

**Influence of Domestic Politics on the Making of Foreign Policy:
A Case Study on Taiwan
Regarding the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands Dispute**

by

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
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CERTIFICATION

I, CHANG Yu-Che (Student ID: 51116602) hereby declare that the contents of this Master's Thesis / Research Report are original and true, and have not been submitted at any other university or educational institution for the award of degree or diploma. All the information derived from other published or unpublished sources has been cited and acknowledged appropriately.



CHANG Yu-Che
2018/09

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ABSTRACT

This research strives to find out the impacts of domestic political factors on the making of foreign policy in the ROC (Taiwan) regarding the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands dispute among the ROC (Taiwan), the PRC (China), and Japan. Started by asking what are the major domestic factors, the literature review section examines the perspectives of scholars in International Relations in the six factors selected, which are the bureaucracy, the political leaders, political parties, bureaucracy, public opinions, media, and interest groups. After examining the political contents in Taiwan, the research hypothesized that the public opinion factor is more influential among the others because they possess more independence than the other factors, while the other factors, such as the political leaders, would have influence from all other factors due to political interests, personal preferences, and all political considerations. The research adopted the mix method that all qualitative information collected went through the attitude scale created in this research, then quantified and put into chronological order to see the trend in changes in each of the factors to see the correlations between the variables identified. In conclusion, the research findings supported the hypothesis that the public opinions factor is significantly influential in this case, although all the factors have impact on the decisions made by each other. Aside from that, this research also found that the political leaders and political parties act as intermediate variables in this case study, rather than on the same level as all other independent variables.

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1. Background

There is a saying that if human race were to end, it will not be because of natural disasters, diseases, comets hitting our earth, or any other force majeure, but because of failure in developing adequate foreign policies and international relations. In an era where countries fight over each of their own national interests for ideology, or the political and economic benefits through diplomatic means or confrontations, it is important for us to understand international relations. This requires long term diplomatic strategies through good communication skills and respect of the others.

Realists believe that, in the international system, states are the main actors in the decision-making. The selfishness and power-seeking nature of individuals organize in states for its own national interest; they struggle for power, and that results in competitions and conflicts occur because there is no higher anarchy, and the idea of self-help makes states believe that they can only rely on themselves (Mingst, 2008; Elman, C. & Jensen, M. A., 2008). States act rationally after calculations of the possible gains and consequences by learning from the history. However, what each state learns is never the same as the others and thus act in different manners (Zakaria, 1992). This is why we see, in cases of the territorial dispute, some states act more provokingly while some do not.

However, rather than focusing only on the state-actor, this research recognizes more on the actors within a state as contributors in the decision-making process and the implementations. Helen V. Milner, in her *Interests, Institutions, and Information*, suggests that on the domestic level, politics could be polyarchy and domestic politics do have effect on decision-making (Milner, 1997). The decision-making behavior could be understood from the international political situation of the country, but we should also look at its political context (Simon, 1990). This research strives to suggest that not only the state-actors are important in the forming of foreign policies, but the domestic politics also have effect on it.

2. Research Objective and significance

This paper aims to explore whether domestic politics could be highly influential or only have a little influence on a country's foreign policy depending on its political context. This is a case study on the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands dispute among the ROC (Taiwan), the PRC (China), and Japan, however, focuses solely on the ROC (Taiwan). Being an island nation, which currently have limited international influence over other countries, Taiwan's relatively low political power makes it a country highly dependent on the larger and/or the neighboring nations, such as the USA, Japan, and China. However, while external influences are critical, being the most democratic country among the other

two disputants, the domestic politics, which involves many different voices from within, has a crucial standpoint to effect the final decision made. Understanding the political contexts of a country is especially important in international relations. Moreover, figuring out which one among the factors are more significant would help us understand the background of a country better. As a country that is less studied and is often times neglected in the international community, this research aims to bring attention to Taiwan's domestic politics as it is, nonetheless, one of the unique cases in the world.

3. Research Question

The purpose of this research is find out if we were to look at how the domestic politics of the ROC (Taiwan) influence the making of its foreign policy, in the case of the Diaoyutai/Senkaku dispute, “What are the main domestic political factors and which among them is more influential in Taiwan regarding the Diaoyutai/Senkaku dispute, and how?”

4. Organization of the thesis

This thesis research is conducted in five chapters. Chapter 1 highlights the background of the research and consists of research objective, significance, and research question. Chapter 2 examines literature reviews from the previous works of international relations scholars in the realist perspective and digs into the importance of domestic

politics. And after further explores the main domestic political factors that would influence the making of foreign policy, background of stances of the disputants on the Diaoyutai/Senkaku dispute, the chapter then ends with the hypothesis of the research. Chapter 3 discusses the methodology used to test the hypothesis along with the set of variables, source of data, procedures, and limitation of the research. Chapter 4 explains the applications of the methodology, and examines the relationships and correlations between the independent variables (domestic political factors) and the dependent variable (implemented foreign policy). Chapter 5 summarizes the findings of the research and compares them with the research question and hypothesis, and addresses opportunities for the future researches regarding this topic.

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS

In order to examine thoroughly with focus, most of the research in International Relations can be organized into three levels of analysis. The three levels of analysis introduced by Kenneth Waltz are: Individual level, State level, and International system level, which individual level of analysis focuses on the personality, perceptions, decisions of the decision-maker and individual participants; state level focuses on the characteristics of the state, type of government, economic system, and interest groups; international level focuses on the characteristics of the international system, regional and international organizations, as well as their strengths and weaknesses (Mingst, 2008; Waltz, 1959). It is important for scholars to pay attention to all three levels because doing so would help us to make logical deductions and be able to inspect all categories of possible explanations (Mingst, 2008).

However, since this paper focuses mainly on the domestic political factors, although the analysis covers all three levels and explains them comprehensively together, the international level is only covered slightly. Before examining the main focus of the in research, Taiwan, the literature review section first reviewed the key factors of analysis suggested by many scholars. The chapter is divided into three parts. The first two focus on the domestic level, which includes individual and state level: polyarchic domestic

politics, and major political factors, section three explains the main case study of the research, the Diaoyutai/Senkaku dispute, lastly, stating the hypothesis.

1. Polyarchic Domestic Politics:

Realists believe that in the international system, states are the main actors in the decision-making. The selfishness and power-seeking nature of individuals organize in states for its own national interest; they struggle for power, and competitions and conflicts occur because there is no higher anarchy (Hobbes, 2012). However, Helen V. Milner, in her *Interests, Institutions, and information*, suggests that on the domestic level, politics could be hierarchy, anarchy, or polyarchy, which lies in between the two on the spectrum; state is not the unitary actor, and domestic politics do have effect on decision-making. The domestic factors structure the possibilities and nature of international agreements, and since international agreements create winners and losers domestically due to different interest preferences, they also create supporters and opponents within a state (Milner, 1997). Thus, this research pays attention to the domestic factors and regards them more prominent.

There are three factors to define the placement of a state on the spectrum. First, policy preference of the domestic actors: a state is hierarchic when all actors have the same preferences, but it is polyarchic when preferences vary. Second, power-sharing in

the institutions: a state is hierarchic when decision-making is not shared among the actors, but it is polyarchic when it is shared. Third, the distribution of information: when the control of information is not shared, it is hierarchic, but when all actors have access to information, it is polyarchic (Milner, 1997). These factors are inter-crossable. For instance, a state is polyarchic if power is shared and the actors have different preferences. However, when power is shared but actors still have the same preferences, then it could still be categorized as hierarchy and unitary and forms a national interest. In this case, Taiwan could be categorized as a country with polyarchy; detailed explanations are in Part Two as follows.

2. Major Political Factors:

Due to the complexity of politics, scholars have different focuses when it comes to analyzing political factors. This research focuses on six political factors, which includes: bureaucracy, political leaders, political parties, public opinions, media, and interest groups. The economic factor is not discussed in order to keep this paper more domestic oriented.

In the case of Taiwan, ever since the defeat in the Chinese Civil War with the Communist Party, the Nationalist party of Kuomintang, which was the government of the Republic of China, then retreated, or some say refuged, to the island of Taiwan in late

1940s. Beginning in the late 1980s, Taiwan moved from a one-party rule of military dictatorship by the Kuomintang, gradually to a decentralized, democratized, and multi-party representative system under the presidency of Lee Teng-Hui. The end of martial law in the late 1980s also meant the end of “party-over-government”, which Kuomintang party no longer held absolute power of the nation, and were to follow the ROC constitution with the principle of separation of powers under five branches, or Yuan, of the government, namely: Executive Yuan, Legislative Yuan, Judicial Yuan, Examination Yuan, and Control Yuan. There was gradual increase of political competition with the establishment of the Democratic Progressive Party (DDP), decrease of restrictions on freedom of press and information, and increase importance of public opinions to decision-making (Swaine & Mulvenon, 2001). This research thus examined the six political factors which would influence the making of foreign policy and their roles in Taiwan.

2.1. Bureaucracy

The bureaucracy is a major part of the planning of a country’s development. When dealing with issues, bureaucracy would try to resolve them with domestic political experiences, which might sometimes constrain its foreign policy (Kissinger, 1966).

In Taiwan, the foreign policy decision body is usually the Executive Yuan, which functions as a supporting body to the President, and is also obligated to report to the

Legislative Yuan. The premier, which is appointed by the President, has the power to appoint the rest of the cabinet, including the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of National Defense, Chairperson of the Mainland Affairs Council, and etc. (Executive Yuan of the Republic of China (Taiwan), 2016). All foreign policies and diplomatic undertakes are within the responsibilities of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; contact offices in foreign countries are usually named as “Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office” instead of Taiwan Embassy or ROC Embassy due to the unrecognized, while controversial, status of Taiwan. However, nonetheless they still function as de facto embassies.

2.2. Political Leaders

In *Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy*, Kissinger emphasizes on the leadership of the states. He categorizes political leaders into three types: bureaucratic-pragmatic, ideological, and revolutionary-charismatic. The choices made by the leaders depend on their understanding of the nature on many different factors, and the most important three includes: their experience during their rise, the social structure where they live in, and their own value of society (Kissinger, 1966).

First, Bureaucratic-pragmatic leaders possess the same idea as the factor of bureaucracy. This kind of leaders prefers to deal with actual cases rather than hypothetical

ones, and they are concerned with methods, rules, regulations, and actual knowledge rather than judgments and values (Kissinger, 1966). Some scholars criticize this kind of ruling as being inefficient and inflexible. Because of the lack of creativity, bureaucratic-pragmatic leaders emphasize on the technical nature of problem and problem-solving, but would not start before an agency or department is assigned and made responsible for the problems (Cleva, 1989). However, as the name suggests, they are also more pragmatic. Kissinger thinks that this kind of leaders have desire not to prejudge the process of negotiations, therefore, they pause until certain rules and methods are made, and act accordingly to them; they tend to retain flexibility for unpredictable events (Kissinger, 1966).

The second type is ideological leaders. Leaders are highly influenced by the ideology they grow up with, or exposed to. This is especially significant in the Marxist-Leninist or communist hierarchy where the basic categories of thought are highly affected. They focus extremely on security. Ideological leaders attempt to make the country capable to be independent of the decisions made by other countries, and achieve absolute security, where “absolute security for one country means absolute insecurity for all others” (Kissinger, 1966). Associating with communist leadership, ideological leaders are more single-minded, unemotional, and motivated for power; they rise by eliminating all

possible opponents, either bureaucratically or even physically. And this applies to either domestic and international problems, too, which they have tendency to see different opinions and interests as displays of dissent, and often times causes the disagreements to be more difficult to resolve (Kissinger, 1966).

The third type of leaders is revolutionary-charismatic. Leaders of this type are more interested in common opinions; they are always in constant revolutions against others to maintain power and are more commonly seen in newly developed states. They focus on the future, which they think the significant reality is the world they aim to bring, rather than the world they are overcoming; they see a vision of the future, and see it as a quest for political power. (Kissinger, 1966). Because of their background, their behavior is often difficult to predict. Revolutionary-charismatic leaders are also more willing to take risks, and initiate major foreign policy changes, and their goal of creating new values and goals, are also more likely to develop new political directions (Maoz, 1990).

All political leaders have the same desire in their political careers, which is to get reelected and/or implement their own goal, or party program (Milner, 1997). The motivation for policy choices are mostly because of electoral considerations, and this is affected by two factors: economy and preference of interest groups. Maintaining the country in a good position helps the political leader to stay in the office, or, voters might

change their support to others if the economy declines. Since all political leaders are seat-seeking, they need to win the election through campaigns. In order to run campaigns, they also need resources from the interest groups who provide resources for them. Therefore, redistribution of policies, or proposed policies, would have to favor those interest groups in return. With the two factors, political leaders would choose policies that improves national economy and secures the interests of the interest groups (Milner, 1997).

The President in Taiwan, as the head of state, should be elected directly by the population. He or she, during the term of presidency, should have the power to command armed forces, promulgate laws and decrees, and, with the approval and confirmation of the Legislative Yuan, declare martial law (Office of the President of the Republic of China (Taiwan), 2016). According to the Constitution, the President may also appoint the premier and all other ministers, as well as dissolving the Legislative Yuan. In determinations of major policies in national security, such as, national defense, foreign affairs, and cross-strait relations with the People's Republic of China, the President may also establish a National Security Council as an advisory organization (Office of the President of the Republic of China (Taiwan), 2016). The President may also have considerable power if his or her political party enjoys majority seats in the Legislative Yuan (Swaine & Mulvenon, 2001).

2.3. Political Parties

Similar to the political leaders, political parties need seats in the legislature to implement their political agendas which they need votes from the public and supports from interest groups to be elected, or reelected, and maintaining good economy through relevant policies (Moravcsik, 1991). As stated earlier, interest groups are important to political parties because they are the big parts of the resources for campaigns.

However, the interest groups for the political leaders might not be the same as the ones for political parties due to differences in political systems in different countries (Milner, 1997). In a parliamentary system where the prime minister is elected by the legislators, their interests usually similar. However, in a presidential system which the political leader (president) and legislators are elected separately, the political leader would be focusing national constituency, and legislators are more focused on each of their own district. This kind of system creates possibility for having a divided government, which one party controls the executive office and another controls the legislature, and different interests among them requires all of them to work together. This works best when it is a multiparty system which major parties still depend on coalition of parties to pass their bills and policies (Milner, 1997). Political parties do not control policy-making totally; they need supports from the public, interest groups, and also support from the president

candidates who are also running campaigns because the interest groups or public supports often times overlap.

As a country that adopts democratic presidential and multi-party system, the political parties and the politicians would have different agendas from the one running for president due to differences in focus. The multi-party system which started in the late 1980s also made the power distribution polyarchy since each party would have each of their own philosophy and agenda. These politicians, who are elected to be the legislators, would have the certain powers in the Legislative Yuan. Functions and powers of the Legislative Yuan include deciding statutory bills, budgetary bills, martial law, amnesties, declaration of war or peace, treaties, and etc. All laws or acts have to be passed by the Legislative Yuan and promulgated by the president before coming into force. Other important affairs also include proposition to amending the Constitution or national boundaries, and impeachment of the president (Legislative Yuan of the Republic of China (Taiwan), 2016).

2.4. Public Opinions

As mentioned above, political leaders need votes from public support to win the election and stay in office. Therefore, international cooperation, dispute resolutions, and any foreign policies would need acceptance from the relevant interest groups and

individuals in order to be effective (Diesing, 1962); policies would have difficulty in succeeding if they cannot attract a domestic political consensus (Baker, 1995). With the concern of domestic acceptability, political decision-makers would take domestic sentiment into account; it should be a preceding concern that must be addressed before all other factors (Diesing, 1962; Geva & Mintz, 1993).

Since domestic acceptability is such a crucial factor, how to enhance it becomes a major point, too. Barbara Farnham categorized two strategies for improving acceptability in her journal article *Impact of the Political Context on Foreign Policy*. First, traditional strategy: political decision-makers, or leaders, desire to serve several values in order to attract more supports. Thus, blending and combining of elements, or even modifying existing ones into a new one would be a possible solution. This kind of strategy is often rational because it is a compromise between several ideas; it recognizes the conflicting ideas and pay attention to the substantive concerns. Second, biased strategy: this kind of strategy covers up the major conflicts and avoid to resolve them. Although the conflict is recognized, leaders choose to sacrifice some substance in order to get acceptability (Farnham, 2004).

The relationship between the elite group and the public group would influence the way decisions are made. Risse-Kappen introduces this idea in his *Public Opinion*,

Domestic Structure, and Foreign Policy in Liberal Democracies; a country is either elite-led or mass-led, which mass-led countries are highly pressured and influenced by public, societal interest groups, and the political parties, while elite-led countries are centralized with strong bureaucracies, and are more capable to resist public demands (Risse-Kappen, 1991). Mass-led system is bottom-up, and the public has impact on the foreign policy-making process; the public might be able to change the policy goals and priority directly with their votes, or they could influence the coalition-building among elites indirectly; this kind of societal control of policy network enables public opinions to be highly influential. However, there are multiple opinions within the public. In a democratic structure, public opinions could be coming from three major groups: mass public, attentive public, and issue public. Which attentive public means the group with interest in politics, and issue public is the groups that have particular interest in certain issue. Elite-led system is top-down, and the public is easily manipulated by the political leader because: first, the policies or issues might not be significant to them. Second, the knowledge of the issues is generally low. And Third, public opinion is simply unstable. This kind of state-dominated system would preserve the decision-making process exclusively to the elite, and public opinions would much –likely to be passed over. However, there are also sub-groups even within an elite-led system, too; different elite

groups will try to convince their respective general public or interest groups for power (Risse-Kappen, 1991). Nonetheless, a kind of system that lies in between the two is also possible. This is best illustrated by democratic corporatism, where political and societal actors are both engaged in the negotiation processes to find a compromising policy for all (Risse-Kappen, 1991).

Enhancement of public acceptability could be done through education and media. While education is usually led by the government system (elite-led), media could be either elite-led or mass-led. In an elite-led system, political leaders would their propaganda resources and mass media to demonize the other party when there is a dispute. Or, they can use their resources and media to beautify the other party when they are trying to cooperate. In a mass-led system, public opinions could push political leaders to adopt policies they prefer (Kaufman, 2001; Kim, 2014).

