

**A Comparative Study on Soft Power of
Japan and China on Cambodia's Foreign Policy**

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March 2019

Master's Thesis Presented to
Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University (APU)
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Science in Asia Pacific Studies
(Division/Specialization: International Relations)

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CERTIFICATION

I, LAK Chansok (51117004), hereby declare that the contents of this Master's Thesis are original and true, and have not been submitted at any other university or educational institution for the award of degree or diploma.

All the information derived from other published or unpublished sources has been cited and acknowledged appropriately.

LAK, Chansok

2018/12/05

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

First and foremost, I would like to sincerely and profoundly thank Prof. SATO Yoichiro for his tireless supervision to successfully construct, shape, reshape, polish, and complete the best of my thesis from the beginning to the end. Apart from his tightest schedule, Prof. Sato took most of his valuable time to provide me with many additional in-class research lectures and to guide me through all processes of my research study. All of his kind and constructive comments have not merely motivated me to enthusiastically complete my thesis, but also enlightened me to be aware of the significance of research for my real life and my current and future careers as part of contributions to the long-term development of my beloved country – Cambodia.

Second and equally important, I would like to expand my deep and heart-felt thanks to Prof. Mie Oba, Prof. Catherine Phipps, Prof. Kitti Prasirtsuk and other colleagues for their comments during a research seminar funded by the Japan Foundation in Tokyo. I would also like to thank Prof. Kaseda Yoshinori, Dr. Neak Chandarith, Dr. Nhem Boraden, Dr. Chheang Vannarith, Dr. Leng Thearith, Mr. Cheunboran Chanborey and many other professors who guided and taught me for years to strengthen my research knowledge and skills in this field and to enable me to experience hand-on researches in fieldworks to finish all my assignments and projects. Without their valuable teachings and supports, I would have never become who I really am today.

Last but not least, I would like to gratefully thank all of my family members and friends for their very generous and heart-felt supports. I would indeed like to thank my parents, wife, and daughter, who are always my priceless and inevitable motivations and who have always and tirelessly supported whenever I need their assistances. In addition, I would like to thank all of my colleagues at the Department of International Studies and Cambodia 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road Research Center at the Royal University of Phnom Penh (RUPP) for their emotional support, kind understanding, and encouragement for me to make the best use of my efforts and time apart from my work to focus on my study and to strive for my future endeavors.

ABSTRACT

Since 1990 after the end of the Cold War, both China and Japan have projected their soft power in Cambodia through four diplomatic aspects: aid, cultural, economic, and public diplomacy. These growing soft power components have been intertwined to influence Cambodia's foreign policy. In this regards, many studies argued that Cambodia was drawn into China's political and strategic orbit as a consequence of its "no-strings attached" or "unconditioned" aid. This paper, therefore, aims to investigate soft power of both China and Japan in Cambodia, and to empirically compare their soft power influence on Cambodia's foreign policy. To achieve these objectives, this paper uses both quantitative and qualitative approaches; primary and secondary data; and retrospective-prospective study design. As found, based on quantitative comparative method, China has pledged its generous aid twice larger than that of Japan. China's bigger trade, investment as well as other attributes of cultural and public diplomacy in Cambodia over the last two decades have contributed to its growing political, economic and strategical leverage on Cambodia's foreign policy as exemplified by Cambodia's policy on the South China Sea dispute in explicit political support of China's long-standing position in the sea.

Keywords: Soft power, aid diplomacy, economic diplomacy, cultural or public diplomacy

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AD	: Aid Diplomacy
ADMM+	: ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting Plus
AIIB	: Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
ARF	: ASEAN Regional Forum
ASEAN	: The Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASEAN+3	: ASEAN Plus Three (China, Japan and South Korea)
BRI	: The Belt and Road Initiative
BRICS	: Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa
CAFTA	: China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement
CCP	: China's Communist Party
CD	: Cultural Diplomacy
CDC	: Council for the Development of Cambodia
CG	: China's Consultative Group
CI	: Confucius Institute
CJCC	: Cambodia-Japan Cooperation Center
CLMV	: Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam
COC	: Code of the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea
CNRP	: Cambodian National Rescue Party
CPP	: Cambodia's People Party
CSAJ	: Cambodian Students Association in Japan
DOC	: Declaration of the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea
SCO	: Shanghai Cooperation Organization
EAS	: East Asia Summit
EBA	: Everything But Arms
ED	: Economic Diplomacy
EEZs	: Exclusive Economic Zones
EU	: The European Union
FP	: Foreign Policy

IFL	: Institute of Foreign Languages
JBTC	: Japanese and Business Training Center
JDS	: Japan Development Scholarship
JENESYS	: Japan-East Asia Network of Exchange for Students and Youths
JICA	: Japan International Cooperation Agency
JOCV	: Japan Overseas Cooperation Volunteers
JPY	: Japanese Yen
MEXT	: Japan's Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology
MoD	: Ministry of National Defence
MoFA	: Ministry of Foreign Affairs
NHK	: Nippon Hōsō Kyōkai
NPC	: China's National People's Congress
ODA	: Official Development Assistance
PD	: Public Diplomacy
RAC	: Royal Academy of Cambodia
RCAF	: Royal Cambodian Armed Forces
RUPP	: Royal University of Phnom Penh
SCS	: South China Sea
SEZ	: Special Economic Zone
SSEAYP	: Ship for Southeast Asian and Japanese Youth Program
TV	: Television
UN	: The United Nations
UN PKO	: The United Nations Peacekeeping Operation
UNTAC	: The United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
U.S.	: The United States of America
US\$: The U.S. Dollar
VOA	: Voice of America
VOC	: Voice of China
WTO	: World Trade Organization
YLP	: Young Leader's Program

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background

The post-Cold War 1990s marked the changing global political, geo-strategic, socio-cultural, and economic landscapes. Soft power has become a form of national power that constitutes not only cultural but also political, educational and socio-economic values and ideas (Lee, 2011). Recognizing the rising significance of soft power, Joseph Nye (1990) first coined and defined the term as states' ability to obtain their foreign policy outcomes or objectives through "co-optation" rather than "force" or "coercion" in order to alter behaviors of the other states by being "attractive" (Nye, 1990), and to maintain their reputation and image as "responsible actors" in international relations (Chen, 2016; Hsiao & Yang, 2009; Steven, 2005). Therefore, as ones of major powers, both China and Japan are believed to have projected their soft power instruments through aid and economic assistances (Sayama, 2016; Steven, 2005); trade and investment (Chen, 2016; Hsiao & Yang, 2009; Kurlantzick, 2008); public diplomacy and cultural aspects (Anderson, 1992; Chen, 2016; Nye, 1990 & 2004; Wang & Lu, 2008; Sayama, 2016); as well as engagement in multilateral organizations (Lum, et al., 2008; Schimdt, 2008) to achieve their national interests at regional and international levels.

Since the early 1990s, both China and Japan have played many significant roles in Cambodia's reconstruction and economic development through their massive aid, technical assistances, trades, and investments (Heng, 2012; Ciorciari, 2013; Kurlantzick, 2007). Both of them have thus far been Cambodia's biggest aid donors. In 2000s, China provided Cambodia with roughly US\$600 million in aid and loans annually. In 2007, China raised its foreign aid to Cambodia through the Consultative Group; As a consequence, US\$689 million in assistances was given to Cambodia, US\$91.5 million of which was from China (Lum et al., 2008). In addition, other millions worth of China's aid and assistances was offered to both socio-cultural and military sectors to boost the Sino-Cambodian "comprehensive strategic partnership." The large amount of generous and the so-called 'no-strings attached' loans/aid have enabled Chinese investments

to economically cover and dominate most of Cambodia's significant and lucrative development sectors (Heng, 2012). Thus, this investment strategy was argued to be an increasing economic dependency of which Cambodia's foreign policy making process would be influenced by China (Kurlantzick, 2008). In this connection, it was also seen to create a "patron-client" relationship in which China as a "patron" would guarantee multiple benefits of Cambodia as its "client" in exchange for mutual political and strategic trust, confidence and support to China in both the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and in other institutions (Ciorciari, 2013).

As a consequence, due to China's soft power influence, Cambodia has guaranteed China that Cambodia has strictly and sincerely adopted its "One-China" policy against de-facto Taiwanese diplomatic recognition and implicitly supported China's foreign policy, political stance, and its "core interests" in the context of the South China Sea dispute. In addition, economic incentives and favorable investment conditions have been provided to attract more Chinese investors in Cambodia (Heng, 2012). In return, China continues offering a great amount of very generous economic incentives to powerful and wealthy Cambodian elites who have strongly supported China against both presence and influence of the United States and its Western allies at both regional and international levels, particularly in the ASEAN context (Ciorciari, 2013).

Similarly, since the early 1992, Japan has generously provided Cambodia with more than US\$2 billion in its Official Development Assistance (ODA). Both Japanese aid and assistances have placed bold focus and emphasis on rebuilding and reconstructing Cambodia's soft and hard infrastructure, which had been severely ruined by several decades of the civil war. They include public-private institutional capacity building programs, roads, schools, hospitals, bridges, and irrigation systems in both urban and rural areas (Phoak, 2015). As parts of its socio-economic development projects, Japan has financially and technically assisted Cambodia in improving its education system through constructing schools, supporting educational exchange programs, as well as offering scholarships funded by both Japanese government and its private institutions to Cambodians to pursue their academic and technical studies in Japan and in other countries.

This aims to develop more human resources to adequately tackle skills shortage problems in Cambodia, particularly in the area of natural science, technology as well as engineering (Phoak, 2015). In addition, Japan's massive generous foreign aid on Cambodia's health care, gender equality, public finance management, and legal and judicial improvement and reforms have so far built Japan's positive perception or image as one of Cambodia's vital development partners, and therefore enabled Japan to achieve Cambodia's political and strategic support.

From 2007 to 2009, China pledged Cambodia a total of US\$236 million aid in comparison to Japan's US\$337 million. Both countries' aid was directly and indirectly used for institutional and educational development and other physical infrastructure projects in Cambodia (Lum et al, 2008; Win, 2012). To contain China's rising influence in Cambodia, Japan also signed a "strategic partnership" for cooperation with Cambodia in 2013 so as to enhance their political, economic, and socio-cultural relations. Japan's approach is, however, perceived "less personal" than that of China in approaching direct contacts with powerful Cambodian elites (Ciorciari, 2013). Against China's soft power instruments, it is believed that China's aid and assistances were "riskier" or more dangerous than those of Japan since it would lead to China's excessive political influence and domination in Southeast Asian countries including Cambodia regardless of China's objectives and intentions in the region (Schimdt, 2008; Win, 2012).

1.2 Research Problems

Since the 1990s, both China and Japan have increasingly projected their soft power instruments in Cambodia. It has long been debatable and questionable whether China or Japan has had more soft power influence on Cambodia's foreign policy, which has rarely been thoroughly and critically studied by any scholar before. Moreover, some previous studies just slightly touched upon China's or Japan's soft power in Cambodia. In other words, most of those studies focused on a few economic and cultural aspects of soft power on both Cambodia's domestic and foreign policies. Therefore, given its level of difficulty, this study could be a significant pioneer work to find out soft power components of China and Japan and to be aware of their soft power

influences on Cambodia's foreign policy in order that Cambodia and other countries are able to tackle or accommodate their soft power dynamics and impacts in the region.

1.3 Research Objectives

Overall, this study is primarily aimed at comparing China's and Japan's soft power influences on Cambodia's foreign policy objectives. By doing so, it identifies both China's and Japan's soft power instruments in Cambodia from four important diplomatic aspects, namely economic diplomacy, aid diplomacy, public diplomacy, and cultural diplomacy to influence Cambodia's foreign policy objectives. Also, this study makes a thorough and critical comparison to know whether China or Japan has more soft power to affect and influence Cambodia's foreign policy at regional and global levels. Thus, four research objectives of this study include as follows:

1.3.1 Main Research Objective

- To compare Japan's and China's soft power influence on Cambodia's foreign policy (FP).

1.3.2 Sub-Research Objectives

- To investigate China's soft power from four diplomatic aspects on Cambodia's FP.
- To identify Japan's soft power from four diplomatic perspectives on Cambodia's FP.
- To compare whether China or Japan has more soft power influence on Cambodia's FP.
- To find out why China or Japan has more soft power influence on Cambodia's FP.

1.4 Research Questions

To tackle the research problems and obtain the aforementioned objectives, the study formulates two main research questions (MRQs) and four sub-research questions (SRQs) as follows:

- **MRQ1:** What are China's and Japan's soft power influences on Cambodia's FP?
 - **SRQ1:** What is China's soft power influence on Cambodia's FP?
 - **SRQ2:** What is Japan's soft power influence on Cambodia's FP?

- **MRQ2:** Does Japan or China have more soft power influence on Cambodia's FP?
 - **SRQ1:** Between Japan and China, which one has more influence on Cambodia's FP?
 - **SRQ2:** Why does Japan or China have more soft power influence on Cambodia's FP?

1.5. Significance of Research Study

In the growing changing regional and global geo-political, geo-strategic, economic, and socio-cultural landscapes, it is so important to investigate power instruments, particularly soft power, of the major countries projected in small states like Cambodia. Therefore, the study is deemed very significant because it looks at many different lens from both scholars and practitioners by thoroughly and critically studying soft power influence of both China and Japan on Cambodia's foreign policy. This study also adds more significant findings to the previous literature or the existing body of knowledge on both Japan's and China's soft power, which has thus far become a crucial focus in scholarly and academic circles. Equally important, the study puts bolder focus on insightful diplomatic aspects of soft power and practical policy recommendations for the Cambodian government, politicians, political scientists, and the general public to accommodate and confront the soft power dynamics of China and Japan and its huge gradual impacts on Cambodia's foreign policy objectives or goals. Being well aware of Beijing's and Tokyo's soft power projection through aid diplomacy, economic diplomacy, public diplomacy, and cultural diplomacy will help Cambodia to position itself as a sovereign state to take advantages of those major countries' soft power projection and get rid of its significant risks or challenges.

1.6. Scope and Limitation of Research Study

This study puts bolder emphasis on China's and Japan's soft power since the early 1990s when Japan and China were believed to increasingly project their soft power in Cambodia in terms of aid and assistances, investments and trade, culture and public diplomacy. The post-Cold War 1990s marked significant political dynamics of Japan and China in Southeast Asia and in Cambodia when these major countries began coining and deploying the term soft power in their political rhetoric and agenda that determined their foreign policy actions in Cambodia.

Moreover, so far there have not been many literatures on soft power of China and Japan in Cambodia and their influences on Cambodia's foreign policy. Unlike those several previous studies, this research is conducted based mainly on in-depth interviews with carefully selected scholars, practitioners and policy makers from Japan, China, and Cambodia who have involved and/or have good knowledge of those soft power instruments in Cambodia.


In addition, the study does not specifically focus on China's and Japan's domestic "social unity" and "ethnic harmony" as internal sources of their soft power to develop their societies as argued by Zhang (2015) and Chen (2016). Due to the time constraint, the study does not include the two countries' engagement in the regional multilateral organizations, either. Thus, the study is limited only to the external soft power instruments through four important diplomatic aspects, namely cultural diplomacy, aid diplomacy, economic diplomacy and public diplomacy.

1.7 Theoretical Framework

The study adopts liberal and constructivist perspectives as a guiding conceptual framework in order to answer the research questions. Liberals believe that the concept of soft power is close to the liberal school of thought, despite the fact that there is unclear contradiction between soft power and realism (Nye, 2011). As opposed to hard power, soft power puts a bolder emphasis on possibility of cooperation through trade and investment, aid and assistances, culture, as well as multilateral engagement. It was found that soft power was relevant to the liberal perspective to solve or resolve possibilities and problems of war and conflict arising from using hard power (Gomichon, 2013). Thus, the hard or coercive power is not necessarily the most vital source of power as argued by the realists (Vyas, 2011). Besides, liberal thinkers perceive that economic activities can gradually promote trust and peace as a result of "economic interconnectedness" and "interdependence" (Mingst, 2008; Vyas, 2011), and that participating in multilateral institutions can enable states to establish norms and rules so as to foster their peaceful relations for maintaining international peace and security (Mingst, 2008; Vyas, 2011).

Moreover, building upon those liberal assumptions, neo-liberal scholars argue that states are rational actors to carry out economic cooperation and engage in forming multilateral rule-based institutions in the hope that their national interests can be protected, achieved, and maximized in the anarchic international relations (Mingst, 2008). Therefore, soft power projected by China and Japan might be in either liberal or neo-liberal theoretical realms in which both cooperation and national interests cannot be avoided in such a dynamic international structure. There is no doubt that both Beijing and Tokyo governments with their projected soft power instruments in Cambodia through the aid, cultural, economic, and public diplomatic aspects have more or less affected and influenced Cambodia’s foreign policy since the early 1990s.

Figure 1.1: Theoretical Framework



Meanwhile, constructivists perceive that international system is not “inherently anarchic” as argued by both realists and neoliberalists, yet it is shaped by “ideas, beliefs, and the ways of thinking of actors” that involve in the system (Vyas, 2011). In this sense, states’ behaviors are mainly defined by “elite beliefs, identities and social norms” (Mingst, 2008) and also by their national interests (Wendt, 1999; Vyas, 2011). Moreover, constructivists believe that power is very important in terms of “ideas, culture, and language” allowing states to shape and change identities (Mingst, 2008). Those ideas and beliefs of actors within states are being created and

reshaped by “prevailing norms” as well as internal structure within those states (Vyas, 2011). Therefore, both China and Japan have been striving to project their soft power through culture, aid and assistances, trade and investments, as well as public diplomacy. They are also currently projecting their soft power aspects to attract Cambodia to partly achieve their foreign policy objectives in Southeast Asia. Together with the liberal and neo-liberal schools of thought, constructivism becomes a core theoretical framework of the research study.

1.8 Conceptualization, Operationalization, and Measurement Procedure

Many existing studies defined the term “soft power” from different perspectives. In this context, China and Japan have projected their soft power instruments via economic aid and assistances (Sayama, 2016; Steven, 2005); trade and investments (Chen, 2016; Hsiao & Yang, 2009; Kurlantzick, 2008); public diplomacy; as well as cultural aspects (Anderson, 1992; Chen, 2016; Nye, 1990 & 2004; Wang & Lu, 2008; Sayama, 2016) to achieve their national interests at regional and international levels. Therefore, the four diplomatic aspects of soft power tools are thoroughly studied in this research, including aid, economic, cultural, and public diplomacy. Those aspects are indicated by education, aid/assistances, investments/trade, and media.

Table 1.1: Soft Power Indicators

	Four Diplomatic Aspects of Soft Power			
	Cultural Diplomacy	Aid Diplomacy	Economic Diplomacy	Public Diplomacy
Indicators	Ethnicity	Economic aid	Investments	TV/radio channels
	Scholarships and exchange programs	Technical assistances	Trade	Newspapers and printing media
	Schools and language			Online media outlets

There remain controversial debates on “economic power or influence” as one of soft power components. On one hand, Nye (1990, 2004 & 2011) defined soft power as one state’s cultural “attractiveness” that alters behavior of others. He later claimed that cultural component alone


was not sufficient, states' "internal social and political value" and "style and substance" of their foreign policy could strengthen their soft power to influence others through "co-option." Nye (2004 & 2011) regarded military and economic might in forms of "guiding," "leading," and "rewarding" as hard power, arguing that both economic inducement (carrots) and threats or coercion (sticks) "directly" or "intentionally" get others to shift their position. Agreeing with Nye, Gray (2011) argued that both military and economic elements generated "forcefulness" or "coercion" regardless of their forms to persuade, compel or deter others. He praised the U.S. political, cultural and ideational values as key factors contributing to the American soft power in the 21st century. Economy (2016), in addition, includes economy in "hard power" and argued that soft power was primarily embedded in cultural, educational, and diplomatic aspects.

On the other hand, E. H. Carr (1964) in his well-known book – *The Twenty Years' Crisis: 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations*, evaluated all forms of power and divided them into three types: military, economy and power over opinion (ideological power). His power distinction was later studied by other scholars, some of whom defined "economic component" as both hard and soft power between "military might" and "ideational values." In 2008, Kurlantzick argued that besides cultural and political value, foreign trade and investment could strengthen states' politico-economic position to influence others without using coercion, given their economic interdependence and mutual benefits (Kurlantzick, 2008). Hsiao & Yang (2013), moreover, termed economic diplomacy and regarded it as more "carrots" than "sticks." They argued that such diplomacy helped "soft-pedal" states' foreign investments for "mutual benefits" and strengthened their "attractiveness" to influence others. Chen (2016), in addition, defined soft power as "intangible assets" including not only political values, diplomatic skills and cultural values, but also international reputation and "innovative industry or economy."

Therefore, this study focuses on "economic diplomacy" and defines it as a contributing factor to strengthen soft power of China and Japan in Cambodia for two main reasons. First, since the 1990s, despite the growing international criticisms against Cambodia's political crackdown on

opposition parties, political activists and civil society advocates, Japan has used “gentleman or quiet diplomacy” to mediate the tensions and has never imposed any economic sanction against Cambodia. In addition, China has never opted for any coercive use of “economic power” to pressure Cambodia to change its domestic and foreign policies, either. Second, both Japan and China have so far been the most attractive and significant “economic partners” for Cambodia. The two countries’ trade and investment volumes with Cambodia have steadily increased over the last two decades, contributing to advancement of their bilateral relations with Cambodia to “strategic level.” Such strategic partnerships have strengthened both political, diplomatic and strategic leverage of Japan and China to influence Cambodia’s policy decision making.


In addition, the study critically focuses on Cambodia’s foreign policy in three crucial contexts, namely international, governmental, and domestic contexts, in accordance with foreign policy arena of Webber and Smith (2002). The study of these contexts is very important to understand Cambodia’s foreign policy making process and its objectives, which have thus far been influenced by both China’s and Japan’s soft power instruments since the early 1990s. Cambodia’s foreign policy objectives include political-strategic and socio-economic objectives as clearly illustrated in the flowchart below (Figure 1.2).



Moreover, to compare China and Japan to assess which has more soft power influences on Cambodia’s foreign policy, the study first thoroughly identifies and quantitatively compares

both countries' soft power components in Cambodia (as in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4) to find out how much their soft power instruments have been projected since the 1990s. In this connection, a case study is taken into consideration based on a set of selected criteria to critically compare these two major countries' initial foreign policy objectives and actual foreign policy outcomes in order to examine how much their foreign policy objectives have actually been achieved through their soft power projection in Cambodia (Figure 1.3).

Figure 1.3: Framework for Case Study




1.9 Research Methodology

1.9.1 Study Design

The study deploys both qualitative and quantitative approaches to empirically analyze both China's and Japan's soft power instruments and their influences on Cambodia's foreign policy. The study also utilizes retrospective-perspective study design to look at not only at the past but also at the future in the sense that the research findings and practical recommendations will contribute to reshaping Cambodia's foreign policymaking to deal with the soft power dynamics and its impacts. Moreover, the study is based on both primary and secondary data. As to the latter (desk research), there are Chinese, Japanese, as well as Cambodian governments' national strategy and policy publications, official statements and speeches (as for the content analysis),

published research and academic papers on China’s and Japan’s soft power, and other online materials including, but not limited to, online newspapers, magazines, reliable statistics, as well as other useful electronic sources. Moreover, the former also plays a significant role in finding more critical, insightful and updated information from government officials, scholars, and other practitioners who have engaged and have had a good knowledge of soft power of China and/or Japan in Cambodia. Therefore, in-depth interviews with those carefully selected respondents were thoroughly conducted for this study as specified in the chart and table below.



1.9.1.1 Desk Research

The desk research (secondary data) mainly aims (1) to review the existing literature on China’s and Japan’s foreign policy and their soft power tools in Cambodia, as well as (2) to analyze Cambodia’s foreign policy towards both China and Japan. Hence, this critically analyzes many peer-reviewed publications (especially published journal articles, working papers and books), online articles, policies, reports, commentaries and others as aforementioned in session 1.9.1.

1.9.1.2 In-Depth Interviews

The study includes two sorts of in-depth interviews briefly described as follows:

- (1) Interviews with selected policy makers or public institutions, especially the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (and International Cooperation) of both Japan and China in Cambodia; and

(2) Interviews with selected experts, scholars, think tanks, researchers and academics who have a solid background or knowledge with regards to this issue or topic of this study.

The overall aim of such interviews is to get more insightful, analytical and credible data which cannot be found in the literature so as to offer rich and inclusive understanding of the topic.

1.9.2. Sampling Design

The study conducted in-depth interviews of key informants: Japanese, Chinese and Cambodian governments' foreign policy makers and experts. There are merely two respondents each from the public institutions due to fact that those officials' ideas or comments are mostly in line with their governments' domestic and foreign policies. However, such interviews are also important to obtain the most updated information and combine bureaucratic perspectives with scholarly views for an inclusive analysis. On the other hand, a greater number of respondents from the private institutions were contacted for interviews since they may freely and frankly share their ideas or concerns. Thus, the study adopted the following sampling and data collection methods.

Table 1.2: Sampling Design

	Japan	China	Cambodia
Public	<p>Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other related public institutions</p> <p>In-depth interviews (n=2)</p>	<p>Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation and other related public institutions</p> <p>In-depth interviews (n=2)</p>	<p>Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation and other related public institutions</p> <p>In-depth interviews (n=2)</p>
Private	<p>Universities, Think Tanks and other related research institutes</p> <p>In-depth interviews (n=*)</p>	<p>Universities, Think Tanks and other related research institutes</p> <p>In-depth interviews (n=*)</p>	<p>Universities, Think Tanks and other related research institutes</p> <p>In-depth interviews (n=*)</p>

(*) There is no limit for in-depth interviews with private institutes for more insightful data collection.

(**) Each public and private institute/individual is non-randomly selected for the in-depth interviews.

1.10 Ethics

All of respondents were asked for their consents prior to interviews, and both their names and answers will be kept confidential. This means that each participant had to sign an informed consent form or approve a verbal agreement before the interviews. The primary purpose of the study and possible benefits and harms were informed to them. Their participation was indeed voluntary and could be withdrawn without penalty or punishment at any time.

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Definitions of Soft Power

The concept of power has long been debated in international relations. It is generally believed that power is one's ability to change behaviors of others in a "desired direction" by force (Hill & Beadle, 2014; Grieco et al., 2014). Among many scholars, Joseph Nye classified power into three types: sticks, carrots, and persuasion (Nye, 1990; Sayama, 2016). The former is regarded as hard power, while the latter two are known as soft power enabling states to change behaviors of the others by promising to offer positive benefits or interests in the future (Sayama, 2016). In his book – *The Power to Lead*, Joseph Nye (2008) also argued that effective power and leadership required both soft and hard power. The mixture of these two types of power has been called smart power (Lee, 2011). Despite its elusive notion, soft power is still relevant and significant to increase states' regional and global influence as it is regarded as a "slower, surer, more civilized way of exercising influence than crude force [hard power]" (The Economists, 2006). Nye (2004), Lee (2011), Sayama (2016) and other scholars also argued that soft power component remained relevant, crucial, and complementary to military or hard power.

