

Research Report:
Exploring the Outcomes of Summit-Diplomacy:
“A mixed-method Case Study on Japanese Prime Minister
Abe Shinzo’s Diplomatic Activities”

BRAKSTAD Sverre

51117006

January 2019

Research Report Presented to Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University.

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of

Master of Science in Asia Pacific Studies.

“International Relations” Division

立命館アジア太平洋大学

**Exploring the Outcomes of Summit-Diplomacy:
“A mixed-method Case study on Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s
Diplomatic Activities.”**

Abstract: Although embassies and diplomats have traditionally operated as the main actor of diplomatic representation abroad, the 20th and 21st century has seen a significant rise in the frequency of diplomatic summitry between high-level government officials. However, what are the actual political and economic effects of foreign visits by our political leaders? Do they have more substance, or are they simply an opportunity for political leaders to have a photo-op? A review of the literature suggests these exchanges have gradually become a core diplomatic function for the strategic management of international diplomacy realizing important national interest goals.

To better understand the role of summit diplomacy in regard to achieving national interest goals, this paper developed a list of hypotheses based on the research literature and relevant theories of how and why states use these diplomatic exchanges with other countries. Subsequently, the researcher selected a case study on Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s bilateral visits abroad to investigate the contributory effects in achieving Japanese national interest goals. Using a dataset covering Prime Minister Abe’s travels, this study investigates whether the diplomatic activities of the Japanese Prime Minister had any significant security and economic effects on the bilateral ties of seven visited countries. By analyzing trade-levels, press conference summaries, and public joint-communique of Prime Minister Abe’s diplomatic visits, the empirical analysis demonstrated significant outcomes in the form of negotiations of international arrangements, and strategic signaling functions, showing that the summit meetings was contributory in achieving economic and security-related national interest goals. The empirical observation of the case study also demonstrated findings consistent and conclusive to the theories used, thereby identifying relevant and applicable theories for further use in exploring and understanding the functions of summit diplomacy.

Keywords: Diplomacy, Summit meeting, Personal diplomacy, Foreign policy, Japan, Abe Shinzo, Economic interest, Security interest, mixed-method.

Acknowledgment

This research has not been possible without the valuable input and feedback from the academic professionals at Ritsumeikan Asia-Pacific University. I want to express my gratitude to my thesis supervisor, Professor ROTHMAN Steven B. in providing overall guidance throughout the research process. I would also like to express appreciation to Professor MIZUTANI Akira, in supplementing in-depth knowledge of diplomatic history and suggesting valuable sources of Japanese diplomatic practices. Moreover, I want to thank Professor BUI Thanh Huong, in giving tips and advice on statistical data analysis techniques, and Professor JONES Thomas E. in suggesting relevant articles and help for the methodological framework. Finally, I would also like to give a special thanks to Professor KAZEDA Yoshinori for his careful reading of this research paper, and in giving high quality and constructive feedback during the examination procedures.

Certification

I, BRAKSTAD Sverre (51117006) hereby declare that the contents of this Research Report are original and have not been submitted at any other university or educational institution. Published and unpublished resources I have referred to in this paper have been properly cited and acknowledged.

SVERRE BRAKSTAD 2019/1/15

Table of Contents

Abstract:	i
List of Tables	v
List of Figures	vi
1.0 Introduction	1
1.1 Research Objectives	6
2.0 Conceptual Analysis & Theoretical Framework	9
2.1 Defining Diplomacy and Foreign Policy	9
2.2 Evolution and Historical Origins of Modern Diplomacy.....	11
2.3 Diplomatic Functions	14
2.4 Summit Diplomacy	17
2.4.1 Historical Origins of Summit Diplomacy.....	20
2.4.2 Significance of Summit Diplomacy	22
2.4.3 Summit Diplomacy and the Importance of Setting	26
2.5 Theories of Summit Diplomacy	33
2.5.1 The Role of Two-level Game Theory in Summitry	34
2.5.2 The Role of Communication and Signaling Theory in Summitry	39
2.5.3 The Prospect of Achieving National Interest Goals	46
3.0 Operationalizing the Theories & Hypothesis Development	52
3.1 Operationalizing Two-level-game Theory (agreements)	52
3.2 Operationalizing Costly Signaling Theory (communication)	55
3.3 Organizing hypotheses by National Interest Goals	56
3.3.1 Economic-contributory Summits.....	57
3.3.2 Security-contributory Summits	59
3.3.3 Noncontributory Summits	61

4.0 Methodology & Procedures	63
4.1 Hypotheses	63
4.2 Case study Methodology	65
4.2.1 Case Selection: Japan and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe.....	69
4.2.2 Sample Selection: Countries Visited	76
4.3 Research Design: mixed-methods sequential exploratory design.....	79
4.3.2 Qualitative Data and Method: Document Analysis	82
4.3.2 Quantitative Data and Method: EDA Time-series Analysis	89
5.0 Analysis	100
5.1 Palestine	100
5.2 Djibouti	105
5.3 Ethiopia	109
5.4 Mozambique.....	113
5.5 Brunei.....	117
5.6 Cambodia	121
5.7 Jordan	125
6.0 Summary & Conclusion	130
6.1 Summary of the Empirical Analysis	130
6.2 Conclusion.....	136
6.3 Further research.....	142
Bibliography	145
Appendices.....	154

List of Tables

Table 3.1: The four core needs of National Interest	49
Table: 3.2: Summit Diplomacy and Security/Defense agreements	53
Table: 3.3: Summit Diplomacy and Economic/Commercial agreements.....	54
Table 4.1: Hypotheses overview	65
Table 4.2: List of selected countries	78
Table 4.3: Document Selection Criteria	86
Table 4.4: Documents Analyzed.....	89
Table 5.1.1: Qualitative summary results (Palestine).....	102
Table 5.1.2: t-test for Japan's export to Palestine (Adjusted).....	104
Table 5.1.3: Control Chart (Palestine/annual)	104
Table 5.2.1 Qualitative summary results (Djibouti)	106
Table 5.2.2: t-test for Japan's export to Djibouti (Adjusted).....	108
Table 5.2.3: Control Chart (Djibouti/annual)	108
Table 5.3.1 Qualitative summary results (Ethiopia).....	110
Table 5.3.2: t-test for Japan's export to Ethiopia (Adjusted).....	112
Table 5.3.3: Control Chart (Ethiopia/annual)	112
Table 5.4.1: Qualitative summary results (Mozambique)	115
Table 5.4.2: t-test for Japan's export to Mozambique (Adjusted).....	116
Table 5.4.3: Control Chart (Mozambique/annual).....	116
Table 5.5.1 Qualitative summary results (Brunei).....	118
Table 5.5.2: t-test for Japan's export to Brunei (Adjusted)	120
Table 5.5.3: Control Chart (Brunei/annual).....	120
Table 5.6.1 Qualitative summary results (Cambodia)	123
Table 5.6.2: t-test for Japan's export to Cambodia (Adjusted).....	124
Table 5.6.3: Control Chart (Cambodia/annual)	124
Table 5.7.1 Qualitative summary results (Jordan).....	127
Table 5.7.2: t-test for Japan's export to Jordan (Adjusted)	128
Table 5.7.3: Control Chart (Jordan/annual)	129
Table 6.1: Summary results of hypotheses	132

List of Figures

Figure 4.1: Destination countries of Abe’s visit (2012-2015)	74
Figure 4.2: Proposed Impact of the high-level visit on Trade Flows	95
Figure 5.1.1: Monthly Japanese export to Palestine (Jan. 2013-Jan. 2017)	102
Figure 5.1.2: Scatter Plot (Palestine)	103
Figure 5.2.1: Monthly Japanese export to Djibouti (Aug. 2011-Aug. 2015)	107
Figure 5.2.2: Scatter Plot (Djibouti)	107
Figure 5.3.1: Monthly Japanese export to Ethiopia (Jan. 2012 – Jan. 2016).....	111
Figure 5.3.2: Scatter Plot (Ethiopia)	111
Figure 5.4.1: Monthly Japanese export to Mozambique (Jan. 2012-Jan. 2016)..	115
Figure 5.4.2: Scatter Plot (Mozambique).....	116
Figure 5.5.1: Monthly Japanese export to Brunei (Oct. 2011-Oct. 2015)	119
Figure 5.5.2: Scatter Plot (Brunei)	120
Figure 5.6.1: Monthly Japanese export to Cambodia (Nov. 2011-Nov. 2015) ...	123
Figure 5.6.2: Scatter Plot (Cambodia)	124
Figure 5.7.1: Monthly Japanese export to Jordan (Jan. 2013-Jan. 2017)	128
Figure 5.7.2: Scatter Plot (Jordan)	128

1.0 Introduction

Although embassies and diplomats have traditionally functioned as the main actor of diplomatic representation, the 20th and 21st century has seen a significant rise in the frequency of diplomatic summit meetings (meetings between the head of state/government) (Goldstein, 2008; Weilemann, 2000: 16). For instance, the frequency of summity in the European Union has risen dramatically, as reflected in an increase from 9% in average over the period 1977-1986 to 26% over the period 1997-2007 (Lavallée & Lochard, 2016: 4). These meetings are the highest form of diplomatic interaction, and in a world with digital instant-communication, summit meetings are still one of the most prominent ways to demonstrate alliance solidarity and cement political, cultural and economic ties between countries.

In recent years, summity in the Asia-Pacific has also seemed to be on the rise, as these exchanges have received considerable media attention. Chinese, Russian, Filipino, Japanese and American heads of state/governments are constantly seen in talks with each other and key partners abroad, while geostrategic interests (involving territorial disputes, influence, security-alliances, and commercial partners) melodramatically collide, as illustrated by the media (Xinhua net, 2015, South China Morning Post, 2017; The Diplomat, 2017). For instance, when Filipino President Rodrigo Duterte visited China and Japan in 2016-17, many observers and analysts jumped to various conclusions, ranging from a Philippine bandwagon-strategy to pitting China and Japan against each other (Deutsche Welle, 2016). Furthermore, the high frequency of mutual visits by Chinese and South Korean

leaders has also been cited as a source for closer trade ties between the two countries (Xinhua net, 2015).

Most media observers implicitly perceive face-to-face high-level diplomatic meetings as an effective instrument for achieving whatever is within a country's national interest. Critics, however, argue that higher level diplomatic interaction is disruptive (Giauque, 2001: 429), or declined in necessity in the age of globalization and development of modern communication methods (Neumayer, 2008: 230; Barston, 2014). The criticism is especially related to the revolution of information and communication technologies, which have fundamentally changed the traditional functions of face-to-face diplomatic communication. Indeed, modern political leaders communicate instantly with counterparts worldwide through video-feeds and telephones. From the rise of communication technologies, critics have emphasized the decreased necessity of traditional diplomatic communication procedures, as diplomatic exchanges of political leaders abroad involve a significant commitment of resources related to the cost of their absence from their normal duties (Berridge, 2005: 189; Lebovic & Saunders, 2016: 108).

Other criticism has come from professional diplomats arguing that diplomacy conducted by heads of state/government has the potential to lead to irrevocable blunders and are thereby better left to qualified diplomatic representatives. Indeed, according to Giauque:

The potential positive impact of summit diplomacy is best demonstrated in those rare cases when two leaders forge ahead of, or against, domestic opinion and reach agreements, settle conflicts, or symbolically bridge divides previously

thought to be immutable and thereby transform their countries' bilateral relations. Needless to say, such episodes are extremely rare, and the risks for the leaders involved are very high (Giauque, 2001:430).

Journalists such as Sol Sanders agree with the disruptive nature of the high-level meetings stating that:

The truth is that personal diplomacy, whether practiced by Franklin D. Roosevelt with the cool disdain of a Hudson River patroon or Henry Kissinger with his accent 'mit schlag', has largely led to disaster... intimacy among national leaders is probably not possible, nor is it beneficial (World Tribune, 2008).

These arguments are based on the belief that state diplomacy is best left alone to professional diplomats. However, considering that summit exchanges have increased in frequency, there seems to be little reason to believe that these types of interactions will disappear, thus remaining a key phenomenon in International Relations (IR) which necessitates closer examination.

Research Question:

To contribute to the debate surrounding the significance of face-to-face diplomacy conducted by high-level governmental officials, this study intends to explore, identify and categorize observable effects and outcomes associated with summit diplomacy. Based on the criticism against summitry, the research question proposed in this study is:

“How are summit meetings contributory in achieving goals related to national interest?”

Recognizing the symbolic value and the long-term improvement of relations by these types of diplomatic exchanges, as well as pre-negotiation by lower-level officials, the research focus in this paper intends to identify and explore observable economic and security-related contributory effects and outcomes.

Outline of the Research Procedures:

To answer the research question, the research plan was conducted in four stages. First, based on relevant concepts and theories in diplomacy-related literature, a list of hypothetical propositions was generated aimed at identifying the contributory effects of summit meetings by top-level officials. In this paper, summit diplomacy is conceptualized in functional terms, meaning it is perceived as an action, where the ‘effects’ were defined as outcomes and results associated with the action¹. Based on the review of literature and theories, three observable summit-effects contributory in achieving national interest goals were identified as: i) international negotiation of agreement (security and/or economic negotiations), ii) signaling strategic intentions (accompanied business representatives and/or joint security-related statement), and iii) increased trade performance. In order to distinguish between the different summit-effects, identified outcomes were categorized by

¹ “Effect” as defined by Mayfield Electronic Handbook of Technical & Scientific Writing. Accessible at: http://www.mit.edu/course/21/21_guide/affect.htm

whether the effects were instrumental in achieving normative core national interest goals, such as realizing economic prosperity, and enhancing national security.

The second phase applied the hypothetical propositions to a case study. Recognizing that summit diplomacy is a complex social phenomenon of human interaction, this research applied the case study methodology as the overarching approach in answering the research question. As pointed out by Yin (2009), case study design can be a beneficial methodological strategy when questions such as “why” or “how” are postulated in research problems, and when there are many explanations, or effects, related to the object of study. Hence, considering the complexities of summitry, the case study methodology served as a useful and viable approach in not only answering the research question but also generating a deeper understanding about summitry in general, its effects and outcomes, and how it unfolds within a real-world context.

Under the case study methodology in this research, a specific summit format was designated and specified into the foreign bilateral summit meetings of Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. Since being reelected in 2012, the Japanese Prime Minister has visited a quarter of the world’s countries in less than two years, which imply an active use of diplomatic summitry, thereby presenting itself as a suitable case to apply the theories and hypothetical propositions.

The third phase collected verifiable evidence from quantitative and qualitative data in order to empirically analyze the Japanese Prime Minister’s summit meetings to the seven countries. With the case study methodology as the overarching design, the researcher applied a mixed-method sequential approach through the utilization

of qualitative document analysis and quantitative exploratory time-series analysis of both numeral and document data. Subsequently, a sequential analysis was conducted on the selected individual summit meetings, identifying and categorizing the effects based on its contribution in achieving national interest goals.

The fourth and closing phase summarized the findings and concluded the research. In this paper, the empirical observations demonstrated significant outcomes in the form of concluded/introduced arrangements relevant to the case country, and strategically significant economic and security-related signaling functions. Hence, according to the findings, the researcher concluded that the case study summit meetings were contributory in achieving national interest goals. The research results also showed findings and observations consistent with the theories involved (two-level game theory and signaling theory), where the boundaries of the theories were explored and subsequently discussed. The final section presents prospective avenues for further research on summit diplomacy.

1.1 Research Objectives

The overall purpose of this research is to contribute to the discussions related to the significance of diplomatic exchange. Traditionally, the significance of face-to-face diplomacy has largely been overlooked by IR scholars in focusing on the state as the centerpiece in international interaction (Devin & Toernquist-Chesnier, 2011: 73). This perspective, however, often reduces diplomatic activities to an exercise in formalities and thus largely unessential (Sharp, 2009: 54-55). Hence, if the diplomatic exchanges were observed to be associated with significant strategic

signaling functions, and increases in bilateral trade, or the negotiations of significant economic or security-related arrangements, it will underscore the significance summit diplomacy in foreign relations, meanwhile demonstrating a counter-argument to the belief that summitry by high-level officials is irrelevant and disruptive.

A secondary motivation for this study is to provide additional information on East-Asian diplomatic activity, and its similarity/difference to western diplomacy, and whether it can offer a counter-point to prevailing assumptions. Within the English literature of international summit diplomacy, there are plenty of studies on the United States of America (US), European and Chinese summit meetings. Detailed English materials on Japanese leadership summitry, however, seems to be lacking or broadly categorized as following mercantilist foreign policies. Some recent observers even suggested that the Japanese Prime Minister travels extensively due to low approval rates in Japan because “reception he gets abroad is increasingly warmer than that at home.” (Washington Post, 2014). Hence, this research will add to growing literature on summit diplomacy and the economic and security-related effects on the bilateral relationship among states. If Japan and Prime Minister Abe’s summit meetings appear to have the same effects as other countries in the literature, general theories regarding summitry may be improved.

The rest of this paper is structured as follows: the second chapter provides a conceptual analysis of the literature on diplomacy, before presenting the main theoretical framework. The third chapter presents how this research operationalizes the theories and concepts, before producing the hypotheses which will guide the

research. The fourth chapter introduces the methodological framework, which contains the selected methods, procedures for data collection, and the analytical design. The fifth chapter presents the analysis, and the sixth chapter contains the summary/conclusion.

2.0 Conceptual Analysis & Theoretical Framework

The purpose of this chapter is twofold. Recognizing that summitry is part of the topic of diplomacy, the first sections are concerned with clarifying the meaning of relevant concepts in diplomacy-related literature. As such, the researcher first sought to clarify the relevant concepts, such as foreign policy, diplomacy, summit meeting, and diplomatic setting. Also, an analysis of the historical origins and relevant functions was conducted in order to get a better understanding of the object of study.

The second section contains a review of dominant theoretical approaches to diplomacy and summitry, such as international negotiation theories (two-level game theory) and communication theories (signaling theory). The last section presents how the researcher will label and organize the potential results of the research by categorizing them into core national interest needs, such as security/defense interest, and economic/commercial interest.

2.1 Defining Diplomacy and Foreign Policy

Diplomacy has a broad meaning and has a plurality of actors and are diverse in its methods. In the field of IR, British philosopher Edmund Burke is credited with the first use of the term in its modern form in 1796. Whereas formerly it was commonly known as 'negotiation,' Burke defined diplomacy to certain activities in international politics which are centered around human negotiation between two inter-state entities. Burke essentially defined diplomacy as communication between

official actors designed to promote and ensure objectives either by “formal agreement” or “tacit adjustment” (Berridge, 2005: 1-3; Sharp, 2009). In a more modern definition, Sir Harold Nicolson defined diplomacy as:

the management of international relations by negotiation; the method by which these relations are adjusted and managed by ambassadors and envoys; the business or art of the diplomatist (Nicolson, 1963: 5).

As such, state diplomacy embodies the specific activities of which states through their representatives articulate, coordinate and secure wider interests, using private talks, exchanges of view, lobbying, visits, threats, and other related activities. This definition of diplomacy is functional because it focuses on the roles and purposes of diplomatic representatives or “diplomatists” in Nicolson’s wording.

As pointed out by Barston (2014), however, diplomacy is an evolving concept that has increasingly recognized that various actors can perform diplomatic roles besides official envoys. In its modern form, diplomacy incorporates activities that can be carried out by other officials and by private persons under the direction of official actors. However, in traditional diplomacy the primary actors are mostly related to state officials ranging from: i) high-level representatives (head of state, head of government); to ii) lower-level embassy officials and diplomatic missions.

This is also a definition that encompasses more than the promotion of peaceful means. Instead, it applies to all inter-state relations, such as peaceful, hostile, and ceremonial. As pointed out by historical diplomacy scholar, Paul Sharp, it is thereby no coincidence that the word diplomacy is often used interchangeably with “foreign policy” due to its shared focus on interstate relations (Sharp, 1999: 36-37). Foreign

policy, however, Sharp argues, is best understood as how a country defines its interests or a country's "plan-of-action." Diplomacy, on the other hand, is best understood through a consideration of its "practices." Sharp thereby agrees with Nicolson and Burke's definition of diplomacy as a central activity in interstate relations.

Adhering to Burke, Nicolson (1963) and Sharp's (1999) definitions, diplomacy consists of the human political practice of interaction between states. The interaction itself evolve around promoting and negotiating the participant's respective foreign policies, or their diplomatic agenda. As such, diplomacy is thereby the method and processes by which states pursue their foreign policy strategies in order to achieve certain goals.

2.2 Evolution and Historical Origins of Modern Diplomacy

Currently, the most common example of both the use and platform of diplomacy is the activities of embassies. Through embassies, states utilize diplomats to promote their political and economic interests, negotiate, coordinate and solve problems, they gather information that is difficult to get and convey messages to foreign representatives (Barston, 2014; Berridge, 2008; Neumayer, 2008: 236). The development of embassies and consulates, however, did not appear suddenly. Contemporary diplomacy is as old as the modern international system of sovereign states itself, and perhaps older. A central theme in diplomacy literature highlights how the management and practices have developed over the years.

According to the research literature, the first historical origins of diplomatic missions and permanent ambassadors have its origins in the Italian peninsula in the 15th century AD, which is near the events leading up to the Peace of Westphalia, or the formation of the modern system of nation states. Indeed, a widely accepted notion by diplomatic scholars is that the first permanent diplomatic mission was established by the Duke of Milan at Genoa in 1455 (Neumayer, 2008: 230). Berridge (2005: 2), however, argues that older origins can be found in the middle-east in the 4th millennium BC, although the older types of diplomatic communication were slow, unpredictable and highly insecure. Also, diplomats before modern times were often related to the ruling family or other nobility in order to give them legitimacy during negotiation with officials abroad.

Thus, it was not before the 15th century in the Italian city-states when conditions were set for stable links of communications in a modern system (Berridge, 2008; Neumayer, 2008). Since then, the role and practices of diplomatic representation have changed considerably along the course of history. Until the 17th century, the responsible organ for diplomacy varied between different bureaucracies in the countries in Europe. In 1626, however, the first foreign ministry was established in France by King Louis XIII's chief minister, Cardinal Richelieu (1585-1642) (Berridge, 2005: 5). Cardinal Richelieu recognized that the various relations between the European countries needed to be continuously nurtured and attended. In order to attend to the French foreign relations, the French minister appointed resident ambassadors in all important capitals of Europe. Moreover, this included the establishment of a Foreign Office in charge of communicating, directing and

administering the diplomatic service. Over time, the international system followed suit with Britain establishing its first Foreign Office in 1782, the US in 1789, and Turkey, China and Japan² establishing their own Foreign Offices in the middle of 19th century.

With the establishment of foreign ministries, the diplomatic services came more under the direct management of the state, whereas the two traditional diplomatic branches – the foreign ministry and its representatives abroad - gradually unified (Berridge, 2005). Thus, it was only at the end of a long process that the leadership of foreign diplomatic relations has been centered in the hands of the government. Hence, as mentioned in the definition of diplomacy, whereas diplomacy is the means of which states pursue their foreign policies, these foreign policies are still framed in a significant degree in a country's office of Foreign Affairs.

Through the formation and centralization of the diplomatic services, certain diplomatic activities increasingly emerged. As noted previously, negotiation is broadly conceived as the main activity of diplomacy. The function to negotiate agreements between states, however, demanded certain special privileges. According to Jervis (1992), and Aaslestad (2015), who have done extensive comparative studies on the shaping factors of diplomacy, cite The Congress of Vienna in 1815 as one of the primary events shaping the conduct of diplomacy. The

² In Europe the profession of “diplomat” was first established, with the subsequent establishment of the Foreign Ministry institution/organization. In Japan, however, it was the opposite.

Congress's main purpose evolved around European leaders' negotiation with Napoleon and the relinquishment of territories seized by the French Empire.

Nevertheless, diplomatic scholars conceive this event by emphasizing that the Congress created new patterns of diplomacy in which it largely organized and laid down procedures for an institutional framework for modern diplomacies, such as diplomatic immunities and a defined diplomatic chain of command (such as ambassadors, ministers plenipotentiary, minister resident, and *chargés d'affaires*). From a legal perspective, the Congress laid the framework for a customary diplomatic law, in which its basic framework was included in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961 and remains one of the main legal frameworks for modern diplomatic law. It also gave the necessary privileges and immunities for resident diplomats.

This framework has remained remarkably robust throughout history. In an effort to undermine/reshape the 'set' functions of diplomacy, the Soviet Union attempted to reject all unwritten rules/manners as well as functional titles related to traditional diplomacy through purges and reformations in the 1930s and 1940s. Such efforts, however, brought severe confusion and annoyance in the international community, which arguably forced the Soviets to return to the original functions and system (Kocho-Williams, 2008).

2.3 Diplomatic Functions

Modern diplomacy functions through a network of embassies, consulates, and foreign envoys operating around the world. Barston (2014: 2-3) illustrates a

simplified overview of the practical functions of diplomacy, which he divides into six broad areas: i) “ceremonial representation,” ii) “assessment and reporting,” iii) “management of bilateral relations,” iv) “duty of protection” (consular service), v) “contributing to international order,” and vi) “international negotiation”. It is important to mention that the importance of each area varies between countries, and this overview represents a basic version of the day to day activities of modern diplomacy. They can also evolve and change through times of crisis.