Taiwan seems to be more of a mass-led society where public opinions do have influence on the policies made by the government. Since both the president and legislators are both directly elected by the people, the people are said to have certain power and influence over the decision-making of the politicians. Party leaders as well as most politicians have become gradually relying on the voters, and the party strategies are increasing linked to public opinions and elections, while less concerned with the original

party ideology (Swaine & Mulvenon, 2001). For instance, although its original party ideology aims for the official recognition of Taiwan, the DDP has been keeping it down since its overall victory in the 2016 presidency and legislative elections; while bills on amending the constitution and territory should be easily passed with its 69 out of the 113 seats, the DDP has been focusing on transitional reforms regarding KMT's 40 years of authoritarian rule in the past because it has been a major concern of the voters (Democratic Progressive Party, 2016).

2.5. Media

Media is highly valued by the government because it has become easier and easier for the public to access information through various means, and the information that they provide to the public is thus important. Televisions and the internet have become a major influence in foreign policy making; public polls might not necessarily be conducted but the government will surely use the media to collect public opinions with the comments and reactions from the them as one of the decision-making factors (Chen S. , 2014). Since not all medias are state-owned in democratic countries, they can be either opportunities or dangers, because medias are also a group of interest groups which possesses their own interests and preferences as well.

The freedom of press in Taiwan is one of the freest in Asia, where the constitution protects basic freedom of speech and expression of political perspectives is also unrestricted; Taiwan scores 26/100 (0=best, and 100=worst) in 2015 for freedom of press (Freedom House , 2018). However, in a country with population of 23 million, the media industry in Taiwan is highly competitive that whether they are to write in favor of the public or the political parties is of question and part of this research.

2.6. Interest Groups

Interest groups, by definition, means “any association of individual or organizations that on the basis of one or more shared concerns, attempt to influence public policy in its favor usually by lobbying members of the government” (Martini, 2012). Interest groups could be categorized into three sub-groups: economic, professional, and public interest, which economic interest groups include business corporations or organizations, are the main lobbying group to the political actors. Economic interest groups usually influence political decisions through direct negotiations with officials, commenting on media, or providing resources to run their campaigns. Resources include not only financial funding, but also expert knowledge on issues and information of opinions of others (Martini, 2012). There are pros and cons of having interest groups as long as they do it appropriately. Interest groups could help to improve decision-making

by providing useful knowledge and data for certain issues depending on their expertise, and they can help to keep their eyes on the legislative process. However, some interest groups provide too much undue benefits to the political actors that involves administrative bribery and political corruptions, or sometimes even promise them with positions in the private sector in the future and use this for more lobbying in the future (Martini, 2012).

the interest groups within Taiwan might be able to use influence the making of the policy through professional knowledge, campaign funding, political contributions, or personal interests.

3. The Diaoyutai/Senkaku Dispute:

The Diaoyutai/Senkaku Dispute between the ROC (Taiwan), the PRC, and Japan has been a tough issue since the 1970s. It is not until September and December 1971 that the ROC (Taiwan) and the PRC started claiming the islands respectively after the potential gas and oil discovery by the ECAFE¹ in 1968 (Shaw, 1999). All three disputants have been claiming the islands with their own justifications, which Japan mainly focuses on Treaty Law and Effective Control, the ROC (Taiwan) mainly focuses on Treaty Law and History, and the PRC has the same justifications with Taiwan, however from the

¹ ECAFE: United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East.

perspective that Taiwan is a breakaway province of the PRC that is yet to be reunified (Nakauchi, 2004; Shaw, 1999).

All three disputants have different interpretations on the treaties signed between 1895 to the end of the World War Two. The ROC (Taiwan) is mainly arguing from the Treaty of Shimonoseki and the administrative status of the islands during the Japanese occupation in Taiwan, which they consider the islands as appertaining or belonging islands of Formosa (Taiwan) before the treaty, and also it was administrated by the Taihoku (now Taipei) prefectural government during the Japanese era in Taiwan until 1945, they should be returned to the ROC. (Shaw, 1999). The PRC, on the other hand, has the same basic interpretations with the ROC (Taiwan), however, since they claim the sovereignty over the island of Taiwan and see the ROC government as a political entity in history, the Diaoyutai/Senkaku islands should also belong to the PRC (Shaw, 1999). Japan, however, does not find the islands appertaining or belonging to Taiwan, and refutes with their discovery-occupation justification based on International Law² (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, 2016). However, even if we look at the treaties signed after World War Two, from a textual approach, Japan cannot fully say that they have the sovereignty

² Japan claims that they have the islands before the treaty; the islands were incorporated into Japanese territory in January 1895, which was three months before the signing of the Treaty of Shimonoseki in April 1895.

over the islands since none of the treaties mention about the sovereignty of Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, specifically³. The Okinawa Reversion Treaty in 1971, which USA gave Okinawa prefecture back to Japan, also does not mention about the sovereignty even though the disputed islands were under USA administration as well⁴ (Chi M. , 2010; Beukel, 2011). These different interpretations of treaties make the Treaty Law approach unhelpful to the dispute, and leave the other justifications debatable.

Therefore, while it is controversial to judge which disputant's justifications are more acceptable and adoptable, this research strives to find out in what ways have the Taiwanese government been working on to keep itself not only as a legitimate disputant, but also to work on coming up with a more both domestically and internationally acceptable policy regarding the dispute.

4. Hypothesis:

The public opinion is more influential than other factors because people can reflect their thoughts through the public polls more without the interference of other

³ Cairo Communique, Potsdam Declaration, Treaty of Taipei, and San Francisco Treaty of Peace.

⁴ The treaty stipulates that USA "relinquished" all rights and interests in the islands and Japan shall exercise all powers of administration, legislation, and jurisdiction over the territory and inhabitants (Okinawa Reversion Treaty, 1971).

factors, and by casting their opinions, their interests become the political interests of the other factors as well.

CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY

In order to answer the research question of “which domestic political factor is more influential in Taiwan regarding the Diaoyutai/Senkaku islands dispute? And How?”, this research used the mixed method of both qualitative and quantitative analysis on the case study of Diaoyutai/Senkaku islands. By quantifying qualitative data, this research was able to examine the influence of independent variables over the dependent variable.

1. Variables and Source of Data:

Since the question is about how the factors affect the policy, the variables are identified as follows:

- a) Independent variables (IVs), which are the domestic factors that would influence the making of the policy, are the six factors of Bureaucracy, Political Leaders, Political Parties, Public Opinions, media, and Interest Groups.
- b) On the other hand, the dependent variable (DV) would be the policy affected by the independent variables above.

The time scope of the research was limited to from the mid-1990s to early 2010s for a better focus of examination. This period of time covers two political transfers and also democratization in Taiwan, which there were more changes in the stances of political

leaders and parties to see. To identify the influences of the factors, this paper first selected the actors in the list below, which also shows the source of data and information of each of the variables:

- a) Policy (DV): Since policies are usually announced by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, information was collected from official statements by the MoFA announced in the official website, and newspaper articles which cover the questions and answers in from the official press conferences.
- b) Bureaucracy (IV): information was collected from official statements by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced in the official website of the MoFA, agencies related to the disputed, and newspaper articles which cover the questions and answers in from the official press conferences.
- c) Political Leader (IV): From the 1990s, three politicians were elected as the President of the ROC (Taiwan), namely: Lee Teng-Hui, Chen Shui-Bian, and Ma Ying-Jeou. Stances of each of the political leader were identified from the official statements delivered by the spokesman of the President's Office in official press conferences, which were then collected through news articles.
- d) Political Parties (IV): Although there are always more than 5 political parties participating in the politics of Taiwan, this paper only examined the stances of the

two of the major political parties that have always been having the largest representations in the Legislative Yuan of Taiwan; the Kuo Ming Tang (KMT) and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) were the main focus for the political party factors.

- e) Public Opinions (IV): Information was collect from public polls made by agencies such as China Times Center of Public Opinion, Era Survey, TVBS Poll Center, and the Election Study Center of National Chengchi University.
- f) Media (IV): Information are collected from news articles and opinion columns from major news agencies. Opinion columns were added to further examine the media since newspapers tend to express their truth stance and opinion through the columns as they are selected to be published by the agencies themselves, while trying to remain neutral on the news articles. Out of the major newspaper agencies, I have selected two agencies with each of them on the different side of political spectrum based on general knowledge. Liberty Times reports are usually more supportive on the DPP side and columns are written by pro-independence and Japan-friendly columnists who are either political commentators, professors, or normal citizens. On the other hand, China Times are more supportive on the KMT side and columns are written by pro-China and anti-Japan columnists who are

either political commentators, professors, or normal citizens. However, rather than looking at the tone and attitudes of the news agencies continuously from the 1990s to 2010s, this research decided to pick specific times within the years to narrow it down more. For instance, by looking at the results from Google Trend throughout the years since interests from the public are drawn by the actual events occurred. Setting topic keywords in English as “Senkaku Islands”, “Diaoyu Islands”, and “Diaoyutai Islands”, the Search Interest peaks in 2005, 2010 and 2012; the Search Interest shows similar results when topic keywords were inputted in the languages written in the three countries, which “尖閣諸島” (Senkaku Shotou) is Japanese used in Japan, “钓鱼岛” (Diaoyu Dao) is Simplified Chinese used in the PRC, and “釣魚台” (Diaoyutai) is Traditional Chinese used in Taiwan; Figure 1 and 2 are the Google Trend results for topic searched in these different languages. Thus, for a better comparison, this research picked year 2005 for the time under the DPP/Chen Administration and year 2012 for the time under the KMT/Ma Administration because there were more number of incidents and had more attentions from the disputants and public that it would be easier to see the differences in the factors over time as a comparison. Out of the 9 incidents recorded from 2005 and 2006, and the 47 incidents in 2012, I have selected one

incident from each time that were considered critical especially in Taiwan;
 incidents on June 8, 2005, and September 25, 2012; See Appendix 1 for the stories
 in detail.

Figure 1: Google Trend results in English





Figure 2: Figure 5: Google Trend results in the three languages used in the three countries



Source: Google Trend (2018). Retrieved from: <https://trends.google.com/trends/?geo=US>.

g) Interest Groups (IV): Information of related interest groups was narrowed down
 to the funders of the news agencies selected in the public opinion section due to

lack of specific information⁵ useable for the identification of correlations.

2. Method of Evaluation and Procedures:

This paper did the evaluations by coding and scaling to represent the attitudes of different factors regarding the dispute and incidents selected during the time frame:

- 1) +1: Strong and provocative tone: stating the sovereignty over the islands with words such as “waging war” or “fortitude to risk war”.
- 2) +0.5: Strong but non-provocative tone: stating the sovereignty over the islands and condemning the actions of disputant.
- 3) 0: Moderate tone: Stating the sovereignty over the islands and hope to resolve the problem through diplomatic and peaceful means.
- 4) -0.5: Weak but still with dignity: Stating the sovereignty over the islands but try to avoid saying such by changing the focus to other topics, such as fishery right.
- 5) -1: Weak and no dignity: Avoid stating the sovereignty over the islands or merely saying the ROC (Taiwan) does not have the sovereignty.

The analysis started by sorting the major events (announcements of policy and meeting between diplomatic representatives) and the incidents (detentions and

⁵ E.g.: Information of fund transcripts from corporations to political parties or leaders.

deportations of vessels due to crossing of borders) in chronological order. And then by using the attitude scale shown above, the changes in attitude of the different domestic factors (IVs) over time were able to be seen. I then compared the changes in the independent variables to see whether or not there was a correlation among them, and then also compared the independent variables with the dependent variable to see whether or not the changes in the policy or attitudes were caused by the independent variables.

3. Limitations:

- a) Variables: There could be some other domestic factors as well as external factors that would be influencing the making of foreign policy. However, this research only focused on factors of bureaucracy, political parties, political leaders, public opinions, media, and interest groups.
- b) Time: The time scope of this research was limited to only roughly the recent 20 years; results could have been different if the time before 1990s was included to the research.
- c) Source of data: Only articles from China Times were examined for the tones and attitudes of the different factors in the 1990s due to lack of access into databases of other Taiwanese news agencies from overseas. Therefore, some articles might have been written in a biased way that would lead to a false interpretation of

attitudes. Regarding the media, only two of the very opposite news agencies, Liberty Times and China Times, were chosen that some other perspectives from other news agencies might be missing.

- d) Personal bias: Since the evaluation relied on my own interpretations regarding the tones and attitudes of the factors, the rating might have been somehow subjective. However, this paper attempted to avoid been too subjective that, not only two agencies with the very opposite stances were chosen, but also that the interpretations of tones were done with the same standard.

CHAPTER 4: ANALYSIS

1. Changes in The Foreign Policy (DV)

Two major policies and one agreement made regarding the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands were made from 1996 to 2013: 1) “Four Principles of 1996” made in September 1996; 2) East China Sea Peace Initiative made in September 2012; 3) Taiwan-Japan Fishery Agreement made in April 2013 after 17 times of negotiations over 17 years. The following 3 parts explains them through the periods of three presidencies in Taiwan.

1.1. During Lee Teng-Hui’s Presidency (May 1996 – May 2000)

After Japan ratified its Law on the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf in June 1996, Taiwanese fishermen’s fishery zones around the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands had been narrowed down; deportations or detentions of the fishermen started become more and more common around the area. As Taiwan was unable to participate in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea in 1983 due to the pressure from the PRC, Taiwan and Japan began to have their own meetings regarding fishery around the disputed islands; meetings began in August 1996 with the two parties of Association of East Asian Relations from Taiwan and Exchange Association⁶ from Japan (Chang &

⁶ Exchange Association: A foundation under the MoFA of Japan which functions as a de facto Japan Embassy in Taiwan due to the absence of formal diplomatic ties. The association was renamed as Japan-Taiwan Exchange Association in 2017.

Chen, 1996). The 1st to 5th Taiwan-Japan Fishery Meetings (台日漁業談判) were done during the Lee Administration before May 2000; and topics moved from mainly about sovereignty over the islands to gradually including the discussion on the protocols in the overlapping EEZ between the two countries as Taiwan also ratified its Law on the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf in January 1998 (Hsieh, 2016).

Aside from that, the MoFA also established a special group for Diaoyutai affairs (釣魚台案工作小組) on September 12, 1996 with four main principles, hereinafter called as the 4 principles of 1996, which stipulated that the dispute of the islands should be resolved with principles of 1) Safeguarding Sovereignty; 2) Resolving by peace; 3) No cooperation with the PRC; 4) Fishing right as first priority. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China (Taiwan), 2012) These four principles were decided by the Diaoyutai Special group (釣魚台專案小組), under the supervision of the MoFA, to work as a Think-thank group for the government to deal with issues related to the disputed islands (Lee C. , 1996)

1.2. During Chen Shui-Bian's Presidency (May 2000 – May 2008)

During the era of Chen administration, the MoFA did not come up with a new policy other than the 4 principles of 1996. However, the fishery meeting carried on and amendments were made. The 6th to 10th Taiwan-Japan Fishery Meetings continued to have

no consensus about the sovereignty but had begun to talk about more specific topics such as discussions on borderlines of the EEZ and the legislation of the related laws, as well as approving Taiwanese fishing vessels to enter the Japanese EEZ (Lu C. , 2008).

However, things started becoming more challenging for Taiwan after Japan and the PRC signed their fishery agreement in June 2000. After the 11th fishery meeting, Japan had been refusing to have negotiations with Taiwan due to China's One China Policy. The 12th to 14th fishery meetings, although the scope had become more specific than before, which was about the fishing protocols on 27th parallel north and south between the two parties, there was still no consensus made (Hsieh, 2016).

Aside from many other incidents (either deportations or detentions; a total of 54 times), a major incident happened on June 8, 2005. Taiwanese fishing vessels entered the overlapping EEZ of two and were stopped by a Japanese coast guard vessel. The Taiwanese coast guard also arrived and stated the stance of Taiwan regarding the EEZ. Nonetheless, the incident ended with no injuries, and even further helped to bring about the 15th fishery meeting between Taiwan and Japan (Hsieh, 2016). A draft was made for the fishing protocols on 27th parallel north and south between the two parties, however, Taiwan refused the proposal by Japan because the fishing zone is mainly skipjack tuna, which does not have high economic values (Lu C. , 2011).

1.3. During Ma Ying-Jeou's Presidency (May 2008 – May 2013)

During the era of Ma Administration, two policies had been implemented: East China Sea Peace Initiative and Taiwan-Japan Fishery Agreement; proposed and ratified in 2012 and 2013 respectively. However, things were not quite successful before 2012.

Right in beginning of Ma's first term of presidency, an incident occurred that a Taiwanese fishing vessel sunk due to a collision with the Japanese coast guard vessels on June 10, 2008. Both the MoFA and the Executive Yuan were quite provocative; the Executive Yuan responded to the legislators during an interpellation that "We should have the fortitude to risk war", and the MoFA said that the government was considering recalling the TECRO representative from Japan. These statements, not only brought about the official apology from Japan, but also the 16th fishery meeting. The Vice-Representative of Exchange Association paid a visit to the fisherman whose vessel was sunken with the official compensation from Japan; topics discussed during the 16th fishery meeting in February 2009 included discussions on the mechanism for emergency contacts and protocol for law-enforcing on the sea (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China (Taiwan), 2012). Yet, after the meeting, there were still a total of 14 times detentions by the Japanese government from 2010 to 2012 (Lin S. , 2014), and Japan also ratified the bill of nationalizing the disputed island on September 11, 2012 (Su & Lee,

2012).

In fact, just 4 days before Japan nationalizing the islands, Ma formally proposed his new policy towards the dispute, East China Sea Peace Initiative, which includes principles of “safeguarding sovereignty, shelving disputes, pursuing peace and reciprocity, and promoting joint exploration and development.” The proposition strives to ask all disputants to keep calm and put aside the problem of sovereignty of the island but focus on the cooperation for fishing, mining, marine science research and maritime environmental protection, and develop a formal code of conduct (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China (Taiwan), 2012). The Japanese government seemed as if they did not take this proposal into consideration at that time and still ratified the bill of nationalizing the islands.