In his another book – *Bound to lead: The Changing Nature of American Power* in 1990, Joseph Nye asserted that a state's soft power is its ability to obtain its foreign policy goals or outcomes through "co-option" rather than "[brute or crude] force" or coercion, and therefore he referred soft power to "co-optive" power as one's ability or capability to alter or change the behaviors of the other states by being attractive (Nye, 1990). Similarly, Christopher Hill and Sarah Beadle (2014) together defined soft power as one state's capability to "influence" or "affect" behaviors of the others in order to achieve desired goals through "co-option" or "attraction" that requires authorities, respect, and credibility of that state. Both Arndt (2005) and Schneider (2009) also added that soft power is ones' co-optive ability aimed at influencing results of others' foreign policy conducted to achieve their national interests. Lee (2011) argued that states knew whether or not they obtained this source of power by taking three major dimensions into consideration:

cognitive, affective and normative. The former refers to how other states assess a state's image, reputation, and standing in the international relations. The latter two are about whether other states support or do not support a state despite its political, military and economic weaknesses or strengths and in accordance with their compliance with international laws and norms.

2.2 Soft Power Diplomacy: Attributes and Components

Hayden (2012) vaguely asserted that to achieve main soft power elements, states utilized their cultural and institutional attractiveness, while Joseph Nye (1990 & 2004) claimed that cultural attractiveness alone was not enough, internal social and political value, as well as "style and substance" of those states' foreign policy formulation and implementation were indeed required to influence others through co-optive or soft power. Likewise, Young and Jong (2008) together with Schimdt (2008) agreed with Nye by arguing that soft power could be attractive primarily based on three key indicators: culture, political values and ideas, and foreign policy. However, according to them, social values are not included in order to achieve this sort of power.

Moreover, Kurlantzick (2008) claimed that soft power could be achieved not merely through culture and political diplomacy, but also through participation in cross-national, both regional and global, multinational organizations or institutions, investments, and the "gravitational pull of economic strength." Kurlantzick argued foreign investment and trade could strengthen one state's politico-economic position to influence others without using coercion or force, given their economic interdependence or dependency and mutual benefits (Kurlantzick, 2008; Hsiao & Yang, 2013). Similarly, Chen (2016) defined soft power as "intangible assets" including not only political values, foreign policies, diplomatic skills and traditional cultural values, but also international reputation and innovative industries or economies. Besides, it includes domestic driving forces, such as civil education, scientific development, social harmony and unity (Chen, 2016). However, Economy (2006) argued that soft power was primarily embedded in cultural, educational and politically diplomatic aspects, not at all in economic aspects as argued by Chen

(2016), Kurlantzick (2008), as well as Hsiao and Yang (2013) since the economic power has been an ambiguous term that refers to either hard or soft power influence (Lee, 2011).

Lee (2011) in his article *Soft Power as Productive Power* discussed how economic component could be used as both hard and soft power. First, he agreed with Dahl (1969) that when state A (a sender) uses “economic power” as its ability to force state B (a receiver) to do what state B otherwise would not do, state A’s “direct, relational and coercive” use of its economic might against state B refers to hard power. Second, Lee (2011) also used a definition of Nye (1990 & 2004) that soft power is state A’s ability to alter state B’s behavior in order to obtain its foreign policy objectives through “co-option” rather than “coercion” by being “attractive.” Therefore, Economic strength can be converted into either hard or soft power. Lee & Jhee (2011) in their co-authored article – *Measuring Soft Power in East Asia: An Overview of Soft Power in East Asia on Affective and Normative Dimensions* – took the second observation of Lee (2011) to analyze attractive “economic power” of Japan, China, the United States and South Korea.

In addition, Barnett & Duvall (2005) categorized power into four types that are not mutually exclusive: compulsory, structural, institutional and productive. They developed these four by two dimensions: sorts of “social relations” through which power functions and “specificity” of social relations through effects are generated. First, compulsory power works via interaction of “direct control” by state A (the sender) over state B (the receiver). Second, institutional power functions when the sender controls, constraints and/or guides the receiver by working through rules and/or procedures of informal and formal institutions. Third, structural power works when the sender’s “direct control” over the receiver’s behavior through “socially constituted internal relations.” Finally, productive power is generated through diffuse “social processes” through which “meaning,” “ideas or discourse,” and “knowledge system” are “lived, experienced, and transformed” from the sender to the receiver without “coercion.” The processes lead to the receiver’s empathy to support the sender’s values and practices. To put in economic terms, Lee (2011) regarded the first three as economic hard power and productive power as soft power.

2.2.1 Cultural and Public Diplomacy

Owing to significance of culture as soft power attribute, according to Hsiao and Yang (2013), Kurlantzick (2008), Nye (1990), Schimdt (2008), as well as Young and Jong (2008), domestic or national culture of a state can generate attraction and admiration from other countries. To do so, governments host many cultural programs and activities and provide their national language classes to foreigners so as to stimulate appreciation of their cultural pride and therefore to be able to build their soft power influences. Anderson (1992), Chen (2016), Wang and Lu (2008), and Sayama (2016) referred public diplomacy as a set of cultural activities intended to enhance legitimacy and consistency of a state's foreign policy. In other words, public diplomacy is able to establish a state's positive or good image and reputation as a vital and responsible player in the global affairs. According to Nye (1990 & 2004), other cultural elements strengthening soft power include, but not limited to, sports, arts, literature, television channels, films, academic exchange programs, radio, films, scholarship, and other cultural events in order to attain more significant international attention and reputation. For this reason, Nye (1990) asserted that since the 1980s, the United States had huge cultural power resources that consisted of, but not limited to, its Hollywood movies, music, and sports including basketball and the American football.

Furthermore, many other existing literatures on mass communication and propaganda through mass media also argued that the public diplomacy or mass media predominated by the United States for many decades had played enormously significant roles in generating personal influences (Katz & Lazarsfeld; 1955) and shaping the global perspectives (Tunstall, 1977; Wright, 1959). It was found by that the American imperialist media as coined by Tunstall (1977) was globally and widely spread in 1960s to disseminate the U.S. economic, political, and socio-cultural aspects to articulate its capitalist and democratic values to shape perceptions and influence a wide range of audiences or people (Wright, 1959). Likewise, both Katz and Lazarsfeld (1955) also found that in addition to personal interaction, the mass media could easily penetrate the general public to form certain ideas or perspectives. Therefore, from their findings, it is explicit to say that the public diplomacy through mass media serve as a significant

factor to strengthen a state's image, reputation and consistency of other states' foreign policies as argued by Sayama (2016).

2.2.2 Political Diplomacy

In addition to the cultural aspect, political values and ideas are significant to enhance a state's persistent and coherent set of rules, norms, and values in order to pursue its interests at national and international levels (Hsiao & Yang, 2013; Nye, 1990; Kurlantzick, 2008; Schimdt, 2008; Young & Jong, 2008). Nye (1990) and Elizabeth Economy (2006) added that both skills and intelligence of one country's political diplomacy are significant enhancer of its soft power. In this connection, as Nye (1990 & 2004) argued, since its independence in 1776 and particularly since the end of the World War II, the United States with its skillful diplomats and scholars has tirelessly promoted American political values, including plural liberal democracy, human rights, as well as freedom and liberty through many of its diplomatic missions, educational institutions, research groups, and think tanks around the world. Sayama (2016) also added to Nye's political diplomacy that the United States and its Western allies had thus far strengthened their soft power influences through regional and international natural disasters and many other humanitarian relief missions.

However, many other scholars argued that the engagement of the United States and its allies to advocate democratic or American values was primarily aimed at justifying or legitimizing their actions in interfering into and altering internal political regimes of the so-called "belligerent states" or the "axis of evils" after the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in 2001 (Bacevich, 2016; Chapman, 2004; Juhasz, 2013; Palast, 2013; Turley, 2014). As a result, their soft power projection in Africa, the Middle East, and Asia is believed to have declined in a fast changing international order, exemplified by their long-standing military engagement in the Middle East and elsewhere in the world.

2.2.3 Aid and Economic Diplomacy

Moreover, foreign trade, investments, economic aid, and technical assistance, which were ignored by both Nye (1990) and Economy (2006), are believed to be ones of soft-power elements that assist countries in projecting their positive or “benign” national image in the international relations (Chen, 2016; Hsiao & Yang, 2009; Hu, 2007; Kurlantzick, 2008; Steven, 2005). Also, Jhee and Lee (2011) in their soft power assessment in East Asia, Mano (2016) in his case study in Zimbabwe, and Johanson (2016) in his research in Sudan all found that economic growth and foreign aid as soft power attributes contributed to strengthening states’ power. For this reason, major powers and economically developed countries, such as the United States and its European allies, China, Japan, and South Korea have offered economic assistance to many developing countries with or without conditions, which have been appreciated by aid-recipient countries. The dependency on economic aid and technical assistance of developed countries for mutual benefits enable them to portray their positive images and thus to influence foreign policies of developing countries (Mingst, 2008). For instance, to enhance its soft power in Africa, China provided African countries with roughly \$US200 million aid for constructing new headquarters for the African Union (AU) situated in Addis Ababa (Sayama, 2016).

2.2.4 Multilateral Engagement Diplomacy

In addition, Lum, Morrison & Vaughn (2008), Sayama (2016), Lee (2011), and Schimdt (2008) argued that soft power can be achieved through aligning one state’s political-security, socio-economic, and cultural activities with multinational organizations, such as the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU) and ASEAN. The alignment with the multilateral institutions requires states to respect and comply with international law and norms in order to promote both international peace and stability and build their positive images as one of the “most responsible actors” in the global community (Lum et al., 2008; Schimdt, 2008). In addition, humanitarian actions can promote their soft power derived from their good international reputation (Sayama, 2016). Therefore, Sayama (2006) argued that dictatorship, authoritarianism, and unilateralism in the international relations would undermine states’ capability to project their soft power.

2.2.5 Domestic Sources of Soft Power

Besides the aforementioned soft power aspects, Zhang (2015) agreed with Chen (2016) that a state's soft power can be increased if it can achieve "social unity" and "ethnic harmony". Zhang (2015) stipulated in his article that soft power can "strengthen socialist core values, improve China's excellent traditional culture, cultivate noble thought and morality, and strengthen all-Party, all-military, and all-people's unity." However, this component of Chinese style of soft power has been elusive, debated, criticized and thus ignored by many scholars who argued that the domestic "social unity" were not crucial components to build soft power (Economy, 2006; Hsiao & Yang, 2013; Lum et al., 2008; Nye, 1990 & 2004; Sayama, 2006).

2.3 China's Soft Power in the Postwar Order

Many scholars argued that soft power is not a new notion since it has been embedded in classical Chinese cultures and philosophies (Sheng, 2008; Sun, 2004). Sheng (2008) claimed that the notion of soft power has long appeared in Chinese history, war strategies, as well as Confucian and Taoist schools of thought that the power could be gained through "morality and benevolence, good governance and the winning of heart and minds." In addition, soft power as one state's ability to influence and defeat its opponents without using brute force or coercion was mentioned in Sun Tzu's *Act of War* (Sun, 2004) and in the Chinese principle of morality in which soft power was regarded as one's capability to convince others with moral reasons and principles (Zhai, 2004). Similarly, China's soft power is also believed to go beyond its ability to general moral societal compliance to persuade and influence other countries (Wang & Lu, 2008). Nonetheless, other scholars, taking contemporary history into account, found that China's soft power was rooted in Zhou Enlai's diplomatic model of "peaceful rise" or "peaceful development" based on the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence that helped China's status in the international community since 1950s ascend after obtainment of its independence in 1949 (Zhan & Li, 2005). The notion of "peaceful rise" has continued to enhance China's good image in the international relations (Zhang & Li, 2005; Lum et al., 2008; Hsiao & Yang, 2009).

To illustrate, China's modern foreign policy initiatives, such as "smile diplomacy," "win-win diplomacy," "public diplomacy," and "good neighbor diplomacy" by primarily focusing on "peaceful rise" or "peaceful co-existence" have promoted China's soft power (Hsiao & Yang, 2009; Wang & Lu, 2008). In early 1992, China's soft power was embedded in its peaceful rise in the post-Cold War period (Wang, 1993). Wang Huning (1993), who is a member of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Political Bureau and the head of the Central Policy Research Office, firstly brought the notion of American soft power of Nye (1990) to China. He translated the term into China's foreign policy against the notion of "China as a threat" and the "American values". Such Western values have been seen contradictory to "Chinese values," a combination of modern Marxism or socialist core values and China's classical Confucianism (Huang, 2013).

In late 2002, the 16th CCP National Congress stressed the significance of culture in its political reports. However, the term soft power was not officially and widely utilized until 2007 when another key political report to the 17th National Party Congress featured the term as one of China's foreign policy tools (Hu, 2007; Chen, 2016). Since then, China's soft power policy was widely implemented abroad, despite vagueness of the term stipulated in that report of the 17th National Party Congress according to which only "socialist core values" and "Chinese culture" or Chinese Confucianism among people were introduced (Hu, 2007; Sayama, 2016; Chen, 2016; Wang & Lu, 2008). Zhan Dexiong also argues that Western or American countries with their plural/liberal democratic values have thus far seen India's consolidated democracy more stable and better than China's dictatorial and socialist regime, while they are ignoring the fact that India has not economically been better off than China (Zhang, 2014).

The term soft power had become an important tool of China's foreign policy, and this tool was boldly reiterated, widely recognized, and clearly stipulated in the Political Report of the 18th National Party Congress of the CCP in 2012 before Xi Jinping became a new Chinese President (Sayama, 2016). Since 2013, President Xi has prioritized China's policy of "peaceful rise" and "good neighbors" in a new type of international relations greatly contributing to promotion of

China's soft power and its political position at regional and international levels (Sayama, 2016). Similarly, Chen (2016) added that President Xi has incorporated China's soft power into his ambitious "Chinese Dream", which was believed to inherit his predecessor Mao Zedong's Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. The principles include national sovereignty and territorial integrity; non-interference into others' internal affairs; non-aggression; equality and mutual benefit; and peaceful coexistence to build China's positive image as a pacifist and responsible actor in the current international system (Chen, 2016). To strengthen China's co-optive power, President Xi has developed the "One Belt, One Road" or the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as a massive infrastructure development project to connect China with Asia, Africa and Europe, and created its financial bodies, such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), Silk Road Fund, and BRICS Development Bank, to finance such mega-projects in order to deploy China's diplomacy and economic cooperation to shape China's soft power (Chen, 2016).

In addition, it is believed that China's continued economic growth enables China to assert its claims to play greater roles in the international economy in order to articulate its soft power to promote Chinese socialist core values (Hu, 2007); to establish a political and fiscal foundation with developing countries through economic aid and assistance (Sun, 2004; Lum et al., 2008; Johanson, 2016); to establish economic cooperation through free trade agreements; to promote Chinese cultural understanding; and to intensify China's influence through its private sectors and business networks in developing countries (Hsiao & Yang, 2009) since China has been so far regarded as a huge market in Asia (Lum et al., 2008). In supporting China's soft power, Wu (2014) argued that the Western powers had lost confidence in the liberal capitalism after facing the global Financial Crisis in 2008, and Zhange (2015) argued that China's 'socialist values' would finally prevail over capitalism and earn more soft-power influences in years to come.

In addition to its economic aspect, China has promoted its soft power through cultural aspect. In 2013, China had 440 Confucius Institutes, 646 classrooms, and 850,000 students across more than 100 countries; China was estimated to have other 60 institutes and 350 classrooms by the

late 2015 (The Economist, 2014). The Confucius Institutes have promoted China's soft power through nurturing Chinese language, history and culture (Hsiao & Yang, 2013); providing more scholarships and funds for students' exchange programs and China-related research projects (Li & Ronning, 2013); as well as recruiting thousands of volunteers and teachers to work for those Chinese educational institutes in developing countries (Hsiao & Yang, 2013) in order to convince developing countries to recognize China's image as a "non-threatening, constructive and reliable" power at both regional and international levels (Chen, 2016). However, it has been widely criticized that the Chinese Confucius Institutes have suppressed any discussion of sensitive issues, particularly the U.S. plural liberal democracy and democratic revolutions in Xinjiang, Tibet, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and elsewhere (Bell, 2008; Sayama, 2016).

Moreover, public diplomacy is very significant for enhancing China's soft power by justifying, legitimizing and promoting its activities, images, and relationships with individuals, groups and institutions through its countless conferences, research programs, mass media and other activities (Calder, 2014, Chen, 2016; Sayama, 2016; Wang & Lu, 2008). Anderson (1992) argued that long-distance nationalism enabled China to promote its patriotism and nationalism to its Chinese decedents around the world including the United States where Calder (2014) claimed more than 3.62 million Chinese Americans in 2010 had supported and influenced the U.S. decision-making agenda through mass media, academia and think tanks. China has had hundreds of mass media channels and was estimated to spend approximately US\$10 billion on its external propaganda every year (Shambaugh, 2015) and specifically on its 60 journalists, 400 local staff members, 1,800 and 2,000 pieces of news in English and French, 2,200 photos, and 150 videos outnumbering other Western media in news releases (Li & Ronning, 2013).

Additionally, China has promoted its soft power through multilateral platforms, specifically to enhance its images and positions in the UN, the World Trade Organization (WTO), Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), ASEAN, and hundreds of other regional and international organizations or institutions (Schimdt, 2008). Lum, Morrison and Vaughn (2008) argued that

to increase its soft power in ASEAN, China has so far been both active and proactive in many ASEAN-led platforms such as China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA), ASEAN Plus Three (ASEAN+3), ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting Plus (ADMM+), East Asia Summit (EAS), ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and other ASEAN+ summits or meetings at regional and sub-regional levels since its admission to be a full ASEAN dialogue partner in 1996.

2.4 Japan's Soft Power in the Postwar Order

Unlike Chinese soft power related literature, there have not been many studies on Japan's soft power that are rooted in Japan's ancient culture and philosophical thoughts. Some argued that Japan's soft power was associated with Japanese cultural, philosophical thoughts of "patience" (Uehara, 2013) and of "outstanding" and "cautious" works to avoid making mistakes (Ogoura, 2004) or so-called "culture of excellence" (OECD, 2010). Most of the previous studies were conducted on the post-second World War soft power of Japan (Ahlner, 2006; Johnson, 1995; Nissim, 2007; Ogoura, 2004; Green, 2015). Since its massive devastation in 1945, Japan adopted its Peace Constitution in which Article 9 stipulates that Japan is not able to deploy its military troops overseas and therefore shifts from its hard to soft power (Johnson, 1995). Ahlner (2006) and Johnson (1995) shared a similar argument that the constitution and the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty enabled Japan to boldly focus on its economic might, while its external security was guaranteed by the United States. Thus, from the 1950s and the 1960s, Japan formulated its objectives of Japanese cultural diplomacy to alter its prewar portrait as a very militaristic state to its current new image as a pacifist or peace-loving liberal democracy (Ogoura, 2004).

Moreover, in the 1970s, Japan's cultural diplomacy was promoted against the growth of an anti-Japanese sentiment in the Asian region. Ogoura (2004) argued this was due to the fact that Japan dominated the Asian markets through its economic means and thus established a "dependency relationship" between Japan and those small countries. Japan's culturally diplomatic objectives were altered in the 1980s and the 1990s due to the rising economic competition between Japan and the West to create a strong economic growth as one of sources

of soft power around the world (Ogoura, 2004). In the postwar era, three pillars of Japan's foreign policy include promotion of cultural exchanges for mutual understanding, expansion of Japan's ODA overseas, and contribution to international peace (Ahlner, 2006). Therefore, McGray (2009) argued Japan as an important economic power had certainly achieved and successfully implemented its soft power diplomacy through its cultures as exemplified by anime, computer games, manga, karaoke and sumo; by its foods, especially Sushi; as well as by its "J-pop" music. The domination of Japanese cultural soft power elements on its economic prosperity is called by McGray (2009) "Japan's Gross National Cool." Also, Johnson (2015) found that in 2013 the Japanese government launched a "Cool Japan Fund" campaign aimed at advocating the sales of such Japanese cultural products as manga and anime and promoting people-to-people connectivity and other cultural creative business activities. As estimated, a total of the fund amounted to JPY37.5 billion of which JPY30 billion was provided by the Japanese government and the rest by 15 private Japanese companies (Johnson, 2015).

In addition, Yano (2015) coined the term "pink globalization" as driving force for "Cool Japan" in accordance with Japan's "Kawaii [cute] diplomacy." This sort of soft power embedded in Japan's culture has been expressed through Hello Kitty, Anpan Man, Poke'mon and many other famous anime figures, which have transformed Japan's image as the war perpetrator into a new image of victims. This Kawaii diplomacy has been seen as a key source of national reputation and soft influence on others in the world (Yano, 2015; Nissim, 2007). Ogoura (2004) also added that these cultural aspects allowed Japan to promote its cultural understanding in order to gain a positive "internationalized" outlook for its specific strategic goals. According to the Marubeni Economic Research Institute (2003), Japan exported its cultural products, such as its media, publications, copyrights, fashion, and other artistic and entertainment assets worth JPY10.5 trillion in 2005 and the same time contributing to the rise of Japan's global soft power.

In addition, Japan has gained or earned much of its soft power through Official Development Aid (ODA) to most of the developing countries for over five decades (Ahlner, 2006). Similar

to China, Japan's foreign aid, economic assistance, and people-to-people connectivity through Japan-sponsored cultural programs have been Japan's crucial sources of soft power (Hsiao & Yang, 2013). For this reason, Japan has provided billions worth of its foreign aid and technical assistance annually to individual countries and organizations on JENESYS (Japan-East Asia Network of Exchange for Students and Youths), ASEAN's single market, the Mekong Basin development, and many academic scholarships. For instance, Hsiao and Yang (2013) argued that in 2012 Japan offered its official assistance of \$US3 billion for ASEAN for development to enhance Japan's soft power because Japan has realized that the rise of China would certainly undermine Japan's strategic position in the Southeast Asian region. The rising economic assistance of Japan has established the so-called ASEAN-Japan "dependency politics" making Japan as a trustworthy and indispensable partner for ASEAN countries (Hsiao & Yang, 2013).

Besides its cultural and economic aspects, Japan has promoted its public diplomacy through courses and media available for countries abroad. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (2017), Japan has published bulletins, organized various Japanese cultural and business events, funded open scholarly debates among think tanks, researchers and academics, as well as supported Japanese experts in attending national and international conferences. To improve its good image, Japan has allowed TV channels, images, and video films in Japanese and other foreign languages (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2017). Also, Japan has engaged in many multilateral organizations. For instance, in 1951, Japan became one of the UNESCO members in order to raise its postwar status in international organizations (Ogoura, 2004). Plus, Japan has become a very active, proactive and generous member of both regional and international organizations to raise its postwar reputation or image. For example, Japan is the second largest financial contributor to the UN and manages to send its peacekeeping troops or personnel and technical or professional staff members under the UN auspices to other war-prone and impoverished developing countries (Ahlner, 2006).

Furthermore, Japan has long built and gained its soft power influence through tackling "soft issues" that include, but not limited to, global warming and other technical and environmental

problems, as exemplified by the expired Kyoto Protocol. Also, Funabashi (1993) and Inoguchi (2005) argued that Japan's pacifism or soft power was witnessed through its civilian power and its support of humanitarian reliefs and anti-nuclear and non-militaristic policies. This engaging diplomacy in multilateral platforms has so far promoted Japan's soft power worldwide.

2.5 China's and Japan's Soft Power in Cambodia

It has been questionable whether China or Japan has more soft power to influence Cambodia foreign policy. A few previous studies slightly touched upon China's or Japan's soft power in Cambodia. Several scholars shared similar ideas that Cambodia has fallen into China's "Charm Offensive" or soft power with significant influence on Cambodian foreign policy (Heng, 2012; Ciorciari, 2013; Kurlantzick, 2007). To illustrate that, Kurlantzick (2007) argued that since the 1990s, China has utilized its soft power in the Southeast Asian countries, including Cambodia, through a variety of means, such as trade, investments, economic aid, and cultural tools to influence individual states and the ASEAN. He also found that China's soft power in Cambodia had so far been exercised mostly through its popular culture, trade, investments, and generous economic aid benefiting especially the Cambodian powerful elites. Similar to Kurlantzick's argument, Heng (2012) stressed that Cambodia was trapped in China's strategic "String of Pearls" in Southeast Asia, and that China became Cambodia's indispensable largest foreign investor and aid donor through investments, trade, and cultural activities.

On the other hand, since the 1990s, Japan has provided Southeast Asian CLMV (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam) with millions of dollars of ODA. This generous aid has so far been perceived as "less threatening" or "less dangerous [fewer strings-attached]" than that of China (Win, 2012). More specifically, Japan has thus far been one of Cambodia's largest aid donor, offering roughly US\$2 billion in ODA to Cambodia to rebuild and reconstruct both Cambodia's soft and hard infrastructure such as institutional capacity, roads, schools, hospitals, bridges, as well as irrigation systems in both urban and rural areas (Phoak, 2015).

Moreover, Ciorciari (2013) found that China's growing soft power influence on Cambodia had characterized the Sino-Cambodian relations as a "patron-clientelism," in which China as patron generously offered Cambodia both massive financial and economic incentives in exchange for Cambodia's diplomatic and political support for China at the regional and international levels. Therefore, Cambodia and China signed a "comprehensive strategic partnership" in 2010, and Cambodia has expressed its strict commitment to adopting "One-China" Policy against the *de facto* Taiwanese diplomatic recognition in Cambodia. Ciorciari (2013) also added that China continued providing its economic incentives to the Cambodian powerful elites who have personally and politically supported China against the West. To contain China's soft power influence in Cambodia, Japan also signed a "strategic partnership" for mutual cooperation with Cambodia in 2013, but it has been perceived less personal than China in directly contacting with the Cambodian elite. As Phoak (2015) mentioned, most of Japan's ODA have been helping rebuild soft and hard infrastructure, and thus projecting Japan's positive image in Cambodia.

Since 1997, especially after several armed clashes between two top Cambodian political parties, China has scheduled regular annual meetings with Cambodia to offer aid packages amounting to US\$500 million of economic aid and loans to financially support Cambodia in rebuilding its infrastructure and hydro-power plants (Lum et al., 2008). In 2006, China provided Cambodia with US\$600 million in aid and loans. A year later, China gave aid to Cambodia through the China-led Consultative Group (CG). As a consequence, US\$689 million in total assistance was given to Cambodia, of which US\$91.5 million was from China (Lum et al., 2008). From 2007 to 2009, China also offered Cambodia US\$236 million aid compared to Japan's US\$337 million that was directly and indirectly spent on institutional and educational development and other physical infrastructure construction in Cambodia (Lum et al, 2008; Win, 2012). Against China's soft power, Schimdt (2008) argued that China's ODA and military assistance were "riskier" or more dangerous than those of Japan and would result in China's domination in Southeast Asia, including particularly Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar.