For some countries diplomacy abroad means only the first category, i) ceremonial representation. Ceremonial representation, however, is often associated with the old-style function of diplomacy, whereas diplomats formally represented their country abroad in various courts and followed the procedural rules/protocol when meeting foreign officials. The second area, ii) assessment and reporting, can also be considered a more traditional function, which is the acquisition of information and assessment, reporting and advising to officials at home, as well as acting as a listening post or early warning system. The first American diplomat to the UK, John Adams (1735-1826), played in the most part ceremonial role but legitimized the independence of the US through his presence in the court of King George III. He arguably also provided valuable information about significant developments in Europe to the US (Ferling, 1994).

The third area, iii) management, are broadly concerned around the improvement of bilateral relations, such as the exchange and promotion of political, security, economic and cultural interest through lobbying, consultation, and coordination. Interestingly, commercial work was not of primary concern for diplomats until well

into the 20th century. Before this, economic and commercial interest was usually delegated to autonomous or semi-autonomous foreign trade services, such as the German Chamber of Commerce which was before the 1970s left to fend for itself. According to Berridge (2005), this changed when trading states, such as the UK and Germany, were growing increasingly concerned with low levels of world trade during the economic problems of the 1970s. In order to increase the efficiency of international commercial trade, a direction for many states was for the diplomatic services to absorb and use more resources in commercial functions such as export -and inward investment promotion.

The fourth area, vi) duty of protection, can also be conceived as a traditional function, which includes the consular services such as protection of citizens living and traveling abroad. This responsibility has also increasingly gained importance over the years, due to the growing mobility of traveling citizens (Berridge, 2005; Barston, 2014). A prominent example of this function can be illustrated by the efforts of the Norwegian diplomatic services in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2009, whereas two Norwegians, Tjostolv Moland, and Joshua French, were charged and convicted of the murder of a native Congolese. Through several years of extensive efforts of experienced diplomats, French was returned to Norway in 2017, although Moland died in prison during the process (Free Joshua French, 2014).

The fifth category, v) contributing to international order, relates broadly to the function of the multilateral assistance of regional and global developments in which diplomats work closely with international intelligence services and contribute to

structure in the international system. This can be exemplified through the attempted peace diplomacy by Norway during the 2002 Peace processes in Sri Lanka, whereas Norwegian Diplomats functioned as mediators between the Sri Lankan government and the Tamil Tigers (Sørnbø, Goodhand, Klem, Nissen, Selbervik, 2011). Although the efforts are mostly conceived as a failure in bringing an end to the civil war, it brought along several achievements, such as a temporary ceasefire agreement and mediated talks between the involved parties.

The final category, vi) international negotiation, remains as the core function of traditional diplomacy, and are included in many of previous categories. Barston (2014), however, contends that it is no longer only the preserve of professional diplomats. Indeed, as established earlier, diplomacy is not only what professional diplomats do. It can be carried out by other officials and by private persons under the direction of official actors.

2.4 Summit Diplomacy

As noted at the end of the previous section, diplomacy is a broad concept recognizing that various actors can perform diplomatic roles besides professional diplomats (Barston, 2014). While embassies and professional diplomats have become imperative in the promotion of long-term commercial interests and safeguarding its citizens abroad, it is the political leadership of the state, that has gradually taken over the traditional functions of handling short-term economic and political issues and agreements. Barston (2014: 43) argues that diplomacy conducted at the highest level of government has gradually become the workhorse

for the strategic management of relations and policy. Especially in meeting counterparts abroad, whereas heads of state and government are seen increasingly through both direct and indirect involvement of activities such as implementing joint investment projects, improving trade, defusing security threats and easing political tensions (Nitsch, 2007: 1797; Barston, 2014). The need for quick and substantive short-term successful results in high-level diplomatic negotiation is particularly true for democratically elected leaders, which seek to boost their popularity at home for potential reelection purposes (Putnam, 1988).

Moreover, the increasing presence of heads of government in traditional diplomatic procedures has to some degree reduced the role and influence foreign ministers, as well as the local ambassador. In many cases during summit meetings, foreign ministers and diplomatic services are often left struggling to discover what was actually said and agreed upon in these private exchanges (Barston, 2014). This is not to say that ambassadors have lost their function, but their traditional roles have arguably changed with the increasing frequency of other high-level diplomatic exchanges.

This development, however, has led to a new and growing literature that cites diplomacy conducted by high-level officials (Presidents, Prime Ministers, Kings, Queens) as an important feature in IR (see Barston, 2014; Berridge, 2005; Goldstein, 2008; Holmes, 2013; Nitsch, 2007; Denny, 2012; Leiby & Butler, 2005; Kastner, & Saunders, 2012; Lebovic, et.al. 2016; Devin et al., 2011; Wong, 2016). Although their perspective and methods vary, they all agree that summit meetings are an

important element in understanding what a state essentially prioritizes in its international affairs.

Meetings between top officials have numerous definitions, dependent on country and political system. In Norway and the United Kingdom, for instance, a state-visit (*statsbesøk*) is defined strictly to incoming and outward foreign visits by royalties, while official-visit (*offisielle besøk*) is the conducted by the head of government (Prime-Minister)³. In other countries, a state-visit is defined as a meeting between Presidents and Presidents/Prime Ministers. For instance, a visit by the Japanese Prime Minister to the US is usually referred to as ‘state-visit’ by official American records⁴. Other names include summit meeting, exemplified by the multilateral meetings between the member states, as defined by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)⁵.

In some cases, countries define these visits differently. For instance, during the 2004 G8 summit, a bilateral US-Japan meeting occurred on the sidelines. In Japan, it was recorded as a bilateral summit meeting, while US officials denoted it as a 40-minute working lunch (Barston, 2014). Nonetheless, despite various definitions, these types of meeting occur between two national leaders and are usually based in the capital city and involve ceremonial occasions (Goldstein, 2008). Due to the

³ The Norwegian Royal House Homepage: <https://www.royalcourt.no/>

⁴ The White House Homepage. Retrieved from: <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2015/04/28/welcome-us-prime-minister-japan-s-state-visit>

⁵ Official NATO Homepage. Retrieved from: https://www.nato.int/cps/ua/natohq/topics_50115.htm

numerous definitions of these types of visit, the researcher will adhere to the term as ‘*summitry, summit meeting, and summit diplomacy.*’

2.4.1 Historical Origins of Summit Diplomacy

As noted by Goldstein (2008) and Berridge (2005) the historical origins of summit diplomacy can be found in the occasional meetings between monarchs in medieval and early modern times. Due to logistics, mutual suspicion and fear, however, these personal meetings were extraordinary rare before the 19th century. For instance, the famous meeting between Henry VIII (1491-1547) and Francois I (1494-1547) in Calais, 1520, was aimed at a political meeting in goodwill, but occurred under distrust and was arguably meant as a way for the Kings to flaunt their wealth and power. Moreover, communication was also limited to boasting their greatness, which can be illustrated in how Ottoman Sultan Murad III and Queen Elizabeth I of England addressed each other in letters in the 16th century⁶. The communication evolved around being respectful, flaunting their power, while showing the utmost reverence for the recipient.

Arguably, a face to face meeting between two political leaders contained many complications and was, therefore, an exceptional diplomatic activity until very recently (Berridge, 2005). For instance, no American president met a European

⁶ See Hakluyt's Principall Navigations collection. Retrieved from: <http://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/12693/pg12693.html>

leader before 1918⁷, in which President Woodrow Wilson visited France (Goldstein, 2008). The occasional visits of the medieval princes and monarchs, however, were treated with ceremonial splendor, and some of this remains in the protocol of the modern-day summit meetings.

The 20th century has been marked an increase in the frequency of summitry, almost vertically so according to Goldstein (2008). Indeed, Lavallée et al. (2016) demonstrate that the share of summit meetings has increased dramatically in the European Union, as reflected in an increase from 9% in average over the period 1977-1986 to 26% over the period 1997-2007. Several reasons can explain the clear increase in the frequency of summit meetings.

First and foremost, technological advancement in communication and transportation made such opportunities easier and more accessible (Berridge, 2005: 153). Second, as mentioned earlier, the Congress of Vienna in 1815 brought an institutional framework for international cooperation among the political leaders and monarchies in Europe which is often conceived as the early stages of modern multilateral diplomacy. This was in turn fortified after two destructive world wars and the establishment of international organizations, such as the foundation of the United Nations (Barston, 2014). The frequent meetings between Truman, Churchill, and Stalin can exemplify this development during the Potsdam Conference and the establishment of the post-war order. Observers and politician were gradually led to

⁷ The first foreign outward visit of an American President occurred in 1909, where President William Howard Taft visited Mexican President José Domingo de Obaldía.

believe that important decisions in the nuclear age were far too important to be left to 'lower level' diplomats, which gave way to higher level exchanges.

Third, the decolonization of former European colonies in the 1950s and 1960s brought along the formation of regional organizations which in turn gave summitry a natural platform (Berridge, 2005). Thus, summit diplomacy changed from being a tense face-off between adversaries to a meeting more about the exchange of interests and the maintenance of diplomatic networks.

2.4.2 Significance of Summit Diplomacy

Termed as the highest form of diplomatic interaction, summit diplomacy is valued traditionally for its enormous symbolic or propaganda potential. During the cold war, for instance, the summitry between political leaders was often portrayed as alliance solidarity in the US vs. USSR paradigm (Berridge, 2005). Recently, however, several studies show that diplomatic exchanges signify more than symbolism and routine diplomacy.

First, there is a general perception that face-to-face diplomacy between political leaders is effective when compared with other means of communication, such as through phone and video-feeds. As stated on the website by the office of the German president:

[Summit] visits make a valuable contribution to foreign relations, for although the Federal Republic of Germany is represented abroad by its embassies, it is often only through face-to-face talks between leaders that productive outcomes

fair to both sides can be found. Whether the objective is coordinating policy, explaining German interests or resolving any bilateral problems that may arise from time to time, the kind of informal talks the Federal President has with foreign leaders during his trips abroad can be most helpful (Der Bundespräsident, 2007).

The studies emphasizing the significance of face-to-face diplomacy also substantiate this argument. Holmes (2013), approaches the relevance of face-to-face diplomacy through a social and cognitive psychology lens and points out that face-to-face meetings allow individuals to transmit information and empathize with each other, which reduces uncertainty. This, Holmes argues, provides a signaling mechanism that increases the likelihood of cooperation and the ability to come to agreements. Wong (2016) corroborates Holmes studies in arguing that it enables practitioners to exchange intentions better when compared to other means of impersonal communications which may be lost or distorted⁸. This, however, does not reduce telephone diplomacy to insignificance, but instead, that face-to-face meeting can prove more successful if the meeting has a substantive purpose, such as concluding or initiating negotiations and arrangements, or even improving trade performance. Telephone diplomacy has its advantages and particularly during times of crisis when communication is urgent (Berridge, 2005).

⁸ This will be discussed in greater detail in the theory section.

Nevertheless, as mentioned in the first chapter, the arguments provided by the scholars supporting face-to-face summit diplomacy is in stark contrast to critics who argue that high-level personal diplomatic interaction has proved disruptive in regards to improving bilateral relations (Giauque, 2001; *Sol Sanders in World Tribune*, 2008), or declined in necessity in the age of increased globalization and the development of modern communication technologies (Neumayer, 2008). As pointed out by Giauque:

Critics emphasize that government leaders often have little familiarity with, or interest in, the intricate details of diplomacy; that summits are often poorly prepared, with vague goals; that pressures of time and domestic politics can propel leaders to make poor decisions; and that summits are often wrongly viewed by both leaders and public as a panacea for relations that are troubled by profound long-term differences of national interests (Giauque, 2001: 429).

This is in turn based on the belief that personal diplomacy is cheap talk, or irrelevant. These are valid arguments, as diplomatic visits abroad involve a significant commitment of resources related to the high cost of their absence from their normal duties (Berridge, 2005). This may explain why summit meetings take place only relatively rarely.

The relative rarity of summitry, however, leads to the second argument which is the opportunity-cost axiom developed by Phillip C. Saunders. Kastner and Saunders (2012: 165) argue that the scarcest resource in government is high-level attention, which is exemplified by the significant commitment of time, cost and absence from normal duties at home it takes for a foreign diplomatic visit. The commitment of

resources implies a substantial strategy or purpose behind the visit. This is particularly true for outward foreign visits which occur over several days (Berridge, 2005: 179).

Finally, a third argument relates to the potential impact they can have during the exchanges. As pointed out by Berridge (2005: 175-176), the emphasis on summit meetings automatically incorporates certain assumptions about heads of government as a special class in diplomacy, primarily that they contain the sovereign authority of their regimes, thereby holding the final appeal on many important policy questions. This, Berridge argues, increases the likelihood for heads of government to conclude significant bilateral and multilateral agreements.

Indeed, the research literature indicates that in many cases summit exchanges can have immediate effects on a bilateral relationship, such as facilitating important foreign trade deals, or the establishment of significant security agreements and warming up the political relations between states (Goldstein, 2008; Nitsch, 2007; Denny, 2012).

The importance pre-negotiation by lower-level officials:

However, as pointed out by Berridge (2005: 189), a key to a successful summit meeting is often due to the pre-negotiations and arrangements by lower-level officials. The preparatory negotiations include pre-visits by lower-level ministers and talks by resident diplomats on political and economic arrangements that will be signed during the visits, as well as detailed choreography of the chain of events during the meeting. Although meticulous prearrangement conducted by lower-level

officials is often crucial to a successful summit meeting, it is, however, only a component to the meeting itself (Lebovic et al., 2016; Berridge, 2005: 190). In many cases, without the summit meeting, there will be no progress, conclusion or initiation of planned agreements and arrangements. Indeed, this can be exemplified by the summit meetings between President Donald Trump and North Korean Leader Kim Jong Un in 2018, which despite criticism, at least secured vague pledges of nuclear disarmament (CNN, 2018a). To sum up the argument, MIT's Security Studies Professor, Vipin Narang, indicated: "the risks of war - no matter how low the odds - would go up," if Trump and Kim would at some point abandon the meeting (VOX, 2018). Indeed, the US administration might have gone back to escalating tensions with Pyongyang.

Considering the frequency of personal diplomatic summit meetings have increased along the advancement of modern telecommunication technologies, there seems to be little reason to believe that these types of interactions will disappear. Taking into consideration the prearrangement conducted by lower-level officials, these types of diplomatic meetings, whether they are part of routine diplomacy (ceremonial), signaling diplomacy (alliance solidarity), or have substantial purposes such as concluding or initiating negotiations and arrangements represent a key development in IR which requires closer examination.

2.4.3 Summit Diplomacy and the Importance of Setting

Modern summit meetings occur in a variety of settings, and for a variety of reasons. Generally, regarding summitry, the usual methods of meeting the counter-part(s)

depend on whether it is bilateral, multilateral, open, private or secret (Conceição-Heldt & Mello, 2017: 1). This, in turn, varies from country to country. The following section attempts to highlight the most prominent settings in which these types of diplomatic exchanges occur, as well as drawbacks and advantages attached to the various settings. Subsequently, several outcomes are identified based on the setting.

Secret/Quiet Summit Diplomacy:

Secret diplomacy, also called quiet diplomacy, are exchanges conducted behind the scenes and with minimal publicity. According to Barston (2014), a substantial amount of modern diplomatic procedures is conducted on a confidential/secret level basis. Particularly negotiations conducted by lower-level diplomatic officials usually occur behind closed doors. For instance, during the early negotiation-stages between Norway and Japan regarding a weapon/arms transaction in 2016, most of the meetings between lower level-official occurred under strict secrecy (CNN, 2017a). When the agreement reached the concluding stages, however, it was opened to media attention. As such, secret diplomacy walks a thin line between transparency and confidentiality.

Moreover, they can also occur between higher-level officials. For instance, during the private exchanges between Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and Russian President Vladimir Putin. Questioned by media about the contents of the exchange during a plenary session at the Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok, September 2018, Prime Minister Abe simply stated: "...I cannot talk about it

because we are in the middle of negotiations” (Asahi Shimbun, 2018). Reasons for the secrecy vary regarding content but are usually aimed at domestic political stability, i.e., avoiding political wrangling between competing agency interests, and issues being scrutinized by public/domestic interference, that may harm overall negotiation procedures (Barston, 2014). Also, the use of secret diplomacy varies from country to country, although regime type is an important factor. Isolated and authoritarian regimes, such as Iran, North Korea, and Belarus, have tendencies to conduct most of their diplomatic activities in secret (Barston, 2014).

Multilateral Summit Diplomacy:

As mentioned briefly, the 20th century gave rise to multilateral summit diplomacy which has now become a recognized feature of modern diplomacy (Barston, 2014). Multilateral diplomatic exchanges involve negotiations and communication between more than two parties and occur primarily in international and regional organizations where states have a membership.

Proponents of multilateral diplomacy view these exchanges as beneficial because they provide an arena in which participating states can have sovereign equality by masking differences in economic or political power (Barston, 2014). Moreover, for participating members, they are often perceived as less time-consuming, as multilateral frameworks usually follow a fixed and comprehensive rule of procedure, particularly for summits occurring inside institutions (Berridge, 2005). Berridge (2008) identifies multilateral summit diplomacy as educational for heads of government/state, in that they force political leaders to acknowledge

themselves with international realities in order to avoid embarrassment when meeting other officials. Although this is true for bilateral summits as well, the more actors involved in multilateral summits amplify what political leaders should know. Multilateral diplomacy is also beneficial for promoting a ‘friendly’ atmosphere future international negotiation between participating actors (Weilemann, 2000).

Today there is an overabundance of multilateral diplomatic frameworks for summit-exchanges. To mention a few, these include meetings such as the G-group summits, or the Association of Southeast Asian Nations plus three (ASEAN+3), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) summit, or the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM), or the African Union Summit (AU) (Berridge, 2005). Both the German Chancellor Angela D. Merkel and French President, Emmanuel Macron, are national leaders, notable for preferring multilateral diplomatic frameworks when conducting international negotiations (The Guardian, 2018). This can be illustrated through their increased efforts in promoting multilateral platforms and forums for summit meetings, particularly in the European Union.

The difficulties of multilateral diplomacy are principally related to difficulties in finding common ground for all involved parties. Multilateral exchanges usually consist of consensus for establishing agreements among its members. During an ASEAN meeting, for instance, the interaction and negotiated agreements are based on consensus, which requires all members to vote in an agreement. Most often, however, the consensus is usually difficult to achieve, and voting takes place

whereas some states might end up agreeing with something contrary to their interest (Barston, 2014).

Moreover, the issues dominating in these meetings are very broad, such as G-groups summits which usually involve topics of crisis management, global security, energy, and terrorism (Weilemann, 2000). Although issues discussed in these multilateral summits may be relevant regarding long-term development, it is difficult to observe any tangible evidence. For instance, Weilemann (2000) points out that the G8 multilateral summits have become too rigid and formalized, with increasingly little room for free discussion and “exchange of views.” Instead, broader, and more complicated international topics are forced to be discussed by its participants. Also, the topics and the final communique, are usually agreed upon far in advance.

Bilateral Summitry:

Traditionally, summit meetings, in particular, have been exercised in bilateral settings and occur when communication is limited to two parties at any one time (Goldstein, 2008). There are a few identified reasons why certain states prefer to conduct its foreign policy through bilateral diplomacy. According to Barston (2014), it gives states and political leaders a sense of control and management. The proponents of bilateral diplomacy have a sense that the more actors involved, the more complicated the issue gets, and the easier it gets to agree.

Conversely, bilateral diplomacy is also usually preferred by relatively more powerful states, which potentially have the upper hand (economically, politically,

militarily) during international negotiations facing a weaker counterpart. This is particularly the case during security issues. For instance, during the height of the Spratley island territorial dispute between the PRC and the Philippines in the South China Sea in 2017, the PRC refused to acknowledge or answer the rulings from the International Court of Justice. This demonstrated a rejection for a multilateral approach in solving territorial disputes (CNN, 2017b). Only when approached bilaterally by Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte, did the PRC accept to enter the negotiation stage.

It is also preferred by states which have historical links with another country, such as long-standing alliances. For instance, the Franco-British bilateral summits have been occurring annually since 1976, and the US-Russian summits which take place three times a year (since the 1980s) (Berridge, 2005: 181). Bilateral summit diplomacy is not only reduced to security issues. Since the early 2000s, they have also evolved around economic and commercial issues. A motivational factor for this frequency is the promotion of economic interests in resource-rich developing countries by securing market access, securing supply, enhancing trade and diversifying its trade alternatives (Barston, 2014).

Several countries are known to prefer to diplomatic negotiation through bilateral visits, such as Cuba, North-Korea, Russia, the People's Republic of China (PRC), Japan, Malaysia, Egypt and Saudi Arabia (Berridge, 2005; Barston, 2014). Current US President, Donald J. Trump, is also a proponent of bilateral diplomacy (one-on-one negotiation), as he essentially switched US foreign diplomacy from regional and multilateral forums to focusing on bilateral channels, exemplified by his

rejection of the Trans-Pacific-Partnership agreement (Wall Street Journal, 2017). The downsides of bilateral diplomacy are that it limits international contacts (unless supported by a multilateral initiative). Each bilateral relationship requires significant attention and commitments of organization resources, which can be taxing on the long run (Barston, 2014). Moreover, bilateral diplomacy usually consist of an unequal relationship were one state is highly dependent on the other, and thus susceptible to coercive frameworks (Barston, 2014).

Identifying effect and outcomes:

The research objective in this paper is based on an educated guess that most summit meetings have some form of effect and outcome. Otherwise, as Grygiel (2008) point outs, “it becomes a series of pointless social encounters that manage nothing and, in the end, solve nothing,” which is contrary to what a democratically elected political leader is supposed to do. To better understand the role of summits, it makes sense to differentiate types of summits according to the setting, such as whether they are bilateral or multilateral, secret or open because they usually have different outcomes. This is important for the research objective because any interpretation of the outcomes of certain summit meetings should be made on the background of the goals these meetings are meant to accomplish.

Secret diplomacy, for instance, shows that it could be impossible to get the full picture of diplomatic interaction and outcomes, not unless the researcher has inside details and uses a far-ahead retrospective approach. Equally, for multilateral summits, which usually have more broad topics of discussion and occur over

several intervals, reveal that outcomes might take years to be observable. Bilateral summits, on the other hand, may contain more observable short-term outcomes, as the negotiations and agreements consist of narrow interest topics, specifically involving the participating countries.

To summarize, disadvantage and advantages of the setting notwithstanding, they do share some common traits, such as an emphasis on communicating national interests and negotiating international agreements. The setting of these functions, however, are important in understanding what they are meant to accomplish, such as an agreement between two countries (bilateral) or establishing rules of conduct for all the states in the world (multilateral). As such, in order to narrow the research topic, this study will primarily focus on bilateral summits.

2.5 Theories of Summit Diplomacy

The task set out in this paper is to examine summit diplomacy by examining the outcome of these exchanges. So far, however, much of this chapter has focused on defining concepts in the literature on diplomacy and summit meetings. Although this is significant in the overall procedure by organizing and highlighting relevant literature, it lacks the quality of being researchable, e.g., missing theoretical models and assumptions that can be tested.

Consequently, in order to form an approach to answer the research question, a necessary step in any research project is to develop theoretical frameworks which generate prediction or expectations about the phenomena under study. Indeed, as stated by Moses and Knutsen (2012: 41): “Without theory, we fumble helplessly

around in the thicket of trees that is the empirical forest.” By applying theories, on the other hand, empirical observation of phenomenon becomes organized by embedding meaning and content, which enables the researchers to examine and evaluate information of the phenomenon under study critically.

The theoretical literature on the purpose and meaning of summit diplomacy, however, is complex and often reduced to empirical studies of lower-level diplomacy with little theoretical foundations (Rose, 2007; Nitsch, 2007; Denny, 2012; Head & Ries, 2010). However, many studies do reflect central functional properties regarding diplomacy in general, which can subsequently be applied to summitry. Such as studies focusing on international diplomatic negotiation (Putnam, 1988; Conceição-Heldt et al., 2017), and the effects of personal diplomatic communication as methods for signaling (dis)approval or convey information to reach desired diplomatic outcomes (Wong, 2016; Holmes, 2013; Hall & Keren Yarhi-Milo, 2012; Fearon 1997). The following sections introduce two theories relevant to understanding summit diplomacy: the two-level game theory and signaling theory.

2.5.1 The Role of Two-level Game Theory in Summitry

As mentioned earlier in this chapter, negotiation is a core instrument of diplomatic interaction between countries. A theoretical model used to conceptualize international diplomatic negotiation is the two-level game theory, developed by Robert D. Putnam (1988). Putnam’s two-level-game theory is a conceptual approach that emphasizes the complex, but the logical interplay between domestic

and international stakeholders during the negotiation of agreements between countries.

Putnam argued that whenever democratically elected political leaders engage in international negotiations, e.g., bilateral summit meetings, bargaining would occur at two stages:

Across the international table sit his foreign counterparts, and at his elbows sit diplomats and other international advisors. Around the domestic table behind him sit party and parliamentary figures, spokespersons for domestic agencies, representatives of key interest groups, and the leader's own political advisors (Putnam, 1988: 434).

Thus, the two-level game theory presumes that when political leaders engage in international negotiation, they are constrained and influenced by international priorities and domestic interest groups which occur over several stages. At the first negotiation stage, e.g., summit meeting, the political leaders reach a tentative agreement with his counterpart (level-I). The next stage of the process leads the political leader in bargaining with domestic constituents (e.g., through a parliamentary hearing) for potential ratification of an agreement (level-II).

