

**Master's Thesis**

**Evaluating Development Planning Deliberation (the *Musrenbang*)  
as a Participatory Budgeting Practice in Indonesia  
A Case of Batu City Government, East Java Province**

by

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## Abbreviations and Acronyms

ADD	: <i>Alokasi Dana Desa</i> – Village Funding Allocation
APBD	: <i>Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Daerah</i> – Local Annual Budget
APBN	: <i>Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Negara</i> – State Annual Budget
Bappeda	: <i>Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Daerah</i> – Local Development Planning Agency
Bappelitbangda	: <i>Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan, Penelitian, dan Pengembangan Daerah</i> – Local Research and Development Planning Agency
Desa	: Village
Dispendukcapil	: <i>Dinas Kependudukan dan Pencatatan Sipil</i> – Population and Civic Registration Agency
DPRD	: <i>Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah</i> – Local Legislative Assembly
Kabupaten	: Regency
Kecamatan	: Subdistrict
Kelurahan	: Neighbourhoods
Kota	: City, Municipality
KUA	: <i>Kebijakan Umum Anggaran</i> – General Budget Policies
LPMD/K	: <i>Lembaga Pemberdayaan Masyarakat Desa/Kelurahan</i> – Village/Neighbourhood Empowerment Organization
Musrenbang	: <i>Musyawarah Perencanaan Pembangunan</i> – Development Planning Deliberation
OPD	: <i>Organisasi Perangkat Daerah</i> – Local Government Agencies
PPA	: <i>Prioritas dan Plafon Anggaran</i> – Budget Priorities and Funding Ceilings
PPAS	: <i>Prioritas dan Plafon Anggaran Sementara</i> – Provisional Budget Priorities and Funding Ceilings
Renja	: <i>Rencana Kerja OPD</i> – Local Government Agencies Work Plan
Renstra	: <i>Rencana Strategis OPD</i> – Local Government Agencies Strategic Plan
RKPD	: <i>Rencana Kerja Pemerintah Daerah</i> – Local Government Work Plan
RPJMD	: <i>Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Menengah Daerah</i> – Local Medium Term Development Plan
RPJPD	: <i>Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Panjang Daerah</i> – Local Long Term Development Plan
RTRW	: <i>Rencana Tata Ruang Wilayah</i> – Spatial Plans

## **Certification Page**

I, Sinta Kusuma Primastuti (Student ID 51216621) hereby declare that the contents of this Master's Thesis are original and true, and have not been submitted at any other university or educational institution for the award of degree or diploma.  
All the information derived from other published or unpublished sources has been cited and acknowledged appropriately.

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## Abstract

Deemed as a panacea of democracy disenchantment, Participatory Budgeting (PB) becomes a noteworthy mechanism that enables the common public to voice their rights in allocating public expenditures. In the late 1980s, PB was pioneered in one of the capital cities in Brazil, namely Porto Alegre, and captured the world's attention due to its success. Accordingly, PB travelled and transformed throughout the globe in varied ways. Many studies have investigated PB proliferation by using different perspectives, yet are not able to provide a complete evaluation that brings about more comprehensive understanding. Thus, this study utilized four dimensions of PB in evaluating the Musrenbang—a PB practice in Indonesia—by taking a case of Batu City Government in East Java Province.

Both qualitative and quantitative approaches within an exploratory sequential mixed methods design were employed to work on data derived from in-depth interview, nonparticipant observation, documentation, questionnaire, as well as assessment and evaluation sheets. This study involved 11 (eleven) people who directly participated in the Musrenbang as well as 120 (one hundred and twenty) citizens who did not take part in the process.

The result disclosed that in general, the Musrenbang in Batu City Government was implemented in a minimal arrangement. Within the dimension of financial/budgetary, the Musrenbang did not have adequate debated resources; specific allocation; and taxation policies. The evaluation of the participatory dimension comprising the subdimensions of citizen participation and local government participation revealed that the Musrenbang had not represented an advanced participatory practice yet. This encompassed variables of participation form; decision maker; participation of the excluded; monitoring and control; information sharing and dissemination; project completion; and legislative role. Furthermore, the Musrenbang also did not pay much attention to intramunicipal decentralization; ruralization; and investment within the spatial/territorial dimension. A preferable result came from the normative/legal judicial dimension in which adequate laws and regulations had been stipulated to institutionalize the Musrenbang in a framework of national planning and budgeting.

*Keywords: Participatory Budgeting, the Musrenbang, dimension, evaluation*

# **1. Introduction**

## **1.1 Background**

In the past two or three decades, the Participatory Budgeting (PB) that involves ordinary citizens in a democratic process of public funds decision-making has been granted as one of the most effective participatory instruments (Cabannes, 2004, p. 27; Ebdon & Franklin, 2006, p. 437; Rodgers, 2010, p. 2; Sintomer, Herzberg, & Röcke, 2008, p. 164, 2014, p. 28). According to Sintomer et al. (2008, 2014), “Basically, PB allows the participation of nonelected citizens in the conception and/or allocation of public finances” (p. 168, p. 29).

Initiated in the late 1980s in a Brazilian city of Porto Alegre, PB spread first in Latin America and then proliferated worldwide in varied transformations (Dias, 2014, p. 23; Krenjova & Raudla, 2013, pp. 18-19; Patterson & Wagner, 2013, p. 11-14; Sintomer et al., 2008, p. 164, 2014, p. 29). Sintomer et al. (2014) found that in 2014, there were between 626 and 1138 participatory budgets in Latin America; between 474 and 1,317 in Europe; between 58 and 109 in Asia; and between 110 and 211 in Africa (p. 29). This vast propagation resulted from the promises of PB as a social movement. In the context of PB implementation in Least Developed Countries (LDCs), Kuruppu et al. (2016) asserted PB as a substantial component of New Public Management (NPM) and New Public Governance (NPG) that has the targets of “...democratizing democracy, eradicating corruption and clientelism, and improving the living conditions of the most deprived” (Célérier & Botey, 2015, p. 740).

Considering its importance, therefore, many studies have been conducted in order to investigate the practice of PB in different countries and continents. Some results evince success through certain adjustments within adoptions of the original form of Porto Alegre PB or even through a highly differentiated process, for instances in the United States, Spain, and Italy (Gilman, 2012; Sintomer et al., 2008). However, there are also evidences where PB faced remarkable challenges—mostly political practices—that impeded its implementation such as in China, Sri Lanka, and Argentina (He, 2011; Kuruppu et al, 2016; Rodgers, 2010).

In addition to the facet of PB replication, there was also a notable fact from Asian case studies. Fölscher (2007) scrutinized PB procedures in five countries, i.e. Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand. She revealed a dissimilarity between the Asian cases and the Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) ones in PB activities. In the Asian case study countries, domestic actors—either local government or local civil society—play greater role than the third sector—either development partners or international NGOs. She stated that this disparity is derived from “Asia’s longer traditions of accountable governance and civic engagement” (Fölscher, 2007, pp. 163-164). On this point, citizens already have an understanding regarding their roles in local governance by which promotes civic engagement in decision-making process. Conversely, the disempowerment of civil societies under the centrist communist domination in CEE has brought a consequence of building citizens awareness of rights and obligations. As this “platform” of awareness was already established, executing PB in Asia countries is therefore more feasible.

Notwithstanding the growing literature on variants of PB across the world, it should be admitted that there is still limited research evaluating PB by using

comprehensive dimensions. The existing case studies mainly emphasize single perspective on how PB works. Accordingly, this study intended to fill the gap by descriptively researching the practice of PB in one of the Southeast Asian countries, Indonesia, which was one of the seven Asian countries with participatory budgets (Patterson & Wagner, 2013, p. 87).

Classified as ‘developing economies’ country with lower middle income (World Economic Situation and Prospects [WESP], 2014, p. 146), Indonesia continues to implement significant political and governance changes after the overthrow of the New Order regime in 1998. The launch of the decentralization process in 1999 outlined in Law No. 22 of 1999 (that was replaced by Law No. 32 of 2004 with its twice amendments, afterwards replaced by Law No. 23 of 2014 with its twice amendments lastly with Law No. 9 of 2015) was one of the central government’s strides to foster the participatory approach in the development planning process. The central government enabled citizens to get involved in local governance through the *Musrenbang* standing for *Musyawarah Perencanaan Pembangunan* (Development Planning Deliberation).

This study operated a concept of the Musrenbang as defined by the Local Governance Support Program (LGSP), i.e. “a deliberative multi-stakeholder forum that identifies and prioritizes community development policies” (LGSP, 2007, p. 2). Furthermore, the Musrenbang has objectives of “negotiating, reconciling, and harmonizing differences between government and nongovernmental stakeholders and reaching collective consensus on development priorities and budgets” (LGSP, 2007, p. 2). Local government’s planning agency is responsible to implement the Musrenbang in order to accommodate citizens’ aspirations and priorities.

Thus, this research examined the PB process in the Musrenbang by conducting a case study in one of local governments in East Java Province of Indonesia, Batu City Government. Since stipulated as an autonomous region in 2001, Batu City has experienced a significant growth, particularly in economy sector. Based on data of the *Bappelitbangda* (Local Research and Development Planning Agency), the economic growth in 2016 was 6.69 percent (Bappelitbangda, 2017, p. 14). It was even higher than the East Java province's and Indonesia's economic growth, i.e. 5.57 percent and 5.02 percent respectively (Badan Pusat Statistik [BPS], 2017). This was mainly supported by investment of more than 1.8 trillion rupiahs or more than 100 million U.S. dollars (Bappelitbangda, 2017, p. 19). Another achievement of Batu City was evident by the 2016 Human Development Index (HDI), 72.62 percent (Bappelitbangda, 2017, p. 15). Again, it was considerably above the provincial attainment of 69.74 percent (BPS, 2017).

Recently, Batu City was awarded *Anugerah Pangripta Nusantara* (APN) in 2016 and 2017 as the first rank in the category of “city with the best planning” by *Kementerian Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional* (the National Development Planning Ministry). This award aims at motivating all local governments to continuously enhance the quality of development planning in their region. The category employs 12 (twelve) criteria consisting of relatedness; consistency; completeness and depth; measurability; policies innovation; the process of bottom-up planning; the process of top-down planning; the process of technocratic planning; the process of political planning; innovation on regional processes and programs; display and material of presentation; as well as presentation capability and material comprehension. Based on this noteworthy achievement, examining development planning in Batu City is therefore relevant.

## **1.2 Research Question**

Drawing on aforementioned background, this study evaluated performance of the Musrenbang as a Participatory Budgeting (PB) practice in Batu City Government by raising a question of “How is the performance of the Musrenbang in Batu City as a practice of Participatory Budgeting?” In spite of the fact that Porto Alegre PB is acknowledged as a good practice, this study did not intend to merely compare it to the Musrenbang in Batu City Government. Instead, this study operated four dimensions of PB in an attempt to have a more comprehensive analysis.

## **1.3 Significance of the Study**

Theoretically, the findings of this study offer contribution to the existing literature on the public administration area concerning Participatory Budgeting (PB), particularly in Asia. Practically, the results of this study might contribute to Batu City Government, especially the Bappelitbangda to enhance its substantial role and function in development planning. Based on the evaluation derived from this study, Batu City Government might consider offered recommendations and take follow-up actions in order to improve the quality of the Musrenbang in the future.

## **2. Literature Review**

Drawing on the aforesaid problem statement, this study encompassed a meticulous analysis of literatures that specifically examined Participatory Budgeting (PB). In theoretical perspective, it is imperative to discuss experiences of PB in precursory studies. Subsequently, foci on PB's definition and dimensions are felicitous. This literature review also comprehends discourses on PB practice of Porto Alegre as well as the Musrenbang as a PB practice of Indonesia in general standpoints.

### **2.1 Previous Research on Participatory Budgeting**

Participatory Budgeting (PB) was initiated in 1989 in the city of Porto Alegre that is the capital of Brazil's southernmost state, Rio Grande do Sul (Célérier & Botey, 2015, p. 740; Grillos, 2017, p. 343; Souza, 2001, p. 165; Wampler, 2007, p. 23). Several Brazilian cities and other countries in Latin America adopted Porto Alegre PB, followed by local governments in many other countries in the world (Dias, 2014, p. 23; Krenjova & Raudla, 2013, p. 19; Patterson & Wagner, 2013, pp. 11-14). Many studies have scrutinized the implementation of PB across different countries and continents by using assorted perspectives. Some of them are summarized as follows:

- (a) The most popular PB of Porto Alegre and Belo Horizonte has encouraged Souza (2001) to analyze its limitation and possibilities in constructing democratic institutions. She concluded that PB practices in these two Brazilian cities with diverse societies should be prized for the inclusion of those formerly excluded in society rather than for the material or physical benefits. On this point, the implementation of PB both in Porto Alegre and in Belo Horizonte became a great

stride in improving democratic institutions as a critical element of re-democratization agenda in any country.