CHAPTER 3: CHINA'S SOFT POWER IN CAMBODIA

3.1 Introduction

The bilateral relations of Cambodia and China can be traced back 2,000 years when the Chinese envoy Zhou Daguan came to visit the Angkor of the Khmer Empire (Chandler & Harries, 2007). The modern bilateral ties of these two countries became diplomatically and politically closer starting in the 1950s, when Cambodian King Norodom Sihanouk contacted Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai for his assistance, especially after the coup d'état in Cambodia in 1970 (Zhai, 2000). After the genocidal Khmer Rouge period of the 1970s, China continued to be both close ally to and friend of Cambodia by becoming one of the 19 key signatories of the 1991 Paris Peace Accords. Such agreements were made on a comprehensive political settlement to Cambodia's prolonged conflicts, which returned peace and political stability to the country after decades of civil wars. Many scholars refer to Cambodia's postwar 1990s as a "renaissance of Chineseness" due to the rapid rise of the Sino-Cambodian political, economic, and socio-cultural activities (Verver, 2012; Nyiri & Tan, 2017). These activities are regarded as China's "normative resources" of soft power as argued by Jhee and Lee (2011).

Since then, China has become a closer ally to and friend of Cambodia through increasing economic aid, technical assistance, cultural activities, trade and investments. Since 2006 until 2010, it was officially reported that Cambodia had approved a total of US\$6 billion Chinese investment, and that China had offered at least US\$2 billion in grant aid and loans to Cambodia (Chap 2010). Since 2010, China has been the top investor in Cambodia, accounting for 29.92 percent of the US\$3.6 billion total investment in Cambodia in 2016 (CDC, 2017). In 2017, it was estimated that bilateral trade between the countries would increase by five percent annually (Open Development Cambodia, 2016). In addition, based on the report of the Radio Free Asia in 2014, with this substantial economic relationship, China pledged to provide Cambodia with its unconditioned grant aid between US\$500 and US\$700 million per year for building physical infrastructure and promoting Chinese cultural activities across the country.

This close Sino-Cambodian tie was enhanced and upgraded from a “strategic partnership” for cooperation in 2006 to a “comprehensive strategic partnership” of cooperation in 2010, which was regarded as a milestone of deep and comprehensive cooperation between the countries. As asserted by Heng (2012) and Var (2016), this strong strategic level of bilateral cooperation and political commitment of the two governments have so far offered both countries possibility of benefiting politically, diplomatically, strategically and economically in Cambodia and the region. With this close relationship, China has projected soft power to strengthen its strategic trust and confidence, as well as to promote its positive image to implicitly influence Cambodia through aid, economic, cultural, and public diplomacy as sources of soft power.

3.2 Aid Diplomacy

3.2.1 Grant Aid

From the 1950s to the mid-1970s, Cambodia was the first non-socialist or non-communist country to receive China’s foreign aid (Zhang et al., 2015). After six official visits to China in the 1950s and the early 1960s, Cambodian King Norodom Sihanouk and Chinese President Liu Shaoqi and Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai signed the first agreement on about US\$6.27 million worth of Chinese economic assistance to Cambodia (Xue & Xiao, 2011). The economic aid aimed to reinforce Chinese political commitment to improving Cambodia’s nation-building effort, building mutual trust, as well as promoting mutual cooperation against the predominant presence of the United States, Thailand and Vietnam in the region (Zhang et al, 2015).

Amidst the growing Cold-War confrontation and tension in Southeast Asia in the 1960s, Chinese economic aid was transformed into military assistance to Cambodia upon the request of the King Sihanouk for reassuring his power (Qu, 2012) and protecting national security (Zhang et al., 2015). In quick response, China pledged Cambodia hundreds of million dollars worth military facilities, such as training camps, schools, hospitals and equipment, as well as many other necessary facilities for civil purposes. China also provided Cambodia with military trainings to enhance Cambodia’s military capability against any contingency (Zhang, 2015).

Between 1971 and 1979 alone during the Lon Nol's coup d'état and Pol Pot's genocidal regime, it was found that China had further increased its economic aid and military assistance larger than the accumulative aid from the 1950s to the 1970s (Shi, 1989). This enormous increase in aid and assistance during this period was regarded as China's geostrategic engagement in the region using Cambodia as the strategic base against the growing influence of the United States and the Soviet-backed Vietnam (Zhang et al., 2015). On the other hand, some scholars argued that China was keen to provide Cambodia with huge military aid and assistance in exchange for Cambodia's potential agricultural products for China in the 1960s (Ben, 2002; Sok, 2009).

After the postwar 1990s, China dramatically reduced its military assistance and increased its aid for Cambodia's national reconstruction and rehabilitation. As noted by both Lee (2011) and Kurlantzick (2007), the soft power projected through China's foreign aid served as its cognitive and justifiable form of power to influence others including Cambodia. To consolidate its soft power, for over the last two decades, China has become not merely Cambodia's major foreign aid donor in the region, but also its first partner to forgive the entire debt (Kurlantzick, 2007). China's grant aid began to steadily increase since 1993 after Cambodia's first postwar elections (Table 3.1). In the late 1990s, China generously pledged Cambodia millions dollars of aid, persuading Cambodia to cancel the *de facto* Taiwanese Embassy to Cambodia, ban Cambodian officials from visiting Taipei, and strictly support its "One China Policy" (Ciorciari, 2013).

In 2009, China pledged a total of US\$257 million including roughly US\$115 million in aid to Cambodia after another election in Cambodia (Heng, 2012). In 2012 when Cambodia took over the ASEAN chairmanship, Chinese President Hu Jintao offered the largest amount of Chinese aid to Cambodia in the last twenty years since the 1990s, including US\$70 million grant aid, US\$20 million military aid, and US\$430 million in loans (Graceffo, 2016). China's cumulative ODA from 1993 to 2011 was estimated to have reached US\$0.86 billion or 7.1 percent of Cambodia's total ODA (Heng, 2012), making China its second largest aid donor after Japan in

2011 (CDC, 2011). In 2013, China’s bilateral aid reached US\$2.5 billion, the largest bilateral aid ever in Cambodia’s ODA history (Zhang et al., 2015).

Table 3.1 China’s Grant Aid for Cambodia (In Million US Dollars)

Fiscal Year	Foreign Aid	
1991	-	-
1992	-	-
1993	0.81	-
1994	7.09	-
1995	3.13	-
1996	10.85	-
1997	9.50	-
1998	14.35	-
1999	2.99	-
2000	2.61	CNY 1.22 billion (RMB)
2001	16.33	CNY 0.87 billion (RMB)
2002	5.72	CNY 1.25 billion (RMB)
2003	5.57	CNY 2.51 billion (RMB)
2004	32.47	CNY 2.52 billion (RMB)
2005	46.64	CNY 5.00 billion (RMB)
2006	53.24	-
2007	92.45	-
2008	95.41	-
2009	114.70	-
2010	154.10	-
2011	332.10	-
2012	460.70	-
2013	436.60	-
2014	343.00	-
2015	338.80	-
2016	450.00	-

Sources: The 1993-2013 report of the CDC/the Cambodian Rehabilitation and Development Board of the CDC of Cambodia: The Cambodian Aid Effectiveness Report 2010, p.54. The 2011-2015 data from the CDC in 2016. The 2016 data cited from the Open Development. The 2000-2005 aid data from “Expanding Innovation for the Sustainable Development of China-Cambodia Trade and Economic Cooperation” of the Economic and Commercial Counsellor’s Office of Chinese Embassy in Cambodia.

3.2.2 Technical Assistance

Together with its large amount of economic aid (Table 3.1), China has promised to continue technically assisting Cambodia in many sectors ranging from physical or hard infrastructure to military capacity-building trainings. As divided, China's aid in goods or equipment accounted for 58.8 percent; in technical assistances for complete projects for 32.4 percent; and in cash for 8.8 percent (Shi, 1989). Since the 1990s, China has financed and technically built a wide range of both hard and soft infrastructures in Cambodia, such as the Cambodian government's cabinet building; the National Assembly and Senate; judicial and electoral reforms; national roads; the Prek Kdam Bridge across Tonle Sap River; the Prek Tamak Bridge across Mekong River; the Ta Keo Restoration, the Stung Trang–Krauch Chmar Bridge; the Mao Zedong Boulevard; Kirirom I & III, Stung Atai, Stung Tatai, Kamchay, Lower Russei Chrum and other significant hydropower dams; schools; railways; ports; and many other recent projects (Appendix 1).

Moreover, China's bilateral aid is not confined exclusively to financial aid package for civil purposes in the postwar 1990s. In five months after the July 1997 clashes, China offered a total of US\$2.8 million worth of military facilities and equalities for Cambodia (Storey, 2006). Such aid and assistance have witnessed to be steadily increased. In 2006, China pledged millions worth of assistance for Cambodia's military trainings and equipment including six patrol boats for combating both human and drug trafficking (Intell-Asia 2005). Since 2009, approximately 200 Cambodian cadets have been admitted to a four-year program co-hosted by both China's Defence Ministry and advisors, of which a compulsory six-month military training is conducted at Military Academy in China (Belford & Prak, 2015). In 2010, China pledged Cambodia 257 military cars, 50,000 uniforms, and US\$15 million (Radio Free Asia, 2010). In 2012 after the ASEAN Summits in Cambodia, China pledged another US\$20 million for Cambodia to build military schools, hospitals, and technical trainings for Cambodia's armed forces (Radio Free Asia, 2012). In 2013, China provided Cambodia with twelve military-grade helicopters worth US\$195 million. In 2014, China offered 26 trucks and 30,000 uniforms to Cambodia's Defence Ministry. Besides, a new military training facility in Kampong Speu province and a few joint

military exercises between the two countries even in South China Sea (SCS) were technically and financially supported by China (Open Development Cambodia, 2016). Since 2015, China has further increased its substantial technical military support for Cambodian armed forces.

Owing to the immense bilateral aid and assistances, it is believed that China has been able to politically, strategically, economically and culturally influence Cambodia's foreign policy, as Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen once described China as "the most trustworthy friend" for Cambodia, and Chinese President Xi Jinping described Cambodia as a "good neighbour, like a brother" and "good friend with sincerity" in the Southeast Asian region (Var, 2016).

3.3 Cultural Diplomacy

Cambodia was culturally influenced by both China and India as it is geographically situated in the middle of Southeast Asia and particularly in the Indochina (Whitmore, 2008). Despite the substantial impacts of Indian cultural religion, Cambodia has remained dramatically influenced by Chinese cultures due to the rising flows of Chinese immigration, labor forces, businesses or investments, Chinese language schools, Confucius Institutes, research institutes, scholarships, as well as many other China-funded cultural exchange programs and activities. Hsiao and Yang (2013), Kurlantzick (2008), Nye (1990), Schimdt (2008), and Young & Jong (2008) all agreed that all of these cultural activities could generate attraction and admiration from other countries. Jhee & Lee (2011) also coined the terms "cognitive" and "affective" dimensions of China's soft power projection to enhance its regional and global posture as a culturally civilized and pacifist country to explicitly affect, attract and influence other countries including Cambodia.

3.3.1 Ethnic Chinese in Cambodia

As a result of conflicts, economic hardship, political pressures and businesses and trade, a great number of Chinese people immigrated to work and reside in Cambodia. It was found in the 1960s and the 1970s, the Chinese became Cambodia's the first largest ethnic minority, totaling 425,000 (Ross, 1987). Due to the Pol Pot genocide and Vietnamese occupation in Cambodia,

only 61,400 Chinese were left by 1984 (Ross, 1987). Owing to their successful businesses coined as the “Chinese capitalism” by Redding (1990), all generations of Cambodia Chinese or “Chineseness” were estimated to be around three percent of Cambodia’s total population, the great majority of whom were Teochew (Verver, 2012). Others include Cantonese, Hainanese, Hakka and many other groups. Besides Chinese nationals, these Chinese Cambodians have strongly and closely engaged in economic, political and cultural spheres, as is evident through common practices of Chinese festivals and cultural ceremonies; Chinese foods; generational Chinese businesses and investments; as well as a growing number of powerful political Chinese Cambodian tycoons who are royal and close to Cambodian leaders. As Ciorciari (2013) argued, those Chinese Cambodian elites as a core cultural and political driving force could contribute to “crony capitalism” and thus development of China’s soft power to influence Cambodia.

3.3.2 Chinese Schools and Language

In March 2006, Hu You Qing, Deputy to the National People’s Congress (NPC) reiterated that, “Promoting the use of the Chinese language will contribute to spreading Chinese culture and increasing China’s global influence [as its affective and normative dimensions of power soft]” (Kurlantzick, 2007). For this reason, China has encouraged and financially supported Chinese schools in Cambodia. By 1938, there were a total of 93 Chinese schools across Cambodia, and the figure dramatically increased to 231 with 50 Chinese schools situated in Phnom Penh alone in 1970 (The Phnom Penh Post, 1999). After the defeat of the Khmer Rouge and the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia in the late 1980s, only 69 Chinese schools reopened, among which only 16 were situated in Phnom Penh (The Phnom Penh Post, 1999). In the 2010s, the figure dropped to 56 (Heng, 2012); however, other Chinese language teaching centers were created at both public and private institutions in Cambodia (The Phnom Penh Post, 2017).

With its massive financial and technical supports, the Confucius Institute (CI), whose branches of both Chinese cultural and language teaching in over 140 countries around the world, was also kicked off in Cambodia. David Shambaugh found out that the Chinese government spent roughly US\$10 billion each year on projecting its soft power in cultural sphere through its CIs

in both developed and developing countries including Cambodia (Phnom Penh Post, 2017). The Cambodia-based CI is situated at the Royal Academy of Cambodia (RAC) to provide Chinese language courses for Cambodian government officials and the general public at high schools, private companies, as well as government ministries. A total of 80 Chinese instructors, sixteen of whom are volunteers, are selected from the Hanban, a specialized China-funded Chinese language teaching unit based in Beijing (Phnom Penh Post, 2017).

As reported, in July 2017, a “Chinese Mandarin Center” was launched at Cambodian Ministry of National Defence (MoD) in Phnom Penh in order to teach both MoD officials and soldiers or armed forces at the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF). A total of 60 are selected to participate in such language classes each year. It is found that this center is aimed at promoting Chinese cultural soft power and strengthening Sino-Cambodian strategic partnership at military level in order that soldiers and armed forces of two countries can work more cooperatively and more closely with each other (Phnom Penh Post, 2017). During the inauguration of the center, Li Ningya, a Military Attaché of the Chinese Embassy to Cambodia, reaffirmed, “[...] Through the study of such center, Cambodian military personnel will develop a deeper understanding of Chinese culture and contribute more to cooperation and exchanges between the two militaries” (CI-RAC, 2017). As Ciorciari (2013) noted, such a deep cooperation driven by cultural factors has gradually pushed Cambodia into China’s orbit for strategic trust and mutual support.

3.3.3 Chinese Scholarships and Exchange Programs

As part of its cultural promotion strategies, China has pledged to offer Cambodia hundreds of scholarships and exchange programs each year. The number of scholarships is estimated to be roughly 200 in addition to hundreds of other short-term political-security, economic, and socio-cultural exchange programs (Suos, 2018). As Stetar et al. (2010) noted, a country’s education system promotes its norms and values through cooperation of both institutions and students. The norms and values are taught to culturally and professionally influence those students when they return home. In addition, Charles (2015) found out that such scholarships and exchange

programs could provide a country with good opportunities to select both potential and qualified candidates for their learning of its cultural norms and values. It is agreed that both scholarships and exchange programs serve as a driving force for promoting China's soft power.

For over two decades since 1998, the number of Chinese scholarships and exchanges has been steadily multiplied due to comprehensive and strategic bilateral relationship. In the late 1990s, there were some scholarships available; however, it was reported to grow many times in the 2000s. By 2016, more than 2,000 educational scholarships were granted to Cambodian students (Xihua, 2017). In addition, Chinese President Xi Jinping during his official visit in Cambodia in October 2016 signed thirty-one agreements including US\$237 million in bilateral soft loans and pledged to provide additional 500 scholarships for Cambodians (Reuter, 2016). This was seen as the largest number of Chinese government scholarships for Cambodia since 1998 for the purpose of developing China's soft power in the context of the Belt and Road Initiative.

Upon receiving scholarships for their education and exchange programs, Cambodian students have to travel to China to expose themselves to learn and appreciate Chinese social and cultural norms and values. In addition, most of them are required to study Chinese language and other China-related subjects such as Chinese history, culture and civilization, literature, and just list a few. They are taught and conveyed with Chinese philosophy, norms and values that will later influence their perceptions and ways of thinking after their return to their home countries. Also, based on interviews with some researchers, for potential scholarship students who used to hold high-ranking positions in public institutions, they would be approached frequently by Chinese scholars and/or politicians as part of their networks for future close collaborations. Therefore, as Charles (2015) argued all forms of scholarships contributed to soft power promotion.

3.4 Economic Diplomacy

Taking historical economic data into account, Jhee & Lee (2011), Mano (2016), and Johanson (2016) argued that the economic aspect could also contribute to developing and strengthening

a country's soft power as it helps build cooperation and trust to promote their foreign policy. It is true that throughout empirical observation of both trade and investment between Cambodia and China (Table 3.2 and 3.3), there has no signs of economic pressures imposed by China to threaten or compel Cambodia to alter its domestic and foreign policies. It is different from what the European Union (EU) has utilized the economic means as part of its hard power to consider withdrawing its "Everything But Arms" (EBA) scheme to levy tariffs on Cambodian products if Cambodia does not carry out a comprehensive political reforms regarding issues of its human rights, democracy and its "free and fair" election in Cambodia (Phnom Penh Post, 2018).

Since the 1990s, China's trade and investment in Cambodia have been seen a dramatic growth especially in the 2000s. Its investment and trade volumes grew more than 60 and 200 times respectively between 1993 and 2016 (Table 3.2 and 3.3). The significant increase was in 1998 after both countries accelerated its political and diplomatic relationship after the 1997 clashes. Since 2011, China has been Cambodia's top trader and investor, followed by Japan, Thailand, South Korea, the United States, Australia, Singapore, Malaysia, Vietnam, and other countries (Suon, 2016). In 2016, China's trade totaled US\$4.8 billion, and its investment capitals alone accounted for 29.92 percent of the total investment in Cambodia, 2.37 percent more than the investment of Cambodia (Table 3.2 and Suon, 2016). Plus, of the 6,321 registered companies in Cambodia in 2015, China has always ranked first with its 1,055 registered companies legally operating their businesses in Cambodia both inside and outside the Special Economic Zones (SEZs) – attractive special areas for the development of different economic sectors bringing together industrial and other related economic activities within Cambodia (Suon, 2016).

Table 3.2 Cambodia-China Trade (In Million US Dollars)

Fiscal Year	China-Cambodia Trade	
1991	-	-
1992	-	-
1993	19.34	21.53
1994	36.27	36.27
1995	57.34	57.34
1996	70.25	70.24
1997	120.69	120.69
1998	161.87	161.87
1999	160.12	160.12
2000	224.00	223.55
2001	240.00	240.41
2002	276.50	276.11
2003	320.65	320.50
2004	482.43	481.71
2005	-	653.34
2006	-	732.86
2007	-	933.99
2008	1,130.00	1,134.37
2009	944.00	944.15
2010	1,441.00	1,347.34
2011	2,499.00	2,499.11
2012	2,923.00	2,923.43
2013	3,770.00	3,773.14
2014	3,760.00	3,757.65
2015	4,430.00	-
2016	4,800.00	-

Sources: The compiled 1993-2002 and 2008-2004 trade data of the Economic and Commercial Counsellor's Office of the Chinese Embassy in Cambodia; the 2003-2004 report from "Expanding Innovation for the Sustainable Development of China-Cambodia Trade and Economic Cooperation" of the Economic and Commercial Counsellor's Office of the Chinese Embassy in Cambodia; and the 2005 data from "Cambodia 2015 macroeconomic situation and 2016 forecast" of Cambodia-China Chamber of Commerce. The 1993-2014 bilateral trade data of "China's Statistics Yearbook (1993-2015)". The 2016 trade data reported by Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen and quoted by Xinhua Net.

Table 3.3 China-Cambodia Investment (In Million US Dollars)

Fiscal Year	China-Cambodia Investment	
1991	-	-
1992	-	-
1993	-	-
1994	7.00	-
1995	2.90	2.52
1996	38.00	16.31
1997	36.00	10.02
1998	104.00	5.88
1999	46.00	32.77
2000	28.00	17.23
2001	5.00	34.87
2002	23.00	5.15
2003	31.00	21.95
2004	77.00	29.52
2005	444.00	5.15
2006	274.00	9.81
2007	116.00	64.45
2008	4.30	204.64
2009	247.00	215.83
2010	-	466.51
2011	-	566.02
2012	600.01	559.66
2013	768.32	449.33
2014	953.16	438.27
2015	856.52	-
2016	1,077.12	-

Source: The 1994-2002 database of the Council for the Development of Cambodia (CDC), extracted from "The Roles of International Aid: A Case Study of China's and Japan's Assurances to Cambodia"; and the 2003-2014 data from the "2011 China Foreign Direct Investment Statistics" Bulletin. The compiled data from the "China Foreign Economic and Trade Yearbook (1996-2003)" and from "China Business Yearbook (2004-2015)". The investment data from the CDC as quoted from Suon (2016).

For some scholars, as Lee (2011) asserted, the economic aspect of soft power is ambiguous and elusive as it also greatly contributes to hard power, while other scholars such as Mano (2016), Jhee & Lee (2011), and Johanson (2016) argued that economic diplomacy could be classified as one of soft power tools. Thus, based on the postwar economic trajectory between Cambodia and China, it is strongly believed that this affective dimension of China's soft power through the dramatic growth of its bilateral trade and investment could attract Cambodia's attention and aspiration to politically, strategically and diplomatically support China.

3.5 Public Diplomacy

Many existing studies mostly agreed and found that public diplomacy through mass media was a common tool for promoting and developing a country's soft power (Tunstall, 1977; Nye 1990 & 2004; Hsiao and Yang, 2013; Kurlantzick, 2008; Schimdt; 2008; Young & Jong, 2008). To build its image as a peaceful and pacifist major power, China has believed to invest more than US\$6 billion on its public diplomacy or media outlets in 65 languages in 140 countries around the world (Yip, 2018). As Yip noted, China established a new giant broadcaster, called Voice of China (VOC), replicating the U.S.-sponsored Voice of America (VOA), which was kicked off during World War II to strengthen American public diplomatic interests. The Chinese VOC version was created by merging three top Chinese global media outlets, such as China Central Television, China Radio International and China National Radio, so as to promote and develop China's peaceful rise. With no exception, Cambodia has indeed been flooded by Chinese media through both traditional and modern versions serving as one of China's soft power components.

In Cambodia, among five daily Chinese-language newspapers in Cambodia, the most important newspapers are the Sin Chew Daily, the Jian Hua Daily and Commercial News Cambodia (Hor, 2018). As Hor observed, those media outlets frequently cover a wide range of issues including official visits of leaders, exchanges of government personnel, Chinese languages, scholarships, and other Chinese cultural activities. Other Chinese-language magazines, reports and bulletins are published on non-daily basis to promote certain issues Chinese government and its agencies

find significant. For instance, based on the interviews with local teachers in Cambodia, since 2010s, the bi/weekly magazines produced and published by the Chinese Embassy to Cambodia are given for free and delivered to both private and public institutions. Many of them observed that those news coverage included China-Cambodia high-level visits and cooperation, cultural exchanges and China's development projects that also contributed to China's soft power.

In addition to traditional newspapers, other media outlets through televisions and radios have been regarded as significant driving factors to develop China's public diplomacy. As Wagstaff (2009) found, all of 11 state-owned and affiliated TV channels in Cambodia had news coverage in great support of Cambodian government and its Chinese counterpart in areas of economic, political and diplomatic cooperation. To illustrate, it was found that 37 percent of Cambodians in the public poll thought that Cambodian channels remained limited (Wagstaff, 2009) and that their broadcasting was a result of partisan influence that led to highly biased news coverage (Maloy, 2008). Besides, in 2006, as estimated, over 50,000 cable TV subscriptions and 10,000 satellite antennas enabled Cambodian users to be daily exposed to more than top 20 Chinese-language channels (Kea, 2008). This did not include those who illegally subscribed to the cable TV channels in Cambodia. To ease this issue, NICE Cultural Investment Group, a well-known Chinese government-affiliated enterprise, invested millions of dollars in kicking off its first TV channel to further bridge Cambodia-China bilateral relationship. Deng Li, the NICE chairman declared, "As the first Chinese-invested digital TV channel in Cambodia, NICE TV would act as a bridge connecting China and Cambodia in culture and information" (Xinhua, 2017a).

In addition, among 80 radio stations in Cambodia, only 29 are state-owned (NSDP, 2014). As Wagstaff (2009) found, most of those stations were considered to be under the stricter scrutiny and influence of the Cambodia's People Party (CPP). At least one channel broadcasts news in Chinese languages and other others are always in line with the government's political agenda and policies. Worse than that, two of the U.S.-funded radio channels such as Voice of America-Cambodia (VOC-Cambodia) and Radio Free Asia (RFA), which are critical of both Cambodian

and Chinese governments, were closed and later investigated for espionage with the opposition Cambodian National Rescue Party (CNRP) (IFJ, 2018). Despite growing criticisms, it has been seen as good opportunities for China to consolidate its soft power through such media.

Other online media and social networks are also crucial for China to project its soft power. The popular website, Fresh News, the Khmer Times and a few others, have been believed to be in favor of the Cambodian government. In 2018, besides its English-language version, the Fresh News launched Chinese-language newspaper to promote bilateral cooperation of two countries (Hor, 2018). In addition, a growing number of unofficial Facebook groups, pages and blogs are seen as soft promoters of Chinese culture, Chinese language, Chinese music, films, investments and many bilateral development projects. As Hsiao and Yang (2013), all of the aforementioned aspects of public diplomacy help greatly promote China's positive image in Cambodia.

CHAPTER 4: JAPAN'S SOFT POWER IN CAMBODIA

4.1 Introduction

Japan began its bilateral relations with Cambodia much later than China. This bilateral tie can be dated back to the late sixteenth century in the post-Angkorian trade relationship between the two people (Leang, 2017). Since the 1560s, this frequent people-to-people contacts resulted in sequent political, economic and socio-cultural exchanges. The bilateral relations, however, were suspended for a short period of time due to formation and implementation of Japan's policy of national seclusion or "Sakoku" during the Edo period. In mid-19th century, the bilateral tie was resumed only when Japan shifted to adopt an "open-door policy." At the height of the WWII in the early 1940s, Japan sought special concession in Indochina from France and occupied Cambodia from 1941 to 1945 (Nelson, 2003). Since September 1951 after Japan's signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, Cambodia under French protectorate was allowed to establish its diplomatic relations with Japan. The bilateral relations witnessed enhancing in 1953 when Cambodia fully obtained its independence paving ways for Norodom Sihanouk to visit Tokyo in 1954 for bilateral diplomatic ties, renounce Cambodia's rights for war reparation from Japan, and sign a Treaty of Amity for mutual cooperation in 1955 (Chheang, 2018).

Due to growing political tension between the Phnom Penh and Washington governments in the 1960s, the bilateral Japan-U.S. security alliance prevented Japan from explicitly providing Cambodia with aid and assistance (Leang, 2017). Apart from its political matter, Japan announced to economically assist Cambodia in 1966 for the first time to provide Cambodia with ODA, but this was disrupted by two decades of Cambodia's civil wars. In the 1980s and the early 1990s, Japan played many significant roles in Cambodia's national reconciliation and peace by settling political disputes among Cambodian political fractions. With its efforts under the auspices of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), Japan contributed to Cambodia's postwar election arrangement, restoration of liberal democratic political system, and national rehabilitation with increasing aid and assistance since 1992.

