize and deliver to the Indonesian government and that

the weaponry and equipment that they are using are also the ones that the Dutch

failed to deliver to Indonesia led the Indonesian leadership to believe that the Dutch

deliberately did so to support the secessionists. This led to the decision to

commence a military operation to end the movement, which culminated with the

invasion of Ambon (Puar, 1956).

4.5.3. Indonesia's Response: Military Operation to Pacify the Secessionists

The Indonesian government believed that the Republic of South Maluku

secessionist movement was supported by the Dutch by deliberately letting the ex-

KNIL soldiers join the movement and leaving enough weaponry and military

equipment. It viewed this act as providing the secessionists with military training

since the ex-KNIL soldiers were better trained than the Indonesian Armed Forces

which were made up of mostly militias at the time, and with weaponry and military

equipment. Therefore, the Indonesian government decided to launch a military offensive aimed to end the movement swiftly. To achieve this objective, the Indonesian government deployed almost 20.000 troops with the hope that the sheer number advantage will coerce the secessionists to give up peacefully (Puar, 1956).

The military operation was codenamed Military Operation Movement III, which was led by Colonel Kawilarang (Chauvel, 1990). The operation was announced on July 1950 and started with naval blockade surrounding the islands of Buru, Seram, and Ambon. The army was instructed to be precise and to avoid any civilian casualties (Puar, 1956). When the Republic of South Maluku declared its independence, they were backed by 1739 KNIL soldiers, which included 1080 Malukunese which were stationed in Ambon (Chauvel, 1990). During the following months after the proclamation, more Malukunese ex-KNIL soldiers joined the secessionists numbering up to around 4000 fighters, including civilian recruits and militia (Puar, 1956).

Figure 5. Map of Indonesia showing the location of the islands of Buru, Seram, and the city of Ambon

The Republic of South Maluku armed forces occupied the islands of Buru, Seram, and the city of Ambon. The vanguard of the Indonesian Armed forces comprised of one battalion, and two companies first landed on Buru island in mid-July 1950. They rendezvoused with another battalion in the northern part of the island. These troops were assigned to assault an RMS military base in Namlea, Buru (Puar, 1956). The assault went smoothly because the RMS fighter retreated immediately, and the only casualties sustained were from the Republican side. The next target of the military operation in the city of Piru where Colonel Kawilarang sent three RMS soldiers who were caught in Namlea to convince the RMS forces

in Piru to surrender peacefully. This tactic failed, and the three soldiers were executed by the RMS forces in Piru before they retreated from the city.

The military operation continued on for a few months with Indonesian forces gradually pushing back the secessionists towards their main base in Ambon with minimum casualties from both sides (Chauvel, 2008). By November 1950, Indonesian forces managed to reach Ambon and were primed to take the city and quell the secessionist movement. Indonesian forces approached the city from the north and occupied Fort Victoria, an old colonial fort which was strategically located on a hill overlooking the city. The secessionists, however, already fled the town before the Indonesian forces set up their position and retreated southward and waged guerrilla warfare from their position (Puar, 1956). The invasion lasted for two months, where the Indonesian forces initially occupied the northern half of the island and facing fierce resistance from the secessionists (Chauvel, 1990). By November 1950, Indonesian forces occupied the island, and the secessionists' leadership along with a small number of fighters fled to the nearby island of Seram while the majority of the RMS fighters surrendered peacefully (Puar, 1956).

The island of Seram was uninhabited and densely forested, which made it an ideal place to hide for the secessionists. While the Indonesian forces still commenced small scale operations to try to find the secessionists in Seram up until Soumokil's capture in 1963, the armed conflict itself ended in 1950 with the capture of Ambon by the Indonesian forces. The Indonesian government's response to the Republic of South Maluku secessionist movement was swift and precise (Chauvel, 1990). The military was strictly ordered only to go after the ex-KNIL soldiers and avoid any civilian casualties as much as possible (Puar, 1956).