- (b) Sintomer, Herzberg, and Röcke (2008) examined PB in more than 20 European cities. Instead of merely enabling democratization and social justice, PB in Europe relies on a multitude of devices. They propounded an intelligible methodological definition of PB and constructed the six ideal-types of PB to compare and comprehend the heterogeneity of concrete experiments. The six different models influenced heavily by existing participatory and democracy traditions are Porto Alegre adapted for Europe; Participation of organized interests; Community funds at the local and city level; The public/private negotiating table; Consultation on public finances; and Proximity participation. Furthermore, they contended that the models of Porto Alegre adapted for Europe and Community funds at the local and city level are the most feasible to strengthen an empowered participatory governance and a fourth power.
- (c) From his study of PB in Buenos Aires, Rodgers (2010) highlighted how politics influenced PB implementation. The peculiar interaction of various political interests, networks, and incentives in the midst of the Argentinazo crisis did not correspond to PB goal of enhancing public participation in government. However, this brought about an effective involvement of different actors enabling the development of PB within a contingent democracy. Rodgers therefore argued that the Buenos Aires case is salient for the process of contingent democratization can foster democratic initiatives albeit within the inadequacy of programmatic politics.
- (d) He (2011) revealed some evidences from PB experiments in China. Drawing on PB success in increasing transparency and fairness, he investigated and analyzed three distinctive logics of PB—viz. administrative, political reform, and citizen



empowerment. The conclusion of his research is that the administrative logic will persist with its domination in PB experiments. Conversely, the fact that the central leaders keep warning and the local governments keep being resist will impede the development of local People's Congresses within the logics of political reform. Likewise, government control will hinder the citizen empowerment through PB.

- (e) Based on his empirical data, Gilman (2012) developed two conceptual models within PB adoptions in United States, i.e. results oriented and process oriented, that disclose a dualism between efficiency through short-term service delivery and inclusiveness through democratic reinforcement. In respect of effectiveness, results-focused model is better in producing viable projects whereas process-focused model is better in ensuring that all participants' demands are accommodated. Gilman also pointed out that the practice of deliberation and decision-making in U.S. PB was varied immensely depending on the structural condition of district constitution, bureaucratic constrains, and facilitator skill.
- (f) Baiocchi and Ganuza (2014) disaggregated PB into its communicative and empowerment dimensions. Further, they criticized that the global proliferation of PB has heavily focused on open, transparent, and egalitarian communication overriding the way to embody primacy, scope/importance, participatory power, and self-regulation as empowerment dimensions. As other traditional participatory tools, PB becomes an ineffectual participatory device where participants collectively think about unrelated issues from the perspective of the power administration within multifarious national and political contexts. Nevertheless, Baiocchi and Ganuza raised their optimism that citizens can exceed these limitations as PB also functions as a learning platform.

- (g) Employing Bourdieu's theoretical framework, Célérier and Botey (2015) scrutinized the implication of accountability practices in the process of Porto Alegre PB as well as the way accountability enables socio-political emancipation. They deducted that PB in Porto Alegre supported the power relation to perpetuate and facilitated participation in political field. In addition, accountability practices led to both the cause and consequence of the distinctive capitals of councillors that in turn improved the councillors' social capacities. Notwithstanding, this councillors' emancipation also resulted in alienation due to widened gap between councillors and their electors.
- (h) Kurrupu et al. (2016) explored PB practice in the "Costal Urban Council (CUC)" of Sri Lanka by drawing on Bourdieu's triad—namely field, habitus, and capital. They emphasized the failure of PB experiment in the CUC in attaining its pivotal aim to enhance public participation through equality, justice, and transparency. They also illustrated how PB was more likely a practice of power, domination, and symbolic violence rather than a mechanism to promote citizen engagement in the political process and political emancipation. In this respect, the control of the CUC chairman on the entire PB process became a threat to democracy.
- (i) Grillos (2017) assessed PB process in Surakarta (Solo) city, Indonesia, by utilizing newly digitized records of the infrastructure expenditures from the stages of proposal, prioritization, and implementation for the sake of targeting the poor. She found a poverty-related bias where the program allocated less proportion of funding to sub-units with higher number of the needy. Moreover, the fact that the decisions made in implementation phase remarkably diverged from those made in public proposal and prioritization processes was solely based on legitimate technical considerations such as proposals submission.

**Table 1 Summary of Previous Research**

No.	Researcher(s)	Title	Year	Country/Region	Dimension
1.	Souza, C.	Participatory Budgeting in Brazilian cities: Limits and possibilities in building democratic institutions	2001	Brazil	Participatory
2.	Sintomer, Y., Herzberg, C., and Röcke, A.	Participatory Budgeting in Europe: Potentials and challenges	2008	Europe	Participatory
3.	Rodgers, D.	Contingent democratisation? The rise and fall of Participatory Budgeting in Buenos Aires	2010	Argentina	Participatory
4.	He, B.	Civic engagement through Participatory Budgeting in China: Three different logics at work	2011	China	Participatory
5.	Gilman, H. R.	Transformative deliberations: Participatory Budgeting in the United States	2012	The United States	Participatory
6.	Baiocchi, G. and Ganuza, E.	Participatory Budgeting as if emancipation mattered	2014	The United States	Participatory
7.	Célérier, L. and Botey, L. E. C.	Participatory Budgeting at a community level in Porto Alegre: a Bourdieusian interpretation	2015	Brazil	Participatory
8.	Kuruppu, C., et al.	Participatory Budgeting in a Sri Lankan Urban Council: A practice of power and domination	2016	Sri Lanka	Financial/Budgeting; Participatory
9.	Grillos, T.	Participatory Budgeting and the poor: Tracing bias in a multi-staged process in Solo, Indonesia	2017	Indonesia	Financial/Budgeting; Spatial/Territorial

*Source: Summarized by the author (2018)*

## 2.2 Participatory Budgeting

### 2.2.1 Defining Participatory Budgeting.

Many scholars have propounded various definitions of PB based on different point of views. In identifying the subject engaging in PB, scholars employed some terms such as *population* (UN HABITAT, 2004), *local people* (PB Unit, 2010), *resident* or *ordinary resident* (Blair, 2012; Stortone, 2010), and *citizen* or *ordinary citizen* (Afonso, 2017; Gilman, 2012; Goldfrank, 2007; He, 2011; Krenjova & Raodla, 2013; Shah, 2007; Wampler, 2000; Zamboni, 2007). Regarding the object of PB, some literatures involved a term of *resources* or *public resources* in defining PB (Gilman, 2012; He, 2011; Shah, 2007; UN HABITAT, 2004; Zamboni, 2007), while some others operated *budget* or *public budget* in their definitions (Blair, 2012; Goldfrank, 2007; Krenjova & Raodla, 2013; PB Unit, 2010; Stortone, 2010). Some scholars also highlighted *policy* or *public policy* to interpret PB (Afonso, 2017; Wampler, 2000). These literatures included different predicates to link the subject to the object, e.g. decide, allocate, prioritize, vote, deliberate, negotiate, debate, control, influence, etc. In addition, some scholars also presented a dimension of time, for instance *throughout the year* (Wampler, 2000), *annual* (Goldfrank, 2007), and *yearly* (Stortone, 2010).

However, considering its ranging implementation with multifarious adoption and adaptation throughout the world, it is arduous to ascertain a singular definition on PB. Sintomer, Herzberg, and Röcke (2008, p. 168) emphasized the illegitimacy of a *nominalist* definition at any time and in any place because of these varied procedures. Cabannes (2004, p. 28) posed that this *uniqueness of each experience*

becomes a challenge in examining worldwide PB practices. In other words, no acknowledged definition of PB describes minimum requirements to distinguish this participatory procedure from others.

This study, in its place, concurs with Sintomer et al. (2008, 2014) contending that “Basically, PB allows the participation of nonelected citizens in the conception and/or allocation of public finances” (p. 168, p. 29). With an intention of defining PB more accurately, they added five further criteria as follows:

(1) the financial and/or budgetary dimension must be discussed; participatory budgeting involves dealing with the problem of limited resources; (2) the city level has to be involved, or a (decentralized) district with an elected body and some power over administration (the neighbourhood level is not enough); (3) it has to be a repeated process (one meeting or one referendum on financial issues does not constitute an example of participatory budgeting); (4) the process must include some form of public deliberation within the framework of specific meetings/forums (the opening of administrative meetings or classical representative instances to ‘normal’ citizens is not participatory budgeting); (5) some accountability on the output is required. (Sintomer et al., 2008, p. 168).

In brief, there shall be five indispensable principles to determine whether a practice deemed as PB, i.e. financial/budgetary discussion, city/district level involvement, yearly repetition, public deliberation, and results accountability.

## **2.2.2 Dimensions of Participatory Budgeting.**

In the view of the considerable variations of PB involving numerous variables, Cabannes (2004) condensed experiences of 25 (twenty-five) municipalities in Latin America and Europe into four key dimensions as follows (pp. 33-41):

### ***2.2.2.1 Budgetary/financial dimension.***

This substantial dimension is mainly related to the amount of resource allocated to PB within two possible schemes. First, it entails a discussion to identify the debated amount. Second, there is no discussion on the amount, so that amount is only symbolic and gains less attention compared to project. Based on budgetary/financial dimension, there are three degrees of resource allocation for PB process presented in percentage of the municipal investment resources, namely less than 2 per cent; between 2 per cent and 10 per cent; and 100 per cent. Again, these amounts correspond to a proportion of the executed budget within the overall municipal budget. It depends therefore on each local situation, especially on the political will of the local government and the pressure of its citizens.

Another variable that determines and has direct impact to the quality of PB process is specific budgetary allocation. This allocation might cover the costs of the personnel in charge, operation, communication, transportation for citizens to unreachable meeting venue, dissemination of results, external

auditing, documentation, etc. The availability of resource in each municipality affects the diverse allocations of these specific costs.

Lastly, it is pivotal to consider the relationship between PB practice and tax revenue. Given that PB process requires significant amount of financing, the local government strives to maximize tax revenues and minimize delinquency. In fact, there is an interrelationship within this endeavour. The more revenue generated from evasion reduction, the more works and services result from PB projects. Correspondingly, the realization of work and services funded by PB along with its transparency would influence the taxpaying habit. In other words, the process also heightens awareness among the citizens of the resources, their limits, and their origin.

#### ***2.2.2.2 Participatory dimension.***

Many studies have much considered participation when discussing PB. Therefore, participatory dimension comprises the highest number of variables compared to three other dimensions. To begin with, this prominent dimension differentiates participation in PB into three forms: (a) direct democracy, in which a citizen can directly and individually participate in the meetings; (b) indirect/representative democracy, in which citizens are represented through existing organizations in discussions and decisions process; and (c) community-based democracy, in which only one single organization allowed by the government is able to represent citizens and participate in the process. Beside these three common forms, there is also

mixed-system that relies on social or neighbourhoods organizations as well as open discussions for whole citizens.

In addition to the forms of participation, varied models of governance, public management, and democracy play a significant role in determining who decides on the budget. In the first modality, which is the most popular, elaboration and consolidation of the budget occur in participatory meetings under the responsibility of the central body of PB (for instance the Council of Participatory Budget or COP). This body is also responsible to finalize and present the budget to the municipal council for final approval. A second approach first begins with the budget approval by the municipal council followed by discussion between the executive and the citizens. Some researchers called this practice *transversalization* and considered it as a dilution of PB. The last and least common procedure emphasizes the authority of the mayor in making the final decision as the representative of executive branch, so that the citizens only have consultative power.

Furthermore, participatory dimension also embraces exclusion issues relating to gender, age, ethnicity, and immigration. Participation of those who are traditionally excluded becomes one of overriding topics for debate. PB deals with this matter through different approaches, such as formation of committee particular to vulnerable groups, universalization without specific focus, introduction of actor-centric perspective, and execution of affirmative action towards excluded groups.



The last variable in the scope of citizen participation is monitoring and controlling during the implementation of PB. Those carrying out the function to oversight and oversee varies from specific entity; specific body of PB or social/neighbourhood organizations with/without its specific commission; to apparatus of the local government. The later reflects a traditional role of the executive branch.

Aside from the citizen, participatory dimension also encompasses the vital role of the local government in PB process. Firstly, it is related to how the municipality shares the information and disseminates the results of PB. A minimum scene is that of lacking information as well as unpublished and inaccessible PB's outcomes that in turn diminish public trust and willingness to participate in the upcoming events. Next degree is the government restricts communication through official bulletin, limited information amid the representatives only, or digital-based information excluding those illiterate or without internet access. The last situation involves a wide dissemination of the results and progress through mass media (television, radio, or press), pamphlets distributed house-to-house, or public accountability meetings. Secondly, the completion of the approved projects in the following two years, which might be below 20 per cent; from 20 per cent to 80 per cent; or above 80 per cent, has an influence on citizens' trust towards PB process. Finally, to what extent the legislative branch engages in the PB practice is also remarkable. The probability ranges from being opposition; playing a passive role with lacking involvement; to performing an active participation in every single phase of the process.