Japan's cumulative ODA between 1992 and 2016 reached approximately US\$2.9 million including loans, grant aid and technical assistance.

Since the late 1990s, Japan's trade and investment have rapidly increased due to Cambodia's growing open market and attractive investment policies. Over the last 25 years, it was estimated that Japan's investment in Cambodia totaled US\$1.5 billion. The dramatic increase in Japan's investment has also improved and accelerated its bilateral trade with Cambodia (CDC, 2017). Japan's export trade volume to Cambodia reached US\$366 million in 2010 and US\$1.61 billion in 2017 (CDC, 2017). In comparison to China, Japan's trade has long been seen as more "reciprocal" since Cambodia's export trade to Japan grew to US\$1.26 billion by 2017. Together with its development aid, Japan has so far multiplied its economic tools to increase its influence and balance China's rise and influence in Cambodia.

This close Cambodia-Japan relationship was further strengthened when the two countries upgraded their bilateral relationship to a "strategic partnership" for cooperation in 2013 during Prime Minister Hun Sen's official visit to Tokyo. This partnership has also enabled Japan to both strategically and politically engage with Cambodia, as is evident through Japan's growing high-level state visits and its military assistance to Cambodia. In addition, after the July 2018 election in Cambodia, Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen paid official visits to the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in September and to Japan in October in order to legitimize his political regime at global level. During his stay in Japan, Hun Sen described Japan as Cambodia's "long-standing partner", praised Japan's constructive soft power through its development models, and announced that he was willing to advance the bilateral tie to a "comprehensive strategic partnership" (Kyodo, 2018). Thus, this has been perceived as a result of Japan's soft power projection through its aid, economic, cultural and public diplomacy.

4.2 Aid Diplomacy

4.2.1 Grant Aid

In 1955 after signing of the friendship treaty, Japanese Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke during his official visit to Cambodia exchanged a diplomatic note concerning bilateral economic and

technical cooperation agreement. Such agreement was later signed in Phnom Penh on 2 March 1959 and came into force on 6 July, allowing Japan to offer Cambodia two separate packages of grant aid including US\$4.17 million worth of products and services. Another US\$ 4.17 million loan, based on the agreement, was utilized for physical infrastructure construction and technical assistances in three sectors such as healthcare, agriculture, and animal husbandry (Leang, 2017). Due to disruption by the civil wars in Cambodia, such aid and assistance were suspended, and a large amount of aid was used for refugee relief (Nagano & Kondo, 1990).

After Cambodia reached its Paris Peace Accords for a complete settlement of the political conflicts in 1991, Japan's ODA for Cambodia was finally resumed. Apart from its bilateral aid, in 1992 Japan reopened its embassy in Phnom Penh and organized the first post-Cold War International Conference on Cambodia's Reconstruction in Tokyo attended by official representatives from a total of 33 countries and 12 international organizations. This resulted in accumulation of US\$800 million of which between US\$150-US\$200 million worth of aid and assistance was pledged by Japan alone (Leang, 2017). For effective utilization of such aid, Japan studied and adopted key principles for foreign aid implementation and Cambodia's development priorities. As a consequence, Japan largely pledged to develop both soft and hard infrastructure, as well as to promote main public-private partnership in Cambodia.

Between 1992 and 1997, Japan's cumulative loan aid worth US\$2.61 million and other larger amounts of grant aid and technical assistance were pledged to Cambodia (Table 4.1). This aid was used for Cambodia's national reconstruction and rehabilitation through constructing the Cambodia-Japan Friendship Bridge and the National Road No. 6 (ODA White Paper, 1998). However, in July 1997 during the armed clashes and growing political criticism, many political and scholarly debates were conducted for suggesting a paradigm shift in Japan's ODA from quantity to quality and efficiency/effectiveness (Blacker, 1993). This resulted in cutting down its aid and urging the Cambodian government to restore its political stability, domestic security, and especially democratic principles as stipulated in the 1991 Paris Peace Accords. Such

statement was viewed as Japan's exercise of its hard power through aid, paving ways for China to explicitly share its position with the *de facto* Hun Sen's government.

Table 4.1 Japan's ODA for Cambodia (In Million US Dollars)

Fiscal Year	Loan Aid	Grant Aid	Technical Assistance	Total
1991-1996	-	2.61	-	2.61
1997	0	36.11	25.52	61.63
1998	0	58.35	23.05	81.40
1999	0	27.62	23.25	50.87
2000	1.53	65.32	32.35	99.20
2001	0.21	79.79	40.11	120.11
2002	7.47	48.46	42.65	98.58
2003	7.96	76.68	41.24	125.88
2004	7.35	38.27	40.75	86.37
2005	4.07	53.10	43.45	100.62
2006	9.5	56.93	39.86	106.29
2007	11.36	62.35	39.84	113.55
2008	4.82	70.21	39.73	114.76
2009	19.94	59.40	48.14	127.48
2010	13.54	80.83	53.10	147.47
2011	-	-	-	134.21
2012	0	66.55	41.69	108.24
2013	88.52	74.78	43.89	207.19
2014	368.09	88.27	43.66	500.02
2015	172.98	79.47	35.27	287.72
2016	111.36	107.28	39.69	258.33

Sources: The 1991-1996 data from the 2007 Project Report of ERIA and IDE-JETRO and from an article of Uchida and Khuno (2008). The 1997-2010 data of Japan's ODA for Cambodia from the 1998 Report of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan and the 1998-2006 and 2006-2010 Country Reports. The 2012-2016 data from Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. Due to missing of some data of aid and assistances from 1991 to 1996, the total ODA during those periods was grant aid. The total data of Japan's ODA for Cambodia in 2011 from the 2014 White Paper of Japan's MoFA.

In 1998 after settlement of the political dispute and organization of the second postwar election in Cambodia to restore peace and stability, Japan initiated and held a Third Consultative Group

meeting concerning Cambodia in early 1999 in Tokyo under the auspices of the World Bank. After the meeting, Japan approved a new package of grant aid and assistance amounting to a total of US\$50.87 million (Table 4.1) and a resumption of loan aid that would be pledged in a year later. According to the report of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the cumulative ODA for Cambodia from 1992 to 2010 totaled around US\$1.76 billion for building peace and rehabilitating and reconstructing Cambodia (Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1998). In addition, Japan's ODA disbursement for Cambodia reached a total of US\$2.52 billion from 2011 to 2015, with US\$213.97 million as loan aid, US\$1.48 billion as grant aid, and US\$827.01 million as technical assistance (Japanese Embassy in Cambodia, 2015).

4.2.2 Technical Assistance

In accordance with Japan's ODA program, the key objectives of its technical assistance for Cambodia are: (1) building and developing social and economic infrastructure; (2) promoting and strengthening basic socio-welfare services such as healthcare and education; (3) promoting and developing agriculture and rural community; as well as (4) promoting human resources for Cambodia's sustainable development (Japanese Embassy in Cambodia, 2015). Therefore, Japan's technical assistance covers a wide range of development areas including, but not limited to, physical or hard infrastructure construction, educational system, good governance, environmental protection, mine clearance, public health, aid for the disabled, natural resources management, as well as agricultural and rural sustainable development.

Since the 1960s, much of Japan's technical assistance has been provided for large-scale hard infrastructure development. Those key achievements include the Cambodia-Japan Friendship Bridge; the Neak Loeung or "Tsubasa" Bridge; the western Tonle Sap irrigation and drainage rehabilitation and improvement; educational development in science and mathematics at lower secondary schools; educational capacity development in technology and innovation; the Phnom Penh flood control and drainage improvement; the Sihanouk Ville Seaport; electoral reforms

and monitoring, national roads; hospitals; and many other current projects that are conducive to achieving the stipulated ODA objectives in Cambodia (Appendix 2).

Compared to China's growing assistance for Cambodia's military facilities and capacity building trainings, Japan's technical assistance has been regarded as a "soft" or "pacifist" approach. Since the late 1990s and the early 2010s, Japan has technically assisted in training the Cambodian armed forces under the auspices of the UN Peacekeeping Operation (PKO) although one of the basic ODA principles is to refrain from using all types of Japan's aid for military purposes (Japanese Embassy in Cambodia, 2015). Based on the 2016 report of the Japanese Ministry of Defense, after its preliminary field survey in the late 1990s, Japan found the demanding needs of "civil engineering education" for the Cambodian armed forces. The educational programs primarily include basic training on road building, trainings for educating directors of road construction, and specific training for detailed operations (Japanese Ministry of Defense, 2016). All of these knowledge and skills are significant for overseas operations of the uniformed Cambodian peacekeeping forces.

Therefore, with its tremendous aid and assistance particularly since the early 1990s, Japan has projected much of its soft power in Cambodia in order to win both the Cambodian government's and people's heart and trust as one of the most pacifist and strategic development "partner" for Cambodia. Based on the public opinion poll conducted by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2016, it was found that the great majority of Cambodian people had a positive perception of Japan's ODA and its effectiveness for Cambodia's development (Table 4.2). Based on the interviews with both Cambodian government officials and scholars, Japan's financial assistance as one of its soft power components is deemed less dangerous to influence Cambodia's foreign policymaking process. Schimdt (2008), Win (2012), and Ciorciari (2013) have also argued that unlike Japan, China's political influence or leverage as a result of its soft power projection in the Southeast Asian countries including Cambodia was "riskier" to their domestic policymaking autonomy and to ASEAN centrality in the long run.

Table 4.2 Cambodia’s Perception toward Japan’s Aid Diplomacy

No.	Aid Diplomacy (Aid Effectiveness)	Percentage
1	Very helpful	27%
2	Rather helpful	57%
3	Not very helpful	4%
4	Not helpful at all	1%
5	Do not know/No idea	12%

Source: The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2016

4.3 Cultural Diplomacy

The two countries’ bilateral relationship was resumed only in the 1940s and strengthened after the end of the Cold War in the 1990s. Japan’s postwar foreign policy towards Southeast Asian countries including Cambodia has been primarily based on the 1977 Fukuda Doctrine, which centered on “heart-to-heart” relationship and cultural cooperation (ISEAS, 2011; Chheang, 2009). Based on this policy, Japan’s cultural promotion through its people, language, exchange programs, scholarships, and other cultural activities in Cambodia over the last two decades has made Japan’s culture well-known and praised by the majority of Cambodian people (Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2016).

4.3.1 Japanese Nationals in Cambodia

Japanese immigration to Cambodia has thus far been steady owing to Cambodia’s attractive economic/investment policy, research studies, aid coordination programs, and abundant career development opportunities for young Japanese. In the early 1990s, Japanese nationals and peacekeeping troops came to Cambodia under the auspices of the UNTAC to assist Cambodia in legal reforms, national election, peace process and sustainable development. Over two and a half decades since its first postwar election in 1993, there has been a remarkable increase in the number of Japanese people residing in Cambodia, most of whom are believed to start up their businesses, invest in some projects, and work for JICA’s aid coordination programs. An

estimated 1,000 Japanese nationals lived in Cambodia in the early 2010s, and the officially disclosed figure reached 1,479 Japanese residents in 2012 (Phnom Penh Post, 2013). Based on a report of Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, by 2014, there were a total of 2,270 Japanese nationals residing and working in Cambodia, one-third growth in only a two-year interval (Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2016). However, according to the interview with Jiro Kurokawa, President and CEO of HUGS (Humanity United by Giving Support) and Japanese resident in Cambodia, through his business networks, he believed that Japanese population totaled between 5,000 to 6,000 (Heliot, 2015).

Most of those Japanese expats residing in Cambodia are believed to engage more in economic activities. Based on the interviews with two Cambodian government officials at the Ministry of Commerce, among hundreds of registered companies, a small portion of Japanese expand their branches, while others kick off their new businesses in Cambodia's emerging market. In an interview with the Phnom Penh Post newspaper in 2015, young Japanese nationals voiced their concerns about Japan's matured market where they could not find jobs they desired as those jobs were already filled by seniors (Heliot, 2015). Despite their economic successes in Cambodia, Heliot notes that those Japanese nationals did not focus much on cultural factors as Japan's soft power attraction. However, their business model, compliance with the rules of law, as well as kind and respectful interacting behaviors have so far been much appreciated.

4.3.2 Japanese Schools and Language

From 1953, since establishment of the Japan-Cambodia diplomatic relations, there was no formal Japanese-language class in Cambodia due to the limited bilateral economic relations despite several language exchanges by the Japan Overseas Cooperation Volunteers (JOCV) in 1966. In 1992 after the Paris Peace Accords, the JOCV was resumed and expanded to be more permanent by offering formal academic curriculums and Japanese-language courses at the Institute of Foreign Languages (IFL) at the Royal University of Phnom Penh (RUPP), which is the oldest and the largest public university in Cambodia. With a growing demand for

Japanese language for academic and economic purposes in recent years, Japanese has become one of the most popular languages in Cambodia (Sar, 2016). Since the late 2000s, there have been dozens of private Japan-language classes across the countries, some of which only lived for a short period of time. As Sar (2016) noted, one of the most successful private schools is Paññāsāstra University of Cambodia, which created its Japanese and Business Training Center (JBTC) in 2015 for a total of 250 Cambodian students to learn Japanese language and culture.

Similar to China's Confucius Institute (CI), since 2002, a new Japan-funded Center at the RUPP, named the Cambodia-Japan Cooperation Center (CJCC), has played many significant roles in promoting Japanese language and culture. In two years since its establishment, the CJCC with its approximately US\$12.6 million annual fund offered a total of 44 Japan-language courses, eight special Japanese programs, and one special language seminar attended by 1,620 people, 70 percent of whom completed those courses (CJCC, 2008). To date, the number of both students and classes have steadily increased to fulfill Japanese language-based job demands in Cambodia and Japan. Those classes are expanded to include entrepreneurship and businesses. Other popular and influential programs consist of Japanese seminars, conferences, Japanese speech contests, Japanese quiz game as well as Japanese-language essay contests, and are seen as Japan's growing soft power projection in Cambodia.

Moreover, in the Southeast Asian region alone, the number of ASEAN people who study Japanese language has remarkably increased over the last three decades. The figure grew nearly eightfold from 55,000 people in 1988 to 440,000 in 2006 (ISEAS, 2011). It was expected that the number keeps growing as Japan's culture, job market, trade and investment are very attractive to younger ASEAN generations including Cambodians. With both domestic and global trends, Japan's soft power through its language classes or schools have so far made Cambodia more aware of Japan's culture and civilization.

4.3.3 Japanese Scholarships and Exchange Programs

As part of its “affective” cultural dimension of soft power, to date Japan has provided Cambodians with more than 1,000 Japanese government scholarships to pursue their education and build their professional capacity in Japan (ACF, 2016). Compared to China, Japan’s scholarships are from a variety of development programs run by different agencies and are funded by both the Japanese government and private Japanese corporations. Besides the scholarship scheme for education, since 1992, there have been a growing number of cultural and professional exchange programs funded by the Japanese government. As noted, more than 240 young Cambodians participated in the programs in Japan (ACF, 2016). The common objectives of these programs are to foster people-to-people relations, build soft infrastructure, and produce more human resources in all fields or sectors to help contribute to Cambodia’s long-term economic and sociocultural development. These programs have been seen as Japan’s cultural diplomacy to promote and develop its soft power in Cambodia.

Among all of the Japanese government-funded programs through its ODA, two most important and well-known programs among Cambodian government officials and general public are the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology (MEXT) or Monbukagakusho Scholarships, Young Leader’s Program (YLP), and the Japan Development Scholarship (JDS). Based on the report of the Japanese Embassy in Cambodia, the number of Cambodian MEXT scholars has remarkably and steadily increased over the last ten years. The number of recipients of such prestigious scholarships was only 18 in 2010, steadily increasing to a total of 38 in 2015 and to around 24 in 2016 for four scholarship categories: research students, undergraduate students, colleague of technology students, and specialized training college students (Japanese Embassy in Cambodia, 2017). As to both YLP and JDS, dozens of very potential and qualified candidates from Cambodian ministries and other public institutions are granted scholarships to pursue their higher education in Japan and help promote the bilateral relations.

Apart from the scholarships, the Japanese government and its agencies have offered more than 200 Cambodian students financial packages for their cultural, educational, technological, and sports exchange programs in Japan. Those programs include Teenage Ambassadors, Japan-East Asia Network of Exchange for Students and Youths (JENESYS), Information and Culture Exchange Program, Ship for Southeast Asian and Japanese Youth Program (SSEAYP) and are significant for Japan's long-term political, diplomatic and strategic interests. As Hidehisa Horinouchi, the current Japanese Ambassador to Cambodia, reiterated, the exchange programs served as a core driving force to strengthen long-term relations between students and countries.

Therefore, for promoting and enhancing its strategic relationship with Cambodia, Japan has to date provided millions of dollars for both scholarships and exchange programs in the hope that this can significantly contribute to cognitive and affective dimensions of Japan's soft power in Cambodia. According to the public opinion poll of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2016, the majority of Cambodian respondents voiced to have known and appreciated Japan's financial support on education. Most of them ranked Japan's ODA usefulness and effectiveness for the top, higher than China. The poll revealed that Japan was one of the most appreciated and thus trusted in Cambodia and in the Southeast Asian region.

4.4 Economic Diplomacy

Scholars have seen economy as one of soft power components. Mano (2016) and Johanson (2016) each empirically studied China's economic activities that assist in building its influence in some African countries. Jhee & Lee (2011), in addition, took Japan's economic growth and performance overseas to measure the affective dimension of its soft power. With its soft power promotion strategy in Southeast Asia at large and in Cambodia in particular, Japan's bilateral trade and investment with Cambodia have steadily increased over the last two decades, making it Cambodia's second largest economic partner after China.

As Chap (2010) noted, despite the fact that Japan's ODA continued to come into the Kingdom during the post-conflict period of the 1990s, Japan's foreign investment inflow was small. This

was mainly due to Cambodia’s political instability, unattractive market, and especially its weak investment rules. Despite existence of bilateral trade in the late 1990s, the data were not well recorded, and some sources of data reported both countries’ trade was not much in value (Chap, 2010). However, the bilateral trade volume gradually increased in the first half of the 2000s from US\$69.13 million in 2000 to US\$108.61 million in 2004 (Table 4.3). Since 2005, it was a sharp increase in trade in all sectors, totaling around US\$1.5 billion annually (Table 4.3).

Table 4.3 Cambodia-Japan Trade (In Million US Dollars)

Fiscal Year	Export to Japan	Import from Japan
1991	-	-
1992	-	-
1993	-	-
1994	-	-
1995	-	-
1996	-	-
1997	-	-
1998	-	-
1999	-	-
2000	10.74	58.39
2001	13.30	60.89
2002	18.86	63.82
2003	14.77	79.52
2004	25.04	83.57
2005	62.82	150.87
2006	34.07	129.60
2007	33.60	140.71
2008	32.14	114.13
2009	79.76	118.80
2010	89.45	156.47
2011	153.18	248.10
2012	184.21	239.80
2013	314.06	174.53
2014	344.88	263.96
2015	571.55	422.95
2016	827.22	528.27

Sources: The compiled data from the CDC and some data extracted from a book chapter of Chap Sotharith (2010). The 2000-2016 bilateral trade data from Cambodia’s Ministry of Commerce.

Table 4.4 Japan-Cambodia Investment (In Million US Dollars)

Fiscal Year	Japan's FDI Inflow to Cambodia	
1991	-	
1992	-	
1993	-	
1994	-	
1995	0.563	
1996	11.02	
1997	0.294	
1998	1.372	
1999	-	2.5
2000	0.225	
2001	-	
2002	2.19	
2003	-	
2004	2.17	
2005	-	
2006	10.69	
2007	113.08	
2008	7.83	
2009	5.50	
2010	11.25	
2011	74.50	
2012	265.35	
2013	77.91	
2014	67.08	
2015	58.88	
2016	820.08	

Sources: The 1994-2009 data of the CDC, cited from the chapter by Chap (2010). The 2009-2013 data from Mizuho Economic Outlook & Analysis (2014). The 2012-2016 FDI data from the CDC. The 1994-2002 unpublished data of Japan's FDIs in Cambodia from the Cambodian Investment Board.

In addition to the bilateral trade, investment has also played a significant role in “cognitive” dimension of Japan’s soft power in Cambodia. Japan’s investment in Cambodia was properly recorded, totaling US\$563,000 in 1995, two years after Cambodia’s postwar election. In 1997 during the political armed clashes in Cambodia, the investment dropped to US\$294,000. The

value fluctuated over the late 1990s and the early 2000s; some periodic investment data were not well recorded (Table 4.4). Nonetheless, the investment grew since 2006 and reached a total of US\$820.08 million in 2016, making Japan Cambodia's second largest investor.

4.5 Public Diplomacy

Another cognitive dimension of Japan's soft power in Cambodia is public diplomacy through mass media outlets to transform its wartime militarist image into pacifism in the postwar order. According to Kulanov (2007), McGray (2009) and Johnson (2015), the Japanese government launched its "Cool Japan" strategy to promote its "J-pop" and cartoonist culture Yano (2015) termed as "Kawaii diplomacy" to promote its soft power worldwide. To achieve that, a total of JPY37.5 billion was provided, of which JPY30 billion was from the Japanese government and the rest by 15 private Japanese corporations (Johnson, 2015). Despite its large financial support for its public diplomacy since the 1990s, Japan has only a few media outlets in Cambodia.

Among 600 printing media in Cambodia, there is only one Japanese-language newspaper – the Phnom Penh Press Neo – which was first launched and printed in late 2014 (Styllis, 2014). The paper is published, as the sister newspaper of the Yangon Press located in Myanmar, once per month. A total of 5,000 copies are printed and distributed to a wide range of places including restaurants, hotels, bars and others mainly in Phnom Penh and Cambodia's airports as the paper captures only business-based contents. It is found that the Japanese-language newspaper market is still narrow and its contents target only Japanese businesspeople. Besides, other printing papers including magazines, leaflets and the like are neither widely targeted nor distributed to various public and private institutions in Cambodia. Compared to China, Japan's printing media have been lagging behind to leverage its public propaganda in Cambodia.

As for TV channels, although there is no Japanese-language channel among Cambodia's public TV stations, the "Cool Japan" has been promoted through local TV channels. According to the 2016 poll of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 57 percent of Cambodian respondents

confirmed their knowledge about Japan through the TV (Table 4.5). In almost every public TV channel, Japanese anime, Kawaii cartoons, and ninja films are displayed and much viewed by most Cambodians. In addition, there are only a few Japanese-language channels on the cable TVs. The most popular of them is Nippon Hōsō Kyōkai (NHK) where Japanese news can be found. However, this channel is for Japanese nationals and those who study the language.

Table 4.5 Cambodia’s Perception Towards Japan’s Public Diplomacy

No.	Public Diplomacy of Japan	Percentage
1	Television	57%
2	Magazines and Books	25%
3	Radio	25%
4	Websites	42%
5	Blogs	15%
6	Mail magazines and online newsletters	15%
7	Facebook, Twitter and other social networks	43%
8	Video sharing websites e.g. You Tube	17%

Source: Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2016

In addition, based on the reports of Wagstaff (2009) and Maloy (2008), there was no radio channel relevant to Japanese cultural promotion. Much of information has been provided on regular radio channels in terms of Japanese products, Cambodia-Japan cooperation, as well as Japanese scholarships and exchange programs. The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs found in 2016 that 25 percent of Cambodians knew Japan through those radio channels (Table 4.5). Based on the same poll, the significant media outlets to promote Japan’s public diplomacy are social media and websites, each accounting for almost 43 percent. For this reason, the Japanese Embassy in Cambodia established its Facebook page and has regularly posted all pieces of such information as Japanese culture, educational programs, high-level bilateral cooperation in all fields, and many other important Japan-funded development projects in Cambodia.

In short, Japan has invested and projected much of its soft power in Cambodia especially since the 1990s through four key diplomatic aspects – aid, economic, cultural and public diplomacy.

With its tremendous financial support, promising economic benefits, growing cultural contacts, and its “Cool Japan” campaigns, Japan has also been in a significant position to develop its soft power but less influence on Cambodia’s foreign policy as explained in next chapters.

CHAPTER 5: QUANTITATIVE COMPARISON OF SOFT POWER OF CHINA AND JAPAN IN CAMBODIA

5.1 Introduction

Since the early 1990s, Joseph Nye's works and other sequent studies of soft power in different dimensions and countries have contributed to the growing understanding of the changing nature of power in the post-Cold War world order. As Nye (2004) noted, it is "better to be loved and feared" for a state to achieve its national interests. For Nye and other scholars, both hard and soft power are both important for foreign policy formation and implementation in this growing dynamic international relations. Despite its controversial and elusive definitions, soft power has been measured by using a variety of methods including (1) quantitative comparison of the soft power elements (Johanson, 2016; Lum et al., 2008; Schimdt, 2008); (2) qualitative comparison based on such intangible assets as political and cultural values (Chen, 2010; Dani, 2016); (3) public opinion polls or surveys to measure "attractiveness" or soft influence of one or more countries' dimensions of soft power (Jhee & Lee, 2011; Chu, 2011); and (4) a mixture of methods for inclusive understanding of soft power influence (Bouton & Holyk, 2011).

To measure soft power components of both China and Japan in Cambodia, this chapter aims to use both quantitative measurement and existing public opinion polls on normative and affective dimensions of soft power projected by these two major countries in Cambodia. The quantitative comparative method is particularly used based solely on the findings of aid, cultural, economic, and public diplomacy in the previous two chapters. In addition, the opinion polls conducted by Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2016 are applied to only cultural and public diplomacy in order to provide an inclusive understanding of soft power of Japan and China in Cambodia.


5.2 Comparing Aid Diplomacy of China and Japan

5.2.1 Comparing Grant Aid

Table 5.1 shows the trend of bilateral foreign aid provided by China and Japan for Cambodia since the 1991 Paris Peace Accords to restore political stability and build peace in Cambodia.

To compare this soft power component, it is crucial to divide the trend into three key periodical categories. First and foremost, the renaissance of official foreign aid began after the end of the postwar election in 1993. Japan and China pledged thousands of U.S. dollars to assist Cambodia in rebuilding and rehabilitating its nation. Japan’s ODA was significantly increased in 1996, despite its small drop in late 1998, reaching US\$125.88 million in 2003. However, in its initial stage of rebuilding its post-Cold War bilateral tie with Cambodia, China offered an average of only US\$7 million over the first 10 years. Therefore, this made Japan Cambodia’s first largest aid donor earning much of the Cambodian government’s strategic trust (Leang, 2017).

Figure 5.1 Aid of China and Japan in Cambodia (In Million US Dollars)



Second, at the beginning of 2010, both Japan and China steadily provided Cambodia with foreign aid until late 2011 before Cambodia was rotated to hold its chairmanship of ASEAN. During this period, Japan’s ODA amounted about US\$930.75 million with an average of ten percent annual growth rate. To further enhance its strategic trust and reward Cambodia to adopt “One-China Policy,” China, on the other hand, pledged a total of US\$921.11 million worth of grant aid for Cambodia. This figure presented a more than 100 times increase in China’s grant aid between 2003 to 2011. As some scholars argued, this large amount of aid marked the


milestone of deep and comprehensive cooperation between Cambodia and China after both upgraded their bilateral tie to a comprehensive strategic partnership in 2010 (Var & Po, 2017).