During the level-I stage of the negotiation, political leaders: “seek to maximize their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures, while minimizing the adverse consequences of foreign developments” (Putnam, 1988: 434). During the level-II stage of negotiation, domestic constituents (political institutions, governmental coalitions, interest-groups, public opinion) within the state are expected to put

pressure on political leaders negotiating with counterparts in order to provide a favorable domestic outcome.

At the negotiation stages, any domestic interest group at level-II who is not satisfied with the outcome agreement may have the incentive to obstruct the negotiation process. While at the same time, any leader who cannot satisfy his domestic constituents would potentially lose his seat. Consequently, any agreement reached at level-I must, ultimately, be approved, or ratified, at level-II.

The theory of ratification (winning the two-level game):

The key to winning in the two-level game theory (reaching an international agreement) depends on the win-set of both participating parties. According to Putnam (1988), the win-set is the outcome of level-I negotiations, acceptable/satisfactory for level-II constituents. In other words, the domestic structures and interest of each country are of the utmost importance during the process of securing an international agreement (Conceição-Heldt et al., 2017).

The win-set (potential for agreement) has several requirements attached to it. First, any tentative agreement at the international level that derails from the win-set of domestic constituents will not get ratified, and therefore, arguably, less likely to appear on the bargaining table in the first place. Second, “large win-set” makes an establishment/introduction of a level-I agreement more likely. A “large win-set” represents how much the tentative agreement at level-I overall aligns/overlap with domestic interest, i.e., public opinion, political institutions, and interest groups (level II) (Putnam, 1988: 449-450). For example, during the diplomatic negotiation

of reducing tariff rates between two countries, a domestic interest group set demands for a certain limit but would agree to anything below the limit. Other interest groups would possibly have other limit requirements. When all demands (win-set) overlap, however, an agreement is possible.

The outcome of an agreement is therefore complex and difficult to achieve due to the involvement of multiple actors, institutions and interaction at the domestic and international level (Putnam, 1988; Conceição-Heldt et al., 2017). For instance, in some cases, political leaders disagree at level-I. In other cases, aligning all interest is not possible (failing level-II). However, if an introduced/established agreement can meet the requirement at both levels (level-I and level-II), in both participating countries, then an agreement can be confirmed.

On the other hand, a no-agreement (no-win outcome) usually represent a status quo in the state of affairs. However, in some cases, no-agreement may lead to a worsening relation, such as the failed ratification of negotiations of the Versailles Peace Treaty in 1919, whereas negotiation failed, and conflict broke out (Putnam, 1988)⁹. Conversely, regarding modern summitry, the potential for a no-agreement outcome at the international level may portray the summit meeting as useless by domestic constituents for its high cost and time consumption, risking the political leader to lose his seat.

⁹ Negotiations broke down at level II due to Germany perceiving the terms unreasonable.

However, as Putnam points out, most political leaders in a negotiation know the bargaining game at the domestic level and rearrange his own political interest against the domestic pressure to ensure a deal abroad, which makes the introduction of an international agreement very likely. In other words, many democratically elected political leaders tend to use international negotiation for boosting his/her popularity at home through the introduction of quick and substantive agreements (Putnam, 1988).

The Importance of Domestic Constituents in International Negotiation:

As mentioned, the two-level game theory regards domestic structures and interest of each country as utmost importance during the process of introducing an international agreement. In other words, a core assumption of the two-level game theory is that the process by which preferences are defined and followed through the introduction of an agreement is one that the domestic collectivity considers legitimate.

According to the two-level game model, domestic interest (II level) is influenced by two main factors which are crucial for the ratification process: i) domestic political institutions and ii) public opinion (Putnam, 1988). In most democratic countries the political leader is democratically elected and are therefore expected to represent domestic constituents in order to keep his political position. Several studies have shown that public opinion has an impact on policy-making in both foreign and public affairs in liberal democratic societies (*see* Risse-Kappen, 1991; Burstein, 2003). Burstein (2003), for instance, show substantial evidence that public

opinion affects policy, even when including the activities of interest organization and political parties.

The impact of political institutions has also demonstrated influencing capabilities (see Conceição-Heldt et al., 2017; Milner, 1997). Milner (1997) for instance, demonstrate a deep divergence of interest priorities between the political institutions (executive and legislative branch) and domestic interest-groups within states. She summarizes that the more information is distributed among these factions, the more they have a say in shaping foreign relations preferences (*Milner 1997*, as cited in Conceição-Heldt et al., 2017). Indeed, the large amount of literature dedicated to showing the influencing properties of a state's internal factors, demonstrate the significance of domestic interest in understanding foreign relations.

Before the two-level game model, theories generally tended to perceive countries and governments as unitary actors in international negotiation that would hold interest deriving from exogenous, system-level factors. The two-level game model, however, introduced a heuristic understanding of the contours of international diplomatic negotiation, presenting a wide range of agreement-outcomes originating from domestic consensus-based influences. Although not entirely comprehensive, it does provide a theoretical framework where international diplomatic negotiations can be understood.

2.5.2 The Role of Communication and Signaling Theory in Summitry

Thus far, the theoretical framework has focused on assumption based on specific substantive outcomes of summit diplomacy, such as international diplomatic

agreements. However, it is important to note that summit diplomacy is rarely precise, and do not always result in a binding agreement. As mentioned, in many cases, summitry can also represent a routine in foreign policy affairs, such as the meetings between neighboring countries soon after a head of state takes office. For instance, the Nordic states usually pay their first visits to each other, while the US president usually meets his Canadian and Mexican counter-parts (Goldstein, 2008: 158). The multilateral serial summits are occurring at preterminal intervals, such as the summits between the political leaders of ASEAN, or the multilateral meetings between the member states of NATO, have also been referred to as routine summits (Berridge, 2005; Barston, 2014).

As noted earlier in the chapter, it is clear these types of exchanges are far from insignificant as they often are aimed at long-term tending of strategic partners through a mechanism such as showing alliance solidarity (Berridge, 2005; Lebovic et al., 2016). As pointed out by Berridge (2005) these types of routine exchanges also resonate with summitry aimed at “exchange of views” or “friendly talks.” Instead of concluding with a binding international agreement, it is suggested that the diplomatic interactions evolve around conveying certain information or giving orientation such as reassuring common political goals and values (Weilemann, 2000).

This, however, reflects summit diplomacy more as a procedure of communication (Adler & Pouliot, 2011; Jönsson & Hall, 2003: 196). Using a negotiation-approach to these types of diplomatic exchanges, however, would possibly give limited results. Indeed, as demonstrated through the various settings

of summitry, any interpretation of the advantages and disadvantages of certain summit meetings should be made on the background of the tasks these meetings are meant to accomplish. Thus, recognizing that many summits do not always involve substantial outcomes in the form of agreements and negotiation, a potential source of information in the literature of summitry is identified to the political leader's content of communication. Here, studies on interpersonal communication are significant for broadening an understanding of Summit diplomacy, as well as the potential for an expanded theoretical framework.

Signaling theory:

An important theory for understanding communication in IR is Signaling theory. The foundational properties of this theory originate from biology and animal studies, focusing on how animals interact and show their intention with each other, e.g. courting, mating, and so on (Donath, 2011). In essence, the theory is about communicative methods of conveying intentions aimed at influencing some sort of outcome or change of behavior/opinion (Jönsson et al., 2003). Understanding signaling as such, the theory has also been applied to a wide field of studies in IR, whereas political actors (e.g., state, politicians) are regarded as some animal, which has the potential to implicitly and explicitly express and convey certain intentions through various forms of communicative methods (Tingley & Walter, 2011). A more precise definition of signaling theory, as it relates to studying political actors, is suggested by Gartzke, Gannon, and Zhang (2017):

Signaling is the purposive and strategic revealing of information about intent, resolve, and/or capabilities by an actor A to alter the decisions of another actor B to improve the chances that an outcome desired by A is reached when the desired outcomes of A and B may be dissimilar (Gartzke et al., 2017: 2).

Understood from this definition, signaling theory, as it relates to summitry and diplomatic interaction, is about a purposive calculated signal/message to influence strategic interaction through communicative methods. Understandably, however, the theory has been most often operationalized in zero-sum games in the context of conflict and crisis-bargaining between states, whereas states use “carrots and sticks” (e.g., sanctions or aid) signaling in an attempt to alter the behavior of another state (Fearon, 1997).

However, signaling can also be used in a more peaceful setting (e.g., non-zero sum), whereas signaling communication can help and promote the involved actors in achieving strategic interest through cooperation. For instance, during a summit meeting where one political leader A, issues a purposive signal (e.g., concession) to political leader B, in order to gain a concession in return. The result is a strategic interaction of interest whereas both parties may potentially benefit.

Keohane (1986), demonstrate that purposive signaling could help in reciprocal trade liberalization between countries. Signaling good intention and a willingness to cooperate (e.g., diplomatic interaction, summit meetings), would help build trust between countries and protectionist economies in that reducing a country’s tariff level would be reciprocated in the other country. Other areas of non-zero sum signaling, is through establishing communication in order to overcome problems

by establishing institutions, setting standards and writing laws (Gartzke et al., 2017).

This type of signaling is often used through diplomatic channels.

The importance of making signals costly:

An important aspect of the signaling theory is that it is distinguished from cheap-talk, e.g., communication with no risk/cost attached to it, that may or may not *indirectly* affect a specific outcome or payoff. If it has an outcome, however, it contains very subtle results (Tingley et al., 2011). A common problem for cheap-talk to be taken as a credible signaling mechanism relates to its detachment of costs and risks. For instance, consider two political leaders in conflict over the phone or Twitter, whereas one of the leaders, A, issues a threat or promise. In this scenario the other leader, B, expects the sender to have an incentive to bluff or lie because it might be cheap-talk (e.g., empty threats or promises). Alternatively, political leader, B, might be purposively misrepresenting signals in order to get a better deal. To make a signal more credible is through conveying it as a costly signal (Fearon, 1997). The costly signal criteria are thereby an important contextual factor for a signal, particularly important in a zero-sum diplomatic setting.

Audience cost/tying-hands theory:

According to Fearon (1997), a significant method to convey a credible and costly signal is through the act of issuing a signal message with some type of cost/risk attached to the sender, which will emphasize the willingness of the sender to keep

his/her word (Fearon, 1997). For Fearon, the most effective way for a signal to be taken seriously materializes by sending a signal under the conspicuous observation of an audience (e.g., the general public, domestic institutions). He calls these signals “Tying-hands signals,” which usually appears as open public statements of intent by state leaders (Fearon, 1997). These signals/statements:

typically works by creating audience costs that the leadership would suffer due to the reaction of domestic political audiences to a perceived failure in the management of foreign policy (Fearon, 1997: 70).

In other words, political leaders can send credible signals that influence and inform by imposing onto themselves an incurring penalty/cost if the statement is regarded as insincere, e.g., cheap talk (Gartzke et al., 2017). For instance, a political leader can make promises with another political leader during a summit meeting. In order to make his intentions clear, he addresses the promises and statements (signals) publicly through a press release or joint statement. Assuming the political leader is part of modern liberal democracy, he puts his reputation and leadership on the line by addressing his intention to the public and media. Since he made the discussion of the meeting publicly (creating an audience), the statements and promises gain credibility (cost) because his reputation would potentially be damaged if he does not follow through.

The importance of signaling in a face-to-face setting:

Studies focusing on signaling theory, are usually scholars that assert the relevance of face-to-face communication and rhetoric in IR (see Holmes, 2013; Wong, 2016; Hall et al., 2012). This is in stark contrast to state-centered critics (usually from the neo-realist school) who argue that “talk is cheap” in the context of system level perspective. However, it is clear that communication (speech) do have a direct potential to persuade and change people’s mind (and thereby strategic interests). As mentioned, several studies have shown the impact of face-to-face communication and its capabilities to influence outcomes regarding persuasion. Holmes (2013) argues that face-to-face meetings allow individuals to transmit information and empathize with each other, which reduces uncertainty (mirror-neurons). This, Holmes argues, provides a signaling mechanism that increases the likelihood of cooperation and the ability to come to agreements. Wong (2016) corroborates Holmes studies in arguing that it enables a better way of conveying intentions that are otherwise lost or distorted through other means of impersonal communications.

However, a study by Hall et al. (2012) demonstrated that signals could be easily misrepresented in face-to-face interaction, as shown during the meetings between American and Soviet leaders (Kennedy and Khrushchev). By analyzing the memoirs and diaries of the leaders, Hall et al. show that commitments and important strategic choices were made by both leaders after meeting each other. Although the study suggests that face-to-face meeting is important, it is a double-edged sword in that many signals were misrepresented due to the leaders being adversaries with separate interests (zero-sum).

2.5.3 The Prospect of Achieving National Interest Goals

The theories in the section above demonstrated methods for conducting summitry through negotiation (two-level game theory) and communication by conveying certain intentions (signaling theory). In other words, they theoretically explain the 'how' of summit diplomacy but lack a clear definition of the 'why.' In order to clarify the 'why' of summit diplomacy, this section introduces the concept of national interest as the prospective goal of conducting summitry.

What is National Interest:

At the beginning of this chapter, the researcher adopted Sharp, Nicolson and Burke's functional concept of diplomacy. As such, diplomatic summit meetings are conceived as an important instrument for states to communicate and apply their foreign policy. This definition implies a strategic-interest perspective in which diplomatic interactions reflect and serve whatever is in a state's national interests. National interest remains an ambiguous, yet central concept for both diplomats and foreign policy analysts, which maintains that the foreign policies of each nation are formulated on the prospect of achieving national interest (Nye & Welch, 2013).

According to Oxford Reference (2018), national interest is "the interest of a state, usually as defined by its government." From a descriptive perspective, national interest is perceived as *particular* goals, usually still framed in a country's ministry of foreign affairs (Berridge, 2005). Based on these goals, foreign policy strategies

are implemented, and diplomatic activities are conducted. Moreover, as indicated in the two-level game model, the decision-making procedures of achieving certain national interest goals is a highly complex process with many domestic constituents involved, and therefore very subjective. National interest goals are expected to vary significantly from country to country, from leadership to leadership, and from time to time. As such, it is very difficult to understand national interest without having clear knowledge about its contextual factors, such as institutional framework, the system of government, and domestic constituents.

The normative approach to National Interest:

An alternative method for understanding national interest broadly, however, is through a normative approach, whereas national interest goals relate to the inherent rights and duties of the state (Nuechterlein, 1976; Clinton, 1986). As a normative concept, Clinton (1986) defines national interest as:

the general regulative principle of diplomacy, which posits the common good of the society, in its relations with other national units, as the end of diplomatic action (Clinton, 1986: 500).

This definition indicates that foreign policies and diplomatic activities are designed to satisfy and promote a set of demands which are ascribed to the state as a whole.

By taking a normative understanding to the national interest, one can presume that the purpose of certain political/diplomatic activities ought to pursue what is

best for the state's existence and its people (Kanehara, 2011). As pointed out by Nincic (1999: 48): "national interest goals are identified when it resolves itself into a verifiable expression of the nation's preferences." Subsequently, leading statesmen attempts to approximate strategies and activities to achieve the common good for the state and its domestic constituents.

Categorizing national interest into core needs:

From the perspective of what national interest ought to be, Donald E. Nuechterlein defined national interest as: "the perceived needs and desires of one sovereign state in relation to other sovereign states compromising the external environment" (Nuechterlein, 1976: 247). Nuechterlein assumed that most states have a set of perceived core needs, which can be identified. Although these core needs are based on normative concerns, it can provide a general standard of which to interpret and judge diplomatic activities. The core needs are presented in the following table.

Table 3.1: The four core needs of National Interest

<i>Security/defense interest</i>	“The protection of the nation-state against the threat of physical violence directed from another nation-state, and/or inspired threat to its system of government.”
<i>Economic/commercial interest:</i>	“The enhancement of the nation-state’s economic wellbeing in relations with other states.”
<i>World order interest:</i>	“The maintenance of an international political and economic system in which the nation-state may feel secure, and in which its commerce may operate peacefully.”
<i>Ideological interest:</i>	“The furtherance in the external environment of a set of values which the nation-state believes to be good.”

(Nuechterlein, 1976: 249).

It should be mentioned that these needs and requirements are not mutually exclusive, as they more or less overlap each other. However, if conceived as the national interest of a major powers’ decision to utilize diplomatic interaction at the highest level, these interests may compete for attention and resources (Nuechterlein, 1976). In this paper, the researcher will primarily focus on the first two needs, “Security/defense interest” and “Economic/commercial interest” as a method to organize and label the potential outcomes of summitry. These core needs represent the most basic normative requirements of what constitutes national interest. The third and fourth needs, “World order interest” and “Ideological interest,” however, contains arguably secondary goals, and will be excluded in this study in order to avoid overinterpretation.

Security/defense Interest

According to Morgenthau, the number one national interest priority of the state, is the survival, protection of physical, political and cultural identity against encroachments by other nation-states (Morgenthau, 1985). In order to improve the survival rate, states are expected to fortify their security in order to survive perceived threats. As such, the first core need is “Security/defense interest” and relates to the basic requirement of states to protect its national population, while making sure the state survives in the world.

Moreover, security as a concept can be addressed from three perspectives: international, national, and individual security. International security is understood as the stability of the international system, whereas the level of political tension or violence can be defining features. National security relates to the security of the nation states overall wellbeing. Individual security can be defined as the wellbeing of a states’ private citizen (Barston, 2014). As such, security, as it relates to summitry, can have a wide array of topics attached to it. For instance, if the meeting resulted in signaling promises of closer cooperation on bilateral security issues, or signaling assistance in promoting regional stability, it would be labeled as being based on security interest.

Economic/commercial Interest

“Economic/commercial interest” entails activities for ensuring economic well-being for its population through interaction with other states (Nuechterlein, 1976). As such, governments design and pursue economic, diplomatic activities with the

aim to secure prosperity and welfare for its citizens. A common term for activities conducted by state representatives abroad, aimed at encouraging economic development and trade, is Commercial Diplomacy, or Economic Diplomacy (Bergeijk, Okano-Heijmans, Melissen 2011; Naray, 2008).

A broad assumption in economic diplomacy is that governments (and its officials) pursue economic interest with the aim of promoting overall economic prosperity and stability (Bergeijk et al. 2011). Moreover, there are a wide array of actors who can conduct this type of promotion. As mentioned in the conceptual analysis, embassies are often tasked with achieving commercial and economic interest (Rose, 2007). However, also, domestic constituents such as businesses and local agencies (Putnam, 1988; Barston, 2014). As such, economic diplomacy is concerned with the processes and the employment of political-economic instruments (e.g., a visit by a political leader) (Bergeijk, et al. 2011). Understood from this perspective, the political leader takes the role as a commercial representative through summitry, in order to enhance economic prosperity at home (Bergeijk, et al., 2011). As such, it can be predicted that the summit meeting had a welfare enhancing effects. For instance, if the summit meeting resulted in a trade-agreement, improvement of exports, or discussions of closer economic cooperation it could be labeled as being based on economic diplomacy.

3.0 Operationalizing the Theories & Hypothesis Development

The purpose of this study is to examine the effects and outcomes of summit diplomacy. This section presents how the researcher will operationalize and apply the theories to the phenomenon under study, summit-diplomacy. As such, predictions and expectations regarding summitry will be generated based on the theoretical models presented in the previous chapter. The theoretical models suggested that diplomatic interaction, e.g., summit meetings, usually entails negotiation (two-level game) and communication (signaling) strategies aimed at the prospect of achieving national interest.

3.1 Operationalizing Two-level-game Theory (agreements)

The two-level game theory introduces a heuristic understanding of the contours of summit-diplomacy regarding negotiating agreements. As such, the model provides the basis for the analysis of negotiated agreements. In this paper, however, the researcher will primarily focus on international agreements (level-I bargaining), presuming that introduced/concluded agreements had a high potential for ratification by domestic constituents. Hence, the domestic level-II bargaining will be regarded indirectly through the win-set, as preconceived factors for introduced/established agreements at the time of the summit meeting.

In order to operationalize the two-level game theory for analytical examination, the researcher classified potential international agreements into agreement-archetype. The agreement-archetype is broadly based on Fred C. Ikle's book, "*How*

Nations Negotiate,” and enhanced by Barston (2014). Barston’s classification of agreements handled in diplomatic negotiations consists of six general archetypes (Political, Development, Contractual, Economic, Security, Regulatory agreements). Subsequently, these archetypes were categorized by the discretion of the researcher into Nuechterlein's core national interest needs: “Defense/Security interest” and “Economic/Commercial interest”. As such, national interest consists of two core interests, which purposes derives from a desire of i) economic growth at home through the promotion of commercial interest; and/or ii) enhancing its security by nurturing strategic partners abroad.

While security/defense interest is strictly limited to agreements related to international and national security, economic/commercial interest relates broadly to agreements of an economic, commercial or financial nature.

Table: 3.2: Summit Diplomacy and Security/Defense agreements

<i>Political arrangements</i>	Diplomatic relations; normalization and mediations; and exchanges of POW.
<i>Security arrangements</i>	Bilateral security pacts; development/trade of weapons/arms; mandate of peace-keeping force; base agreement; and arms control.
<i>Regulatory agreements</i>	Agreements regarding the law of the sea; air services; narcotics; and issues concerning international organizations.

(Barston, 2014: 54)

Table: 3.3: Summit Diplomacy and Economic/Commercial agreements

<i>Economic arrangements</i>	Trade agreements; tariff agreements; anti-dumping; and balance of payments standby facility.
<i>Development arrangements</i>	Loan; bilateral aid; project finance; inward investment; and debt abolishment/rescheduling.
<i>Contractual agreements</i>	Offshore exploration rights; sale/purchase of oil/LNG; and hiring of foreign technical personnel.

(Barston, 2014: 54)

Although many of these agreements are explicitly security-related or economic-related, others, arguably, have overlapping themes, such as agreements related to aviation/transit, or foreign aid in which its purpose is continuously debated among scholars (Packenham, 1966; Alesina & Dollar, 2000). In this paper, however, foreign aid agreements are defined as described by Doss (1996); they are introduced to further the economic interests of the donor state, i.e. opening resource-rich foreign markets to manufacturing goods or subsidizing the donor's domestic firms. As such, they were designated as economic/commercial interest.

In addition, as indicated throughout this paper, while the conclusion and initiation of negotiated agreements may have an outcome during the summit meeting, the overall process should be understood through the activities leading up the outcome, such as lobbying by lower officials, exchanges of ideas, and pre-negotiations (Berridge, 2005; Barston, 2014). In other words, potential agreements

established by the summit meetings are most likely pre-negotiated and planned by lower-level diplomatic bureaucrats.

3.2 Operationalizing Costly Signaling Theory (communication)

Signaling theory in diplomacy, seek to identify both verbal and nonverbal messages (signals) as potential outcomes of diplomatic interaction, e.g., summit meeting (Jönsson et al., 2003: 196). As such, this study seeks to analyze a certain aspect of a diplomatic meeting, e.g., verbal and nonverbal communications occurring at the time of the summit meeting and contextual factors that may have conveyed certain intentions. Regarding setting, this study aim converges on signaling in a non-zero-sum game situation, whereas the summit meeting is perceived as a platform for conveying intentions and interests.

Signaling theory conveys meaning to why certain verbal messages are a reliable and credible source of information in a diplomatic context (Jönsson et al., 2003). Considering that most summit meetings occur under considerable media attention (Weilemann, 2000: 16), the signals (intentions and willingness of cooperation) will be regarded as dependable and costly because of the audience risk attached. In other words, issuing an untruthful message in such a public setting would be highly irrational due to the popularity-damage (audience cost) and considering the nonzero-sum situation. However, this does not mean that everything said and done during the summit meeting can be regarded as potential signals. In order to narrow down observable credible signals, this research will focus on functional signals of intention and interest.

According to Donath, a costly signal increases its credibility when both sender and receiver benefit:

Signalers benefit when the receivers change their beliefs and behavior in response to the signal. Receivers benefit from honest signals, for decisions made and opinions formed with true information are generally better than those that result from false assumptions. When the interests of the signaler and the receiver align when both benefit from honest signaling we have straightforward, cooperative communication (Donath, 2011:4).

Indeed, assuming that when signaling occur between political leaders with aligning interests, the communication would be more credible because there would be no reason to be dishonest. As such, this research will focus on intention and aligned opinions expressed by both political leaders at the time of the summit meeting. Thus, a potential outcome of the summit meeting would be manifested in a joint statement by the political leaders.

3.3 Organizing hypotheses by National Interest Goals

The theoretical models identified negotiation and signaling communication as essential methods of conducting diplomatic summitry. The results of negotiation and signaling communication, however, can have a wide array of outcomes. In order to label and categorize potential outcomes, the researcher applied Nuechterlein's (1976) overlying core interest goals as a method of identifying summit types. The following sections present the research hypotheses (predicted

effects) based on its contributory role in achieving the core goals of “security/defense interest” and “economic/commercial interest.”

