

# Why Do Some Asia Pacific Countries Balance A Rising China and Some Do Not?

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## ***Abstract***

This research answers the question “Why do some Asia Pacific countries balance a rising China and some do not”, by analyzing countries’ strategies towards a rising China. It also compares and tests international relations theories related to culture and realism. This research focuses on 16 countries’ strategies to China in the Asia Pacific region from the Post-Cold War era to now. The methodologies of this research are qualitative comparative methodology and explanatory typology in qualitative studies. Each country in this region has their own features, which have different levels of influence to their foreign policies. However, sovereignty disputes and development tend to outshine all the other factors and drive their strategies to other countries to different directions.

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*Abbreviation:*

IR: International Relations. ASEAN: Association of Southeast Asian Nations

Countries Abbreviation in the tables—

Russia: Rus; North Korea: NK; South Korea: SK; Japan: JP; Taiwan: TW; Brunei: Bru;  
Vietnam: VN; Laos: LA; Thailand: Thai or Th; Singapore: Sg; Indonesia: Ind; Malaysia:  
Malay or Mal; the Philippines: Phi; Australia: Aus

## **Section 1**

### **Introduction**

#### **1.1 The Rise of China and the Asia Pacific region**

“China rising” has been a hot topic in recent international relations studies. Many relevant scholars discuss and make predictions about whether China’s rise is a peaceful one and how other countries will react to the rise of China. Different from the rise of the United States from North America and the rise of Germany from Europe, the number and types of countries involved in this region and the diversity in culture dimensions are much more complicated, especially with the close involvement of the U.S, Australia, and Russia in the North. In 2011, the president of the United States Barrack Obama discussed the new military strategy that includes the focus on Asia (Billo, 2012).


The father of Offensive Realism, Mearsheimer talks about his prediction of China's un-peaceful rise in 2006, noting that: the U.S and other Asian countries will contain China's rise and involve in a security competition with China (Mearsheimer, 2006).

Certainly, there are different voices on the rise of China and other countries' reaction to a rising China. As a Chinese scholar, Professor Tang Zhong at Renmin University of China believes that the rise of China is so rapid that even China itself, is in the process of adjusting and figuring out its position in the Asian region. The rapid economic growth commenced since the year 1978, when Deng performed the economic reform after the Cultural Revolution. From 1978 to 2003, China had been chasing closely after the leading nation, Japan, in economic growth. Japan averaged 1.2 percent growth, while China averaged 9.7 percent (World Bank, 2009). From 2009 to 2012, Chinese annual GDP had been stably high around 9 percent; meanwhile Japanese annual GDP was unstable (see Figure 1.1). In Figure 1.1, the X-axis is the timeline from year 2009 to year 2012. Axis Y is the scale of GDP annual percentage of one country. In 2010, China surpassed Japan and became the second largest economy in the world (The Guardian, 2010). Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation speculates that bank assets in China will surpass those in the U.S in 2034, and Goldman Sachs believes that China's GDP will overtake the U.S as No.1 in 2045 (Bradsher, 2004). However, David Kang




points out that China does not need to surpass the U.S to boost influence because China would have a greater total GNP than the U.S once it achieves a per-capita GNP one-fourth that of the U.S (Kang, 2008). With the rapidly rising economic power, the conventional measures of population, geography, military spending, and absolute size of GDP indicate China as a greater power than Japan (Kang, 2008). Despite of Japan, China is by most measures ahead of India, which is believed to be another big rising power. David Kang notes that China's exports are more than five times those of India; and the gap between China and India is increasing (Kang, 2008). Although India is said to be a global competitor to China, its current economic power only makes it the leader of South Asia, meanwhile China is becoming the leading economy of East Asia (Kang, 2008).

Figure 1.1 Chinese and Japanese GDP growth, 2009-2012



Source: World Bank GDP growth (annual %), [www.worldbank.org](http://www.worldbank.org)

Figure 1.2 Chinese and Indian GDP growth, 2004-2012



Source: World Bank GDP growth (annual %), [www.worldbank.org](http://www.worldbank.org)

The X-axis is the timeline from 2009 to 2012 and the Y-axis stands for the annual GDP growth of one country.

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As Professor Tang suggests that the extremely rapid economic growth does not only make the world shock, but also make China itself shock. It is important for China to figure out answers to questions such as “what position is China standing at in the region and in the world?” “How do the neighbors respond to the rise of China?” and “Why do the other countries perceive China differently?” “What are they doing and will do about this?” “Why is there counter voice?” In the year 2010, Beijing issued a white paper titled “China’s National Defense in 2010”. This white paper counters the argument of the “China threat” with the hypothesis “the reason why Asian neighbors balance rising China is because the history of big powers shifting into imperialists make Asian countries see China as the same” (Information of the State Council, 2010). Is this the reason and the only reason why Asian countries “Balance” rising China? This research helps give some ideas for the answers. It is also helping these Asian neighbors see and compare the reasons why they adopt certain policies. What different consequences are their policies leading to from the bigger picture of international relations in this region? However, there was certain amount of research talking about implication of theories to this case, previous

discussions are about countries' perceptions, policies or relations with China individually in single-issue area. A variety of questions emerge for China, because even China itself is searching for a position that is proper and can match the rapid development of itself and the changes in the international system.

It is as difficult for the neighboring countries to react to the changes a rising China brings to the Asian region and to the world (World Bank, 2013). What is more, it is not only about changes that a rising power brings to a region, but also about potential threats. The end of Cold War and the collapse of the previous Soviet Union was also the start of the implication of China's rising power dominating the security agenda of Asia. Also since then, "China Threat Theory" which emerged from the realist school and the cultural institutional perspective together with the historical approach, started being accepted by the international society (Roy, 1996). The "Structural Realism", "Power Transition Theory" and "Alliance Theory" suggest that when there is a new rising power that changes the power structure, countries in that region tends to ally with relatively stronger ones and balance the rising power. The proper strategies towards a "rising China" also became hot topics (Waltz 1979). However, Huntington's "clash of civilization" suggests that "globalization" will one day turn into "regionalization" since

similar cultures and beliefs will integrate and the identity of “region” will be strongly influencing states and their policies (Huntington, 1992). Countries in the Asia Pacific region react rather different to a rising China from all joining the U.S to contain China’s rise. One country’s attitude towards China even vary in different matters, such as economic matters and political matters. This research analyzes 16 neighboring countries’ attitude and strategies to a rising China in the Asia Pacific region. As a slight theoretical discussion touch mentioned above, this research is closely associated with International Relations theories, especially realist and cultural theories. Thus, the analysis and findings are also testing hypotheses derived from realist and cultural theories. Therefore, the following section is a section of realist and cultural theory review.

## 1. 2 Introduction

This paper contains three main sections following the introduction section: theory review and hypotheses, methodology, and empirical study before the conclusion section of this research. The objectives of this research are analyzing countries strategies towards a rising China in the Asia Pacific, testing hypotheses derived from realist and cultural international relations theories, comparing two theories with the cases of

countries strategies towards China, and answering the question “Why do some Asian countries balance a rising China and some do not?”

The paper starts with the background of this research “the rise of China and China threat”. The section following the background is the section of literature review and hypotheses. The first half of the literature review is on realist theories, starting with balance-of-power and structural realism followed by all the major realist theories and sub-theories. The second half of the literature review is theories of culture, identity, sociology, and political ideology in international relations (IR). There is a table of hypotheses at the end of the literature review section, in order to have a clearer presentation of the hypotheses derived from IR theories. The third section is the methodology section. This section contains important measurements, term definitions, period of time, and cases (countries) in this research. Following this section, it is an introduction of the methodologies. A table of the application of the methodologies to this research at the end of this section. The fourth section is the empirical study.

Although this research focuses on the comparison of realist and cultural theories and the analysis of countries strategies influenced by factors derived from these theories, the economic and market power of China is a main factor driving neighboring countries to have close relations with China. However, almost all the countries in this region seize

the opportunity of a developing Chinese economy, so that all of them have close trade and investment relations with China. In order to identify countries that ally with the U.S pursue “external balancing” strategy towards China, there is a section on the U.S-China relations. The U.S is the big balancer of a rising China in this region, so that countries stand close with the U.S balance China. The following section has all the case studies of all the sixteen countries discussed in this research. In each case study, there are strategy analysis and hypothesis testing. This empirical study leads to the last section of this paper, the conclusion.

### 1.3 The significance of this research

There have been discussions on individual state’s response to the rise of China, or at most, one small area or groups of states like ASEAN or The North East Asian three relations. However, there has not been enough research and discussion on the generalization of the most influential factors driving states’ response to the rising China. Asian countries responses to China’s rise are complex.

## Section 2

### Literature Review

#### 2.1 Introduction

This research tests and compares Realist and Cultural theories by the power relations between the neighboring states in the Asia Pacific and a rising China. This section reviews the most important literature sources surrounding the Realist and Cultural theories in International Relations regarding the reactions of neighboring countries to a rising China. A review section of prospective methodology is following the two theory reviews.

#### 2.2 Realist Theories and hypotheses

This section reviews the major realist theories and presents the hypotheses derived from them. The reason why this research focuses on realism is that realism focuses on power relations (Korab-Karpowicz, 2013). This research studies different countries strategies to a rising power, which is what realism focuses and explains the



most. The research question suggests that this research concerns a theoretical term “balance”. Therefore, the theory review starts with the Balance of Power theory to explain how the research question adopts some terms from this theory; it continues with the major Realist theory review from Classical Realism to Structural Realism, Offensive Realism, and extending Offensive Realism on how power balance happens, to a region with a rising power. There are also reviews and discussions regarding how Game theory and Hegemonic Stability theory answer the question ‘Why do some countries balance a rising power and others do not?’

Balance-of-power theory provides the theoretical term “balance” to this research question and it is a topic throughout the discussion of most major International Relations theories. The major realist theories since WWII include Classical Realism, Neo-Realism (also known as Structural Realism), Defensive Realism, and Offensive Realism. Classical Realism suggests that states act according to human nature. Human nature here refers to the point of view that human beings are selfish by nature and have aggressive instincts (Viotti & Kauppi, 2009). The fact that the resource human beings are living on is limited creates a competition and triggers these survival instincts (Viotti & Kauppi, 2009). As a result, men attack others that threaten their survival (Viotti & Kauppi, 2009). Hans Morgenthau also talked about human nature in his work *Scientific*

*Man vs. Power Politics* and points out that human beings pursue power to overcome insecurity (Morgenthau, 1946). Classical Realism argues that states are just like human beings and security is what they care for the most (Viotti & Kauppi, 2009). When there are threats, states tend to balance those threats by pursuing more power themselves either by raising military power or grouping with other great powers. Power is a term with many different definitions by different realist scholars (Viotti & Kauppi, 2009). Morgenthau defines power as man's ability to control and influence people to behave to serve his preference. In militaristic setting, power can be the threat of use of force or force itself (Morgenthau, 1946). Balancing here refers to the action of containing and pressing down a rising power, either by another strong power or by a group of powers (Viotti & Kauppi, P.61, 2009). The term balancing is from the balance of power theory originated from Classical Realism by Hans Morgenthau and completed by Kenneth Waltz in his Neo-Realism (Viotti & Kauppi, P73, 2009).

Balance of power argues that when one power is rising in a region, it presents a threat to the security of other states in the region (Viotti & Kauppi, PP. 61-62, 2009). Therefore, in order to keep a power balance in the region, other countries raise either their tangible power (military and economic power) or group with each other to balance against the rising power (Viotti & Kauppi, PP. 61-62, 2009). For instance, South Korea

and North Korea fought against each other in the Korean War. The action of raising military power to fight the war is a form of balancing called internal balancing. The presence of China and the United States in the war later demonstrated how small powers try to group with a bigger power to keep the power balance. The grouping action is a type of balancing, which is called external balancing by forming an alliance with bigger powers. The current condition on the Korean Peninsula is still a good example of the balance of power. However, other powers in the region can choose to bandwagon with the rising power and balance against other great powers. There are also other actions available to states like buck-passing and hedging. This research question adopts the terms balance, bandwagon and hedging from Balance of power theory.

In the late 1970s in order to upgrade Classical Realism, Kenneth Waltz eliminated the discussion on human nature and made a new theory called “neo-realist theory” with “Anarchy” as the starting point. The main assumptions of Neo-realism or Structural Realism are: international system is anarchic; states are the main actors in international relations; there is no authority above state governments; and states have to pursue self-help to maintain security (Viotti & Kauppi, 2009). With these assumptions, structural Realism states that the distribution of powers in the international system is the

key to international relations and this theory concentrates on big powers (Waltz, 1979).

Power here mainly refers to economic and military capabilities (Waltz, 1979). Structural

changes in the international system result in events regarding international relations

(Waltz, 1979). The power structure of any region or the completely international system

is like a net of all the powers connected together. A change at any point of this net could

affect the entire structure. For instance, tugging at a knot at any point on a net will result

in the net stretching. Similarly, structural changes in international system result in

conflicts and events. Derived from Neorealism, there are two sub-theories: Defensive

Realism and Offensive Realism.

John Mearsheimer originally suggested offensive Realism. Mearsheimer starts his theory with five assumptions: states are the primary actors in the international system; the international system is anarchic, which means there is no authority above state governments; every state has offensive military capability, whether strong or weak; states are uncertain about the intention of other states, because they cannot measure others' intentions today or in the future; the principle of the state is to survive; states are rational actors (Mearsheimer, 2002). With these five assumptions, there are three forms of behavior: great powers get fear from each other; states pursue self-help; in order to survive in this system, states have to be extremely powerful. All the states want to be a

regional hegemon and there are no peer competitors (Mearsheimer, 2002). Mearsheimer had a more recent argument on how offensive realism explains why China will not rise peacefully. With the five assumptions he has for his offensive realism theory, he argues that the point to balance a rising China is to avoid a 'free roam' action possibly by a regional hegemonic China (Mearsheimer, 2005). The term 'free to roam' means that powerful states tend to roam around other countries' territories, since the great powers do not have anything to worry about regarding their own security. Mearsheimer suggests that the United States, as the current world hegemon, should and will balance a rising China even though the balancing is offshore (Mearsheimer, 2005). In the case of other Asian states, Mearsheimer (2005) says

Indeed, there is already substantial evidence that countries such as India, Japan, and Russia, as well as smaller powers such as Singapore, South Korea and Vietnam, are worried about China's ascendancy and are looking for ways to contain it. In the end, they will join an American-led balancing coalition to check China's rise, much the way Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and even China, joined forces with the US to contain the Soviet Union during the Cold War.

When a state is a regional hegemon, they are not surrounded by any strong powers daring to attack, and that is the closest security the states can pursue. John Mearsheimer confidently asserted that China could not rise peacefully, because most of China's neighbors, India, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, Russia, and Vietnam, will likely join with the United States to contain China's power (Mearsheimer, 2001). Thus, the first hypothesis: "the great powers in the region tend to balance a rising China".