### ***2.2.2.3 Normative and legal-judicial dimension.***

A noteworthy issue on the formalization and institutionalization emerged in the spirit of bringing PB experience to the further level. This attempt comprises some objectives such as assuring its adequate performance, maintaining its dynamics, and circumventing bureaucratization, albeit the risks of *instrumentalization* and manipulation remain during the process. At one extreme is that of an institutionalized self-regulation along with manuals consisting of guidelines and general criteria with annual adjustment. In some cases, the process of regulation and institutionalization produce constitutions, laws, decrees, or resolutions of the municipality. At the other extreme is when informal procedures rely only on the Mayor's political will with mobilized citizenry.

Furthermore, considering the fact that PB is a one or two-year exercise dealing with notable demands of the people, its relationship with the existing long-term planning becomes one of the immense challenges. The matter is how to link PB prioritizing the betterment for narrower scope of society with the strategic and development planning as well as necessities of the entire city. The most advance state refers to a lucid relationship and interaction between PB and other planning instruments in the municipality. In this case, the possibility is either PB follows the prevailed plans or PB precedes the plans of development. The reverse circumstance is where the municipality's planning does not exist.

#### ***2.2.2.4 Spatial/territorial dimension.***

The last but not least dimension of PB corresponds to territory of municipality connecting to decentralization of power and de-concentration of services. A minimalist modality is PB process undergoes on the base of the existing administrative division with the administrative apparatus in charge. In a more advance approach, the territorial assemblies exceed the geographically decentralized areas establishing subdistrict assemblies. The superlative scenario is the territorial assemblies exist in all neighbourhoods and communities, even the most marginal ones.

The issue of ruralization, in which development process usually marginalizes certain rural areas, also becomes a consideration in examining PB implementation. Some cases show that the municipality partially conducts PB in either the urban area or the rural area. In intermediate situation, the implementation of PB occurs both in urban and rural area. The most advance state is PB takes place not only in the city as a whole, but also with preferences on rural areas.

Besides two aforementioned variables, PB also enables an *inversion* of priorities within its process. This means that PB prioritizes the most disadvantaged neighbourhoods in directing more resources with the objective of bridging the gap between rich and poor area in the city. A lower degree of investment is that of recognizing the formal and informal city without any preference. The least advance scene is the municipality reinforces the formal city, which includes detriment of illegal neighbourhoods.

Table 2 and Figure 1 present the dimensions of PB in more intelligible display as follows:


**Table 2 Dimensions, Variables, and Arrangements of Participatory Budgeting**

Dimensions	Variables	Minimal arrangement	Intermediate arrangement	Maximum arrangement
Budgetary/ Financial	1. Debated resources	Less than 2% of capital budget	From 2% to 100% of capital budget	100 % of capital and operating budgets
	2. Specific allocation	Municipal department/team covers costs	Personnel and their activities (i.e. travel)	Personnel, activities, dissemination, training, etc.
	3. Taxation policies	None	Deliberation on tax policies	Deliberation on loans and subsidies
Participatory (citizens)	4. Participation form	Community-based representative democracy	Community-based representative democracy, different type of associations	Direct democracy, universal participation
	5. Decision maker	None	Existing social or political structure, government and citizens (mixed)	Specific commissions with elected council members and citizen majority
	6. Participation of the excluded	Thematic and neighbourhood plenaries	Neighbourhoods, themes (including civic issues)	Neighbourhood + thematic + actor-based, preference for excluded groups
	7. Monitoring and control	Executive	Nonspecific commissions (PB councils, associations)	Specific commissions
Participatory (local government)	8. Information sharing and dissemination	Secret, unpublished	Limited dissemination, web, official bulletin, informing delegates	Wide dissemination including house-to-house distribution
	9. Projects completion	Less than 20%	From 20% to 80%	Over 80%
	10. Legislative role	Opposition	Passive, nonparticipation	Active involvement
Normative and Legal-judicial	11. Institutionalization	Informal process	Only institutionalized or only self-regulated annually	Formalized (some parts regulated) with annual self-regulation (revolutionary)
	12. Relationship with planning instruments	Only PB (no long-term plan exists)	Coexistence of PB and City Plans, without direct relationship	Clear relationship and interaction between PB and Planning in one system

Dimensions	Variables	Minimal arrangement	Intermediate arrangement	Maximum arrangement
Spatial/ Territorial	13. Intramunicipal decentralization	Follows administrative regions	Goes beyond administrative regions	Decentralization to all communities and neighbourhoods
	14. Ruralization	Either urban area or rural area	Entire municipal territory	Entire municipality with specific measures for rural areas (preferences)
	15. Investment	Reinforces the city	Recognizes both formal and informal city, without preferences	Priority investment in most needy areas (peripheral, central, rural)

*Source: Adopted from Cabannes (2004) and Cabannes (2006)*

**Figure 1 Dimensions of Participatory Budgeting**



*Source: Modified from Cabannes (2004) and Cabannes (2006)*

### **2.3 Participatory Budgeting in Porto Alegre**

Participatory budgeting came into reality in Porto Alegre after a huge social and political movement that shook the country from the dictatorship regime in 1980s. The new regime of local government insisted a mechanism of participatory process along with the demand by community association to have a co-decision-making capacity (Sintomer et al, 2012, p. 32) as a response to the situation of poor population (Avritzer, 1999, p. 11).

The initiative continued to perform and institutionalized as a conjunction of top-down and bottom-up process. The main idea is to make citizens create their roles in local development by getting involved in the arrangement of allocation of public budget. They

give their hands and voices in decision-making process at village level meeting, in the co-decision at city level, and in oversight at all levels. Any member of the community who wants to participate is allowed to do so.

Generally, PB in Porto Alegre has two stages of process: participatory stage in which voices are sounded directly and representative stage in which delegates/councillor are elected to sound community voices. Then why the PB in Porto Alegre is worth to be explored as a good example? Souza (2001) described the main features of PB in Porto Alegre as follows:

- (a) Functioning. The district and thematic plenary assemblies are the central features of PB in Porto Alegre. They participate in budget-writing process in different ways and areas of the city. The system of PB in Porto Alegre is systematically purposive. The change of 'A', for example, is based on experience and improvement.
- (b) Investment priorities. The preference in using resources allocation is mainly for street, paving, housing, and community equipment. The priorities are usually graded according to their ranking of priorities. They are even indicated by one to five stars. Distribution criteria are also established to assure the distribution of resources so that inferior area may receive more funding than the other ones. The total investment is counted by the district-level measurements of its poverty and infrastructures.
- (c) Resources and expenditure. It has to be understood that PB is not always about deciding the budget, but seems more to be an infrastructure investment. The budgeting may be said an authorization of expenditure on priorities whether it can be completed or not by the executive; that is why the project and the budget may vary from a year to another year like the one it does in Porto Alegre.

- (d) The participants. Social activism is quite strong in Porto Alegre. Almost half of inhabitants are attached to civic association, and more than 50 per cent of them are active in local events and in seeking voting information. The belief that the associations and politicians have a role in defending their interest in local development is not enough, then the emphasis to maintain non-elite political activism emerges.
- (e) Delegates. Delegates are chosen from the participants who attend the second general assembly, not from the members of community association for the reason that they could be tainted by clientelism or political prospects. The criteria and the time of mandate of the delegates are also changed over time following and adapting the complexity of PB order and the possibility of clientelism practices.
- (f) Institutional arrangements and the bureaucracy. Institutional arrangement is also decisive in PB success story in Porto Alegre. The commitment of PB implementing agency was once questioned for its ineffectiveness in bureaucracy and the practice of clientelism, then a particular agency, which links to mayor's office, was created. It currently succeed in to overcome the complaints on bureaucracy's commitment to PB.
- (g) Visibility and satisfaction. PB is exceedingly popular among Porto Alegre local citizens. Almost all of the citizens were ever at least once participating in the process of PB. This maintains the citizens to be active socially and persists the PB to last. The satisfaction to the process is also contributing to the run of PB in Porto Alegre.



## **2.4 The Musrenbang in Indonesia**

Officially, the Musrenbang is the process of bottom-up development planning which includes multi-stakeholder consultation forum to encourage and promote the community participation in planning the development at regional level. It is such a deliberative forum in which differences on local development issues between government and nongovernmental stakeholders are negotiated, reconciled, and harmonized. It is hence, at the same time, a forum for synchronizing the bottom-up and top-down planning to reach consensus on priorities and budgets.

The Musrenbang is administered at all of administrative levels of local government. The process takes its first step in the lowest community level to ensure the bottom-up expression of aspiration and priorities. In this way, government agents in that level are obliged to collect as many voices of community members as possible to identify possible projects. The identification of the voices will call for deliberation and negotiation among stakeholders before later results in a list of priorities. The result of the deliberation will be a legal document of project proposal to bring to the next level of Musrenbang, kecamatan and city levels. The Musrenbang in the latter level will be organized as the preparation of the RKPD (Local Government Work Plan) which is later elaborated to programs and projects (Sindre, 2012, p. 18) to perform in the following financial year.

Musrenbang is a strategy of bottom-up mobilization. The actors of the process, to mention, are the chiefs of desa/kelurahan, kecamatan officials, the members of the DPRD, local government agencies, and the Bappelitbangda as the agency that is responsible for the Musrenbang implementation. Most of all, local community is the main stakeholder for it is the subject of the development and the object at once.

The Musrenbang is an effort to encourage citizen participation in formal administrative planning and budgeting process. The government has legislated the effort with several regulations, such as Law No. 32 of 2004 (23 of 2014 revised) on Regional Governance as the basis of local government autonomy in ministering its budget and sources, Law No. 25 of 2004 on National Development Planning as the legal basis of the Musrenbang activities, Joint Ministerial Decree 2006 and 2007 on the Musrenbang as a set of guideline on procedures, process, and mechanism for conducting the Musrenbang.

While the Musrenbang has been long implemented, some problems and critics with varied issues still emerge. Sindre (2012) pointed out some of them:

- (a) The process is mainly driven by local elites, politicians, and bureaucrats; and questions toward the real participation of local communities therefore arises.
- (b) There is no the real determination nor opportunities for community to decide the budget and allocation. The participation seems to matter only in the early stage of the process to decide what to be the project and what project to do next.
- (c) The Musrenbang claims a large majority of small-scale infrastructure, and then the social and economic change is in question.
- (d) The forum goes to the public to ensure a formal degree of openness rather than a forum for deliberation and discussion.
- (e) The Musrenbang is indeed the bottom-up deliberation yet still top-down implementation and practice.


The problems mentioned above may be the result of the following conditions listed by USAID: (a) Uneven commitment from regional leadership; (b) Limited legislative oversight of budget preparation and disbursement; (c) Little influence of the Musrenbang process on resource allocation; (d) Limited capacity of CSOs to understand the planning

process and to push for transparency and change; and (e) The enormous issues in planning and budgeting.

The Musrenbang, in practice, is open to discretion to find the best shape of participatory planning and budgeting. It is exemplified by Kebumen regency where 10 per cent of development budget is devolved to kecamatan and desa level of government. Then again, Makassar city government distributed about 500 million rupiahs for block grant funds to kecamatan (Sindre, 2012, p. 14). However, it depends on the strength of local political will and support of local government leader to participatory development.

Figure 2 clearly delineates the Musrenbang within a framework of planning and budgeting system in Indonesia.

**Figure 2 Planning and Budgeting of Local Government**



Source: Illustrated from related laws (2018)

### **3. Research Methodology**

In order to respond the problem statement, this study employed both qualitative and quantitative approach encompassing data sources, data collection techniques, and data analysis. Firstly, considering “how” which is raised in the research question, this study primarily utilized qualitative approach in case study design. Yin (2014) contended that case study is an appropriate method “when (a) the main research questions are “how” or “why” questions, (b) a researcher has little or no control over behavioral events, and (c) the focus of study is a contemporary (as opposed to entirely historical) phenomenon” (Abstract, para. 1). Correspond to Yin, Creswell (2014) suggested to choose qualitative approach when limited research has been conducted on a concept or phenomenon, so that it requires to be investigated and comprehended (p. 50). Secondly, this study also used quantitative approach in nonexperimental design with survey basis in an attempt to have measurable and comparable data. Hence, this study utilized an exploratory sequential mixed methods design involving a two-phase project: qualitative phase that built into quantitative phase (Creswell, 2014, p. 44). The amalgamation of both approaches led to a more thorough comprehension of research problems than either approach alone.