3.3.1 Economic-contributory Summits

Drawing from the research literature and theories, the research presumes that if summit meetings take place for economic reasons, negotiations and strategic signals evolved around economic and commercial-related issues. Bilateral summits, in particular, have often been associated with Economic Diplomacy, as the destination of many summits by G7 nations’ leaders are often aimed at achieving access at potential export markets (Goldstein, 2008). Indeed, the research literature points out that many state leaders are often accompanied by high-ranking business delegates and are expected to play the role as commercial representatives during meeting their counterparts abroad (Barston, 2014; Devin et al., 2011: 64).

Hence, drawing from the two-level game theory, the researcher hypothesizes that the level-I negotiations involved around discussions on economic relations.

Also, if the summit meeting was economically motivated, it is expected that the political leader was accompanied by commercial representatives in an economic mission as a strategic signal of intention for closer economic cooperation. Indeed, drawing from signaling theory, the economic missions could be perceived as a purposive signal to show a willingness for cooperation (Gartzke, 2017: 6).

Moreover, besides signaling economic intention and the negotiations of economic and commercial agreements, previous empirical studies and literature have also indicated that diplomatic exchange has had a significant impact on trade

performance between countries (Denny, 2012; Neumayer, 2008). In recent years, studies on Chinese leadership visits have shown an increase in bilateral trade following summit meetings. Denny (2012), found that ‘bilateral visits’ to Africa by the Chinese Prime Minister (from 2003 to 2010) was associated with a 40 percent increase in Chinese exports. Another study also found that summitry had a positive effect on exports in an analysis of leadership visits from France, Germany and the US (Nitsch, 2007). He found that state and official visits were associated with an increase in bilateral exports by about 8 to 10 percent. The immediate increase of bilateral trade suggests the establishment of contracts involving major deals that promote exports was signed during the visit. However, a recent study by Head et al. (2010) cast doubts on this showing that foreign visits by the Canadian Prime Minister resulted in only small, negative, and mainly insignificant effects on trade performance. This could mean that summits and its effects on trade may vary from country to country. It is also difficult to draw general conclusions based on the reviewed literature because of the varied findings.

Nevertheless, ascribing to the relevance of economic relations in the context of summitry, and the empirical research of how Chinese, French, German and US summit meetings have contributed to economic growth, implies a potential relationship between summitry and its contributory effect in achieving increased trade.

Hence, based on the research literature and theories, the researcher hypothesizes that summit meetings contributory in achieving economic interest are categorized to have economically identified effects and outcomes related to the meetings, such

as signaling economic intention through the company of commercial representatives, or negotiations of economic/commercial arrangements, or improved export performance after the meeting when compared with before. Thus, three hypotheses were formulated:

Hypothesis 1: If a summit meeting is contributory in achieving economic interest, the political leaders are accompanied by business representatives signaling closer commercial cooperation between the countries.

Hypothesis 2: If a summit meeting is contributory in achieving economic interest, economic-related agreements are negotiated during the meeting.

Hypothesis 3: If a summit meeting is contributory in achieving economic interest, export performance increases after the meeting.

3.3.2 Security-contributory Summits

Drawing from the research literature and theories, the researcher presumes that if summit meetings are instrumental in achieving security interests, negotiations and signals progressed around security-related issues. Indeed, the research literature points out that summitry can also evolve around talks of solving political issues, peace mediation, topics of human rights, and alliance treaties (Goldstein, 2008; Nitsch, 2007). These topics are broadly related to issues of national and international security.

Security from a broad perspective, however, is also associated with many other fields in diplomacy, such as food and water security, health and population control, and environmental security (Barston, 2014). Although these issues have become increasingly relevant in multilateral diplomatic discussions, bilateral summits are still usually dominated by traditional issues concerning individual states' national

interest, which derives from a desire of enhancing national security (Nye et al., 2013). Regarding specific diplomatic effects, Barston (2014) defines security diplomacy as responses to external threats between states. Ascribing to this definition, security-related summits entails signaling efforts such as building coalitions and alliances, threatening or warning and seeking international support against opponents (Barston, 2014: 244).

A classic example of security-related meetings can be ascribed to British King Edward's state visit to France in May 1903. The diplomatic visit has by many scholars been recognized as the foundation of the Anglo-French relationship which resulted in the formation of the Entente Cordiale in 1904 (Goldstein, 2008). The alliance was forged by using effective negotiations on a bilateral relationship that had been subject to war and conflict over many centuries. It also proved effective in unifying two rival states against Germany on the outset of World War 1. Another example of the political-natured visit can also be illustrated by Peruvian President Fujimori's visit to Ecuador in 1991, which has been cited as one of the key factors in solving the century-long territorial conflict between Peru and Ecuador (Cui, 2014). Following Fujimori's visits, a border treaty was negotiated and later established.

In line with signaling theory, foreign visits can also result in shared security statements and opinions, which is a way of seeking international support. An example of this can be illustrated during China's President Xi Jinping's bilateral visit to Moscow in 2017, where both leaders issued a joint statement condemning both North Korean nuclear armament, and U.S. and South Korea joint military

exercises (CNBC, 2017). Statements by both leaders suggested aligning interest, signaling unified Chinese and Russian security interest through a public announcement expressing a shared opinion on changes/critiques of the international system or one of its states.

Thus, based on the research literature and theories, the researcher hypothesizes that summit meetings contributory in achieving security/defense interest are identified by security-related effects and outcomes, such as aligning security interest through a joint statement, or negotiations of security-related agreements.

Thus, two additional hypotheses were generated:

Hypothesis 4: If a summit meeting is contributory in achieving security interest, security-related agreements are negotiated during the meeting.

Hypothesis 5: If a summit meeting is contributory in achieving security interest, the political leaders signals to align security interest through a joint-statement during the meeting.

3.3.3 Noncontributory Summits

As pointed out in the research literature, however, it is important to note that these summit meetings might not always have positive outcomes, such as conveying advantageous signaling mechanisms or negotiating security, commercial and economic agreements. According to Berridge (2005), some exchanges might even result in agreements that are inconsistent, or irrelevant to a state's interest.

A counterproductive visit can be illustrated by US President Woodrow Wilson's meeting with British prime minister Lloyd George and King George V in 1918 (Goldstein, 2008). After lengthy meetings between president Wilson and prime

minister Lloyd George and King George, the British Prime Minister remarked utter contempt for President Wilsons:

Wilson made a deplorable impression. In reply to the toast of his health, he omitted any reference to the part played or the sacrifices endured by the British Empire in their joint struggle. 'Not a word of appreciation, let alone of gratitude, came from his lips (*Rose, 1983: 232*, as cited in Goldstein, 2008).

The meeting secured no substantial improvement, signaling instead, the worsening of the Anglo-American relations.

A more recent example of a counter-productive visit can also be ascribed to Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau's visit to India, which was cited to damage Canada's political and economic relationship to India (Huffington Post, 2018; Financial Post, 2018; CNN, 2018b). Trudeau's visit became engulfed in controversy after a failed assassin was invited to two of the prime minister's events during his trip. Among the backlash of the visit, were India's supposed decision to raise tariffs on chickpeas as evidence that the visit ended up doing more harm than good. These arguments point to a null hypothesis. In other words, instead of improving relations, the meeting consisted mostly of cheap-talk or damaging to bilateral trade. Thus, the null hypothesis is formulated.

Hypothesis 0: If the summit meeting occurs without a contributory purpose to achieve economic and security interest, there are no economic mission present, increased trade, joint statement, and agreements negotiated.

4.0 Methodology & Procedures

This chapter describes and justifies the methodological and analytical framework, which refers to the researcher's choice of methods, data gathering, and outlines how the researcher will analyze the data. The research design of this study will be composed of an '*hypothesis-driven exploratory mixed method case study*,' and the subsequent sections will discuss its components.

4.1 Hypotheses

The research literature and theories of diplomacy identified signaling (signal theory) and negotiation of agreements (two-level game theory) as potential functions of summit diplomacy. For labeling and organizing summit types based on the outcome, the researcher applied Nuechterlein's (1976) matrix of core national interest goals. Whereas the outcomes can be classified in achieving either i) economic/commercial interest goals, and/or ii) security /defense interest goals.

Following the theoretical framework in achieving economic/commercial interest goals, the summit meeting may result in the negotiations of economic and financial agreements (H1). Moreover, the summit meeting could also result in a functional signal of closer economic cooperation through an economic mission (H2). The final hypothesis, however, examines whether the visit was followed by increased trade performance by measuring export performance before and after the high-level exchange (H3), which will include a quantitative analysis. The methods are discussed in the following sections

Regarding achieving security/defense interest goals, the first hypothesis maintains that the summit meeting resulted in an introduction/establishment of a security-related agreement (H4). A second hypothesis (H5) proposed that a joint statement regarding international security was released during the meeting as a functional signal of closer security cooperation.

The five hypotheses can be true independently, and collectively. The null-hypothesis on the other hand, states the opposite of what the researcher would expect or predict, which remains contradictory to the other hypotheses. In that case, all the summit meetings had no observable security-related and economic contributable outcomes (H0). In other words, it consisted primarily of cheap-talk. An overview of the hypotheses is presented in the following table.

Table 4.1: Hypotheses overview

i) Economic-contributory Summits

Hypothesis 1: If a summit meeting is contributory in achieving economic interest, the political leaders are accompanied by business representatives signaling closer commercial cooperation between the countries.

Hypothesis 2: If a summit meeting is contributory in achieving economic interest, economic-related agreements are negotiated during the meeting.

Hypothesis 3: If a summit meeting is contributory in achieving economic interest, export performance increases after the meeting.

ii) Security-contributory Summits

Hypothesis 4: If a summit meeting is contributory in achieving security interest, security-related agreements are negotiated during the meeting.

Hypothesis 5: If a summit meeting is contributory in achieving security interest, the political leaders signals to align security interest through a joint-statement during the meeting.

iii) Counterproductive Summits (null hypothesis)

Hypothesis 0: If the summit meeting occurred without a contributory purpose to achieve economic and security interest, there are no economic mission present, increased trade, joint statement, and agreements negotiated.

4.2 Case study Methodology

The purpose of this research is to contribute to a greater understanding of summit diplomacy by examining and categorizing the effects and outcomes of diplomatic representation through summitry. In essence, the diplomatic summit meeting between two political leaders is the objects of study and are thereby of primary concern. Recognizing that summit diplomacy is a complex social phenomenon of human interaction, this research will apply the case study methodology as the overarching approach in answering the research question. As pointed out by Yin

(2009), case study design can be a beneficial methodological strategy when the research object is a social phenomenon, and when questions such as “why” or “how” are postulated as research problems/statement, and when there are many explanations, or effects, related to the object of study.

Due to its broad applicability, case study designs have become one of the dominant methodological approaches in social sciences and are used in a diverse field of studies, from law, economics, politics, business and sociology (Moses et al., 2012; Flyvbjerg, 2006; Yin, 2009; Zainai, 2007). According to Yin, the case study design is an:

empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context; when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and in which multiple sources of evidence are used (Yin, 2009: 23).

As such, the case study design investigates social phenomenon through a detailed contextual and empirical analysis, drawing evidence from several sources of data. One of the reasons for the rise to prominence of case study design in social research relates to the critique and limitations of purely quantitative methods in providing in-depth and detailed explanations of social phenomena (Zainai, 2007; Yin, 2009). Although these pure quantitative studies have a strong potential to generalize on a larger population, they usually lack or ignore a full explanation of the context and complexities of the real-life situation under investigation.

The utilization of case study methods, on the other hand, go beyond pure statistical results warranting a deeper contextual understanding of the topic of

interest by advocating its practitioners for “variations in terms of intrinsic, instrumental and collective approaches to case studies allowing for both quantitative and qualitative analyses of the data” (Zainai, 2007: 4). Moreover, the case study methodology allows for a deeper understanding on selected phenomena by closing in “on real-life situations and test views directly in relation to phenomena as they unfold in practice” (Flyvbjerg, 2006: 235). Hence, considering the complexities of summitry and its multiple outcomes, the case study methodology can serve as a useful and viable approach in not only answering the research question but also generating a deeper understanding about summitry in general, its effects and outcomes, and how it unfolds within a real-world context.

Achieving the Research Objectives/Theory-testing Case Study Approach:

With the case study methodology as the overarching approach, this research intends to investigate the effects and outcomes of summit diplomacy through selecting a case country and sampling a number of instances where the case situation (summit meeting) occurred. Subsequently, an empirical analysis will be used in answering the research question and the hypotheses. The research hypotheses in this paper were generated as propositions, drawn and operationalized from the theories involved.

As such, the theories functioned as explanations in that they presented the researcher’s implicit and explicit understanding of what is potentially going on with the phenomenon under study (Løkke, Sørensen, 2014). In essence, the theories manifested key predictions and variables of the research procedure. Considering the

structure of the hypotheses and theories from this understanding, the current research has overlapping similarities to a theory-testing/explanatory case studies, as defined by Yin (1984) and Løkke et al. (2014). In theory testing case studies, hypothetical propositions “are derived from the theory and are compared to observations, or data, in the case” (Løkke et al., 2014: 68). The more often observations demonstrate findings consistent and conclusive to the theory, the more credibility and empirical accuracy are given to the theories. As such, theory testing case studies can contribute significant knowledge to particular fields of studies by evaluating and assessing the applicability and explanatory power of applied theoretical models. In this sense, the case study design does not only contribute knowledge to the selected case, but also to the theories involved, which allow for increased external validity.

The Drawbacks of Case Study Methodology:

While the case study design allows for the exploration and understanding of complex social phenomenon, there are some notable disadvantages related to its application. As briefly mentioned, a common argument regarding the disadvantage of applying the case study approach relates to the limitations of representativeness (Flyvbjerg, 2006). As research using case study design usually focuses on a deeper analysis of a smaller number of cases, critics invoke that a small number of cases (small N-studies) can only yield limited results, and thus lacks generalizability as one cannot generalize from a small number of cases.

Nonetheless, although case studies lack the means of “formal generalization,” it can be thoroughly used as a “means of falsification” and be generalized as a sound example of the phenomenon under study (Flyvbjerg, 2006: 230). The technique of falsification is developed by Karl Popper and is one of the most well-known tests of which hypotheses can be tested. Accordingly, if the observations do not fit with the hypothetical propositions, the theory involved is considered less valid in explaining the phenomenon. It is expected, however, that not all the individual cases have similar equal effects, but the researcher presumes that general trends and patterns might be observed throughout the analysis.

4.2.1 Case Selection: Japan and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe

Regarding case selection, this study will use information-oriented selection, instead of random selection. Flyvbjerg (2006) and Løkke et al. (2014) suggests that when the objective is to achieve the greatest possible amount of information on a given phenomenon, purposively selecting a critical/atypical/extreme case may uncover more valuable information than otherwise. Selecting these types of cases, they argue, “will often reveal more information because they activate more actors and more basic mechanisms in the situation studied” (Flyvbjerg, 2006: 229). Random selection of average cases does not always contain much information, as they usually avoid deeper insight of the case(s) under study. Hence, to analyze the effects and outcomes of summitry more comprehensively regarding its context, and to accumulate more knowledge of the phenomenon under study, a critical, or strategic case was selected. According to Flyvbjerg, a “critical case” can be described as

having strategic importance about the general phenomena. In other words, “cases that are likely to either clearly confirm or irrefutably falsify propositions and hypotheses” (Flyvbjerg, 2006: 231).

Selecting a Critical Case:

To provide a critical and suitable case, the researcher selected the summit meetings of the Japanese Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe. There are several reasons why Japan and its Prime Minister is a critical/strategic case to the phenomena under study, and the research objectives. First and foremost, Japan is considered an important global actor, both politically and economically. It has the third largest economy in the world (BBC, 2018), and remains a significant influential player in the East-Asian security complex.

However, more importantly, Japanese foreign policy relies heavily on both multilateral and bilateral diplomatic efforts, often through diplomatic leadership meetings (DB, 2018; Berridge, 2005; Barston, 2014: 45). Indeed, throughout the Diplomatic Bluebook of Japan published in 2018¹⁰, summit meetings are frequently associated as significant in improving economic and security-related interest through establishing: “relationships of trust with *countries’ leaders* [emphasis added]” (DB, 2018: 7).

¹⁰ The ‘Diplomatic Bluebook’ provides annual reports on Japan's foreign policy, activities and strategies. The reports are published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan.

In regard to achieving economic interest, Japan's foreign policy of "Promoting Economic Diplomacy" is usually cited as a means of enhancing Japan's economy (DB, 2013; DB, 2014; DB 2015). The key to Japan's "Economic Diplomacy" is the strategic implementation of official development aid (ODA), in which diplomatic efforts are aimed at:

achieving win-win cooperation that contributes both to the development of Japanese companies' business overseas and socioeconomic development of recipient countries" (DB, 2018: 7).

As such, Japan's foreign economic interests are manifested as international foreign aid negotiations aimed at stabilizing the international economies through foreign aid, thereby enhancing a friendly environment for the expansion of Japanese businesses abroad. In line with the research literature, it is expected that the Prime Minister of Japan has a central role as chief negotiator in achieving Japan's economic interest

Japan's diplomatic efforts are not only limited to economic interest but also encompassing geostrategic interest as well. Indeed, in 2013 Japan's National Security Council (NSC) was established, where significant security strategies were adopted. As stated by NSC, Japan's diplomatic security efforts are aimed at;

- (1) Strengthen and expand Japan's capabilities and roles;
- (2) Strengthen the Japan-U.S. Alliance;
- (3) Strengthen diplomacy and security cooperation with Japan's partners;
- (4) Contribute proactively to international efforts;
- (5)

Strengthen cooperation based on universal values; and (6) Strengthen domestic foundations and promote domestic and global understanding (DB, 2014: 29).

In regard to securing Japan's security interest, the role of the Prime Minister is significant. Indeed, according to the Diplomatic Bluebook, the Japanese Prime Minister is to: "to function as the control tower of foreign and defense policy concerning national security" (DB, 2014: 28). As such, the Prime Minister has a central role in achieving Japan's security interest abroad.

Thus, Japan's foreign policies and diplomatic strategic functions are clearly critical and consistent with the research objectives, hypotheses, and theoretical framework. Indeed, the foreign policy of "Promoting Economic Diplomacy" is consistent in achieving the core national interest goals of economic prosperity. Moreover, Japan's security strategies are in line with the core interest of enhancing national security goals. Also, as implied throughout chapter 1 in the Japanese Diplomatic Bluebook, Japan's leadership meetings abroad are frequently illustrated as a significant function in progressing these goals. As such, due to Japan's distinctive reliance on diplomatic leadership meetings, it represents a suitable case to assess the hypothetical propositions of the contributory role of summitry in achieving economic and security-related goals. If the summit meetings of Prime Minister Abe have no contributory role in achieving Japan's national interest goals, it is expected that the visits did not include any significant effects and outcomes.

A second point relates to Prime Minister Abe himself. Prime Minister Abe has emerged as a noteworthy political leader winning three major elections, and his Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has near dominated Japanese politics since World

War II (Japan Times, 2017a). Prime Minister Abe's current leadership of the LDP are set to expire in 2021, which may lead him to the historical achievement of being the longest seated Prime Minister of Japan (Nippon, 2018). Thus, under the long-term administration of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, Japan's foreign policy strategies represent stable and analyzable national interest goals.

Third, the Prime Minister has also expressed a practical attitude regarding international diplomacy. For instance, during the high-level diplomatic dialogue between the two Koreas in 2017, Abe stated that: "dialogue for the sake of dialogue is meaningless," and "the only thing that will give the talks meaning is committed and concrete action," demonstrating his utilitarian stance on diplomatic interaction (NHK, 2017). Moreover, after winning the parliamentary reelection in 2014, he vowed to maintain the pursuit of "diplomatic policies," whereas a clear-cut strategy is to utilize economic diplomacy (possibly through summitry abroad) as a means of driving the growth of the Japanese economy (DB, 2018; Japan Times, 2014)¹¹.

Fourth, since being appointed to the office from 2012 until 2015, he conducted 51 foreign bilateral summit visits, approx. 23 foreign visits per year (DB, 2018) (see map).

¹¹ This strategy has been repeated in Japan's Diplomatic Bluebook

secret), this study converges primarily on bilateral summit meetings. Considering the case study, this means the various summit meetings will be constricted to Japan and Prime Minister Abe's open outward foreign bilateral summit meetings.

Foreign bilateral visits usually involve a significant commitment of resources related to the high cost of long-term absence from their normal duties (Berridge, 2005). Due to the cost, effort, planning and time involved in outward foreign visits when compared to inbound visits, the literature indicates a clear strategy behind these types of visit (Lebovic et al. 2016). For instance, the meticulous planning by lower-level officials and the large commitments of resources, suggest that foreign bilateral visits do not occur sporadically. It is more likely the destination countries are carefully selected. Subsequently, this implies a certain strategy behind traveling to each specific country, which suggests a larger chance that outward bilateral visits provide measurable and observable outcomes.

To summarize the researcher's argument in selecting Japan and Prime Minister Abe as the critical case study: due to Japan's distinctive reliance on foreign diplomatic interaction; and the Japanese Prime Minister's utilitarian views on diplomacy; and his numerous visits abroad; the Japanese Prime Minister's foreign visits abroad is thereby a critical and methodological strategic case to assess the hypothetical propositions of the contributory role of summitry in achieving economic and security-related goals.

4.2.2 Sample Selection: Countries Visited

In this study, the foreign bilateral visits of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe are the object of study and are thereby of primary concern. Recognizing that a summit meeting is a highly complex phenomenon and that each specific visit may have different outcomes, the overall investigative framework converged on a systematic sample-by-sample analysis to answer the research question and its hypotheses. As such, the case study will include embedded cases/ samples, conceptualized as destination countries visited by the Japanese Prime Minister.

The sample selection technique in this paper applied the same technique as in the case selection, where purposive sampling techniques, or information-oriented selection, was utilized when selecting the samples (embedded cases).

According to Teddlie and Yu (2007: 77), purposive sampling techniques involve selecting certain units or cases “based on a specific purpose rather than randomly.” In other words, the researcher decides what needs to be known and sets out to find samples that can provide the necessary information by using samples which are expected to yield the most information by selecting those samples that are the most outstanding successes or failures related to the topic of interest (Flyvbjerg, 2006).

Thus, considering the overall purpose of this paper in investigating the contributory role of summit diplomacy in achieving economic and security-related goals (signaling, trade, and agreements), the samples (destination countries) was selected based on their potential to show the most outstanding contributory effects of the summit meeting.

In essence, the researcher sampled destination countries that would have a higher potential to demonstrate that the summit meeting had direct contributory effects than otherwise. Such as countries with relatively lower levels of trade with Japan (higher chance to observe and attribute increased trade levels to the visit); limited political contact with Japan (higher chance to observe and attribute new economic and security-related negotiations to the visit); countries not restricted by embargos (more likely to conduct security-related transactions and negotiations). Hence, the destination countries were selected based on the economic and security-related relationship the sample countries had with Japan before the visit.

Following these guidelines, four criteria were established for selecting the destination country: i) initial bilateral visit by the Japanese Prime Minister within the time-frame of 2012-2015; ii) relatively low levels of Japanese export before Abe's reelection in 2012; iii) not under a strict UN arms/weapons-embargo; and iv) no, or relatively low levels of Japanese high-level diplomatic interaction¹³. Furthermore, as pointed out by Teddlie et al. (2007), purposive sampling techniques focus on small sample sizes in order to achieve a fuller in-depth analysis of each sample. In this paper, seven countries were selected.

¹³ An exception was made for Cambodia due to the low levels of bilateral trade performance during the study period.

Table 4.2: List of selected countries

<i>Country</i>	<i>Trade value ¹⁴2012 (million US\$)</i>	<i>Non-UN arms embargo countries¹⁵</i>	<i>Last visiting Japanese Prime Minister</i>	<i>Time of Prime Minister Abe's visit</i>
Palestine	6	√	2006.6 (Koizumi)	2015.1
Djibouti	43	√	-	2013.8
Ethiopia	130	√	-	2014.1
Mozambique	136	√	-	2014.1
Brunei	187	√	2001.2 (Koizumi)	2013.10
Cambodia	260	√	2012.11 (Noda)	2013.11
Jordan	281	√	2006.7 (Koizumi)	2015.1

Arguably, the type of case and sample-selection method used in this paper may invite criticism of selection-bias toward verification. This is understood as a tendency to confirm the researcher's preconceived notions so that the study, therefore, becomes of lesser scientific value. However, in line with arguments as pointed out by Flyvbjerg (2006) and Moses et al. (2012), social science case studies do not focus on verification, but rather, falsification. The goal is not to find ultimate truths, but rather fortifying related concepts and theories by assessing their boundaries and explanatory power (Løkke et al., 2014).

¹⁴ Source: UN Comtrade Database (<https://comtrade.un.org/data>); World Bank webpage (<http://www.worldbank.org/>)

¹⁵ **UN Arms Embargo countries:** Afghanistan, Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Cote d'Ivoire, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, North Korea, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan. Source: The Journal of Export Controls and Sanctions (WorldECR, 2012).

4.3 Research Design: mixed-methods sequential exploratory design

Throughout this research, summit diplomacy has been conceptualized in functional terms, meaning it is perceived as an action, where the ‘effects’ are defined as outcomes associated with the action. Based on this conceptualization, and in line with the research literature and theories, three observable summit-effects contributory in achieving national interest goals were identified as: i) international negotiation of agreement (security and/or economic negotiations); ii) signaling intentions (accompanied business representatives and/or joint security-related statement); and iii) increased trade performance.