With the Offensive Realist theory, Mearsheimer reasons that a regional hegemon does not want another powerful state to dominate a region the way it does. He uses the term "free to roam" which refers to a situation when a regional hegemon does not have to worry about the security in its own region so that the hegemon is free to roam around in other regions (Mearsheimer, 2005). However, the best situation for a regional hegemon is one in which there is nothing to worry about in the country's own region, but other regional hegemons have to worry about conflicts and varieties of problems in their own regions, so other regional hegemons are not free to roam (Mearsheimer, 2005). This explains the current tense relation between the United States and the rising China. The United States is roaming around Asia near the coasts of China, while China tries to push the United States away. The United States would perceive it just like how

they reached regional hegemony in the West Hemisphere. Therefore, Mearsheimer's theory explains why the United States wants to and has to balance the rise of China, as an outside regional hegemon. The geographic location of balancers matters to Mearsheimer's theory, because he believes that water has stopping power to prevent balancing action (Mearsheimer, 2002).

With the idea of "the stopping power of water", Mearsheimer categorized great powers by their geographical locations as continental great powers, island great powers, and regional hegemons. Since this research looks at Asia Pacific as one region, this review focuses on the in-regional behavior of these great powers to the rising one in Offensive Realism. (1) Continental great powers try to reach regional hegemony while balancing against other states. (2) Island great powers balance against any would-be regional hegemons but do not seek for hegemony themselves. (3) Regional hegemons balance against other states to maintain regional hegemony (Mearsheimer, 2002).

Because of the "stopping power of water", an insular state can hardly become the regional hegemony itself and it does not worry as much as other continental states, which are located right next to a rising power (a rising threat). The United Kingdom is an example of the insular state that only intervenes when the rising power is close to threatening itself. Since the location of a continental country is both helpful for

achieving regional hegemony and quick to feel threatened when there are other rising powers around, a continental great power attempts regional hegemony while balancing other rising powers (Mearsheimer, 2002). According to his theory, the best way for a country to feel secure is to pursue as much power as possible until reaching regional hegemony (Mearsheimer, 2002). Thus, when there is another rising power, the current regional hegemon tends to balance the rising power to make sure to maintain its hegemony (Mearsheimer, 2002).

To add up to Offensive Realism especially to this typology above, Colin Elman has an extended version of Mearisheimer's Offensive Realism. He argues that it is not the balancing inefficiency but rather the lack of balancers that allows a rising power to reach regional hegemony (Elman, 2004). The United States is not as great as how Mearsheimer explains with his offensive realism as a rapid rising power, which successfully drove external big powers away, posed strong within the region, and finally reached the regional hegemony (Elman, 2004). There were simply no big powers within the Northeast American region, and the external balancers in Europe were busy with their own security in the region (Elman, 2004). This is apparently not the case in the today's Asia Pacific. In this extending version of offensive realism, Elman created a fourth category of great power that is the only great power with significant resources in



the region, including an insular great power. Therefore, the forms of behavior would be (1) if the country is one of the multiple great powers in the region, it would try to achieve regional hegemony, while balancing other rising powers. (2) An insular state as one of the multiple great powers in the region would offshore balance against any rising hegemon. (3) A solitary great power in a region seeks regional hegemony. (4) A regional hegemon tries to maintain hegemony. The fourth column basically explains why the United States has stayed as a hegemon since 1900 and does not want to see any other countries rise the same way (Elman, 2004). It makes sense with the logic of Offensive Realism because regional hegemons try to maintain the security they obtain as a dominant power in the region and cannot allow any rising powers to become new threats. At the end of the argument, Elman states that there will not be any countries like the United States reaching regional hegemony, because only when there are no balancers is a regional hegemony possible.

The typology of power geographic locations indicates that within a region, an island great power balances a rising power, and a continental great power balances a rising power while seizing the regional hegemony. Thus, the hypothesis derived from the typology Mearsheimer and Elman suggest is that insular big powers balance the rise

of China and continental great powers try to perform internal balancing while achieving regional hegemony.

The Balance-of-power theory mentioned above is significant to this research, since this paper talks about states' choice of whether to balance out a rising power or not. Balance of power theory argues that under anarchy, any powerful state can force other relatively smaller powers to do what it wants them to do or even eliminate them, as there is no higher authority above state governments. Thus, states tend to consistently check on too much power concentration on one state by either building up their own military and economic power (internal balancing) or by forming alliances with other powers (external balancing) (Mearsheimer, 2002) . Usually, a balancing action can happen before any rising power achieves the power edge, just to anticipate any possible threats in the future (Mearsheimer, 2002).

To add a bit of complexity to the Balance of Power theory, Balance of Threat theory suggests that states tend to balance against threats (Walt, 1990). "Threats" here refer to states with aggressive capabilities, including military and economic power, good geographical locations, and behaviors that can feed the perception of evil intention

(Viotti & Kauppi, 2009). For instance, the DPRK launching nuclear tests is posing as a threat to the neighboring state Republic of Korea, Japan, Russia and China. As the world great power and the military ally of Japan and South Korea, the United States has been actively involved in this issue by grouping the four other countries mentioned above to negotiate with North Korea or put sanctions on North Korea. Balance of threat theory would explain: these actions by rationalizing that with nuclear capability, DPRK's nuclear test makes its neighboring states feel threatened, so that other countries group together and balance against the threat. The very first country worrying about the nuclear test by DPRK is South Korea, because South Korea and North Korea are still at war. South Korea is more likely to confront North Korea than any other state. The balance of power theory would also explain this case as South Korea's fear of North Korea becoming too powerful with the nuclear capability and forcing other states to behave according its will. However, does the fact that North Korea and South Korea are at war, make any difference from the fear other neighboring states have of North Korea? Game theory would say yes.

Game theory is an analysis of conflicts and bargaining, other than Realism (Lieber, 1973). It is usually used to study decision-making, diplomacy, strategic

deterrence and warfare (Viotti & Kauppi, 2009). Game theory is sometimes combined with Neorealism, since both of the theories study conflicts and they share the assumptions that the players are rational actors and players pursue self-help under anarchy. Anarchy does not refer to chaos, but the status when there is no superior authority above state governments (Viotti & Kauppi, P56, 2009). Thus, when there are conflicts between states or one state trying to take over the other, states can only rely on self-help. In order to maintain security, power is the main concern of all state actors. All actors make rational calculations of gains and losses according to their interests against their competitors in game theory.

Anthony Downs points out the rational actors act like this: “(1) He can always make a decision when confronted with a range of alternatives; (2) He ranks all the alternatives facing him in his order of preference in such a way that each is either preferred to, indifferent to, or inferior to each other. (3) His preference ranking is transitive. (4) He always chooses from amongst the possible alternatives that rank highest in his preference ordering and; (5) He always makes the same decision each time he is confronted with the same alternatives”(Downs, 1957).

Game theory offers actors in conflicts to see their options with the possible options the opponents have, so that they can process the actions suggested by Downs to

calculate what action helps them to maximize their interests. Naturally, when states are in conflicts, they do not want the opponents to be able to maximize their interests especially in zero-sum games, which are the situations when one state wins and the others lose. Under anarchy, rational state actors calculate their gains and losses with Downs' logic, so that most game theory patterns suggest that states would choose to "defect" instead of "cooperate" with each other in order to maximize their gains and minimize the loss compared with the other actors. Thus, trust is the primary issue in international relations, especially when it comes to conflicts.

Robert Jervis also discusses the problem of trust in international conflicts in his work *Cooperation under the Security Dilemma*. Jervis points out that the anarchic system gives states the chance to defect in international cooperation. He sets the 'stag hunt' model as an example and concludes that states have similar interests and preferences ranks. 'Stag hunt' is a game theory model talking about several players having a mutual goal to hunt a stag. Only when they cooperate and work together, can they catch the stag and share the reward. However, it is possible for them to work on their own to hunt rabbit. When one defects and turns to hunt a rabbit, the rest do not get anything. The four possible outcomes are (1) cooperate and all the actors go to hunt the stag, which means all the states disarm themselves and there will not be war; (2) one

chases the rabbit while all the rest hold the positions, meaning that one remains highly armed while the rest are disarmed; (3) all chase rabbits, which means arms competition and high risk of war; (4) one chooses to stay at the position while the rest chase rabbits, so that the one at position is disarmed and the rest are armed. When each of the actors believe others will cooperate, they are likely to cooperate. However, the reality is always different, because one either wants to secure its benefits regardless of the whole group or one cannot control its impulses when seeing a rabbit. Therefore, one cannot trust others will cooperate when one tends to defect itself (Jervis, 1978). Even when one state seems trustful, there are still several problems. (1) There are always changes in a state. Either the decision makers cannot bind themselves to a cooperation decision or other possible changes can bring different outcomes, like leadership changes and value shifts. (2) In order to get more profit, states usually try to control resources and lands even outside of their own territory. (3) Direct attack is still the biggest concern, because states always try to control or neutralize their borders to maintain security (Jervis, 1978). Even the intention to create a buffer zone would alarm other states who have stake there to fear their vulnerability to increase (Jervis, 1978).

Game theory provides the concerns over “trust” among states and suggests that states calculate and try to maximize their interests in any international bargaining with

other states. One knows that others will probably defect, and so they do not have trust in others. When it comes to conflicts, states are afraid of their with respect to the neighboring powers. When there is a rising power in a region, other powers in the region tend to balance the power even before it rises to the power edge; the ones in conflict with the rising power especially wish to maximize their bargaining power by either building military capacity or by allying with other powers. When states are in conflicts with a rising power and the rising power is probably choosing to “defect” in the “game,” states would try anything to prevent the power from becoming stronger and posing as a threat. Thus, states with disputes with China are more eager to balance the rise of China.

Distributions of power and Hegemonic Stability theory suggest that a great power tends to influence the system to feed its own interests. As the balance-of-power, theory suggests states under anarchy are unsure of the possibility of others attacking or even eliminating them and thus, try to perform balancing actions against the rising powers (Waltz, 1979). The need to maintain a balance of power and avoid a dominant power contributes to the power distribution in international system. In the international system, there are different power distributions in the structure. The different types of

powers distribute generally in three patterns: unipolar, bipolar and multipolar (Viotti & Kauppi, P59, 2009). Unipolarity refers to a power structure with only one great power dominating the International system (Viotti & Kauppi, P60, 2009). Bi-polarity refers to a situation when there are two great powers balancing each other while multi-polarity means that a multiple number of great powers perform the power balance in the international system (Viotti & Kauppi, P60, 2009). All three patterns of polarities have been dominating some certain periods in history. The pattern of power balance between the Soviet Union and the United States during the cold-war era is an example of bipolar power balance. The power pattern formed by the European countries especially between the post WWI and the start of WWII is a multipolar power balance. Unipolarity is the current world power structure with a dominant great power, the United States, as the world hegemon.

There are three patterns of power distributions and scholars have different ideas on which pattern contributes the best to world stability. Kenneth Waltz believes bipolarity is the most stable structure because the uncertainty is greater when there are more countries involved, and the policy makers can easily misjudge the intentions (Waltz, 1964). Associated with this logic, the chance of war is greater. On the other hand, J. David Singer and Karl Deutsch argue that multi-polarity is more conducive to



stability because uncertainty between two states means too much attention on only one state from the other (Singer & Deutsch, 1964). Too much attention on one state is not helpful for stability while more states can share the attention and reduce the possibility of war (Singer & Deutsch, 1964). However, three scholars agree that when there are more states in the structure, the uncertainty of the consequences from one state's particular action is more severe. The reason is that when there are more states, there is more information to be taken into account by the policy makers when they make foreign policies. The two logics of either bipolarity or multipolarity contributing to the world stability seem sound, but Bruce Bueno de Mesquita has a critique that makes two logics appear to be unconvincing. He argues that either structure the international system has can make the states learn and make the policy makers anticipate the possible consequences of similar behaviors from the past experiences, as long as the structure does not change (Mesquita, 1978). If a unipolar structure maintained international stability, many scholars do not believe it would be long lasting. Although there are arguments that a world hegemon can perform isolationism enhancing the effectiveness of international institutions and unilateralism in its foreign policy, other states will balance against it in any circumstance according to the logic of realist structural analysis (Viotti & Kauppi, 2009).

IR (International Relations) scholars have different opinions on the stability that unipolarity contributes to, while the Hegemonic Stability theory suggests that countries tend to enjoy a stable world system maintained by a hegemon. The current world system has a unipolar power structure with the United States as a world hegemon. Some scholars like Kenneth Waltz believe the United States as the only great power is inviting balancers and the unipolarity of the United States dominance cannot be a permanent condition (Waltz, 1994). On the contrary, the Hegemonic Stability theory states that a world system with a leader can maintain stability and the absence of leadership or world hegemon can result in chaos and instability (Keohane, 1980). A world hegemon provides environment of world peace by establishing international institutions and maintain the function of institutions by offering resources (Kupchan& Ikenberry). The evidence to support this argument is that during the 1930s, when Great Britain was too weak to be the leader of the world economy and the U.S was unwilling to assume leadership, a lot of trouble such as competitive depreciation of currencies, occurred. When a power reaches global hegemony, the hegemon benefits from having influence on the international system according to its own interests. Although not to the same extent as the hegemon does, other states also benefit from a stable developing environment and the system maintained by the hegemon. When there are changes in

leadership, the system does not only tremble but also changes slowly into a pattern that fits the new hegemon's interest. In different world systems, some countries do well and some do not. This is in line with the logic of Bruce Bueno de Mesquita's critiques that countries learn from the old pattern and experience, so that the system is stable as long as there is no change (Mesquita, 1978). If China rises to a regional hegemony or even to a world leadership status, the change in the world system does not only bring possible instability but also upset the countries that develop well under the current America-dominant system. Therefore, countries developing relatively well under the current system tend to balance the rise of China while others do not.

To answer the question "why do some Asian countries balance rising China and others do not," there are many IR theories, social theories, psychological theories and economic theories to look through and derive hypotheses. However, apart from discovering the possible explanations to this question by analyzing the actions of states, the other scope of this research is to compare Realist and Cultural theories on explaining why some countries choose to balance a rising China and other do not. For instance, it does not mean that the economic matters are insignificant in foreign policy making with regard to a rising China. Although economic development and economic

relations can be part of national interests and national power, which is included by Realism, economic matters are not in the detailed discussion. The following section is the literature review of culture theories in International Relations and the hypotheses derived from them.

### 2.3 Cultural Theories and Hypotheses

This section reviews theories that explain foreign relations from the perspectives of culture, identity, philosophy, and ideology. It also introduces the following hypotheses: (5) Countries with similar culture and identity perceptions with China tend to bandwagon a rising China while others do not. (6) States with similar political ideology and political system do not balance a rising China derived from these cultural theories: Huntington's the Clash of Civilization, Anthropologist idea on cultural values, Socialist theories on identity and Hopf's social cognitive theory of culture and identity. There is also discussion on the influence of political ideology and system on countries' foreign relations.