#### **3.1 Data Sources**

##### **3.1.1 Primary data source.**

Primary data sources in this research are the informants of in-depth interview within qualitative design and the respondents of questionnaire within quantitative design. All informants were selected by using one of nonprobability samplings, namely purposive sampling that aims to select information-rich cases based on the

research purpose (Patton, 1990, p. 169). The informants of this study directly engaged in the Musrenbang and are listed as follows:

- (a) heads of villages and neighbourhoods (*desa* and *kelurahan*);
- (b) head and staffs of the Development Subdivision on subdistricts' (*kecamatan*) office;
- (c) government officials of the Bappelitbangda;
- (d) member of the Budget Committee (*Badan Anggaran*) on the Local Legislative Assembly (*DPRD*); and
- (e) member of the Village/Neighbourhood Empowerment Organization (*LPMD/K*);

**Table 3 Number of Informants Based on Categories**

No.	Data Source	Number of individuals
1.	Heads of desa and kelurahan	3
2.	Head and staffs of Development Subdivision in kecamatan office	2
3.	Government officials of the Bappelitbangda	3
4.	Member of the Badan Anggaran	1
5.	Member of the LPMD/K	1
Total		10

*Source: The Author (2018)*

With regard to the respondents, the Statistics of Batu City (*BPS Kota Batu*) has set a sampling for the National Basic Health Research that was conducted by the Ministry of Health in April 2018 throughout Indonesia. The author contacted the local coordinator of this project and asked permission to distribute the questionnaire together with their items. Accordingly, the author randomly picked 5 respondents from each desa or kelurahan who did not directly participate in the Musrenbang at any level with the total of 120 people from 24 desa and kelurahan.

### **3.1.2 Secondary data source.**

The secondary data was derived from legal documents regarding the Musrenbang, both printed (hard copy) and electronic (soft copy) form. This includes laws and regulations (Laws, Government Regulations, Ministerial Regulation, and Ministerial Decree), guidelines, guidance, schedules, attendance lists, meeting notes, and official reports. In addition, this study also utilized geographic and demographic data of Batu City as the research locus.

## **3.2 Data Collection Techniques**

### **3.2.1 In-depth interview.**

Within a case study design, this study undertook in-depth interviews to 10 (ten) informants who were classified into 5 (five) categories as previously presented in Table 1. These categories embrace both government and civil society sectors that formally engage in the Musrenbang process. Each informant was interviewed in once or twice meeting to obtain required data by using an interview guidance designed by Sintomer, Herzberg, and Röcke for their research in 2008 (see Appendix 1) . However, the author has modified and translated it into Bahasa (Indonesian language). While interviewing, the author was also able to do nonparticipant observation in order to have a comprehensive information.

### **3.2.2 Nonparticipant observation.**

This study employed nonparticipant observation in order to witness the actual process of the Musrenbang. According to the prevailed laws and regulations, the

Musrenbang officially begins in January at desa or kelurahan level, continues at the kecamatan level in February, and ends in March at the city level. In fact, the schedules became tentative and were adjusted to the actual condition in the field. The author was not able to attend every single event of the Musrenbang because some desa and kelurahan held the events on the same time. Thus, the author chose to attend events by considering the proportional number of desa or kelurahan in each kecamatan. This nonparticipant observation used observation sheets (see Appendix 2).

### **3.2.3 Documentation.**

Documentation technique also played an important role in this study by which plenty secondary data were collected. These documents were acquired from numerous sources, such as local government agencies (particularly the Bappelitbangda and the Dispendukcapil), Statistics, stakeholders engaged in the Musrenbang process at all level, as well as internet. Thereafter, collected documents were administered based on the same category in order to simplify further stage, videlicet, data analysis. The categories were laws and regulations; guidelines and guidance; schedules and attendance lists; meeting notes and official reports; as well as geographic and demographic data.

### **3.2.4 Questionnaire.**

In order to obtain a complete data, this study involved common public—in other words, nonstakeholders—in the investigation. The objective of this involvement is to examine what and to what extent they know about the



Musrenbang. Along with the interview guidance, the questionnaire in this study was a modification of what Sintomer, Herzberg, and Röcke constructed for their research in 2008 (see Appendix 3). However, the author did a major modification taking into account the relevance to the research environment. The questionnaire consists of 13 (thirteen) questions, to wit: eight close-ended questions, one open-ended question, as well as four mixed close-ended and open-ended questions.

### **3.2.5 Assessment and evaluation sheets.**

In 2007, the Minister of Home Affairs issued a decree on Guideline of Assessment and Evaluation of the Practice of the Musrenbang. Unfortunately, this guideline is less popular and even rarely used by the local governments for the sake of improving the Musrenbang practice. This instrument comprises 119 (one hundred and nineteen) structured questions, appraising four stages of the practice of the Musrenbang in an order as follows:

- (a) Preparation with 23 questions;
- (b) Execution with 59 questions;
- (c) Result quality with 30 questions; and
- (d) Post-implementation with 7 questions.


The author has translated this tool to English for this study's sake (see Appendix 4).

## **3.3 Data Analysis**

This study utilized three concurrent flows of data analysis—viz. data condensation, data display, and conclusions drawing/verifying—proposed by Miles, Huberman, and

Saldaña (2014). Figure 3 presents this perspective, where the activity of data collection and data analysis forms an interactive and cyclical process.

**Figure 3 Interactive Model of Data Analysis**



*Source: Modified from Miles, Huberman, and Saldaña (2014).*

Miles et. al (2014) defined data condensation as “the process of selecting, focusing, simplifying, abstracting, and/or transforming the data that appear in the full corpus (body) of written-up field notes, interview transcripts, documents, and other empirical materials” (p. 12). Thorough data condensation was done on both primary and secondary data derived from in-depth interview, nonparticipant observation, documentation, questionnaire, and evaluation assessment. This process took place in continuity and included categorization and coding. Meanwhile, data display—in forms of matrices, graphs, charts, and networks—enabled the author to comprehend and capture the meaning of the data. Finally, both data condensation and data display built to conclusions drawing/verifying by taking validity into account. As shown in Figure 2, data condensation, data display, and conclusion drawing/verifying are intertwined and cyclic.

## 4. Results and Discussion

The primary purpose of this study was to assess the Musrenbang process as a practice of Participatory Budgeting in Indonesia by taking a case study of Batu City Government. In order to attain this goal, aforementioned methods had been operated for collecting and analysing data. This chapter presents findings from in-depth interview, nonparticipant observation, documentation, questionnaire, as well as assessment and evaluation sheets for further discussion by using aforementioned literature review.

### 4.1 General Overview of Batu City


#### 4.1.1 Geography

Batu City is located between 122°17' to 122°57' eastern altitude and 7°44' to 8°26' southern latitude. The boundaries of Batu City are defined as follows:

- In the North : Mojokerto Regency and Pasuruan Regency
- In the East : Malang Regency
- In the South : Blitar Regency and Malang Regency
- In the West : Malang Regency

Situated in 862 metres above sea level, Batu City area is surrounded by hills. With a total area of 199.09 km<sup>2</sup>, Batu City is divided into three *kecamatan* (subdistrict) areas, i.e. Batu, Bumiaji, and Junrejo. The following map presents Batu City in a geographic perspective.

### Figure 4 Batu City in Map



*Source: Adopted from the Spatial Plans of Batu City (2017)*

### 4.1.2 Demography

The total population of Batu City is 222,540 and spread in its three kecamatan (Dispendukcapil, 2018). Almost half of it (46.07 percent) live in Kecamatan Batu, the downtown area of Batu City. The rest residents occupy Kecamatan Bumiaji (28.72 percent) and Kecamatan Junrejo (25.21 percent). Kecamatan Bumiaji is the widest area in Batu City with the least inhabitants. It is related to the fact that it has mountainous area mostly used as an agriculture area and conservational area.

**Table 4 Administrative Divisions of Batu City**

No.	Kecamatan	Kelurahan	Desa	Inhabitant
1.	Batu	4	4	102,516
2.	Bumiaji	0	9	63,919
3.	Junrejo	1	6	56,105
Total		5	19	222,540

*Source: Adopted from demography data of the Dispendukcapil (2018)*

Population density are closely related to caring capability of an area. The indicator commonly used is density ratio that states the number of population per unit area, in this case, in kilometers square. Thus, based on this indicator, the densest area in Batu City is Kecamatan Batu, followed by Kecamatan Junrejo and Kecamatan Bumiaji. In fact, the density ratio in Kecamatan Batu and Kecamatan Junrejo is almost equal regardless the number of inhabitants.

## 4.2 The Musrenbang in Batu City Government

### 4.2.1 Budgetary/financial dimension.

When discussing budgeting/financial dimension of the Musrenbang in a district/city, it is advantageous to review the local government's budget and

financial system as a whole entity. Different from other countries that have separated budgetary for PB implementation, there is no resource allocated to cover the Musrenbang as an independent public event. In other words, the Musrenbang is not tied to any allocation. In local budget for fiscal year 2018 of Batu City Government, the expenditures are managed by local agencies (see Table 5).

**Table 5 Local Budget for Fiscal Year of 2018**

1	2	3	4	
			IDR	JPY
1	<b>REVENUES</b>		<b>935,194,903,029.69</b>	<b>7,481,559,224.24</b>
1.1	<b>LOCAL OWN-SOURCE REVENUES</b>	<b>15.34%</b>	<b>143,500,209,240.69</b>	<b>1,148,001,673.93</b>
1.1.1	Local Tax Revenue	11.87%	111,000,000,000.00	888,000,000.00
1.1.2	Local Levy Revenue	1.21%	11,345,074,530.00	90,760,596.24
1.1.3	Local Own-Source Assets Revenue	0.30%	2,760,797,996.69	22,086,383.97
1.1.4	Other Legal Local Own-Source Revenues	1.97%	18,394,336,714.00	147,154,693.71
1.2	<b>BALANCING FUNDS</b>	<b>68.01%</b>	<b>636,003,033,000.00</b>	<b>5,088,024,264.00</b>
1.2.1	Tax/ Non-Tax Revenue Sharing	7.59%	71,011,838,000.00	568,094,704.00
1.2.2	General Allocation Fund	50.78%	474,881,106,000.00	3,799,048,848.00
1.2.3	Special Allocation Fund	9.64%	90,110,089,000.00	720,880,712.00
1.3	<b>OTHER LEGAL LOCAL REVENUES</b>	<b>16.65%</b>	<b>155,691,660,789.00</b>	<b>1,245,533,286.31</b>
1.3.1	Grant Revenue	1.58%	14,814,592,918.00	118,516,743.34
1.3.3	Tax Revenue Sharing Funds from Other Provincial and Local Governments	6.79%	63,472,031,871.00	507,776,254.97
1.3.4	Adjustment and Special Autonomy Funds	8.17%	76,391,636,000.00	611,133,088.00
1.3.5	Financial Aid from Other Provincial or Local Governments	0.11%	1,013,400,000.00	8,107,200.00
2	<b>EXPENDITURES</b>		<b>935,194,903,029.69</b>	<b>7,481,559,224.24</b>
2.1	<b>INDIRECT EXPENDITURES</b>	<b>51.41%</b>	<b>480,778,233,582.00</b>	<b>3,846,225,868.66</b>
2.1.1	Employee Expenditure	35.33%	330,398,781,165.00	2,643,190,249.32
2.1.4	Grant Expenditure	6.05%	56,551,052,000.00	452,408,416.00
2.1.5	Social Aid Expenditure	1.87%	17,522,060,000.00	140,176,480.00
2.1.6	Revenue Sharing Expenditure to Province/Regency/City and Village Government	1.04%	9,685,651,734.00	77,485,213.87
2.1.7	Financial Aid Expenditure to Province/Regency/City, Village Government, and Political Parties	6.91%	64,620,688,683.00	516,965,509.46

1	2	3	4	
			IDR	JPY
2.1.8	Unexpected Expenditure	0.21%	2,000,000,000.00	16,000,000.00
2.2	<b>DIRECT EXPENDITURES</b>	<b>48.59%</b>	<b>454,416,669,447.69</b>	<b>3,635,333,355.58</b>
2.2.1	Employee Expenditure	6.40%	59,878,729,761.00	479,029,838.09
2.2.2	Goods and Services Expenditure	29.60%	276,828,174,704.77	2,214,625,397.64
2.2.3	Capital Expenditure	12.59%	117,709,764,981.92	941,678,119.86
	<b>SURPLUS/(DEFICIT)</b>		<b>0.00</b>	<b>0.00</b>
3	<b>LOCAL FINANCING</b>			
3.1	<b>INCOMING LOCAL FINANCING</b>		<b>0.00</b>	<b>0.00</b>
3.1.1	Unspent Funds of Budget in the Previous Fiscal Year		0.00	0.00
3.2	<b>OUTGOING LOCAL FINANCING</b>		<b>0.00</b>	<b>0.00</b>
3.2.2	Equity Participation (Investment) of Local Government		0.00	0.00
	<b>NETTO FINANCING</b>		<b>0.00</b>	<b>0.00</b>
	<b>UNSPENT FINANCING OF BUDGET IN THE CURRENT YEAR</b>		<b>0.00</b>	<b>0.00</b>

Source: Translated from the 2018 Annual Budget of Batu City Government (2018)



Thus, the budget is very limited because top-down planning mechanisms—in national, regional, and local scope—also exist. Having the debated allocation below 2 per cent, in turn, brings an inevitable consequence. The government found that it is hard to accommodate the public demands optimally. This circumstance leads to citizens' apathy and pessimism. A statement of Kecamatan's staff supported this findings:

*"...Masyarakat sudah apatis dan pesimis karena banyak permintaannya tidak dipenuhi. Kan ada yang namanya skala prioritas karena keterbatasan anggaran..."* (S4, O, 2017-08-24)

Translation:

"...The citizens have been apathetic and pessimistic because many of their demands were not fulfilled. There is a priority scale due to the budget limitation..."