Last but not least, from 2012 to 2016, there were opposite trends between China's and Japan's foreign aid to Cambodia. The significant drop in Japan's ODA in 2012 was a result of Cambodia's political support for China's long-standing claim over the South China Sea and its refusal to include the disputes in the Joint Communiqué at the 45th ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting in Phnom Penh (Chong, 2017). This was the first time for ASEAN since its inception in 1967 not to issue a joint statement. As Chong (2017) noted, China pleased Cambodia with US\$600 million, among which US\$460.70 million was its ODA. In addition, to contain China's soft power influence, in 2013, Japan also enhanced its bilateral relationship with a "strategic partnership" with and pledged Cambodia over US\$500 million. This made a slight drop in China's grant aid from 2013 to 2015. However, in 2016, during his two-day official visit to Cambodia, Chinese President Xi Jinping signed thirty-one trade agreements, cancelled US\$89 million debt, and pledged millions of other grant aid for Cambodia (Reuter, 2016).

5.2.2 Comparing Technical Assistance

In addition to its growing grant aid, since 1997, China's technical assistance on development projects remains bigger than those of Japan despite its slight declines in last two years. To date, the total of aid allocated by China for technical development projects in Cambodia was around US\$759.33 million (Figure 5.2). Japan's assistance was estimated to be around US\$403.09 million for technical development projects in Cambodia. In terms of the project number, China has thus far carried out 40 mega-development projects ranging from physical infrastructure construction, irrigation, transportation, training centers, to modern sport stadium (Appendix 1). Despite its smaller financial assistance in value than that from China, Japan has distributed the funds to 120 development projects that focus more on not only physical infrastructure, but also good governance, environmental protection, mine clearance, gender equality and sustainable development through capability building and human resources development (Appendix 2).

Figure 5.2: Project Technical Assistance of China and Japan in Cambodia



Much of China’s technical assistance has been centered on the state-to-state or government-to-government and specifically the military-to-military cooperation in accordance with the 2010 “Cambodia-China comprehensive strategic cooperation.” Since the beginning of 2010, China’s technical assistance has been a significantly growing channel of military assistance to Cambodia. To illustrate, China has provided military training to at least 200 cadets each year, weapons and equipment, military exercises, as well as many other facilities. For Japan, thus far its technical assistance for military training has only been given in civil engineering under the auspices of the UN PKO. Therefore, according to the 2016 opinion poll of Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, most of Cambodians perceived that Japan’s ODA including its technical assistance promoted peace, economic growth, and long-term development in Cambodia.


5.3 Comparing Cultural Diplomacy of China and Japan

5.3.1 Comparing Ethnic Chinese and Japanese

The number of the ethnic Chinese living in Cambodia increased significantly after the end of the Vietnamese occupation in 1989 and signing of the Paris Peace Accords in 1991. As Kiernan (1990) noted, between the 1950s and the 1960s, the number of Chinese was 425,000, of whom

around 200,000 survived the Pol Pot regime. In the 1980s during the third Indochina War, estimated 61,400 Chinese remained by 1984 (Ross, 1987). The figure sharply increased, accounting for three percent of Cambodia’s population in the 1990s (Verver, 2012) and for five percent in the 2010s based on the author’s fieldwork interviews with a few scholars in China. For Japanese expats in Cambodia, as recorded, there were between 1,000 and 1,479 Japanese in the early 2010s. Based on the data of Japan’s Embassy in Cambodia, there were around 2,300 Japanese in Cambodia in 2016, while around 5,000 to 6,000 Japanese are believed to be currently living, working and running businesses in Cambodia.

Figure 5.3: Ethnic Chinese and Japanese in Cambodia



Heng (2012), Ciorciari (2013) and Verver (2012) also argue that some Chinese Cambodian descendants, who are economic tycoons and/or political elites, are royal and close to the current top Cambodian leaders in both “Chinese capitalism” and “patron-clientelism.” In such system, those powerful Chinese Cambodian elites can somewhat influence Cambodia’s policy decision making to assure their economic gains in exchange for “royalty” and political support for their leaders (Ciorciari, 2013). Japanese nationals, on the other hands, have business-oriented goals, seeking more business opportunities in Cambodia’s emerging market. Based on the interviews, it was found that the political connection between the Japanese expats and Cambodia’s political leaders was neither close nor “personal”. Therefore, as both Ciorciari (2013) and Kurlantzick

(2008) concluded, China's soft power through its ethnic minority or Chinese Cambodians, who are Chinese nationalist, is effective to influence Cambodia's domestic and foreign policies.

5.3.2 Comparing Schools and Languages

In terms of educational institutions, Chinese-language schools mushroomed in Cambodia, up from 93 in late 1930 to 231 in 1970. After the US-backed coup d'état and the Khmer Rouge rule in the 1970s, only 69 schools reopened in the 1980s. In the 2010s, there were 56 Chinese-language schools, most of which were located in Phnom Penh, receiving hundreds of thousands of students each year (Heng, 2012). However, based on the interviews with RUPP lecturers, there are dozens of Japanese-language schools, and the number is expected to further grow in the next few years owing to the increasing number of Japanese investment in Cambodia and the intensive labor shortage in Japan. Despite this remarkable rise, it has been perceived that the Chinese-language schools remain predominant and linguistically significant for most of Cambodians, especially those who are Chinese decedents residing in Cambodia, amidst the fast-track growth of Japan's and China's investment and trade as their soft power competition in Cambodia (Table 5.1).

Equally important, to effectively influence Cambodia through its language, China has launched a few Chinese-language classes for both Cambodian government officials and armed forces at the Royal Academy of Cambodia (RAC) and Cambodia's Ministry of National Defense. This program has been funded by the Chinese government and operated by the Confucius Institute. It is aimed at promoting Chinese culture, propagating Chinese foreign policy and strengthening the government-to-government cooperation. As part of its language teaching, China has pledged financial and technical support to train about 200 Cambodian cadets each year in both Cambodia and China. Japan has, on the other hand, funded its agencies, both JICA-Cambodia and the Cambodia-Japan Cooperation Center (CJCC), on a number of projects, most of which are targeting to promote Japanese culture, businesses and entrepreneurship. Therefore, it has been viewed that China's approach is more political in nature than that of Japan in Cambodia.

Table 5.1: Cambodia’s Perception Towards Popular Languages

No.	Popular Language For Learning	Cambodia’s Perception (%)
1	Chinese	59%
2	Japanese	44%
3	Korean	12%
4	Arabic	21%
5	Spanish	04%
6	Russian	06%
7	Others	03%

Source: Opinion Poll of Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2016

5.3.3 Comparing Scholarships and Exchange Programs

Both China and Japan have granted Cambodia hundreds of scholarships and short-term exchange programs each year. Since the Paris Peace Accords in 1991, Japan’s scholarships were reported to be approximately 1,000 (ACF, 2016), whereas the number of China’s financial aid for education is twice larger, reaching more than 2,000 scholarships by the end of 2016 (Xinhua, 2017). In addition, hundreds of other exchange programs are annually offered by the Chinese government to promote the so-called “heart-to-heart” relationship through cultural understanding and capacity building. Similarly, despite its relatively smaller number, Japan’s grant aid for exchange programs cover a variety of issues ranging from peace promotion to technical and professional capacity development.

Moreover, according to the Student Survey conducted by the Cambodian Students Association in Japan (CSAJ) in 2018, there are approximately 500 Cambodians who are currently studying in Japan. The majority of them have obtained both public and private scholarships in terms of tuition fees reduction or/and monthly allowances. Similarly, it is estimated that over 1,000 Cambodian students are now educated in China, receiving only Chinese government’s scholarships. Since 2016, after Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Cambodia and pledged

additional 500 scholarships for Cambodia (Reuter, 2016), the number of Cambodian students going to study in China has significantly increased and is many times larger than the number of Cambodians who study in Japan.

5.4 Comparing Economic Diplomacy of China and Japan

Economic growth is another “affective” component of soft power. Both China and Japan, therefore, have significantly increased their trade volumes in Cambodia for over two decades. Compared to Japan, China’s trade is far larger (Figure 5.4). By 2016, it valued a total of almost US\$5 billion, up from around US\$20 million in 1993. China’s main trade items with Cambodia are automobiles, motorcycles, agricultural fertilizers, cigarettes, construction and other fabric materials for thousands of garment factories in Cambodia. Cambodia’s export to China are agricultural products including from paddy rice, rubber, palm oil and cashew nuts. Japan’s trade, however, only amounted around US\$1.37 billion in 2016 (Figure 5.4). Most of Japan’s export trade items to Cambodia are automobiles, electronic devices, machinery, beef, steel and medicines. Thus, taking the trade value in consideration, China’s trade accounted for nearly 30 percent of Cambodia’s total trade volume over the last two decades.

Moreover, since the 1990s, both countries’ investments in Cambodia have significantly grown thanks to Cambodia’s low labor cost and its investment policies. Over the last 25 years, China’s investment totaled almost US\$6.7 billion, while Japan’s investment amounted US\$1.6 billion. China has so far invested mostly in low skilled, labor-intensive, and relatively small scale manufacturing, high-tech industries, real estate, finance, agriculture, tourism, health care, casino among others. About 1,500 registered Japanese companies, on the other hand, have invested also in such labor-intensive industries as garment and footwear, manufacture, health care, agriculture, supercenters, real estates, etc. Given their similar investment sectors, it is also believed the two countries are competing to project its economic diplomacy in Cambodia.

Figure 5.4 Trade of China and Japan in Cambodia (In Million US Dollars)





Figure 5.5 Investment of China and Japan in Cambodia (In Million US Dollars)



5.5 Comparing Public Diplomacy of China and Japan

In quantitative terms, Japan's media outlets have lagged behind those of China, ranging from traditional printing media to modern social networks. There are a number of Chinese-language newspapers, among which three are printed daily, sold and delivered to every corner of Cambodia from public to private institutions. Hundreds of other printing media, including magazines, leaflets and books, are sold and found in most bookstores, libraries, pubs, and restaurants in Cambodia. For Japan, its printing media remain limited. There is only a monthly Japanese-language newspaper, and other traditional media are used for specific and apolitical purposes such as promoting businesses, entrepreneurship, culture and scholarships.

Moreover, China has owned a few radio programs and 20 Chinese-language cable TV channels with more than 50,000 subscribers particularly in Phnom Penh (Kea, 2008). In 2018, the Chinese state-owned NICE corporation also launched its first public TV channel in 2017 for the purpose of promoting Sino-Cambodian culture and providing China-related information. Many popular online news and websites, such as Fresh News, which is believed to be affiliated with and close to the Cambodian government, are also sponsored by China to further promote Chinese culture and image. For Japan, there are only a few Japanese-language cable TV channels. Despite the absence of its radio programs and public TV channels in Cambodia, Japan has effectively promoted its "Cool Japan" or "Kawaii diplomacy" through its cartoons or anime, ninja films among others. In addition, Japan has rather enhanced its online networks, through which the majority of Cambodians have known both Japan's society and culture.

In accordance with the 2016 opinion poll by Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China's attractiveness is higher than Japan and many other countries. China accounted for 58 percent; Japan for 43 percent; Indonesia for 13 percent; the United States, the United Kingdom and France each for 12 percent, and the rest combined only for 52 percent (Table 5.2). The number of media outlets of a country is associated with its attractiveness through its public diplomacy. Therefore, based on the poll, it is believed that China's tremendous financial investment on

promoting its public diplomacy through all sorts of media outlets in Cambodia, both traditional and modern, contribute to its positive image.

Table 5.2: Cambodia’s Perception Towards Countries’ Attractiveness

No.	Countries	Cambodian Perception (%)
1	China	58%
2	Japan	43%
3	South Korea	11%
4	The United States of America	12%
5	The United Kingdom	12%
6	France	12%
7	Germany	08%
8	Australia	09%
9	Canada	07%
10	Indonesia	13%
11	South Africa	08%
12	Brazil	09%

Source: Opinion Poll of Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2016

Moreover, based on a comparison model of Dani Madrid-Morales (2016) as shown in Table 5.3, China’s news broadcasting has been more political in nature. As Dani noted, China’s media are aimed at serving its concrete political interests of preserving the political status quo of bonding with, supporting and enhancing current political leaders with whom Beijing has enjoyed strategic and special preferential treatments. Through its news coverages, China has assisted Cambodia and its ruling Cambodia’s People Party (CPP) with “no-strings attached” and “unconditioned” foreign aid for Cambodia’s economic development. On the other hand, Japan’s news coverages have centered on businesses, trade, ODA, development projects, and do not explicitly illustrate Japan’s political stance or position to support the ruling CPP.

As Dani (2016) and Wu (2012) argued, China’s actions in Cambodia and other countries in regards to the government-affiliated and funded media outlets need to be understood as part of its renewed public diplomacy strategy in search for promoting soft power. Wu (2012) explained

that China had found ways to promote itself against the West’s anti-Chinese sentiment and narratives through mass media. China has promoted its positive images in three languages – Khmer, Chinese and English. On the other hand, Japan weighs its key strategy by focusing on effectiveness and efficiency of its businesses, ODA, and projects that touch the heart of the Cambodians at large. Japan’s media outlets indeed broadcast also in those three languages.

Table 5.3: Comparison of Media Involvement of China and Japan in Cambodia


No.	Locus of Explanation	China	Japan
1	Number of Media Outlets	Growing since 1990s, 20 cable TV channels, one public TV channels, at least three daily Chinese-language newspaper, and many other online news, blogs, pages and websites.	Growing slower since 1990s, a few Japan-language cable TV channels, one monthly Japanese-language newspaper, and some other online outlets
2	Market expansion and diversification	Owning a public TV channel, a public radio program, dozens of newspapers and a few online media outlets	Owning a monthly newspaper and other printing media outlets
3	Ideology and Political Alignment	Propagating political news, supporting the current Cambodia’s People Party, and publicizing news related to China’s aid and development projects	Promoting business-oriented news, supporting the government-to-government cooperation, and publicizing Japan’s development projects
4	Counterhegemonic Narrative	Broadcasting in Chinese, English and Khmer	Broadcasting Japanese, English and Khmer
5	Cultural Reproduction	Broadcasting a series of cultural arts and activities	Broadcasting a series of cultural arts and activities

Both China’s and Japan’s media outlets not just broadcast their films, music, cartoons and other documentaries, but also their political and cultural values that are associated with practical skills (Dani, 2016). On those media, the two countries launch a series of cultural arts and other activities ranging from traditional dances to modern songs to project an image that they are a

civilized, supportive, pacifist and responsible friend and partner for mutual benefits and development. Therefore, with its more numerous media outlets, China has been playing more significant roles in promoting its soft power in Cambodia.

In short, based on the quantitative comparative method in terms of aid, cultural, economic and public diplomacy, China has more soft power influence on Cambodia (Figure 5.6). It is crystal clear that since the early 1990s, China has steadily and significantly used tremendous and generous financial packages to buy the heart of Cambodia, particularly of its long-standing political leaders. Japan, on the other hand, has offered its ODA over the last 20 years in pursuit of Cambodia’s sustainable development and its political agenda of strategically balancing or counterweighing China’s soft power influence in Cambodia and in the wider region. In terms of culture and public diplomacy, China has owned more TV channels, radio programs, printing media outlets, scholarships, exchange programs, as well as Chinese-language schools. In the economic terms, China since the early 2010s has remained Cambodia’s largest and closest trader and investor outmatching Japan and any other countries in the region and the world.

Figure 5.6: Index Comparison of China’s and Japan’s Soft Power in Cambodia



Note: AD: Aid Diplomacy; CD: Cultural Diplomacy; ED: Economic Diplomacy; PD: Public Diplomacy

CHAPTER 6: COMPARING SOFT POWER INFLUENCE OF JAPAN AND CHINA ON CAMBODIA'S FOREIGN POLICY

6.1 Introduction

As a small state in Southeast Asia, Cambodia has adopted its foreign policy that is grounded in geopolitics with its neighbors, historical memories of anti-colonialism/imperialism, economic condition and nationalism. As stipulated in its modern constitution, Cambodia's foreign policy is centered on three key principles such as "neutrality, non-alliance and peaceful co-existence" (Cambodian Constitution, 1993). Since the postwar 1990s, the stated "neutrality" and "non-alliance" turned Cambodia to be the closest "ally" and thus in "more favor" of China in disguise due to Cambodia's strong political support for China at both regional and international levels (Chong, 2017). For Japan, maintaining "healthy" bilateral relations with Cambodia serves as a counterweight to China's geostrategic and geopolitical influence in the country and the wider Southeast Asia region. Therefore, instead of using hard power instruments, Japan has thus far opted for soft power diplomacy to limit China's growing influence in Cambodia.

Moreover, Cambodia's foreign policy has been more "reactive" in response to more proactive foreign policies of two major countries in the region – both China and Japan (Chheang, 2014). Many existing studies argue that Cambodia has more positively reacted to China rather than Japan as a result of China's growing soft power projection. Kurlantzick (2007) illustrated that Cambodia fell into China's strategic "charm offensive" or soft power diplomacy influencing Cambodia's foreign policy. Heng (2012), in addition, added that Cambodia was trapped in China's strategic "string of pearls" in Southeast Asia through its soft power. Ciorciari (2013) also stressed on China-Cambodia "patron-client relationship" as a result of China's massive financial aid and investment for Cambodia's strategic and political support.

Since the 1990s, China has had much soft power in Cambodia, ranging from its tremendous financial incentives to its political propaganda through public media outlets. This chapter aims to look further at a specific case study to analytically and inclusively understand whether China

or Japan has projected more soft power influence on Cambodia's foreign policy. The case study of Cambodia's policy on the South China Sea dispute and especially its 2012 chairmanship of the 20th ASEAN Summit in Phnom Penh analyzes and scrutinizes foreign policy objectives of China and Japan to find out whether or not their initial objectives were actually achieved, and how much Cambodia's foreign policy shifted in reaction to these two major countries.

Moreover, the chapter aims further to find out significant rationales behind Cambodia's support of China and Japan as a consequence of both cognitive and affective dimensions of their soft power since the 1990s. Using both liberal/neo-liberal and constructivist schools of thought, the chapter utilizes Webber & Smith (2002)'s foreign policy arena focusing on three significant levels for foreign policy analysis: international, governmental and domestic. These three levels of analysis are important for explaining why Cambodia has supported China more than Japan, focusing on four key diplomatic aspects of their soft power in Cambodia.

6.2 Comparing Soft Power Influence on Cambodia's Foreign Policy

6.2.1 Selection Criteria of Case Study

Over the last two decades, China has possessed more soft power in Cambodia as measured quantitatively in terms of aid, cultural, economic and public diplomacy. In order to further validate the argument, it is useful to look at a specific case study to examine whether China or Japan has effectively projected its soft power to influence Cambodia's foreign policy. This session analyzes Cambodia's policy on the South China Seas dispute and its controversial 2012 ASEAN chairmanship in handling such dispute with other ASEAN members in particular.

The selection criteria for the case study include: both China and Japan have had (1) substantial bilateral relations with Cambodia; (2) direct or indirect involvement in the selected case; and (3) concerns and national interests in the said case. Since 1990, both China and Japan have developed and further advanced their bilateral relations with Cambodia to the "strategic level" in 2010 and 2013 respectively. As a consequence of this substantial bilateral ties, both Japan and China have so far pledged billions of foreign aid and technical assistance contributing to

Cambodia's rehabilitation, peace and long-term development. In addition, both countries have strengthened their economic cooperation with Cambodia, making them become Cambodia's top two traders and investors, together reaching a total of around US\$15 billion of both trade and investment volumes by the end of 2016. These close strategic and economic relations are followed by frequent political and cultural exchanges among leaders and people and broadcast through both traditional and modern media outlets in Cambodia.

Second, both China and Japan have either direct or indirect engagement in the selected case. Their direct engagement is defined by their actual active or/and proactive "participation" in the case. For instance, China's direct engagement in the South China Sea disputes is seen through its assertive and non-negotiable claim of most of maritime territories and overlapping exclusive economic zones (EEZs), regarded as one of China's "core interests." Japan, on the other hand, has been seen as an indirect actor in the disputes, whose geostrategic and geo-economic interest would be immensely affected if China owns the so-called nine-dashed line area and the sea lanes inside it. Thus, in this case, Cambodia's foreign policy making in the early 2010s was at a critical juncture in response to foreign policies of these two major countries, which have politically, economically and culturally projected their soft power in Cambodia since 1990.

Third, in the aforementioned case study, both concerns and interests of China and Japan are taken into account. They comprise not only political, strategic, economic but also socio-cultural considerations for their direct and/or indirect engagement in the case. In addition, the concerns include risk or threat perceptions of China and Japan in such areas as geopolitical, geostrategic and economic conditions that are seen to undermine their foreign policy goals.

6.2.2 Case Study: Cambodia's Policy on the South China Sea Dispute

6.2.2.1 Cambodia's 2012 ASEAN Chairmanship

As significant semiannual meetings among heads of states and governments, ASEAN summits are organized to discuss a wide range of regional and global issues and to find consensus-based

solutions to tackle regional problems. As the ASEAN's youngest member, Cambodia accepted its role to hold the ASEAN chairmanship in its capital city of Phnom Penh and promised to move ASEAN forward to achieve its stipulated goal of materializing the ASEAN Community by 2015 [and beyond] (Chheang, 2012). As stated by Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen prior to the summit, Cambodia would hold a "neutral" position to facilitate and mediate all pressing regional and global concerns. He also reaffirmed Cambodia's significant ASEAN membership and reiterated to strengthen Cambodia's role in the regional grouping. As some scholars argued, the successes of Cambodia in chairing the ASEAN summits in 2012 amidst its growing border conflicts with Thailand and tensions in the South China Sea would weigh its bidding power to be one of the rotating non-permanent members of the UN Security Council (Chheang, 2012).

In his opening remark at the 20th ASEAN Summit in 2012, Prime Minister Hun Sen mentioned that ASEAN had to strengthen its joint commitment, determination, and cooperation among its people and governments to achieve the 2015 ASEAN Community as a "cohesive family, living in political security, economic, and socio-cultural harmony, and which is rules-based, peaceful and economically strong" (ASEAN, 2012). Nonetheless, at the 45th ASEAN Ministers Meeting on the sideline of the April ASEAN summit, Cambodia refused to include the South China Sea disputes with reference to China in ASEAN's traditional Joint Communiqué or joint statement. Cambodia's failure as the ASEAN chair to issue such statement was the first such instance since ASEAN's inception in 1967. All of the SCS claimant states' needs to use a multilateral approach and include the Scarborough Shoal tensions in the joint communiqué were denied and frustrated by former Cambodian Foreign Minister Hor Namhong (BBC, 2012).

As former Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda addressed during the 180th session at the Diet in January 2012, Japan was committed to securing "freedom of navigation" in the Asia Pacific region as a geostrategic sea lane for both Japan's "security reassurance" and "economic revival" (Noda, 2012). He also stressed that he held a series of bilateral negotiations and talks with the Chinese counterpart to nudge China to adhere to the principles of the United Nations

Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and strengthen Japan's "constructive" roles in reassuring freedom of shipping and transiting across the maritime routes including both East and South China Sea. As Aizawa (2014) argued, despite its non-claimant-state status, Japan's bolder and proactive approach was to secure its economic interests as approximately 40 percent of Japan's total maritime trade and 95 percent of its total energy supplies transit across the South China Sea. Moreover, as Nirmala (2016) argued, China's "Blue Water Navy" strategy, its military modernization and growing assertiveness in the South China Sea, combined with both historical animosity and geostrategic proximity, would affect Japan's security interests in the long run. Therefore, Japan demonstrated its explicit strategy to help Southeast Asian littoral states pursue a legal and multilateral approach by claiming that the South China Sea issue was a common regional challenge or threat.

However, the failure of Cambodia as the 2012 ASEAN chair to issue a joint statement not only upset Japan, but also illustrated the Kingdom's growing political and strategic support of China over the last two decades since 1992 (Chong, 2017). Despite similarly large aid and trade of China and Japan as their soft power components or tools, China remained more significant in Cambodia's strategic calculation owing to the "no-strings attached" financial incentives to support the regime survival (Chong, 2017). In addition, Ciorciari (2013) argued that this was a result of China's growing soft power influence on Cambodia's foreign policy decision making in order to achieve its desired objectives and undermine the others including Japan.

6.2.2.1.1 China's Foreign Policy Objectives in Southeast Asia

Since the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, China has adopted its foreign policy that is consistent and accommodative to the postwar liberal world order. It regards a stable security environment as a driving force for strengthening its fast-track economic growth by adopting a concept of "harmonious worldview", Five Principles of Peaceful-Coexistence, and policy guidance of "good neighbor diplomacy" to counter the existing perception of "China threat". In addition, because of its limited military capacity against the West, China has centered its

foreign policy on its soft power through aid, cultural, economic and public diplomatic aspects to demonstrate that its rapid rise or “[later] development” is peaceful (Sun, 2012). For China, its foreign policy objectives towards the Southeast Asian region are:

(1) keep stable political and security environment, particularly on China’s periphery, that allows China’s economic growth to continue; (2) maintain and expand trade route in Southeast Asia; (3) gain access to regional energy resources and raw materials; (4) develop trade relationship for both economic and political purposes; (5) isolate Taiwan through the pursuit of a policy China calls “using all economic and diplomatic resources to reward countries that are willing to isolate Taiwan”; and (6) influence the region to defeat perceived attempt at strategic encirclement or containment (Cheunboran, 2009).

Accorded a full ASEAN Dialogue Partner status in 1996, China pledged both economic aid and loans to some of the ASEAN countries to deal with the Asian financial crisis in 1997 and thus enhanced bilateral ties with those countries. As argued by Tsai et al. (2011), China’s response was to ensure the stable regional political, security and economic environment conducive to accelerating its economic growth. China advocated a series of regional economic cooperation mechanisms including the CAFTA, ASEAN+3, and other frameworks to help China continue its economic development. As Sun (2012) argued, to achieve political-economic objectives and especially its “One-China” policy, China has aimed to project its soft power elements through its over US\$300 billion investment and trade with ASEAN.

In 2003, China proposed the “peaceful rise” guidance for its foreign policy to illustrate that its perception as a threat to the region was “illusory.” Such term was first coined by influential Chinese Vice-President of the Chinese Communist Party School, Zheng Bijiang (Sun, 2012). Since the term “rise” still bears the sense of “forcefulness” or “use of force”, it was changed to “peaceful development” as stipulated in China’s 2015 White Paper. To defeat the threat perception after the 1989 Tiananmen Massacre, China adopted proactive multilateral and

bilateral trade policies; supported regional political and security initiatives such as the ARF and the EAS; as well as expanded its cultural and public diplomatic cooperation. As addressed by former Chinese President Hu Jintao, China aimed to develop a “harmonious” region by adopting multilateral diplomacy, promoting stable and harmonious environment, as well as enhancing cultural connectivity (Tsai et al., 2011).

However, despite its stipulated “desire for long-term peace” and “peaceful development” in the 1998 and 2005 White Papers respectively, China reserved three significant strategic objectives: (1) reduce “great power influence” in Southeast Asia, especially that of the United States; (2) creating a “strategic buffer zone” made of friendly and close ASEAN countries; as well as (3) protecting the non-negotiable and undeniable sovereignty of China in the South China Sea (Tsai et al., 2011). With these objectives, China made a strategic calculation to sign the DOC in 2002 with ASEAN to build China-ASEAN strategic trust and promote its “peaceful rise.”