The information provided by them also allow us to infer to the scale of the Indonesian government's response. While the Maluku declaration of independence was declared on 25 of April 1950, the first battle-related death is not recorded until the 5th of August of that year. There was a significant period of time where no armed conflicts were recorded, although this can also be attributed to the time of mobilization of troops by the Indonesian government.

However, there is no considerable break on hostilities once the first death is registered. In the end, the conflict ended with an estimated number of roughly

4500 battle-related deaths. Government sources (Puar, 1956) estimated that the casualties suffered by the secessionists at around 500 and Indonesian casualties at around 4000. The 500 casualties suffered by the secessionists were comprised of around 100 soldiers and 400 civilians. These civilians are not non-combatants, but volunteer fighters who supported the secessionists during the armed conflict (Chauvel, 1990). It also must be noted that the problems of recollection of date attributable to the time make the corroboration of these numbers a daunting task.

The conflict ended with minimal civilian casualties and many civilians, and ex-KNIL secessionists members who made up the secessionists' armed forces were pardoned and allowed to continue their daily lives after the conflict ended (Puar, 1956). In total, the number of casualties from the secessionists was only around 500 people who mostly comprised of RMS fighters and a small number of civilians who fell during the invasion of Ambon (Puar, 1956). Only the secessionist's leaders were tried and later sentenced to prison with the length ranging from three to fifteen years and only the founder of the movement, Soumokil was executed (Chauvel, 1990).

4.5.4. Conclusion of the Republic of South Maluku Case

The Republic of South Maluku secessionist movement was considered as a security threat due to the changes that it brought and may bring should it be allowed to secede successfully. The stark differences in the identity held by the Republic of South Maluku and the Indonesian government meant that there is a possibility of future conflict with them.

Another consideration is the region's proneness to the conflict, which is measured through the existence of other states which are hostile or have aggressive intentions and are geographically close enough to endanger the state. In this case, the presence of Dutch colonial forces which were trying to reclaim Indonesian territories as their colonial territories fulfilled the condition of the region's proneness to conflict. With that circumstance, the potential of future conflict is likely, and as such, the Indonesian government could not afford to lose any territories and chose to deal with the secessionists using force.

POTENTIAL OF FUTURE CONFLICT		Identity Division	
		Indifferent/None	**Opposed**
Regional Dynamics	**Peaceful**	Future Conflict Unlikely	Future Conflict Likely
	Prone to Conflict	Future Conflict Likely	<mark>Future Conflict Likely</mark>

Table 4.2. Table illustrating Indonesia's calculations of Potential of Future Conflict in the RSM case

The next step is to determine how much violence is going to be used. The host-state will measure how much third-party support that the secessionists have to determine the severity of the violence. This measurement, however, is subjective to the host state's perception. In this case, the Indonesian government perceived that the Dutch provided weaponry and military equipment while facilitating the secessionists' war efforts through logistic assistance and deliberately neglect their responsibilities to demobilize the KNIL soldiers under their command which later will make up the secessionists' armed forces.

The Dutch also provided logistic aid by helping the secessionist leader, Soumokil avoids arrest by the Indonesian government by transporting him from Makassar to Ambon where he later founded the Republic of South Maluku (Puar, 1956). Dutch military officials and Maluku people who were residing in the Dutch

New Guinea also provided the secessionists with military intelligence and tactical advice while also providing arms and ammunition for the secessionists (Chauvel, 1990). This perception was also publicly stated by then Indonesian president, Sukarno. The colonial administration's support towards the Republic of South Maluku secessionists; however, only amounts to a moderate level of third-party support according to the measurement provided by the External Security Theory (Butt, 2017).

In response to the secessionist movement, the Indonesian government commenced a military operation codenamed Military Operation Movement III led by Colonel Kawilarang (Chauvel, 1990). The army was instructed to be precise and to avoid civilian casualties (Puar, 1956). The military strategy against the Republic of South Maluku was to try to use their numerical superiority to convince the secessionists to surrender peacefully (Puar, 1956).