What happens in Porto Alegre is extremely different. The allocation for PB practice is almost 10 per cent of the entire city's budget that could reach 100 per cent of the investment resources (Cabannes, 2004, p. 34). The percentage of investment, however, might fluctuate year by year. Without budget difficulty, Porto Alegre PB is able to focus on the prioritizing of the proposed projects. It is not surprising, thus, that PB experience in Porto Alegre becomes a best practice modeled by its adherents.

However, Batu City Government provides particular funds through the Bappelitbangda as the agency responsible to manage and organize the Musrenbang. Specific allocation addresses the meetings held at every level and phase, especially for the rented venue, office administration (printing and copying the materials), catering, and transportation cost for the citizens attending. Table 6 displays global budget for local development planning program—including the Musrenbang—handled by the Bappelitbangda for fiscal year of 2018.

**Table 6 Budget for the Musrenbang**

Code	Description	Expenditures (IDR)			Expenditures (JPY)
		Employee	Goods and Services	Capital	
4.03 . 4.03.01 . 21	<b>Local Development Planning Program</b>	<b>0.00</b>	<b>1,402,648,700.00</b>	<b>0.00</b>	<b>11,221,189.60</b>
4.03 . 4.03.01 . 21 . 06	Implementation of Musrenbang RPJMD	0.00	169,518,000.00	0.00	1,356,144.00
4.03 . 4.03.01 . 21 . 07	Drafting and enactment of RPJMD	0.00	486,815,000.00	0.00	3,894,520.00
4.03 . 4.03.01 . 21 . 09	Implementation of the Musrenbang RKPD	0.00	226,255,500.00	0.00	1,810,044.00
4.03 . 4.03.01 . 21 . 12	Drafting coordination of LKPJ	0.00	139,821,000.00	0.00	1,118,568.00
4.03 . 4.03.01 . 21 . 22	Drafting and enactment of RKPD	0.00	129,920,000.00	0.00	1,039,360.00
4.03 . 4.03.01 . 21 . 53	Monitoring and evaluation of using and development results financed by specific funds	0.00	85,227,200.00	0.00	681,817.60
4.03 . 4.03.01 . 21 . 54	Coordination and Synchronization of Divisions	0.00	165,092,000.00	0.00	1,320,736.00

*Source: Translated from the 2018 Annual Budget of the Bappelitbangda (2018)*

Related to the discussion on taxation policies, there is a significant disparity between Batu and Porto Alegre. Drawing on laws and regulations concerning decentralization, local governments in Indonesia are entitled to manage its local revenues and expenditures autonomously. Nevertheless, there is no chance of public involvement in determining what and how the municipality's finance operates. Along with local levy revenue, local own-source assets revenue, and other legal local own-source revenue, local tax revenue becomes one area of the government's authority. On one hand, any action to enhance revenue on tax sector does not have any effect on the Musrenbang implementation due to the absence of resources distributed. On the other hand, the results of the Musrenbang also do not prompt any improvement of taxpaying patterns. In Porto Alegre case, the descent of tax nonpayment from 20 per cent to 15 per cent in less than a decade has contributed to 6 per cent upsurge of the municipality's revenue (Cabannes, 2004, p. 36). This escalation, in turn, influences positively to the practice of PB in which PB has more resources to deliver works and services. Subsequently, productive implementation PB stimulates the citizens to avoid tax evasion.

#### **4.2.2 Participatory dimension.**

Participatory is deemed as a crucial element of PB. Evaluating the Musrenbang based on this dimension, therefore, is noteworthy. To begin with, the Musrenbang is an indirect or representative democracy in which citizens are represented through their leaders from the lowest level of community. The nonparticipant observation confirmed this statement. In fact, the higher level of the Musrenbang is, the smaller number of common public involving. At the desa/kelurahan level, the member of village-level organizations and community

chiefs attend the meeting. At the kecamatan level, only the desa/kelurahan chiefs and three representatives are allowed to join the meeting. Finally, at the city level, only the desa/kelurahan chiefs are able to take part in the meeting. This presence does not mean that they can actively participate during the process.

Secondly, there is no specialized body responsible to the Musrenbang implementation. The Bappelitbangda is the entity that has authority over it. Nonetheless, the Bappelitbangda of Batu City Government tends to merely execute a coordinative function. This fact is revealed by the kecamatan's staffs criticizing the recent performance of the Bappelitbangda. As S4 stated:

*“Bappeda yang sekarang berbeda dengan yang sebelum-sebelumnya. Mereka sekarang seperti lepas tangan dan menyerahkan segala sesuatunya kepada desa dan kelurahan. Kan tidak bisa seperti itu. Bahkan jadwal pun kami sendiri yang akhirnya mengatur, karena Bappeda tidak ada inisiatif.”*  
(S4, O, 2018-03-01)

Translation:

“Different from the previous condition, the Bappelitbangda tended to take a hands-off action and handed everything over to desa/kelurahan. It should not be like that. We ourselves even had to make the schedule because there was no initiative from the Bappelitbangda.”

With regard to inclusiveness, it is officially regulated that the Musrenbang practice has to involve all elements of the society. Yet, this involvement is still in representative-based through legal organizations acknowledged by the government. At the city level, representatives of NGOs, business actors, marginal groups, women groups, and professional organizations are indeed invited. This does not ensure that they have opportunity to raise their voices.

In terms of monitoring and evaluation, the Bappelitbangda also takes the responsibility. Thus, it is troublesome to have a fair and thorough oversight and

oversee in this vulnerable mechanism. Actually, the Ministry of Home Affairs issued a decree No. 050-187/Kep/Bangda/2007 on Guideline of Assessment and Evaluation of the Practice of the Musrenbang. This instrument assesses and evaluates the Musrenbang practice from the preparation, execution, result quality, and post-execution facet. This study, therefore, utilized this instrument to enrich the comprehension on the Musrenbang practice in Batu City. The data from observations and interviews are used to fill out the questions and Table 7 shows the results as follows:

**Table 7 Assessment and Evaluation of the Musrenbang**

Description	Number of Question	Ideal Total Score	Achieved Total Score	Percentage
Preparation	23	23	21	91.30
Execution	59	59	29	49.15
Result Quality	30	30	18	60.00
Post-Execution	7	7	3	42.86
<b>Cumulative Score</b>	<b>119</b>	<b>119</b>	<b>71</b>	<b>59.66</b>

*Source: The author (2018)*

The Musrenbang practice in Batu City fulfilled 71 (seventy one) out of 119 (one hundred and nineteen) indicators of assessment and evaluation. The percentages reveal that the score of execution and post-execution are less than 50 per cent. The result quality is slightly above with 60 per cent accomplishment. The only good news is that the preparation stage is outstanding with more than 90 per cent.

Moving to the participatory dimension of the local government, the Musrenbang tended to be a ceremonial or formality. Informants stated, explicitly and implicitly, the government was less enthusiastic to create conducive environment of PB. Some problems emerged especially at the lower level such as:

- (a) The lack of communication from local government agencies. Some informants revealed that problems related to the accomodation of citizens' demands could be avoided if local government agencies opened a better communication. Local government agencies should share the outline of their programs based on RPJMD (Local Medium Term Development Planning) in order to minimize citizens' proposals which do not accord with it. As S3 said:

*"...Ketika Musrenbang itu sampaikan, program-program SKPD tahun ini yang sudah ada ini, ini, ini. Sehingga tahun depan jangan memunculkan yang ini. Jadi tidak double. Tapi tidak pernah ada penjelasan sejak awal..."* (S3, O, 2017-08-29)

Translation:

*"...The local government agencies should inform their current-year programs. So that, the citizens do not need to propose the same programs for the following year. But there has never been any explanation from the beginning..."*

This statement is supported by S6 who said:

*"...Saya pernah menyampaikan kepada Bappeda. Sebelum pelaksanaan Musrenbangdes itu apakah memungkinkan jika SKPD memberikan acuan untuk membatasi usulan masyarakat. Jadi bisa lebih terarah..."* (S6, O, 2017-08-24)

Translation:

*"...I have ever asked the Bappelitbangda. Is it possible if before the Musrenbang at desa/kelurahan level, local government agencies give a guidline to limit citizens' proposals. So that they can be more directed..."*

In addition, when citizens' proposal is rejected, responsible local government agencies should explain the reason of the rejection. It intends to avoid misunderstanding among citizens. As S3 stated:

*"...Delegasi ini membawa misi yang sangat berat karena dipercaya oleh masyarakat. Harapannya masyarakat usulan yang telah dimasukkan itu terealisasi atau bisa diterima. Nah, ini ketika dipertimbangkan dan ditolak, susah sekali untuk menjelaskan balik kepada masyarakat. Pemerintah ini agak kaku dalam memutuskan. 'Oh, tidak bisa ini.'*

*Menjelaskan tidak bisa ini karena apa? Begitu lho maksudnya...” (S3, O, 2017-08-29)*

Translation:

“...These delegates have a very heavy burden, since they were trusted by the citizens. Citizens’ expectation was that the proposals submitted would be executed or accepted. If the proposals got status of ‘considered’ and ‘rejected’, it was very difficult to explain to the citizens. The government was rather stiff in deciding. They only said, ‘Oh, this is not acceptable’. They did not explain the reason. That is what I mean...”

This statement is supported by S10 who said:

*“...Terkait usulan masyarakat itu harapannya ada penjelasan dari pemerintah. Ada jawaban walaupun tidak dapat direalisasikan. Jadi kami yang mewakili ini bisa menyampaikan kembali kepada masyarakat...” (S10, H, 2017-08-27)*

Translation:

“...Related to citizens’ proposal, we expected that there is any explanation from the government. There is any answer in case the proposal is not able to be executed. So that we who represent the citizens could explain to them...”

- (b) The lack of information concerning the unit price standard in drafting proposal.

This complicates citizens in determining the nominal price of the project proposed. For instance, the citizens proposed for a road improvement. They could measure the volume including length, width, and height of the road. But they could not decide which specification or quality will be used and how much the cost is. Thus, they used a raw estimation of the nominal price that sometimes did not meet the standard. As S1 stated:

*“...Masyarakat mengidentifikasi kebutuhan mereka, kemudian menyepakati mana-mana yang akan diusulkan. Nah, kesulitannya adalah menentukan nominal usulannya sesuai dengan standar baku yang berlaku di Pemkot. Misalnya, masyarakat akan mengusulkan perbaikan jalan. Volumennya bisa diukur, panjangnya sekian, lebarnya sekian. Tetapi untuk nominalnya kan masyarakat tidak tahu berapa standar harganya. Erat kaitannya juga dengan spesifikasinya kan? Mau pakai*

*kualitas yang mana? Itu yang tahu kan dinas teknisnya. Akhirnya yang terjadi adalah nominalnya dikira-kira saja...” (S1, O, 2017-08-24)*

Translation:

“...Citizens identified their necessities, afterwards they agreed on which ones would be proposed. The difficulty was in determining the nominal price of the proposal in accordance with prevailed standard in city government. For example, the citizens will propose road improvement. The volume indeed can be measured, what the length is, what the width is. But citizens do not know how much the price standard to determine the nominal price. It depends on the specification, doesn't it? Which quality will be used? One who knows is the technical agency. What happened finally was that the nominal price was only a raw estimation...”

This statement is supported by S6 who said:

*“...Belum lagi untuk menentukan spesifikasi dan nominal usulannya itu masyarakat kesulitan. Kalau hanya volume dan lokasi saja kan mudah. Tapi kalau nominal kan akhirnya hanya memakai perkiraan saja karena tidak tahu standarnya...” (S6, O, 2017-08-24)*

Translation:

“...It included the difficulty experienced by the citizens on how to determine the specification of proposal's nominal price. If we only talk about volume and location, it is easy. But if we talk about the nominal price, what finally used is only an estimation because they do not know the standard...”

S10 also had similar argument:

*“...Kalau proyek fisik kan harus ada RAB (Rencana Anggaran Biaya.red). Itu ada volumenya dan ada anggaran biayanya. Lha standar baku penentuan biayanya itu tidak ada...” (S10, H, 2017-08-27)*

Translation:

“...For infrastructure project, there must be a budget plan. It comprises volume and budget plan. The fact is that there was no standard to determine the cost...”