The Taiwanese fishermen then organized a demonstration on September 25, 2012⁷. After the demonstration, the minister of Foreign Affairs, Timothy Yang Chin-Tien, had a meeting with the head of Japan-Taiwan Exchange Association, Imai Tadashi. The MoFA did not accept Japan’s discontent and protest because Taiwan does not recognize Japan’s unilateral decision on nationalizing the island without discussing with the disputants. Other than that, the minister also said that Taiwan would never cooperate with PRC on

⁷ See Appendix 1.


this issue, and restated again that Taiwan proposed the “East China Sea Peace Initiative” to resolve the issue (Cheng M. , 2012).

On March 11, 2013, which was the second Great East Japan Earthquake memorial ceremony, Taiwan was invited as an official guest and was also offered an official apology from Japan for the absence of invitation to the memorial ceremony on the year before⁸ (Hsieh, 2016). A month later, the 17th fishery meeting finally took place and a bilateral agreement was finally signed. Although the dispute remained unresolved, the fishing area for Taiwanese fishermen was finalized to be between 27th parallel South and north from the Yaeyama Islands and Miyako Islands of Japan, however, excluding the area within 12 nautical miles from the Diaoyutai/Senkaku islands, as shown in the figure below (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China (Taiwan), 2012); the red line indicates the EEZ line claimed by Japan and the blue line indicates the EEZ line claimed by Taiwan (ROC), and the area in blue is the fishing area for Taiwanese vessels as agreed in the Taiwan-Japan Fishery Agreement. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, David Lin Yung-Lo, responded to the press that Taiwan (ROC)’s stance on the sovereignty remains unchanged that the government would still follow the protocol when foreign vessels,

⁸ Due to Chinese pressure, Taiwan was not invited to the ceremony in 2012 although Taiwan was the second biggest donor (a total of 29.2 billion Yen); however, as Taiwan was invited in 2012, China boycotted to come to the event.

including China, enter the area. However, this fishery agreement safeguards the safety and right of the fishermen without concerns of the interference of the Japanese coast guard vessels; this agreement confirms the friendship between Taiwan and Japan (Chen, Hung, & Chiu, 2013). The Japanese Prime Minister of that time, Shinzo Abe, also commented that Taiwan is an important partner, and this fishery agreement means a lot to the Asia-Pacific region; this is a big progress on regional safety (Huang C. , 2013).

Figure 3: Middle-line agreed upon the Taiwan-Japan Fishery Agreement



Sources: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the ROC (Taiwan) and Goldenseason (2013).

1.4. Changes in the Policies

The policy on the disputed island did not change much over the time. However, new elements of perspective were added over time. Although Taiwan (ROC) had never given up on reaffirming the sovereignty over the islands and had always seem to promote resolving the dispute by peaceful means, prioritizing fishing rights, and reconfirming no cooperation with the PRC. Interestingly, not only was the principle of “No cooperation with the PRC” especially pointed out every time the agencies responded to the press, but also it was more frequent during the time of second and third incidents, which was the time under the Ma administration (KMT); it was pointed out only once during Lee’s era, 3 times during Chen’s era, but 6 times already during Ma’s era before 2013⁹.

Nonetheless, comparing with the time before Ma, the Ma Administration had greater achievement than Lee and Chen that the situation had become more peaceful and stable as the East China Sea Peace Initiative was proposed and the Taiwan-Japan Fishery Agreement was signed. The table below shows the statements, meeting topics, and policies by the bureaucratic agencies of MoFA from 1996 to 2013.

⁹ The ROC (Taiwan) stated many times that the government would never cooperate with the PRC regarding the disputed islands; the information was examined using keywords such as, 中華人民共和國(PRC), 中國(China), 大陸(Mainland), 中國大陸(Mainland China), 對岸(The other side), and 中共(Communist China).

Table 1: Timeline from May 1996 to April 2013

Timeline from May 1996 to April 2013			
Era	Date	Title	Descriptions (Main topic)
Lee Teng-Hui Administration	1996.06.14	Japan ratified its Law on the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf	
	1996.07.20	Law on the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf took into effect.	More deportations and detentions of the Taiwanese fishing vessels.
	1996.08.03	1 st Taiwan-Japan Fishery Meeting	Sovereignty
	1996.09.12	MoFA's 4 Principles of 1996	1) Safeguarding Sovereignty; 2) Resolving by peace; 3) No cooperation with the PRC; 4) Fishing right as first priority
	1997.12.17	2 nd Taiwan-Japan Fishery Meeting	Sovereignty
	1998.01.21	Taiwan ratified Law on the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf	
	1998.01-2000.05	3 rd -5 th Taiwan-Japan Fishery Meeting	1) Sovereignty; 2) Protocols for the overlapping EEZ
	1998.03.18	Japan-China Fishery Agreement	Regarding the concern of the meeting of Japan and China on the issue of fishery, the MoFA stated: 1) Safeguarding Sovereignty

			2) No cooperation with China
Chen Shui-Bian Administration	2000.06	Japan-China Fishery Agreement	Signed
	2000.06.-09	6 th -10 th Taiwan-Japan Fishery Meeting	1) Sovereignty 2) Discussions on drawing of the borderlines on the EEZ and the legislation of the related laws 3) Discussion on approving Taiwanese pacific saury fishing vessels to enter the Japanese EEZ
	2001.06	11 th Taiwan-Japan Fishery Meeting	1) Sovereignty 2) Discussions on drawing of the borderlines on the EEZ and the legislation of the related laws 3) Discussion on approving Taiwanese pacific saury fishing vessels to enter the Japanese EEZ
	2002.03.27	MoFA restated the 4 principles of 1996.	MoFA's response during an interpellation for the disputed islands in the Legislative Yuan.
	2003.03-06, 2004.09	12 th -14 th Taiwan-Japan Fishery Meeting	1) Sovereignty 2) Fishing protocols on 27th parallel north and south.
	2005.06.13, 17	Fishing vessels deported	Regarding the deportation of Taiwanese fishing vessels on June 8, 2005. MoFA said they will: 1) Safeguard the sovereignty 2) No cooperation with China

	2005.06.08	Clash	Taiwanese fishing vessels entered the overlapping EEZ and were confronted by the Japanese coast guards.
	2006.10.26	MoFA restated the 4 principles of 1996.	MoFA's response to questions regarding a clash between Taiwanese fishing vessels and Japanese coast guards.
	2005.07.29	15 th Taiwan-Japan Fishery Meeting	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Sovereignty 2) Fishing protocols on 27th parallel north and south. 3) Japan's proposal on the borderline
Ma Ying-Jeou Administration	2008.06.10	Taiwanese fishing vessel crashed and sunk	Executive Yuan and MoFA both delivered strong statements.
	2008.06.17	Official apology and compensation from the Exchange Association.	Regarding the incident in early June.
	2009.02	16 th Taiwan-Japan Fishery Meeting	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Sovereignty 2) Emergency contact mechanism 3) Law-enforcing protocol
	2010.09.14	MoFA restated the 4 principles of 1996.	As the Japan-US joint military drill took place around the area, MoFA reiterated again.
	2010.10.19	Chinese vessels	AEAR responded to the press that there will be no cooperation with China and the incident with Chinese fishing vessel had nothing to do with Taiwan.
	2011.03.11	Great East Japan Earthquake	Taiwan donated 29.2 billion Yen (2 nd biggest donor) to the

			Japanese Red Cross Society
2012.03.11	Memorial ceremony of the earthquake		Taiwan was not invited due to Chinese pressure.
2012.07.12,19,26	Clash between the parties		A Taiwanese activist carried a PRC flag to the disputed area. MoFA responded that there would be no cooperation with China
2012.08.16			No cooperation with China
2012.09.07	Japan nationalizing the disputed islands		
2012.09.11	East China Sea Peace Initiative proposed		1) Safeguarding sovereignty 2) Shelving disputes 3) Pursuing peace and reciprocity 4) Promoting joint exploration and development.”
2012.09.25	925 Bao-Diao Movement		Fishing vessels gathered in protest for Japan nationalizing the islands.
2013.03.11	Memorial ceremony of the earthquake		Taiwan was invited to the ceremony and was offered an official apology; China boycotted to come.
2013.04.10	17 th Taiwan-Japan fishery meeting (agreement signed)		Fishing area finalized: From 27th parallel South and north from the Yaeyama Islands and Miyako Islands; excluding the area within 12 nautical miles from the Diaoyutai/Senkaku islands
2013.04.11	Comment on the Taiwan-Japan Fishery Agreement		MoFA stated that: 1) Dispute on the sovereignty is shelved but not given up

			2) There will be no cooperation with China 3) Japan is an important partner.
	2013.04.23	Japanese PM Abe gave positive comment on the fishery agreement	

Source: Information collected from *A study on Taiwan-Japan Fishery Agreement: A viewpoint of Sea Power Theory* (Hsieh, 2016).

So, what is causing the change in tones and the progress of the policy? This research then further examined the correlations between foreign policies (dependent variable) and the domestic political factors (independent variables).

2. Changes in The Domestic Political Factors (IVs)

2.1. Bureaucracy

All policies concerning the economic and political activities between Taiwan and Japan are all discussed and proposed through the Taiwan-Japan Relations Association (formerly The Association of East Asian Relations, AEAR), an agency registered as a civil organization however functions under the MoFA with personnel from directly dispatched from the MoFA and the Ministry of Economic Affairs (Taiwan-Japan Relations Association, 2018). All former directors have close relationships with Japan and Japan-friendly politicians regardless of political party in power. For instance, the third appointed director who served from October 1996 to August 2001, Lin Chin-Chin, was

the secretary of the ROC ambassador in Japan in 1959, the ROC ambassador in Japan from 1993 to 1996 during Lee Teng-Hui's presidency, and then the director of the Taiwan-Japan Relations Association from 1996 to 2001. The 7th appointed director, Chen Hung-Chi, was the ROC vice ambassador in Japan in 2004, and then served as the director of the Taiwan-Japan Relations Association from 2007 to 2009 (Taiwan-Japan Relations Association, 2018).

As mentioned in the previous section, policies over the years did not change much even though there were 2 transfers of political power. One way to explain this is because there was respect in professions from the bureaucrats in Taiwan. For instance, the two former directors of the association, Lin and Chen, served through the times of transfer of power in 2000 from KMT (Lee) to DPP (Chen), and 2008 from DPP (Chen) to KMT (Ma). This is different from other top-rank officials, such as ministers and ambassadors, that are always replaced and appointed after every transfer of power. The case of Taiwan-Japan Relations Association is unique that, although it is in a higher position than the TECRO in Japan, the director and former directors are not replaced along with the transfer of political power. This means that the director and personnel in the association are to carry on the negotiations for economy and diplomacy between Taiwan and Japan regardless of which political party is in power. Thus, this is why policies are able to be passed on over

the time.

Another way to look at this is that these bureaucrats are appointed by the MoFA rather than directly by the president that they are only responsible to the MoFA and are to follow the constitutions and regulations rather than orders from the president. This allows the Taiwan-Japan Relations Association to carry on what they have been working on over the time rather than changing their stance along with the president or political party in power.

Through out years and the the 16 times of fishery meetings, which representatives were mainly from the Taiwan-Japan Association along with the Diaoyutai Special Group under the MoFA, Fishery Agency and Coast Guard Administration under the Executive Yuan, the sovereignty over the islands is still unsettled. However, the disputed has been shelved, and fishery right has been safeguarded with lawful agreement. Nonethelss, this does not mean that the MoFA has given up its stance on the sovereignty over the islands; from 1996 to 2013, the MoFA has always stated to safeguard the sovereignty regardless of which political party was in power. The tone has always been neutral as well; no provocative words were openly stated.

The influence of bureaucracy on the policy seems to be high and enjoys certain amount of autonomy. As the bureaucrats develop their skills while working with standard operation procedures in the bureaucratic agencies over the years, they have developed

rational behavior and routines which are not to be affected much by the political leader or political party in power.

2.2. Political Leaders

2.2.1. Lee Teng-Hui

Lee Teng-Hui's stance towards the disputed islands had always been soft but corresponding to the bureaucracy during his presidency. After the first Taiwan-Japan Fishery Meeting in 1996 and the announcement of the 4 principles of 1996, Lee expressed his stance as the President of the ROC (Taiwan) to the visiting LDP politicians from Japan that he thinking that Taiwan and Japan should negotiate about the dispute in fishery rights through diplomacy without violence and arms (Lin C. , 1996). Japan should respect the fact that the Diaoyutai/Senkaku area has always been a fishery zone for the Taiwanese fishermen since even before the Japanese Occupation and that it was also under the administration of the Taihoku prefectural government (former name of Taipei during the Japanese era) (Chang & Chiang, 1996). Lee also restated the 4 principles as announced by the MoFA in early September 1996 (Chang H. , 1996).

However, Lee's stance towards the disputed islands became soft and even submissive to the Japanese government after he stepped down as a president in 2000. During an interview with Okinawa Times newspapers from Japan in 2002, Lee said that

the islands belong to Japan without questions, and then restated the same stance again in 2008 (Wen, 2008). Even during the time when the Ma Administration proposed the new East China Sea Peace Initiative in September 2012, Lee had once again restated that the islands belong to Japan and there is only a dispute regarding fishery rights rather than sovereignty (TWIMI, 2012).

Lee's stance as the Head of State was the same as the bureaucracy during his presidency, but had been soft and rather non-dignified after stepping down. In fact, the former Deputy Chief of the general staff of Navy Headquarter, Lan Ning-Lee, told China Times newspaper in 2005 that a military drill around the disputed island was disapproved and canceled by Lee in 1990, but this information was kept confidential during Lee's presidency (Ho, 2005). This shows that on the personal level, Lee has always been soft, and was only stating sovereignty over the islands when he was openly stating as the Head of State,

2.2.2. Chen Shui-Bian

Chen's stance regarding the disputed islands was similar to Lee's that it went from somewhat too soft to moderate and corresponding to the MoFA as he started his presidency in 2000. In September 1996, regarding a minor confrontation in the area, as the Mayor of Taipei at that time, Chen said that Taiwan should not be too provocative

regarding the Diaoyutai islands since Taiwan does not have 100% administration that the military might not be able to provide full protection around the area (Lin S. , 1996). This statement made by Chen not only showed that Chen was soft but also that he did not think that Taiwan has the complete sovereignty over the islands due to lack of total control and administration of the area.

However, Chen's stance became the same as that of the MoFA during the time of his presidency, in respond to Lee's personal stance regarding the islands, which Lee said that the islands belong to Japan, Chen said that the disputed islands belong to the ROC (Taiwan), and he, as the Head of State, should stand along with the people to protect the sacred territory (Yang M. , 2002). And then Chen again stated his stance regarding the islands twice in 2005. Two weeks after the incidents on June 8, 2005. Chen said that Taiwan holds the sovereignty over the disputed islands. However, the case this time (June 8) was a matter of fishery right rather than sovereignty, and Taiwan does not want any conflict with Japan (Lin, Kao, & Chen, 2005). The second time in 2005 was in August when Chen boarded the Pengjia Islet, which is the most northern point which Taiwan currently holds administration, to declare sovereignty over the Diaoyutai/Senkaku islands (Lin S. , 2005).

Hence, we can see that Chen's stance regarding the islands changed from extremely

soft without claiming full sovereignty to a more moderate tone which he started claiming complete sovereignty over the islands. One thing to notice is that he did not use any provocative words against Japan and was even trying to play it down by focusing only on the fishery problem rather than sovereignty. Although this research was not able to find any public data about Chen's stance after 2008 due to his absence from the public¹⁰, we can still see that he has the similar trend with Lee which stance became more moderate rather than soft during the time in office.

2.2.3. Ma Ying-Jeou

Ma's stance towards the disputed islands were similar to the one as implemented by the MoFA during the periods under KMT's administration in the 1990s and after 2008. During the time of Lee administration, as a KMT politician, around the time when the MoFA announced its 4 principles of 1996, Ma had many times said that the fishermen have all the rights to express their opinions regarding the issue, however things should be resolved by diplomatic means rather than violence and irrational behaviors; the sovereignty of the Diaoyutai/Senkaku islands are, nonetheless, a part of the territory of

¹⁰ Chen's absence from the public: Chen was accused of money laundering and 10 other charges, and was imprisoned right after stepping down from presidency on May 20, 2008. Until 2014, all accusations were either closed as non-guilty or still on res judicata; Chen was found guilty only on the cases of land procurement scam in Longtan and scandal of the building Taipei 101. Chen was released from the prison on medical parole in 2015 and is currently still on it.

the ROC (Ying, 1996; Dung, 1996; Lin S. , 1996).

Ever since the DPP came in power in 2000, Ma became more of a radical who went extremely provocative against Japan whenever incidents of collisions or deportations of fishermen happened. For instance, regarding former President Lee Teng-Hui's statement on the sovereignty of the islands during an interview with a Japanese media, Ma commented that it was an inappropriate act of Lee as a former president; the islands are only currently under Japanese occupation but that does not mean that Japan has the sovereignty (Wang & Dung, 2002). Regarding the incident on June 8, 2005, Ma expressed an provocative statement that the ROC (Taiwan) should do whatever it takes to raise the voice, or even to risk war against Japan so that the ROC could be in a better position for negotiation (Lin & Chao, 2005; China Times, 2005).

However, after Ma was in power in May 2008, his attitude towards the issue became less and less provocative. For instance, regarding the incident when a Taiwanese fishing vessel was crashed and sunk by the Japanese coast guard on June 10, 2008, on behalf of Ma, along with the Executive Yuan and MoFA, the President Office condemned the Japanese side for such action and restated the sovereignty over the islands (Hsiao, 2008). What was different this time was that Ma was no longer as provocative as he was in the mid-2000 that he said, "As a democratic state, we should always resolve disputes like this


with peace and through diplomatic means; violence and confrontations are not in our consideration and would be avoided.”; a peaceful sign could be seen as Ma did not want to worsen the situation when the transfer of power was just a month earlier (Hsiao, 2008).