Essentially, this is a controlled experimental research framework, where there are two “units,” or “variables” of interest: the “independent variable,” and the “dependent variable” (Moses et al. 2012: 52). While the independent variable is defined as the predictor or explanation of potential outcomes, the dependent variable is defined as the response to the presence or absence of the independent variable.

From this understanding, the overall research design focuses on an exploratory sample-by-sample basis of a number of summit meetings (independent variable) in order to observe and explore the hypothesized effects and outcomes (dependent variables).

Hence, in the context of the case study and the theoretical framework, and to answer the research question (and the hypothesis) more comprehensively, two types of methods were used: one qualitative (Document Analysis), and one quantitative (Time-series Analysis). As such, under the case study design, this paper used a

mixed methods approach, which is defined as a procedure for collecting, analyzing and combining both quantitative and qualitative data within a single study (Greene, Valerie, Graham: 1989: 256). When applied to studies, this method has been referred to as a mixed-methods sequential explanatory design, because it consists of two sequencing phases (*Creswell et al. 2003* as cited in Ivankova, Creswell, and Sheldon, Stick, 2006).

Weighting/Priority

As noted by Creswell (2009), an important factor for mixed-method procedures is the weigh, or priority given to the quantitative or qualitative method. In some studies, the weight might be equal; in other studies, it might emphasize one or the other. For this study, most hypotheses were answered within the framework of the qualitative analysis, thereby emphasizing it as qualitative research. Nevertheless, due to a large part of the literature suggesting a potential relationship between trade and high-level meetings, a quantitative method was applied to analyze this section of the research.

Timing and Mixing

Another important factor of mixed-method research is mixing/timing of the analyses. In other words, whether the two analyses sections were mixed, or with one following the other, sequentially. According to Creswell:

mixing means either that the qualitative and quantitative data are actually merged on one end of the continuum, kept separate on the other end of the continuum or combined in some way (Creswell, 2009: 207-208).

In this paper, the qualitative analysis converged on events occurring at the time of the summit meeting (intra-outcomes), while the quantitative analysis focused on a period after the meeting itself (post-outcomes). Hence, for this paper, the qualitative analysis came first in the sequence, while the quantitative analysis came second. The reason for this choice of sequencing relates to the potential impact the meeting itself could have on trade variation. For instance, if the conclusion of a tariff- and free-trade agreements incurred in the meeting, there would be a *direct* link between the summit meeting and trade variation. If no economic agreement were established at the time of the meeting, and trade still increased, it would be designated as an *indirect* outcome.

Following this design, the researcher first collected and analyzed the qualitative data. The initial qualitative section served to ground the research in the context of summitry and related dependent variables under study. Also, besides from providing contextual richness of the research, the section also accounted for specific agreements occurring at the time of the visit, which may have potentially affected trade, such as political instability, tariff- and free-trade agreements. Then, the quantitative data was collected and analyzed second in the sequence which provided additional information on the phenomenon under study. The two phases were connected and discussed in the analytical stage of the study.

The main argument for using mixed method as a design strategy is that all methods are limited and biased, so the use of only one method to investigate a phenomenon will end in biased and limited result. Ivankova et al. (2006) point out that quantitative data and method are advantageous for identifying and categorizing variables of interest, and in this way reducing and restructuring complex problems to a limited number of variables. Qualitative data and method, on the other hand, contributes a deeper analysis of the phenomenon while suggesting contextual factors in which quantitative data cannot address.

The mixed method strategy has been cited as beneficial in providing robust findings, diverse data, increased validity and greater understanding of studied phenomena (Moses et al., 2012; Greene et al., 1989). A second argument is related to the inadequacies found in one-source data. The use of multiple sources may provide additional verification and validity while diversifying the data (Ivankova et al., 2006). The subsequent sections will present the qualitative and quantitative phases, their selected methods, and why they are appropriate for this study.

4.3.2 Qualitative Data and Method: Document Analysis

The qualitative method was selected based on the intention of providing an in-depth analysis of the visit itself. As such, the method is concerned with events occurring at the time of the visit. In this paper, Document Analysis was selected, which is defined as a: “systematic procedure for reviewing or evaluating documents, both printed and electronic (computer-based and Internet-transmitted) material” (Bowen,

2009: 27). The qualitative data were examined and interpreted in order to produce meaning, gain understanding, and used as empirical knowledge.

There are several important reasons for applying the qualitative method. First, it contributed depth to the analysis, such grounding the research in the context of the case study (Japanese high-level diplomatic exchange) and related phenomena being investigated. Second, the qualitative data and method revealed contextual factors in which quantitative data and analysis had more difficulty in addressing. Third, it clarified the results of the quantitative phase by providing direct reasons for potential trade variance. Thus, following (Ivankova et al. (2006), and Greene et al. (1989) mixed method design, the qualitative data and analysis are included together with the quantitative results as sectional narratives for each visited country in the analytical stage of the report.

(Qualitative) Independent variable of interest:

Based on the critical case selection procedures in this study, the foreign bilateral visits of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe represent the independent variable to assess the hypothetical propositions of the contributory role of summitry in achieving economic and security-related goals. In other words, the foreign bilateral visit of Prime Minister Abe is perceived as the independent variable because of its presumed role in contributing to the effects. As mentioned, this study converges primarily on bilateral summitry, because such meetings may contain more observable short-term outcomes, as the negotiations and agreements usually consist of narrow national interest goals, specifically involving the participating countries.

Moreover, according to the research literature, outward visits usually involve a significant commitment of resources related to the high cost of absence from their normal duties, which further imply the presence of potential effects. Also, seven ‘visited’ countries were purposive sampled based on relatively low levels of trade and limited political contact with the case country, presuming that these countries would show the most outstanding effects of the visit.

(Qualitative) Dependent variables of interest:

In light of the research literature, theoretical framework and hypotheses, several dependent variables were identified. To organize the potential dependent variables, the hypotheses were categorized by whether the independent variable (summit meeting) was instrumental in achieving normative core national interest goals, such as realizing economic prosperity, and/or enhancing national security. Whether or not the independent variable was instrumental, relied on the presence of the identified dependent variables.

In the first and fifth hypotheses, the dependent variables were identified through the signaling theory. Specifically, Hypothesis 1 presumed the presence of business representative during the summit meeting as a signal of closer economic cooperation (H1). Hypothesis 5 presumed the announcement of a joint security related statement during the summit meeting as a signal of aligning security interest (H5).

In the second and fourth hypotheses, the dependent variables were identified through the two-level game theory as topic of negotiated arrangements. Specifically,

Hypotheses 2 presumed the presence of economic/commercial negotiations during the summit meeting as instrumental in achieving economic interest (H2), while Hypotheses 4 presumed the presence of security-related negotiations during the summit meeting as significant in achieving security interest (H4).

Following the mixed-method sequential design, the qualitative analysis will corroborate the quantitative analysis of whether the case study visit is related to significant changes in trade-level. This is particularly relevant to tariff or trade agreements which can potentially both affect trade, but also be affected itself through the meeting. The second part investigated additional areas other than economic interest, such as examining political/security-related arrangements between Japan and the visited country concluded/introduced during the visit. Apart from Hypothesis 3, all the other hypotheses will be assessed based on qualitative documents.

Qualitative Data Selection

As pointed out by Bowen (2009) a document analysis is a textual analysis of documents. As such, it requires data selection, instead of data collection. Of course, the most obvious sources of information would be a firsthand interview of Prime Minister Abe, or any one part of the delegation during the visit. Nevertheless, due to the inability to get in contact with reliable representatives, secondhand sources were selected. Hence, for this phase, the researcher intended to select reliable documents from the bilateral meeting between Abe and the visited counterpart. In

order to purposefully provide reliable records from the visits, several requirements were followed during the data selection process:

Table 4.3: Document Selection Criteria

-
- Authentic/Credible document source.
 - The data was written as a firsthand record.
 - The data-source answered the hypothesis/research question
-

The first requirement relates to selecting a source that is credible, or trustworthy (O’Leary, 2014). The main strategy to substantiate trustworthiness in this paper was to cite a primary source that was credible. A second strategy was to use secondary sources that corroborated the primary source (i.e., scientific journals and mass media records). The second requirement, firsthand record, relates to selecting a source which gave rich details of the phenomenon under study. The third requirement relates to internal validity by selecting a source that essentially answered the research question and its hypotheses.

- o Was the visit joined by a commercial delegation? (yes/no)
- o Was security/political/defense arrangement start/conclude (yes/no)
- o Did an economic/commercial arrangement start/conclude (yes/no)
- o Was a joint-statement released (yes/no)

In this paper, two sources were used for the qualitative data: i) the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and ii) the webpage of the office of the Japanese Prime Minister (Kantei). The records provided a credible source (official governmental records), a firsthand account (Press conferences and joint communiqué) and satisfied the

requirements for internal validity (answered the research question/hypotheses). The researcher trusted that these documents provided facts, not opinions, and were thus used as the primary source of data. Subsequently, a thorough, systematic review of the data provided background information that helped the researcher understand the general outline of events and outcomes of each specific visit.

Document Interview Technique:

In order to extract the necessary information from the documents, the researcher followed the interview technique from O’Leary (2014: 179-180). The interview technique entails “treating each document as a respondent” that may provide relevant information to the research inquiry. In this study, the research question and its hypotheses determined what the researcher wanted to know and whether the “respondent” or document provided the answers. Subsequently, the researcher “asked” questions related to the hypotheses that highlighted ‘textual passages’ of the document with answers within the text.

The primary documents used in this study was the online summary records (published by the Japanese MOFA) of the summit meetings conducted by Prime Minister Abe to the selected destination countries. The selected records copies of the online records, where ‘textual passages’ were highlighted and organized by the presence of the dependent variables (economic mission, joint-security related statements, security negotiations, and economic negotiations) in the document. Subsequently, in line with the theoretical framework and research literature, the researcher confirmed the presence of the dependent variables, and further classified

the dependent variables by national interest goals (economic interest and/or security interest).

To account for lack of information, scientific journals and mass media records were additionally analyzed in order to corroborate the findings, as well as pointing out contextual factors for each specific country.

Data Source

The qualitative data which provided the primary source of information can be found on the official website of the Japanese MOFA¹⁶, and the webpage of the office of the Japanese Prime Minister¹⁷. In order to account for transparency (suitable for repeated reviews), the primary documents are provided in table 4.4.

¹⁶ The webpages can be accessed at the official webpages of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs: <http://www.mofa.go.jp/>

¹⁷ The webpages can be accessed at the official webpages of the Government of Japan: <https://japan.kantei.go.jp/>

Table 4.4: Documents Analyzed

<i>Sample country</i>	<i>Primary Documents selected</i>
<i>Palestine</i>	Prime Minister Shinzo Abe Visits Palestine - Joint Press Release on the Meeting between Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and President Mahmoud Abbas of Palestine (MOFA, 2015a). Prime Minister's Visit to the Palestinian Authority (Kantei, 2015a)
<i>Djibouti</i>	Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's Visit to the Republic of Djibouti (August 27) (MOFA, 2013a). Press Conference by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe during His Visit to the Middle East (Kantei, 2013a)
<i>Ethiopia</i>	Prime Minister Abe's Visit to Ethiopia (Outline and Outcomes) - Joint Communiqué (MOFA, 2014a) Prime Minister's Visit to the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (Kantei, 2014a)
<i>Mozambique</i>	Prime Minister Abe's Visit to Mozambique (Outline and Outcomes) - Joint Communiqué (MOFA, 2014b) Prime Minister's Visit to the Republic of Mozambique (Kantei, 2014b)
<i>Brunei</i>	Japan-Brunei Summit Meeting (MOFA, 2013b) The Prime Minister Attends ASEAN-related Summit Meetings and Others (Kantei, 2013b).
<i>Cambodia</i>	Joint Statement between Japan and the Kingdom of Cambodia (MOFA, 2013c) Press Conference by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe Following his Visit to Cambodia and Lao PDR (Kantei, 2013c)
<i>Jordan</i>	Prime Minister Abe Visits Jordan (MOFA, 2015b) Press Conference by Prime Minister Abe during his Visit to the Middle East (Kantei, 2015b)

4.3.2 Quantitative Data and Method: EDA Time-series Analysis

A significant part of the literature concerning itself with summit diplomacy contains empirical studies suggesting an *indirect* relationship between summit meetings and improved trade performance. In other words, summitry occurs and is followed by

improved trade between the countries. Hence, taking into consideration the qualitative results, the next phase of this paper aimed to test this proposition.

(Quantitative) Independent variable of interest:

As in the qualitative analysis, the foreign bilateral visits of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe are conceived as the independent variable to assess the hypothesis in the quantitative analysis, conceptualized as the potential reason for the variation.

(Quantitative) Dependent variable of interest:

In the quantitative analysis, the dependent variable is related to previous empirical studies' indication of a potential relationship between diplomatic representation and economic ties regarding improved trade performance (Denny, 2012; Nitsch, 2007). Although Head, et al. (2010), cast doubt over such relations, this research intends to evaluate empirically the impact of the case study meetings on trade. In other words, whether the independent variable (the bilateral visit) represents the potential reasons for the variation of trade performance over time.

Quantitative procedure:

Thus, the quantitative method will investigate whether an outside event affected subsequent time-series observations. The most fitting design to analyze variable variation over time is the time series analysis (Anderton & Carter, 2001; Barbieri & Levy, 1999). This study follows the step-by-step method, as illustrated by Barbieri et al. (1999), which examines the impact of war on bilateral trade. Hence,

the researcher will analyze significant changes in trade performance before and after the intervention of the visit.

However, due to the recent nature of the case study visits, this paper contains a monthly analysis of export trade performance on a sample to sample basis. This is critical because it differs from other comparable intervention-empirical works (*see* Head, et.al., 2010; Barbieri et al. 1999; Denny, 2012; Nitsch, 2007; and Rose, 2007) by focusing on internal change, instead of comparable change, and short-term variation, e.g., monthly data instead of annual data. Two shortcomings incur because of this: i) lack/unavailability of data, and ii) inability to generate a robust confirmatory model. In other words, while the independent variable for this paper (export trade performance) is easily accessible, other control variables (e.g., GDP, tariff rates, currency rates) which can also have a significant impact on the value and levels of trade, was harder to attain in the form of monthly data. Subsequently, this leads to the inability to generate a robust model, as well as resulting in inadequate findings.

In light of this, the current study followed the pattern of exploratory data analysis (EDA). According to Behrens (1997), EDA can be loosely characterized as an emphasis on understanding the data and discover patterns in data. The EDA-approach was developed in the early 1960s by statistician John Turkey. Turkey advocated against efforts aimed at understanding data from a hypothesis-testing or confirmatory data analysis (CDA) alone, without proper consideration of techniques that would aid in the understanding of patterns of data more broadly (Behrens, Yu, 2003). In practical terms, EDA consist of preliminary statistical

techniques, and are usually present in the first part of the data analysis process which assess assumptions on which statistical inference will be based. The results will then confirm whether the researcher is asking the ‘right question’ regarding the topic of interest, which in this paper is the potential relationship between high-level diplomatic exchange and improved export performance. Thus, EDA fits with the purpose of this paper, due to the conflicting literature of the relationship between high-level diplomatic visits and increased trade performance. It also provides a robust analytical framework for preliminary analysis, which will be conducted in this paper.

EDA-approach focuses on using graphical representation with the primary objective to provide visual insight into the data, which graphical techniques often provide more readily than other quantitative techniques. The purpose of this approach is to test the hypothesis in a quantitatively-visual way and investigate whether datasets are similar, different, or whether there is a trend or major difference between data sets (Behrens, 1997). As mentioned, the literature indicated a strong increase in bilateral trade after a summit meeting. Subsequently, this study aims to test if this can be answered within the EDA framework. Of course, using both EDA and CDA would yield optimal results, however, due to the unavailability in data, as well as incomparability to other studies, basic EDA will be used in this paper.

Period of the quantitative study:

The quantitative analysis examined Japan's export performance in terms of value for a period of two years before and two years (monthly) after Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's visit to the selected country. As such, the quantitative analysis was separated from the qualitative analysis, which examined the effects and outcomes of the summit meeting at the time of its occurrence.


Tools and interpretation for data analysis:

This paper used an EDA-approach, whereas tabular and graphical representation tool is used for the analysis of data. As mentioned, EDA consist of preliminary statistical techniques, which assesses and establishes grounds for further study. Estimates for regression coefficients are based on basic preliminary data analysis and obtained through: i) a change in trade performance (level) and ii) a change in slope trend before and after the intervention. According to Barbieri et al. (1999), a change in level is defined as the difference between the observed level at the first intervention time point and that predicted by the pre-intervention time trend, and a change in trend is defined as the difference between post- and pre-intervention slopes.

In this paper, paired t-test (Paired samples for means) was applied, whereas the pre- and post-visit period was tested on trade performance¹⁸. Paired t-test compares two interrelated means (i.e., before-trade, and after-trade), and whether the difference in means is statistically significant. As pointed out by Shier (2004), this technique can be beneficial for before-and-after observations on dependent data-series. Scatterplot and OLS linear regression analysis were applied to examine the change in slope. In most of statistical analyses, an alpha of 0.05 is used as the cutoff for significance. Hence, if the p-value is larger than 0.05, the researcher cannot conclude that a significant difference exists. A significant change would be meaningful if both the level and slope show both altered results.

¹⁸ Programs used: Statistical Package for the Social Science (SPSS).

Figure 4.2: Proposed Impact of the high-level visit on Trade Flows



Based on Barbieri et al. (1999)

Figure 1 illustrates how the researcher applied the time-series model to assess the impact of the case study visit on trade. The model portrays the case country whose trade increases monthly, yielding the positive sloping line from A to B. If Abe's visit has any positive impact on trade, one would expect to see a noteworthy increase in the value of trade from B to C, e.g., a difference in trade level before and after. If the visit were to have no impact, one would assume to either see an uninterrupted trend in the trade data, following the same increasing/decreasing pattern. The researcher argues that if the visited countries lack either evidence for improved trade performance and a strong positive slope trend in the post-intervention period, which are suggested in the previous studies, it contains enough evidence to deductively conclude that a bilateral visit did not enhance trade performance in the study period.

Control and adjustment for trade

Attempting to analyze a shaping factor on international trade is challenging and cannot be performed without having a clear idea of the evolution of trade patterns over time. Indeed, besides diplomatic interaction, it is important to address factors which can have a significant impact on the value and levels of trade. This is particularly important for experimental and observational design and data analysis, whereas control variables constitute an extraneous or third factor whose influence needs to be isolated. In order to operate and isolate the time-series for the experimental analysis, the researcher applied two functions on the data as a whole: inflation adjustment/deflation (uncovering *real* growth/change), and seasonal/cyclical adjustment (identifying trend-patterns).

For this paper, the researcher followed the methodical techniques by Nau (2018) and Shier (2004). Subsequently, recognizing inflation as a significant component of apparent growth in any monetary time-series, each monthly trade value was first adjusted for inflation, which was accomplished by dividing the monthly trade value (US\$) by the monthly Consumer Price Index (CPI, base index year 2015), multiplied by the CPI for the last month in the time-series (for the case country, Japan). Moreover, as noted by Shier (2004), for a paired t-test to be valid, the differences need to be approximately normally distributed. Accordingly, in order to highlight trends and to reduce extreme outliers, the inflation-adjusted data-set was then controlled for seasonal/cyclical variations to stabilize the variance of random outliers in the time-series trade data. This was done by averaging monthly data into six-month periods, which cleared out peaks and irregularities.

Additionally, according to the literature, there is an abundance of other factors which influence exports. Even factors, such as cultural, social and physical differences between countries have shown to influence trade performance between countries (Egger, Lassmann, 2012). In general terms, however, conventional economic theory points out that tariff levels and high currency rates are prominent barriers to trade, and vice versa, mechanisms for improved trade performance. Although the general trend globally has been toward lower tariffs, some nations still impose relatively high import taxes, particularly countries in Africa, South Asia, and the Caribbean. For instance, Tamirisa (1999) and Lee and Swagel (1997) show that capital controls, such as tariff barriers and high currency rates, significantly reduces exports into developing and transition economies. Subsequently, if there is indeed an improvement of trade performance, tariff and currency rates could be crucial factors which accounted for the growth, which therefore need to be addressed and discussed. For instance, if lower levels of tariff rates were implemented at the same time as the increased trade performance, it would weaken the hypothesis that the visit alone was tied to the increased performance rate. As mentioned, however, these variables will be provided in a separate chart in annual values.

Quantitative Data Collection

The quantitative data for the present study is collected from secondary sources. The researcher has used the official website of the Japanese Government to obtain

specific data on travel destination¹⁹. Monthly total trade data was taken from UN Comtrade Database²⁰. The data made available on UN Comtrade have been provided by countries or downloaded from their official websites. The CPI data is developed by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) database and defined as the change in the prices of a basket of goods and services that are purchased by specific groups of households. Inflation is measured regarding the annual growth rate with 2015 as the base year with a breakdown for food, energy and total excluding food and energy²¹.

The control variable data, such as tariff and currency rates were retrieved from the World Bank webpage²². The annual value denoting tariff rates is the unweighted average of effectively applied rates across all products subject to tariffs calculated for all traded goods. Values for currency rates were calculated as an annual average based on monthly averages (local currency units relative to the US dollar).

Limitations of Methods

The limitations related to the qualitative analysis is its relative lack or sparseness of information. A document will not always provide complete information, and it is important to recognize that some of the events of the diplomatic visit might have

¹⁹ Accessed at: <http://www.mofa.go.jp/>, and <https://japan.kantei.go.jp/>. The specific webpages are cited in the bibliography.

²⁰ Accessed online at: <http://comtrade.un.org/data/>

²¹ The data can be accessed at <https://data.oecd.org/price/inflation-cpi.htm>

²² Accessible at: <http://www.worldbank.org/>

transpired behind closed doors (Bowen, 2009). Also, some documents may be incomplete or exaggerated. For instance, the documents analyzed in this paper lacked information about whether agreements were introduced by lower-level officials or by the Prime Minister himself. In order to address issues of reliability, the researcher evaluated the validity and reliability of each document by analyzing additional scientific journals and mass media records of the meetings.

The limitations of the quantitative method are related to the recent occurrence of the visit, which confined the study to twenty-four months before and twenty-four months after Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's visit to the country. As mentioned, the quantitative method is based on measuring performance before and after the introduction of an intervention. The observed differences are assumed to be due to the intervention (Eccles, Grimshaw, Campbell, Ramsay, 2003). Although the evaluative designs are intrinsically weak because secular trends or sudden changes make it difficult to attribute observed changes directly to the intervention, the results were considered along with two control variables. However, due to the lack of access to monthly and quarterly data, annual tariff, and exchange rate data is used to control for trade fluctuations. Although this framework is far from ideal, it will provide a general control factor of the relationship between the data and contributing to either weaker or stronger evidence of causality.

5.0 Analysis

This chapter presents the empirical analysis and interpretation of the data. The main objective of the study is to explore, identify and categorize observable economic and security-related effects and outcomes associated with summit diplomacy. In order to do this, the researcher selected a case study on Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's official bilateral visits to seven countries around the world. In line with the research question and hypotheses, the analysis aimed to identify whether the summit meeting contributed to achieving Japan's national interest goals (identified as security or economic interest).

The following sections contain the document analysis and the exploratory data analysis of trade performance regarding Abe's visit to seven countries. As a mixed-method design, this study is a sequential-qualitative first, whereas the two databases are kept separate but connected for methodological consistency. For instance, as a major part of the qualitative analysis investigated negotiated agreements, possible trade-affecting agreements was taken into account as bringing potential cause for trade variation. To abridge the analysis, formalities and ceremonial talks/processes were largely excluded in the analysis but are available in the source material.

5.1 Palestine

On January 20, 2015, Abe visited Palestine. During his visit, he met with President Mahmoud Abbas (MOFA, 2015a; Kantei, 2015a). According to the Japanese government homepage the visit was primarily cited as economically purposed, but

more in the field of international development and humanitarian aid (MOFA, 2015a).

Qualitative analysis

Abe was the first Japanese Prime Minister to visit Israel and the Palestine authorities in almost ten years. According to the Japanese government homepage, Abe's visit to the Palestinian authority was cited primarily on the grounds of international development and humanitarian aid, although Abe himself was joined by an economic mission (**H1: yes**) (MOFA, 2015a; Kantei, 2015). During the meeting with President Abbas, Abe promised approximately 100 million US\$ of assistance for humanitarian/reconstruction support and funding in the fields of employment and healthcare. Also, Abe promised to further intensify Japanese investment and efforts in the "Corridor for Peace and Prosperity" project (**H2: yes**). The project is a Japanese government's initiative aimed at the financial development of Palestine's agricultural sector. 2017 marked the initiation of the second phase of the project, which includes the development of 50,000 square meters for factories, approximately 8000 square meters for facilities of industrial services and 17,000 square meters for logistic services (MOFA, 2015a, Wafa, 2017).


The topic of international/national security played a minimal part of the visit. However, Abe did indicate that he was in support of the two-state solution between the Israelis and Palestinians. Nevertheless, no joint agreements or statements were found regarding this topic (**H4: no, H5: no**).