In a series of growing maritime territorial confrontation and claims of four ASEAN states since the early 2010s, China announced its firm position that it historically and justifiably possessed sovereignty over its “nine-dashed line” area in the South China Sea. In 2010, at the sideline of the regional conference in Vietnam, the U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced that the United States confirmed its interests in “freedom of navigation” in the South China Sea to access Asia’s commons in accordance with the international laws (Writers, 2010). Amidst these growing tensions and the U.S. engagement in the region, Cambodia’s ASEAN chairmanship in 2012 became China’s testing ground to reaffirm the effectiveness of its soft power diplomacy to influence Cambodia’s foreign policy in the regional context.

6.2.2.1.2 Japan’s Foreign Policy in Southeast Asia

Since the postwar 1950s, it was perceived that Japan’s aid and investment to Southeast Asia were forms of its grand strategy to regain control over the region. As Tang (2013) noted, some countries feared “economic dependency” on Japan as a new strategic paradigm of Tokyo

replacing military occupation by Japan from early 1940 to 1945. Many existing studies argued that bilateral Japan-ASEAN relations was strengthened in 1977 when the former Japanese Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda stated its regional foreign policy to:

- (1) Promote its pacifism and reject its role of military power;
- (2) consolidate mutual confidence and trust based on the so-called “heart-to-heart” understanding; and
- (3) promote an equal partnership between Japan and ASEAN member states and contribute to peace and prosperity throughout the Southeast Asian region (Sudo, 2002).

Japan’s reassurance of “no remilitarization” and its determination for “heart-to-heart” relations based on equal relationship or partnership for regional peace and resilience contributed to strategic trust and confidence building. In the 1980s, based on both the “Plaza Agreement” and the “flying geese” economic pattern, Japan appreciated its national currency and increased its production ties with Southeast Asia in search for low production costs. This helped Japan reconstruct its postwar policy to strengthen its economic, political and diplomatic relations with the Southeast Asian countries. As Sudo (2002) argued, in 1989, Japanese Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita made another improvement in the bilateral ties with ASEAN countries by reaffirming Japan’s foreign policy objectives that also touched upon long-term rural and human resources development to:

- (1) Commit to non-military roles in international community;
- (2) promote Japan’s political roles to help maintain world peace and commensurate its status [an equal status or partnership with ASEAN and its member states] in the community of nations; and
- (3) develop four areas for economic development, such as rural development, energy resources, human resources, and small-and-medium sized enterprises (Sudo, 2002).

In the 1980s, Japan’s ODA was increased to assist the regional developing countries in social-cultural and economic resilience. However, in 1997 after the political armed crashes in Phnom

Penh, Japan reassessed its ODA effectiveness in particular and its foreign policy at large at the time Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto announced his foreign policy objectives towards the Southeast Asian region to:

(1) Promote regional political and security dialogues among the countries of the region to strengthen the Asia-Pacific peace and stability and think about future vision of the regional security; (2) continue Japan's efforts to enhance openness of the Asia-Pacific economy to promote dynamic regional economic development; (3) promote proactive efforts to tackle such tasks to humankind as promote democratization, development and environmental conservation; and (4) build regional peace and prosperity (Sudo, 2002).

The so-called 1997 Hashimoto Doctrine contributed to the advancement of Japan's bilateral tie with the ASEAN-five together with China to lift ASEAN out of the 1997 Asian financial crisis. With its stipulated foreign policy objectives, Japan also shifted its interests to weigh regional security cooperation and promotion of liberal democratic political system, which made CLMV countries turn to China. As Tang (2013) argued, to counter China's rise in its soft power, Japan resumed to pledge million dollars of ODA and enhance stagnated economic growth of Japan. Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda addressed his political remarks at the 180th session of the Diet on Tuesday, 24 January 2012. Japan under Noda's leadership aimed to:

(1) Consolidate mutual confidence and trust based on the so-called "heart-to-heart" understanding; (2) regaining Japan's economic competitiveness and reviving economic growth; (3) securing freedom of navigation for trade transiting; (4) promoting universal values of freedom, democracy, and the rule of law; (5) promoting rule-based order and multilateralism; and (6) advancing people-to-people exchanges (Noda, 2012).

At the height of both confrontation and standoff in the South China Sea, Prime Minister Noda's foreign policy was explicitly announced to secure "freedom of navigation" and "freedom of

flight” for ensuring its free flow of trade and energy resources across the South China Sea. In addition, owing to China’s growing assertive and aggressive behavior in the maritime disputes, smaller ASEAN countries lacked competitive military capabilities and security mechanism. As Nirmala (2016) stated, Japan with its regional foreign policy would prevent China’s unilateral military actions that would alter the status quo of the South China Sea by promoting the rules-based multilateralism, supporting those countries’ security capacity building, and urging all of the conflicting parties to cooperate and comply with the legal principles of the UNCLOS.

6.2.2.1.3 Cambodia’s Foreign Policy

As a newly independent state in Southeast Asia, Cambodia experienced domestic and regional conflicts as a consequence of geographical proximity to Vietnam and Thailand, nationalism, historical memories of anti-colonialism and imperialism, as well as ideological confrontations. After the end of the Cold War, Cambodia adopted a new constitution stipulating six principles for both formulating and implementing its foreign policy in Article 53:

- (1) Adopt a policy of permanent neutrality and non-alignment;
- (2) follow a policy of peaceful co-existence with its neighbors and with all other countries;
- (3) not invade any country, nor interfere in any other country’s internal affairs, directly or indirectly, and shall solve any problem peacefully with due respect for mutual interest;
- (4) not join in any military alliance or military pact which is incompatible with its policy of neutrality;
- (5) not permit any foreign military base on its territory or have its own military base abroad, except within the framework of a United Nations request;
- (6) reserve the right to receive foreign assistance in military equipment, armaments, ammunition, in training of its armed forces, and other assistance for self-defense, to maintain public order, and security within its territory (Cambodian Constitution’s Article 53, 1993, p.18-19).

As Chong (2017) argued, Cambodia’s politics and its foreign policy during the 2012 ASEAN Chairmanship were in “more favor” of China as a consequence of its soft power-driven political

support for Beijing. Cambodia indeed refused to discuss any point about the South China Sea with reference to China. Cambodian Foreign Minister Hor Namhong insisted not to approve the Philippines’ request to put the Scarborough Shoal confrontation and other member states’ demand to address ASEAN as whole to urge China to dissolve the SCS disputes through the multilateral security frameworks (BBC, 2012). Therefore, two significant shifts in both China’s and Japan’s foreign policy objectives are illustrated in Table 6.1 below.

Table 6.1 Comparing Initial and Achieved Foreign Policy Objectives

Countries	Initial Objectives ^(a)	Achieved Objectives ^(b)
China	Accessing to regional trade routes for transit and shipping	Accessing to the SCS and Cambodia’s sea ports for trade
	Promoting free trade for politico-economic purposes	Increasing trade in Cambodia
	Promoting “One-China” policy	Adhering to “One-China” policy over the recognition of Taiwan
	Maintaining its territorial sovereignty in the South China Sea	Supporting China’s claims
	Insisting to bilateral-based solution to the SCS disputes	Supporting bilateral approach
	Promoting China’s peaceful rise or development	Praising China’s peaceful rise
Japan	Promotion of universal values: freedom, democracy, human rights	Cambodia still adopting a variant authoritarianism (semi-democracy)
	Protecting freedom of navigation through the South China Sea	Supporting China’s claims
	Insisting to multilateral-based solution to the disputes under auspices of ASEAN	Cambodia insisting to resolve the SCS disputes on bilateral basis
	Reviving economic growth through trade	Increasing trade in Cambodia
	Strengthening cultural relations and people-to-people connectivity	Increasing cultural exchanges

Note: ^(a) Initial foreign policy objectives of China/Japan; ^(b) Their achieved objectives from Cambodia

It is worth noticing that prior to the host of the April ASEAN summit in Cambodia, Japanese Prime Minister Noda stressed the issue of the South China Sea as “common concerns” for both

ASEAN and the international community as it affected security and economic stability (Szep & Pomfret, 2012). Noda's statement implies that to strengthen its centrality in tackling regional issues, ASEAN and especially Cambodia as this year's chairman regarded the South China Sea issue as a "common concern" for the grouping to address multilaterally to ensure freedom and openness of the sea lanes. Yet, with its chairing power, Cambodia refused such multilateral-based approach and reiterated to not include any phrase or statement related to freedom of navigation in the South China Sea with reference to China. Thus, it was believed that China had more soft power influence on Cambodia to achieve its stipulated foreign policy objectives (Table 6.1). There are two reasons that should be highlighted to support this argument.

First, prior to Cambodia's ASEAN Chairmanship in 2012, China approached Cambodia at all levels of bilateral meetings. As Ciorciari (2013) argued, this "personal contact" enabled China to raise its financial incentives and economic promises for buying Cambodia's support in both regional and global contexts. In late 2010, China's aid amounted to US\$154 million, increasing twice in value in 2011, while Japan's ODA experienced a slight drop from 2010 to 2012. Chong (2017, p.6) found that China used its financial rewards as its soft power to influence Cambodia and its foreign policy within ASEAN. As a result, after the ASEAN summits, China pledged another US\$600 million grant aid for Cambodia (Chong, 2017). As quoted from Zhou (2016), "Nowadays, when debating the South China Sea issue [on multilateral basis] within ASEAN, Cambodian [government] officials and scholars are regarded as representatives of the national interests of China [...] with reference to previous statement of the South China Sea."

Second, Chinese leaders after a series of visits reiterated that China would increase both its trade and investment to ensure Cambodia's economic growth to support its authoritarian regime survival. With its economic networks of Chinese Cambodians as Prime Minister Hun Sen's capitalist cronies, Cambodia opted for being in "more favor" of China (Ciorciari, 2013; Heng, 2012). Besides, one of Cambodian officials who works at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs revealed during an interview that "as long as China gives unconditioned aid and economic

guarantee [to support the current political regime or the CPP], Cambodia continues its political and strategic support of China.” As a consequence, both trade and investment in the early 2010s significantly increased (Figure 5.5 and 5.6).

6.2.2.2 Cambodia’s Post-2012 ASEAN Chairmanship

After the November ASEAN Summit in Cambodia in 2012, Japan under a new administration of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe first paid an official visit to Jakarta, Indonesia, in January 2013. During his visit, Prime Minister Abe also stressed that the South China Sea should be addressed through peaceful means in compliance with the UNCLOS to ensure “free and open sea lanes”. Surprisingly, Prime Minister Abe supported the engagement for rebalancing China’s growing assertiveness and aggressiveness in the Asia Pacific region in general and the South China Sea in particular. Prime Minister Abe’s foreign policy is to:

- (1) Establish and expand universal values such as freedom, democracy, and human rights;
- (2) protect the free and open seas as common goods, which are governed by laws and rules, and welcome the United States’ rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific;
- (3) further promote flows of trade and investment;
- (4) protect and nurture Asia’s diverse cultures;
- and (5) to actively promote exchanges among younger generations (Nirmala, 2016).

After his trip to Indonesia, Prime Minister Abe also kicked off his visit to Cambodia on 16-17 November 2013 to participate in a bilateral summit in Phnom Penh to mark the 60th anniversary of diplomatic relations between Japan and Cambodia. The two leaders issued a joint statement addressing a wide range of issues including the South China Sea issue as follows:

[...] settling maritime disputes by peaceful means based on the universally recognized principles of international law including the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), in order to establish the principle of the rule of law in the Asia-Pacific region. They expressed their expectation on an early conclusion on an

effective Code of Conduct (COC) which contributes to the effective settlement of conflicts in the South China Sea (Joint Statement between Japan and Cambodia, 2013).

Despite the fact that Japan has insisted Cambodia to support peaceful and multilateral solutions to the South China Sea, it has appeared that Cambodia remains royal and supportive of China's position in the disputes. As Chong (2017) found, Cambodia again approved an agreement with China that Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar announced to be "non-claimant states" of the South China Sea and prevented from utilizing any of the ASEAN's multilateral mechanisms (Ismile, 2016). In July 2016, at the ASEAN meeting, Cambodia again blocked any debate or mention of the South China Sea issue to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) against Beijing in an ASEAN statement, expressing "concern" over the SCS's militarization (Reuter, 2016a).

At the 32nd ASEAN Summit in Singapore, during the drafting of ASEAN Leaders' nine-page statement that consists of a preamble and five main sessions comprising 37 points, Cambodia alone requested for seven interventions accounting for approximately 44 percent of the total (Carl, 2018). Among those interventions, Cambodia asked for deleting the following sentences with references to the ASEAN's multilateral mechanisms and especially the UN tribunal's ruling in the favor of the Philippines against China's claims in the South China Sea:

#15 [*Express serious concerns*] over recent and ongoing developments, including large scale/all land reclamations and militarization in the area (Zero draft of the statement).

#16 [Called for] full respect for *legal* and diplomatic processes [to tackle the dispute].

#17 We [*ASEAN as a whole*] emphasized the importance of non-militarization and self-restraint in the conduct of activities, including land reclamation that could further complicate the situation and disputes or escalate tensions in the South China Sea.

Cambodia resisted to call for deleting such wordings in the joint statement of ASEAN leaders, while other ASEAN member states such as Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, Vietnam and Singapore request to retain those sentences. Laos, Myanmar, Thailand and Brunei abstained. As a result, the final ASEAN Chair's Statement did not include those wordings against China's interest in the South China Sea. Therefore, as Carl (2018) described in his article on the South China Sea, Cambodia continues to serve as "stocking horse" of China in ASEAN.

Moreover, at the 9th Japan-Mekong Summit Meeting in the Philippines on 13 November 2017, Prime Minister Abe brought up some pressing regional issues including North Korea's nuclear development and the South China Sea dispute, working together with five Mekong countries including Cambodia to ensure "free and open Indo-Pacific," promote rules-based order, as well as maintain regional peace and stability. The leaders issued a joint statement to:

[...] Maintain and promote a free and open sea lines of communication in the region, in accordance with international law, including the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 1982. [...] Japan's constructive contributions to development and regional cooperation, including through its "free and open Indo-Pacific strategy".

[...] Discuss some matters related to the South China Sea and took note of the positive developments in ASEAN and China relations. [...] Encouraging [ASEAN] to adopt the framework of the Code of Conduct on the South China Sea (COC), and urged the Parties to conclude a substantive and effective COC at the earliest opportunity.

According to a report of Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2017, despite its proactive and constructive role to bring up the SCS dispute, the Mekong leaders preferred not to discuss it at such a sub-regional meeting for two reasons. First, among those five Mekong River countries, Vietnam is the only conflicting state in the South China Sea. Thailand remains "silent" due to its non-claimant status, while Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar are believed to side with China.

Second, the leaders regard the Mekong Cooperation meeting as a sub-regional platform used for discussing issues related to the Mekong River such as infrastructure connectivity, human resources development, environmental protection, poverty reduction and the like.

In addition, at the 10th Japan-Mekong Summit in Tokyo on 9 October 2018, Japan approved to adopt a new policy to accelerate the implementation of more than 150 development projects in the Mekong region. Prime Minister Abe also reiterated serious concerns over the South China Sea dispute and called for the rules-based measures with reference to the UNCLOS. The leaders released a joint statement after the Summit without mentioning China as follows:

[...] Some concerns over the situation in the South China Sea including land reclamation projects and activities in the area, which have eroded trust and confidence, increased tensions and may undermine peace, security and stability in the region. [...] Promoting free and open Indo-Pacific based on international law including UNCLOS.

Despite that fact that the five Mekong leaders confirmed that they would support Japan's "free and open Indo-Pacific strategy," they did not bring up any mention with reference to the rules-based multilateral mechanism against China. Amidst the growing economic pressures from the United States and the EU, Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen on the sideline of the summit voiced to defend its regime which has been politically and economically supported by China (Asia Correspondent, 2018). He also stressed the importance of Cambodia-Japan bilateral tie, while praising the advancement of Cambodia-China comprehensive strategic partnership.

Before the 10th Japan-Mekong summit, Cambodia also joined the GMS Economic Cooperation Program summit in March 2018 during which China pledged a total of US\$300 million fund for Mekong countries. Prime Minister Hun Sen also said, "Chinese Foreign Affairs Minister Wang Yi told me [Prime Minister Hun Sen] at the sideline meeting of the GMS summit, in Hanoi, that China supports and wishes Hun Sen to continue to be re-elected in the near future to continue leading Cambodia [current regime] to be more prosperous" (Tomiyaama, 2018).

In short, at both ASEAN and Mekong River Cooperation meetings, Cambodia has resisted that the maritime territorial disputes in the South China Sea are not a common problem for ASEAN and that they need to be addressed bilaterally. Despite having no any direct interest in the SCS, Cambodia has repeatedly interfered to block or water down any critical wording against China.

It is explicit that Cambodia has sided with China in the SCS issue; however, Japan's approach toward Cambodia remains soft in offering both economic and financial incentives to the current Cambodian government for three reasons. First, Cambodia's ASEAN membership is vital for Japan to maintain its geopolitical and economic roles in the region primarily due to China's controversial rise. Based on ASEAN's stated principle of "consensus-based decision making," Cambodia is able to block any decision of ASEAN against its interests. Despite Cambodia's longstanding support for China's position in the SCS, Japan's effort to bring Cambodia to join other ASEAN countries in a "freedom of overflight" pact with Tokyo has been seen "positive." Second, in the context of Japan-Mekong Cooperation, Cambodia's diplomatic support remains important for Japan's huge interest and investment in new energy and raw materials in the Mekong region. Third, in lieu of its stalled economic growth, Japan needs Cambodia's market. The bilateral trade and investment by 2016 amounted to nearly US\$4 billion. Thus, using "hard power" against Cambodia is indeed not a good strategic option for Japan, let alone for China.

6.3 Rationales of Cambodia's Embrace of China's Soft Power Diplomacy

A great number of existing studies argued that Cambodia was drawn into China's political and strategic orbit by its tremendous and "no-strings attached" aid, economic cooperation, cultural exchanges, and public diplomacy. In comparison to Japan, China has pledged more attractive incentives in its soft power diplomacy to support Cambodia's regime survival. With these "carrots," Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen publicly reiterated in a series of his public speeches that China was Cambodia's "most trustworthy friend" and that supporting China was "Cambodia's [prioritized] political choice" (Pang, 2017). Therefore, Cambodia has so far been named by many scholars as a "client state" (Ciorciari, 2013; Pang, 2017); an "ever-royal

satrap” (Chong, 2017); a “vassal state” (Amaro, 2016); “China’s closest ally” (Nirmala, 2016); as well as “China’s pawn” in the geostrategic game in Southeast Asia (Hutt, 2017).

With its gigantic and generous amount of foreign aid, China has also been more interested in Cambodia due to its strategic location at the heart of Southeast Asia for Beijing’s strategic and economic benefits; its ASEAN membership to increase China’s political and strategic leverage to counterbalance influences of Japan, South Korea, the United States and its allies in the region; as well as its long-standing and close bilateral relations with strict adherence to the One-China policy. For Cambodia, compared to Japan, China remains more strategically, politically, economically and socio-culturally important. China has indeed been Cambodia’s major source of foreign aid, technical assistance, investment, trade and security protection for gaining mutual interests. China’s personal approach with both top Cambodian leaders and its Chinese sub-state actors have been normatively and psychologically influencing Cambodia’s foreign policy making as argued by constructivists. In this light, three foreign policy arenas of Webber and Smith (2002), including international, governmental and domestic contexts, are used to analyze factors making China’s soft power more significant than that of Japan.

6.3.1 International Context

For the last two decades, China has experienced a miracle economic growth, making it become the world’s second largest economic power after the United States, and the region’s first biggest source of investment and trade. Therefore, China’s growing economic and political power has enabled its government to use “carrots” rather than “sticks” to build friendship and alliance to increase its political and strategic leverage against the power of the United States and Japan. With its soft power strategy, China has effectively used its financial assistances to earn political support from small states in the region including Cambodia, which are not satisfied with the U.S. foreign policy embedded in the American values. For those states, China has served as the best alternative for reassuring their security and economic growth.

For Cambodia, China remains economically more significant due to its large foreign reserves as well as its economic growth that could surpass that of the United States in the next two decades. Despite Trump's "protectionist" policy, the 2018 OECD Economic Policy Paper estimates that China will take over the U.S. economy in value and size between 2030 and 2060 (Guillemette & Turner, 2018). In addition, China has possessed more foreign reserves worth approximately US\$3 trillion and its gold reserves totaling around US\$74 billion more than its other BRICS member states combined. Also, China's holding of the U.S. treasury bonds valued a total of US\$1.18 trillion more than that of Japan (Bloomberg, 2018). Therefore, in such economically interdependent world, China has appeared to be more attractive for Cambodia.

China has been Cambodia's first largest trader and investor who opted to economically support Cambodia at the time of both economic and political pressures from the United States and its allies. Regardless of political regimes, China has pledged to gradually increase its investment and imports enabling Cambodia's current political regime to maintain its credibility of through sustained economic growth and survive. It allows Cambodia to catch up with the growth of its neighboring countries, especially Vietnam and Thailand. For Cambodia, Japan's stipulated foreign policy of weighing universal values of liberal democracy and its close security alliance with the United States have made Phnom Penh more skeptical about whether Japan will opt to use its economic component as bargaining power to democratize Cambodia, amidst the recent growing political and economic pressure from both the United States and the West.

Moreover, both China and Cambodia share a common concern of geostrategic encirclement and historical memories of foreign invasion and humiliation. China has strengthened its soft power diplomacy to enhance bilateral ties and reinforce allegiance of the neighboring countries to protect its security (Chong, 2017; Pang, 2017). Cambodia needs China as its significant "strategic ally" for counterbalancing power and relations with its neighboring countries, especially Vietnam and Thailand. With its strategic calculation, Cambodia has opted to side with China rather than Japan, because of the (1) geographical distance; (2) antagonistic Sino-

Vietnamese tie; (3) Japan/Thailand-U.S. security alliance in the Asia-Pacific; (4) harmonious Sino-Cambodia political relations; and (5) China's massive soft power influences in Cambodia. Taking these rationales into account, Cambodia has supported China "more" as Prime Minister Hun Sen repeatedly praised China as Cambodia's "trustworthy friend", "good neighbor", and "political option" to reassure Cambodia's long-standing political regime and security.

At the international level, Cambodia needs China to support its political and diplomatic legitimacy. Both Japan and China are significant for Cambodia in order to gain and maintain its political and diplomatic recognition at the global stage, thanks to their strong voice and lobbying power at the United Nations. However, if compared to Japan, China's permanent membership at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) can assist Cambodia in vetoing any UNSC resolution rendering pressures or sanctions on Cambodia's political situation.

6.3.2 Governmental Context

As Webber & Smith (2002) argued, the governmental arena is significant for foreign policy analysis since the government is regarded as a primary "unitary actor" for both foreign policy formulation and implementation. Likewise, as neoliberalist thinkers argued, despite importance of other non-state actors, the government remains the significant actor in making both domestic and foreign policies in cooperation with others for achieving its national interests (Mingst, 2008). In addition, as Webber and Smith (2002) also explained, foreign policy is generally separated from the public sphere and thus is controlled by the private sphere or a small group of elites. Those specialized elites, as argued by constructivists, shape or reshape their foreign policy according to influential norms, ideas and values (Mingst, 2008), as well as identities and interests (Wendt, 1999; Vyas, 2011). In this connection, three key factors, convergent values and norms, political regime, and elites' personalities are taken into account to illustrate how they have shaped Cambodia's foreign policy in strong support of China's charm diplomacy.

First, as to the convergent norms and values, Cambodia and China share common principles of “non-interference” and “respect for sovereignty” when grant aid or other economic incentives are pledged. In other words, Cambodia has been very pleased since 1997 when China raised its Five Principles of Co-existence guiding its “soft power diplomacy” and “peaceful rise” when other Western countries and Japan condemned and criticized the de-facto Hun Sen government of “coup d’état” (Ciorciari, 2013). China in return recognized the result of such coup, provided huge financial support, and promised to adhere to its five principles of peaceful co-existence. Those principles include crucial convergent norms and values, such as “non-interference” into domestic affairs; “respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity”; “non-aggression or non-use of force”; “equality and mutual benefit”; as well as “peaceful co-existence” in the region.

Such principles and unconditioned foreign aid of China literally sound positive to Cambodia, which needs a sense of respect for its long-standing authoritarian political regime. As explained by Ciorciari (2013), unlike the aid from Japan and the West, China’s financial support is given without any “forcefulness” of structural reforms. This has been largely seen by the Phnom Penh government as part of its sovereign power that has been strategically respected by China. Prime Minister Hun Sen once asserted that Cambodia was indeed not going to sell its sovereignty to any single country and praised China as “it [China] does more than it just says” in comparison to other countries, including Japan, who have provided Cambodia with financial assistance. In addition, since the 1990s, Chinese ambassadors to Cambodia always remind of the five principles and reiterated that “Chinese assistance aims to economically develop Cambodia and respects its ownership [sovereignty]”. Thus, as constructivist thinkers argue, the convergent norms and values shape and reshape political elites’ ideas and beliefs translated into making of foreign policy. Cambodia has been satisfied with China’s consistent principles and values and fearful of the West’s internal interference. Such ideas and beliefs are shaping Cambodia to side with or be more in favor of China.

Second, China's foreign aid has mutually benefited Cambodia's current political regime and China's interests. To tighten and consolidate their omnipotent political power, Cambodian leaders since the 1993 election have constituted a strong variant of authoritarian regime empowered by a strong "patron-client" network. Such a regime has been labelled "pseudo democratic", "semi-democratic", "electoral-authoritarian", or "developmental authoritarian" type of government involving in a rampant systematic corruption, human rights violations, undemocratic elections, political deadlock, and political pressure on civil society organizations. Therefore, China's foreign aid has so far been the biggest and the most crucial source of financial support for Cambodia's authoritarian government in order to (1) serve as the best alternative against the aid package from Japan and the West; (2) legitimize its political legacies contributing to peace and socio-economic development through massive hard infrastructural construction projects; as well as (3) consolidate its political power and regime through building strong "top-down" "patron-client" networks.

Third, the Chinese-favored personality of Hun Sen, who has been called "strongman" serving as Cambodian Prime Minister for over 30 years, has been shaped by his perceptions. Despite China's involvement in the Khmer Rouge regime, Hun Sen has explicitly known that China supports whoever serve China's interests (Jeldres, 2013). In 1997, the armed clashes between two prominent political parties, which were viewed as the coup d'état by the United States and the West resulted in international condemnation and suspension of foreign aid and other economic incentives. In return, China not only voiced its recognition of Hun Sen's government, but also pledged a huge amount of grant aid and military equipment. In addition, in 1998 during the reconciliation process, Hun Sen with China's support succeeded in his "Win-Win Policy" to disarm and reintegrate former Khmer Rouge armed forces into the government. This marked a remarkable milestone of Hun Sen's legacies in addition to his so-called "liberation" from the genocidal Pol Pot regime from 1975 to 1979. In this connection, the political support of China weakened Khmer Rouge's resistant position; deprived it of financial and military assistance along the border; and thus smoothened the process of reconciliation. In addition, the recent

election – labelled “undemocratic” as a consequence of political crackdown on the opposition CNRP, political activists and civil society advocates – indicates China’s ongoing political and financial support of Hun Sen’s regime and his political and strategic trust of China.