- (c) The less commitment from local government agencies to support. It is plausible to invite local government agencies in the Musrenbang at desa/kelurahan level and kecamatan level. This invitation intends to facilitate



the Musrenbang process in accordance with main duties and functions of each local government agencies. Unfortunately, it is not always responded in a positive tone. Heads of these agencies often delegated their presence to their subordinates such as head of division, head of subdivision, or even staff who do not have any authority to make a decision or even to answer in ongoing meeting. As S1 stated:

*“...pada Musrenbang tingkat desa atau kelurahan dan kecamatan kan seluruh dinas terkait diundang. Harapannya, ketika ada permasalahan terkait usulan, dinas tersebut bisa mengambil keputusan. Tapi faktanya, yang hadir pada Musrenbang adalah mereka yang tidak memiliki kewenangan untuk menentukan kebijakan karena bukan kepala dinas. Kepala dinas mewakilkan kepada bawahannya, entah kepala bidang, kepala sub bidang, bahkan stafnya. Jadi sifatnya hanya mendampingi. Kalau sekiranya membutuhkan keputusan, ya mereka hanya bisa bilang, ‘Ya nanti saya sampaikan dulu.’ Jadi ngambang...”* (S1, O, 2017-08-24)

Translation:

“...All related agencies were invited in desa/kelurahan-level and kecamatan-level Musrenbang. Hopefully, if there is any problem regarding proposal, the agency is able to make a decision. But the fact was that those coming did not have any authority to determine the policy since they were not head of agency. Head of agency delegated to her/his subordinates such as head of division, head of subdivision, or even staff. It tended to be merely an accompaniment. When it was necessary to make a decision, they only could say, ‘I will convey it later.’ There was no solution...”

This statement is supported by S9 who said:

*“...Kadang yang diundang kepala dinas, ternyata diwakilkan ke kepala bidang. Jangankan kepala bidang, malah staf. Itulah kelemahannya. Harusnya ya minimal sekretaris. Ketika ada pertanyaan bisanya bilang, ‘Iya, Pak, nanti saya sampaikan ke pimpinan.’ Pertemuannya sekarang koq nanti disampaikan...”* (S9, H, 2017-09-03)

Translation:

“...The head of agency was invited, but in fact she/he delegated to head of division or even staff. That is one of the weaknesses. It should be secretary of agency at minimum. When there was a question, she/he was

only could say, ‘Yes, Sir, I will convey it later.’ The meeting was ongoing right now but she/he would convey it later...”

S10 also had similar argument:

*“...Yang terjadi kadang unik. Musrenbang didampingi oleh dinas terkait. Tapi hanya diwakili oleh orang-orang yang tidak punya kewenangan. Akhirnya mereka saling lempar karena tidak bisa menjawab...”* (S10, H, 2017-08-27)

Translation:

“...What happened was sometimes unique. The Musrenbang was accompanied by related agencies. But it was delegated by those who did not have any authority. Finally they threw the responsibility on one to another because they were not able to answer...”

- (d) The role of the DPRD is weak. Administratively, the DPRD was elected in three different election areas based on the kecamatan division in Batu City, i.e. Batu, Bumiaji, and Junrejo. In the Musrenbang at the kecamatan level, they were invited regarding their functions as the “citizens’ representative”. In fact, their role tended to be political. As S1 said:

*“Oh, jelas. Apalagi kalau usulannya sudah masuk Banggar. Bisa banyak proyek siluman juga. Yang tidak ada menjadi ada.”* (S1, O, 2017-08-24)

Translation:

“Oh, it is obvious. Even more when the proposals were proceed in the Budget Committee. There could be ‘invisible’ project too. The inexistent one became exist...”

This statement is supported by S4 who said:

*“...Menurut saya, pengakomodasian usulan ditentukan oleh dua hal. Yang pertama adalah skala prioritas, yang kedua adalah kepentingan politis...”* (S4, O, 2017-08-28)

Translation:

“...In my opinion, proposal accommodation is determined by two things. The first one is priority scale, the second one is political interest...”


S6 also had similar argument:

*“Kepentingan politik itu menurut saya sangat besar. Malah lebih menentukan ketimbang alasan ketersediaan pagu. Jadi misalnya ada permintaan dari dewan setempat ya bisa diadakan. Karenanya ada yang menyebutkan, kalau di suatu daerah itu usulan-usulannya banyak yang tidak terakomodir, bisa jadi lantaran tidak ada dewan yang mewakili daerah tersebut. Kalau ada dewan yang berasal dari wilayah itu, usulan yang ada bisa dipercepat, usulan yang tidak ada bisa diadakan. Begitu. Itu memang tidak ada bukti sahnya, tetapi nyata terjadi...” (S6, O, 2017-08-24)*


Translation:

“Political interest, in my opinion, is very great. It is even a greater determinant than budget availability. For example, if there was a demand from a member of the DPRD, (the project) was able to be executed. Therefore some said that if many proposals from certain area were not accommodated, it was possibly caused by there was no council representing the area. If there was a council from the area, the exist proposals could be accelerated, the inexist proposals could be exist. That is it. There was no legal evidence indeed, but it obviously happened...”


Another fact comes from questionnaire distributed to 120 (one hundred and twenty) people in 24 (twenty four) desa/kelurahan in Batu City. Interestingly, towards one of closed questions interrogating whether the responded knows or does not know about the Musrenbang, 60 per cent of the respondents gave the answer of “No” and the rest 40 per cent stated that they knew it. The following figures are beneficial to identify the respondents’ background.




**Figure 6 Number of Respondents based on Occupation Categories**



**Figure 7 Number of Respondents based on Educational Background**



**Figure 8 Number of Respondents based on Age**



*Source: The author (2018)*

These four figures describe some characteristics of the respondents in the basis of residency, occupation, educational background, and age. Figure 5 obviously shows the number of respondents who live in the rural area and in the urban area with 79.17 per cent and 20.83 per cent respectively. Accordingly, it is not surprising that 40.83 per cent of the respondents are working in farming sector (Figure 6). While the rest belongs to miscellaneous activities, namely trader (16.67%), civil servant (10%), student (10%), employee (8.33%), housewife/househusband (7.50%), teacher (5%), and retirement (1.67%). Figure 7 reveals a fact regarding education of the respondents, the respondents were mainly graduated from senior and junior high school totaling 65%. This evidence is consecutively followed by the graduates of elementary school, college for further education, and undergraduate/graduate, with 20.83%, 10%, and 4.17% respectively. Finally, almost half of the respondents are 35-59 years old (48.33%) and 20-34 years old meaning that they are in young and middle adulthood (Figure 8).

#### **4.2.3 Normative and legal-judicial dimension.**

The Musrenbang is a national program institutionalized by some legal basis such as Law No. 25 of 2004 on National Development Planning; Law No. 32 of 2004 on Regional Governance; Governmental Regulation No. 8 of 2008 on Stages, Procedures of Arrangement, Controlling, and Evaluation of Regional Development Planning Practice; and Home Affairs Ministerial Regulation No. 54 of 2010 on The Implementation of Governmental Regulation No. 8 of 2008 on Stages, Procedures of Arrangement, Controlling, and Evaluation of Regional Development Planning Practice. In addition to these national laws and regulations, local governments are feasible to stipulate their own technical regulations based on their local needs. However, Batu City Government—in this case is the legislative body—had never stipulated any local regulation on the Musrenbang. The Bappelitbangda also did not initiate to make guidelines on the Musrenbang to be referred by all stakeholders. In the case of Porto Alegre, the Council of Participatory Budget (COP) as the central body determines the prevailed system that includes the decision-making system, the criteria of resources allocation, the plenary meetings schedule, as well as discussion themes.

Furthermore, the Musrenbang is a part of planning and budgeting system prevailing in national, provincial, and local governance. Figure 2 presents the relationship between the Musrenbang at desa/kelurahan level, kecamatan level, and regency/city level with other planning instrument such as RPJPD (Local Long Term Development Plan), RPJMD (Local Medium Term Development Plan), RKPD (Local Government Work Plan), Renstra (Local Government Agencies Strategic Plan), Renja (Local Government Agencies Work Plan), etc. It is obvious that the

Musrenbang plays a significant role within the system. In other words, an adequate system of planning and budgeting including the Musrenbang has been already there. The matter is that how local government implements it as a whole unity.

Since there are stipulated regulations concerning the Musrenbang, process design and mechanisms of the Musrenbang can not be changed. All informants stated that the Musrenbang took place as the regulated procedures. It is a public meetings forum starting at the desa/kelurahan level continued to the kecamatan level. Before the Musrenbang at the city level, there was the Forum of OPD (Local Government Agencies) as a preparation stage. Government therefore could only schedule the meetings by coordinating with each desa, kelurahan, and kecamatan. While the Forum of OPD was conducted on March 16 and the city-level Musrenbang was held on March 31.

The following table is the schedule of the Musrenbang 2017 at desa/kelurahan and kecamatan level:

**Table 8 Schedule of the 2017 Musrenbang in Batu City**

No.	Desa/Kelurahan	Date	Kecamatan	Date
1.	Sisir	January 24	Batu	March 6
2.	Temas	January 24		
3.	Ngaglik	January 20		
4.	Songgokerto	January 16		
5.	Sidomulyo	January 23		
6.	Sumberejo	January 18		
7.	Oro-Oro Ombo	January 25		
8.	Pesanggrahan	January 18		
9.	Bumiaji	January 30	Bumiaji	March 1
10.	Tulungrejo	January 27		
11.	Sumbergondo	January 23		
12.	Bulukerto	January 25		
13.	Punten	January 31		
14.	Sumberbrantas	February 7		
15.	Gunungsari	February 6		
16.	Giripurno	February 1		
17.	Pandanrejo	February 3		
18.	Tlekung	January 24	Junrejo	March 2
19.	Pendem	January 30		
20.	Beji	January 23		
21.	Torongrejo	January 31		
22.	Mojorejo	February 17		
23.	Junrejo	January 25		
24.	Dadaprejo	February 1		

*Source: Summarized from the schedule of all desa/kelurahan (2018)*

#### **4.2.4 Spatial/territorial dimension.**

Based on the laws and regulations prevailing in nationwide scale, the Musrenbang in Batu City Government takes place on the base of the existing administrative division that is in nine desa and fifteen kelurahan in the scope of three kecamatan. In other words, regarding ruralization, the Musrenbang is implemented both in urban and rural area. Furthermore, Batu City Government only executes the reinforcement on the legal territories.



In order to have a more simple recognition, the conclusions on evaluation of the Musrenbang practice in Batu City are presented in the following table:

**Table 9 Evaluation of the Musrenbang in Batu City**

Dimensions	Variables	Minimal arrangement	Intermediate arrangement	Maximum arrangement
Budgetary/ Financial	1. Debated resources	Less than 2% of capital budget		
	2. Specific allocation		Personnel and their activities (i.e. travel)	
	3. Taxation policies	None		
Participatory (citizens)	4. Participation form		Community-based representative democracy open to different type of associations	
	5. Decision maker	None		
	6. Participation of the excluded	Thematic and neighbourhood plenaries		
	7. Monitoring and control	Executive		
Participatory (local government)	8. Information sharing and dissemination	Secret, unpublished		
	9. Projects completion	Less than 20%		
	10. Legislative role		Passive, nonparticipation	
Normative and Legal-judicial	11. Institutionalization		Only institutionalized or only self-regulated annually	
	12. Relationship with planning instruments			Clear relationship and interaction between PB and Planning in one system
Spatial/ Territorial	13. Intramunicipal decentralization	Follows administrative regions		
	14. Ruralization		The entire municipal territory	
	15. Investment	Reinforces the city		

*Source: Summarized from the results (2018)*

## **5. Conclusions and Recommendations**

### **5.1 Conclusions**

Some literatures acknowledged the Musrenbang as a practice of Participatory Budgeting conducted in Indonesia. Many research, both national and international, have investigated performance of the Musrenbang by considering numerous point of views. As many studies researching PB practices in diverse countries, participatory has become a paramount dimension to determine its success. However, it should be admitted that there are other dimensions that require to be taken into account in order to have more comprehensive evaluation. This study, therefore, utilized four dimensions of PB, i.e. financial/budgetary, participatory, normative/legal-judicial, and spatial/territorial dimension.

Analysis on collected data derived from five different techniques has led to a conclusion that in general the performance of the Musrenbang in Batu City Government was still in the range of minimalist implementation. Lacking of debated resources, specific allocation, and taxation policies evinced that financial/budgetary dimension of the Musrenbang was poor. Ineffective circumstance was also found in the participatory dimension comprising participation form, decision maker, participation of the excluded, monitoring and control, information sharing and dissemination, projects completion, and legislative role. Furthermore, the Musrenbang did not touch spatial/territorial dimension raising issues of intramunicipal decentralization, ruralization, and investment. Nonetheless, normative and legal-judicial dimension of the Musrenbang indicated a conducive environment through institutionalization and relationship with other planning instruments.

## **5.2 Recommendation**

Basically, Indonesia has adequate laws and regulations regarding Participatory Budgeting such as Law No. 22 of 1999 on Local Government (that was replaced by Law No. 32 of 2004 with its twice amendments, afterwards replaced by Law No. 23 of 2014 with its twice amendments lastly with Law No. 9 of 2015), Law No. 17 of 2003 on State Finance, Law No. 25 of 2004 on National Development Planning System, the Minister of Home Affairs Regulation No. 54 of 2010 on the Implementation of Government Regulation No. 8 of 2008 on Stage, Procedure Development, Control, and Evaluation of Regional Development Plan, and the Minister of Home Affairs Regulation No. 13 of 2006 on Guidelines for Management of Local Finances (that was replaced by Regulation of the Minister of Home Affairs Regulation No. 11 of 2011). Good implementation of these regulations should result in an effective PB in the Musrenbang. Unfortunately, its practice still needs more evaluation and improvement.