Table 5.1.1: Qualitative summary results (Palestine)

<i>Visited country</i>	<i>Economic agreements (concluded/initiated upon the visit)</i>	<i>Security agreements (concluded/initiated upon the visit)</i>	<i>Economic mission present</i>	<i>Joint security-statement upon the visit</i>
Palestine	100 million US\$ of ODA for humanitarian/ reconstruction support (<i>development</i>) Promises of investments in the “Corridor for Peace and Prosperity” Project (<i>contractual</i>)	<i>n/a</i>	yes	<i>n/a</i>

Quantitative analysis

The qualitative analysis indicated no significant trade-affecting agreements established at the time of the visit. A potential trade improvement is therefore considered indirect. Tables and figures below present the output of the quantitative analysis. Figure 5.1.1 shows Japanese exports spiking haphazardly during the period of study but remained relatively low. The dotted line shows raw data, while the blue area is inflation -and seasonal adjusted. At first glance, no outstanding changes are visible.



The most significant influential factor for Palestine’s trade relation is its dependency on Israel. However, although Palestine’s trade regime is dependent on following Israeli customs, its authorities can freely enter into bilateral trade agreements with third countries. Also, Israel is the main entry point for most Palestinian imports and remains, therefore, an involved partner in Palestine’s foreign trade relations (Agbahey, Siddig, Grethe, Luckmann, 2018). As illustrated in the quantitative results, reported Japanese exports to Palestine have been fluctuating since 2012, with i) Meat fish and seafood, ii) Optical/photo/medical apparatus, and iii) Heavy machinery as the largest import commodities. Japanese annual export value to Palestine amounted to 6.5 million US\$ in 2012, then 970 thousand in 2013, increasing to 1.7 million in 2014, and 1.5 million in 2015, and decreasing to 2.7 million in 2016.

Figure 5.1.2: Scatter Plot (Palestine)




Table 5.1.2: t-test for Japan's export to Palestine (Adjusted)

<i>Variables</i>	<i>Pre-Visit</i> <i>N = 26</i>		<i>Post-Visit</i> <i>N = 26</i>		<i>t-value</i>	<i>p-value</i>
	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>		
Japanese Export to Palestine	190417.31	137182.527	180616.87	122896.270	0.228	0.821

Table 5.1.3: Control Chart (Palestine/annual)

<i>Variables</i>	<i>Pre-Visit</i>		<i>Post-Visit</i>	
	<i>2013</i>	<i>2014</i>	<i>2015</i>	<i>2016</i>
Israeli/Palestine tariff rate (%)	1.77	1.78	4.03	3.84
Official exchange rate (LCU per US\$, period average)	3.6	3.5	3.8	3.8

The time series plots show a declining trend line of observed pre-visit trade data, while the post-visit trade data show an increasing trend. Moreover, reported annual tariff levels for 2015 and 2016 show a significantly higher rate than for 2013 and 2014, indicating rising Japanese imports despite increased adjustment of tariff levels. Annual currency rate levels remained stable throughout the study period. Having compared data of Japan's export to Palestine within 26 months before the visit to the data of 26 months after the visit, results of pair sample t-test on the adjusted time-series showed the mean value of trade performance in the pre-visit period ($M = 190417.31$, $SD = 137182.527$) was slightly higher than the mean value in the post-visit period ($M = 180616.87$, $SD = 122896.270$). Moreover, no statistical difference of trade value of pre- and post-visit was found when $t(23) = 0.288$, $p = 0.821$, much larger than the threshold of 0.05. Due to the insignificant difference in

mean value between pre- and post-visit trade data, a meaningful improvement of trade performance was not associated with the visit (*H3: no*).

5.2 Djibouti

Abe's visit to the Republic of Djibouti occurred on August 27, 2013. During the visit, he met with Ismaïl Omar Guelleh, President of Djibouti (MOFA, 2013a).

The overlying objective for the visit was primarily credited to the promotion of international security.

Qualitative Analysis

According to the Japanese government homepage, one of the primary reasons for the visit was for the promotion of international security. Indeed, none of the qualitative documents indicated that Abe was joined by an economic mission during this visit (*H1: no*). Instead, Abe visited the Japanese defense forces stationed there (AllAfrica, 2013; MOFA, 2013a). However, some economic developments occurred as the visit resulted in promises of Japanese financial aid and support to Djibouti. Abe promised in general terms to contribute private and public means of approx. 18 billion US\$, and official development aid (ODA hereafter) of approx. 14 billion US\$, in the following five years. Furthermore, during the meeting with President Guelleh, a plan was implemented for the realization of geothermal power generation development through technical cooperation and for improvement of electricity supply in the capital of Djibouti (*H2: yes*) (MOFA, 2013a). Apparently, the arrangements developed smoothly, and in 2014, Japan's International

Cooperation Agency identified 13 potential sites for geothermal development in various surveys. According to ThinkGeoEnergy, an online news media focusing on geothermal energy, Japan is currently heavily invested in Djibouti's geothermal projects with the most recent drilling program scheduled to start in 2019 (ThinkGeoEnergy, 2017).

Regarding political/security agreements, Abe promised to extend support in the field of maritime security (MOFA, 2013a) Japan Times, 2017b). The support was given in the form of study plan from September 2013 regarding the supply of patrol vessels to the Coast Guard of Djibouti (**H4: yes**). In regard to this, an agreement was also made between the leaders that Japan would send experts on maritime law enforcement for enhancing the capabilities of the Djibouti Coast Guard. However, no joint security-related statement was released by the two leaders (**H5: no**).

Table 5.2.1 Qualitative summary results (Djibouti)


<i>Visited country</i>	<i>Economic agreements (concluded/initiated upon the visit)</i>	<i>Political agreements (concluded/initiated upon the visit)</i>	<i>Economic mission present</i>	<i>Joint security-statement upon the visit</i>
Djibouti	Private and public means of approx. 18 billion US\$, and ODA of approx. 14 billion US\$ Preliminary talks in advancing geothermal technical cooperation. Agreement on sending maritime law experts	Provide a study plan for the supply of patrol vessels.	<i>n/a</i>	<i>n/a</i>

Quantitative analysis

The figures and tables below demonstrate the results of the quantitative analysis of Abe's visit to Djibouti. As Palestine, Djibouti is a relatively small trading partner

for the Japanese economy, and monthly export levels remained low throughout the study period.

Figure 5.2.1: Monthly Japanese export to Djibouti (Aug. 2011-Aug. 2015)



Japanese exports to Djibouti have been following a decreasing trend from 2011 (66.3 m US\$), 2012 (43.7 m US\$) and an all-time low in 2013 (11.8 m US\$) but have increased since 2014 (35.8 m US\$) and 2015 (51.4 m US\$). Top export commodities to Djibouti during the study period contained of i) Electrical equipment, ii) Vehicles other than railway, and iii) Heavy machinery.

Figure 5.2.2: Scatter Plot (Djibouti)




Table 5.2.2: t-test for Japan's export to Djibouti (Adjusted)

<i>Variables</i>	<i>Pre-Visit</i> <i>N = 26</i>		<i>Post-Visit</i> <i>N = 26</i>		<i>t-value</i>	<i>p-value</i>
	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>		
Japanese Export to Djibouti	4053681.71	2864514.520	2667979.63	1234280.616	1.725	0.098

Table 5.2.3: Control Chart (Djibouti/annual)

<i>Variables</i>	<i>Pre-Visit</i>			<i>Post-Visit</i>	
	<i>2011</i>	<i>2012</i>	<i>2013</i>	<i>2014</i>	<i>2015</i>
Djibouti tariff rate (%)	11.97	11.97	N/A	7.74	N/A
Official exchange rate (LCU per US\$, period average)	177.7	177.7	177.7	177.7	177.7

The scatter plots show a declining trend line of observed pre-visit trade data, while the post-visit trade data show an increasing trend. However, reported annual tariff levels for the pre-visit period of 2011 and 2012 showed a significantly higher rate than for 2014 and 2015, indicating lower adjustment of tariff levels might have accounted for increasing levels of Japanese imports. Annual currency rate levels remained stable throughout the study period.

Having compared data of Japan's export to Djibouti within 26 months before the visit to the data of 26 months after the visit, results of pair sample t-test showed the mean value of trade performance in the post-visit period ($M = 2667979.63$, $SD = 1234280.616$) was lower than the mean value in the pre-visit period ($M = 4053681.71$, $SD = 1234280.616$). Moreover, no statistical difference of trade value of pre- and post-visit was found when $t(23) = 1.725$, $p = 0.098$, higher than the threshold of 0.05. Consequently, there was no statistical difference between pre-

and-post-visit trade data. Hence, no increase in trade performance was observed (**H3: no**).

5.3 Ethiopia

Abe visited Ethiopia from January 13 to January 14, 2014. Incurred in the visit was a meeting with Prime Minister Hailemariam (MOFA, 2014a).

Qualitative Analysis

After reviewing the qualitative primary sources, the overall purpose of the visit suggested as being commercially motivated due to Abe's large retinue of 15 private companies (including its CEOs, and Executive Vice President of JETRO) (**H1: yes**) (MOFA, 2014a; The Economist, 2014). In the summit meeting with Prime Minister Hailemariam, several economic and political arrangements were discussed.

Apart from the signing of an aviation agreement (direct flight), several economic agreements were discussed. In the meeting with Prime Minister Hailemariam, Abe expressed intentions to recommence ODA-loan (not determined) aimed at Ethiopia's geothermal power generation capability (which was currently under the Feasibility Study (F/S) funded by Japan) (MOFA 2014a). The leaders further discussed Japan's assistance in a technical survey of the urban water supply projects and a study mission for small town water supply. Finally, a concluding arrangement was made to provide approx. 4.5 million US\$ in grant assistance for underprivileged farmers to improve self-sufficiency in food

Regarding regional stability, Abe announced his intention to extend ODA-grant aid of approx. 11.6 million US\$ through international aid agencies for Ethiopian refugees, and to contribute approx. 500 thousand US\$ to the African Centre for Peace and Security Training (ACPST) (**H2: yes**).

On the topic of international security, no security arrangements were discussed (**H4: no**). However, a joint statement was made in the form of a shared view that Japan and Ethiopia should work together to achieve concrete progress in the reform of the United Nations Security Council, by increasing the number of both permanent and non-permanent member (**H5: yes**).


Table 5.3.1 Qualitative summary results (Ethiopia)

<i>Visited country</i>	<i>Economic agreements (concluded/initiated upon the visit)</i>	<i>Security agreements (concluded/initiated upon the visit)</i>	<i>Economic mission present</i>	<i>Joint security-statement upon the visit</i>
Ethiopia	Aviation agreement. Approx. 500 thousand US\$ to the ACPST. ODA-grant of approx. 11.6 million US\$ for Ethiopian refugees. ODA-loan (not determined) aimed at Ethiopia's geothermal power supply. Technical survey and study missions for small town water supply. 4.5 million US\$ in ODA-grant for farmers.	<i>n/a</i>	yes	Both leaders advised the need for reforming the UN Security Council.

Quantitative analysis

The tables and figures below demonstrate the results of the quantitative analysis of Abe's visit to Ethiopia. The first glance of figure 5.3.1 provides no visible pattern indicating a change in trade performance even after seasonal adjustment.

Figure 5.3.1: Monthly Japanese export to Ethiopia (Jan. 2012 – Jan. 2016)



Japanese exports to Ethiopia fluctuated in the study period. Annual Japanese export value to Ethiopia amounted to 130 million US\$ in 2012, then 108 million US\$ in 2013, increasing to 110 million in 2014, and 126 million in 2015, and decreasing to 102 million in 2016. Top export commodities in the study period were: i) Vehicles other than railway, ii) Heavy machinery, and iii) Metals.

Figure 5.3.2: Scatter Plot (Ethiopia)




Table 5.3.2: t-test for Japan's export to Ethiopia (Adjusted)

<i>Variables</i>	<i>Pre-Visit</i> <i>N = 26</i>		<i>Post-Visit</i> <i>N = 26</i>		<i>t-value</i>	<i>p-value</i>
	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>		
Japanese Export to Ethiopia	8910137.79	2440356.544	9942718.32	1455252.969	-2.740	0.012

Table 5.3.3: Control Chart (Ethiopia/annual)

<i>Variables</i>	<i>Pre-Visit</i>		<i>Post-Visit</i>	
	<i>2012</i>	<i>2013</i>	<i>2014</i>	<i>2015</i>
Ethiopia tariff rate (%)	18.15	N/A	N/A	17.87
Official exchange rate (LCU per US\$, period average)	17.7	18.6	19.5	20.5

The scatter plot demonstrates an increasing trend line of both observed pre-visit and post-visit trade data. Annual currency rate and tariff levels remained relatively stable throughout the study period. Having compared data of Japan's export to Ethiopia within 26 months before the visit to the data of 26 months after the visit, results of pair sample t-test of the adjusted time-series showed the mean value of trade performance in the post-visit period ($M = 9942718.32$, $SD = 1455252.969$) was higher than the mean value in the pre-visit period ($M = 8910137.79$, $SD = 2440356.544$). Moreover, a statistical difference of trade value of pre- and post-visit was found when $t(23) = -2.740$, $p = 0.012$, lower than the threshold of 0.05. Thus, the results give a preliminary indication of supporting the first hypothesis in which trade performance increased after the visit. However, considering that monthly Japanese exports grew both before and after, it is difficult to attribute the post-visit trend specifically to the visit (**H3: inconclusive**).

5.4 Mozambique

Prime Minister Abe visited the Republic of Mozambique from January 11 to January 13, 2014. During his visit, he met with Mozambique President, Guebuza (MOFA, 2014b). The visit was primarily cited as motivated by commercial interest and promoting/assisting Mozambique's infrastructure and industrial potential.

Qualitative analysis

Accompanying Abe to Mozambique, was a delegation of 33 Japanese companies, organizations and universities faculties organized as an investment forum during the visit (**H1: yes**). During the summit meeting, an agreement (AMIZADE) was established and signed by the two leaders by upgrading the bilateral relationship through enhanced dialogues such as regular high-level policy dialogue and public-private joint dialogue. Furthermore, both leaders oversaw the signing of the Exchanges of Notes on “the Project for Construction of Health Science Institute in Maputo” which targets women's empowerment, and on “the Maputo Gas Fired Combined Cycle Power Plant Development Project” that aims at improving the living standards and promoting economic activities in the Southern region of Mozambique. Finally, both leaders oversaw the conclusion of the memorandum of cooperation between the Japanese International Research Center for Agricultural Sciences (JIRCAS) and the Mozambique Institute of Agricultural Research (IIAM) in agricultural research.

On the topic of economic development, an arrangement was made between the leaders that Japan would provide approx. 625 billion US\$ in ODA, intended for infrastructure development such as roads, ports and electricity, and industrial development. Other arrangements were initiated by Abe's invitation of Mozambicans to Japan through "the African Business Education Initiative for the Youth (the ABE Initiative)," whereas 300 Mozambican (occurring within five years) would be trained in the area of natural resources/environment management. Also, an arrangement was made by the leaders to increase the number of Japanese Overseas Cooperation Volunteers (JOCV) in Mozambique (**H2: yes**).

Regarding international security, no concrete arrangements were established (**H3: no**). However, both Abe and President Guebuza shared the opinion that the countries should work together to achieve progress in the reform of the United Nations Security Council, whereas the number of both permanent and non-permanent number of the Council should be increased (**H4: yes**).


Table 5.4.1: Qualitative summary results (Mozambique)

<i>Visited country</i>	<i>Economic agreements (concluded/initiated upon the visit)</i>	<i>Security agreements (concluded/initiated upon the visit)</i>	<i>Economic mission present</i>	<i>Joint security-statement upon the visit</i>
Mozambique	<p>Enhanced political dialogues agreement (AMIZADE).</p> <p>Exchanges of Notes on “the Project for Construction of Health Science Institute” and on “the Maputo Gas Fired Combined Cycle Power Plant Development Project”.</p> <p>Memorandum of cooperation between JIRCAS and IIAM.</p> <p>625 billion US\$ in ODA.</p> <p>Enhancing the ABE Initiative through student exchange.</p> <p>JOCV agreement.</p>	<i>n/a</i>	yes	Both leaders advised the need for reforming the UN Security Council.

Quantitative analysis

The tables and figures below demonstrate the results of the quantitative analysis of Abe’s visit to Mozambique.

Figure 5.4.1: Monthly Japanese export to Mozambique (Jan. 2012-Jan. 2016)



Annual Japanese export value to Mozambique amounted to approx. 148 million US\$ in 2012, then 247 million US\$ in 2013, 275 million in 2014, and 248 million in 2015, and decreasing to 102 million in 2016. Top export commodities in the study period were: i) Vehicles other than railway, ii) Heavy machinery, and iii) Metals.




Table 5.4.2: t-test for Japan's export to Mozambique (Adjusted)

<i>Variables</i>	<i>Pre-Visit</i> <i>N = 26</i>		<i>Post-Visit</i> <i>N = 26</i>		<i>t-value</i>	<i>p-value</i>
	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>		
Japanese Export to Mozambique	17057034.71	7102696.249	14583183.05	3099084.834	1.341	0.193

Table 5.4.3: Control Chart (Mozambique/annual)

<i>Variables</i>	<i>Pre-Visit</i>		<i>Post-Visit</i>	
	<i>2012</i>	<i>2013</i>	<i>2014</i>	<i>2015</i>
Mozambique tariff (%)	8.76	N/A	7.45	N/A
Official exchange rate (LCU per US\$, period average)	28.3	30.1	39.9	63.9

The scatter plot figure shows an increasing trend line of observed pre-visit trade data, while the post-visit trade data show a decreasing trend. Mozambique's rapid increasing currency rate in the post-visit period might have accounted for the decreasing trend.

Having compared data of Japan's export to Mozambique within 26 months before the visit to the data of 26 months after the visit, results of pair sample t-test showed the mean value of trade performance in the post-visit period ($M = 14583183.05$, $SD = 3099084.834$), was much lower than in pre-visit period ($M = 17057034.71$, $SD = 7102696.249$). Also, no statistical difference of trade value of pre- and post-visit was found when $t(23) = 1.341$, $p = 0.194$, higher than the threshold of 0.05. Recognizing there was no statistical difference between the trade value of pre- and post-visit periods, hypothesis 1 was rejected (***H3: no***).

5.5 Brunei

During Abe's visit to Brunei Darussalam on October 9, 2013, he had a summit meeting with His Majesty Haji Hassanal Bolkiah, Sultan and Yang Di-Pertuan of Brunei (MOFA, 2013c).

Qualitative Analysis

The meeting between Abe and Sultan Bolkiah was largely aimed at improving Brunei as a valuable exporter of liquified natural gas (LNG) to Japan (MOFA, 2013c; Japan Times, 2013b). Hence, strengthen energy cooperation between their two countries remained in focus during the meeting, whereas Abe committed

utilizing Japan’s technology in fields including renewable energy and energy conservation in Brunei (**H2: yes**). Also, it was indicated that Abe welcomed Brunei’s revision of import restrictions on Japanese products, although it is not specified that this occurred because of the exchange²³ (MOFA, 2013c). However, there is no indication of an economic mission present during this exchange (**H1: no**).

Regarding international security, Abe requested continued understanding and cooperation from Brunei on the issues of Japanese abductees in North Korea, whereas Sultan Bolkiah recognized the importance of the abduction issue for the Government of Japan. However, no joint-statement or Security/political agreements were established/introduced at this meeting (**H3: no**) (**H4: no**).

Table 5.5.1 Qualitative summary results (Brunei)


<i>Visited country</i>	<i>Economic agreements (concluded/initiated upon the visit)</i>	<i>Security agreements (concluded/initiated upon the visit)</i>	<i>Economic mission present</i>	<i>Joint security-statement upon the visit</i>
Brunei	Arrangements for employing Japan’s technology in the field of renewable energy and energy conservation.	<i>n/a</i>	<i>n/a</i>	<i>n/a</i>

²³ Effective from October 2, import prohibition on products from eight prefectures including Fukushima Prefecture was eased to the prohibition on products only from Fukushima Prefecture.

Quantitative analysis

The tables and figures below demonstrate the results of the quantitative analysis of Abe's visit to Brunei.

Figure 5.5.1: Monthly Japanese export to Brunei (Oct. 2011-Oct. 2015)



Brunei is one of the few countries in which its exported value of goods to Japan exceeds the import value of goods. As seen in monthly data, overall Japanese exports to Brunei was fluctuating in the study period, amounting to 143 million US\$ 2011, 187 million US\$ in 2012, 152 million US\$ in 2013, 106 million US\$ in 2014, and 120 million US\$ in 2015. Reported annual tariff levels for the pre-visit period of 2011 and 2012 showed a higher rate than for 2014 and 2015. Top export commodities to Brunei during the study period contained: i) Vehicles other than railway ii) Metals, and iii) Heavy machinery.

Figure 5.5.2: Scatter Plot (Brunei)




Table 5.5.2: t-test for Japan’s export to Brunei (Adjusted)

<i>Variables</i>	<i>Pre-Visit</i> <i>N = 26</i>		<i>Post-Visit</i> <i>N = 26</i>		<i>t-value</i>	<i>p-value</i>
	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>		
Japanese Export to Brunei	14374443.28	3819932.332	10323763.21	1652260.021	4.166	0.000

Table 5.5.3: Control Chart (Brunei/annual)

<i>Variables</i>	<i>Pre-Visit</i>		<i>2013</i>	<i>Post-Visit</i>	
	<i>2011</i>	<i>2012</i>		<i>2014</i>	<i>2015</i>
Brunei tariff rate (%)	2.56	N/A	N/A	1.38	N/A
Official exchange rate (LCU per US\$, period average)	1.25	1.25	1.25	1.26	1.37

The scatter plot shows large fluctuations in the post- and pre-visit periods, whereas the R-squared is far from zero signifying a neither decreasing or increasing trend. Annual currency and levels remained stable throughout the study period. Regarding tariff levels, however, during the meeting between the leaders, Abe welcomed Brunei’s revision of import restrictions on Japanese products to Brunei which was implemented in the same month.

However, having compared the adjusted time-series of Japan’s export to Brunei within 26 months before the visit to the data of 26 months after the visit, results of

pair sample t-test showed the mean value of trade performance in the post-visit period (M =10323763.21, SD =1652260.021) was lower than the mean value in the pre-visit period (M =14374443.28, SD = 3819932.332). A statistically significant difference of trade value of pre- and post-visit was found when $t(23) = 4.166$, $p = 0.000$, below the threshold of 0.05, illustrating a decreased export performance in the post-visit period (**H3: no**).

5.6 Cambodia

Abe paid an official visit to the Kingdom of Cambodia on 16-17 November 2013. During his visit, Abe and Prime Minister of Cambodia, Hun Sen, held a summit meeting (MOFA, 2013c).

Qualitative analysis

Abe's visit to Cambodia was the first of visit to Cambodia by a Japanese Prime Minister. According to qualitative data, the visit occurred in connection with the 60th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between Japan and Cambodia (MOFA, 2013c; Cambodia New Vision, 2013). Hence, much of the visit was dominated by ceremonial diplomatic protocol, such as Abe's audience with the King of Cambodia, and a signing ceremony concerning the deployment fulfillment of Japanese UN peacekeeping personnel (Kantei, 2013c). During his visit, however, there was no indication that Abe's was joined by an economic mission (**H1: no**)

Regarding economic and commercial affairs, Abe and Prime Minister Hun Sen began the preliminary negotiations to conclude an air services agreement, where direct flight services would be available between the two countries. The negotiations were finally implemented in 2016, where ANA began the first direct flight service from Tokyo's Narita Airport to Phnom Penh. Also, Abe expressed his intention to conduct exchange projects with approximately 3,000 participants in the next five years, by taking advantage of various exchange programs such as JENESYS 2.0. Moreover, an agreement was made to send Japanese experts to Cambodia in order to assist with the country's' electoral reforms (*H2: yes*).

In the area of international security, Abe and Hun Sen decided to advance cooperation between the defense authorities of both countries through capacity building assistance (*H3: yes*). In the month after the visit, during Hun Sen's visit to Tokyo, the two leaders oversaw the signing by their defense ministers of a memorandum of understanding concerning the cooperation and exchanges, which upgraded the bilateral relations to a "strategic partnership" (Japan Times, 2013a). During a press conference, both leaders emphasized the importance of settling maritime disputes by peaceful means by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) (*H4: yes*).


Table 5.6.1 Qualitative summary results (Cambodia)

<i>Visited country</i>	<i>Economic agreements (concluded/initiated upon the visit)</i>	<i>Security agreements (concluded/initiated upon the visit)</i>	<i>Economic mission present</i>	<i>Joint security-statement upon the visit</i>
Cambodia	Enhancement of health/medical care in Cambodia (by utilizing Japan's medical Technologies). Implementation of student exchange projects. Aviation agreement (direct flight). Technical assistance in electoral reforms.	Advance cooperation between the defense authorities.	<i>n/a</i>	Both leaders urged the need of settling maritime disputes in accordance with UNCLOS.

Quantitative analysis

The tables and figures below demonstrate the results of the quantitative analysis of Abe's visit to Mozambique.

Figure 5.6.1: Monthly Japanese export to Cambodia (Nov. 2011-Nov. 2015)



The most significant influential factor for Cambodia's trade relation with Japan is the Japan-ASEAN Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement which entered into force in 2009. Cambodia is, therefore, one of the few countries in which its exported value of goods to Japan exceeds the import value of goods. Annual Japanese exports to Cambodia have been increasing steadily since 2009, and in the

study period annual export value amounted to 205.5 m US\$ in 2011, 234.4 m US\$ in 2012, 209.9 m US\$ in 2013, 255.7 m US\$ in 2014 to 302.2 m US\$ in 2015. The top Japanese export commodities to Cambodia during the study period were: i) Vehicles other than railway, ii) Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery, and ii) Electrical, electronic equipment.