One of the very influential cultural theories by Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations*, suggests that countries belonging to the same Confucian civilization

group with China together with cultural factors would result in clashes amongst different civilizations. Huntington argues that the cold war period world structure was formed with an American-led free world, the Soviet Union-led communist camp and the so-called non-aligned third world. It is only the history and disappeared (Huntington, 1992). In the post-cold war era, cultural factors are going to be more influential than political factors on the world order. Countries with similar cultures will naturally group with each other and conflicts will occur between the biggest civilization blocks (Huntington, 1992). Huntington uses the breaking up of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia as an example to support his argument that countries with different cultures tend to separate eventually. Huntington defines that the world has eight big civilizations, Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin-American and African. Rather than structural function, conflicts between civilizations are going to be the theme. "The conflicts occur along the cultural fault lines separating the civilization from one another" (Huntington, 1992). Huntington illustrates that firstly, differences among civilizations go beyond politics. Secondly, the interactions amongst civilizations raise the consciousness of different civilizations and identities; finally, cultural clash, economic developments, and the western influence all make the clash of civilization more likely to happen. Huntington believes that culture and identity will be

the driving factors rather than national interests. It does not mean that countries do not care about national interests anymore, but they define national interests in cultural terms and as aligning themselves together with similar cultures (Huntington, 1992). Similar cultures tend to have similar values too and national interests are coherent with values. Therefore, similar culture drives states to group with each other. In the last part of *The Clash of Civilizations*, Huntington illustrates that the future conflicts will be between the Western and the Non-western, especially the Confucius-Islamic states. The Non-Western civilizations either join the Western, or fight against the Western. However, the world will look like the remains of different civilizations (Huntington, 1992). Since Confucianism originated in China, Huntington's theory would suggest that Confucius states are close with China instead of the West (which is the United States). The countries with similar culture and identity perceptions with China tend to bandwagon a rising China while the others do not. Samuel P. Huntington's theory is definitely significant but not the first ever theory to emphasize the importance of culture and identity.

Scholars in anthropologic studies also talk about cultural values and the implication on states' views of other countries. Franz Boas, the pioneer of cultural anthropology, suggests that the understandings of a country's own culture and other

countries' cultures can shape that country's attitude towards others (Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein, 1996). Sociologists say that culture refers to beliefs, behavior and symbols that are meaningful for one particular group (Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein, 1996). This leads to the sense of identity and belonging. Furthermore, it guides people in a particular society to understand and act. The long formed identity and values from culture can certainly influence states' foreign policies towards another country (Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein, 1996). The discussion of cultural factors in international politics has long been there, but the measurement of cultural influence in foreign policies is always a challenge in these studies.

In the year 2006, Singapore's ambassador to the U.S, Chan Heng Chee stated in her speech in Houston and Texas about the relations between China and ASEAN that: although Singapore is often viewed as one of the important allies the U.S has in East Asia, Singapore, together with other ASEAN member states are optimistic about the rise of China (Kang, 2008). They seek to accommodate the relations with China and the United States in the Asia Pacific region (Kang, 2008). David Kang adopted the term "accommodating", because he believes that the traditional balance of power theory does not explain the optimistic attitude ASEAN countries, together with South Korea has

towards a rising China (Kang, 2008). In his argument, Kang asserts that the absence of balancing against China is rooted in economic interdependence and similar identity with China. Identity is central to explain the absence of fear in East Asia to a rising China (Kang, 2008). Identity is a set of ideas on how a nation perceives the world and its place in it (Wendt, 1994). National identity especially does not exist in isolation from other nations. It is constructed through histories and current interactions with other states. Identity is to separate the nation from the influence of other states and show its uniqueness (Rozman, 1999).

The term “identity” is one of the main terms discussed in sociology. When talking about identity, it is necessary to talk about the sociologist theory of Self and Other, because it is one of the most fundamental theories of sociology. The idea of the Self in sociology is positioned relatively to the Other (Norton, 1988). The identity of the Self cannot be formed without the existence of the other to be generated. However, the Self always treats the other as a threat to the Self and the conflict relationship between the self and the other is inevitable (Norton, 1988). This basic social theory on self and other suggests that the cognition of the “self” leads to a grouping action while the cognition of “other” causes conflicts. Thus in the case of how countries react to a rising China, this theory also indicates that countries with similar identities tend to bandwagon



a rising China and others do not. Additionally, this idea of the self and other is also the logic adopted by Ted Hopf, a constructivist IR scholar in his book *Social Construction of International Politics*.

In the book of *Social Construction of International Politics*, Hopf adopts the social cognitive theory of identity, which argues that a state's own domestic identity (which can be formed only internally regardless of the recognition of external oppositions in identity) constitutes the social cognitive structure. This structure can decide the threats and opportunities, enemies and allies (Hopf, 2002). He argues that states' interests (usually economic and strategic) are decided by domestic identities (Hopf, 2002). Domestic identities here refer to the social habits and norms of a state (Hopf, 2002). When having the domestic identity, the state knows their values (Hopf, 2002). Therefore, by clarifying domestic identity, states can choose enemies and allies. Sometimes, without recognizing the interests, states would recognize their enemies and allies. Following this logic, the hypothesis derived from the social cognitive theory of Identity is also that states having close identity and culture with China tend to see the rise of China as a positive phenomenon and group with China, because their identity constructs their strategic and economic interests, and they see China as an ally instead

of an enemy. On the contrary, the states with vastly different identities would see China as a threat and would not ally with China.

Leszek Busynski also agrees that culture and identity are important in security and foreign policies in the Asia Pacific, because security is about the protection of identity (Busynski, 2004). Different from tangible power factors, value, or identity is something that cannot be traded, compromised or negotiated (Busynski, 2004). In his words, “threatened identity” can be the start of conflict and can lead to the deepest passions of a state (Busynski, 2004). This leads to sharp languages in diplomatic matters and this could be the point when reasons for conflict disappear. The disputes over history and territory amongst the Northeast Asian three, China, Japan, and Korea, sometimes leave the rest of the world puzzled over why these Asian countries have to hold history grudges so tightly that they cannot find means to resolve the problems and achieve cooperation. Values and identities may be the answer (Busynski, 2004).

Looking at the question of ‘Why do some Asian countries balance rising China and others do not?’ through this perspective, the countries without values or identities that clash with China’s tend to have better relations with China. Apart from these well-cited and often mentioned theories and concepts, the discussion on the implication of cultural factors in international relations is not a recent phenomenon.

In the 1950s, Gabriel Almond raised the idea of “political culture and political system”, which suggests that countries with similar political systems tend to group with each other. He states that cultural factors shape cognition, preference, and evaluation or choices of states (Almond, 1956). He adopts the term “political system” from the social theory suggested by Max Weber. Political system here refers to a system of action and it includes a wide range of norms in institutions, patterns of behavior, what they do, why they do and how they influences what others do. This term covers all the ideas and behaviors related to decision making (Weber, 1947). Almond uses the term “orientation to political action” to cover all the terms “attitude towards politics”, “political values”, “ideologies”, “national character,” and “cultural ethos”. The term “orientation to political action” includes three parts: perception or cognition, preference, involvement or affect, and evaluation or choice through the application of standards or values to the cognitive and affective components (Parsons and Shils, 1951). The terms of “political culture” and “orientations to political actions” of political systems cover a wide range of meanings including ideology and political values. This indicates that different political systems are entirely different in “political culture” and “orientations to political actions” and the political systems do not influence policy making but include the behavior of

policy making. Therefore, states with similar political ideology and political system do not tend to go against the similar system. This theory leads to the hypothesis that countries with similar political ideology and political systems do not balance a rising China.

## 2.4 Table of Hypotheses

The section above talks about how each hypothesis was derived from theories. This small section provides the table of all six hypotheses to offer a better picture of what this research is testing exactly.

- (1) Continental powers balance a rising China while the insular ones do not.
- (2) Countries with disputes with China balance a rising China, and the ones without do not.
- (3) Previous and current big powers balance rising China.
- (4) States developing relatively well under an America-dominated system balance the rise of China.

(5) States with similar culture and identity perceptions bandwagon rising China while others do not.

(6) States with similar political ideology and political system (communist party ruled) do not balance rising China.

## **Section 3.**

### **Methodology**

#### **3.1 Introduction**

This section introduces the research methodology, which sits in between of the theoretical review and the empirical studies following this section. It mainly includes three parts: important definitions and measurements of this research; the introduction of research methods; and the application of the methods to this research.

Measurement, here also referred as definition of each variable is a vital part in this research, as how each term is defined leads to whether the theories are correct about countries' strategies towards a rising power. This section includes not only theoretical terms, but also the countries that are discussed and the period this research focuses on.

There are two groups of theoretical definitions to clarify: the strategies that countries have towards a rising China; and the typologies derived from theories and hypotheses.

Firstly, countries' strategies such as "balance", "bandwagon", or "hedging" are important, because to what extent an action falling into one category influences the accuracy of the theory testing. As the research question suggests, "balance" is a core theoretical term throughout this whole paper. Different scholars define the term "balance" all differently in their research. David Kang only sees military building for preparation of either current or future use of force as "balance" action in his book of *China Rising* (Kang, 2008). Kai He defines the action of including big powers (including rising powers) in international institutions and wishing big powers contain

each other's power in the institution as balancing (He, 2002). Traditionally the term balancing in the realist theories is defined as turning "latent power" into military capabilities. Tangible power includes economic, technological, social, and natural resources (Lieber & Alexander, 2005). This research defines "balance" and "bandwagon" as how Waltz does in his *Theory of International Politics*. Balancing includes internal (arm buildings directed at a threat) balancing and external (alliance with other states, sometimes other big powers against the threat) balancing (Waltz, 1979). The converse term "bandwagon" refers to the action that states align itself with the threatening power in order to either neutralize the threat or benefit from the spoils of victory (Walt, 1987). Although these two concepts are the most common ones when talking about power rising in a region, it is necessary to mention the other actions in between these two polar actions "balance" and "bandwagon". There are terms such as hedging, soft balancing (institutional balancing), engaging, hiding, and accommodating (Kang, 2008). Kang includes a spectrum of the strategies in his book of *China Rising*, which has bandwagon and balance on the left and right sides of a spectrum, there are two categories in between: accommodate and hedge. Accommodate falls on the left side, which is next to bandwagon, whereas hedge sits between accommodate and

balance. Under accommodate it says “less fear”, while under hedge there is “more fear” written (Kang, 2008).

This paper categorizes countries’ strategies by the two traditional terms balancing and bandwagoning with Waltz and Walt’s definitions. It defines balancing close to “external balancing”, which means balancing one power by aligning with another big power, but not excluding “hard balancing” (military build-ups). Specifically in this paper, countries that have military race with China, ally with the United States, welcoming the U.S military presence, and any similar action or countries that have official statements on choosing the U.S over China are considered “balancers”. Countries that are strategic allies of China, established strategic partners, welcoming China’s presence in the countries, and similar friendly attitude towards China are considered “bandwagoning” a rising China. There are countries which do not have a clear attitude between choosing China or the United States. Their strategies are considered “not clear” in this paper.

Secondly, there are two key terms in each hypothesis derived from realist and cultural theories. The definitions of those terms decide the results of the theory tests. Hypothesis “(1) Continental powers balance a rising China while the insular ones do not.” has two key terms to differentiate countries, “continental power” and “insular



power”. Elman defines the terms in his article *Extending Offensive Realism*. As the word itself suggests, continental powers refer to countries that locate on a big continent. Insular powers refer to “the only great power on a large body of land that is surrounded on all sides by water” (all four sides of the country facing body of water) (Elman, 2004). He sets England as the example of an insular power. In the case of Asia Pacific, Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia and Australia belong to this category. Thus, the rest are categorized as continental powers.

In hypothesis “(2) Countries with disputes with China balance a rising China, and the ones without do not.” Disputes refer to territorial disputes. China has territorial disputes with most of the bordering countries. However, this research focuses on the recent big ones that draw attention of most major media, such as Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands disputes and South China Sea issue. The high military tension between mainland China and Taiwan also counts. Therefore, the disputants include Japan in Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands disputes, Taiwan’s controversial position either as a country or as a part of China; Brunei, Vietnam, Malaysia, and the Philippines in the South China Sea issue. The Chinese ethnic groups’ problems in Indonesia also make Indonesian elites not favoring China, so that this counts as a dispute as well. South Korea is a special case, because China’s support to North Korea is not a direct dispute between

China and South Korea. However, the war status of North Korea and South Korea would put China's support to North Korea to a hostile spot against South Korea. Thus, South Korea is also in the group of disputed countries with China.

Hypothesis “(3) Previous and current big powers balance rising China.” involves the term “big power”. The opposite terms would be “middle and small power”. Before defining big and small power, it is necessary to define what power is. Defining power has been prominent in discussion of International interaction from Thucydides until current time. Kenneth Waltz notes that power is a key concept in International Relations, but “its proper definition remains a matter of controversy” (Waltz, 1979). Robert Gilpin describes the concept of power as “one of the most troublesome in the field of international relations and suggests that the “number and variety of definitions should be an embarrassment to political scientists” (Gilpin, 1981; 1975). The terms such as influence, control, coercion, force, persuasion, deterrence, compellence and inducement are usually associated with power. Robert A. Dahl suggests that power refers to the influence of A causing B to do something that B otherwise would not do. A refers to the actor with exercising influence and B refers to the actor being or potentially being influenced (Dahl, 2057). The problems do not only lie in definition of power, but also in the measurement of power. Scholars often times desire to measure power on a

single dimension to allow states power ranking. Frey pointed out that researchers frequently redefine power to make the practice easier, because it is difficult to measure power (Frey, 1989). For instance, influence of A causing B to do something that B otherwise would not do is associated with power. The intention of A and the perception of B may not always go hand in hand, because influence does not only go one way (intention). Some scholars believe national power rely primarily on GNP, but are supplemented with demographic and military measures (Merritt and Zinnes, 1988). The Correlates of War Project developed these measures and they are the most well-known (Singer, 1988). Baldwin argues such measurements are useful only when they are set in an appropriate policy-contingency framework. The Correlates of War Projects has been applied in a military context. However, even military capabilities vary greatly from one policy-contingency framework to another (Baldwin, 2012). However, this research requires the definition and measurement of power. Mearsheimer defines power as “Military capabilities, meaning the material wherewithal of land power. This in turn is based on latent power, operationalized as wealth.” in his *Tragedy of Great Power Politics*. According to the definitions by both Dahl and Mearsheimer, the countries with these characteristics can belong to the big power category. This paper chooses military power and economics power (GDP and GDP growth) to quantify powers and categorize

powers into “big” and “small” groups. According to the “globalfirepower” ranking, regardless of nuclear weapons, Russia, South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Indonesia, and Australia are in the top ten countries in the list (N/A, Asia-Pacific Countries Ranked by Military Powers 2014, 2014). The economic big powers are Japan, Russia and Australia, above 1,500.000 millions of dollars, according to the World Bank. South Korea ranks high in the firepower list and its economic power ranks slightly lower than Australia with 1,304, 554 dollars, so South Korea belongs to the big power club (the World Bank, 2014). The big powers in this research are Russia, South Korea, Japan, and Australia.