2.2.4. Attitudes of Political Leaders and The Actual Policy

In comparison with the official foreign policy from the bureaucracy, it seems that political leaders in Taiwan are more influenced by the bureaucracy rather than the other way around; the position of Head of State had made Lee, shown in orange, change his stance from extremely soft without dignity (-1) to standard non-provocative and with dignity (0) as a State that's claiming the islands, and then back to his soft stance (-1) again once he was no longer the president. In the case of Chen, shown in green, although data after 2008 is not available, his attitude also changed from extremely soft (-1) to moderate (0) as he was in power. Ma's attitude towards the islands is most interesting; as a scholar who had Diaoyutai/Senkaku islands as the topic of his PhD thesis, Ma's stance, as shown in blue, before 2000 had always been very moderate (0) without neglecting the dignity of the ROC. However, ever since the DPP was in power during the early 2000, Ma, who was the Taipei Mayor at that time, became very provocative (+2) regarding the issue. And then as KMT regained power in 2008, Ma came back to his moderate attitude again (0). The graph below visualized the comparison on a timeline, and the raw data is in Appendix

2.

Figure 4: Attitudes of Political leaders in Taiwan in comparison to the actual policy made by the MoFA



Arranged by the author

It seems that the bureaucracy has more influence over the political leaders that their attitudes regarding the islands all move towards the middleline/moderate attitude when they were in office. However, since Ma's original stance is closest with that of the MoFA and the bureaucracy, we can also say that Ma might have relatively more control of the policy. As mentioned in Ma Ying-Jeou section, instead of the MoFA or the Executive Yuan, Ma announced the new proposition of East China Sea Peace Initiative by himself in September 2012; this was very different from other political leaders before. The bureaucracy also mentioned Ma's name almost every time when the peace initiative

was mentioned from 2012 to 2013; a sign of personality cult with possible influence of policy could be seen here.

2.3. Political Parties

2.3.1. Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)

The attitude of DPP shifted in different periods of political regimes in Taiwan. During the 1990s, when Taiwan just democratized that multiple parties started to be allowed, DPP did not want to mention much about the sovereignty over the islands whenever there was issue with Japan. However, the DPP had always been asking the ruling party at that time, KMT, to safeguard the fishery right for the Taiwanese fishermen and should avoid cooperating with the China. For instance, around the time when Taiwan and Japan had the first fishery meeting in August 1996, while still mentioning that Taiwan has the sovereignty over the island, the DPP had always been focusing on the fishery right in the disputed area when the agenda of the first fishery meeting was still focusing on sovereignty (Liu, 1996; Fan, 1996).

When the party had the ruling power, the DPP was still in its moderate to low attitude about the islands. Regarding the statement made by the former president, Lee Teng-Hui, although DPP did say that Lee's statement only represented himself rather than organizations, they still did not openly condemn Lee for not standing for the country's

perspective (Lee & Chen, 2002). On July 2, 2005, a DPP politician in Hualien, where the Diaoyutai/Senkaku islands are administrated according to the laws of ROC (Taiwan), Chen Ting-Nan openly stated that fighting about sovereignty would only trigger more conflicts with Japan, so it is best to resolve the problem in fishery for now (Lin M. , 2005). And then in 2006, the Vice President, Annette Lu Hsiu-lien, even said that Taiwan should not do anything that would challenge the US-Japan Security Treaty (CRNTT, 2008).

However, starting in the KMT's ruling era, the DPP not only openly stating their stance regarding the islands as in Taiwan holding full sovereignty, but even said that they would support Ma and the KMT government's new East China Sea Peace Initiative; the DPP politicians, stated in a press conference, that if the Ma administration could avoid conflict and maintain the Taiwan-Japan relations by diplomatic means, as well as avoiding any forms of cooperation with the PRC, DPP would give full support for Ma's new proposal and policy (TWIMI, 2012). However, when the KMT politicians proposed to board the vessels and protest around the islands after Japan announced to nationalize the islands in September, the DPP politicians refused to join and said that it was an irrational act (Chen W. , 2012). We could see that, although DPP has become more moderate, they still see the relations with Japan as top priority.

2.3.2. Kuo Min Tang (KMT)

On the other hand, the KMT had always been either moderate or provocative regarding the issue that sovereignty had always been their top priority since the beginning, however, only until 2012.

During the Lee era in the 1990s, KMT's stance was more unstable, being either moderate and peaceful or highly provocative. Around the time of the first Taiwan-Japan Fishery Meeting and the announcement of the 4 principles in July and September 1996 respectively, KMT politicians thought that the sovereignty is to be safeguarded, and Taiwan should only seek dialogue through diplomatic and peaceful means through the MoFA, rather than letting the fishermen protest or showing our military power; neither of these would help the current situation (Liu, 1996; Ying D. , 1996). However, although wasn't passed in the Legislative Yuan, several KMT politicians also suggested to boycott Japanese products and construction project companies for BOT projects permanently in Taiwan as an act of protest to the Japanese government regarding the island (Chi C. , 1996)

Starting in the era of DPP in the early 2000s, the KMT became more aggressive against Japan and wanted the Chen administration to take provocative actions. For instance, regarding the incident in June 2005, aside from Ma's stance of having the fortitude to risk war (China Times , 2005), a KMT politician, Lu Luo-Hua also said that the government should act against Japan instead of teaming up with them against China;

the detention of fishing vessels would only increase if the ROC does not act tougher (Lin M. , 2005).


However, during the era of KMT starting in 2008, KMT not only began to call for sharing of resources and fisheries with Japan, but also mentioning no cooperation with China, or even implying that the PRC has no right in discussing such issue. For instance, during an interview with the Japanese media, KMT chairman, Wu Po-Hsiung said that Taiwan and Japan should cooperate together for the development of natural and sea resources; the problem is only between Taiwan and Japan, therefore Taiwan will not cooperate with China (Huang C. , 2008). Although, in September 2012, after Japan announcing to nationalize the islands, as mentioned in the previous section, KMT politicians suggested to board the vessels together with the protesters to sail around the islands, comparing to the past, the KMT became more moderate and peaceful with Japan that they would only want to show their patriotic actions rather than risking war, and tried to clarify that they do not want to cooperate with China as well.

2.3.3. Attitudes of Political Parties and The Actual Policy

The attitude of KMT started off close to the MoFA when they were in power in the 1990s and then became provocative as DPP became the ruling party in the 2000s; one possible reason for this is that the KMT has been in a better relation with the Chinese

Communist Party and PRC, who is also a disputant in this matter, that they are more aligned with them. And as they regained power in 2008, they came back to be more moderate; it seems that they are more careful about what they say when they are in power. Comparing to the KMT political leaders, the party does not seem to have much influence over the decision-making of the policy regarding the disputed islands. The graph below shows the changes in attitudes of the parties over time, and the raw data is in Appendix 3.

Figure 5: Attitudes of Political Parties in Taiwan in comparison to the actual policy made by the MoFA



Arranged by the author

On the other hand, the DPP also started off having a similar stance with the MoFA in the 1990s, but became weaker as they came into power in the 2000s. This was going in the opposite direction of the KMT in the 2000s; one possible reason for this is that the DPP has a good relation with Japan as a political organization. And then as they became

the opposition party in 2008s, their attitude started to become more moderate.

To explain why the KMT were provocative in the 2000s, and why the DPP were weak in the 2000s and moderate later, this paper focuses on the influences of domestic factors rather than external factors such as the PRC or Japan. Therefore, the next part, public opinion, shows how I have found better correlations as an explanation to the change in the political leaders and parties.

2.4. Public Opinion

2.4.1. Public Polls

In 1996, after the MoFA announced the 4 principles regarding the dispute in September and a proposition to destroy the Japanese lighthouse on the Diaoyutai/Senkaku, the DPP had a press conference saying that 72.4% of the respondents does not want to have any provocative actions towards Japan regarding the issue to harm the relations, and 11.7% of the people think the PRC should not be included in the dispute. And most importantly, 62.3% of the people think that Taiwan has the sovereignty over the islands (Fan, 1996).

During the time of Chen administration, two polls were conducted by China Times and Era Survey on June 19 and 23, 2005 respectively. It was gathered around the time of the incident on June 8, 2005, when there was a clash between Taiwanese fishing

vessels and Japanese coast guards. Results showed that 56% of the respondents have bad impression on the Japanese government but 58% still has good impression on Japan in general, and more people think the KMT's stance, which was being strong, was more appropriate than that of the DPP (China Times Center of Public Opinion, 2005). As for the result from Era Survey, 34% of the people, who responded as mostly KMT supporters, think that the government should safeguard the sovereignty; 44% of the people, who responded as mostly DPP supporters, think that maintaining good relations with Japan should overweight fighting over the sovereignty (Era Survey, 2005).

And then in 2012, after Ma formally proposed his new peace initiative and Japan's announcement of nationalizing the islands, China Times and TVBS news agency revealed two poll results on September 25 and 27, respectively. As a result, 71.3% of the respondents on China Times' survey have bad impression on the Japanese government (China Times Center of Public Opinion, 2012), and 42% of the respondents on TVBS news agency's survey have bad impression on the Japanese government while still having 63% of the respondents having good impression on the people in general (TVBS Poll Center, 2012).

Looking at the results from the 1990s to 2010s, as shown in the table below, we can see that the attitude of the people is generally constant and moderate through the

period. At least from the results in 1996 and 2005, although there is certain amount of people who think that Taiwan has the sovereignty and should safeguard the islands, there are more people who think that being aggressive or provocative is not appropriate for the issue, and the relations among Taiwan and Japan weights more. Aside from that, although the impression on the Japanese government is not clear that it was around 56% in 2005, but resulted as 71.3% and 42% from different agencies, the impression on Japan in general was always more than 50%; this means that Taiwanese people seem to be able to separate political stance from the impression to the people, in other words, although the Taiwanese people did not like that the Japanese government being aggressive, their impression on the Japanese people remain unchanged. Regard the impression on the attitudes of the political parties, when KMT was the ruling party in 1996, 52.1% of the people think that the party was too weak that there was no comment from the government regarding protesting vessels to the disputed islands. However, in 2005, more people agreed with KMT's relatively provocative statement over DPP's moderate to weak tone. These results show that the people, while still adhere to the sovereignty over the islands, do not want the relations of the two to worsen because of the issue.

Table 2: Changes in the attitudes of the public opinion: Public Polls

Date	Agency	Impression on Japan	TW-JP Relations and Sovereignty	DPP vs. KMT
October 9, 1996	DPP Poll Office		62.3% thinks Taiwan has the sovereignty. 72.4% oppose for aggressive action to Japan	52.1% think KMT is too weak
June 19, 2005	China Times	56%: bad impression on the gov't; 58%: good impression in general		19.6%: KMT; 12.3%: DPP
June 23, 2005	Era Survey		34%: Safeguard Sovereignty (KMT Supporters); 44%: Relations is more important (DDP Supporters); 22% no comment	
September 25, 2012	China Times	71.3%: bad impression on the gov't		
September 27, 2012	TVBS	42%: bad impression on the gov't; 63%: good impression on the people		


Sources: 1. October 9, 1996 (Fan, 1996); 2. June 19, 2005 (China Times Center of Public Opinion, 2005); 3. June 23, 2005 (Era Survey, 2005); 4. September 25, 2012 (China Times Center of Public Opinion, 2012); 5. September 2, 2012 (TVBS Poll Center, 2012).

Another poll result that relate to the fact that the government had been reaffirming the policy of no cooperation with the PRC over and over again was also due to the fact that more and more people in Taiwan deny the Chinese identity. According to

a survey conducted by the Election Study Center of National Chengchi University, until 2013, the number of people identifying themselves as Taiwanese had rose from only 17.6% in 1992 to 57.1% in 2013; the number of people identifying themselves as Chinese had dropped from 25.5% in 1992 to 3.3% in 2013; the number of people identifying themselves as both Taiwanese and Chinese had also decreased from 46.4% in 1992 to 35.8% in 2013 (Election Study Center, N.C.C.U., 2018). The graph on the next page shows the total result from 1992 to 2017. This trend in the change in the self-identification of Taiwanese people might be an explanation of why the government has been reaffirming “no cooperation with China” many times.

The differences in the attitude towards the Japanese government and the people in general could also be seen in the year in 2011. Although the dispute in the sovereignty of the Diaoyutai/Senkaku islands has been going for years, this does not seem to effect the general image of Japan from the Taiwanese people. As mentioned in the section of MoFA in the time of Ma administration, for instance, after the Great East Japan Earthquake happened on March 11, 2011, a total of 29.2 billion Yen was donated from from Taiwan with more than 90% coming from private donors; Taiwan was the second biggest donator. This showed that the territorial conflict between the Taiwan and Japan did not seem to have negative influence in the image of Japan from the Taiwanese.

Figure 6: Changes in the Taiwanese/Chinese Identity of Taiwanese as Tracked in Surveyed by the Election Study Center, NCCU (1992-2017)



Sources: (Election Study Center, N.C.C.U., 2018)

2.4.2. Influence of public opinions regarding the dispute

The public opinion seems to have a stronger correlation with the decision-making of the political leaders and political parties. For instance, the poll result from June 19, 2005, shows that more than half of the people do not like the action of the Japanese government and more people think DPP was too weak to them. Chen Shui-Bian, who was

the president at that time kept silence from the public for 2 weeks and finally openly stated that Taiwan has all the right to claim sovereignty over the disputed islands on June 21, which was two days after the poll result. This shows that the government noticed the demand of response from the president himself regarding this issue and that the political leader had no choice but to follow the public opinion and to give an appropriate statement.

As the time went on to 2012, the public polls also show that the people want to keep peace with Japan and wish for a win-win resolution for the disputants. Therefore, KMT was no longer as aggressive as it was in the early 2000s, and became more moderate with peaceful tone; Ma Ying-Jeou also announced its peace initiative which was very different from his tones in the early 2000s. DPP also was no longer weak on this issue that they also became more moderate, and even supportive to the KMT's new policy, which went along with the public opinion that the Taiwan-Japan relations is important, but so is the sovereignty. According to a news report from China Times, the national security council admitted that they contacted the PRC not to join along the 925 Bao-Diao Movement in order to not to violate its own policy of "no cooperation with the PRC" and also requested Japan to avoid huge confrontation with the fishermen prior to September 25. This shows that the government cares about the public opinion on the necessity of the protest to calm the anger of the Taiwanese regarding Japan nationalization the islands

(China Times, 2012).

Although the policies do not change much over the period from the 1990s to 2010s that the government still keep the 4 principles from 1996 to safeguard the sovereignty and hoping to solve through peaceful means, there are still some differences that the principle of “no cooperation with the PRC” becomes more frequently mentioned during the ruling period of Ma Ying-Jeou since KMT’s close relationship with China always raise questions in the public as the definition of Taiwanese identity shifts to a more Taiwan-oriented trend over the years.

2.5. Media

2.5.1. Liberty Times News Agency (pan-green)

Although news articles from Liberty Times were not available before 2000s, the articles from 2000 onwards show that the newspaper is going along with the DPP. Taking examples from the times in 2005 and 2012, 5 out of 8 news articles regarding the incident of the clash between the Taiwanese fishing vessels and the Japanese coast guards, and the remaining 3 are neutral without criticism. Regarding the incident on July 4, 2012, 4 out of the 7 articles were negative towards the ruling party, KMT. Aside from that, an article with the title of “Taiwan vessels goes to Diaoyutai for territorial right; challenged by Japan authority” is very Japan oriented that it reports mostly about Japan’s statements

coming from different agencies and only one statement from the Ma Administration; this is different comparing to other news agencies they give big portion of the newspaper reporting about Japan's point of view. Interestingly, Liberty Times started to show changes in the tone. They especially quoted the coast guard for restating that PRC vessels would be either deported or detained if found during the protest in September 25, 2012. This is very unusual for Liberty Times because while they could easily attack the KMT government with suspicion of cooperation with China, Liberty Times chose to support the KMT for stating the the long term principle from 1996 again (Yang Y. , 2012). Liberty Times also reported about a new survey which said that due to the dispute, the number of Japan people (sample) disliking the PRC has increased from 17% in 2002 to 38% in 2012 (Chang M. , 2012); it seemed as if the newspaper was telling the readers that the 925 Bao-Diao Movement might create negative image of Taiwan for the Japanese people, too; this goes along with the Liberty Times long term stance which not only is the newspaper pro-independence and pan-green, but also very Japan-friendly. The articles examined are shown in Appendix 4.1.

2.5.2. China Times News Agency (pan-blue)

On the other hand, China Times seems to be more on the side of KMT. In 2005, while still reporting neutrally about the incident in June, China Times also published an

article which might associate the DPP's soft and weak attitude with that of Lee Teng-Hui; as mentioned in the Lee Teng-Hui section previously, an article with the title ""Deputy Chief of the general staff of Navy Headquarter: "Occupying Diaoyutai, former Premier Hao approved, however stopped by former President Lee." This seems intending to associate DPP with Lee that they both did not want to fight back when it comes to Japan (Ho, 2005).

In 2012, all the articles regard the incident as a patriotic move and reports about how the Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded to Japan's official protest. A very critical difference between Liberty Times and China Times was that China Times did not mention anything about the activist brought only a PRC flag with him but not a ROC flag. The newspaper seems as if it was trying to reduce the emphasis regarding the PRC flag but amplify the ROC (Taiwan) government's point of view and policy since the reporting went on for almost a week. One of the articles reported mainly on the statements of the three disputants and the Japanese government's decision of nationalizing the island a few days after the incident with the title of "Japan nationalizing the island; President Ma, "Not going to back down"; Chinese Communist Party, "Chinese territory is not for sale"" (Huang C. , 2012), and another one which reports that the government would never cooperate with the PRC regarding the Diaoyutai/Senkaku issue because Taiwan has its

own national interest (Cheng M. , 2012). Focusing on the protest on September 25, 26 out of 34 articles give positive comments on both the protestors and the government. Interestingly, the newspaper also focused on quoting Ma for the “East China Sea Peace Initiative”; during his meeting with the delegates from the United Kingdoms on the same day. President Ma said that although this is an unrelated issue with the UK, he only wanted to use the opportunity to let the world knows that Taiwan is a part of the dispute and the ROC is a nation that would always promote peace and would only use peaceful means when it comes to international dispute (Chou, 2012); this was not found in the Liberty Times reporting. The articles examined are shown in Appendix 4.2.