The conflict ended with minimal civilian casualties and many civilians, and ex-KNIL secessionists members who made up the secessionists' armed forces were pardoned and allowed to continue their daily lives after the conflict ended

(Puar, 1956). In total, the number of casualties from the secessionists was only around 500 people who mostly comprised of RMS fighters and a small number of civilians who fell during the invasion of Ambon because they were supporting the secessionists in the armed conflict (Chauvel, 1990). Only the secessionist's leaders were tried and later sentenced to prison with duration ranging from three to fifteen years and only the founder of the movement, Soumokil was executed (Puar, 1956).

4.6. Case Studies and Analysis Conclusion

From the explanations above, the author had provided data on the cases of the Free Aceh Movement and the Republic of South Maluku Secessionist Movement. In both cases, the Indonesian government used force in response to the movement. However, the level of violence that was used in each case is different. Both cases are quite similar to each other. In both cases, the Free Aceh Movement and the Republic of South Maluku secessionists have an identity construct that is ethnic and religious-based (Ellen, 1983; Schulze, 2004). This is in opposition to the secular Indonesian national construct which is based not on ethnic and religious affiliations but on a shared history of colonialism and an imagined concept of being "Indonesian" (Dwi Winarno, 2006; Sukma, 2004).

In both cases, when the secessionist movement started, Indonesia was also living in a region that it perceived as prone to conflict. When the second phase of the Free Aceh Movement started in 1976, Indonesia was still in the middle of a territorial dispute with Malaysia (Haller-Trost, 1995). This dispute is relatively peaceful; however, with no real danger of escalating to an armed conflict. The bigger security threat came from its ongoing armed conflicts with the Free Papua Movement secessionists, and Fretilin in East Timor, which Indonesia just annexed in 1975 (Jones, 2002). In 1976, these two conflicts were relatively low violence, and Indonesia had them under control. However, if the Free Aceh Movement were allowed to succeed, it might encourage these two organizations to capitalize and escalate the level of conflict.

The division of identity between the secessionists and Indonesia and the perceived region's proneness to conflict at the time fulfilled the first independent variable's potential of future conflict considerations, which is why in both cases the Indonesian government chose to respond with the use of force against the secessionists. The difference between the two cases lies in the severity of the

violence. The determining factor for this is the second independent variable of this research, which is the level of third-party support for the secessionists (Butt, 2017).

In the Free Aceh Movement case, the Indonesian government perceived that the secessionists received high-level third-party support, especially from Malaysia (The Straits Times, 1999). While this perception might not reflect the actual conditions, it is based on this perception that the Indonesian government formulated their counterinsurgency strategies. Indonesia, at the time, perceived that Malaysia supplied both weaponry and manpower for the secessionists, which, according to the External Security Theory amounted to high-level third-party support (Butt, 2017). That is why Indonesia responded with a counterinsurgency strategy that implemented systematic repression (Amnesty International, 2013).

In the case of the Republic of South Maluku secessionists, Indonesia's perception of third-party support only amounted to moderate-level third-party support (Puar, 1956). According to Indonesia's perception, the Dutch supported the movement by deliberately leaving their weapons to be used by the secessionists and providing tactical intelligence, funding, and logistic support. This moderate-level

of third-party support means that Indonesia did not have to be as severe as it was with the Aceh case (Butt, 2017). That is why Indonesia responded with a military operation that is specifically targeting only the armed forces of the secessionists while trying to avoid civilian casualties (Puar, 1956).

The difference between the severity of the violence dealt against the two secessionist movements can be seen from the strategies adopted and the number of non-battle related casualties (Petterson, 2019). In the Free Aceh Movement, the Indonesian government enacted systematic repression as part of its counterinsurgency strategy. This strategy claimed around 12000 lives where over than 95% of casualties suffered by the Acehnese people were not battle-related and are civilians instead of combatants (Amnesty International, 2013). On the contrary, in the Republic of South Maluku case, the reported number of casualties suffered by the secessionists were only around 500 people where most of them are combatants (Chauvel, 1990).