Figure 5.6.2: Scatter Plot (Cambodia)




Table 5.6.2: t-test for Japan’s export to Cambodia (Adjusted)

<i>Variables</i>	<i>Pre-Visit</i> <i>N = 26</i>		<i>Post-Visit</i> <i>N = 26</i>		<i>t-value</i>	<i>p-value</i>
	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>		
Japanese Export to Cambodia	19369734.48	1331742.665	21437828.95	2700237.936	-4.257	0.000

Table 5.6.3: Control Chart (Cambodia/annual)

<i>Variables</i>	<i>Pre-Visit</i>			<i>Post-Visit</i>	
	<i>2011</i>	<i>2012</i>	<i>2013</i>	<i>2014</i>	<i>2015</i>
Cambodia tariff rate (%)	11.97	11.97	N/A	7.74	N/A
Official exchange rate (LCU per US\$, period average)	4058.5	4033.0	4027.7	4037.7	4067.7

The scatter plot figure shows a steady trend in the pre-visit data, where the R-squared is close to zero signifying a neither decreasing or increasing trend. The

post-visit trend, on the other hand, shows a strong, increasing trend. However, reported annual tariff levels for the pre-visit period of 2014 shows decreasing levels for all product, indicating lower adjustment of tariff levels might have accounted for higher levels of Japanese imports. Annual currency rate levels remained relatively stable throughout the study period.

Having compared data of Japan's export to Cambodia within 26 months before the visit to the data of 26 months after the visit, results of pair sample t-test showed the mean value of trade performance in the post-visit period ($M = 21437828.95$, $SD = 2700237.936$) was higher than the mean value in the pre-visit period ($M = 19369734.48$, $SD = 1331742.665$). Moreover, a statistically significant difference in trade value of pre- and post-visit was found when $t(23) = -4.257$, $p = 0.000$, below the threshold of 0.05.

Hence, the quantitative analysis showed an increase in trade performance in the post-visit period. Nevertheless, both the pre- and post-visit period showed an increasing slope, making it difficult to attribute the improved export performance to the visit alone (*H3: inconclusive*).

5.7 Jordan

On the 17th of January 2015, Abe visited Jordan. During his visit, he had bilateral talks with Prime Minister Abdullah Ensour, and a summit meeting with King Abdullah II (MOFA, 2015b). The talks were mainly focused on economic cooperation and investment opportunities (MOFA, 2015b; Jordan Times, 2015).

Qualitative analysis

As Abe was joined by an economic mission, one of the main events was a bilateral meeting between Abe, Prime Minister Ensour, and representatives from the business sectors of both Japan and Jordan (**H1: yes**). During this meeting, it was indicated by Jordan Times (2015) that an agreement was signed between the private sectors of Jordan and Japan to establish the solar power plant, Shams Maan. As of 2018, it is the second largest solar power plant in the region. Moreover, as agreed upon by Abe and Ensour, a memorandum of understanding/letter of intent was signed between the Jordanian Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources (JMOEMR) and the Japanese company, Mitsui & Co.

Other introduced arrangements included agreements in which Japan will provide Jordan with grant aid for the rehabilitation and expansion of water networks in Balqa Governorate (approx. 20 million US\$), and the non-project grant aid for provision of Japanese small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) products (approx. 1.7 million US\$) in cooperation with the Japan International Cooperation Agency. Furthermore, Abe pledged to contribute approx. 102 million US\$ in loan aid to support Jordanian management of refugees fleeing Syria and Iraq. Additional agreements included the contributions to international organizations providing medical assistance and supplies to refugee camps (MOFA, 2015b; Jordan Times, 2015) (**H2: yes**).

On the topic of international security, during the summit meeting with King Abdullah II, Abe expressed determination to enhance cooperation with Jordan by

contribution in the field of peacekeeping operations (PKO)²⁴ (**H4: yes**). Both leaders condemned the actions of the Islamic state (Japan Times, 2015) (**H5: yes**).

Table 5.7.1 Qualitative summary results (Jordan)


<i>Visited country</i>	<i>Economic agreements (concluded/initiated upon the visit)</i>	<i>Security agreements (concluded/initiated upon the visit)</i>	<i>Economic mission present</i>	<i>Joint security-statement upon the visit</i>
Jordan	Non-project grant aid provision for Japanese SME products, 1.7 million US\$. Establishment of solar power plant (Shams Maan). The signing of a memorandum between JMOEMR and Mitsui. 102 million US\$ in ODA loan to regional stability.	Extend nonmilitary assistance through PKO.	yes	Both leaders condemned actions by the Islamic State.

Quantitative analysis

Tables and figures below show the results of the quantitative analysis of Abe's visit to Jordan. Graph 5.7.1 demonstrates an increasing trend throughout the study period.

²⁴ The contributions were unspecified due ratification requirements. The agreement was therefore tentative. However, Abe expressed intention to legislative reform in effort to permit Japan to engage in collective self-defense (Japan Times, 2013).

Figure 5.7.1: Monthly Japanese export to Jordan (Jan. 2013-Jan. 2017)



As illustrated in Figure 5.7.1, Japanese exports to Jordan increased steadily throughout the study period. Annual export value amounted to 298 m US\$ in 2013, 490 m US\$ in 2014, 578 m US\$ in 2015, and 632 m US\$ in 2016. Largest export commodities to Jordan consisted of: i) Vehicles other than railway, ii) Chemical products, and ii) Heavy machinery components.

Figure 5.7.2: Scatter Plot (Jordan)




Table 5.7.2: t-test for Japan’s export to Jordan (Adjusted)

<i>Variables</i>	<i>Pre-Visit</i>		<i>Post-Visit</i>		<i>t-value</i>	<i>p-value</i>
	<i>N = 26</i>		<i>N = 26</i>			
	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>		
Japanese Export to Jordan	31298935.62	7036016.327	51103777.99	6071085.581	-13.814	0.000

Table 5.7.3: Control Chart (Jordan/annual)

<i>Variables</i>	<i>Pre-Visit</i>		<i>Post-Visit</i>	
	<i>2013</i>	<i>2014</i>	<i>2015</i>	<i>2016</i>
Jordan tariff rate (%)	11.97	11.97	7.74	N/A
Official exchange rate (LCU per US\$, period average)	0.71	0.71	0.71	0.71

The scatter plot shows an increasing trend line of both observed pre-visit and post-visit trade data. Moreover, reported annual tariff levels for the post-visit period of 2015 had a lower rate than for 2015 and 2015. Annual currency rate remained stable throughout the study period. Having compared the adjusted time-series of Japan's export to Jordan within 26 months before the visit to the data of 26 months after the visit, results of pair sample t-test showed the mean value of trade performance in the post-visit period ($M = 51103777.99$, $SD = 12358070.277$) was higher than the mean value in the pre-visit period ($M = 31298935.62$, $SD = 7036016.327$). Moreover, a statistically significant difference in trade value of pre- and post-visit was found when $t(23) = -13.814$, $p = 0.000$, below the threshold of 0.05.

After adjusting for inflation and cyclical variation, the quantitative analysis showed both an increase in trade performance and an increasing slope, while the annual currency rate remained stable. The results give a preliminary indication of supporting the first hypothesis in which trade performance increased after the visit. Nevertheless, considering that monthly Japanese exports to Japan grew throughout the study period, it is difficult to attribute the increased performance of exports specifically to the visit alone (***H3: inconclusive***).

6.0 Summary & Conclusion

The task set out in this paper was to examine summit diplomacy by identifying and analyzing why and how summit meetings contribute to achieving national interest goals. To answer these questions, a mixed method approach was conducted on the case study (Japan) and its embedded cases (visited countries). The following section presents the summary of the empirical analysis, before presenting the conclusion and further research.

6.1 Summary of the Empirical Analysis

Using exploratory data analysis on the collected data were aimed at contributing to weaker or stronger evidence of causality that a visit by a head of government was followed by improved export performance. The analysis of the visited countries, however, gave varied results. After adjusting for inflation and cyclical variation, the result of the t-test showed that only three (Ethiopia, Cambodia, and Jordan) of the seven countries had improved export performance in the two years following the visit. These countries, however, had an increasing export slope before and after the intervention, making it difficult to attribute observed changes directly to the intervention alone.

Moreover, this study included only a short-term trade performance of four years, which limited the window of post-visit trade performance to two years. Given the short timeframe, the effects of the Japanese visit may continue well beyond the timeframe presented in this paper. Also, the measures of control variables, such as

tariff levels and currency rates are probably far from ideal. Further work and statistical analysis are needed to examine and isolate other control variables such as labor force which figure prominently in the theoretical literature but for which this study was unable to obtain suitable data.

The four remaining cases resulted in both insignificant and negative export performance after the visits. Consequently, considering the small sample size, the quantitative results in this paper are in more support of the findings as presented by Head et al. (2010) indicating small/insignificant and negative changes after the occurrence of a high-level exchange, suggesting a weak association between trade and summit diplomacy.

The limitations imposed by the quantitative analysis notwithstanding, this study obtained verifiable qualitative evidence that the visits conveyed significant signaling functions, as well as the negotiations of international arrangements with all the visited countries. By analyzing press conference summaries, and public joint-communicate of Prime Minister Abe's visits, this study shows that the case visits reflected functional purposes represented by the signals and negotiations conducted at the time of the visit. The results of the hypotheses are presented in table 6.1.

Table 6.1: Summary results of hypotheses

<i>Hypotheses</i>	<i>Overall Assessment</i>	<i>Palestine</i>	<i>Djibouti</i>	<i>Ethiopia</i>	<i>Mozambique</i>	<i>Brunei</i>	<i>Cambodia</i>	<i>Jordan</i>
H1: Company of an economic mission	Mixed/dependent on destination	<i>supported</i>	<i>rejected</i>	<i>supported</i>	<i>supported</i>	<i>rejected</i>	<i>rejected</i>	<i>supported</i>
H2: economic/ commercial arrangement concluded/ initiated	Confirmed for all visits.	<i>supported</i>	<i>supported</i>	<i>supported</i>	<i>supported</i>	<i>supported</i>	<i>supported</i>	<i>supported</i>
H3: improved export performance after the visit.	Not visible/ rejected.	<i>Not significant /rejected</i>	<i>Not significant /rejected</i>	<i>indecisive</i>	<i>Not significant /rejected</i>	<i>Not significant /rejected</i>	<i>indecisive</i>	<i>indecisive</i>
H4: a security/ defense arrangement concluded /initiated	Mixed/ dependent on destination	<i>rejected</i>	<i>supported</i>	<i>rejected</i>	<i>rejected</i>	<i>rejected</i>	<i>supported</i>	<i>supported</i>
H5: A joint-security statement was released.	Mixed/ dependent on destination	<i>rejected</i>	<i>rejected</i>	<i>supported</i>	<i>supported</i>	<i>rejected</i>	<i>supported</i>	<i>supported</i>

While the foreign bilateral visits conducted by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe may not have proved decisive in promoting increased export performance, the empirical observations confirmed verifiable outcomes in the form of negotiations of international agreements, and strategic signaling functions, showing that the summit meetings were contributory in achieving Japan's foreign policy goals to the selected destinations. The result demonstrates that the Japanese Prime Minister is operating in line with achieving specific goals.

Japan's bilateral visits as contributory in achieving economic interest

The case study findings demonstrate that in certain instances summitry can have contributory effects in achieving national interest goals related to economic interest. Indeed, the findings showed a frequent number of negotiations concerning development or contractual arrangements. Specifically, arrangements related to Japanese foreign aid, technical assistance, and promises of investments in the energy sector were negotiated in all the selected visits. Other introduced/concluded arrangements were aviation agreements and arrangements related to academic and student exchanges between Japan and the visited countries. Designated as economic/commercial arrangements, the findings make sense from several perspectives.

The economic agreements are consistent with Japan's foreign policy strategies of "Promoting Economic Diplomacy," where foreign aid agreements are perceived as instrumental in establishing a friendly environment for the expansion of Japanese

businesses abroad (DB, 2018). As such, the case study findings are interpreted as conforming with Japan's foreign policy goals, and thereby contributory in achieving what Japan considers its national interest goals.

Drawing from signaling theories, the presence of business representatives in the summit meeting was perceived as a costly functional signal of intention (a means to an end), primarily in furthering economic interest. Indeed, planning and conducting a summit meeting with attending business representatives would seem wasteful and irrational without a purpose in improving economic ties.

The empirical analysis of the case visits showed that business representatives were present in four of the seven case visits (Palestine, Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Jordan). The presence and meetings between the domestic business representatives indicate functional economic properties of the summit meeting and that the overall economic relations between the countries are stable or improving, and the perception from the visiting political leader that prospective business ventures are likely to be successful in the destination country.

Japan's bilateral visits as contributory in achieving security interest

The case study findings demonstrate summitry can also have contributory effects in achieving national interest goals related to security interest. Indeed, the empirical findings show that the Japanese Prime Minister had security-related negotiations in three of the seven destination countries. Negotiations were observed as the formation of study plans in the supply of patrol vessels (Djibouti), preliminary talks

in advancing security cooperation between the defense authorities (Cambodia), and tentative discussions for peacekeeping operations (Jordan). The case study findings show that foreign bilateral visits by the Japanese Prime Minister are not constrained by economic interest alone, but rather encompasses a broad set of national interest-based priorities, such as contributing to international security and establishing new strategic security alliances. Indeed, the negotiations are consistent with Japan's security-related foreign policy goals in enhancing international security cooperation with strategic partners.

The empirical analysis also demonstrated various joint statements, significant to the Japanese security interest. Operationalized as statements where the political leaders expressed a shared opinion on changes/critiques of the international system or one of its states, such statements were found in four of the seven case visits. The content of the joint security-related statements varied depending on the destination country. For the Ethiopia and Mozambique visits, the statements concerned aligning interest in reforming the UN Security Council. For the Cambodia visit, a joint statement was released concerning the importance of respecting the law of the sea (UNCLOS). This particular signal might have been functional for garnering security interest, considering the statement was released during the height of the territorial disputes in the South China Sea. For the Jordan visit, the statements represented a shared security interest in combating terrorism in the region.

Considering the empirical observations that negotiations of international agreements occurred during the visit, as well as the identified signaling functions, the researcher rejected the null-hypothesis for the selected countries, which stated

that: *If the summit meeting occurred without purposes to achieve economic and security interest, there is no economic mission present, increased trade, joint statement, and agreements negotiated.*

Thus, the findings show that the bilateral summit meetings abroad by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is representing and achieving Japanese economic and security interest, where the negotiations and signaling functions are in line with Japan's strategic interest. If normative goals concerning diplomatic activities can be set as standard, then the Japanese bilateral summits are effective, as the negotiations and signaling functions are in line with Japan's foreign policy goals.

It also shows that foreign visits by the Japanese Prime Minister are not constrained by economic interest alone, but rather encompasses a broad set of national interest-based priorities, such as enhancing economic ties and fostering security links with countries both inside and outside the Asian region.

Finally, the findings in this paper should not be interpreted without recognizing the preparatory negotiations and plans by lower-level officials leading up to the visit itself. Without proper arrangements before the visit, it is unlikely the visit itself may have become successful.

6.2 Conclusion

Some scholars and practitioners see the increasing number of summit meeting as harmful to the code of conduct in international relations (*Sol Sander in World Tribune*, 2008). Others have concluded that summitry only consists of rare benefits

(Giauque, 2001). To contribute to the debate surrounding the significance of face-to-face diplomacy conducted by high-level governmental officials, this study sought to understand, identify and categorize observable effects and outcomes associated with summit diplomacy. Subsequently, the research question proposed in this study was: “*How are summit meetings contributory in achieving goals related to national interest?*”

Consequently, this study examined summit diplomacy by identifying and analyzing why and how the bilateral summit meetings of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe contributed to achieving Japan’s national interest goals. While the bilateral visits conducted by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe may not have proved decisive in promoting increased export performance, observations of the bilateral meetings identified significant effects and outcomes, from concluding and initiating international negotiations of agreements and conveying economic and security-related intentions. Moreover, if negotiations and strategic signaling functions can be perceived as a means to an end, and if normative goals concerning foreign policies and diplomatic activities can be set as standard, then the Japanese bilateral summits are, in a sense, effective, as the negotiations and signaling functions were clearly in line with Japan’s foreign policy goals.

Indeed, the numerous contractual and development agreements negotiated at the time of the summit meeting, evidently demonstrate Japan’s efforts in promoting its economic diplomacy policies. The findings of security negotiations and joint statements also demonstrate the increasing presence of Japan’s security interest abroad. From this understanding, summit diplomacy does have its relevance in the

field of IR in that they can reflect key economic and security-related developments between states in the international community.

From a different angle, this study also shows the direct involvement of the Japanese Prime Minister in foreign aid donations through initiating and concluding development and contractual agreements with its minor diplomatic partners. While the direct involvement of Japan's political leader in foreign aid allocation may serve several purposes, the media attention involving summit meetings could arguably present a platform that makes foreign aid donations more reliable and transparent by observers and the aid-receiving country. They also, to some extent, propagates and clarifies Japan's intertwined foreign policy strategy goals in advancing its economic interest through contributing to the socioeconomic development of recipient countries, which subsequently creates a more 'friendly environment' for the expansion of Japanese overseas businesses. Understood as such, these diplomatic meetings might be more beneficial, and less damaging than indicated by scholars and practitioners.

Bilateral summits and two-level game theory:

In this paper, the two-level game theory facilitated a basic understanding of the contours of summit diplomacy and how it relates to international negotiations of agreements. Although the model was not directly applied to each of the case studies, the framework provided a theoretical understanding of how political leaders negotiate with other political leaders on a range of issues categorized by the researcher into economic interest and security interest. While the negotiations

within the level-II game were not directly a subject of study in this paper, the domestic level provided implicit insight into the underpinnings of the decision-making processes and foreign policy strategies of governments when exploring the international negotiations of summitry at the level-I game.

When operationalized, the theory was particularly useful in identifying specific negotiation topics, which were attributed to whether the summit meeting was more directed towards achieving economic or security interest.

The frequent findings of foreign aid agreements certainly demonstrate that topics of negotiations are maybe more in line with interests both abroad and at home. Indeed, from the perspective of the two-level game theory, agreements do not occur contrary, or against domestic opinion, but can be understood as a broader consensus. Perceived from the domestic level of the donor country, foreign aid agreements may be seen as a benevolent act, while advancing economic interests abroad. At the domestic level of the recipient country, the Japanese foreign aid agreements may be perceived as a positive gain of material donations. On the other hand, from an international level, the political leader of the donor country negotiating aid agreements demonstrates an act of public generosity. Presumably, this is rewarded by gaining strategically higher prestige at home and abroad. The receiving political leader is perceived as securing a prosperous deal, primarily gaining higher prestige at home. From this understanding, the frequent findings of economic/commercial agreements seem consistent with the two-level game theory as an acceptable agreement by all involved parties.

The various negotiations observed in the empirical analysis is a testimony that the two-level game theory is still a highly applicable theory of understanding and analyzing summit meetings. The theory, however, is clearly best utilized when there are actual negotiations to observe. As such, the theory has its limitations in analyzing a summit meeting where there are no negotiations. Moreover, the theory, as it has been used in this paper, can only demonstrate tentative agreements. Indeed, the domestic level would definitively provide a more deep and conclusive understanding of the overall negotiation processes in the formation of international agreements.

Bilateral summits and signaling theories

If a summit meeting did not have any negotiations occurring at the time of the meeting, signaling theories represents an applicable method of identifying more subtle effects and outcomes, such as threats, conveying intention, and willingness to cooperate (Gartzke et al., 2017: 5-6). From a diplomatic signaling theoretical perspective (Jönsson et al., 2011), the researcher perceived the open and public arena in which a summit meeting between two political leaders as an important platform of conveying interest and intentions both between the leaders and to observers in the international community.

In this paper, the signals were conditioned and identified by three contextual factors: i) whether the signals contributed as an observable means to an end (practical value), ii) whether the signals occurred in a zero-sum game (adversarial meeting) or non-zero sum (allies meeting), and iii) whether the signals had audience

cost to them (higher of cost of lying). As the sampled countries consisted of Japan's minor diplomatic partners, the conditions were set towards identifying signaling that was functionally important in achieving economic or security interest and observed in a contextual environment of a non-zero-sum situation. Also, as summit meetings usually receive considerable media attention, the researcher assumed the signals more credible under the audience of public media (higher cost of lying).

Thus, two important signals were identified in Japan's bilateral summits: i) the presence of an economic mission as a functional means of signaling intentions of closer economic cooperation, and ii) aligned security interest through a joint-statement as a willingness of cooperation on security issues. These signals were perceived credible by fulfilling the costly condition criteria and perceived as functional means to an end in identifying and explaining the activities of the Japanese Prime minister during the meetings.

As such, this study was an attempt to explore and identify diplomatic signaling as a functional method of achieving certain goals in combining theory and empirical observations. The limitations of signaling theories relate arguably to external validity. Due to the high importance of the contexts in which signals occur, analysis requires an in-depth understanding of the setting and motivations. Hence, the signals can only be obtained sparingly and perceived credible in specific situations.

Bilateral Summits and Increased Trade Performance

The relationship between summitry and increased trade performance were drawn from economic diplomacy theories where the political leader functions as a commercial representative during a summit meeting ensuring profit-maximizing results in his/her diplomatic activities. This idea is primarily prevalent in economic and statistical studies where diplomatic actors follow an inherent cost-benefit axiom.

The preliminary quantitative findings in this study, however, warranted little confidence in significant growth rates following the case visits. The overall results indicated only minor changes after the summit meeting, despite being conditioned (through the case and sampling procedures) toward generating a favorable situation in which this could be observed.

6.3 Further research

This research was a systematic attempt at understanding, identifying and categorizing the contributory effects and outcomes of summit diplomacy through a case study on the Japanese Prime Minister's bilateral diplomatic visits abroad. The effects and outcomes of strategic signaling functions and negotiated topics were interpreted as central contributory themes in Japan's foreign policy goals.

The analytical focus, however, was primarily constricted to what happened at the individual bilateral summit meetings in light of preselected theories, where the effects, although contributory in achieving national interest of the case study, consisted primarily of subtle and tentative outcomes. As such, this study included

only a narrow focus on the overall effects of summit diplomacy, leaving central inquiries still open for investigation. Consequently, there are some directions available for further research. The following sections contain several suggestions in corroborating and expanding the significance of summit diplomacy:

- 1) Due to the study's focus on identifying the effects of summit diplomacy, one of the largest limitations in this research was that it lacked evidence for or against that summit meeting (between heads of government) produced any *better* international agreements or signals than what could potentially be achieved through other channels of diplomatic interaction (e.g., state visits, lower level ministerial meetings, or telephone diplomacy). Given a suitable and comparable evidence source, further research could shed more light on summit diplomacy by conducting a comparative analysis between different types of diplomatic interaction on variation in strategic signaling functions, the topic of negotiations, or even trade performance.
- 2) Although the research literature identified a clear difference between multilateral and bilateral diplomacy regarding achieving narrow and broader national interest, further empirical research could investigate this assumption by assessing and comparing records of negotiations between multilateral and bilateral summit meetings.
- 3) Based on the signaling theories, a general assumption is made on a perception that summit diplomacy receives higher media attention than otherwise, thereby increasing its relative audience cost. The research literature lacked any clear evidence supporting this assumption. Future research could further assess and strengthen/weaken signaling theory regarding summit diplomacy by providing evidence for or against the possible higher media coverage it gets in comparison to other channels of diplomacy. For example, by investigating the number of media reports on the various types of diplomatic interaction.

- 4) In most of the visits, the Japanese Prime Minister was accompanied by economic missions where promises of Japanese investments were made to destination countries. As FDI is often conceived as an important economic indicator for economic cooperation, further research could potentially corroborate economic-related summits by providing evidence for or against investment growths after the summit meeting.