2.5.3. Opinion Columns

Although opinion column archives from the 1990s are not collectable, the opinion columns from the agencies, at least starting in the 2000s, shows that the readers of Liberty Times are more supportive to the DPP and the readers of China Times are more supportive to the KMT. However, Liberty Times is more biased towards the DPP than China Times is to the KMT; both positive and negative comments on the KMT could be found from the columns in China Times during KMT’s ruling era from 2008 onward, however, columns are mostly positive in the Liberty Times during the period when the DPP was the ruling party from 2000 to 2008.

For instance, regarding the incident on June 8, 2005, although 5 out of the 7 opinion columns were written negatively in the Liberty Times, they were all towards the KMT, the opposition party at that time, for being provocative towards Japan. Articles with titles of “Not being aggressive towards communist China?”, and “The conspiracy of triggering a war” (Chen W. , 2005) were directly targeting at the KMT for being too aggressive. Regarding the incidents that happened during KMT’s ruling era in 2012, all opinion column articles were negative and all of them were targeting the KMT; article titles with “Do not fear for a battle! But for whom?!” , questions how carrying a PRC flag to protest is not only cooperating with China, but also helping them to claim Taiwan (Lai, 2012).

However, as for China Times, at least 2 out of the 6 opinion columns were supportive to the DPP for staying moderate and not too provocative, although the rests still criticized the DPP for acting like a little brother of Japan regarding the incident that happened on June 8, 2005. As for the incidents in 2012, one column written by Huang Kui-Po, a professor in the College of Foreign Affairs in National Chengchi University, has the title of “An opened up foreign policy could correspond to the Diaoyutai situation”, and is fully supportive of Ma’s policy on “Being close with the USA, friend with Japan, and peace with PRC.” The column also again quoted the MOFA that the ROC (Taiwan) government would never cooperative with PRC on this issue (Huang K. P., 2012).

Although it is common that agencies would choose what opinion columns to be published on their newspapers based on their political preferences, the opinion columns chosen by the news agencies shows that they are not 100% influenced by the political parties that they are free to publish articles, although mostly in the opinion columns, of their choices. It seems that the newspapers are more public opinion-driven because publishing column articles in difference stances not only could show that the agencies try to stay neutral to attract more median voters, but also to show the political parties of the thoughts of the mass public and the academics, which was to have the government and protesters to remain non-provocative, peaceful, and China-influence-free.

2.5.4. Influence of Media regarding the dispute

There are correlations between the media and the political parties that the Liberty Times reports is more DPP- and Japan-friendly and China Times is more KMT- and PRC-friendly. However, what is different between the two is that, Liberty Times seems to have more influence from the DPP than the China Times has from the KMT; there are less negative comments about the DPP in the Liberty Times than there are about the KMT in China Times.

Aside from political parties, the news agencies seem to have correlations with the preference of the public as well. For instance, as the public opinion moved toward a

more moderate stance, the China Times have also become more moderate and neutral; Liberty Times, on the other hand, remains critical on the KMT.

2.6. Interest Groups

2.6.1. Powers behind the newspapers

There were no formal statements made by business corporations from Taiwan regarding the disputed islands through the period of time. However, the individuals and corporations behind the two major newspaper agencies, Liberty Times and China Times, have some influence over the way the medias report either regarding the political parties, leaders, and the incidents that happened because of the islands.

In the case of Liberty Times, the newspaper has been a Taiwan-centric newspaper since the very start. Former owner of the newspaper, Lin Rung-San, was born during the Japanese Era¹¹ in 1939; he served as the Vice President of Control Yuan¹² from 1992 to 1993 when he was KMT politician. His political stance during the one-party era before Taiwan democratized, has always been on the pro-Taiwan faction within the KMT with Lee Teng-Hui, and his support for Lee grew even stronger after Lee abolished

¹¹ Taiwan under Japanese rule: The Qing Dynasty ceded Taiwan to Japan in 1895 under the Treaty of Shimonoseki after losing the First Sino-Japanese War; Taiwan was under the rule of Japan for 50 years until World War Two ended in 1945.

¹² Control Yuan: An auditory agency of the ROC government; it is one of the 5 branches (Yuan) of government under the Constitution of the ROC.

the ban on newspaper and publications in in 1988 when Lee served as the President of the ROC; he was hired as the political advisor of the Lee administration in 1993. Lin's support for Lee passed on to Chen Shui-Bian and the DDP as Chen own the presidency in 2000. He was also honored by Chen with the second rank of "Order of Brilliant Star¹³" in 2008 for promoting "Taiwan Value" and "Taiwan's sovereignty and independence" (Cheng J. , 2008). This power influence from the pro-independence individual, although is not necessary a negative influence for the future of the country, is considered a threat for the original pan-blue supporters¹⁴ who support for unification under the ROC (whether applicable or not), and also for the pan-red supporters who want unification under the PRC. With such relationship with Lee and DPP, Liberty Times' articles are also influenced by it. For instance, since both Lee and DPP have good relations with the Japanese government, Liberty Times also often writes about Japan's point of view on the things related to the disputed islands, or sometimes, even reports about how the Japanese people view about China due to the issue as mentioned in the section of Liberty Times previously.


On the other hand, as mentioned in the introductory section of this chapter, the

¹³ Order of Brilliant Star of ROC: 景星勳章; an order of the ROC to recognize outstanding contributions to the development of the nation.

¹⁴ Original pan-blue: KMT supporters used to be more on the belief of the KMT party philosophy, which is to unify the whole China under democracy. However, most of them, even the KMT politicians and retired KMT generals, are turning pan-red as there are more incentives as the PRC grows stronger now.

925 Bao-Diao Movement on September 25, 2012, was personally funded by the director of Want Want China Holdings, Cai Yan-Ming, who has most of his investments in the PRC rather than Taiwan. As shown in the figure below, Want Want China Holdings owns a total of four newspaper and news channels, and China Times is one of them (Want Want China Holdings, 無日期). Political interest is involved. For instance, according to an article on the Economist in 2013, Want Want China Holdings was funding by the PRC government of 47 million US Dollars as subsidy in 2011, which was equivalent to 11.4% of the corporation's net profit of the year; companies that are subsidized by the PRC government are often encouraged to pursue goals such as resource acquisition, technology transfer, and diplomacy (The Economist, 2013); it is possible that the PRC has certain amount of lobbying power and had encouraged China Times under Want Want China Holdings to report the news regarding Diaoyutai in a certain ways.

Figure 7: Hierarchical relationships of Want Want China Holdings



Source: (Chang Y. , 2017).

In this case, driving a wedge between the ROC (Taiwan) and Japan by using the dispute would be the best way to raise the patriotism of the Taiwanese people and also bring them closer to the PRC, although the Ma administration had stated many times that the government would never cooperate with the PRC. To add to the findings of external influence from the PRC, although it is out of the time scope of this research, in 2014, China Times even signed two Memorandums of “Strategic Cooperation” with two PRC government-own media, namely the Xinhua News Agency and the Beijing Daily (Lu S. , 2014; Wang M. , 2014). China Times has become more of a pan-red (PRC) newspaper rather than pan-blue (KMT).

Although not influencing the policy directly, the owners of the newspapers do have some effects in shaping the thoughts of their readers over time by writing in different tones when describing certain political parties and leaders of their preferences, and then further influence the public opinion of the people that might also have a say in the decision-making process regarding the dispute. However, the direction in influence here is unclear; whether it is the individuals or corporations that are using the newspapers to influence public opinion and then government, or it was the political parties, or external force (in the case of China Times), that are influencing the newspapers to write in the ways they prefer and further shaping the thoughts of the public.

3. Correlations between the DV and IVs

The findings supported the hypothesis; as a result, among the 6 independent variables, the public opinion factor appears to be the most influential regarding the dispute besides the bureaucracy. The public poll results, although not directly influencing the policies made, influenced the attitudes and tones of the political parties and leaders that their stances become more and more moderate over the time. And then further helped to push the policies to become more solid in a peaceful trend; the KMT and Ma Ying-Jeou became less aggressive and moderate, and the DPP and Chen became stronger but still moderate. The mentioning of the policy of no cooperation with China might also be due to the fact that more people identify themselves as just Taiwanese but not Chinese or both Taiwanese and Chinese that the government had to reaffirm the policy again and again, although it could also be due to that the KMT, the ruling party after 2008, has a good relationship with China.

However, one more factor that helped to advance and accomplish the signing of the Taiwan-Japan Fishery Agreement in 2013 was the donation from the Taiwanese people for the Great East Japan Earthquake in March 11, 2011. Since ABE Shinzo was in office in late 2012, the not only the Fishery agreement was finally signed, but also that Taiwan was finally invited to the memorial ceremony of the earthquake in 2013; ABE not only personally thanked Taiwan for the contribution for the earthquake, but also said that

the fishery agreement helped to assure the regional safety. However, since this paper only analyzes on the domestic factors, no further examinations were done for the external factors, such as, Japan, China, or the United States.

Nonetheless, the interest group, the individual and corporations behind the media could also been trying to influence the people's preference, although not very significantly effective. Lin Rung-San of the Liberty Times and Want Want China Holdings of China Times are both effecting the tones and attitudes of the newspapers, which might also affect the readers. However, as of now, although Liberty Times seems to be reporting things from Japan's perspective a lot of times, despite the fact that the people value the peaceful and friendly political relations with Japan very much, the voice of calling to safeguard the sovereignty still remains significant. China Times, or the PRC government that subsidies Want Want China Holdings, had not been successful in bringing a big protest against Japan as it was in China in 2012, even though Cai, the owner of Want Want China Holdings, funded the protest on September 25, 2012; the relationship between Taiwan and Japan was not undermined. Therefore, the public opinion from the people still seem to be the most significant factor besides the bureaucracy that contribute to the shaping of the trend of the policy regarding the disputed islands.

CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION

1. Findings

Solving international dispute is a difficult mission for countries because it is tough for countries have come up with adequate foreign policies that could not only avoid expanding the conflicts but secure national interests and promote peaceful diplomatic relations simultaneously. For the case study of the research, the Diaoyutai/Senkaku islands dispute among the ROC (Taiwan), the PRC (China), and Japan, while it is still controversial which country possess the sovereignty over the disputed islands although Japan currently holds the administrative control, each of the disputant have its own foreign policy towards the issue that is most favorable to them based on the current situation. However, aside from the external factors that would affect the making of foreign policy, this research focused on the domestic political factors that would also have influence over such. To answer the research question, “What are the main domestic political factors and which among them is more influential in Taiwan regarding the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands dispute, and how?”, this paper first reviewed the previous works of International Relations scholars on the most valued factors: bureaucracy, political leader, political party, public opinions, media, and interest groups. From the literature reviews, while all factors have influence over the decisions made by one another, the public opinions from the people seem have less influence from the other factors. For

instance, while political leaders and political parties need approvals from each other due to the constitutional settings, they also need votes from the public in order to stay in office and proceed their political and personal agendas. Therefore, electoral considerations become a crucial point when it comes to the making of policies. This research then hypothesized that the public opinion is more influential than the other factors because people can reflect their thoughts through the public polls without the interference of the other factors, and by casting their opinions, their interests also become the political interests of the other factors as well.

To test the the hypothesis, this paper examined Taiwan on the dispute by quantifying qualitative information. The two main policies and one agreement advocated by the MoFA of the ROC (Taiwan) from the mid-1990s to early 2010s, as the time scope of research, and onwards were the 4 principles from 1996, the East China Sea Peace Initiative in 2012, and the Taiwan-Japan Fishery Agreement in 2013, which the first two mainly focus on safeguarding the sovereignty, resolving by peace, no cooperation with the PRC, fishing right as first priority, and promoting joint exploration and development, and the fishery agreement with Japan focuses on the legislations and protocols to secure lawful fishery area from 27th parallel South and north from the Yaeyama Islands and Miyako Islands of Japan; excluding the area within 12 nautical miles from the

Diaoyutai/Senkaku islands, which finally settled the principle of securing fishing right from 1996. Although the overall policies did not change over the 20 years, the ways and frequencies that the principles were mentioned by the different political factors vary over the years. By putting everything in chronological order, I found that the attitudes of the political leaders and parties changed correspondingly to the public polls made by different agencies. Both the DPP and the KMT changed their stances from weak and extremely provocative respectively, to a more moderate tone which aligned with those of the public and the MoFA, the same happened to the former president from the DPP, Chen Shui-Bian, and the former presidents from the KMT, Lee Teng-Hui and Ma Ying-Jeou. The MoFA, and the KMT also began to mention the principle of no cooperation with the PRC more and more frequent during the time from 2008 onwards, it was due to the fact that more and more Taiwanese people perceive themselves as solely Taiwanese rather than both Taiwanese and Chinese or just Chinese over the years, and the fact the KMT is known for having a closer relationship with the PRC. From these findings, the research was able to confirm that the public opinions had impacts on the shaping of these policies.


However, this does not mean that the people are not influenced by any other factors at all. Another factor in the public opinion factor, the media, had impact on all other factors as well. This research analyzed two of the major newspaper agencies in

Taiwan, Liberty Times and China Times, and found that their stances changed along with the transfer of political power between the political parties; Liberty Times changed simultaneously with the DPP, and China Times changed simultaneously with the KMT. Although this research had not been able to find out entirely which has more impact on another since only the China Times newspaper appeared to be more independent from the KMT, the interest groups behind the newspaper agencies had been identified that they do have mutual interests with the political parties, and even with external factor, namely the PRC. The founder of Liberty Times, Lin Rung-San, had been a KMT politician during Lee Teng-Hui's era and was later awarded with a national honor by Chen Shui-Bian; both Lee and Chen are pro-independence and Japan-friendly politicians. The owner of China Times, Want Want China Holdings, is a Taiwanese cooperation with most of its investments in the PRC and has been receiving subsidies from the Communist Party of China; this aligns with the stance of the KMT to stay friendly with the PRC and create anti-Japanese sentiments in Taiwan.

Therefore, as a result, rather than having all six independent variables (the domestic political factors) affecting the dependent variable (policies regarding the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands), this paper concludes that the public opinions, bureaucracy, and media influence the policy through the political leaders and parties in this case study

of Taiwan on the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands dispute. Public opinions influence the attitudes of the political leaders and parties through casting opinions on polls, which are highly valuable for the acceptancy of politicians; the media acts mostly accordingly to the interest groups to influence the political leaders and parties; the bureaucracy, as the think-tanks and personnel working for both negotiations and policies, influence the political leaders and parties with their long-term experience in handling issues of the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands. The figure below shows the findings in conclusion which shows that intermediate variables exist in the case study of Taiwan on the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands dispute.

Figure 8: Variable Relationships in the case study of Taiwan on the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands dispute



Arranged by the author

2. Limitations and Opportunities for Future Research

This research would have a better contribution to the field of study if several

improvements were done. Aside from the limitations mentioned in Chapter 3, after the doing the analysis, I found that it is almost impossible to neglect the external factors entirely. The pressure coming the United States, Japan, and the PRC, would have have impact on the policies of the Taiwanese government since Taiwan is relatively weaker in both political and economic aspects, and the fact that Taiwan is one of the possible flashpoints between the United States and the PRC in modern time that whatever foreign policies that we implemented would have impacts on them, such that they would definitely try to impose influences, as examined in the interest groups section.

Second, the findings of the research could have been more profound if a more in-depth analysis was done. The research could have gone deeper into the history and relationships between the politicians within each political parties and the bureaucracy to see how each of them can relate to the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands dispute, or to the other two disputants (the PRC and Japan).

Third, since the conclusion suggests a new relationship between the variables from the hypothesis, further analysis on the relationships between the independent variables, intermediate variables, and dependent variables should be conducted to test deeper on the cause in effect of decision-makings in this case study.

Fourth, a comparison between all territorial disputes involving Taiwan would

help to test the relationships between these variables that whether the relationship only applies to Taiwan on the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands dispute, or also applies to other territorial disputes, such as, the dispute on the future of Taiwan (to unify with China or declare de jure independence).

Fifth, a comparison between the relationships of the variables in the three disputants (Taiwan, Japan, and China) would make this research contribute more to the study. And further look at all the territorial disputes of each of the three disputants might be able to generate new findings on the patterns of decision-making in foreign policies on territorial disputes.

If the above improvements were done, the research can provide more useful findings and contribute to the efforts of resolution of the conflict in the future.

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APPENDICES

Appendix 1

1.1 Incident on June 8, 2005

Taiwanese fishing vessels entered the fishery near the disputed island and were deported by the Japanese Coast Guard vessels due to the overlapping exclusive economic zone (EEZ) between ROC (Taiwan) and Japan (Chang M. , 2005). Aside from the sovereignty of the disputed island, the fishery in the area was, and still is today, always a problem between the two parties.

1.2 Incident on September 25, 2012

The 925 Taiwan Bao-Diao Movement¹⁵ was a movement which strived to sail around or even board the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands organized by Yilan County Fishing Committee. Fishing vessels gathered in Nan-Fang-Ao Harbor of Yilan County in the afternoon of September 24 and arrived near the disputed island area on September 25, 2012. This was the largest Bao-Diao movement in the Taiwanese history; a total of 58 fishing vessels with 292 fishermen participated in the movement along with 12 Taiwan Coast Guard vessels escort. The group confronted the Japan Coast Guard vessels as they met; both sides used loud speakers and water cannons. In the end, the activists did not manage to do either goals, but were able to get as close as 2.1 nautical miles to the islands, which was the closest one in the 2000s. The movement was triggered because Japan decided to nationalize the disputed islands; the movement was funded by the president of Want Want China Holdings¹⁶, Cai Yan-Ming, who contributed 170 Thousand USD to support for the gas expense of the vessels.

¹⁵ 925 Bao-Diao Movement: How the incident on September 25, 2012 was generally called by the Taiwanese media; In Chinese Bao-Diao (保釣) means Protecting the sovereignty over Diaoyutai.

¹⁶ Want Want China Holdings: A Taiwanese company that has large and most of its investments in the PRC; the Director, Cai Yan-Ming, is a well-known pro-unification under PRC businessman.