The key terms of “developing well” or “not developing well” need to be defined in the hypothesis (4) States developing relatively well under an America-dominated system balance the rise of China. This research looks at each country’s GDP and the GDP growth as the development indicator. The reason why it is necessary to look at GDP is that China started having influence on the international system as a rising power since the early 1990s. Countries that developed well (developed countries) before 1990s may already have good GDP records. On the contrary, countries, which are developing very fast the recent years, may not have been developing well in the American dominant

system. Therefore, it is important to look at all GDP, GDP per capita, and GDP growth (see appendix 3.1).

The disadvantages of this measurement of development come from the unclear influence of big powers on the international system. Since China is rising, the demands to favor for China from the system has been increasing along with its rise. However, it is uncertain that the demands to favor China also favor other developing countries.

Meanwhile, the GDP growth of developing countries appear to be higher than developed ones in the same year. These are the disadvantages, which can cause inaccuracy in the outcomes. This research looks through the years from 1978 to 2013.

The U.S influence is still strong in the early years (1990s) when China started developing fast. Thus, the countries with high annual GDP record from 1978 to 1990 belong to the category of countries that develop well under the U.S dominant system, whereas the rest belong to the other category. The appendix 3.1 has a value system of identifying countries as developed countries, developing countries, and graduated developing countries by their GDP record. The developed countries and the graduated developing countries are the countries that developed well under American dominant system. Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Australia are the countries, which develop well. The rest are developing relatively slower in the U.S dominant world

system. Thus, apart from the data of GDP, the developed countries are considered to be developing well under American dominant system and the developing countries in the developing slower group.

However, only looking at each country's development does not tell whether its development has been influenced by the U.S or China. This research looks at each country's trade partner share in the year 1992 (post-cold war), that in 2012 (current time), and the trend in between, to see either the U.S or China has a bigger influence on the trade especially the ones that trade is a big portion in GDP. The table below is database of countries' top trade partner is either China or the U.S from WTO (world trade organization).

Table 3.2.1 WTO Data of countries' top trade partners list (WTO, 2014) (other sources)

Country \ Year	1992	2012	Trend
Russia	Top trade partner: Japan (Mikheeva, 1996)	Exports: China/EU Imports: China/EU Trade to GDP ratio: 51.5	Moving from Japan towards China
North Korea	N/A	N/A	China (Dick K. Nanto, 2010)

South Korea	Imports: Japan-23.8%  U.S-22.4%  Exports: U.S-23.7%  Japan-15.1% (Solution, 2014)	Exports: China 1 <sup>st</sup> , U.S 2 <sup>nd</sup>  Imports: China 1 <sup>st</sup> , U.S 3 <sup>rd</sup>  Trade to GDP ratio: 110.9	Moving from Japan, U.S to China, U.S
Japan	Imports: U.S-22.6%  Exports: U.S-28.4%  China Hongkong-6.2% (Solution, 2014)	Exports: China 1 <sup>st</sup> , U.S 2 <sup>nd</sup>  Imports: China 1 <sup>st</sup> , U.S 3 <sup>rd</sup>  Trade to GDP ratio: 31.6	Moving from the U.S to China
Taiwan	N/A	Exports: China  Imports: Japan/China  Trade to GDP ratio: 141.1	Currently China
Brunei	Imports: Singapore, U.S, Japan around 20% each  Exports: Japan-57.5% (Solution, 2014)	Exports: Neither  Imports: China  Trade to GDP ratio: 109.1	Moving from Japan, U.S to China
Cambodia	N/A	Exports: U.S  Imports: China  Trade to GDP ratio: 118.7	Currently U.S and China
Thailand	Imports: Japan-29.3%, U.S  Exports: U.S-22.6% (Solution, 2014)	Exports: China  Imports: Japan  Trade to GDP:145.0	Moving from Japan, the U.S to China, Japan

Laos	N/A	Exports: N/A Imports: N/A Trade to GDP: 64.0	N/A
Singapore	Imports: Japan-21.1%, U.S-16.5 Exports: U.S-21.1 (Solution, 2014)	Imports: China Exports: China and the U.S (similar) Trade to GDP: 400.2	Moving from Japan, U.S to China
Myanmar	Imports: Japan 39.9% Exports: Singapore and India around 24% (Solution, 2014)	Exports: Thailand/HK China Imports: China Trade to GDP: 28.8	Moving from Japan to China, Thailand
Vietnam	N/A	Exports: U.S/EU Imports: China Trade to GDP ratio: 153.0	Currently the U.S and China
Malaysia	Imports: Japan 26%, U.S, and Singapore Exports: Singapore-23%, U.S, and Japan (Solution, 2014)	Exports: China Imports: China Trade to GDP ratio: 165.9	Moving from Japan, U.S and Singapore to China
Indonesia	Imports: Japan-22%, U.S-14% Exports: Japan-31.7% (Solution, 2014)	Exports: Japan/China Imports: China Trade to GDP ratio: 48.0	Moving from Japan, the U.S to China
The Philippines	N/A	Exports: Japan Imports: U.S	Currently Japan and the U.S



		Trade to GDP ratio: 59.6	
Australia	Imports: U.S-22% Japan-17.8% Exports: Japan-24.1% (solution, 2014)	Exports: China Imports: China Trade to GDP ratio: 44.1	Moving from the U.S Japan to China

The chart above suggests that most countries in the Asia Pacific region had trade heavily with the U.S and Japan back in 1992. As time went by, most of them have moved towards trading with China. Some of them remained trading with the U.S and Japan, such as the Philippines. This brings a controversial concept to this measurement, because most countries are leaning towards the same direction from trading with the U.S and Japan to trading with China. It becomes hard to define which countries are enjoying the system under either the U.S or China influence. If the results are combination from both GDP data and trading share, the results are as below.

In this research, the countries that develop well under American dominant system are South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Singapore, and Australia. The rest are considered developing slower under American dominant system. The definition and logic is not inevitable, because it is difficult to be certain that the U.S is the only influence of the world system instead of other factors, such as capitalism and market

power, even globalization. The disadvantages of the definitions here together with other parts are in the section following this one.

The hypothesis “(5) States with similar culture and identity perceptions bandwagon rising China while others do not” involves terms of “similar culture and similar identity perceptions” and “far culture and identity perceptions”. Defining culture and identity perception is controversial and difficult. This research adopts the definition from *Clash of Civilization* by Samuel P. Huntington. Huntington argues that different cultural civilizations tend to clash. In the future, the non-western civilizations either turn western or challenge western civilization (Huntington, *Clash of Civilizations*, 1993). “A Confucian-Islamic connection has emerged to challenge Western interests, values, and power” (Huntington, *Clash of Civilizations*, 1993). Russia and Japan are swinging countries, although they are located in Asia and Europe (Huntington, *Clash of Civilizations*, 1993). Therefore, countries in this research include ones that belong or are close to Chinese culture (Confucius), including North Korea, South Korea, Taiwan, Vietnam, and Southeast Asian countries. Russia, as a Slavic-Orthodox or swinging civilization and Japan count as far culture together with Australia. However, there are disadvantages in the defining methods. For instance, Japan is an Asian country geographically and its culture is similar to Chinese culture, so that Japanese people

perceive themselves as Asian. This does not appear to be accurate to some scholars.

Huntington mentions in the early stage of his argument and separately in his book that

Japan belongs to a different group from Confucius-Hindu civilization. Together with

Ethiopia and several other countries, Japan is one of the lone countries (Huntington,

1996). At the same time, some other scholars also raised the idea that Japan and Russia

will be the swinging countries, which do not belong to the East or the West. As all the

possible suggestions could exist to this question, “Japan as Asian” “Japan as Western”

and “Japan as both or neither”, the previous studies have these major voices. Some

scholars argue that Japan has this Asian root in its culture and identity due to its

geographical location, historical, and intellectual contexts. The two recently opened

Kyushu National Museum and Fukuoka Asian Art Museum exhibitions are both strong

evidences that Japan belongs to Asia and this Asian identity is going to be stronger in

21<sup>st</sup> century (Carlile, 2009). With a similar argument, some other scholars concentrate

on the cultural aspects. Historically, Japanese language and culture was influenced by

Tang Dynasty culture and traditions in China from 15<sup>th</sup> to 16<sup>th</sup> century and the

contemporary Japanese society even keeps the Confucius ideology and culture better

than the original country, China (after the 10 years cultural revolution). Therefore, they

argue that Japan is still Asian, from the historical perspective (Nishio, n.d.). Through

the modern cultural perspective, the popular Japanese Manga (Comics), Anime (Animation) and TV dramas in East Asia are functioning as cultural and identity bonds for “Asians”, especially from the Western view (Katsumata, 2011). From a political view, the Imperial Japan’s “Pan-Asianism” is also evidence that Japan is Asian and is willing to bonding Asians together to “counter” the West. However, some other scholars argue that, if we interpret this “pan-Asianism” as the intention of Japan to be a leader of Asia instead of “part” of Asia, this same evidence actually proves that Japan is viewing Asia as “others”. What is more, many TV shows in Japan even present an idea that Japan is viewing Asia from a “Western lens”. These scholars brought out Fukuzawa Yukichi’s exhortation in the 19<sup>th</sup> century titled “Datsuo Nyuo”, which literally means “breaks away from Asia and join the West” (Tay, 2010). There are also studies in the past arguing that Japan has been facing identity crisis, out of its mixed history and political efforts of an Asian side and Western contents. It has been “Flip-Flopping between ‘Asian’ and ‘Western’ poles” (Jo, 2011; Hatch, 2010). Huntington mentions Russia together with Japan as swinging countries between the West and the East (Huntington, 1992). Thus, this research follows the definition Huntington sets and categorize Russia and Japan as far culture countries. The terms that needs definitions in hypothesis “(6) States with similar political ideology and political system (Marxist-

Leninist party ruled) do not balance rising China;” are simple and more obvious than the other ones. North Korea, Vietnam, and Laos belong to the category of countries with similar political ideology.

### 3.3 Period in discussion

The period studied in this research is from post-cold war era until now, because the end of Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union was also when the rise of China started dominating the security agenda of Asia. Thus, this research focuses on other Asian countries strategies to a rising China from the post-cold war era until now.

### 3.4 Countries in discussion

This research includes 16 countries in the Asia Pacific region. They are Russia, North Korea, South Korea, Japan, Taiwan located in the Northeast, ASEAN ten members including Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam in the Southeast; and Australia in the Pacific Ocean. The scope of this research is on the Asia Pacific countries, which are East Asian countries and Australia, because they are in between of the United States (the world hegemon) and China (the rising power on the other side). This research

concentrates on what factors drive these countries pursue a certain strategy such as balancing or bandwagoning towards a rising China.

The section below talks about the specific methods this research uses.

### 3.5 The methods

The methodologies this research adopted are qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) primarily discussed by Ragin (Ragin, 2000) and Elman's Explanatory Typologies in Qualitative Analysis (Elman, 2005), which are for theory testing. QCA involves case study research, configurational comparative research and variable-oriented research. This research adopts a method in the middle of Configurational Comparative Research and Variable-Oriented Research, because the key words in the research question are "Asian countries" "Balance or not" and one case cannot represent the cases categorized in the same theoretical concept. On the other hand, an only Variable-Oriented Research is too vague, and the case population is not large enough for it. However, one of the main goals of this research is testing hypotheses and theories, which Variable-Oriented Research does the best.

Explanatory Typologies in Qualitative Analysis makes categories from the theoretical concept underlying theories and gives description to each typology. This research categorizes the countries in discussion by the typology (See table 3.1. and table 3.2.). For instance, the first hypothesis includes two variables “continental” and “insular”. Among the 16 countries, continental countries are Russia, North Korea, South Korea, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, Myanmar, and Vietnam. Each typology box is filled with countries with the character described in the typology.

### 3.2 Expected categorization-Realist categorization

Continental	Br, Rs, Ns, Ss, Ca, La, My, Sg, Th, VN	Insular	Tw, Aus, JP, InS, Mal, Phi
Big power	Rs, Aus, JP, SK	Middle and Small	The rest
Disputed	JP, SK, Tw, Mal, Phi, VN	Non- disputed	The rest
Developing well	JP, Sk, Tw, Aus, Jp	Developing less	The rest

### 3.3 Cultural categorization

Similar culture	Nk, Sk, Tw, ASEAN10
Far culture	Japan, Russia, Aus
Communist	Nk, VN, La, Rs
Non- communist	The rest

The categories above include countries that have the characteristics independently. However, this research compares realist and cultural theories. In order to compare the theories and hypotheses, this paper combines realist and cultural typologies (see table.3.3). Under the combined typologies, there are predictions and examples under these combined categories. There are these six hypotheses, from which there are two opposing and complementary categories of each hypothesis. As table 1 shown below, there are 32 cells in the 4×8 matrix. However, the cells in shadow can be eliminated because there are no examples for them. Thus, the case selection will be based on this table and the accessible information. Cross-case study is the main case study method this research adopts, because cross-case study allows theory testing, which suits the purpose of this research (Ragin, 2000). Case study sources are from official government statements, previous studies, and some major media resources, such as CNN News and The Guardian. Since there are numerous previous case studies about each country's strategy towards a rising China. The relevant studies were randomly chosen.



Table 3.4. Typology of states' features and responses to a rising China predicted in the Asia Pacific region (predictions and country examples)

	Continental	Insular	Big	Middle and small	Disputed with China	Non-disputed with China	Developing well under current system	Developing slowly
<b>Similar culture &amp; Identity</b>	(1) Possibly balance: Ns, Ss, Ca, La, My, Th, Vn	(5)Balance: Tw	(9)Balance: Japan, Sk, Aus	(13)Bandwagon: Nk, Tw, ASEAN 10	(16)Balance: Jp, Sk, Tw, Vn, Phi, Mal, Indo, Singapore	(21)Bandwagon or do nothing: Nk, Bru, Ca, La, My, Th	(25)Balance: Jp, Australia	(29)Bandwagon or do nothing: Nk, Bru
<b>Different culture &amp; Identity</b>	(2)Balance: Russia	(6)Balance: Australia, Jp	(10) Balance: Russia, Australia	(14)	(18)	(22)Balance: Australia, Russia	(26)Balance: Australia, Rs	(30)
<b>Communist ruled or related</b>	(3) Possibly balance/bandwagon: Nk, Vn, La, Rus, Ca	(7)	(11)	(15)Bandwagon: Laos	(19)Possible to Balance: Vietnam	(23)Bandwagon or do nothing: NK, La	(27)possible to balance: Vietnam	(31)Bandwagon or do nothing: North k, Laos
<b>Non-communist ruled democracy</b>	(4)Balance: Sk, Th	(8)Balance: Japan, Tw, Aus	(12)Balance: Japan, Aus	(16)Possible to balance: Indonesia	(20)Balance: Japan	(24)Possible to Balance: Australia	(28)Balance: Japan	(32)Possible to balance: Cambodia



= empirically no existence

The chart above is a sample chart of the theory testing process. As shown, Australia balances rising China. Then, the matching variables of this country compared with the hypotheses (shown in table. 3.3) present a simple result.