Moreover, after many years of their studies, Harish Mehta and Julie Mehta (1999) in their book entitled *Hun Sen: Strongman of Cambodia* described Hun Sen’s personality as both “obstinate” and “resilient”. With little consultation from others, he trusted his own decisions and ability to handle all difficult events. Such personality together with his negative, anti-colonial, and anti-imperial attitude towards the United States have made Prime Minister Hun Sen build the closest and personal relationship with China. In addition, Rourke (2003) analyzed his personality to be one of assuming that opponents are his enemies or rivals. In 1997, amidst growing political criticism, Hun Sen rejected any political meeting or negotiation with the United States as he reiterated that he did not really want be advised by the United States how to govern or rule Cambodia (Mehta & Mehta, 1999).

“Asian values” are, in addition, a significant constituting factor to shape Hun Sen’s perception. “Hierarchical respect”, “allegiance”, and “social harmony” with less consideration of human rights serve Cambodia-China relations well. The rising criticisms of Cambodia’s human rights violation by the United States, Japan, and the West denote a different set of both convergent values and norms guiding “personalities, ideas and beliefs” (Mingst, 2008). Therefore, most of the time, Prime Minister Hun Sen praised China as the major country that respected decisions of other countries, either big or small, at equal footing. In every high-level official exchanges, China treats Cambodia with huge respect regardless of its human rights and political issues. Hun Sen’s consistent value-driven personalities bodes well with China’s soft power diplomacy, and it has become Cambodia’s “most trustworthy friend” and “closest ally” in the region.

6.3.3 Domestic Context

As liberal thinkers argued, besides the government, other sub-state and non-state actors in the public sphere are also significant in shaping and making a state's foreign policy (Mingst, 2008). Those actors include bureaucrats, interest groups, and the general public taking their parts in pressuring certain foreign policy inputs and outcomes. To illustrate, the political bureaucrats are able to influence a state's foreign policy making. Interest groups play important roles in pressuring governments to reshape the policy formulation and implementation. The general public can influence the government to reconsider its policy objectives to gain more popular support for its political legitimacy. Thus, at the domestic level, these three groups are taken into account in order to understand why China's soft power is more influential in Cambodia.

First and foremost, a great number of governmental officials received their degrees and/or technical or professional trainings from China. At least 200 cadets and a few hundreds of other government officials are specifically provided with scholarships to continue studying and learning their skills in China. As Ciorciari (2013) noted, the bilateral relationship driven by tremendous foreign aid without any condition for reforms has been ameliorated by political bureaucrats whose perception is more favorable for China. For example, during Cambodia's 2012 ASEAN chairmanship, it was very clear that Hun Sen was not an expert of the South China Sea issue. Much of foreign policy to side with China was made by his most allegiant former Foreign Minister Hor Namhong, who has been well known to be politically close to China since the 1990s.

Second, most of contributions to the patron-client relationship between China and Cambodia is due to Cambodian interest groups and especially rich businessmen who are politically close to and financially support the powerful elites. Those people have indeed been known to obtain close business links with Chinese government-owned enterprises. In addition, many other newer Cambodian Chinese, with their Cambodian nationality by birth or naturalization,

become prominent business tycoons and obtain a high-profile and honorific status as “Oknha” to dominate Cambodia’s market and thus influence Cambodia’s foreign policy.

Lastly, China has been positively perceived in Cambodia based on the 2016 opinion poll by Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In comparison to Japanese, the ethnic Chinese remain far more significant in size and influence. With five percent of Cambodia’s total population, the ethnic Chinese have contributed long and inclusive cultural influence on Cambodia’s society in such areas as education, beliefs, festivals, food and media outlets. The same opinion poll found that Chinese language and media outlets remain influential and more popular than other languages and ethnic media in Cambodia. Despite the recent explosion of illegal Chinese immigrants, Chinese culture has been the most popular. Therefore, with this advantage, China continues to promote its cultural soft power diplomacy in order that the most popular public perception is able to justify and legitimize Cambodian government’s foreign policy option to side with China at the domestic, regional and international levels.

CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1 Conclusion

The growing body of academic writing in the post-Cold War 1990s has shifted its focus on the states' alternative means to achieve its ends of foreign policy as the use of military power is no longer properly justified. In 1990, Joseph Nye Jr. first termed "soft power" to denote the U.S. means incorporated into its foreign policymaking and diplomatic efforts to promote its ability to get their foreign policy objectives through "co-option" or "attractiveness" rather than brute force or "coercion". To achieve that, Nye mainly weighed both cultural and public diplomatic soft power resources of major countries to strengthen their multifaceted power, while smaller states are also struggling to utilize their soft power diplomacy to fill their "hard power deficit." Thus, Nye stressed that soft power is complementary to the classical power, arguing that it is better to be feared and loved. Since his first publication, many scholars and political scientists carried out their studies on a wide range of soft power dimensions and aspects around the world, especially in Japan and China as rising powers in Asia. These two countries have been so far believed to use their soft power through economic aid and technical assistance; trade and investments; public diplomacy and cultural aspects; and proactive engagements in multilateral organizations to achieve their foreign policy objectives at both regional and global levels.

Since the 1990s, especially after signing of the Paris Peace Accords to end decades of civil war in Cambodia, China and Japan have played significant roles in rehabilitating and reconstructing the postwar Cambodia through their massive foreign aid and assistance, trade, and investments. Both countries have also deployed other components of soft power through cultural and public diplomacy to build political confidence and strategic trust as a "slower and more civilized" alternative means to influence Cambodia's foreign policy. For China, Cambodia is situated at the heart of Southeast Asia – a geostrategic location to ensure China's economic and energy resources transition across the main Southeast Asia. Cambodia is also a good strategic partner and "closest ally" to assist China in blocking or watering down any decision undermining

China's interest in ASEAN because of its consensus-based decision making known as the "ASEAN Way" and stipulated in ASEAN Charter. On the other hand, Cambodia is important for Japan to counterbalance the rapid rise of China and support its strategic position in ASEAN. Despite its relatively smaller market size in Cambodia, Japan remains significant for both trade and investment, becoming Cambodia's second largest economic partner after China since 2010.

As found, to achieve its foreign policy objectives, China has thus far projected much of its soft power through financial assistance and economic means to leverage its diplomatic, political, and strategic influence on Cambodia. To illustrate, since 1993, China's grant aid has steadily increased over these 25 years, reaching a total of around US\$7 billion. A large part of China's financial aid was pledged in terms of technical assistance to fund its development projects, train Cambodian armed forces, and provide the Phnom Penh government with huge amount of military equipment and other facilities. As to its trade and investment, for two decades also, China has traded with and invested in Cambodia reaching a total of US\$5 billion and US\$6.7 billion, respectively, and making itself Cambodia's largest economic partner. In addition, as to its cultural diplomacy, China has a huge advantage of Chinese ethnic minority accounting for almost five percent of Cambodia's whole population. This indeed enables China to spread its soft influence via fast growing numbers of scholarships, Chinese-language classes, exchange programs and Confucius Institute (CI) offices across Cambodia in order to promote its positive culture, civilization and especially language as a cognitive dimension of China's soft power.

For Japan, to appreciate Cambodia's withdrawing of its rights for Japan's reparation and to counterweigh China's growing power and influence in the region and especially in Cambodia, since the 1980s, Tokyo has adopted a more proactive foreign policy to play constructive roles in Cambodia's peace process and national rehabilitation. In the early 1990s, Japan resumed its aid and assistance in Cambodia. The cumulative ODA between 1992 and 2016 amounted to about US\$2.9 billion including loans, grant aid, as well as technical assistance for developing Cambodia's most prioritized sectors ranging from good governance and human resources

development to rural development and environmental protection. Moreover, Japan's trade and investment in Cambodia amounted to a total of US\$1.37 billion and US\$1.6 billion respectively in 2016. Its export trade items with the Kingdom include such goods as automobiles, electronic devices, machinery, steel and medicine. In addition, Japan's growing investment primarily covers labor-intensive industries, manufacture, health care, agriculture, shopping centers and real estates among others, making itself Cambodia's second largest investor after China. In cultural aspect, given a small number of its nationals living in Cambodia, Japan has had dozens of Japan-language classes, scholarships, as well as cultural and capacity building exchange programs to promote people-to-people connectivity as stipulated in Japan's foreign policy. As to public diplomacy, despite its limited media outlets in Cambodia, Japan has triumphantly obtained huge attention to its "Cool Japan" or "Kawaii diplomacy" through anime or cartoons, ninja films, video games, food and many other entertainment programs in Cambodia.

Taking Japan's and China's aforementioned soft power components into consideration, based on quantitative measurement, it is found that China has had more soft power in Cambodia. To demonstrate, China's cumulative grant aid has been twice larger than that of Japan over the last two decades, also including a tremendous financial package for military purposes. In addition, China's trade and investment have surpassed those of Japan particularly since the early 2010s, making it Cambodia's first and most significant economic partner. It is also worth noticing that China's investment is more than that of Cambodia in the Kingdom accounting for almost 38.1 percent of US\$2.1 billion in 2016, followed by Japan (14 percent), Thailand (6.2 percent), the United Kingdom (2.1 percent), and South Korea (0.99 percent). This gigantic investment of China covers all key development sectors ranging from agriculture to garment factory.

In terms of cultural diplomacy, China has funded its more influential CIs and Chinese-language centers in both private and public institutions including the Ministry of National Defense, while Japan has had only its CJCC at the RUPP campus to promote its language in addition to several other private Japanese-language schools across the country. China has provided more financial

aid for scholarships and exchange programs many times larger than those from Japan. As to public diplomacy, China has so far owned more public and cable TV channels, radio programs and media outlets conducive to developing and promoting its “charm diplomacy” in Cambodia.

Due to this quantitative amount of soft power as its utmost advantages, China has influenced Cambodia’s foreign policy to a great extent as explicitly illustrated by Cambodia’s policy on the South China Sea dispute particularly at 2012 ASEAN Summit in Phnom Penh to block the issuance of ASEAN’s traditional joint statement. As one of six claimant states, China reiterated that the nine-dashed line areas belonged to China’s “non-negotiable” sovereign territories and would like address such dispute on bilateral basis. Despite being a non-party to the conflict, Japan has become an indirect player, adopting a more proactive and bolder approach to ensure “freedom of navigation” and “freedom of flight” to maintain its huge interest in the South China Sea. However, at the 20th ASEAN Summit, supporting China’s position, Cambodia denied any mention of the South China Sea dispute in the joint statement and requested other ASEAN member states to utilize a bilateral approach to individually deal with such dispute. In 2016, Cambodia declared itself as a non-claimant state who did not support the ASEAN’s multilateral framework to debate or resolve the South China Sea disputes and rejected any mention of such dispute to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). At the Mekong River Cooperation meetings, while maintaining a healthy bilateral relationship with Japan, Cambodia remain cautious about any wording or sentence in the statements against China’s interest in the South China Sea.

Therefore, it has so far been believed that Cambodia has been drawn into China’s political and strategic orbit owing to China’s growing soft power projection in Cambodia. In comparison to Japan, China indeed remains more strategically, politically, economically and socio-culturally significant for Cambodia. In the international context, with its second world largest economic status, huge foreign and gold reserves, and biggest holding of the U.S. treasury bonds, China has opted for “carrots” in its soft power diplomacy to reconstruct more friendship and alliance to enhance its political and strategic leverages against the United States, Japan and other major

powers. Besides its largest trade and investment in Cambodia, China has pledged to further strengthen the bilateral economic tie with Cambodia to maintain Hun Sen's current regime and promote his credibility of lifting Cambodia from lower or lower-middle income country.

In addition, in the regional security, China and Cambodia share a common fear of geostrategic encirclement and historical antagonism of external invasion and humiliation. China has so far strengthened its soft power to make more friends and allies with its neighbors based on China's "good neighbor diplomacy." China also opted to win their "allegiance" in its "peaceful rise" or "development" to protect its geopolitical and geostrategic interests. For Cambodia, China still remains more significant to counterbalance both power and relations with its strong neighbors, Vietnam and Thailand. This is because of geographical distance; antagonistic Sino-Vietnamese relations; The U.S.-Japan and the U.S.-Thailand security alliance; long-standing harmonious Sino-Cambodian political relations; and gigantic China's soft power influence in Cambodia.

Moreover, in the governmental context, both Cambodia and China share convergent values and norms in accordance with the principles "non-interference" and "respect for sovereignty" when China's grant aid is generously provided for Cambodia. At the time of political, economic and financial pressures from the United States, Japan, and the West, China remains recognizant of Hun Sen's political regime and continues to pledge its millions of aid to Cambodia per year, as exemplified during the 1997 armed clashes or the so-called coup d'état when the United States and EU suspended aid to Cambodia. For Cambodia, this shows a sense of respect for its long-standing authoritarian regime, and these common values, norms and fear have assisted the two countries in being politically and strategically close to each other for mutual benefits.

Similar to the aforementioned convergent norms and values, Cambodia has found China's soft power diplomacy more suitable to maintain its regime type labelled as "pseudo democratic", "semi-democratic", "electoral-authoritarian" or "developmental authoritarian". Regardless of any political system, China is willing to support Cambodia in exchange for its political support

at the regional and global levels based on their “patron-client” tie. Besides, China’s soft power is also consistent with Hun Sen’s personalities shaped by a series of past events, especially the 1997 armed clashes and the 1998 reintegration of the Khmer Rouge troops into the Cambodian armed forces to mark the total peace in Cambodia. The two events explicitly proved that amidst both pressures and condemnation of the West, China has always been there for Cambodia. In addition, both Hun Sen’s natural obstinate personality and his shared positive perception of the Asian values of “respect of ruler [sovereign authorities]”, “hierarchical authorities” and “social harmony” also contribute to Cambodia’s trust and long-standing support for China.

In the domestic context, Cambodian bureaucrats have also played significant roles in shaping Cambodia’s foreign policy towards China. With huge financial aid, China has pledged around 500 scholarships and other short/medium exchange programs mostly targeting Cambodian government officials. These programs together with China’s generous foreign aid without any precondition for reforms have shaped the bureaucrats’ perception to be more in favor of China (Ciociari, 2013). In addition, businessmen as one of interest groups in Cambodia have hugely benefited from China’s businesses and investment in Cambodia. Therefore, for those tycoons, the healthy, close economic links with and political support for China are absolutely vital for maintaining their lucrative sources of income in the patronage networks. The Chinese ethnicity has thus far developed a long and inclusive Chinese cultural influence on Cambodia’s societal fabrics including education, food, beliefs, festivals and media outlets among many others.

To conclude, China’s quantitative amount of soft power together with other soft power-driven factors at international, governmental and domestic contexts have cognitively and effectively attracted Cambodian leaders to politically and strategically side with Beijing rather than Tokyo. Owing to that explicit and immense strategic calculation, Cambodia has so far moved closer to China while keeping its good relations with Japan. Not surprisingly, Cambodia has been named as a “client state”, an “ever-royal satrap”, a “vassal state”, “China’s closest ally” and “China’s pawn” in the geostrategic game to serve China’s geopolitical and economic interests.

Despite its relatively less influential soft power in Cambodia, Japan remains significant for the Phnom Penh regime thanks to its ODA and rapid increase in bilateral trade and investment over the last two decades. Amidst growing political and economic pressures of the United States and the EU against Cambodia's human rights violations and democratic deficit, Japan has opted for "quiet diplomacy" while continuing to provide its aid and increase its investment, and thus earned much of political trust from Cambodia. As argued by scholars, Japan primarily aims to counterweigh China's rising power in the country and the wider region. In addition, although its cultural and public diplomatic clouts remain smaller, Japan's image remains highly positive in Cambodia, making it Cambodia's trustworthy and most potential development partner.

7.2 Recommendations

Cambodia should be more cautious of China's growing soft power projection through its aid and technical assistance that claim to be "no-strings attached" or "unconditioned" as it is said, "there ain't no such thing as free lunch" especially in a fast dynamic international politics. It is rational for Cambodia to pursue financial and political reassurance from wealthier China that has constantly pushed the Kingdom into its political and strategic orbit. A large number of the existing studies also found that this excessive "aid dependency" of a state ended up depending on and losing its political or foreign policy making autonomy to another state. For this reason, Cambodia as a small country in Southeast Asia needs to pursue strategic diversification of its foreign relations with many countries in order to reduce its heavy dependence on the patronage networks and grant aid of China. In this connection, Cambodia also needs to express its strong and sincere commitment to support multilateralism, especially ASEAN, in order to improve its strategic bargaining power, maintain its foreign policy of "neutrality" and "non-alignment," and boost ASEAN centrality or relevance to maintain its medium and long-term interests. This indeed requires Cambodian leaders to be visionary and stay out of comfort zone to pursue their complete sovereign autonomy in making foreign policy for Cambodia's long-term benefits.

In addition, despite available and excessive loans from Beijing, there remains skepticism about China's loans that might push Cambodia to fall into the so-called a debt trap. China has owned a seaport as its autonomous region in Sri Lanka when the government was unable to repay the loans and cumulative interests. According to Cambodia's Ministry of Finance and Economy in 2017, Cambodia's bilateral loans increased to US\$5.3 billion, of which roughly US\$3.9 billion was from China (Ministry of Economy and Finance, 2017). The loans from China are estimated to be four times larger than those from Japan. Although the current debt level has not been a grave or serious concern for Cambodia in comparison to other countries, Cambodia should be more cautious about not falling into China's debt trap and lose its sovereign right.

In addition, despite over two decades of grant aid from both China and Japan, Cambodia has so far experienced a slower path of development in terms of good governance, social services, environmental protection, education, hard infrastructure among others. As found, this is largely due to chronic and rampant systematic corruption and "crony capitalist" networks resulting in ineffective use of billions of dollars of loans and foreign aid per year. For the Cambodian government, transparency, accountability, and aid effectiveness are essential to develop long-term growth of the country; reduce corrupt officials; build more good legacies and credibility to maintain the current regime; and strengthen positive public perception of the government.

As to both trade and investment, Cambodia needs to be cautious about China's economic and strategic intension of transforming Cambodia into another Chinese marketplace. Over the last ten years, there has been a great number of Chinese businessmen, skilled labors and other labor-intensive Chinese immigrants coming to work in Cambodia. A few cities are transformed into casinos as China's second Macau, and thousands of night clubs, beer gardens and bars involved in human trafficking are also found in various places across the country. Worse than that, the influx of those Chinese immigrants overtake local businesses and job opportunities, and some of Chinese garment factories lack compliance to labor law, environmental law, as well as other investment law and regulations. In this context, Cambodia needs to strengthen the rule of law

and pursue diversification of economic partners including the existing EU and the United States. To do so, Cambodia needs to shift its track to pursue a plural and liberal democratic political system as stated in its constitution and Paris Peace Accords to obtain healthy economic development, sound economic environment for both foreigners, locals and regime survival.

Last but not least, with growing impact of Chinese and Japanese cultural and public diplomacy, Cambodia needs to be more cautious about loss of its “Khmer” identity embedded in societal and cultural contexts. This identity loss and fast-track “Sinicization” would result in losses of Cambodia’s own “attractiveness” as a civilized nation that used to build one of historic wonders of the world. To reduce China’s socio-cultural influence, Cambodia indeed needs to preserve its tradition and culture, and pursue its own soft power in terms of UN humanitarian assistance, the UN PKO and other international contributions for good reputation of Hun Sen’s regime.

In short, despite rapid soft power influences of China and Japan on Cambodia’s foreign policy, the country indeed needs to be more pragmatic and proactive to make the best uses of current foreign aid and assistance to pursue its long-term development. Diversifying both its diplomatic and economic partnerships, preserving its own cultural identity, and creating its own soft power are important for Cambodia to enjoy a healthy economic environment, maintain its neutral and non-aligned foreign policy, as well as reconstruct its good image or reputation.

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Appendix 1: China's Undergoing Projects in Cambodia

No	Official Title	Project Status	#	PIP Number	Start Date	Completion Date	Budget	Own Disbursement (USD) (All Projects)			Planned Disbursement (USD) (All Projects)		
								2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
▶ China (40 Projects)													
1.	2019 Census Material for Aid Cambodia	On-going			8-Feb-2018	31-Dec-2018	15,000,000.00 CNY			2,293,578			
2.	Achang Irrigation Development Project in Kompong Chhang Province	On-going			3-Dec-2013	3-Dec-2019	283,500,000.00 CNY	6,795,188	6,778,828	6,880,734			
3.	Construction of 115kV Transmission Line and Substation from Phnom Penh to Bavet Project	On-going			3-Dec-2013	3-Dec-2018	475,414,600.00 CNY	9,513,263	9,369,952	9,722,161			
4.	Construction of NR. 51 Project	On-going			1-Nov-2016	31-Dec-2019	252,045,640.00 CNY		15,643,014	6,188,559	4,950,847		
5.	Enhancement Public Transportation	Completed			16-Dec-2016	16-Dec-2017	57,000,000.00 CNY		8,399,853				
6.	Equipment Provision to Senate of Cambodia	On-going			19-Jul-2018	31-Dec-2018	4,200,000.00 CNY			642,202			
7.	Kanghot Irrigation Development Project - Phase II	Completed		AGRI/5//30	1-Nov-2012	1-Nov-2016	209,000,000.00 CNY	4,755,634					
8.	Koh Thom Bridge Project	On-going			19-Jun-2013	19-Jun-2020	126,000,000.00 CNY	3,805,305	2,784,434				
9.	Landmine Clearance Activity in Cambodia	On-going			19-Jun-2018	31-Dec-2018	2,500,000.00 USD			2,500,000			

10.	Morodok Techo Stadium	On-going			15-Oct-2016	1-Jan-2021	1,000,000,000.00 CNY		18,420,729	35,237,920	33,758,716	34,214,373	30,581,040
11.	Multipurpose Dam Development Project in Battambang Province	Completed	AGRI/3/197/30		13-Jun-2012	13-Jun-2017	99,283,600.00 USD	9,928,360					
12.	National Road No. 5 of Cambodia	On-going	TPRT//100/30/L		31-Mar-2012	31-Dec-2017	55,309,000.00 USD	5,530,900	2,765,450				
13.	National Road No. 51 Project (Economic and Technical Cooperation)	On-going			30-Nov-2016	31-Dec-2019	97,135,600.00 CNY		7,260,134	3,713,135	2,970,508		
14.	National Road No. 55 Project (Pursat-Phnom Korvanh-Veaveng-Thmorda)	On-going			25-Aug-2014	25-Aug-2019	129,314,000.00 CNY	3,929,204	3,831,512	3,978,670			
15.	National Road No.3 Construction Project (From Chom Chao - Bek Kus - Kampot)	On-going					208,915,450.00 USD						
16.	Project for Preparation of the Intermodal Transport Master Plan in Cambodia	On-going			19-Jun-2018	31-Dec-2018	18,000,000.00 CNY			2,752,294			
17.	Project for School Facility Improvement in Cambodia	On-going					133,810,000.00 CNY						
18.	Project of Extension National Road 76	Completed	TPRT/2/088/30		2-Feb-2012	2-Feb-2017	89,273,400.00 USD	8,927,340	4,137,060				
19.	Project of National Road 1577	On-going			6-Sep-2015	6-Sep-2020	36,301,400.00 USD	7,802,600	7,880,300	7,822,600			
20.	Project of National Road No. 58	On-going			22-May-2015	22-May-2020	119,751,775.00 USD	41,913,121	17,962,767	21,453,600	14,471,932		
21.	Project of Reconstruction NR.6 of Cambodia (The Section from Thnal Kaeng to Ang Kroeung)	Completed	TPRT/2/089/30		13-Jun-2012	13-Jun-2017	242,269,000.00 USD	24,226,900	12,113,450				

22.	Project of Rehabilitation NR.44	Completed		TPRT/2/090/30	13-Jun-2012	13-Jun-2017	78,192,000.00 USD	7,819,200	3,909,600				
23.	Project on the design and construction project of Phnom Penh Ring road N0.3 (NR.4-NR.1)	On-going					259,397,500.00 USD						
24.	Restoration Project of Royal Palace in Angkor Cambodia	On-going					90,000,000.00 CNY						
25.	Rural Grid Extension Phase III & IV	On-going			1-Jan-2015	1-Jan-2019	94,862,727.00 USD	37,945,091	18,972,545	4,583,261	4,903,012		
26.	Rural Grid Extension Project Phase II	On-going			4-Dec-2014	4-Dec-2019	47,088,128.00 CNY	915,456	494,438				
27.	Sreng River Basin Water Resources Development (Phase II)	On-going			15-Oct-2014	15-Oct-2019	43,035,551.00 USD	17,318,776	6,350,777	1,143,641	1,008,137		
28.	Staung River Basin Water Resources Development Project Phase I	On-going			9-Sep-2013	9-Sep-2020	329,750,000.00 CNY	5,221,282	5,232,312	5,749,309	1,627,790		
29.	Stung Chikreng Water Resources Development Project in Siem Reap Province (Phase I)	On-going			1-Jan-2014	1-Jan-2019	280,900,000.00 CNY	5,227,849	9,410,506	2,280,850			
30.	Stung Pursat Dam No. 3 & 5 Development Project in Pursat Province - Phase II	On-going			16-May-2017	16-May-2020	309,000,000.00 CNY		9,107,209	11,811,927	12,432,588		
31.	Technical Vocational Education and Training Center at Sihanouk Province	Completed			10-Dec-2015	10-Jun-2017	56,000,000.00 CNY	3,382,494	825,249				
32.	The 230 KV Loop Transmission Line Project in South Western Part of Cambodian National Grid (Phase I)	On-going			1-Jan-2016	1-Jan-2021	159,155,400.00 USD	92,310,132	10,711,317	16,711,317	18,711,317		

33.	The Construction of National Road No. 11 Project (Nak Leoung - Thnal Torteung)	On-going			16-Sep-2017	16-Sep-2020	671,067,000.00 CNY		19,778,470	30,672,852	35,260,024	16,154,830	
34.	The Project on the construction of Express Way (Phnom Penh-Preah Sihanouk)	Pipeline			1-Jan-2019	31-Dec-2019	88,540,000.00 USD				88,540,000		
35.	The Project on the construction of Express Way (Phnom Penh-Sihanouk)	On-going											
36.	The Transmission Line 230 KV Project Phase II (Loop Line in Eastern Part of Cambodian National Grid Part I)	On-going			1-Jul-2017	16-May-2020	116,620,120.00 CNY		5,155,746	5,275,229	5,566,516	1,640,531	
37.	The Transmission Line 230KV Project Phase II (Completion of Loop Transmission Line in South Western & Eastern Part of Cambodian National Grid)	On-going					176,490,468.00 USD						
38.	Vaico Irrigation Development Project - Phase I	Completed	AGRI/5/198/30		2-Feb-2012	2-Feb-2017	99,303,000.00 USD	9,930,300	4,738,956				
39.	Vaico Irrigation Development Project Phase II	On-going			13-Oct-2016	13-Oct-2020	599,253,500.00 CNY		27,331,167	16,052,367	14,045,726		
40.	Vaico Irrigation Development Project Phase II (Economic and Technical Cooperation)	On-going			1-Nov-2016	31-Oct-2021	229,384,200.00 CNY		8,287,362	7,014,807	8,768,509		