Appendix 2

2.1 Lee Teng-Hui's attitude over the years.

	Title	Reporters	Agency
1996.09.07	<p>李總統：中日應協商解決釣魚台漁業權問題</p> <p>lǐ zǒng tǒng : zhōng rì yīng xié shāng jiě jué diào yú tái yú yè quán wèn tí</p> <p>President Lee: ROC and Japan should negotiate on the fishery problem in the Diaoyutai Islands area</p>	Chang, H.	China Times
	<p>During a meeting with LPJ legislators from Japan, Lee said that the two countries should keep calm and negotiate about fishing zones as soon as possible in order to avoid further conflicts. The Diaoyutai/Senkaku area has always been a fishery for Taiwanese fishermen since the Japanese occupation in Taiwan, and was always under the authority of Taihoku (Taipei) government at that time. A cooperation would benefit the two. Lee did not touch on the sovereignty issue.</p>		
1996.09.10	<p>李登輝釣魚台事件透過外交途徑談判</p> <p>lǐ dēng huī diào yú tái shì jiàn tòu guò wài jiāo tú jìng tán pàn</p> <p>Lee says the incident should be resolved through diplomatic negotiation</p>	Lin, C.	China Times
	<p>Negotiation should be done through diplomacy with peace and considering national interest; not through violence and war.</p>		

1996.09.13	<p>昨接見日議員李總統：中日應理性和平協商解決釣魚台之爭政院宣布我方處理四原則： ①堅持主權②理性解決③不與中共合作④維護漁權民代擬赴釣魚台抗議內政部將疏導</p> <p>zuó jiē jiàn rì yì yuán lǐ zǒng tǒng : zhōng rì yīng lǐ xìng hé píng xié shāng jiě jué diào yú tái zhī zhēng zhèng yuàn xuān bù wǒ fāng chǔ lǐ sì yuán zé : 1. jiān chí zhǔ quán 2. lǐ xìng jiě jué 3. bù yǔ zhōng gòng hé zuò 4. wéi hù yú quán</p> <p>Meeting a Japanese dietman yesterday, President Lee, "ROC and Japan should resolve the Diaoyutai Dispute peacefully." Executive Yuan stated the the 4 principles: 1. Safeguard sovereignty 2. Resolve relationally 3. No cooperation with the PRC 4. Safeguard fishing right</p>	Chang, H.	China Times
	Lee mentions the 4 principles of 1996 to a Japanese dietman.		
2008.09.25	<p>李登輝訪沖繩 重申釣魚島為日領土</p> <p>lǐ dēng huī fǎng chōng shéng chòng shēn diào yú dǎo wéi rì lǐng tǔ</p> <p>Lee restates that Japan holds the sovereignty over the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands during his visit to Okinawa</p>	Wen, Y.	BBC 中文網
	During an interview with Okinawa Times in 2002, Lee said that the sovereignty of the islands belongs to Japan. And again in 2008.09.24, during a banquet with Okinawa prefectural government, Lee restated his stance that the islands belong to Japan.		
2012.09.12	李登輝：釣魚台要談的是漁權不是主權	TWIMI	TWIMI

	<p>lǐ dēng huī : diào yú tái yào tán dí shì yú quán bù shì zhǔ quán</p> <p>Lee says the negotiation is for the fishing right rather than sovereignty</p>		
	<p>Lee says that there's no dispute regarding the sovereignty, only fishery rights.</p>		

2.2 Chen Shui-Bian's attitude over the years.

1996.09.07	<p>陳水扁：保釣活動應謹慎不可魯莽</p> <p>chén shuǐ biǎn : bǎo diào huó dòng yīng jǐn shèn bù kě lǚ mǎng</p> <p>Chen says the Bao-Diao protests should be done with caution</p>	Lin, S.	China Times
	<p>Chen says that Taiwan shouldn't be too provocative regarding the Diaoyutai islands since Taiwan does not have 100% administration of the islands that the military might not be able to provide full protection around the area.</p>		
2002.11.12	<p>陳水扁首對釣魚台主權表態</p> <p>chén shuǐ biǎn shǒu duì diào yú tái zhǔ quán biǎo tài</p> <p>Chen makes his first public statement regarding the sovereignty over the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands</p>	Yang, M.	BBC 中文網
	<p>Chen says that the disputed islands belong to the ROC, and him as the Head of State should stand along with the people to protect the sacred territory.</p>		
2005.06.23	<p>陳總統首度定調「漁權爭議」非「主權爭議」 軍艦護漁 我亦知會美國</p>	Lin, S., Kao, Y., & Chen,	China Times

	<p>chén zǒng tǒng shǒu dù dìng diào 「 yú quán zhēng yì 」 fēi 「 zhǔ quán zhēng yì 」 jūn jiàn hù yú wǒ yì zhī huì měi guó</p> <p>Chen says the dispute is about fishing right rather than sovereignty, and the consideration of escorting the fishermen's protest to the islands with navy vessels will be reported to the United States</p>	C.	
	<p>Chen says that Taiwan holds the sovereignty over the disputed island, however, the incident on 0608 this time, is a matter of fishery right rather than sovereignty; Taiwan does not want to have conflict with Japan, and shall resolve this through diplomacy.</p>		
2005.08.11	<p>扁赴彭佳嶼 宣示釣魚台主權</p> <p>biǎn fù péng jiā yǔ xuān shì diào yú tái zhǔ quán .</p> <p>Chen boarded Peng-Chia Island to declare sovereignty over the Diaoyutai Islands</p>	Lin, S.	China Times
	<p>Chen boarded the Peng-Chia Island and said that the sovereignty of the Diaoyutai belongs to Taiwan.</p>		

2.3 MA Ying-Jeou's attitude over the years.

1996.09.10	<p>馬英九談釣魚台領土主權爭議問題</p> <p>mǎ yīng jiǔ tán diào yú tái lǐng tǔ zhǔ quán zhēng yì wèn tí</p> <p>Ma talks about the problem of the sovereignty over the Diaoyutai Islands</p>	Ying, D.	China Times
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	<p>Ma says that fishermen have the right to express their opinion and anger regarding the issue. However, violence and irrational behaviors should be avoided, so that the government could have more negotiation space.</p>		
1996.09.30	<p>馬英九：保釣光靠抗議是不夠的愛盟辦座談會與會學者多批評政府立場不夠堅定大學生缺乏運動熱情</p> <p>mǎ yīng jiǔ : bǎo diào guāng kào kàng yì shì bù gòu dí ài méng bàn zuò tán huì yǔ huì xué zhě duō pī píng zhèng fǔ lì cháng bù gòu jiān dìng dà xué shēng quē fá yùn dòng rè qíng</p> <p>During a panel discussion with scholars, Ma said that safeguarding sovereignty through protests will not be enough, and scholars criticized the government for being too soft and university students are too careless about such issue</p>	Dung, M.	China Times
	<p>During a discussion panel set up by the Anti-Communist Association, Ma said that the government's 4 principles are good and Taiwan should keep calm without taking provocative actions.</p>		
1997.05.25	<p>錢復、馬英九：政府應堅持釣魚台主權均主張透過外交避免直接衝突馬籲民間保釣勿過火</p> <p>qián fù 、 mǎ yīng jiǔ : zhèng fǔ yīng jiān chí diào yú tái zhǔ quán jūn zhǔ zhāng tòu guò wài jiāo bì miǎn zhí jiē chōng tū mǎ xū mǐn jiān bǎo diào wù guò huǒ</p> <p>Chien and Ma both say that safeguarding sovereignty of the islands should be done through diplomacy and should avoid civil conflicts</p>	Lin, S.	China Times

	Ma says that the government should safeguard the sovereignty, however, things should be resolved through diplomatic means rather than confrontations.		
2002.09.27	馬：釣魚台是我領土 毋庸置疑 mǎ : diào yú tái shì wǒ lǐng tǔ wú yōng zhì yí Ma says Taiwan holds sovereignty over the Diaoyutai Islands absolutely.	Wang, C., & Dung, M.	China Times
	Regarding Lee stating that the islands belong to Japan. Ma said that it was inappropriate for a former president and the island is only currently under Japanese occupation and it does not mean that they have the sovereignty.		
2005.06.24	釣魚台爭議 馬轟軟弱總統 府：下月談判解決 diào yú tái zhēng yì mǎ hōng ruǎn ruò zǒng tǒng fǔ : xià yuè tán pàn jiě jué Ma condemns the government for being too soft on the dispute, and the government plans to negotiate in the next month	Lin, Y., & Chao, H.	China Times
	Regarding that Chen says that the problem is fishery rather than sovereignty. Ma said that Chen is too soft and should never say such thing as a president.		
2005.06.25	商談航權，馬英九促以戰逼和 shāng tán háng quán, mǎ yīng jiǔ cù yǐ zhàn bī hé Mayor Ma expresses opinion on the negotiation for fishing right that ROC should have the fortitude to risk war and force Japan to give in	China Times	China Times

	Ma said that ROC should prepare for a battle so that the ROC could have a better position in negotiation with Japan.		
2008.06.13	<p>四點聲明 強硬護釣魚台主權 總統府要日方立即放人、賠償</p> <p>sì diǎn shēng míng qiáng yìng hù diào yú tái zhǔ quán zǒng tǒng fǔ yào rì fāng lì jí fàng rén 、 péi cháng</p> <p>The President's Office of the ROC demands Japan to release the fishermen immediately, pay the compensations, and restated the 4 principles of 1996.</p>	Hsiao, H.	China Times
	Regarding the Japanese CG sinking the Taiwanese fishing vessel, the government will continue claim the islands.		
2008.06.17	<p>撞船事件 馬總統指示和平解決</p> <p>zhuàng chuán shì jiàn mǎ zǒng tǒng zhǐ shì hé píng jiě jué</p> <p>Ma instructs to resolve the incident of the collision of the vessels</p>	Hsiao, H.	China Times
	Ma says that, as a democratic state, Taiwan should always resolve disputes like this with peace and through diplomatic means; violence and confrontations are not in our consideration and would be avoided.		
2012.03.24	<p>馬訪台灣文獻館 重申釣魚台主權</p> <p>mǎ fǎng tái wān wén xiàn guǎn zhòng shēn diào yú tái zhǔ quán</p> <p>Ma restated the sovereignty over the Diaoyutai</p>	沈揮勝	China Times

	Islands again during his visit to the Taiwan Historica		
	Ma once again restated that the ROC holds the sovereignty over the islands.		
2012.08.06	活路外交 馬拋「東海和平倡議」 盼和平方式解決釣魚台問題 重申中華民國擁有主權 籲中日擱置爭議合作開發東海資源 日等國未回應 huó lù wài jiāo mǎ pāo 「dōng hǎi hé píng chàng yì」 pàn hé píng fāng shì jiě jué diào yú tái wèn tí zhòng shēn zhōng huá mín guó yōng yǒu zhǔ quán xū zhōng rì gē zhì zhēng yì hé zuò kāi fā dōng hǎi zī yuán rì děng guó wèi huí yīng Flexible diplomacy, Ma proposes the East China Sea Peace Initiative, hopes to resolve the Diaoyutai issue with peace, restates ROC's sovereignty over the islands, suggests PRC and Japan to shelve the dispute and cooperate on the development. Both Japan and PRC has not yet responded	Lee, M.	China Times
	Ma proposed the East China Sea Peace Initiative		
2012.08.29	馬：台灣拒讓 和平雙贏 mǎ : tái wān jù ràng hé píng shuāng yíng Ma, "Taiwan refuses to step down, but hopes to have a win-win outcome with peace.	Chou, P.	China Times
	We will continue to safeguard the sovereignty but we should be able to cooperate peacefully for the mutual benefits.		
2013.02.24	接見日媒再提東海和平倡議 馬：擱置爭議而非主權 jiē jiàn rì méi zài tí dōng hǎi hé píng chàng yì	Wang, C.	China Times

	mǎ : gē zhì zhēng yì ér fēi zhǔ quán Ma talks about his peace initiative proposal to shelve the dispute but not sovereignty during a press conference with the Japan media.		
	During a press conference with Japanese media, Ma said that Taiwan is shelving the dispute however not giving up on the sovereignty.		
2013.05.09	馬：台日簽漁業協議 歡迎陸加入 mǎ : tái rì qiān yú yè xié yì huān yíng lù jiā rù Ma welcomes the PRC to join the fishery agreement that Taiwan and Japan signed.	Chou, P.	China Times
	Ma said that the signing of the fishery agreement means peace between Japan and Taiwan and the government welcomes China to join the agreement as well.		

2.4 Attitudes of Political leaders in Taiwan in comparison to the actual policy made by the MoFA.

Year	MoFA	Lee	Chen	Ma
1990	0	-1	-	0
1996	0	0	-1	0
1997	0	0	0	0
2002	0	-1	0	1
2005	0	-1	0	1
2008	0	-1	-	0
2012	0	-1	-	0

Appendix 3

3.1 DPP's attitude over the years.

1996.07.19	<p>朝野國代主張重申釣魚台主權</p> <p>zhāo yě guó dài zhǔ zhāng zhòng shēn diào yú tái zhǔ quán</p> <p>The national assembly states the sovereignty over the islands</p>	Liu, T.	China Times
	<p>The national assembly states that the islands have always been a ROC territory and a traditional fishery to Taiwan.</p>		
1996.08.06	<p>民進黨認為釣魚台問題國民黨態度曖昧</p> <p>mín jìn dǎng rèn wéi diào yú tái wèn tí guó mín dǎng tài dù ài mèi</p> <p>DPP politician think that the KMT does not show a clear stance regarding the dispute</p>	Fan, C.	China Times
	<p>DPP said that the government needs to state the country's stance regarding the islands officially and should not cooperate with the PRC in order to avoid falling in the framework of One-China.</p>		
2002.10.22	<p>釣魚台主權爭議再掀波 國親立委批李登輝喪權辱國 主張禮遇預算減半 綠軍極力護衛台聯強調李是陳述歷史事實民進黨認發言與預算不相干</p> <p>diào yú tái zhǔ quán zhēng yì zài xiān bō guó qīn lì wěi pī lǐ dēng huī sāng quán rǔ guó zhǔ zhāng lǐ yù yù suàn jiǎn bàn lǜ jūn jí lì hù wèi tái lián qiáng diào lǐ shì chén shù lì shǐ shí míng jìn dǎng rèn fā yán yǔ yù suàn bù xiāng gān</p> <p>KMT and PFP politicians proposed to cut courtesy for former president Lee, but DPP and</p>	Lee, C., & Chen, C.	China Times

	TSU says Lee's statement should not affect Lee's courtesy		
	The DPP responded that the government has stated the sovereignty many times that it is unnecessary to do anything to Lee since he is no longer the president, his statement would only represent himself.		
2005.07.02	<p>漁權問題 藍綠各表</p> <p>yú quán wèn tí lán lǜ gè biǎo</p> <p>KMT and DPP have different opinions regarding the issue of fishery right</p>	Lin, M.	China Times
	DPP politician, Chen Ting-Nan said that it is right to focus on the fishing right than the sovereignty because it would only trigger conflict now, it is best to resolve fishing problem and shelf the sovereignty for now.		
2008.06.19	<p>呂秀蓮聲稱:強調釣魚台主權,沖擊日美安保</p> <p>lǚ xiù lián shēng chēng : qiáng diào diào yú tái zhǔ quán , chōng jī rì měi ān bǎo</p> <p>Lu says that emphasising on the sovereignty might challenge the US-Japan Security Treaty</p>	CRNTT	CRNTT
	Lu said that Taiwan should not challenge the US-Japan Defense Treaty.		
2012.08.15	<p>釣魚台爭議民進黨提五點原則</p> <p>diào yú tái zhēng yì mǐn jìn dǎng tí wǔ diǎn yuán zé</p> <p>DPP states 5 principles regarding the Diaoyutai dispute</p>	TWIMI	TWIMI

	DPP said that If the Ma administration could hold on to the five points as follows, the DDP would have no problem in supporting him, “diplomacy by peace”, “avoid conflicts”, “Taiwan-Japan relations as first priority”, “no cooperation with PRC”, and “Ma has to keep his words for sovereignty”.		
2012.09.25	登艦巡島 藍委提案 綠委拒跟 dēng jiàn xún dǎo lán wěi tí àn lǜ wěi jù gēn KMT politicians proposed to board the islands, DPP politicians refused)	Chen, W.	China Times
	KMT politicians suggested that the legislators should board the vessels with the fishermen to sail around the islands. DPP politicians think it is irrational to do such thing.		