### 3.6 Advantages and Disadvantages of the methodologies

There are several advantages and disadvantages of the research methods in this research. The advantage of the measurement (definitions of the terms) is that they are simple and straightforward, because they are mostly derived directly from theories themselves. The disadvantage of the measurement is that they are not perfectly explicit. It is difficult to measure countries' exact strategy when they fall in between of "balance" and "bandwagon". Measuring countries' development and define them as "developing well" or "developing relatively slower" are extremely difficult and controversial. There are varieties of ways to define countries' development. Moreover, to what time and extent is the international system influenced by the United States is not measurable. Whether the international system is only influenced by the U.S and whether other big power influence is to the same direction as the U.S one are other difficulties in the measurements. What is more, whether the good development is due to the U.S influence is still questionable. However, the U.S has been the only world hegemon after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The world system has been maintained by the United States, so that the system is influenced the most by the United States. The Hegemonic Stability Theory also argues that the world system that dominant by the hegemon is the most stable structure (Gilpin, 1987). In terms of the case studies, there are numerous of previous studies on each individual countries. However, due to the size of this research, this paper only mentions around five

previous studies on each country. It brings the disadvantage when this paper does not cover the entire existing previous studies on this matter.

The advantages of the configurational comparative qualitative method and the variable oriented method include that these methods are suitable for theory testing. The explanatory typology suggested by Elman allows the prediction of hypotheses test and a logical theory test process. However, the features of these methods, which are analysis of big number of cases, have to bear less in-depth case studies. Even though some of the case studies are in-depth, the focus of this research is towards generalization instead of details of each case.

The empirical section below goes through the sixteen countries one by one, to present the policies and analyze the strategies. According to the government policy sources and previous research, each country falls into **one of the three categories** of strategy towards a rising China: “balance”, “bandwagon”, and “do nothing”. After categorizing each country’s strategy, each country goes back to the typology table (table. 3.3) and test each hypothesis. In the end, the typology boxes that have more than half of the countries meeting the prediction, the hypotheses are confirmed. The ones with less than half countries meeting the prediction are rejected. The sources of the empirical section are from government official website, major media, and academic research papers. This section includes three to five previous studies on each country, which are selected randomly. Apart from the books, the online articles are following the key words “XXX country’s strategy/policy to a rising China”.

## **Section 4.**

### **Empirical Study**

#### 4.1 Introduction

This section does the empirical studies of 16 countries' policies and strategies to a rising China. The goals are confirming the strategy each country has towards China; and testing the hypotheses with the findings. This research focuses on the time from post-cold war era until now. In this section, the order of countries goes from the North to the East, starting with Russia and ending with Australia. Under each empirical study section of one country, the first part talks about the information presented on the government official website; the second part is literature review of previous studies on the country's relations with China and the analysis of news reports from major media; the following part analyzes the strategy to a rising China and test the hypotheses. Because this paper does not contain every single case study in the past, the cases included are randomly selected. There are around three to five cases for each country.

Before going into the 16 countries in the Asia Pacific, there is a section on the U.S relations with rising China. This research presumes that the U.S balances a rising China, so that other countries can "externally balance" China by allying with the U.S. This following section confirms whether the U.S plays a role of "balancing" China in the Asia Pacific region.

#### 4.2 The U.S relations with China

The United States is the most powerful state in the Asia Pacific region now. Realist theories and theories under Realist perspective, such as balance of power suggests that when there is a rising power in the same region with a big power, the big power balances the rising power. In the case of Asia Pacific region where there is a rising China, the United States is supposed to balance China theoretically. Empirically, the U.S—China relations look complex.

The United States, as the most influential regional and world power, does not only make its China policies according to its short-term and long-term interests, but also try to create a favorable strategic environment in East Asia (Ross, 1999). The American China policy options are usually portrayed as between “containment” and “engagement” (Ross, 1999). “Containment” usually happens as coercive policies designed to prevent China from developing and using its growing power to degrade the U.S influence in this region, while “engagement” presents to be adjustment to legitimate Chinese objectives to establish an East Asian order. However, the East Asian order is both conducive to US interests and characterized by peaceful resolution of conflicts of interests (Ross, 1999). Thus, either “containment” or “engagement” is an active move to “balance” China instead of “supporting” China’s rise. What is more, the U.S makes its China policy on balancing its short-term and long-term interests. The short-term interests include maintenance of the security alliance with Japan and Taiwan, protection of American-led international economic and security regimes, and protection of American domestic security and economic interests (Ross, 1999). In terms of long-term interests for the U.S, to maintain its major power influence in the Asia Pacific region and to keep the balance of power are the most important long-term interests (Ross, 1999). In order to protect its own interests, the U.S has to balance China. Furthermore, the so-called “engagement” is engaging China in the U.S-led international institutions. This action is defined as “institutional balancing” by He Kai (He,

2002). All these make the U.S policy towards China on the “balance” side rather than the “bandwagon” side, or the “do nothing” category.

Some other scholars see the U.S—China relations complex and slightly changeable from one administration to another. Going through the Clinton and W. Bush administration, Clinton made an “engagement” strategy to China, while W. Bush lowered China’s priority for the U.S decision makers, which led to a downturn in relations (Sutter, China's Relations with the United States, 2005). The issues involved in the U.S—China relations are North Korea nuclear issue, Taiwan issue, the U.S—Japan military alliance, South China Sea disputes, and leadership battle in the Asia Pacific region (Sutter, 2005). There are so many issues that one trigger of any can turn these two big powers into enemies, even though the U.S and China tend to cooperate in economic matters from time to time.

Because China is considered one of the two big powers (the other one is Russia) that can possibly challenge the United States in military matters, “without a more durable set of Sino-American political and strategic understandings, both countries will seek to ensure their security interests through a combination of national level strategies and political security relations with other Asia-Pacific powers” (Pollack, 2002). Although government officials of both China and the United States state that they would love to cooperate in many issue areas, the zero-sum interests still look more dominant than the mutual interests do. Thus, the United States is the biggest balancer in the Asia-Pacific region, and the biggest power that other countries can group with to balance China externally.

#### 4.3 Economic interdependence between China and other countries in the region

One of the main objectives of this research is comparing realist and cultural theories. However, economic and trade relations between China and other Asian countries play significant roles in the overall strategies of Asian countries towards a rising China. Although economic and trade relations between China and other Asian countries are important indeed, they do not bring controversial factors to the strategies towards China. This section talks about other countries' close economic and trade relations with China. Almost all the 16 countries in this research are having extremely positive economic relations with China, because China is growing rapidly not only in terms of production but also in term of the huge market power. This section goes through all the countries' economic relations with China from the North to the South, starting with Russia.

### Russia

According to the Russian government official site, there have been Russian-Chinese economic forums every annually. They have talks on trade and economic cooperation especially in the energy cooperation. (Russian government, 2009) According to "Russia Briefing", CNTV news under Chinese government and other multiple Medias, China has become the largest trade partner of Russia. Of both the Federal State Statistic Service (Roskomstat) and Chinese customs authority data show that, foreign trade turnover of Russia with China increased by 43.1 percent and has reached US\$55.44 billion in 2010. In the areas such as energy development, spaceflight and aviation, nuclear power, mechanics, high-tech industry, China and Russia had enjoyed the "sound cooperation" accordingly. The Russian president Vladimir Putin announced plans to raise bilateral trade to between US\$60 billion and US\$80 billion annually by 2010. Both of the

countries were processing rapidly towards that goal initially. Not long afterwards, China and Russia decided to abandon the US dollar and use their own currency in bilateral trade. Moreover, according to the International Energy Agency, China is already the largest energy consumer and automobile market in the world. Russia is the second biggest oil exporter so that Russia expects to have remarkable economic cooperation in the energy sector. The other facts that China's outbound foreign direct investment in Russia has been large since the first half of 2010, tourism connected the biggest port city of Russia and Northern China (Russia Briefing, 2010). The Newspaper Xin Hua under Chinese government reported earlier this year that China is Russia's top trade partner from the beginning of this year. According to a report released by the Russian Federal Customs Service that China-Russia, trade turnover raised 20 percent year-on-year increase. Two countries have set a goal to lift bilateral trade to 100 billion by 2015 and to 200 billion by 2020 (Mo, 2012). Since the late 1980s, Moscow decided to put more attention to its Northeast Asian neighbors. Moscow puts a priority to China as a regional partner and creating a geopolitical relations with China rather than economic relations (Rozman, 2004). The early period after Russian Federation was established, Moscow did not do much to have a good relation with China (Rozman, 2004). However, as late as 2000 when Putin was the president, there was a sign that the relation is growing stronger through the Russian gas pipeline built across northern China. The trade between Russia and China also increased in amount (Rozman, 2004). The split of Russia and the U.S on the Iraq war matter in 2003 and Beijing's agreement with Russia strengthened the strategic partnership between Beijing and Moscow (Rozman, 2004).

### Japan



Japan and China have huge numbers in trade and foreign direct investment in data records. For instance, on the official website of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, the total exports in 2006 to China worth \$118.5 billion, total imports worth \$92.9 billion, and the direct investment from Japan to China was \$58.2 billion (MOFA, 2014).

Although the economic relations look close in numbers, the territorial and historical disputes between two countries have been having negative influence on the economic relations between two countries (Watch, 2010). There are even speculations that two countries will delink their economic relations. However, so far the economic relations have been close and interdependent.

### South Korea

The economic relationship between China and South Korea is presented by media and interpreted by scholars to be complex. On the United States' government official website, it says China is both the biggest export market and importer of South Korean products in the Economy section of an intro page of South Korea (Bureau of East Asian and Pacific, United States, 2012). Other than this, there are a few reports on China, Japan and South Korea trilateral free trade talks suggested by Hu Jintao, the president of China. It says because China is both the largest trade partner of South Korea and Japan, the leaders of these three countries are having meetings to make progress on both free trade and trilateral investments (BBC, 2012). Most online sources shown under the key words "China", "South Korea", "economics", and "cooperation" are either associated with either Sino-North Korean relations or relations between North Korea and South Korea. Few research reports are on the "secret" economic cooperation between China (Chung,

1988) and South Korea in order not to provoke North Korea or Taiwan and the reluctance of the South Korean government when dealing with economic cooperation with China in the 1990s (Chung, 1990). In Robert G. Sutter's book *China's Rise in Asia*, there is a chapter about China's relations with the Korean Peninsula. The "Economic and Other Exchanges" section talks about the increase of bilateral economic relations from post-Cold war era until now. It shows the track of these two countries did trade and investments in the past but the term used has never been "economic cooperation". Compared with South Korea, China is putting more effort to "support" this economic relationship (Sutter, 2005). Though online media do not emphasize much about China and South Korea's economic cooperation, some scholars' research does include good statistics of trade and foreign direct investments between two countries from the beginning of the 1990s. Dr. Victor D. Cha points out that not long after the start of trade between China and Korea, China became Korea's third largest trade partner and Korea became China's fourth largest trade partner (Victor. D. Cha, 1999).

From the beginning of 1990s, trade amount between China and South Korea increased sharply. From 1987 to 1988, the amount if China exports and imports almost doubled. During the time when post-cold war era started, the increase each year became stable and significant in amount. Therefore, the trade between two countries is a significant part of their relationship (Victor. D. Cha, 1999). However, many scholars do believe that South Korea is treating rising China as an economic opportunity and adopting a policy of hedging between the US and China. Although South Korea keeps on upgrading the alliance relations with the U.S., it is still not making the "balance" action against China too obvious (Han, 2008)). Therefore, economic cooperation between China and South Korea does matter for the attitude and policy South Korea adopts towards China.

## North Korea

As mentioned in the previous section, North Korea gets financial support from China, arms and food from China (Xu, 2014). Therefore, the economic cooperation here is rather special and more like one-side aid, according to resources.

## ASEAN

Since its foundation in 1967, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations had been promoting “economic growth, social progress and cultural development” through regional cooperation. ASEAN is believed to be a multilateral institution to pursue security for the 10 members (ASEAN, 2014). Kai He explains it as “middle and small powers seeking security among giants”. After the end of cold war and the foundation of ASEAN, these member countries were often considered as one, when talking about international relations between Southeast Asia area and others (He, 2008). In the section of “Interdependence between ASEAN and China: trading friendship”, Kai He noted that ASEAN’s biggest concern after Cold War is China because of the maritime disputes between China and several ASEAN members (He, 2008). He believed that the reason why ASEAN states have not been forging a military alliance against China is out of the economic interdependence. ASEAN states perceive China as an economic opportunity rather than a threat (He, 2008). The attractions for ASEAN members are China’s huge domestic market, China’s spectacular economic growth enhancing ASEAN’s expectation of future investments and the help ASEAN get to offset political pressures from the west, based on a good economic relationship with China (He, 2008). Since ASEAN states are dependent on international trade, they were forced to value the potential market of a rising China in the 1990s. According to ASEAN Statistical Yearbook 2005, its exports to china jumped to \$39 billion in

2004 from only \$2.6 billion in 1990. ASEAN five- Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand accounted for 95% of the exports mentioned above. In 2004, China was the fourth largest export market for ASEAN, following the U.S., EU and Japan (He, 2008). Together with Hong Kong's imports from ASEAN, China was second, right after the U.S. It should be noted that the statistics above includes border trade between China and Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam (He, 2008). There are scholars pointing out that China and ASEAN states are sharing FDI from other countries and regions, so China could be considered as an economic threat (Ravenhill, 2011). However, because of the big influence overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia, the eager of putting FDI in China is rather significant for ASEAN states. "It has been a public secret that conglomerates have significant influences on politics in Southeast Asia. Businessmen provide financial support to political elites while political elites return the favor by facilitating their business" (He, 2008). On the contrary, China's strong economic growth gives hope to the ASEAN states for investments in the future, too. According to the ASEAN-China Expert Group on Economic cooperation published in 2001:

In the future, as China's economy gathers strength, China's investment abroad will increase...ASEAN will be a priority market for China's investment in overseas countries in the future, especially if a closer economic relationship between the two sides could be established (He, 2008).

What is more, China and ASEAN states have similar economic growth pattern. China has been attracting opportunities from different regions. However when China's market is saturate, opportunities can always shift to ASEAN member countries. Therefore, ASEAN countries have been pursuing economic cooperation with China since 1990s (He, 2008).