Appendix 2: Japan's Undergoing Projects in Cambodia

#	Official Title	Project Status	#	PIP Number	Start Date	Completion Date	Budget	Own Disbursement (USD) (All Projects)			Planned Disbursement (USD) (All Projects)		
								2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
▶ Japan (120 Projects)													
1.	Activities to Promote Efficiency of Technical Cooperation	On-going		MULT/0/12 8/31	1- Jan- 2012	31- Dec- 2018	914,736,000.00 JPY	1,081,1 14	503,65 2	910,200			
2.	Capacity Building Project on Explosive Remnants of War Clearance for CMAC Phase III	Completed			1- Mar- 2017	28- Feb- 2018	542,050.00 USD		542,05 0				
3.	Comprehensive Mechanical Demining in Kampong Thom (Year 1)	On-going			23- Feb- 2018	22- Feb- 2019	676,019.00 USD			676,019			
4.	Emergency Life Saving Center Development Project	On-going			25- Jun- 2015	25- Dec- 2016	993,000,000.00 JPY	6,906,4 03					
5.	Food and Nutrition Security Project in Kampong Chhnang Province	On-going			22- Dec- 2017	21- Dec- 2018	258,111.00 USD		258,11 1				
6.	Improving Maternal and Child Health Project in Takeo Province (Year 2)	On-going			23- Feb- 2018	22- Feb- 2019	455,528.00 USD			455,528			
7.	Japan Overseas Cooperation Volunteer Program	On-going		MULT/0/12 9/31	1- Jan- 2012	31- Dec- 2018	1,259,765,000.00 JPY	1,259,2 06	1,128, 630	1,365,3 00			
8.	JICA Partnership Program (NGO Collaboration)	On-going		MULT/0/11 6/31	3- Jan- 2011	31- Dec- 2018	1,009,218,000.00 JPY	1,275,8 34	1,787, 644	910,200			
9.	Legal and Judicial Development Project (Phase IV)	Completed		GOVN/4/25 4/31	2- Apr- 2012	31- Mar- 2017	514,560,000.00 JPY	1,214,1 89	229,89 6				
10.	Legal and Judicial Development Project (Phase V)	On-going			2- Apr- 2017	31- Mar- 2022	375,000,000.00 JPY		519,69 8	682,650	682,650	682,65 0	682,65 0

11.	National Road No. 5 Improvement Project (Battambang - Sri Sophorn Section) II	On-going			30-Mar-2017	20-Sep-2027	11,136,000,000.00 JPY				8,983,671		
12.	National Road No.5 Improvement Project (Battambang - Sri Sophorn Section)	On-going		TPRT/2/064/31	9-Sep-2013	9-Sep-2023	8,852,000,000.00 JPY	274	21,751,315	19,722,075	35,442,547	2,148,071	36,408
13.	National Road No.5 Improvement Project (Prek Kdam - Thlea Ma'am Section) (I)	On-going		TPRT/2/065/31	5-Nov-2014	5-Nov-2023	1,699,000,000.00 JPY	1,780,187	699,432	1,606,039	1,412,254	91,020	27,306
14.	National Road No.5 Improvement Project (Prek Kdam - Thlea Ma'am Section) (II)	On-going			31-Mar-2016	20-Jun-2025	17,298,000,000.00 JPY			34,578,111	29,890,903		
15.	National Road No.5 Improvement Project (Thlea Ma'am - Battambang and SriSophorn - Poipet Section) (I)	On-going			30-Mar-2015	23-Jul-2024	19,208,000,000.00 JPY	244,954	3,115,265	891,887	53,432,732		
16.	Phnom Penh City Transmission and Distribution System Expansion Project (Phase 2) (I)	On-going			30-Mar-2015	23-Jul-2023	3,816,000,000.00 JPY		1,620,569	1,185,280	13,790,305		
17.	Phnom Penh Transmission and Distribution System Expansion Project	On-going		ENGY/2/034/31	5-Nov-2014	5-Nov-2021	6,480,000,000.00 JPY	379,354	715,479	2,578,357	18,886,034		
18.	Project for Establishing Business-Oriented Agriculture Cooperative Model in the Kingdom of Cambodia	On-going		AGRI/0/164/31	1-Mar-2014	31-Mar-2019	408,884,000.00 JPY	449,889	755,175	682,650	682,650		
19.	Project for Facilitating the Implementation of REDD+Strategy and Policy	On-going		ENVC/1/053/31	1-Jun-2011	30-Nov-2017	561,160,000.00 JPY	557,227	134,039				
20.	Project for Improving TVET Quality to Meet the Needs of Industries	On-going			30-Sep-2015	31-Mar-2020	450,000,000.00 JPY	726,383	923,017	682,650	682,650	682,650	0

21.	Project for Institutional Capacity Development of CJCC for a Center of Development and Networking for Business Human Resources	On-going		EDCU/5/21 9/31	1- Apr- 2014	31- Mar- 2019	430,779,000.00 JPY	641,512	764,14 3	682,650	682,650		
22.	Project for Rehabilitation of Dom Reik Irrigation System in Kampong Chhnang Province	On-going			2- Mar- 2018	1- Mar- 2019	89,900.00 USD			89,900			
23.	Project for River Basin Water Resources Utilization in the Kingdom of Cambodia	On-going		AGRI/3/166 /31	1- Jun- 2014	30- Jun- 2019	419,799,000.00 JPY	1,152,1 24	958,78 2	682,650	682,650		
24.	Project Formulation and Evaluation Study	On-going		MULT/0/13 0/31	1- Jan- 2012	31- Dec- 2018	4,426,588,000.00 JPY	5,889,7 66	7,800, 045	5,916,2 98			
25.	Project on Capacity Building for Urban Water Supply System in Cambodia (Phase 3)	On-going		WSAN/2/04 2/31	18- Jul- 2012	18- Jul- 2017	400,152,000.00 JPY	1,134,7 64	1,094, 568				
26.	Project on Gender Mainstreaming for Women's Economic Empowerment	On-going			1- Feb- 2017	31- Mar- 2021	375,000,000.00 JPY		508,24 3	682,650	682,650	682,65 0	682,65 0
27.	Project Research	On-going		MULT/0/13 1/31	1- Jan- 2013	31- Dec- 2018	101,973,000.00 JPY	57,104	362,77 6	91,020			
28.	Promotion of Collaboration with SMEs and BOP businesses	On-going			1- Apr- 2016	30- Mar- 2018	320,000,000.00 JPY	681,942	2,958, 672	910,200			
29.	Promotion of Community Development with Demining in Banteay Meanchey	On-going			29- Sep- 2017	28- Sep- 2018	761,202.00 USD		761,20 2				
30.	Senior Volunteer Program	On-going		MULT/0/11 8/31	1- Jan- 2012	31- Dec- 2018	918,940,000.00 JPY	1,002,4 47	733,35 2	1,092,2 40			
31.	SHV Port New Terminal Development Project	On-going			7- Aug- 2017	31- May - 2023	23,502,000,000.0 0 JPY			211,506	1,038,2 17		

32.	Siem Reap Water Supply Expansion Project	On-going		WSAN/2/04 3/31	24- Jul- 2012	24- Jul- 2021	7,161,000,000.00 JPY	842,857	1,533, 831	2,429,6 66	14,155, 826		
33.	Sihanoukville Port Multipurpose Terminal Development Project	On-going		MMTR/2/02 1/31	1- Aug- 2009	10- Dec- 2019	7,176,000,000.00 JPY	7,381,7 83	12,060 ,084	7,238,2 37	43,335		
34.	Southwest Phnom Penh Irrigation and Drainage Rehabilitation and Improvement Project	On-going		AGRI/5/169 /31	5- Nov- 2014	5- Nov- 2026	5,606,000,000.00 JPY	639,018	799,27 5	349,374	2,548,2 51	17,166 ,366	6,708, 172
35.	Technical Cooperation by Experts	On-going		MULT/0/12 3/31	1- Jan- 2012	31- Dec- 2018	1,136,758,000.00 JPY	1,729,8 17	1,612, 038	1,365,3 00			
36.	Technical Training in Japan	On-going		MULT/0/12 2/31	1- Jan- 2012	31- Dec- 2018	2,126,283,000.00 JPY	3,115,9 31	3,614, 807	2,730,5 99			
37.	The Project for Capacity Development of General Department of Taxation (GDT) under the Framework of PFM Reform, Phase 2	On-going			1- Aug- 2015	1- Aug- 2018	300,000,000.00 JPY	433,306	402,69 5	682,650			
38.	The Project for Capacity Development on Training Management for Strengthening Sub-National Administrations	On-going			1- Feb- 2017	3- Jan- 2022	450,000,000.00 JPY		274,58 5	682,650	682,650	682,65 0	682,65 0
39.	The Project for Capacity Enhancement on Environmental and Social Considerations in Implementing Agency in Road Sector	On-going			1- Apr- 2016	31- Jan- 2020	300,000,000.00 JPY		2,620, 991	682,650	682,650	682,65 0	
40.	The Project for Constructing Agricultural Cooperative Centers in Stung Treng Province	Completed			16- Dec- 2016	15- Dec- 2017	83,000.00 USD	83,000					
41.	The Project for Constructing Ba Rong Health Center in Kandal Province	On-going			5- Dec- 2017	4- Dec- 2018	84,972.00 USD		84,972				

42.	The Project for Constructing Bridges in Two Communes in Kaoh Nheak District, Mondulkiri Province	On-going			29-Sep-2017	28-Sep-2018	242,367.00 USD		242,367				
43.	The Project for Constructing Emergency Ward at Baray-Santuk Referral Hospital in Kampong Thom Province	On-going			15-Feb-2018	14-Feb-2019	90,072.00 USD		90,072				
44.	The Project for Constructing Emergency Ward at Stoung Referral Hospital in Kampong Thom Province	Completed			13-Feb-2017	12-Feb-2018	83,175.00 USD		83,175				
45.	The Project for Constructing General Ward at Kaoh Nheak Referral Hospital in Mondulkiri Province	On-going			15-Feb-2018	14-Feb-2019	89,700.00 USD		89,700				
46.	The Project for Constructing Gynecology and Obstetrics Ward at Trapang Kraloeng Referral Hospital in Kampong Speu Province.	Completed			25-Nov-2016	24-Nov-2017	82,341.00 USD	82,341					
47.	The Project for Constructing Internal Medicine and Pediatrics Ward at Bati Referral Hospital in Takeo Province	On-going			15-Feb-2018	14-Feb-2019	90,712.00 USD		90,712				
48.	The Project for Constructing Kranhoung Senchey Health Center in Kraite Province	On-going			5-Dec-2017	4-Dec-2018	89,632.00 USD		89,632				
49.	The Project for Constructing Marist Solidarity Cambodia Community Village in Kandal Province	On-going			15-Feb-2018	14-Feb-2019	72,179.00 USD		72,179				
50.	The Project for Constructing School Building at Boeung Snuol Primary School in Bavel District, Battambang Province	Completed			25-Nov-2016	24-Nov-2017	81,818.00 USD	81,818					

51.	The Project for Constructing School Building at Chheu Teal Chrum Primary School in Veal Veng District, Pursat Province	Completed			25-Nov-2016	24-Nov-2017	58,800.00 USD	58,800					
52.	The Project for Constructing School Building at Khlaing Primary School in Ba Phnum District, Prey Veng Province	Completed			25-Nov-2016	24-Nov-2017	82,355.00 USD	82,355					
53.	The Project for Constructing School Building at Kok Ngoun Lower Secondary School in Kampong Svay District, Kampong Thom Province	Ongoing			16-Mar-2018	15-Mar-2019	87,879.00 USD		87,879				
54.	The Project for Constructing School Building at Korki Primary School in Kien Svay District, Kandal Province	Completed			24-Mar-2017	23-Mar-2018	80,244.00 USD		80,244				
55.	The Project for Constructing School Building at Samdech Euv Samdech Mae Secondary School in Banlung City, Ratanakiri Province	Completed			24-Mar-2017	23-Mar-2018	83,000.00 USD		83,000				
56.	The Project for Constructing School Building at Slab Leng Secondary School in Basedth District, Kampong Speu Province	Completed			24-Mar-2017	23-Mar-2018	75,415.00 USD		75,415				
57.	The Project for Constructing School Building at Thlork Andaung Lower Secondary School in Siem Reap City, Siem Reap Province	Ongoing			16-Mar-2018	15-Mar-2019	90,727.00 USD		90,727				
58.	The Project for Constructing School Building at Ya Dav Primary School in Ou Ya Dav District, Ratanakiri Province	Completed			24-Mar-2017	23-Mar-2018	80,750.00 USD		80,750				

59.	The Project for Constructing School Buildings at Damnak Korkoh Primary School and Lbauk Svay Primary School in Svay Chek District, Banteay Meanchey Province	On-going			16-Mar-2018	15-Mar-2019	86,610.00 USD			86,610			
60.	The Project for Constructing School Buildings at Preah Kanlong Primary School and A Tao Primary School in Chong Kal District, Otdar Meanchey Province	On-going			16-Mar-2018	15-Mar-2019	87,419.00 USD			87,419			
61.	The Project for Constructing Silk Center at Royal University of Phnom Penh	On-going			2-Mar-2018	1-Mar-2019	90,834.00 USD			90,834			
62.	The Project for Constructing Vegetable Shipping Center in Kandal Province	On-going			2-Mar-2018	1-Mar-2019	114,821.00 USD			114,821			
63.	The Project for Constructing Water Treatment Kiosks in Six Communes in Takeo Province	Completed			9-Mar-2017	8-Mar-2018	77,840.00 USD		77,840				
64.	The Project for Development and Dissemination of Sustainable Production System Based on Invasive Pest Management of Cassava in Vietnam, Cambodia and Thailand (SATREPS)	On-going			1-Jan-2016	30-Apr-2021	325,000,000.00 JPY	98,347	148,284	591,630	591,630	591,630	
65.	The Project for Development of Social Health Insurance for the Informal Sector	On-going			1-Nov-2016	30-Apr-2018	225,000,000.00 JPY			682,650			
66.	The Project for Development of Traffic Management System in Phnom Penh	On-going			30-Mar-2015	28-Feb-2019	1,727,000,000.00 JPY	8,018,691	2,061,097	898,242			
67.	The Project for Effective Implementation of EIA and Pollution Control Through	On-going			1-May-2017	31-Dec-2020	300,000,000.00 JPY		1,008,561	682,650	682,650	682,650	

	Capacity Development of MOE												
68.	The Project for Establishing Foundations for Teacher Education College (E-TEC)	On-going			25-Jan-2017	31-Dec-2022	450,000,000.00 JPY		1,588,102	682,650	682,650	682,650	682,650
69.	The Project for Expansion of National Maternal and Child Health Center	Completed		HLTH/3/190/31	26-Mar-2014	28-Feb-2017	1,193,000,000.00 JPY	5,908,396	632,930				
70.	The Project for Expansion of Distribution Lines in Southern Economic Corridor	On-going			26-Sep-2016	31-May-2019	893,000,000.00 JPY		521,169	3,048,031	1,270,011		
71.	The Project for Expansion of Lower Secondary Schools in Phnom Penh	On-going		EDCU/3/213/31	10-Jul-2014	31-Jan-2015	851,000,000.00 JPY						
72.	The Project for Expansion of Water Supply System in Kampot	On-going			16-Jun-2015	31-May-2019	2,985,000,000.00 JPY	2,764,754	11,810,665	12,514,737	5,807,729		
73.	The Project for Expansion of Water Supply Systems in Kampong Cham and Battambang	On-going		WASN/2/045/31	20-Jun-2013	31-Dec-2018	3,355,000,000.00 JPY	14,957,081		614,385			
74.	The Project for Flood Protection and Drainage Improvement in the Phnom Penh Capital City (Phase IV)	On-going			10-Oct-2017	31-Dec-2023	3,948,000,000.00 JPY			5,752,462	5,752,462	5,752,462	5,752,462
75.	The Project for Flood Protection and Drainage Improvement in the Phnom Penh Capital City (Phase IV) (Detailed Design)	On-going			30-Mar-2017	31-Aug-2018	109,000,000.00 JPY		291,504	466,878			
76.	The Project for Human Resource Development Scholarship (2014)	On-going		EDCU/5/225/31	30-May-2014	31-Dec-2018	295,000,000.00 JPY	857,841	97,034	218,448			

77.	The Project for Human Resource Development Scholarship (2015-2019)	On-going			16-Jun-2015	31-Dec-2019	299,000,000.00 JPY	1,335,679	604,029	725,438	725,438		
78.	The Project for Human Resource Development Scholarship (2016-2020)	On-going			1-Aug-2016	31-Dec-2020	332,000,000.00 JPY	677,684	930,176	578,177	813,174	989,422	
79.	The Project for Human Resource Development Scholarship (2017-2023)	On-going			14-Jul-2017	31-Dec-2023	363,000,000.00 JPY		128,333	187,005	410,702	621,359	686,728
80.	The Project for Human Resource Development Scholarship (2018-2025)	On-going			22-Jun-2018	31-Dec-2025	342,000,000.00 JPY			20,753	159,012	316,658	461,744
81.	The Project for Human Resource Development Scholarship (FY2013)	Completed		EDCU/5/22 6/31	20-Jun-2013	31-Dec-2017	258,000,000.00 JPY	124,889					
82.	The Project for Human Resource Development Scholarship (three-year cycle)(2017-2022)	On-going			14-Jul-2017	31-Dec-2022	286,000,000.00 JPY		120,613	322,831	508,535	565,630	565,630
83.	The Project for Improvement of Battambang Provincial Referral Hospital	On-going			30-Mar-2017	31-Mar-2023	1,453,000,000.00 JPY		686,382	2,204,200	2,204,200	2,204,200	2,204,200
84.	The Project for Improvement of Equipment for Demining Activities (Phase VII)	On-going			31-Mar-2016	31-Jul-2018	1,372,000,000.00 JPY	477,573	10,662,208	1,119,546			
85.	The Project For Improvement of Marine Aquaculture Seed Protection Techniques	On-going			1-Nov-2016	1-Nov-2019	300,000,000.00 JPY	72,956	721,950	682,650	682,650		
86.	The Project for Improvement of Public Bus Operation in Phnom Penh	On-going			2-Jan-2017	31-Dec-2020	300,000,000.00 JPY		1,416,043	682,650	682,650	682,650	
87.	The Project for Improvement of Svay Rieng Provincial Referral Hospital	On-going			30-Mar-2015	31-Dec-2020	1,077,000,000.00 JPY	4,445,196	3,890,649	1,704,844	1,704,844	1,704,844	
88.	The Project for Improvement of the National Road No. 1 (Phase IV)	Completed		TPRT/2/075 /31	15-Jan-2014	30-Nov-2017	1,585,000,000.00 JPY	6,354,731	3,922,857				

89.	The Project for Improvement of the National Road No1 Urban Section	On-going		TPRT/2/087 /31	8-Jan-2015	31-Jan-2018	251,000,000.00 JPY		1,110,382	61,746			
90.	The Project for Improvement of Transportation Capacity of Public Bus in Phnom Penh	On-going			30-Nov-2016	31-Mar-2020	1,396,000,000.00 JPY			3,909,658	3,909,658	977,414	
91.	The Project for Improving Continuum of Care with Focus on Intrapartum and Neonatal Care	On-going			1-Mar-2016	31-Mar-2021	375,000,000.00 JPY	369,953	745,405	682,650	682,650	682,650	
92.	The Project for Improving Maternal and Child Health in Takeo Province Phase I	Completed			1-Mar-2017	28-Feb-2018	466,431.00 USD		466,431				
93.	The Project for Installing Medical Equipment at Chamkar Leu Referral Hospital in Kampong Cham Province	Completed			13-Feb-2017	12-Feb-2018	82,180.00 USD		82,180				
94.	The Project for Installing X-ray Machine and Cardiovascular Ultrasound System at Angkor Hospital for Children in Siem Reap Province	Completed			5-Dec-2017	27-Mar-2018	67,545.00 USD		67,545				
95.	The Project for Modernization of Vehicles Registration and Inspection Administration System	On-going			1-Jul-2016	31-Jul-2019	300,000,000.00 JPY	180,888	1,311,235	682,650	682,650		
96.	The Project for Primary Health Care System Strengthening for Mothers and Children in Kampong Cham Province	Completed			5-Sep-2016	4-Sep-2017	134,526.00 USD	134,526					
97.	The Project for Productions of Integrated Digital Terrain Model and Electronic Navigational Chart	Completed		TPRT/4/079 /31	15-Mar-2013	31-Mar-2017	247,288,000.00 JPY	1,698,953	1,056,797				
98.	The Project for Promotion of Inclusive Education for Children with Disabilities in Kandal Province (2nd Phase)	Completed			4-Jul-2016	3-Jul-2017	256,317.00 USD	256,317					

99.	The Project for Promotion of Inclusive Education for Children with Disabilities in Kandal Province (3rd Phase)	Completed			29-Jun-2017	28-Jun-2018	279,038.00 USD		279,038				
100.	The Project for Realization of Sustainable Living Environment by the Practical Environmental Education in Regional Teacher Training Centers in Cambodia	Ongoing			21-Nov-2017	20-Nov-2018	131,189.00 USD		131,189				

101.	The Project for Rehabilitation of Boeung Kanseng Irrigation System in Pursat Province	Completed			13-Feb-2017	12-Feb-2018	82,379.00 USD		82,379				
102.	The Project for Rehabilitation of Chroy Changva Bridge	Ongoing			31-Mar-2016	31-Aug-2020	3,343,000,000.00 JPY	807,717	7,723,790	7,768,845	7,768,845	3,237,019	
103.	The Project for Rehabilitation of Kandieng Irrigation System in Pursat	Completed			22-Dec-2017	31-Mar-2018	89,351.00 USD		89,351				
104.	The Project for Rehabilitation of Ta Pao Irrigation System in Svay Rieng Province	Ongoing			22-Dec-2017	21-Dec-2018	83,370.00 USD		83,370				
105.	The Project for Rehabilitation of Veal Sdoav Irrigation System in Kampong Cham Province	Completed			16-Dec-2016	15-Dec-2017	82,524.00 USD	82,524					
106.	The Project for Rice Seed Production and Promotion	Ongoing			1-Nov-2017	30-Nov-2022	412,500,000.00 JPY		220,812	682,650	682,650	682,650	682,650
107.	The Project for Road Improvement in Pang Rolim Village, O'tavao Commune, Pailin City, Pailin Province.	Completed			16-Dec-2016	15-Dec-2017	82,600.00 USD	82,600					
108.	The Project for Road Improvement in Thma Sa	Ongoing			2-Mar-2018	1-Mar-2019	89,262.00 USD			89,262			

	Commune, Botum Sakor District, Koh Kong Province												
109.	The Project for Road Rehabilitation in Romtum Commune, Rovieng District, Preah Vihear Province	On-going			5-Dec-2017	4-Dec-2018	87,587.00 USD		87,587				
110.	The Project for Strengthening Agricultural Cooperatives in Tbaeng Meanchey District and Kulean District, Preah Vihear Province	Completed			9-Mar-2017	8-Mar-2018	82,960.00 USD		82,960				
111.	The Project for Strengthening Capacity for Maintenance of Roads and Bridges	On-going			1-Mar-2015	1-Mar-2018	300,000,000.00 JPY	678,991	888,607	682,650			
112.	The Project for Strengthening Engineering Education and Research for Industrial Development in Cambodia	On-going			1-Jan-2019	31-Dec-2022	2,800,000.00 JPY				6,371	6,371	6,371
113.	The Project for the Construction of Teacher Education Colleges	On-going			15-Jan-2018	29-Dec-2023	3,170,000,000.00 JPY			1,002,341	4,033,306	5,808,195	6,063,051
114.	The Project for the Improvement of the Equipment for the Restoration of the Western Causeway of Angkor Wat	Completed	CART/1/04 0/31		27-Dec-2013	31-Aug-2016	94,700,000.00 JPY	48,881					
115.	The Project for Urgent Replacement of Bridges in Flood-Prone Areas	On-going			23-Nov-2017	31-Dec-2023	3,942,000,000.00 JPY			5,898,094	5,898,094	5,898,094	5,898,094
116.	The Project of Primary Health Care System Strengthening for Mothers and Children in Kampong Cham Province (3rd Phase)	On-going			18-Aug-2017	17-Aug-2018	124,839.00 USD		124,839				
117.	The Project on Capacity Development for Mining Administration	On-going	MMTR/4/04 3/31		1-Sep-2014	31-Aug-2019	455,804,000.00 JPY	890,349	772,050	682,650	682,650		

118.	The Project on Establishment of Environmental Conservation Platform of Tonle Sap Lake (SATREPS)	On-going			1-Apr-2016	31-Mar-2021	450,000,000.00 JPY	889,344	1,010,379	682,650	682,650	682,650	682,650
119.	The Project on Promoting Sustainable Agricultural Conditions for Poverty Reduction in Kampong Cham Province	On-going			29-Sep-2017	28-Sep-2018	558,236.00 USD		558,236				
120.	West Tonle Sap Irrigation and Drainage Rehabilitation and Improvement Project	On-going	AGRI/5/191/31		23-Aug-2011	30-Dec-2017	4,269,000,000.0 JPY	1,318,786	7,109,946	17,269,181	11,077,130		

Appendix 3: Semi-Structured Questionnaire for Interviews



RITSUMEIKAN ASIA PACIFIC UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF ASIA PACIFIC STUDIES

No. _____

**RESEARCH QUESTIONNAIRE
(IN-DEPTH INTERVIEW WITH _____)**

Comparative Study on China's and Japan's Soft Power on Cambodia's Foreign Policy

DETAIL OF THE INTERVIEWER:

Name: _____ Date: _____

Place: _____

**A research study conducted in partial fulfilment of the requirement for
Master's Degree in International Relations (Asia Pacific Studies)**

Graduate School of Asia Pacific Studies, Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University

COMMUNE CODE:

(1) CAMBODIA (2) CHINA (3) JAPAN

2017-2018

1. Demographic Information

00.0	Name	_____	
01.0	Age	_____ years	
02.0	Gender	<input type="checkbox"/> 1-Male	<input type="checkbox"/> 2-Female
03.0	Occupation	_____	

2. China's and Japan's Soft Power on Cambodia's Foreign Policy

04.0	What do you think about Cambodia's foreign policy since 1990s?
05.0	What do you think about China/Japan's foreign policy towards Cambodia since 1990s?
06.0	What do you think about China/Japan's soft power in Cambodia since 1990s?

07.0	Do you think that China/Japan has had more soft power influence on Cambodia's foreign policy objectives since 1990s in comparison to Japan? Why?
08.0	How should Cambodia do to get advantages of China/Japan's soft power and to maintain its foreign policy autonomy?
09.0	What are your other suggestions to help reduce potential challenges of China/Japan's soft power?

Important Note:

To ensure ethical integrity, all respondents will be sought for their consents prior to interviews, and their names and answers will be kept confidential. This means each participant must sign an informed consent form before the interviews. The purpose of the study and possible benefits and harms will be informed to them. Their participation is voluntary and can be withdrawn without penalty at any time.