3.2 KMT’s attitude over the years.

1996.07.19	朝野國代主張重申釣魚台主權 zhāo yě guó dài zhǔ zhāng zhòng shēn diào yú tái zhǔ quán The national assembly states the sovereignty over the islands	Liu, T.	China Times
	KMT thinks that the islands belong to the ROC but diplomatic dialogue should be conducted through the MoFA with peace.		
1996.09.10	馬英九談釣魚台領土主權爭議問題 mǎ yīng jiǔ tán diào yú tái lǐng tǔ zhǔ quán zhēng yì wèn tí Ma talks about the problem of the sovereignty	Ying, D.	China Times

	over the Diaoyutai Islands		
	Ma said that the citizens could have high expectation towards the government, however, this is not the time to show our military strength, we should rather be considering the current situation and do what is best for Taiwan.		
1996.09.12	<p>國民黨三議員發起拒用日貨運動要求市府日後對巨蛋、捷運等重大工程不得使用日本規格</p> <p>guó mín dǎng sān yì yuán fā qǐ jù yòng rì huò yùn dòng yào qiú shì fǔ rì hòu duì jù dàn 、 jié yùn děng zhòng dà gōng chéng bù dé shǐ yòng rì běn guī gé</p> <p>Three KMT legislators proposed to boycott goods made in Japan, and prohibit Japanese specifications on all infrastructures</p>	Chi, C.	China Times
	KMT legislators suggested prohibiting the use of Japan standard products and Japanese companies in infrastructure construction projects as a way to boycott Japan.		
2002.10.22	<p>釣魚台主權爭議再掀波 國親立委批李登輝喪權辱國 主張禮遇預算減半 綠軍極力護衛台聯強調李是陳述歷史事實民進黨認發言與預算不相干</p> <p>diào yú tái zhǔ quán zhēng yì zài xiān bō guó qīn lì wěi pī lǐ dēng huī sāng quán rǔ guó zhǔ zhāng lǐ yù yù suàn jiǎn bàn lǜ jūn jí lì hù wèi tái lián qiáng diào lǐ shì chén shù lì shǐ shì míng jìn dǎng rèn fā yán yǔ yù suàn bù xiāng gān</p> <p>KMT and PFP politicians proposed to cut courtesy for former president Lee, but DPP and TSU says Lee's statement should not affect Lee's courtesy</p>	Lee, C., & Chen, C.	China Times

	KMT politicians, Hung Siu-Chu and others, think that Lee no longer should have the courtesy of former president for having such statement.		
2005.06.24	釣魚台爭議 馬轟軟弱總統 府：下月談判解決 diào yú tái zhēng yì mǎ hōng ruǎn ruò zǒng tǒng fǔ : xià yuè tán pàn jiě jué Ma condemns the government for being too soft on the dispute, and the government plans to negotiate in the next month	Lin, Y., & Chao, H.	China Times
	Regarding Chen says that the problem is fishery rather than sovereignty, Ma said that Chen is too soft and should never say such thing as a president.		
2005.07.02	漁權問題 藍綠各表 yú quán wèn tí lán lǜ gè biǎo KMT and DPP have different opinions regarding the issue of fishery right)	Lin, M.	China Times
	KMT politician, Lu Kuo-Hua, said that Taiwan should take action against the Japanese rather than teaming up with Japan to work against China. The problems of detentions of fishing vessels will only increase if we do not take actions.		
2008.12.11	吳伯雄：釣魚台是台日間的事 wú bó xióng : diào yú tái shì tái rì jiān dí shì Wu says the Diaoyutai Dispute is an issue only between Taiwan and Japan	Huang, C.	China Times

	During an interview with Japanese media, KMT chairman, Wu Po-Sion, said that the problem is only between the ROC and Japan, and we should cooperate on the development and fishery rather than fighting. Taiwan will not cooperate with the PRC. And the problem is only between the ROC and Japan, implying that the PRC has no right in this issue.		
2012.09.25	登艦巡島 藍委提案 綠委拒跟 dēng jiàn xún dǎo lán wěi tí àn lǜ wěi jù gēn KMT politicians proposed to board the islands, DPP politicians refused	Chen, W.	China Times
	KMT politicians suggested that the legislators should board the vessels with the fishermen to sail around the islands.		

3.3 Attitudes of Political Parties in Taiwan in comparison to the actual policy made by the MoFA

Year	MoFA	DPP	KMT
1990	0		
1996	0	-0.5	0
1997	0	-0.5	0.5
2002	0	-0.5	1
2005	0	-1	1
2008	0	-1	0
2012	0	0	0.5

Appendix 4

4.1 Articles from the Liberty Times regarding the incident on June 8, 2005, and September 25, 2012.

2005

Date	Article Title	Positive	Neutral	Negative	News	Columns
609	一年多來 日扣留 7 蘇澳船 yī nián duō lái rì kòu liú 7 sū ào chuán Japan has detained 7 vessels from Su-Ao over the year.		1		1	
610	日驅離漁船 我嚴正抗議 rì qū lí yú chuán, wǒ yán zhèng kàng yì Japan expelled Taiwanese fishing vessels, Taiwan expresses strong protest	1			1	
611	逼日談判 立委鼓戰 bī rì tán pàn lì wěi gǔ zhàn Legislators suggest provocative actions to force Japan to negotiate	1			1	
611	護漁 先問四個問題 hù yú xiān wèn sì gè wèn tí Four questions to ask before protecting fishing right		1			1
611	老賊假慈悲 lǎo zéi jiǎ cí bēi A thief who pretends to show sympathy			1		1
614	台日達共識 速開漁業會談 tái rì dá gòng shí sù kāi yú yè huì tán A Consensus between Taiwan and Japan to commence the fishery meeting	1			1	
617	共軍不硬 什麼道理？			1		1

	gòng jūn bù yìng, shí me dào lǐ How is it reasonable to be soft on the Communist?					
617	又見義和團 yòu jiàn yì hé tuán Another boxer rebellion?			1		1
618	戰爭陰謀 zhàn zhēng yīn móu War conspiracy			1		1
618	台獨與護漁 tái dú yǔ hù yú Taiwan independence and protecting fishing right		1			1
618	台日漁業談判 兩週內召開 tái rì yú yè tán pàn liǎng zhōu nèi zhào kāi Taiwan-Japan Fishery Meeting to be commenced in two weeks		1		1	
619	我漁船在琉球海域遭日扣押 wǒ yú chuán zài liú qiú hǎi yù zāo rì kòu yā Fishing vessels detained by Japan in Ryukyu area	1			1	
620	謝揆承諾 儘速與日談判漁權 xiè kuí chéng nuò jìn sù yǔ rì tán pàn yú quán Premier Hsieh promises to commence the fishery meeting and negotiation with Japan	1			1	
620	媚中仇日 加深國家認同分歧 mèi zhōng chóu rì jiā shēn guó jiā rèn tóng fēn qí Admiring the PRC while hating Japan will worsen the sense of national identity in Taiwan		1		1	
621	替老共爭釣魚台？			1		1

	tì lǎo gòng zhēng diào yú tái ? Safeguarding the Diaoyutai Islands for Communist China?					
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2012

Date	Title	Positive	Neutral	Negative	News	Columns
925	呼籲馬「備妥釣魚台說帖」… 呂：透過友邦聯合國發聲 hū xū mǎ 「 bèi tuǒ diào yú tái shuō tiè 」 ... lǚ : tòu guò yǒu bāng lián guó fā shēng Lu suggests Ma to prepare a statement for the sovereignty over the Diaoyutai Islands for the allies to speak up for Taiwan in the United Nation		1		1	
925	互看不順眼 喜歡中國的日人 剩 3 % hù kàn bù shùn yǎn xǐ huān zhōng guó dí rì rén shèng 3 % Not liking each other, only 3% of the Japanese like Chinese			1	1	
925	戰略目標應為漁權 而非主權 zhàn lüè mù biāo yīng wéi yú quán ér fēi zhǔ quán The strategic agenda should be fishing right rather than sovereignty		1			1
925	捍衛漁權 百船赴釣魚台 hàn wèi yú quán bǎi chuán fù diào yú tái Hundreds of fishing vessels sail to Diaoyutai Islands to safeguard fishing right	1			1	
925	浪高 5 米 船隊很辛苦 làng gāo 5 mǐ chuán duì hěn 辛苦	1			1	

	xīn kǔ A long day for the vessels to fight against the 5 meters high currents					
925	老漁民 常登島撿鳥蛋 lǎo yú mǐn cháng dēng dǎo jiǎn niǎo dàn An old fisherman says he used to collect bird eggs on the Diaoyutai Islands often			1	1	
925	馬：漁權問題未決 台日很難 坐下來談 mǎ : yú quán wèn tí wèi jué tái rì hěn nán zuò xià lái tán Ma says that it will be hard for Taiwan and Japan to negotiate before the problem of fishery is resolved		1		1	
925	日新法 海保官可在離島行使 警察權 rì xīn fǎ hǎi bǎo guān kě zài lí dǎo xíng shǐ jǐng chá quán Japanese coast guards can now exercise police authority in the island areas as a new law has been passed		1		1	
925	台保釣漁船與日本巡邏艦對峙 雙方水柱開戰 tái bǎo diào yú chuán yǔ rì běn xún luó jiàn duì zhì shuāng fāng shuǐ zhù kāi zhàn Taiwanese Bao-Diao fishing vessels have water-gun fights with Japanese patrol vessels		1		1	
925	今井正今訪台 盼討論釣魚台 主權問題		1		1	

	<p>jīn jǐng zhèng jīn fǎng tái pàn tǎo lùn diào yú tái zhǔ quán wèn tí Imai looks forward to discuss about the sovereignty over the Diaoyutai Islands during his visit to Taiwan today</p>					
925	<p>海象不佳 保釣漁船上午 9 時 返航 hǎi xiàng bù jiā bǎo diào yú chuán shàng wǔ 9 shí fǎn hang Fishing vessels participating in the Bao-diao movement to return at 9 AM due to bad weather</p>		1		1	
925	<p>釣島海域台日大戰 水柱噴射 一瞬間 diào dǎo hǎi yù tái rì dà zhàn shuǐ zhù pēn shè yī shùn jiān Confrontation between vessels from Taiwan and Japan near the Diaoyutai Islands area</p>		1		1	
925	<p>台日嚴肅談釣島 外長見今井 正重申立場 tái rì yán sù tán diào dǎo wài cháng jiàn jīn jǐng zhèng zhòng shēn lì cháng Minister of Foreigner Affairs restated Taiwan's stance regarding the islands during a meeting with Imai</p>			1	1	
926	<p>南方澳「現撈仔」業者：8 成 來自釣島海域 nán fāng ào 「xiàn lāo zī」 yè zhě : 8 chéng lái zì diào dǎo hǎi yù Seafood dealers say that 80% of</p>	1			1	

	the supply come from the Diaoyutai fishery area					
926	台灣日本釣魚台 tái wān rì běn diào yú tái Taiwan, Japan, and the Diaoyutai Islands			1		1
926	宣示主權 挺進釣島//台日船艦 水柱互轟 xuān shì zhǔ quán tǐng jìn diào dǎo // tái rì chuán jiàn shuǐ zhù hù hōng Fishing vessels enter Diaoyutai area to declare sovereignty // Taiwan and Japan vessels fire water-guns to each other	1			1	
926	「一台各表」如何 「yī tái gè biǎo」rú hé How about “One Taiwan, Two interpretations”			1		1
926	漁權談判 馬遠遠不如李、扁 yú quán tán pàn mǎ yuǎn yuǎn bù rú lǐ 、 biǎn Ma performs worse than Lee and Chen in fishing negotiations with Japan			1		1
926	兩個星期前，為何馬政府不談 漁權？ liǎng gè xīng qī qián , wéi hé mǎ zhèng fǔ bù tán yú quán ? Why didn't Ma talk about fishing right two weeks ago?			1		1
926	日驅趕我漁船 外交部強烈抗 議 rì qū gǎn wǒ yú chuán wài jiāo bù qiáng liè kàng yì MoFA strongly protests against	1			1	

	Japan regarding the deportations of Taiwanese fishing vessels					
926	台灣漁船保釣 中國網友熱議 tái wān yú chuán bǎo diào zhōng guó wǎng yǒu rè yì Hot discussions about Taiwan's Bao-Diao movement among Chinese netizens			1	1	
926	蘇：勿掉入一中陷阱 sū : wù diào rù yī zhōng xiàn jǐng Su warns the nation not to fall into the "One-China" trap			1	1	
926	馬：政府護漁 一點也不含糊 mǎ : zhèng fǔ hù yú yī diǎn yě bù hán hū Ma says the government would not be evasive for the protection of fishing right	1			1	
926	我宣示漁權 船隊挺進釣島三浬處 wǒ xuān shì yú quán chuán duì tǐng jìn diào dǎo sān li chǔ Taiwanese vessels declares sovereignty at 3 Nm near the Diaoyutai Islands	1			1	
926	漁民護漁權 海巡弟兄拚到底 yú mín hù yú quán hǎi xún dì xiōng pīn dào dǐ Coast guards escort fishermen as they protest to protect fishing right	1			1	
926	永昇 106 最接近 衝到 2.1 浬 yǒng shēng 106 zuì jiē jìn chōng dào 2.1 li Vessel Yung-Sheng 106 was only	1			1	

	2.1 Nm from the islands, which was closest among the protestors					
926	破浪保釣 直擊勇敢台灣人 pò làng bǎo diào zhí jī yǒng gǎn tái wān rén Taiwanese going against the currents to protest for fishing right	1			1	
926	日前率先勇闖 大瀚 711 返台中港受到歡迎 rì qián shuài xiān yǒng chuǎng dà hàn 711 fǎn tái zhōng gǎng shòu dào huān yíng As the leading vessels yesterday, vessel Ta-Hang 711 highly welcomed after coming back to Taichung Port	1			1	
926	馬：漁民示主權 網友：國際笑話 mǎ : yú mín shì zhǔ quán wǎng yǒu : guó jì xiào huà Netizens criticize Ma's statement of declaration of sovereignty with the fishermen as an international joke			1	1	
927	挺進釣魚台，然後呢？ tǐng jìn diào yú tái , rán hòu ní ? What comes after entering the Diaoyutai area?			1		1
927	美解密文件：日屢促支持釣島主權 美堅持中立 měi jiě mì wén jiàn : rì lǚ cù zhī chí diào dǎo zhǔ quán měi jiān chí zhōng lì A confidential file of the United		1		1	

	States show that the US persists to remain neutral while Japan suggests the US to back up on the sovereignty over the islands					
927	國共反幫日本穩坐釣魚台 guó gòng fǎn bāng rì běn wěn zuò diào yú tái KMT and CCP help Japan on the Diaoyutai issue			1		1
927	釣魚台不能這樣順風相送 diào yú tái bù néng zhè yàng shùn fēng xiāng song Diaoyutai Islands are not for free			1		1
927	日媒呼籲 重啟台日漁業談判 rì méi hū xū zhòng qǐ tái rì yú yè tán pàn Japanese media suggest the government to restart the fishery meeting with Taiwan		1		1	
927	馬肯定護漁 釣島問題須和平解決 mǎ kěn dìng hù yú diào dǎo wèn tí xū hé píng jiě jué Ma supports the movement and says that the problem shall be solved by peace	1			1	
927	漁民讚海巡...但裝備要加強 yú mín zàn hǎi xún ... dàn zhuāng bèi yào jiā qiáng Fishermen thank coast guard for the escorts but suggest them to upgrade the vessels			1	1	
927	宣示釣島主權 僑胞聯大會場外抗議 xuān shì diào dǎo zhǔ quán qiáo bāo lián dà huì chǎng wài 宣示釣島主權 僑胞聯大會場外抗議		1		1	

	kàng yì Diaoyutai protest outside of the meeting of Overseas Chinese Association					
928	為台灣保釣？為中國保釣？ wéi tái wān bǎo diào ? wéi zhōng guó bǎo diào ? Safeguarding sovereignty for Taiwan or China?			1		1
928	護漁權 陳春生：不能被日人看衰小 hù yú quán chén chūn shēng : bù néng bèi rì rén kàn shuāi xiǎo Chen Chun-Sheng says that Taiwan should not be considered inferior by Japan	1			1	
928	釣魚台爭議 美憂台灣聯中制日 diào yú tái zhēng yì měi yōu tái wān lián zhōng zhì rì The United States worries that Taiwan will cooperate with the PRC against Japan in the Diaoyutai Islands Dispute		1		1	
928	台援引法理論據 批日竊占釣魚台 tái yuán yǐn fǎ lǐ lùn jù pī rì qiè zhān diào yú tái Taiwan to justify its stance on the sovereignty over the Diaoyutai Islands by international law, and criticizes Japan for unlawful occupation of the islands	1			1	
929	聯手為中國保釣 ián shǒu wéi zhōng guó bǎo diào			1		1

	Safeguarding the sovereignty with China, for China					
929	李澄然：美以尖閣／釣魚台並稱 lǐ chéng rán : měi yǐ jiān gé / diào yú tái bìng chēng Lee Cheng-Ran says that the United States calls the islands both Senkaku and Diaoyutai	1			1	
929	釣島爭議 美當年較認同日主張 diào dǎo zhēng yì měi dāng nián jiào rèn tóng rì zhǔ zhāng Regarding the Diaoyutai dispute, the United States supported Japan’s justification more			1	1	
929	綠營大老：釣魚台應共同開發 lǜ yíng dà lǎo : diào yú tái yīng gòng tóng kāi fā DPP seniors suggest cooperation in development of the Diaoyutai Islands		1		1	
930	宜蘭千人保釣 宣示「釣魚台是頭城的」 yí lán qiān rén bǎo diào xuān shì 「diào yú tái shì tóu chéng dí」 Thousands of protestors from Yilan to announce “the sovereignty of Diaoyutai Islands belong to Tou-Cheng town”		1		1	
1001	劣酒、假酒、鷹！ liè jiǔ 、jiǎ jiǔ 、yīng ！ Bad and fake alcohols turn people into hard-liners		1			1
1001	致藍丁丁：月球也是中國人的			1		1

	zhì lán dīng dīng : yuè qiú yě shì zhōng guó rén dí To the KMT supports, “The moon also belongs to China.”					
1001	古厝音樂會的日本客人 gǔ cuò yīn lè huì dí rì běn kè rén Japanese guests in a traditional instrument music concert			1		1
1001	一中緊箍咒／中國打壓戲碼不 會落幕 yī zhōng jǐn gū zhòu / zhōng guó dǎ yā xì mǎ bù huì luò mù The curse of “One-China” policy / Suppression from China will not end			1	1	
1001	逾千鎮民上街：釣魚台 頭城 的 yú qiān zhèn mín shàng jiē : diào yú tái tóu chéng dí Thousand of protestors chant “Diaoyutai Islands belong to Tou-Cheng town”		1		1	
1001	台巡邏船現身釣魚台海域 台 日無線電互嗆 tái xún luó chuán xiàn shēn diào yú tái hǎi yù tái rì wú xiàn diàn hù qiāng Oral confrontations through the radio between Taiwan and Japan as Taiwanese patrol vessels enter Diaoyutai area		1		1	