According to CNN, China and ASEAN agreed to form the world's largest free trade area within ten years in the year 2001. The agreement would create a free trade area with a combined GDP of 2 trillion (CNN M. R., 2001). In 2003, The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) was signed (CNN W. W.-L., 2003). In 2005, the pivotal agreement on trade between China and ASEAN took place marked as the beginning of the China-ASEAN Free Trade Area. The program called "Early Harvest-Program" (EHP) says, "It allows ASEAN products to be exported to China at a very concessionary rate so that ASEAN countries can actually get the benefits of a free trade agreement even before the agreement is realized". ASEAN members under EHP also proved some tariff reductions for certain agricultural products from China. Later on in the year 2009, China unveiled plans to establish a \$10 billion investment fund for ASEAN, according to BBC news (BBC, 2009).

### Taiwan

Economically Taiwan has never stopped the cooperation with mainland China, although governments had officially cut the transportation. However, the year 2009 was remarkable for both businesspersons on both sides and two governments because the transportation especially flights were allowed from then on. From that time, more Taiwanese corporations started their operation and production in mainland China (New York Times, 2012). According to CNN, mainland China and Taiwan signed a historical free trade

agreement Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) in June 2010. Under this agreement, China cuts tariffs on 539 items from Taiwan valued at \$13.8 billion, about 16 percent of the island's 2009 exports to the mainland. The official government site of China also stated that under this agreement, China could use the rich resource from Taiwan Island and Chinese government is also giving beneficial trade policies to Taiwanese corporations (GOV.CN, 2010).

### Australia

Australia is always a trade partner to China especially in resources and energy section, including iron ore, coal, and liquefied natural gas. Xinhua News under Chinese government states that they are “at the heart of” China-Australia economic relationship. It says in 2010, bilateral trade volume reached 99 billion U.S dollars and natural resource and energy trades accounted for 40 billion dollars, nearly half of the total. However, on the second China-Australia CEO Roundtable in Beijing, Chinese vice-premier and Australian Prime Minister stated the wish of going beyond energy and have deeper economic engagement (Xinhua, 2011). The Australian “Former Minister for Trade” reported that the fourth meeting of China-Australia High Level Economic Cooperation Dialogue (HECD) discussed enhancing cooperation on bilateral investment, trade, minerals and energy resources, climate change, transport and infrastructure. It says both sides welcomed the rapid development of the two countries' investment cooperation in recent years, and acknowledged that two-way investment was an increasingly important part of the bilateral economic relationship (Statement by The Crean H.P MP, official government website of Australia 2010). The Australian Embassy in China official site states that Chinese and Australian economies are strongly complementary. According to Australian statistics, two-way merchandise trade has grown from a\$113 million

in 1973 right after the establishment of diplomatic relations. In 2009, it increased to Australian dollar \$78.2 billion and China became Australia's largest trading partner (Australian Embassy in China).

#### **4. 4 Case Studies**

This section tests six hypotheses with case studies of sixteen countries. The cases are randomly chosen.

##### **4.4.1 Russia**

Russia is located in the most Northern area of the region, bordered with China in the South. It used to be part of the Soviet Union before early 1990. Back then, Russia (Soviet Union) and China shared same political ideology, communism (Lukin, 2002). Currently, communist party (Lukin, 2002) no longer rules Russia. However, the close relations with the People's Republic of China still remains, which is presented on the government official website of Russia. When searching for key words "relations with China" on the Russian government official website, all the contents in the archives are about two countries leaders visiting the other country, having meetings on cooperation in security matters, cultural exchange, and economic matters (Russian Government, 2014). In the archive of the Russian government, there are documents on Russia-China relations through the years from 2008 to 2014. Documents with the key words "relations with China" or "China policy" all show a positive attitude to the Russia-China relations (Russian Government, 2014).

The previous studies find Russia perceive and react to a rising China with different dimensions, varying from the Russian elites to the Russian public and the Russian government. Same as this research finds in the official website of Russian government, previous studies also found that the Russian leadership actively work to develop political and economic cooperation with China (Lukin, 2002) (Sutter, China's Relations with Russia, 2005). In 1995, President Boris Yeltsin stated the Russian position on China:

China is the most important state for us. It is a neighbor, with which we share a long border and with which we are destined to live and work side-by-side forever. Russia's future depends on our cooperation with China. Relations with China are extremely important to us in global politics as well. If we can rely on the Chinese shoulder with our relations with the West, the West will be more considerate to Russia (Praktika, 1995) .

In the year 1996, Yeltsin went on a visit to China and announced together with Chinese government their desire to develop a strategic partnership, which is to promote a multipolar system and oppose hegemony. This hegemony is a code word for the United States (Lukin, 2002). Not long after this, a meeting of Shanghai Forum including Russia, China, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan concluded that "China is a strategic partner for all these countries in all spheres of activities" (Lukin, 2002).

While the government official statement sounds exactly like the action of "bandwagoning", the Russian elites hold different opinions on a rising China. They see China as a threat, since the Soviet Union collapsed and democratization "freed" Russia (Lukin, 2002). This perception of a fear from a rising threat does influence some people and some politicians.



For instance, Putin once warned that: “I do not want to dramatize the situation, but if we do not make every effort, even the indigenous Russian population will soon speak mostly Japanese, Chinese, and Korean” (Lukin, 2002). However, most of the Russian public still see China as the friendliest country among ten countries including China, France, Germany, Uzbekistan, Japan, Georgia, USA, Iran, and Estonia. China holds the highest percentage, 52% of the public idea of “friendly relations with Russia” (Lukin, 2002). Previous studies show that Russia has close and friendly relations with China. Information from noted media does not have a different idea on this matter.

Voice of Russia is a Russian government international broadcasting service. When searching for Russia-China relations, the most recent news on this topic include “the U.S trying to isolate Russia, while China stands close with Russia”, “Putin’s visit to China”, and “Russia-China relations is significant to the world politics” (Russia, 2014). Among the news titles above, the most recent one that attracts lots of attention is Putin’s visit to China. Since president of China Xi Jinping assumed the presidency in March, he had visited Russia for three times. Russia and China have been trying hard to tighten their relations, as well. In April, the prime minister of Russia visited Beijing and prepared for Putin’s visit in May. The main topics are not only about enhancing cooperation in many fields, but also on their long-term goal “opposing the U.S dominant world order and creating a multi great power world order” (Tiezzi, 2014). The previous research, government official statements, and the major media all present that Russia stands closely to China, for opposing the U.S dominant world system. Therefore, Russia falls in the bandwagoning group. The next paragraph goes back to the variables from six hypotheses and tests the realist and cultural theories with the Russian strategy to a rising China. Since the late 1980s, Moscow decided to put more attention to its Northeast Asian neighbors. Moscow puts a

priority to China as a regional partner and creating a geopolitical relations with China rather than economic relations (Rozman, 2004). The early period after Russian Federation was established, Moscow did not do much to have a good relation with China (Rozman, 2004). However, as late as 2000 when Putin was the president, there was a sign that the relation is growing stronger through the Russian gas pipeline built across northern China. The trade between Russia and China also increased in amount (Rozman, 2004). The split of Russia and the U.S on the Iraq war matter in 2003 and Beijing's agreement with Russia strengthened the strategic partnership between Beijing and Moscow (Rozman, 2004). Since 1992, there are three stages of the partnership development (Li, 2000). From 1992 to 1994, Russia and China officially announced that they were starting a "friendly" relationship (Li, 2000). In 1994 September, Russia and China defined their relationship as constructive partnership. The third stage is from 1996 to now, when Moscow and Beijing devote to develop a strategic partnership (Li, 2000). The Russian China strategic partnership does have some content and Li Jingjie concluded three features of the partnership. The features include mutual respect and equality, mutual benefit and development, a new security outlook and model, global multipolarity and a new world order, and some other more. The new security outlook and model helps two countries discard the cold war logic and successfully resolve border disputes. Instead, they built a peaceful and cooperative relation with each other (Li, 2000). The feature of a global multipolarity and a new world order is a challenge to the U.S unipolarity (U.S dominant world system). Beyond these, the more recent interaction of two countries also brings Russia to the "bandwagoning" group. The treaty of good neighborliness, friendship, and cooperation signing in 2002 by Putin and Jiang Zemin deepened the mutual political trust, and promoted the relations in economics, military, security, and humanity matters (Tanwar, 2013). Jiang Zemin's visit to Russia in the same year (2002)

enhanced this progress. In the year 2006, Putin's visit to China confirmed that there are no major problems or obstacles between China and Russia. Meanwhile China and Russia decided to sponsor "Russian year" and "China year" in 2006 and 2007 (Tanwar, 2013). Two countries were aware that their economic relations are far poorer than their political cooperation (Thanwar, 2013). Therefore, after Putin took over the office he strengthened the economic and trade relations with China under the good neighbor treaty of friendship and cooperation in 2001 (Thanwar, 2013). Besides the military technology cooperation, Russia and China work closely in international affairs as well after 2001 (Thanwar, 2013). As suggested by varieties of previous studies, Russia is pursuing a close relation with China after cold war. Russia has the strategy of "bandwagoning" towards China. Putting Russia back to the variable chart (see table. 4.1), it meets the realist variables of "continental country, big power, non-disputed with China, and developing relatively slow in the American dominant system". In the table, the boxes with black shadow are the ones not matching. The grey shadow shows the variables that match the case but not completely. Russia fits in the Cultural variables of "different culture and identity, non-communist". However, as mentioned in the methodology section, Russia was once a part of Soviet Union. The history of government ruled by communist party is not far away from the current Russia. Therefore, the previous political ideology and political system may still influence Russia today. Comparing the realist and cultural variables, Russia's strategy rejects most of the realist hypotheses while supports two of them: "Countries with disputes with China balance a rising China, and the ones without do not"; and "States developing relatively well under an America-dominant system balance the rise of China". In terms of cultural theories, Russia's case only supports the hypothesis of similar political system leads a country to bandwagon a rising China. The black cells are the ones not applying to Russia. Each cell shows a combination of two

factors under realist and cultural factors. If one of the factors A influences country's strategy to China, the box has an A instead of B. If both influence country's strategy to China, it says "both" in the box. If neither of them matter, it says neither.

Table. 4.1 Hypotheses test-Russia (Bandwagon)

	continental	insular	big	Mid &Small	disputed	Non- disputed	Dev- well	Dev- slow
Similar culture								
Different culture	Neither		Neither			Non- disputed		Dev- slow
Marxist- Leninist	Marxist- Leninist		Marxist- Leninist			Both		Both
Non-com	neither		neither			Non- disputed		Dev- slow

Moving towards the south—Korean Peninsula is divided into North Korea and South Korea. Two countries are extremely different in most aspects. Their policy strategies to a rising China are not similar, either.

#### 4.4.2 North Korea

North Korea is located to the northeast of China, bordering with China across Yalu River. It is one of the five communist ruled countries left, together with China, Vietnam, Laos, and Cuba. Since it is one of the most authoritarian regime in the world, the information flow is strictly controlled from both in and out ways. On the official government website, there is no specific information on its foreign relations with other countries. Although the previous studies is limited in quantity, North Korea's China strategy can be the most clear and obvious one.

China is most important ally of North Korea. Geographically, China is more important to North Korea than North Korea to China (Dick K. Nanto, 2010). It is also the biggest trading partner, and the source of food, arms, and fuel. The Kim regime has been supported and sustained by China. Dated back to the 1950s, China sent troops to support North Korea during the Korean civil war and finally made the power balance between North Korea and the American backed South Korea. Since then, China backed Il-sung (1912-1994), Kim Jong-il (1941-2011), and Kim Jong-un (1983- ) regimes politically and economically (Xu, 2014) . China also used to oppose the harsh international sanction on North Korea strongly. That action was perceived as avoiding the collapse of the Kim's regime and the cross border refugees' influx (Xu, 2014). However, the latest nuclear test North Korea had in 2013, and the uncooperative performance in the Six-Party Talks upset not only the U.S, but also the holding country China. Although there was time when two countries relations went downhill, in the end of 2013 China rebuilt the solid relations with Jang, Kim Jung-eun's uncle, because of the public shaming and execution (Xu, 2014). Some news reporters argue that North Korea has worn out China's patience by its poor performance in Six-Party Talks and the recent clashes with South Korea (Theguardian, 2014). Recently, Japanese media revealed that China's plan on collapse of North Korea leaked. News commenters at The Guardian argue that it is not true, because if it were true China would not defend North Korea when there are foreign invasions and the documents would not be leaked in an odd way like this. What's more, South Korea and the U.S has long been urging China to deter North Korea to stop the destabilizing behavior, such as nuclear test. If China were planning to do so, it would discuss with Seoul and Washington first (Lind, 2014). However, China has too much in North Korea at stock to withdraw the support. Furthermore, North Korea is a buffer zone between China and South Korea, which is the military ally of the United States (Xu, 2014). For

North Korea, it is completely depending on China economically. China sends direct aid to Pyongyang, and the food supplies channel to military use (Xu, 2014). In recent years, China continued to reply to North Korea's policy cycle of provocations, diplomacy, and aid delivery and back to provocations as other countries, although China has never been the direct target of North Korea missile test (Dick K. Nanto, 2010). China keeps the close relationship with North Korea because on one side, as Mao Zedong once described that China-North Korea are like "lips and teeth"; on the other side, North Korea is a thorn in the side of China (Dick K. Nanto, 2010). Furthermore, North Korea's core interest is overlapped with China's wish on the stability of the Korean Peninsula (Dick K. Nanto, 2010). In terms of the stability on the Korean Peninsula, China has been playing an important role in the six-party talk and most scholars believe that China is going to be influential in the six-party talk in the future as well (Chen Jian, 2003). As an ally, North Korea "bandwagons" a rising China.

Going back to the typology chart (see table. 4.2), North Korea's strategy meets most of the hypotheses.

Table. 4.2 Hypotheses test-North Korea (Bandwagon)

	continental	insular	big	Mid &Small	disputed	Non- disputed	Dev- well	Dev- slow
Similar culture	Similar culture			both		Both		Both
Different culture								
Marxist-Leninist	Marxist-Leninist			both		both		both
Non-com								

As the table shown above, the North Korea strategy towards a rising China supports most hypotheses. It only rejects one hypothesis (1) Continental powers balance a rising China, while the insular ones do not. In this case, similar culture, and political ideology and system have more

influence over geographic factors. North Korea shares the Korean Peninsula with South Korea, but they two barely share any similarities economically or politically.

#### 4.4.3 South Korea

South Korea shares the Korean Peninsula with North Korea, located to the Northeast of China across the Yellow Sea. There is no direct land border between China and South Korea, but the relations between South Korea and China have been close, friendly or not.