5.0. Conclusion

As we have seen in the previous chapters the two case studies have been compared for their similarities and contrasted for their differences. In both cases, the secessionists have an identity construct that is in opposition to Indonesia's national one the State then concluded that the potential of future conflict with the secessionists existed. In addition to that, the region at the time of the start of both movements was also considered prone to conflict. According to these two considerations, the Indonesian government deemed that they must respond to the secessionists with the use of force. This seemed to answer the first research question of this Thesis which is "Why did Indonesia respond with force to the secessionist movements of Aceh and South Maluku?"

The second research question of this Thesis is "What are the factors that influence the level of violence used by Indonesia?" According to the External Security Theory, the severity of violence dealt by the state is determined by the level of third-party support received by the secessionists. This is where the difference lies between the two cases. The Indonesian government perceived that the Free Aceh Movement received a higher level of third-party support compared

to the Republic of South Maluku therefore, the level of violence dealt against the

Free Aceh Movement was also higher.

The difference in the level of violence can be seen from two points. First is the nature of the counterinsurgency strategy implemented. According to the External Security Theory, there are three levels of violence which corresponds to three levels of counterinsurgency strategies of the state. The case studies in this Thesis have two different levels of violence and therefore two different strategies. The Free Aceh Movement case has the highest level of violence where Indonesia implemented systematic repression which targeted not just secessionists combatants but also civilians in its counterinsurgency operations. The Republic of South Maluku on the other hand, received a lower level of violence with militarization counterinsurgency strategy. While in both cases the military were deployed, in the Republic of South Maluku case the military were not targeting civilians. They were ordered to specifically avoid civilian casualties and only target resisting enemy combatants.

Second, from the number of deaths recorded for each case. The number of deaths were divided into battle related combatant deaths and non-battle related non-

combatant or civilian deaths. Higher number of non-battle related deaths compared to battle related deaths indicates that systematic repression counterinsurgency strategies were implemented and therefore, has a higher level of violence. As in the Free Aceh Movement case, battle related deaths only amount to 1,3% of the total 12000 casualties of the counterinsurgency operations. Compare that with the case of Republic of South Maluku where battle related deaths from the secessionist side amount to almost 100% of recorded deaths with a total casualty of only 500. From these comparations we can conclude that the Indonesian government responded to the Free Aceh Movement case with a higher level of violence than the Republic of South Maluku.

While this seemed to confirm the hypotheses of this Thesis, the small sample of the Thesis and the limited variables used in the research design might not have a strong explaining power since there are other possible explanations that might be overlooked. The following section will discuss more about the limitations of this research and other possible alternatives.

5.1 Limitations and Further Research

This study was aimed specifically to test hypotheses with a specific set of conditions and similar circumstances. To further test the theory and hypotheses, more research is necessary with different case studies and different circumstances. The two case studies, for example had similar circumstances regarding the potential of future conflict. Further studies could try to do research on cases where there are is potential of future conflict and see whether the state still choose to use force or to engage in negotiations with the secessionists.

In doing the research, the author had to simplify many of the measurements such as the measurements of potential of future conflict to just a yes or no measurement. However, it is interesting to see the result of the first independent variable should it be measured in a different way. For example, it could be measured to a low, medium, and high potential of future conflicts rather than just a yes or no measurement. In the same way that the level of violence may be subject to a better categorization between pure military confrontation, dirty war, indiscriminate targeting of civilians or pure paramilitary activities. And in a more advance research try to construct a model that can be tested for correlations and causation.

The author is also conscious that the comparison in cases where there was no violence, the successionist movement was successful or the state did not react are not considered or cases in which one state may have different responses to the same challenge are not considered and can certainly try the robustness of the theory. The narrow perspective of the research designs also leave the possibility that there are other independent variables that might have been overlooked such as the influence of different leaderships which might result in a different outcome.

In conclusion the author believes that this paper is a stepping stone for the analyses of secessionism upon which much can be constructed. The use of international theory in cases that have long considered internal and unsuitable to study by it can potentially have good repercussion for the field of international relations and security studies. The case of South Maluku and Aceh provide a good base line for studying the violence responses in complicated situations and how this affects the severity of violence inflicted in the local population as well as the belligerent forces.

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