Bibliography

- Aaslestad, Katherine B. (2015). "Serious work for a new Europe: The Congress of Vienna after two hundred years." *Central European History* 48 (2): 225-237.
- Adler, Emanuel, & Pouliot, Vincent (2011) "International practices." *International theory* 3(1): 1-36.
- Alesina, Alberto, & Dollar, David (2000). Who gives foreign aid to whom and why? *Journal of economic growth*, 5(1): 33-63.
- AllAfrica (2013). "Djibouti: Japan's Prime Minister Shinzo Abe Visits Djibouti." Retrieved from: <https://allafrica.com/stories/201308290848.html>
- Anderton, Charles, H., & Carter, John R. (2001). "The impact of war on trade: An interrupted times-series study." *Journal of Peace Research*, 38(4): 445-457.
- Asahi Shimbun (2018) "Abe: Putin's words show desire for Japan-Russia peace treaty." Retrieved from: <http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/AJ201809140066.html>
- Barbieri, Katherine, & Levy, Jack S. (1999), "Sleeping with the enemy: The impact of war on trade." *Journal of Peace Research* 36 (4): 463-479.
- Barston, Ronald, P. (2014) *Modern diplomacy*. 4th edition. New York: Routledge.
- BBC (2018) "Japan country profile". Retrieved from: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-14918801>
- Behrens, John T. (1997) "Principles and procedures of exploratory data analysis." *Psychological Methods*, 2(2): 131-160
- Behrens, John T., and Chong-ho Yu (2003) "Exploratory data analysis." *Handbook of psychology*, 2: 33-64.
- Bergeijk, Peter A. G., Okano-Heijmans, Maaikje & Melissen, Jan. (2011) *Economic Diplomacy – Economic and Political Perspective*. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.
- Berridge, Geoff, R. (2005) *DIPLOMACY: Theory and Practice*. 3rd edition. New York: Palgrave MacMillan.
- Bowen, Glenn, A. (2009) "Document analysis as a qualitative research method." *Qualitative research journal*, 9(2): 27-40.
- Burstein, Paul (2003) "The impact of public opinion on public policy: A review and an agenda." *Political research quarterly* 56.1 29-40.
- Clinton, David, W. (1986) "The national interest: normative foundations." *The Review of Politics*, 48(4): 495-519.
- CNBC (2017). "Best time in history' for China-Russia relationship: Xi and Putin boost ties." Retrieved from: <https://www.cnn.com/2017/07/04/china-russia-ties-reaffirmed-after-xi-jinping-and-vladimir-putin-meet.html>

- da Conceição-Heldt, Eugénia, & Mello Patrick A. (2017) "Two-level games in foreign policy analysis." *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics*.
- Cui, Shunji. (2014) "Conflict Transformation: The East China Sea Dispute and Lessons from the Ecuador-Peru Border Dispute." *Asian Perspective*, 38(2): 285-310.
- CNN (2018a) "Trump's North Korean gamble ends with 'special bond' with Kim." Retrieved from: <https://edition.cnn.com/2018/06/11/politics/trump-kim-summit-singapore/index.html>
- CNN (2018b) "From 'snub' to scandal, Trudeau's India visit sparks outrage." Retrieved from: <https://edition.cnn.com/2018/02/22/asia/extremist-scandal-Trudeau-india-visit-intl/index.html>
- CNN (2017a) "Japan to buy long-range missiles for first time." Retrieved from: <https://edition.cnn.com/2017/12/08/asia/japan-missiles-purchase-intl/index.html>
- CNN (2017b) "Is China unstoppable in the South China Sea?" Retrieved from: <https://edition.cnn.com/2017/05/18/asia/china-philippines-south-china-sea/index.html>
- Creswell, John W. (2009) *Research design: Qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods approaches*. 3rd edition. California: Sage publications.
- DB (2018) "Diplomatic Bluebook 2017 (Summary)." Retrieved from: https://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/pp/page25e_000237.html
- DB (2015) "Diplomatic Bluebook 2015 (PDF)." Retrieved from: https://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/pp/page24e_000100.html
- DB (2014) "Diplomatic Bluebook 2014 (PDF)." Retrieved from: https://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/pp/page22e_000566.html
- DB (2013) "Diplomatic Bluebook 2013 (PDF)." Retrieved from: https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/page22e_000013.html
- Der Bundespräsident (2007) "State visits." Retrieved from: <http://www.bundespraesident.de/EN/Role-and-Functions/RoleInTheInternationalArena/StateVisits/statevisits-node.html>
- Denny, Brian. (2012) "Chinese High-Level Diplomatic Visits to Africa: The Trade Ramifications of Increased Relations." *Honors thesis, Division of Undergraduate studies. Florida State University*.
- Deutsche Welle (2016) "Is the Philippines' Duterte playing China against Japan?" Retrieved from: <http://www.dw.com/en/is-the-philippines-duterte-playing-china-against-japan/a-41186294>
- Devin, Guillaume, & Toernquist-Chesnier, Marie (2011). "Burst Diplomacy: The Diplomacies of Foreign Policy: Actors and Methods." *Brazilian Political Science Review*, 4 (2): 60-78.
- Doss, Veda (1996) "Japan's development aid: Self-interest or economic partnership?" *International Advances in Economic Research*, 2(3): 232-243.

- Donath, Judith (2011). Signals, cues and meaning. *Unpublished Manuscript. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA*. Retrieved from: <http://vivatropolis.net/papers/Donath/SignalsTruthDesign/SignalsCuesAndMeaning.pdf>
- Eccles, M., Grimshaw, J., Campbell, M., & Ramsay, C. (2003). "Research designs for studies evaluating the effectiveness of change and improvement strategies." *BMJ Quality & Safety*, 12(1): 47-52.
- Egger, Peter H., & Lassmann, Andrea. (2012) "The language effect in international trade: A meta-analysis." *Economics Letters* 116(2): 221-224.
- Fearon, James D. (1997) "Signaling foreign policy interests: Tying hands versus sinking costs." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 41(1): 68-90.
- Ferling, John (1994) "John Adams, Diplomat." *The William and Mary Quarterly*, 51(2): 227-252.
- Financial Post (2018) "Opposition blames Trudeau's India trip for spike in chickpea tariffs". Retrieved from: <http://business.financialpost.com/pmnl/commodities-business-pmn/agriculture-commodities-business-pmn/opposition-blames-trudeaus-india-trip-for-spike-in-chickpea-tariffs>
- Flyvbjerg, Bent (2006) "Five misunderstandings about case-study research". *Qualitative inquiry*, 12(2): 219-245.
- Free Joshua French (2014) "A short story of the events and unjust court cases of Mr. Joshua French and Mr. Tjostolv Moland". Retrieved from: <http://www.freefrenchandmoland.com/nb/saken/saken/616-a-short-story-of-the-events-and-unjust-court-cases-of-mr-joshua-french-and-mr-tjostolv-moland>
- Gartzke, Erik A., Shannon Carcelli, J Andres Gannon, & Jiakun Jack Zhang. (2017) "Signaling in Foreign Policy." *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics*. August 22, 2017. Oxford University Press. Retrieved from: <http://politics.oxfordre.com/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228637-e-481>
- Giauque, Jeffrey, G. (2001) "Bilateral Summit Diplomacy in Western European and Transatlantic Relations, 1956–63." *European History Quarterly*, 31(3): 427–445.
- Goldstein, Erik (2008). "The politics of the state visit." *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy*, 3(2): 153-178.
- Greene, Jennifer C., Caracelli, Valerie J. & Graham, Wendy F. (1989). "Toward a conceptual framework for mixed-method evaluation designs." *Educational evaluation and policy analysis* 11(3): 255-274.
- Grygiel, Jakub (2008) "The Diplomacy Fallacy." *The American Interest*, 3(5).
- Hall, Todd, & Keren, Yarhi-Milo (2012). "The personal touch: Leaders' impressions, costly signaling, and assessments of sincerity in international affairs." *International Studies Quarterly*, 56(3): 560-573.

- Head, Keith & Ries, John (2010) "Do trade missions increase trade?". *Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique*, 43: 754-775.
- Holmes, Marcus. (2013) "The force of face-to-face diplomacy: mirror neurons and the problem of intentions." *International organization*, 67(4): 829-861.
- Huffington Post (2018) "Justin Trudeau's India Trip Caused Political Damage At Home: Poll." Retrieved from: https://www.huffingtonpost.ca/2018/03/07/justin-trudeaus-india-trip-caused-political-damage-at-home-poll_a_23379559/
- Iklé, Fred, C. (1967) *How nations negotiate*. New York: Praeger.
- Ivankova, Nataliya V., Creswell, John W., & Stick, Sheldon L. (2006). "Using mixed-methods sequential explanatory design: From theory to practice." *Field methods*, 18(1): 3-20.
- Japan Times (2017a) "*Shinzo Abe's political agenda.*" Retrieved from: <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2014/11/27/commentary/japan-commentary/shinzo-abes-political-agenda/#.W-KP6ZMzY2w>
- Japan Times (2017b) "*Japan to expand SDF base in tiny but strategically important Djibouti.*" Retrieved from: <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/11/19/national/japan-expand-sdf-base-tiny-strategically-important-djibouti/#.W6BLf8Aa82y>
- Japan Times (2015) "*Abe meets Jordanian king, agrees to help counter Islamic State threats.*" Retrieved from: <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/01/18/national/politics-diplomacy/abe-meets-jordanian-king-agrees-help-counter-islamic-state-threats/#.W6Rsu-Ua82w>
- Japan Times (2014) "*Abe tightens grip on power as ruling coalition wins 325 seats in Lower House election.*" Retrieved from: <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/12/15/national/politics-diplomacy/abes-snap-election-pays-big-win/#.W-vVEvZuI2x>
- Japan Times (2013a) "*Japan, Cambodia upgrade ties to "strategic partnership."*" Retrieved from: <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/12/15/national/japan-cambodia-upgrade-ties-to-strategic-partnership/#.W9KOfPZuI2w>
- Japan Times (2013b) "*Abe seals agreement with Brunei to strengthen energy cooperation.*" Retrieved from: <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/10/09/business/abe-seals-agreement-with-brunei-to-strengthen-energy-cooperation/#.W9bIMOV1M2w>
- Jervis, Robert (1992). "A Political Science Perspective on the Balance of Power and the Concert." *The American Historical Review*, 97(3): 716-724.
- Jordan Times (2015). "*Jordan, Japan sign deals to expand cooperation.*" Retrieved from: <http://www.jordantimes.com/news/local/jordan-japan-sign-deals-expand-cooperation>

- Jönsson, Christer, & Hall, Martin (2003). "Communication: An essential aspect of diplomacy." *International Studies Perspectives*, 4 (2): 195-210.
- Kastner, Scott L., & Saunders, Phillip C. (2012). "Is China a status quo or revisionist state? Leadership travel as an empirical indicator of foreign policy priorities." *International Studies Quarterly*, 56 (1): 163-177.
- Kanehara, Nobukatsu (2011) Japan's Grand Strategy—State, National Interests and Values. *Japan's Diplomacy Series, Japan Digital Library*, Retrieved from: http://www2.jiia.or.jp/en/digital_library/japan_s_diplomacy.php
- Kantei (2015a) "Prime Minister's Visit to the Palestinian Authority." Retrieved from: https://japan.kantei.go.jp/97_abe/actions/201501/20article1.html
- Kantei (2015b) "Press Conference by Prime Minister Abe during his Visit to the Middle East." Retrieved from: https://japan.kantei.go.jp/97_abe/statement/201501/20press.html
- Kantei (2014a) "Prime Minister's Visit to the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia." Retrieved from: https://japan.kantei.go.jp/96_abe/actions/201401/13ethiopia_e.html
- Kantei (2014b) "Prime Minister's Visit to the Republic of Mozambique." Retrieved from: https://japan.kantei.go.jp/96_abe/actions/201401/12mozambique_e.html
- Kantei (2013a) "Press Conference by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe during His Visit to the Middle East." Retrieved from: https://japan.kantei.go.jp/96_abe/statement/201308/28kaiken_e.html
- Kantei (2013b) "The Prime Minister Attends ASEAN-related Summit Meetings and Others." Retrieved from: https://japan.kantei.go.jp/96_abe/actions/201310/09asean_e.html
- Kantei (2013c) "Press Conference by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe Following his Visit to Cambodia and Lao PDR." Retrieved from: https://japan.kantei.go.jp/96_abe/statement/201311/17naigai_e.html
- Keohane, Robert O. (1986) "Reciprocity in international relations." *International organization* 40(1): 1-27.
- Kocho-Williams, Alastair (2008) "The Soviet Diplomatic Corps and Stalin's Purges." *Slavonic and East European Review*, 86 (1): 90-110.
- Lebovic, James & Saunders, Elizabeth (2016). "The Diplomatic Core: How the United States Employs High-Level Visits as a Scarce Resource." *International Studies Quarterly*, 60 (1): 107-23.
- Lee, Jong-Wha, & Swagel, Phillip. (1997) "Trade barriers and trade flows across countries and industries." *Review of Economics and Statistics*, 79(3): 372-382.
- Leiby, L. Michele & Butler, K. Christopher (2005). "The Determinants of Diplomatic Dyads." *In Annual Meeting of the Peace Science Society, Iowa City, Iowa.*

- Lavallée, Emmanuelle., Lochard, Julie (2016) Diplomacy for sale? The impact of bilateral visits on international trade. *Working Paper. Université Paris-Dauphine.*
- Løkke, Ann-Kristina, & Sørensen, Pernille D. (2014). "Theory Testing Using Case Studies." *Electronic journal of business research methods*, 12(1): 66-74.
- Milner, Helen V. (1997) *Interests, institutions, and information: Domestic politics and international relations*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
- MOFA (2015a). "Prime Minister Shinzo Abe Visits Palestine." Retrieved from: https://www.mofa.go.jp/page4e_000178.html
- MOFA (2015b). "Prime Minister Abe Visits Jordan." Retrieved from: https://www.mofa.go.jp/me_a/me1/jo/page3e_000293.html
- MOFA (2014a) "Prime Minister Abe's Visit to Ethiopia." Retrieved from: https://www.mofa.go.jp/afr/af2/et/page18e_000045.html
- MOFA (2014b) "Prime Minister Abe's Visit to Mozambique." Retrieved from: https://www.mofa.go.jp/afr/af2/mz/page18e_000044.html
- MOFA (2013a) "Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's Visit to the Republic of Djibouti (August 27)." Retrieved from: https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/page18e_000012.html
- MOFA (2013c) "Japan-Brunei Summit Meeting." Retrieved from: https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/page3e_000107.html
- MOFA (2013d) "Joint Statement between Japan and the Kingdom of Cambodia." Retrieved from: <https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/000019646.pdf>
- Morgenthau, Hans (1985) *Politics Among Nations, The Struggle for Power and Peace*. Thompson W. Kenneth, & Clinton W. David. 7th ed. New York: McGraw-Hill/Irwin.
- Moses, W., Jonathon & Knutsen, L., Torbjørn (2012) *Ways of Knowing: Competing Methodologies in Social and Political Research*. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Nau, Robert (2018) *Inflation adjustment*. Retrieved from: <https://people.duke.edu/~rnau/411inla.htm>
- Naray, Olivier. (2008). "Commercial diplomacy: A conceptual overview." In 7th *World Conference of TPOs, The Hague, The Netherlands*.
- Neumayer, Eric (2008). "Distance, power and ideology: diplomatic representation in a world of nation-states." *Area*, 40 (2): 228-236.
- NHK (2017) "Abe says inter-Korea talks must be meaningful". Retrieved from: https://www3.nhk.or.jp/nhkworld/en/news/20180107_11/
- Nicolson, Nigel (1963) *Diplomacy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press
- Nippon (2018) "Abe Shinzō on Track to Become Japan's Longest-Serving Prime Minister." Retrieved from: <https://www.nippon.com/en/features/h00296/>
- Nitsch, Volker (2007). "State visits and international trade." *The World Economy*, 30 (12): 1797-1816.

- Nuechterlein, Donald E. (1976) "National Interests and Foreign Policy: A Conceptual Framework for Analysis and Decision-Making." *British Journal of International Studies*, 2 (3): 246–266.
- Nye, S. Joseph & Welch, David A. (2013). *Understanding Global Conflict and Cooperation: An Introduction to Theory and History*. 9th ed. New York: Pearson.
- O’Leary, Zina (2014). *The essential guide to doing your research project*. New York: Sage Publishing.
- Oxford Research Encyclopedias (2018) "Diplomacy in Foreign Policy." Retrieved from:
<http://politics.oxfordre.com/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228637-e-410>
- Packenham, Robert A. (1966). "Foreign Aid and the National Interest." *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, 10(2): 214-221.
- Putnam, Robert D. (1988) "Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games." *International organization* 42(3): 427-460.
- Risse-Kappen, Thomas (1991) "Public opinion, domestic structure, and foreign policy in liberal democracies." *World Politics* 43 (4): 479-512.
- Rose, Andrew K. (2007). "The foreign service and foreign trade: embassies as export promotion." *The World Economy*, 30(1): 22-38.
- Sharp, Paul. (2009). *Diplomatic theory of international relations*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Sharp, Paul. (1999). "For Diplomacy: Representation and the Study of International Relations." *International Studies Review*, 1(1): 33-57.
- Shier, Rosie (2004) "Statistics: 1.1 Paired t-tests." *Mathematics Learning Support Centre* 12. Retrieved from:
<http://www.statstutor.ac.uk/resources/uploaded/paired-t-test.pdf>
- South China Morning Post (2017). "US and China prepare for shift in relations in build-up to Trump’s visit to Beijing." Retrieved from:
<http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2113337/us-and-china-prepare-shift-relations-after-trumps-visit>
- Sørbø Gunnar, & Goodhand Jonathan, & Klem Bart, & Nissen Ada E., & Selbervik Hilde (2011) Pawns of Peace: Evaluation of Norwegian peace efforts in Sri Lanka, 1997-2009. *Evaluation Paper. Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation, NORAD*. Retrieved from:
<https://brage.bibsys.no/xmlui/bitstream/handle/11250/2475172/Pawns%20of%20peace.%20Evaluation%20of%20Norwegian%20peace%20efforts%20in%20Sri%20Lanka%2C%201997-2009?sequence=1>
- Tamirisa, Natalia, T. (1999). "Exchange and capital controls as barriers to trade." *IMF Staff Papers*, 46(1), 69-88.
- The Diplomat (2017). "How the US Is Losing to China in Southeast Asia." Retrieved from: <https://thediplomat.com/2017/10/how-the-us-is-losing-to-china-in-southeast-asia/>

- The Diplomat (2014). “*Shinzo Abe Has Visited a Quarter of the World’s Countries in 20 Months: Why?*” Retrieved from: <https://thediplomat.com/2014/09/shinzo-abe-has-visited-a-quarter-of-the-worlds-countries-in-20-months-why/>
- The Economist (2014) “*Japan’s prime minister visits Ethiopia and pledges support.*” Retrieved from: <http://country.eiu.com/article.aspx?articleid=1631450747&Country=Ethiopia&topic=Politics&subtopic=Forecast&subsubtopic=International+relations&u=1&pid=417056825&oid=417056825&uid=1>
- The Guardian (2018) “*Macron warns of rising nationalism as world leaders mark armistice.*” Retrieved from: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/nov/11/trump-joins-macron-and-world-leaders-at-armistice-ceremony>
- ThinkGeoEnergy (2017) “*Geothermal development in Djibouti – Full steam ahead?*” Retrieved from: <http://www.thinkgeoenergy.com/geothermal-development-in-djibouti-full-steam-ahead/>
- Teddle, Charles & Yu, Fen (2007). “Mixed methods sampling: A typology with examples.” *Journal of mixed methods research*, 1(1): 77-100.
- Tingley, Dustin H., & Walter, Barbara F. (2011) "Can cheap talk deter? An experimental analysis." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 55(6): 996-1020.
- VOX (2018) “*What happens if there is no Trump-Kim Jong Un summit?*” Retrieved from: <https://www.vox.com/world/2018/5/23/17383998/trump-north-korea-meeting-kim-jong-un-cancel>
- Wafa (2017) “*Palestine, Japan launch phase II of Jericho Agro-Industrial Park.*” Retrieved from: <http://english.wafa.ps/page.aspx?id=bfTQyya95819636781abfTQyy>
- Wall Street Journal (2017) “*Trump’s Big Gamble: Luring Countries Into One-on-One Trade Deals.*” Retrieved from: <https://www.wsj.com/articles/trumps-big-gamble-luring-countries-into-one-on-one-trade-deals-1485483628>
- Wang, Jian, & Chang, Tsan-Kuo (2004) "Strategic public diplomacy and local press: How a high-profile “head-of-state” visit was covered in America’s heartland." *Public Relations Review* 30(1): 11-24.
- Washington Post (2014) “*Japan’s Abe looks for friends abroad as popularity wanes at home.*” Retrieved from: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/japans-abe-looks-for-friends-abroad-as-popularity-wanes-at-home/2014/08/04/a8e9e4de-26a4-482a-9297-62c211db299a_story.html?utm_term=.3182daba019f
- Weilemann, Peter R. (2000) “The Summit Meeting: The Role and Agenda of Diplomacy at its Highest Level.” *NIRA Review*. 7(2): 16-68.
- Wong, Seanon S. (2016) “Emotions and the communication of intentions in face-to-face diplomacy.” *European Journal of International Relations* 22(1): 144-167.

- WorldECR (2012) “*Changes to Japan’s export licensing system.*” Retrieved from:
<https://www.worldecr.com/wp-content/uploads/WorldECR-Japan-export-licensing-article.pdf>
- World Tribune (2008) “*The record on face-to-face diplomacy by top U.S. leaders? Damnably disastrous.*” Retrieved from:
http://www.worldtribune.com/worldtribune/WTARC/2008/s2_22.html
- Xinhua net (2015). “*Frequent exchange of high-level visits highlights closer China-South Korea ties.*” Retrieved from:
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-10/31/c_134769756.htm
- Yin, Robert, K. (2009). *Case Study Research: Design and Methods*. 4th ed. California: Sage Publications
- Zainal, Zaidah. (2007). “Case study as a research method”. *Jurnal Kemanusiaan*, (9): 1-6.

Appendices

Appendix 1: Variable Definitions and Sources

Variables	Data definition and Sources
(Independent variable) «Summit Meetings»	Official diplomatic visits by Abe abroad to seven countries. This research used the official website of the Japanese Government to obtain the data on the travels, which can be accessed at http://japan.kantei.go.jp/ , and http://www.mofa.go.jp/ .
(Dependent variable) «Economic mission»	The presence of commercial representatives during the time of the visit. The data was obtained from the summary records, press conference and joint communiqués of each visit, accessible at http://japan.kantei.go.jp/ , and http://www.mofa.go.jp/ .
(Dependent variable) «Adjusted export trade performance over time»	Monthly exports (total US\$) from Japan to the destination country two years before and after Abe's visit. The data-set was adjusted for inflation and seasonal/cyclical variance. Data obtained from the UN Comtrade Database and accessed online at http://comtrade.un.org/data/ .
(Dependent variable) «Negotiated economic/commercial agreements»	Introduced/established economic, contractual or development arrangements during the meeting. The data was obtained from the summary records, press conference and joint communiqués of each visit, accessible at http://japan.kantei.go.jp/ , and http://www.mofa.go.jp/ .
(Dependent variable) «Security/defense agreements introduced/concluded»	Introduced/established political, security or regulatory arrangements during the meeting. The data was obtained from the summary records, press conference and joint communiqués of each visit, accessible at http://japan.kantei.go.jp/ , and http://www.mofa.go.jp/ .
(Dependent variable) «Joint security statements»	An expressed opinion on changes/critiques of the international system, or one of its states during the meeting. The data was obtained from the detailed summary, press conference and joint communiqués of each visit, accessible at http://japan.kantei.go.jp/ , and http://www.mofa.go.jp/ .
(Control variable) «Tariff rate»	The annual value denoting tariff rates is the unweighted average of effectively applied rates across all products subject to tariffs calculated for all traded goods. http://www.worldbank.org/ .
(Control variable) «Currency rate»	Values for currency rates were calculated as an annual average based on monthly averages (local currency units relative to the US dollar). http://www.worldbank.org/ .

Appendix 2: Quantitative results – Paired sample t-test results

<i>Variables</i>	<i>Pre-Visit</i> <i>N = 26</i>		<i>Post-Visit</i> <i>N = 26</i>		<i>t-value</i>	<i>p-value</i>	<i>Post-visit</i> <i>slope: R²</i>
	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>			
Japanese Export to Palestine	167344.25	216939.163	175907.88	290523.567	-0.104	0.918	0.561
Japanese Export to Djibouti	3381739.25	4057110.182	2946853.25	3116271.288	0.371	0.714	0.663
Japanese Export to Ethiopia	9006621.00	3205927.521	9890460.42	3561852.498	-1.107	0.276	0.597
Japanese Export to Mozambique	16845861.92	18142152.509	13668207.88	6570127.414	0.739	0.468	0.759
Japanese Export to Brunei	14452354.33	5809215.311	9711790.83	3390344.125	3.337	0.003	0.010
Japanese Export to Cambodia	18768052.42	2716947.698	22496277.58	4196085.672	-3.593	0.002	0.843
Japanese Export to Jordan	32825358.63	12273728.032	51166029.75	12358070.277	-5.031	0.000	0.487

Appendix 3: Quantitative results – Paired sample t-test results (Adjusted)

<i>Variables</i>	<i>Pre-Visit</i> <i>N = 26</i>		<i>Post-Visit</i> <i>N = 26</i>		<i>t-value</i>	<i>p-value</i>	<i>Post-visit</i> <i>slope: R²</i>
	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>			
Japanese Export to Palestine	190417.31	137182.527	180616.87	122896.270	0.228	0.821	0.5173
Japanese Export to Djibouti	4053681.71	2864514.520	2667979.63	1234280.616	1.725	0.098	0.6592
Japanese Export to Ethiopia	8910137.79	2440356.544	9942718.32	1455252.969	-2.740	0.012	0.5204
Japanese Export to Mozambique	17057034.71	7102696.249	14583183.05	3099084.834	1.341	0.193	0.7491
Japanese Export to Brunei	14374443.28	3819932.332	10323763.21	1652260.021	4.166	0.000	0.0007
Japanese Export to Cambodia	19369734.48	1331742.665	21437828.95	2700237.936	-4.257	0.000	0.8372
Japanese Export to Jordan	31298935.62	7036016.327	51103777.99	6071085.581	-13.814	0.000	0.4889