The foreign relations section on the government official website includes comparatively explicit political attitude towards all the major neighboring countries of South Korea and its strategic ally, the United States. The introduction starts with the influence of the United States to South Korea as the most important ally. However, the government is also straightforward on exposing the odd parts of its relations with the United States, the policies on North Korea for instance (Government S. K., 2014). In terms of relations with China, it only states that “South Korea and China established formal diplomatic relations on August 24, 1992, despite previous hostility dating back to the Korean War.” (Government S. K., 2014). It has two detailed paragraphs on relations with Japan and North Korea. The relations with Japan are presented with an emphasis on the territorial disputes “Dokdo-Takeshima Dispute”, and historical disputes such as the Japanese history textbook changes and president Koizumi’s visits to Yasukuni Shrine (Government S.K., 2014). North Korea has been the biggest concern for South Korea ever since the Korean War in 1950s. Although two Koreas had progress in relations through Olympic games and family reunion events, North Korea made the relations more controversial with several missile tests in the 1990s (Government S. K., 2014). The South Korean ministry of

foreign affairs does not have any clear statements on its attitude towards a rising China on the official website. It includes a simple description of China and the major visits of state heads to each other in the past ten years. The visits appear to be regularly once a year during the past ten years (Korea, 2014). The previous research answers the question why Korea does not have a clearer attitude towards China and what strategies Korea has to a rising China.

South Korea is one of the most important strategic allies of the United States in Asia. Meanwhile, South Korea is dependent on China economically because China is the largest trading partner of South Korea. Thus, it has been an important and difficult task for all the president administrations to balance the relations with China and the United States (Suk-hee, 2012; Chung, 2006). From the government to the public, South Korea has been swinging between China and the United States out of several reasons. The security concern North Korea brings comes the first. China's support to North Korea is always the reason driving South Korea away from China to a closer relation with the United States. Meanwhile, South Korean public also sense the possible instability a rising China is bringing to the region (Suk-hee, 2012). However, South Korea also needs China to bargain with North Korea in security issues, because only China can bring North Korea to the negotiation table and act as a mediator as the only strategic ally of North Korea. Therefore, it is important to have good relations with China, apart from the economic reasons (Suk-hee, 2012). However, the South Korean public perception of China is complex.

A Korean scholar Tae ho Kim notes that the popular South Korean images of China are difficult to generalize but South Koreans view China by its relationship with outside world in three ways (1) China was a traditional great power. (2) China was a Cold-War adversary. This is presented by the hostile experience of the Korean War from 1950-1953. (3) China is a "good



neighbor” after Sino-ROK normalization of 1992. Although Korean society sees China as a desirable trade partner, a relatively small but growing number of human rights advocates with religious and environmental groups are highly critical of China’s policies. Another sizable number of people who are related to commercial, government and other institutions with China tend to be favor of a “cooperative partnership” concept of relation with China. On the other side, a minority group but the elites group including media, military, ideological communities and few foreign-policy analysts view China as a “threat” so that they believe South Korea should “deter”, “contain” or “constrain” China. As the author noted that the great relevance to his study is how Korea values the relationship with China and the US-ROK alliance in comparison (T. Kim, 2002). The Korean public also favors the U.S over China in terms of South Korea’s foreign relations. Two surveys conducted in 1993 and 1996 ask “Which country should be the closest to Korea in twenty first century and by 2006 respectively, the results in 1993 is 34.8% for China and 22.8% for the U.S. In 1996 within the same group of people, 46.6% chose China and 19.4% chose the US. On the contrary, among the older ones in their fifties or above in 1993, 27.7% chose China and 54.8% chose the U.S. In the year 1996, in the same group of people, 41% chose China and 32.1 chose the U.S. This shows that during the 1990s the popularity of the U.S declined and that of China rose in Korea. The vast majority of the South Korean public and elite believe that China’s influence over peninsular affairs will grow in the future so that South Korea should expand cooperation with China. In 2000, Joong Ang Daily conducted another two surveys on “The most helpful countries to Korea and The least supportive countries for Korean reunification” on August 14. In the first survey, 30% chose China, 26% percent chose the U.S and 14.1% chose Japan. For the countries, which do not supportive for Korean reunification, 39.3% chose Japan, 28.1% chose the U.S and 9.2% chose China (T. Kim, 2002).

Han's research presents Korean perception of China more specifically, divided into security concerns and other issues. His research finds out the major concerns South Korea has on China, which lead to negative public perceptions of China or negative relations with China. They are

- (1) Tariff disputes arising from Chinese flooding of South Korean garlic markets in 2000
- (2) China's controversial claim to the ancient Korean kingdom of Koguryo in 2004
- (3) Chinese violence during the torch relay for the Beijing Olympic Games in 2008
- (4) The sinking of the *Cheonan* and the Yeonpyeong Island bombardment in 2010
- (5) Chinese fishermen's illegal fishing and the murder of a Korean coast guard in 2011
- (6) Chinese repatriation of North Korean defectors
- (7) Potential disputes over Socotra Rock in 2012

(Suk-hee, 2012)

According to the survey data from his research, which was conducted jointly by EAI-ARI, the majority of South Korean public believe China is closer with North Korea than South Korea in terms of security issues on the Korean peninsula. 69.2% Koreans think that China would support North Korea once there is an inter-Korean military conflict. 25.8% believe that China would remain neutral, and only 4.2% speculate that China will support South Korea (Suk-hee, 2012). In the same vein, Han's research finds that majority Koreans believe that China will

eventually take over North Korea, so that having close relations with China is an obstacle for the unification of the Korean peninsula (Suk-hee, 2012).

The public views China's position on the Korean peninsula security matters negatively but positively on the economic relations with China. They realize the importance of balancing the relations with China and the United States. The past and current administration have also been trying to manage the relations with two giants carefully, independently, and cooperatively (Suk-hee, 2012). President Roh Moo-Hyun accommodated with China but suffered from some consequences from keeping distance from the United States. Lee Myung-bak strengthened the alliance with the United States, by putting the U.S as the first priority in foreign relations. This fact worsened the China-Korea relations and later efforts Korea put did not successfully make up the relations with China. Some Chinese scholars even challenged Lee's administration by labeling the U.S-ROK alliance as "value alliance", based on shared political, economic, and cultural principles (Suk-hee, 2012). During the latest election, three candidates stated their emphasis on dealing with relations with China and the United States. Park is likely to strengthen the alliance with the United States and work on the partnership with China for national interests. Moon's policy favors Beijing rather than the United States, and the other candidate Ahn had an ambiguous attitude on this matter. Now, Park has won her election and how she plays the game without upsetting either of the giants is yet to see (Suk-hee, 2012). However, under the new leadership of both countries, some scholars already did a research on the very recent situation among Korea, China, and the United States. China's response to North Korea satellite test already shows that the new leader is still going to defend North Korea as those in the past (Byun, 2013). Thus, South Korea tends to enhance the alliance with the United States. This fact to China is an anti-China action, suggested by the interview to a Chinese analyst by *The Korean Times*

(Byun, 2013). A commentary article on *Global Times* also suggests that South Korea should show some goodwill by action instead of lip service, if Seoul is serious about the partnership with China (Byun, 2013).

In a word, China's rise puts South Korea in a strategic dilemma between the U.S and China. Traditionally, South Korea achieved its economic growth and security stability replying on the U.S-Korea alliance (Suk-hee, 2012; Park, 2007). The recent Chinese market power, economic growth, South Korea started depending on China in economic matters (Suk-hee, 2012; Chung, 2006). Although the South Korean public majority do not have positive perception of China, they do think that sacrificing China for better relations with the U.S or the other way around will harm the national interests (Suk-hee, 2012). However, the fact that South Korea has been putting the alliance with the United States is perceived by China as an anti-China action, and defined as external balancing actions towards China in this research. South Korea falls in the balancing category. Going back to the typology chart, the ROK-China relations test theories as shown in the table 4.3.

Table 4.3. Hypotheses test-South Korea (balance)

	continental	insular	big	Mid &Small	disputed	Non- disputed	Dev- well	Dev- slow
Similar culture	continental		big		Disputed		Dev- well	

Different culture				
Marxist-Leninist				
Non-com	both	both	both	both

The case of South Korea strategy towards a rising China has a quite clear picture of supporting all the hypotheses derived from realist theories and rejecting cultural factors. However, the political system and ideology also have influence on their strategy, because the U.S-ROK alliance is based on same political value of democracy (Suk-hee, 2012).

#### 4.4.4 Japan

Japan is an island country located to the east of China. Two countries are not traditionally friendly countries. Japan and China started their diplomatic relations in 1972 (MOFA, 2014). This event did not make two countries maintain friendly relations ever since then. The territorial disputes over Senkaku/Diao Yu Islands, conflicts over historical problems, and comfort women during WWII have been issues that stuck in between to prevent peaceful relations.

Japanese government has very clear statements on their foreign policy to China. It says

In order to ensure the stability and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region, it is important to encourage China to become an even more constructive partner in the international community. In particular, the following points are stressed:

(a) Support for China's open and reform policy (implementation of economic

cooperation, support for China's early accession to the WTO, etc.)

(b) Promotion of bilateral and multilateral dialogue and cooperative relations

(high-level exchanges, Japan-China security dialogue, ASEAN Regional Forum,

APEC, etc.)

(MOFA, 2014)

This government statement does not show an obvious attitude towards China. However, when looking at the VIP visiting records, this kind of activities stopped in the year 2007 when President Wen Jiabao visited Japan (MOFA, 2014). Until 2014, there were not major visiting events between two countries. This shows the severe relations between China and Japan.

There is a section locating right below the basic data section at the top on the Sino-Japan relations page of MOFA (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan), “Japan-China Relations: Current Situation of the Senkaku Islands”. In that section, Japan made a very strong claim on the sovereignty of Senkaku Islands, saying Japan will act firmly and calmly on this matter (MOFA, 2014).

The documents in the archive section are a mixture of statements on disputes, and trade cooperation (MOFA, 2013). Overall, the government official website does give the impression that Japan is definitely not bandwagoning China but having a more or less hostile attitude towards China. This does not look much different from the findings in previous studies.

Since Japan and China are two major big powers in Asia, the future stability of this region will somewhat depend on the relations between these two countries. During the post-cold war era, China surpassed Japan economically. Together with the ongoing territorial strategic, historical issues had been deepening the mistrust and antipathy between two countries (Sutter,

Relations with Japan, 2005). For instance, Japan supports Taiwan and backing the U.S-Taiwan strategic alliance upsets China (Sutter, Relation with Japan, 2005). In Sutter's research, he listed the causes of greater Japanese-Chinese rivalry after cold war:

- (1) Japanese strategic thinkers started focusing more on a rising China for the security concern after the collapse of Soviet Union and cold war era.
- (2) China has continued remarkable economic growth, along with its rising political and military power, prompted Japan to view China as a rivalry.
- (3) Previous Japanese sensitivity and responsiveness to Chinese demands for special consideration on account of Japan's negative war record in China over fifty years ago lessened with the passage of time, the change in Japanese leadership generations, and Beijing's loss of moral standing in Japan on account of its crackdown after the Tiananmen incident, its nuclear testing and its intimidating military actions against Taiwan and in the South China Sea.
- (4) Undergirding Japan's more critical approach to China was a strong sense of national pride and determination among Japanese leaders and public opinion to preserve Japanese interests in the face of perceived efforts by Chinese officials to use charges from the past and recent economic, political, and strategic issues to prompt Tokyo to give way to Chinese interests.

Sutter finds out that during the Cold War period, China did not oppose the militarism of Japan because China wanted to have Japan to balance the Soviet power. The collapse of Soviet Union lowered the strategic cooperation between China and Japan. Japan's role of a key balancer for the strategic framework against Russia ended. The conflict shifts to China-Japan rivalry (Wilson, 1995; Jiang, 2002; Sutter, Relation with Japan, 2005). Despite of the reasons above, the Tiananmen incident in 1988 is also a trigger of how Japan turned its back to China. Whenever talking about Japan's relations with China, the Japan-U.S security alliance comes into the topic. As China is a growing big power in Northeast Asia, many scholars agree with the U.S leaders that it is necessary for the U.S to pose as a police in this region, in order to mediate the possible security dilemma between China and Japan (Christensen, 2000). However, the rooted mistrusts Northeast Asia make the often presence of the U.S military in this region look hostile to China (Mifune, 2011; Christensen, 2000). After the Tiananmen incident, Taiwan issue came to the center of attention in the relations of China and Japan. Japan plays an important role in the U.S-Japan alliance, perceived by China and other countries in the region makes the situation look like an "external balancing" strategy of Japan (Akio, 2004). Not only the alliance with the United States, Japan's will of becoming a "normal" country is perceived as an action of balancing the rise of China (Akio, 2004). The so-called "normal" refers to a country with normal military that has both defensive and offensive characters. Therefore, both government official statements and previous studies position Japan's strategy in the "balance" group.

The previous study does not only include realist research, but also has the study on Japanese perception of "threat", especially "China threat". A Chinese scholar Wenran Jiang discussed four factors that affect Japan's threat perceptions in general. (1) Japan is an isolated island country with poor resource. It is constantly sensitive to all forms of threat to the national



security. The Meiji restoration is a reaction to the U.S and the West threat in the 1860s. Ever since then, Japan started having an entire history of a responding to perceived threat from abroad process. Japan even adopted a new definition of security “comprehensive security” (sogo anze hosho), meaning that any threat to life was a national security concern; (2) Japan does not only perceive others as threat or not, but also cares about how others perceive Japan; (3) Japan’s threat perception was defined and shaped by the U.S-Japan alliance over the past fifty years, because Japan had been following the U.S’s debate on “China threat”; (4) The changing domestic environment of Japan is also likely influencing how it perceives external threats. Since late 1990s, Japan’s economy slide downhill. The domestic political map has been unpredictable. The uncertainties and changes leave their marks on the debate of Japan’s national goals and future roles in world affairs (Jiang, 2002).

A Japanese scholar Haruko Satoh has different idea on Japan’s position facing a rising China in the Asia Pacific Region. He mainly discusses about the historical mistrust between China and Japan, the recent Japanese leaders visiting Yasukuni Shrine creating conflicts in his article on Japan-China relations (Satoh, 2009). However, Satoh argues that “China is too large to ignore”, so that Japan should try to balance its relations in between China and the United States (Satoh, 2009).

Directly or indirectly, Japan is identified as a “balancing” neighbor to a rising China. Putting this fact back to the variables and testing the theories (see table. 4.4), the outcomes show that compared with “having similar cultures with China”, Realist variables are supported. The variable that Japan is an insular country, which does not make it balance a rising China, is rejected. The political system and political value is supported together with other realist variables. Thus, the driving factors are out of the scale of realist factors and political ideology

and values. The major issues involved in two countries relations including North Korea, Taiwan, territorial disputes in East China Sea, historical problems, and Human rights issue in 1989 (Tiananmen incident). These issues in the research of previous studies fall to the box of “disputes” and “developing well in American dominant system” (U.S-Japan alliance). They do not directly support the variable of “Japan as a big power”. However, the fact Japan stepping in the North Korea and Taiwan issue do indicate that Japan is performing its influence as a big power in this region. Finally yet importantly, Japan as a democratic country puts sanction on China out of the Tiananmen incident. It suggests that the political system and political values also matter to the Japanese strategy to a rising China.