4.2 Articles from the China Times regarding the incident on June 8, 2005, and September 25, 2012.

2005

Date	Title	Positive	Neutral	Negative	News	Columns
609	日關切台灣漁民抗議行動 rì guān qiē tái wān yú mín kàng yì xíng dòng Japan shows concern over Taiwanese fishermen's protest		1		1	
609	台日漁事衝突 我宣示主權 派艦護漁 tái rì yú shì chōng tū wǒ xuān shì zhǔ quán pài jiàn hù yú Taiwan sends navy vessels to escort fishermen in the Bao-Diao movement	1			1	
610	談判不成 全卡在釣魚台主權 tán pàn bù chéng quán qiǎ zài diào yú tái zhǔ quán The issue of the sovereignty over the islands stuck the fishery meeting between Taiwan and Japan		1		1	
610	對日嗆聲 漁界同時臭罵政府 duì rì qiāng shēng yú jiè tóng shí chòu mà zhèng fǔ Fishermen blames the government while challenging Japan			1	1	
610	一個欠缺膽識的海洋國家 yī gè qiàn quē dǎn shí dí hǎi yáng guó jiā An island nation without courage			1		1
610	無力保護人民，要這政府做什麼？ wú lì bǎo hù rén mín , yào zhè zhèng fǔ zuò shí me ? What is the use of government if it cannot protect its own people			1		1

610	經濟海域日本撈過界 外交部批粗 暴 jīng jì hǎi yù rì běn lāo guò jiè wài jiāo bù pī cū bào MoFA condemns Japan for crossing over the EEZ	1			1	
612	護漁 南韓能，台灣也能！ hù yú nán hán néng , tái wān yě néng ! If South Korea is able to protect its fishing right, so can Taiwan!			1		1
614	台日漁業糾紛 政院盼降溫 tái rì yú yè jiū fēn zhèng yuàn pàn jiàng wēn The Executive Yuan hopes both Taiwan and Japan can calm down and discuss on the fishery problem	1			1	
614	漁民 盼先共同開發重疊海域 yú mín pàn xiān gòng tóng kāi fā zhòng dié hǎi yù Fishermen hope Taiwan and Japan can start with the co-development in the overlapping sea area			1	1	
615	主權換漁權 我須務實智取 zhǔ quán huàn yú quán wǒ xū wù shí zhì qǔ Taiwan needs to think practical when considering exchanging sovereignty for fishing right		1		1	
616	護漁 善用國際法 hù yú shàn yòng guó jì fǎ Using International Law in the Diaoyutai issue		1			1
618	換旗子又怎樣 huàn qí zǐ yòu zěn yang What is wrong with changing to a			1		1

	different flag?					
618	愛台或害台 ài tái huò hài tái Doing Taiwan good or bad?		1			1
618	前海總副參謀長蘭寧利爆料：攻佔釣魚台 郝默許 李力阻 胎死腹中 qián hǎi zǒng fù cān móu cháng lán níng lì bào liào : gōng zhān diào yú tái hǎo mò xǔ lǐ lì zǔ tāi sǐ fù zhōng Former Deputy Chief of the general staff of Navy Headquarter, Lan Ning-Lee, said that a military drill around the disputed island was approved by the minister of national defense, Hau, but disapproved and canceled by President Lee			1	1	

2012

Date	Title	Positive	Neutral	Negative	News	Columns
925	阻日逮人 海巡：不排除動武 硬起來！ 若漁民登島 將派員隨行 若日方噴水 「我們也會噴回去」 但秉持不挑釁等三不原則 zǔ rì dài rén hǎi xún : bù pái chú dòng wǔ yìng qǐ lái ! ruò yú mín dēng dǎo jiāng pài yuán suí xíng ruò rì fāng pēn shuǐ 「wǒ mén yě huì pēn huí qù」 dàn bǐng chí bù tiāo xìn děng sān bù yuán zé Taiwan coast guard says that escort will be provided to the protestors and will retaliate within the protocols if Japan fires water-gun	1			1	
925	42 年後，中時記者再闖釣島… 搏	1			1	

	浪一路暈 挺進保釣風暴中心 42 nián hòu , zhōng shí jì zhě zài chuāng diào dǎo ... bó làng yī lù yùn tǐng jìn bǎo diào fēng bào zhōng xīn China Times reporters go to the Diaoyutai Islands again after 42 years					
925	保釣不能等 總指揮：被日本欺負 36 年了 bǎo diào bù néng děng zǒng zhǐ huī : bèi rì běn qī fù 36 nián liǎo Protester leader says Taiwan should no longer keep down in safeguarding the sovereignty after being bullied by Japan for 36 years	1			1	
925	漁船總動員 保釣拚頭陣 yú chuán zǒng dòng yuán bǎo diào pīn tóu zhèn Working together in the Bao-Diao movement	1			1	
925	釣魚台護漁 政府這次一定要拿出 成績 diào yú tái hù yú zhèng fǔ zhè cì yī dìng yào ná chū chéng jì The government will try to accomplish something in the Bao- Diao movement this time		1			1
925	緊盯東海 國安會組應變小組 jǐn dīng dōng hǎi guó ān huì zǔ yīng biàn xiǎo zǔ A special group has been formed in the national security council to watch over the East China Sea	1			1	
925	政客 別只出一張嘴 拿出實力護漁 才有得談 zhèng kè bié zhī chū yī zhāng zuǐ		1		1	

	<p>ná chū shí lì hù yú cái yǒu dé tán To the politicians, actions speak louder than words</p>					
925	<p>史上最大 漁民不畏風浪 展現台灣 人的打拚 海軍海巡隨行護衛 我 百艘漁船今晨勇繞釣島 shǐ shàng zuì dà yú mín bù wèi fēng làng zhǎn xiàn tái wān rén dí dǎ pīn hǎi jūn hǎi xún suí xíng hù wèi wǒ bǎi sōu yú chuán jīn chén yǒng rào diào dǎo Largest Diaoyutai Islands protest in history; hundreds of Taiwanese fishing vessels sail to the islands with escorts of the navy</p>	1			1	
925	<p>國軍海空齊發 總統級維安 海巡特 勤全副武裝 「子彈已上膛」 guó jūn hǎi kōng qí fā zǒng tǒng jí wéi ān hǎi xún tè qín quán fù wǔ zhuāng 「zǐ dàn yǐ shàng táng」 The military provides presidential level escort for the protestors of the Bao-Diao Movement</p>	1			1	
925	<p>郝龍斌：保釣分藍綠 給人看笑話 國家重大議題 因朝野惡鬥無法推 動 令他憂心 郝籲請林義雄、連 戰等兩黨大老對談 促進和諧 hǎo lóng bīn : bǎo diào fēn lán lǜ gěi rén kàn xiào huà guó jiā zhòng dà yì tí yīn zhāo yě è dòu wú fǎ tuī dòng líng tā yōu xīn hǎo xū qǐng lín yì xióng 、 lián zhàn děng liǎng dǎng dà lǎo duì tán cù jìn hé xié Hao says that KMT and DPP should not oppose each other on such a national level issue of safeguarding</p>	1			1	

	the sovereignty of the Diaoyutai Islands, and suggests seniors of both parties to hold meeting for consensus					
925	<p>挺保釣 馬：日干擾捕漁 激怒漁民 強調問題不解決 台日很難談下去 重申東海和平倡議 盼各國擱置主 權爭議 共同開發資源</p> <p>tǐng bǎo diào mǎ : rì gān rǎo bǔ yú jī nù yú mín qiáng diào wèn tí bù jiě jué tái rì hěn nán tán xià qù zhòng shēn dōng hǎi hé píng chàng yì pàn gè guó gē zhì zhǔ quán zhēng yì gòng tóng kāi fā zī yuán</p> <p>Ma expresses support for the Bao-Diao movement and restated the East China Sea Peace Initiative; hoping all to shelve the dispute and cooperate on the development</p>	1			1	
925	<p>說明國有化爭議 盼重啟漁業談判 日交流協會理事長今井正 今訪台 滅火</p> <p>shuō míng guó yǒu huà zhēng yì pàn zhòng qǐ yú yè tán pàn rì jiāo liú xié huì lǐ shì cháng jīn jǐng zhèng jīn fǎng tái miè huǒ</p> <p>Japan-Taiwan Exchange Association director Imai visits Taiwan today to explain about nationalizing the islands and discuss about the fishery agreement</p>		1		1	
925	<p>登艦巡島 藍委提案 綠委拒跟</p> <p>dēng jiàn xún dǎo lán wěi tí àn lǜ wěi jù gēn</p> <p>KMT politicians proposed to board the islands; DPP politicians refused</p>	1			1	

926	<p>保釣護漁 成功突圍 挺進距釣島 2 哩 海巡水炮回擊日艦；回敬廣 播、照燈 警告日退出我海域 漁 民難掩興奮 直說「超乎預期」</p> <p>bǎo diào hù yú chéng gōng tū wéi tǐng jìn jù diào dǎo 2 li hǎi xún shuǐ pào huí jī rì jiàn ; huí jìng guǎng bō 、 zhào dēng jǐng gào rì tuì chū wǒ hǎi yù yú mǐn nán yǎn xīng fèn zhí shuō 「 chāo hū yù qī 」</p> <p>Protesters got as close as 2 Nm to the Diaoyutai Islands and say that it exceeded their expectations; coast guards fired water-guns with warning announcements to Japan coast guards</p>	1			1	
926	<p>堅持主權 楊進添拒今井抗議 我不 承認日本片面「國有化」釣魚台 做法 要求撤回 宣示持續捍衛漁 民作業權利</p> <p>jiān chí zhǔ quán yáng jìn tiān jù jīn jǐng kàng yì wǒ bù chéng rèn rì běn piàn miàn 「 guó yǒu huà 」 diào yú tái zuò fǎ yào qiú chè huí xuān shì chí xù hàn wèi yú mǐn zuò yè quán lì</p> <p>Yang refused Imai's protest; ROC continues to safeguard sovereignty and fishing right, and does not accept Japan's unilateral decision on nationalizing the islands</p>	1			1	
926	<p>馬盼美中立 挺漁民愛國行動</p> <p>mǎ pàn měi zhōng lì tǐng yú mǐn ài guó xíng dòng</p> <p>Ma supports the fishermen's movement to Diaoyutai Islands and wishes the United States to remain</p>	1			1	

	neutral					
926	國際、陸媒快報 網民：抗日要靠國軍 guó jì 、 lù méi kuài bào wǎng mǐn : kàng rì yào kào guó jūn Foreign and PRC media report about the protest; netizens say that only the military is reliable against Japan	1			1	
926	保釣 挺進釣島 3 哩 學者：破壞日本管理權 bǎo diào tǐng jìn diào dǎo 3 li xué zhě : pò huài rì běn guǎn lǐ quán Protesters got as close as 2 Nm to the islands; scholars think that the protest violates Japan's administration			1	1	
926	兩岸共同保釣 全靠默契 liǎng àn gòng tóng bǎo diào quán kào mò qì Taiwan and China's understanding of each other helps the success of the Bao-Diao movement	1			1	1
926	水柱突圍 保釣船：尅伊拚了 免驚！ 海巡艦噴水回擊 漁民振奮 看到了！ 漁船迂迴挺進 近距離 凝視釣島 登島下次再來 shuǐ zhù tū wéi bǎo diào chuán : gè yī pīn liǎo miǎn jīng ! hǎi xún jiàn pēn shuǐ huí jī yú mǐn zhèn fèn kàn dào liǎo ! yú chuán yū huí tǐng jìn jìn jù lí níng shì diào dǎo dēng dǎo xià cì zài lái Protesters get excited as Taiwan coast guards fire water-guns to Japan, and hope to board the islands next time	1			1	
926	國安透露 事前與中日交涉過	1			1	

	guó ān tòu lù shì qián yǔ zhōng rì jiāo shè guò National security council says a prior notice was given to China and Japan before the protest					
926	頭城 30 日發動護漁遊行 tóu chéng 30 rì fā dòng hù yú yóu xíng Diaoyutai demonstration to take place in Tou-Cheng town on September 30		1		1	
926	保釣急先鋒 大瀚 711 返台 bǎo diào jí xiān fēng dà hàn 711 fǎn tái Leading vessel during the protest, Ta- han 711, returns to Taiwan		1		1	
926	漁民：政府「沒路用」自己硬起 來 父子兩代的漁場 絕不讓給日 本 yú mín : zhèng fǔ 「méi lù yòng」 zì jǐ yìng qǐ lái fù zǐ liǎng dài dí yú chǎng jué bù ràng gěi rì běn A fisherman says that he and his father will rely on themselves to protect their 2-generation fishery at the Diaoyutai Islands area, rather than relying on the “useless” government			1	1	
926	兩岸共同保釣 台灣學者：不需要 liǎng àn gòng tóng bǎo diào tái wān xué zhě : bù xū yào Taiwanese scholars think it is unnecessary to cooperate with the PRC for Diaoyutai Islands	1			1	
927	肯定漁民保釣、海巡護漁 馬：展 現主權 不挑釁、不迴避	1			1	

	<p>kěn dìng yú mín bǎo diào 、 hǎi xún hù yú mǎ : zhǎn xiàn zhǔ quán bù tiāo xīn 、 bù huí bì</p> <p>Ma gives positive comments on the protest and the escort of the coast guards; it shows that Taiwan has the sovereignty without overly provoking, and not avoiding to show the country's stance</p>					
927	<p>海巡硬起來 讚啦！ 水柱像尿尿？ 無奈 兩軍對峙 日方噴水平直又有力 我方「射不遠又射不強」 漁民感謝護漁但仍認為裝備「需改進」</p> <p>hǎi xún yìng qǐ lái zàn la ! shuǐ zhù xiàng niào niào ? wú nài liǎng jūn duì zhì rì fāng pēn shuǐ píng zhí yòu yǒu lì wǒ fāng 「shè bù yuǎn yòu shè bù qiáng」 yú mín gǎn xiè hù yú dàn réng rèn wéi zhuāng bèi 「xū gǎi jìn」</p> <p>Protesters thank the coast guards for the escort, but suggests them to upgrade the gears as well</p>			1	1	
927	<p>討公道！漁民謝海巡挺、蔡衍明出資</p> <p>tǎo gōng dào ! yú mín xiè hǎi xún tǐng 、 cài yǎn míng chū zī</p> <p>Protesters thank the coast guards for the escort and Cai for the fund</p>	1			1	
927	<p>保釣護漁權 逾 6 成民眾按讚 本報最新民調顯示 82%對漁民熱血行動豎大拇指 66%對政府護漁表示肯定 近 7 成期待更積極作為</p> <p>bǎo diào hù yú quán yú 6 chéng mǐn zhòng àn zàn běn bào zuì xīn</p>	1			1	

	<p>mín diào xiǎn shì 82 % duì yú mín rè xuè xíng dòng shù dà mǔ zhǐ 66 % duì zhèng fǔ hù yú biǎo shì kěn dìng jìn 7 chéng qī dài gēng jī jí zuò wéi More than 60% of the people support the Bao-Diao movement; 82% give positive comments to the fishermen and 66% give positive comments to the government; more than 70% hope for more actions from the government</p>					
928	<p>我外交部：不接受野田言論 wǒ wài jiāo bù : bù jiē shòu yě tián yán lùn MoFA refused Yano’s statement</p>	1			1	
928	<p>大演說 日相掀波 爭釣魚台主權 中日開罵 野田指台灣也主張擁有 主權 籲循國際法和平解決 中國 清晨 5 點多回應「戰敗國要霸占 戰勝國領土 豈有此理」 dà yǎn shuō rì xiāng xiān bō zhēng diào yú tái zhǔ quán zhōng rì kāi mà yě tián zhǐ tái wān yě zhǔ zhāng yōng yǒu zhǔ quán xū xún guó jì fǎ hé píng jiě jué zhōng guó qīng chén 5 diǎn duō huí yīng 「zhàn bài guó yào bà zhān zhàn shèng guó lǐng tǔ qǐ yǒu cǐ lǐ」 Japanese PM Yano says Taiwan has the right to claim sovereignty as well, and suggests to resolve the issue with the International Court of Justice; China refuted, “WW2 loser has no right to occupy winner’s territory.”</p>		1		1	

928	釣魚台紅了 日本人的臉就綠了 diào yú tái hóng liǎo rì běn rén dí liǎn jiù lǜ liǎo Japan would not like it as Diaoyutai Islands get more international attentions	1				1
928	多次表達關切 蔡得勝：美最怕兩岸聯手保釣 duō cì biǎo dá guān qiē cài dé shèng : měi zuì pà liǎng àn lián shǒu bǎo diào Tsai Te-Sheng says that the United States has expressed concern over the possibility of Taiwan cooperating with the PRC on the Diaoyutai Islands issue		1			1
928	南市議會強烈要求日歸還釣島 nán shì yì huì qiáng liè yào qiú rì guī huán diào dǎo Tainan city council strongly requests Japan to return the Diaoyutai Islands		1			1
929	日學者：捨台與中建交 日重大錯誤 Japanese scholars says that it was a big mistake of Japan to switch diplomatic tie from Taiwan to China		1			1
929	500 日本市民連署 肯定「東海和平倡議」 大江健三郎：日占領釣魚台 應反省 500 rì běn shì mǐn lián shǔ kěn dìng 「dōng hǎi hé píng chàng yì」 dà jiāng jiàn sān láng : rì zhān lǐng diào yú tái yīng fǎn sheng 500 Japanese sign a petition to support the East China Sea Peace Initiative; Ooe Kenzauro says that	1				1

	Japan should be sorry to occupy the islands					
930	<p>台日水戰 躍登國際媒體頭版 保釣護漁成功 南方澳漁船及我海巡艦與日保安廳船艦對峙、噴水柱</p> <p>亞、美、歐等紙媒爭相報導</p> <p>tái rì shuǐ zhàn yuè dēng guó jì méi tǐ tóu bǎn bǎo diào hù yú chéng gōng nán fāng ào yú chuán jí wǒ hǎi xún jiàn yǔ rì bǎo ān tīng chuán jiàn duì zhì 、 pēn shuǐ zhù yà 、 měi 、 ōu dēng zhǐ méi zhēng xiāng bào dǎo</p> <p>The water-gun fight between Taiwan and Japan coast guards made it to international Asian, American, and European media</p>	1			1	
1001	<p>日擬重啟漁業談判 我回拒</p> <p>rì nǐ zhòng qǐ yú yè tán pàn wǒ huí jù</p> <p>Japan plans to reinitiate the fishery meeting with Taiwan; Taiwan refuses</p>	1			1	
1001	<p>台灣保釣，向前突破</p> <p>tái wān bǎo diào , xiàng qián tū pò</p> <p>Taiwan safeguards sovereignty over the Diaoyutai Islands, and proceeding forward</p>	1			1	