Therefore, this study propounded some recommendations both for government side and citizens side listed as follows:

- (a) Local capacities. All stakeholders should emphasize capacity-building endeavours.

Along with elected representatives, local governments should strive for enhancement on their capacity in planning, formulating, and executing proposals in order to foster participatory budgeting. In addition, they should construct more concrete guidelines and manuals for more applicable practice at lower level. Public empowerment to reinforce citizens' awareness of rights and obligations in the Musrenbang is also significant. In this respect, the third sector of development might take part more optimally.

- (b) Information accessibility. Local governments should ensure that budget information is available and accessible for all stakeholders engaging the process as well as

common public. In this global era, this attempt should be more feasible to carry out. Local governments could utilize multifarious media, both traditional and digital, to publish every information with regard to budgeting. This openness would prompt citizens' feedback as well.

- (c) Innovation. Central government should facilitate more innovative system of the Musrenbang. Local governments are encouraged to pursue the best practice of the Musrenbang in its own version. This constructive environment would urge local governments to implement the Musrenbang in more effective and efficient way. Furthermore, wide-ranging practices all over the country would be beneficial for the central government to adjust all enacted procedures.

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## Appendices

### 1. INTERVIEW GUIDANCE

1. Detailed self-presentation (*more important for private associations, e.g. nonprofit*). *This question is about the sociological and not the 'activist' profile of the interview partner. Could you please present yourself (where from, profession, age, etc.)?*
2. What are the main advantages? What the main problems of your town? What are the most important challenges?
3. How did you become involved in the Participatory Budgeting (PB)? (*more important for actors from private associations; in the case of actors from administration/political level: Why did you start initiating/supporting the PB?*)
4. How did the PB start and develop?
  - Were there other forms of citizen participation before?
  - Who initiated the PB? For what reason?
  - Were private groups or associations, e.g. NGOs, active in the political life of the town? Did these groups call for more participatory democracy? Which were most important questions in the discussions around the PB? Which the points of controversy or disagreement?
  - Which were the most important steps of the development of the PB?
  - Was it a bottom-up or top-down process?
5. What in your opinion are the aims of the PB? Do other actors (especially the city council and city administration) pursue the same aims?
6. Could you please describe the most important aspects of the PB?
7. What other forms of participation (direct involvement, empowerment of local associations) existing in the town? How are they linked with the PB?
8. Is there a process of modernization of administration currently underway? If yes, in what way it is linked with the PB? (*in short for the organized citizens, longer for political actors, and more detailed for administrative actors. For some administrative person it may be the most important question*)



9. In what way and to what extent is the administration sensitive to gender issues (e.g. gender mainstreaming)?
- Is there a link with the PB?
  - To what extent do women participate in the PB?
  - Are there attempts to foster their participation on all levels?
  - Are the groups who potentially benefit from the PB considered with regard to their sex?
10. What did the PB change? (*open question, to be pursued after a first answer with the following questions*):
- Are there changes in the planned city projects because of direction given by the PB, e.g. refusing or accepting them?
  - To what extent did the PB change the political working methods in the city administration?
  - How about the town employees?
11. What are the most important achievements and problems of the PB? What are the most important challenges for the future? (*open question, to be pursued after a first answer with the following questions*):
- How would you describe the quantitative and qualitative dimension of the participation?
  - What are the connections to the levels of the city?
  - Is there a qualitative discussion in the PB?
  - How is the relation between the participation of lobbying groups (organized citizens) and ordinary citizens?
  - What do you think about the efficiency of the PB?
  - Is there a social dimension of the PB?
  - Is there a redistribution of power?
  - Is the autonomy of civil society preserved?
12. Is there an evaluative body that follows and measures the development of the PB? To what extent there is networking, exchange of views on ‘good practices’, etc.?

## 2. OBSERVATION SHEET

### 1. GENERAL INFORMATION

1.1 Date

1.2 Venue

1.3 Timing of session

- Start :
- End :
- Duration :

### 2. PARTICIPANTS

2.1 Total attendance

2.2 Attendance by gender

- Female :
- Male :

2.3 Attendance by age

- Until 21 years :
- Until 30 years :
- 30-60 years :
- Over 60 :

2.4 Attendance by socio-economic class

- Underclass :
- Middle class :
- Upper class :

2.5 From which districts do participants come?

- Inner city :
- Suburbs :
- Other :

### 3. AGENDA

3.1 Is there any official agenda?

3.2 In what form is the official (or un-official) agenda?

3.3 If there is an official agenda:

- Who wrote the agenda?
- Are participants asked to accept or modify it?
- How much time is given to presentation by the mayor, administration, or citizens, etc. when during the meeting (beginning/end of meeting), of what duration, and what is the connection between presentations?
- Is the official agenda observed?
- When not, why?

### 4. COMMUNICATION

4.1 Which of the participants (administration, politicians, or citizens) speak, in what manner, and for how long?

4.1.1 How long did different participants speak?

4.1.2 Sociological description: sex, age, social group

4.1.3 What style of language (academic, popular, etc.) is used?

4.1.4 Is there technical support for those who speak (visual, microphone, etc.)?

4.1.5 Describe the quality of the discussion of different participants: How do they argue or persuade the meeting to accept a particular point of view (comparison, enumeration of arguments, etc.)?

4.2 Quality of discussion

4.2.1 Do people listen and refer to each other?

4.2.2 Is the discussion dynamic (pro and cons)?

4.2.3 What is the character of the discussion? Is the discussion confrontational, open, or consensual?

a. argued/rhetoric - ideological/strategic - "militant"/strategic - not militant

b. objective/neutral/technocratic<sup>1</sup>

4.2.4 Can forms of 'log-rolling' be observed?

4.3 What are the different roles of the administration, politicians, citizens, and associations?

4.3.1 Is the discussion 'community led' or top-down in character?

## 5. METHODOLOGY (OR DESIGN) OF THE EVENT

- 5.1 Empirical: What format employed? (big open discussion, discussion in little groups, etc.)
- 5.2 Analytical: Why is this format chosen and what is the primary function or motivation for the meeting?
  - a. Functional logic (democratic, distributional justice, protection of minorities)
  - b. Technical logic (technocratic, control mechanisms, dominant position of administration)

## 6. DESCRIPTION OF THE PROGRAMMING OF THE EVENT

- 6.1 Advance
- 6.2 On the day
- 6.3 Follow-up

## 7. CONTACTS

### 3. QUESTIONNAIRE



**Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University**

Address : 1-1 Jumonjibaru, Beppu, Oita 874-8577 Japan

Phone : +81-977-78-1111

Dear Sir or Madam,

Within the framework of a research project about Participatory Budgeting in Indonesia, we need your support to participate by answering this short questionnaire. We would be very glad if you are willing to give information that would be beneficial for our work. We guarantee you an anonymous and confident treatment of the questionnaires.

Thank you very much for your help!

Yours sincerely,

Sinta Kusuma Primastuti

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1. Sex:                      Male [    ]                      Female [    ]

2. Age: ..... years old.

3. Occupation:

Student	[    ]
Teacher/Lecturer	[    ]
Farmer	[    ]
Trader	[    ]
Employee	[    ]
Civil Servant	[    ]
Retirement	[    ]
Housewife/househusband	[    ]
Other (please specify)	[    ]

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4. School degree:

Elementary School and equivalent	[    ]
Junior High School and equivalent	[    ]
Senior High School and equivalent	[    ]
College of further education	[    ]
Undergraduate/postgraduate	[    ]
Other (please specify)	[    ]

.....

5. Marital Status:

Single	[    ]
Married	[    ]
Divorce/separated	[    ]
Widow/widower	[    ]

6. Place of birth:

City/district: .....

7. Residency:

Urban area	[    ]
Rural area	[    ]

8. In your opinion, the population in your city is mostly classified as:
- |              |     |
|--------------|-----|
| Lower class  | [ ] |
| Middle class | [ ] |
| Upper class  | [ ] |

9. Do you have any information about Musyawarah Perencanaan Pembangunan (the Musrenbang)?

Yes [ ] No [ ]

*If yes, please specify what you have known:*

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*If no, please stop at this number.*

10. In your opinion, to what extent is the Musrenbang important for your city development?

Very important	[ ]
Important	[ ]
Less important	[ ]
Unimportant	[ ]

*Please describe your reason:*

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11. In your opinion, to what extent has the Musrenbang implementation been effective in involving public within the budgeting process?

Very effective	[ ]
Effective	[ ]
Less effective	[ ]
Ineffective	[ ]

*Please describe your reason:*

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12. In your opinion, to what extent has the Musrenbang implementation reached public expectation?

Very in line with	[ ]
In line with	[ ]
Less in line with	[ ]
Not in line with	[ ]

*Please describe your reason:*

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13. What is your personal opinion concerning to the Musrenbang implementation in your city?

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*This is the end of questionnaire. Thank you very much for your participation.*

#### 4. ASSESSMENT AND EVALUATION SHEETS

##### Guidance for Filling Assessment and Evaluation Sheets

##### Part A:

Give information based on the question. If the information required is unavailable, state that data is unavailable.

##### Part B, C, D, and E

- 1) Check (✓) the suitable column for each statement
- 2) Score 1 for Yes and score 0 for No

##### Part A Data

This section is to obtain an overview of implementing regency/city; progress status of regional planning; and organizing and profile of the Musrenbang participants, particularly the participation of women and nongovernmental stakeholders.

No.	Question	Answer	
1	Name of regency /city	.....	
2	Population	.....	
	Available planning document(s)	Check (✓) the suitable box	
3	RPJPD	... available	... unavailable
4	RPJMD	... available	... unavailable
5	Renstra	... available	... unavailable
6	RTRWD	... available	... unavailable
7	Venue		
8	Date and time (of the beginning and the end)	.....	
9	Number of participants	.....	
10	Number of participants by gender (male and female)	.....	
11	Number of participants by governmental and nongovernmental element	.....	
13	Amount of funds for the Musrenbang implementation	.....IDR	
14	Organizational structure and membership of the Musrenbang Organizer Team	Attach	

Renstra : *Rencana Strategis OPD* – Local Government Agencies Strategic Plan  
 RPJMD : *Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Menengah Daerah* – Local Medium Term Development Plan  
 RPJPD : *Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Panjang Daerah* – Local Long Term Development Plan  
 RTRWD : *Rencana Tata Ruang Wilayah Daerah* – Local Spatial Plans



## Part B Preparation

Good preparation will improve the quality of the Musrenbang performance and results. Targets of the Musrenbang preparation phase are: (1) participants have been informed earlier about the Musrenbang; (2) participants have received the materials to be discussed, so they have enough time to understand the aims and objectives of the Musrenbang, then to review and prepare relevant comments and suggestions; (3) the information is presented as simply as possible, so that easy to be understood by participants consisting of various educational, experience, and social status backgrounds.

No.	Questions	Yes	No
<b>B.1</b>	<b>Implementation Organizing</b>		
1	Invitation, schedule, and agenda of the Musrenbang are announced/published at least 7 days prior to the event		
2	Media used to announce invitations, schedules, and agendas of the Musrenbang is considered effective		
	<b>Total Score B.1</b>		
<b>B.2</b>	<b>Deliberation process preceding the Musrenbang at regency/city level</b>		
3	All desa and kelurahan have held the Musrenbang		
4	All desa/kelurahan have made a consensus memorandum of the Musrenbang results		
5	All kecamatan have held the Musrenbang		
6	All kecamatan have made a consensus memorandum of the Musrenbang results		
7	All OPD has held the OPD discussion forum		
8	All OPD has made a consensus memorandum of the OPD discussion forum results		
	<b>Total Score B.2</b>		
<b>B.3</b>	<b>Availability of information for participants</b>		
9	Summary of the RPJMD substantial points is available		
10	Summary of the RKPD Draft in the current-year plan prepared by the Bappeda is available		
11	Summary of the RKPD Draft includes: Programs by functions, mandatory affairs, and optional affairs		
12	Activities by functions, mandatory affairs, and optional affairs		
13	Benchmarks for programs and activities performance		
14	Performance targets of programs and activities completion		
15	Indicative funding ceilings of programs and activities		
16	Summary of the current year's APBD is available		
17	Summary of the Renja-OPD Draft based on the OPD Forum results is available		
18	Summary of the Renja-OPD Draft includes Internal Programs and Activities of OPD		

No.	Questions	Yes	No
19	Summary of the Renja-OPD Draft includes the Cross-OPD Programs and Activities		
20	Summary of the Renja-OPD Draft includes the cross-sector Programs and Activities		
21	Summary of the Renja-OPD Draft includes the Multi-Year Programs and Activities		
22	Information on the PPA of ADD is available		
23	List of development activities priorities in kecamatan area as the Musrenbang results at kecamatan level is available		
	<b>Total Score B.3</b>		
	<b>Total Score of Components B</b>		

ADD	: Alokasi Dana Desa – Village Funding Allocation
APBD	: Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Daerah – Local Annual Budget
Bappeda	: Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Daerah – Local Development Planning Agency
OPD	: Organisasi Perangkat Daerah – Local Government Agencies
PPA	: Prioritas dan Plafon Anggaran – Budget Priorities and Funding Ceilings
Renja-OPD	: Rencana Kerja OPD – Local Government Agencies Work Plan
RKPD	: Rencana Kerja Pemerintah Daerah – Local Government Work Plan
RPJMD	: Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Menengah Daerah – Local Medium Term Development Plan

### ***Assessor's Notes on Components of Preparation***

#### **- Implementation Organizing**

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#### **- Deliberation process preceding the Musrenbang at regency/city level**

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#### **- Availability of information for participants**

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## Part C Execution

Targets in the Musrenbang execution are; (1) completeness and quality of information delivered to participants, particularly on the clarity of facing strategic issues, programs priorities, as well as activities and funding availability; (2) availability of instruments (formats, checklists etc.) that enable participants to get involved in decision-making process; (3) correspondence between division of discussion groups and division of the local government functions including the facing strategic issues; (4) availability of independent and competent facilitators to guide the discussion to consensus; (5) quality of democratization and public participation in decision making; (6) representativeness of stakeholders; (7) active involvement of the DPRD; (8) the keynote speakers master the delivered materials.

No	Questions	Yes	No
<b>C.1</b>	<b>Schedule and venue</b>		
1	The Musrenbang is held according to the schedule suggested by the central government (throughout March)		
2	Number of days allocated to the Musrenbang is considered adequate		
3	Time provided for Musrenbang is considered adequate		
4	The Musrenbang venue is considered adequate		
5	Meeting facilities (overhead projector, flip chart, supporting materials) are considered adequate		
	<b>Total Score C.1</b>		
<b>C.2</b>	<b>Delivered information in the keynote speakers' presentation</b>		
6	Presentation from central government on National RKP concerning strategic issues and development priorities at national scale as well as issues/programmes related to regency/city is conducted		
7	Presentation from provincial government on Provincial RKP related to issues and programmes/activities in regency/city is conducted		
8	Information on the de-concentration funds for province is available		
9	Information on the assistance funds for regency/city is available		
10	Presentation on the RPJMD substances is conducted		
11	Presentation on the RKPD Draft by the head of Bappeda is conducted		
12	Presentation on the main opinions by the DPRD is conducted		
13	Information on the PPA of ADD is available		
14	Presentation on the Renja-OPD Draft by the chief of Organizer Team and/or by the heads of OPD is conducted		
15	Verification of the Renja-OPD Draft by the heads of OPD, kecamatan delegates, and the OPD Forum delegates is conducted		
16	Presentation of the heads of OPD carrying out basic service functions and development priorities on the Renja-OPD Draft is conducted		
17	Presentation on estimation of financial capability from regency/city APBD, provincial APBD, APBN, and other sources is conducted		
	<b>Total Score C.2</b>		

No	Questions	Yes	No
<b>C.3</b>	<b>Availability of criteria, score, and format for prioritization</b>		
18	Discussion and consensus on the criteria and score for prioritization of the planned-year development activities proposals are conducted		
19	Prioritization of proposed development activities for the planned year is conducted		
20	Formats, instruments, or forms that enable participants to prioritize are available		
21	Form of Performance Targets of Each Local Government Affairs (Programs and activities targets, performance targets of programs completion, implementing OPD organizations, and indicative funding ceilings) - Appendix A.X. Home Affairs Ministerial Regulation No. 13 of 2006 is available		
22	Form of Programs and Activities based on the Local Government Affairs - Appendix A.VII Home Affairs Ministerial Regulation No. 13 of 2006 is available		
	<b>Total Score C.3</b>		
<b>C.4</b>	<b>Discussion agenda</b>		
23	Aims, objectives, agendas, and outputs of the Musrenbang are explained by the chief of Organizer Team		
24	Discussion group is divided based on local government functions or related functional groups		
25	Guidance of group discussions that follows the strategic thinking flow is available		
26	Facilitator(s) for guiding group is present		
27	Dynamics of discussion in the group run well and conducive		
28	Time provided for group discussions is considered adequate		
29	Group presentation to present group discussion results and consensus in plenary session is available		
30	Time for group presentation is considered adequate		
31	Time provided for plenary presentation on prioritization of development activities is considered adequate		
	<b>Total Score C.4</b>		
<b>C.5</b>	<b>Representativeness of stakeholders and keynote speakers</b>		
32	All OPD representatives are present		
33	Representative(s) of DPRD speakers is present		
34	Representative(s) of NGOs at regency/city level is present		
35	Representative(s) of local universities is present		
36	Representative(s) of business sectors is present		
37	Representative(s) of marginal community groups is present		
38	Representative(s) of women groups is present		
39	Representative(s) of professional organizations is present		
40	Representative(s) of the central government is present		
41	The Provincial Bappeda representative(s) is present		
42	The Compiler Team of RKPD representative(s) is present		
43	The executive and legislative budgeting team/committee representatives are present		
44	Kecamatan delegates for the OPD Forum and the Musrenbang is present		

No	Questions	Yes	No
45	The OPD Forum delegates for the Musrenbang is present		
46	Capacity of participants to actively participate in the discussion is considered adequate		
47	Number of keynote speakers is considered adequate		
48	Capacity of keynote speakers is considered adequate		
	<b>Total Score C.5</b>		
<b>C.6</b>	<b>Availability and competence of facilitators</b>		
49	Facilitator(s) from nongovernmental elements is present		
50	Facilitator(s) from governmental element is present		
51	Number of facilitators is considered adequate		
52	Competence and qualification of facilitators are considered adequate		
53	Facilitators' capacity to guide and stimulate discussion is adequate		
54	Facilitators' capacity to formulate a draft of consensus is considered adequate		
	<b>Total Score C.6</b>		
<b>C.7</b>	<b>Supporting facilities and equipment</b>		
55	Capacity of meeting venue is adequate to accommodate the number of participants		
56	Meeting facilities are considered adequate		
57	Equipment for presentation is considered adequate		
58	Flip chart to organize participants' inputs is available		
59	Stationeries are provided adequately		
	<b>Total Score C.7</b>		
	<b>Total Score Components C</b>		

ADD	: Alokasi Dana Desa – Village Funding Allocation
APBD	: Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Daerah – Local Annual Budget
APBN	: Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Negara – State Annual Budget
Bappeda	: Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Daerah – Local Development Planning Agency
DPRD	: Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah – Local Legislative Assembly
OPD	: Organisasi Perangkat Daerah – Local Government Agencies
PPA	: Prioritas dan Plafon Anggaran – Budget Priorities and Funding Ceilings
Renja-OPD	: Rencana Kerja OPD – Local Government Agencies Work Plan
RKPD	: Rencana Kerja Pemerintah Daerah – Local Government Work Plan
RPJMD	: Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Menengah Daerah – Local Medium Term Development Plan

### *Assessor's Notes on Components of the Execution*

#### **- Schedule and venue**

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#### **- Delivered information in the keynote speakers' presentation**

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- **Availability of criteria, score, and format for prioritization**

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- **Representativeness of stakeholders and keynote speakers**

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- **Availability and competence of facilitators**

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- **Supporting facilities and equipment**

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## **Part D Result Quality**

This section is the most important part in the implementation of Musrenbang considering the main purpose of gaining agreement between local government and stakeholders on the draft of RKPD and Renja-OPD to be processed into the final draft of RKPD and subsequently the final document of RKPD and Renja-OPD. It assesses the extent of correspondence degree between bottom-up process results & the OPD Forum and the agreed draft of RKPD & Renja-OPD as well as satisfaction degree of participants on the consensus results, namely to what extent the draft RKPD and Renja-OPD accommodate public aspirations and demands. It also assesses the correspondence between agreed priorities of programs & activities and local & OPD issues.

No	Questions	Yes	No
<b>D.1</b>	<b>Formulation of consensus for the final draft of RKPD</b>		
1	Policies directory of the planned-year development is agreed		
2	Agreed RKPD Draft includes: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Programs by functions, mandatory affairs, and optional affairs</li> <li>• Activities by functions, mandatory affairs, and optional affairs</li> <li>• Benchmarks for programs and activities performance</li> <li>• Performance targets of programs and activities completion</li> <li>• Indicative funding ceilings of programs and activities</li> </ul>		

No	Questions	Yes	No
3	Agreed Renja-OPD Draft includes: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Programs by functions, mandatory affairs, and optional affairs</li> <li>• Activities by functions, mandatory affairs, and optional affairs</li> <li>• Location of activities</li> <li>• Benchmarks for programs and activities performance</li> <li>• Performance targets of programs and activities completion</li> <li>• Indicative funding ceilings of programs and activities</li> </ul>		
4	Agreed list of activities priorities based on financing source whether regency/city APBD, Provincial APBD, APBN, or other funding sources		
5	Agreed list of policies/regulations proposals at local, provincial, and/or central government level		
6	Agreed funding plan for the ADD		
7	Agreed the post-Musrenbang activities		
	<b>Total Score D.1</b>		
<b>D.2</b>	<b>Effectiveness of consensus result in fulfilling participants' expectation</b>		
8	Programs and activities priorities in RKPD and Renja-OPD Draft correspond to local issues		
9	The Musrenbang results reflect most of the Musrenbang participants/public aspirations (bottom-up process)		
10	Participants are generally satisfied with the Musrenbang results		
11	The main opinions of the DPRD correspond to the Musrenbang consensus results		
	<b>Total Score D.2</b>		
<b>D.3</b>	<b>Programs priorities related to agreed local and national issues</b>		
12	Access and quality of education		
13	Access and quality of health		
14	Poverty alleviation		
15	Malnutrition handling		
16	Child welfare and protection		
17	Empowerment of the role of women in development		
18	Gender justice and equality		
19	Local conflicts handling		
20	Eradication of corruption, collusion, and nepotism		
21	Order and security disturbance handling		
22	Agricultural revitalization		
23	Prevention of anthrax		
24	Prevention and treatment of avian influenza		
25	Infrastructures and facilities		
26	Environment		
	<b>Total Score D.3</b>		
<b>D.4</b>	<b>Memorandum of consensus result of the Musrenbang</b>		
27	Official report of the Musrenbang results is available		

No	Questions	Yes	No
28	Memorandum of consensus result of the Musrenbang clearly includes agreed programs and activities, resources and funds, as well as person in charge for the implementation		
29	The official report is signed by all representatives of the Musrenbang participants		
30	The official report is reformed to the Musrenbang/the OPD Forum participants by each delegate		
	<b>Total Score D.4</b>		
	<b>Total Score of Components D</b>		

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 OPD : Organisasi Perangkat Daerah – Local Government Agencies  
 Renja-OPD : Rencana Kerja OPD – Local Government Agencies Work Plan  
 RKPD : Rencana Kerja Pemerintah Daerah – Local Government Work Plan

### *Assessor's Notes on Components of Results Quality*

#### **- Formulation of consensus for the final draft of RKPD**

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#### **- Effectiveness of consensus results in fulfilling participants' expectation**

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#### **- Programs priorities related to agreed local and national issues**

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#### **- Memorandum of consensus result of the Musrenbang**

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## Part E Post-Execution

This section is closely related to the assurance that the local development budgeting process accommodates the Musrenbang consensus results. It assesses any effort to preserve public involvement in budgeting processes as in the formulation of KUA, PPAS, and APBD Draft. This sustainability is required for the synchronization between local planning and budgeting.

No.	Questions	Yes	No
1	Fixed schedule of the local government/Bappeda planning to deliver the Musrenbang results to the DPRD is available		
2	Fixed schedule of the local government/Bappeda planning to deliver the Musrenbang results to each OPD is available		
3	Fixed schedule of the local government/Bappeda planning to deliver the Musrenbang results to the Compiler Team of Annual Programs and RAPBD is available		
4	Fixed schedule of the local government/Bappeda planning to deliver the Musrenbang results to all kecamatan is available		
5	Fixed schedule of the local government/Bappeda planning to deliver the Musrenbang results to the delegates of the Musrenbang at kecamatan level and the OPD Forum is available		
6	Agenda for the post-Musrenbang activities is available		
7	Planning of public consultation for the KUA and the PPAS is available		
	<b>Total Score of Components E</b>		

APBD : *Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Daerah* – Local Annual Budget  
 Bappeda : *Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Daerah* – Local Development Planning Agency  
 DPRD : *Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah* – Local Legislative Assembly  
 KUA : *Kebijakan Umum Anggaran* – General Budget Policies  
 OPD : *Organisasi Perangkat Daerah* – Local Government Agencies  
 PPAS : *Prioritas dan Plafon Anggaran Sementara* – Provisional Budget Priorities and Funding Ceilings  
 RAPBD : *Rancangan Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Daerah* – Local Annual Budget Draft

### *Assessor's Notes on Components of Post-Implementation*

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