Table. 4.4 Hypotheses testing-Japan (Balance)

	continental	insular	big	Mid &Small	disputed	Non- disputed	Dev- well	Dev- slow
Similar culture								
Different culture	Different culture		Both		Both		Both	
Marxist- Leninist								
Non-com		both	both		both		both	

Japan’s strategy towards China support most of the hypotheses derived from realist theories, apart from “insular countries bandwagon a rising power”, and all the hypotheses derived from theories of Culture and Identity.

#### 4.4.5 Taiwan

As the problem of “One China” or “Taiwan strait” has remained since 1949, Taiwan would never leave its ally, the US. The Taiwan Strait issue is also the direct cause of China’s

military built which threatens countries in this region. The most recent military sale of the U.S to Taiwan took place in late 2011, which was the peak of friendly relations between Taiwan and mainland China (CNN wire staff, 2011). Getting access to the “Government information office, Republic of Taiwan”, a special link on the side leads to a website called “One hundred years of friendship”. There are news, stories and photos of the whole history of the Taiwan-U.S alliance. From the section: “about us”, the intention to keep the strength and the depth of the alliance is made clear (Official Website of Taiwan, 2012). Taiwan is in the “balancing” group against a rising China. This section goes through the previous studies and analyzes the situation of China-Taiwan relations, and Taiwan’s strategy to China.

As mentioned in the section on economic relations between China and other countries in the region. Taiwan and China share the same language and culture, which makes it convenient to have trades with each other (Hong, 1995). The China threat comes directly from the China’s plans to reunify Taiwan with the mainland, because China kept on stating, “China wants to reunify Taiwan peacefully but does not forgo the possibility of using military means”. The constant military practice in the Taiwan Strait also worries Taiwan (Hong, 1995). China claims sovereignty over Taiwan and argues that all the sovereign state has every right to use any means, when necessary, to protect the sovereignty and territorial integrity (Hong, 1995). Therefore, people in Taiwan have suspicious attitude about a “peaceful reunification”. Instead of preparing for “recover the mainland”, Taiwan has changed its military posture to “defend Taiwan”. Thus, the military size has been reduced to the minimum for defense purpose. At the same time, Taiwan seizes the U.S for further security concerns (Hong, 1995). Not only external balancing, Taiwan also keeps on purchasing the U.S weapons and modernizing its military (Hong, 1995).

From the second half of the 1990s until now, China adjusted the previous harsh rhetoric because Beijing finds it usually working against Chinese interests (Sutter, Relations with Taiwan, 2005). However, the issues on China's sovereignty over Taiwan were not less severe because of the softer rhetoric Beijing has towards Taiwan. The main issues arose from two Taiwanese leaders Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-Bian, who emphasize that "Taiwan is an independent country" (Sutter, Relations with Taiwan, 2005). The situation between mainland China and Taiwan was "hot in economics and cold in politics". The most recent presidential election changed the government authority to Kuomintang, which was seen as a hope of "stepping closer to reunification" by the mainland China. The newly elected president Ma Ying-Jeou is dedicated to promote a better interaction between mainland China and Taiwan (Schuber, 2010). The Chinese newly elected president Hu once expressed that "We are counting on Taiwanese people". Beijing wishes to use the Taiwanese businesspersons' influence on politics and reach its goal of "reunification". However, scholars such as Schuber and Keng do not believe that this is going to happen. The recent protests against Ma's policy on "accepting simplified Chinese characters (Han Zi)", and the trade deal with mainland China led by the young in Taiwan show that it is going to be difficult to achieve the goal of "reunification" even with the businessmen supporting a closer relations between China and Taiwan (Lin, 2014). Both the government statements and previous studies identify Taiwan's alliance with the United States. Together with the military race and negative feedback of the youth against the policies that promotes close relations with China, Taiwan is having a "balancing" strategy.

The table below presents the outcomes of hypotheses test (See table.4.5.)

Table. 4.5 Hypotheses test-Taiwan (Balance)

	continental	insular	big	Mid &Small	disputed	Non- disputed	Dev- well	Dev- slow
Similar culture		Neither		Neither	Disputed		Dev- well	
Different culture								
Marxist- Leninist								
Non-com		Non- com		Non-com	Both		Both	

Taiwan's balancing strategy towards China supports the hypotheses that disputed countries with China and the countries that develop well under American dominant system balance a rising China. Similar or in this case, same culture does not make Taiwan bandwagon a rising China. The political ideology and system may have some influence on its strategic decision towards China.

#### 4.4.6 ASEAN 10

ASEAN is the abbreviation of Association of South East Asian Nations. Currently there are ten members, Vietnam, Thailand, Laos, Brunei, Cambodia, the Philippines, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Myanmar. Ten member countries are all located in the South East Asian region, to the Southeast of China (ASEAN, Overview of ASEAN, 2014). Since ten countries are all middle and small powers in this region, and they make strategies towards a rising China often times as a group and acting through ASEAN, this section includes analysis of ten countries as a whole. The first five paragraphs describes ASEAN's strategies and policies towards China through the official statements on the ASEAN official website and previous

research. The part following the first several paragraphs focus on the recent South China Sea disputes between China and Vietnam, Malaysia, and the Philippines. The third part talks briefly about the Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, Singapore, and Indonesia and their relations with China. The last paragraph pulls out Myanmar specifically, because it has just been through a transformation with the U.S influence.

Overall, throughout the past 20 years after normalizing the diplomatic relations with China, ASEAN member countries' China strategies changed over time. ASEAN is not a strictly binding organization like the European Union. Member countries do not give up their sovereignty to the organization. However, as middle and small powers they deal with big powers such as China and the United States through this institution as a whole. This kind of strategies such as middle and small powers including big powers in an international institution for their security or national interests, are defined as "institutional balancing" (He, 2008). Therefore, tracking back the ASEAN strategies to China from the year the diplomatic relations was normalized until now can explain this group of countries' strategies as a whole.

An original purpose of forming ASEAN was to prevent the original five members from the influence of China's support to communist parties in Southeast Asia (ASEAN, SECURING A WIN-WIN PARTNERSHIP FOR ASEAN AND CHINA, 2014). Since when China joined the ASEAN Regional Forum, the relations and partnership between China and ASEAN member countries are strengthened in many areas such economics, politics, security, and culture. ASEAN understands China's Asia policy of getting involved in regional cooperation as a friendly intention, to prevent use of force during military modernization, strengthen market power, and expand international political influence. Meanwhile ASEAN believes that China wants to avoid conflicts with the U.S and Japan (ASEAN, Securing a win-win partnership for ASEAN and

China, 2014). In the security and political matters, ASEAN and China had agreements on non-traditional security issues, and created a regional code of conduct for the South China Sea. Last year, ASEAN and China signed the Joint Declaration on the Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity in Bali, which was a milestone of the ASEAN China relations (ASEAN, Securing a win-win partnership for ASEAN and China, 2014). The so-called “win-win partnership” does not refer to a military alliance or a defense alliance, according to the secretary general of ASEAN. Both sides do not want to define the partnership as exclusive or against any other country. ASEAN sees the partnership as part of the whole connection of this region with China. ASEAN countries and China share common borders, history and cultures. As developing countries, both parties have similar challenges and opportunities (ASEAN, Securing a win-win partnership for ASEAN and China, 2014). Since China is an important power in this region, to have partnership with this rising power ensures the peace and stability of this region. Moreover, ASEAN countries are having rapid economic development. In order to enhance the development, they need the opportunity China offers. Overall, the statements on the official website present that since the normalization of relations between ASEAN and China, ASEAN did well in getting China involved in an institutional way for their security and economic interests. The previous research presents a clearer picture of ASEAN’s attitude towards a rising China in the region.

During the Cold-War period, Southeast Asia was a region where big powers had their power play. ASEAN states had suspicious attitude and mistrust against China, while were mobilized by the United States (Tow, 2004). The post-cold war era was the starting point when ASEAN states can finally play in their own way in the region with the advantage that a stable but competitive Sino-U.S relation provides. The power balance between the U.S and a rising China urges the ASEAN middle and small powers to choose one side to align with (Tow, 2004). The

competition of a regional influence between China and the United States allows ASEAN states to play in between for their survivals and interests. Although Robert Ross argues that the case of ASEAN strategies to China and the U.S subjects little in theoretical analysis, one school recognizes ASEAN's strategy as "hedging" between the U.S and China instead of choosing either side to align with. Avert Goldstein and Amitav Acharya describe the ASEAN strategy differently. Goldstein believes that Southeast Asian states are maintaining closer external ties with one power engaging the opposing power (Archaya & Goldstain, 2003). Acharya argues that ASEAN is pursuing policies of "counter-dominance". Instead of choosing a big power to ally with and balance another one, ASEAN states are "counter-dominating" both big powers as an independent power (Archaya & Goldstain, 2003). Tow analyzes three events, the U.S-Singaporean Memorandum of Understanding in 1990, the 1999 U.S Philippines Visiting Forces Agreement and the 1999 Sino-Thai Plan of Action for the 21<sup>st</sup> century to counter argue Ross's argument that ASEAN strategy does not subject to theoretical analysis (Tow, 2004). In 1990, Singapore welcomed the U.S vessel to stay in Changi port, to contain a rising China and confirm the dominance of the U.S in this region (Tow, 2004). In 1999, Manila reached an agreement of visiting forces with Washington. This event presented the closeness of the Philippines to the United States than the other ASEAN members (Tow, 2004). The Sino-Thai 21<sup>st</sup> century Plan of Action is regarded as the change of strategies of Thailand priorities to China from the United States after the financial crisis, although Thailand is a U.S ally. It is a symbol of Thailand's "entry into a Chinese sphere of influence" (Tow, 2004). Moreover, partially because of China's assistance in the 1998 Asian financial crisis and the annual cultural exchange events between 2 countries, Thailand falls in the "bandwagon" group (The Washington Times, 2011).



Tow's research supports the argument that ASEAN states' strategies subject theoretical analysis. At the same time, it also suggests that ASEAN countries' China strategies vary among themselves. The Philippines and Singapore appear to be balancing a rising China, while Thailand bandwagons China. The next part of this section looks at the South China Sea Disputes, which is the biggest disputes between China and some ASEAN states.

### South China Sea Disputes and the countries involved

South China Sea disputes happen between China and ASEAN member states, Brunei, Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam, and Philippines (Scott, 2012). The countries involved claim over the sovereignty of islands, their related territorial waters, and exclusive economic zones (EEZs), including the disputes over names (Scott, 2012). China calls the maritime area the "Southern Sea", Vietnam calls it the "Eastern Sea", and the Philippines calls it the "West Philippines Sea". Apart from the major actors, China, Vietnam, and the Philippines, there are also external actors involved. The primary external actor is the U.S, and the secondary ones are India, Japan, and Australia. This issue requires a negotiation of norms of behavior for resolution. In order to achieve the negotiation of norms of behavior, a balance of power is needed. The United States plays a key role in this balance of power (Buzynski, 2003). The U.S leaders stated that to help with the South China Sea issue is one of the priorities of the U.S as a returning power to this region.

Vietnamese officials rarely speak openly about "China threat", and Vietnam has been keeping a "proper distance" in the relation with China. At the beginning of the Post-Cold War Era, Vietnam chose to join ASEAN, and "became friends with all the countries" instead of

building ideologist or military relations with China (CNN, 2011). Not long after that, the South China Sea disputes provoked a stormy debate in Vietnam's National Assembly (Thayer, 2002). Some in the assembly believed that Vietnam should have friendly economic relations with China and some did not, because Vietnam could not reach consensus on China's intentions (Thayer, 2002). Though Vietnam adopted a low mannered attitude after the debate, based on thousands of years' relations with China, Vietnam today does not have a relatively stronger perception of the "China threat". However Vietnam seems to be trying to balance Chinese influence by developing relations with ASEAN members, the U.S., Japan and Western Europe (Thayer, 2002). In contrast to Beijing, Hanoi has welcomed this foreign intervention (Jiang, CNN, 2011). Just a week ago, China positioned its oilrig in the disputed area in South China Sea. China believes it has all the rights to drill and Vietnamese government failed to protect Chinese nationals there. However, Vietnam states that China's action is illegal. In this matter, Vietnam does not show any intention to back down (Mullen, 2014). Perceptual-wise, Vietnam has not always been positive about Beijing, even though both of them are communist ruled countries. Vietnam has concerns on China's intentions in this region as its power rise. It is trying to find a balance between economic cooperation and maintain a credible military deterrence because of the disputes over the Spratlys islands (Morada, 2004). Vietnam had a big shift of policies towards China although they have been "brothers" in the communist club. The competition in getting FDIs and exports, territorial disputes and the policies moving towards the U.S drives Vietnam far from the "Bandwagon" group to the "Balance" group (Jiang, CNN, 2011).

The Philippines is one of the U.S's major non-NATO allies. The South China Sea issue brought the U.S, the defense-treaty ally, to offer assistance to the Philippine navy in 2011 (The Guardian, 2012). In mid-April in 2012, a weeklong Philippine-U.S joint military exercise took

place on the Palawan Island of the Philippines. It was believed to be the annual chance for the Philippine troops to learn from American expertise and an opportunity for the U.S to cement this close and longest-standing regional ally. Kate McGowan, the reporter from the BBC noted that, this war-game was giving the opposite effects to Chinese officials. Though China is much closer to the Philippines geographically, The Philippines is giving China the cold shoulder. Moreover, it is during the time when relations between China and the Philippines are at highly strung due to territory disputes (BBC, 2012). In the Philippines, perceptions about China are shaped by historical geographical and domestic factors. Manila has its suspicion on Beijing based on ideological and political differences. The concerns are also from the U.S withdrawal of their military bases in 1992, and China's assertive behavior to Taiwan in the South China Sea (Morada, 2004).

Compared with Vietnam and the Philippines, Malaysia manages its relations with China a bit better. The Malaysian leader has a positive perception about China, but the potential war in Taiwan Strait does worry Malaysia (Morada, 2004). The fact that although the Mischief Reef incident in the early 1995 where China occupied a reef within the Philippines' claimed area of the South China Sea brought some suspicion, Malaysia still publicly rejected the notion that China is posing a threat to the neighbors (Baviera A. S., 2011). In this sense, Malaysia bandwagons a rising China.

The other countries: Brunei, Laos, Indonesia, and Myanmar

The countries left in the ASEAN, which were not analyzed, are Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, Indonesia, and Myanmar. This small section discusses about these countries' attitude to a rising China.

The United States intends to strengthen the tie with Laos for its Southeast Asian strategies to counter “rising China”, because it has noticed how China had won a charm offensive in Lao, which may be making it more difficult for the U.S to reach its goal (VOA, 2010). Senior Thai officials are also emphasizing the importance of Laos-China relations to the new term Laos leadership (People's Daily, 2011). Besides, the Lao minister of National Defense, Douangchay Phichith, has vowed to further enhance military relations with China at the end of 2011 in a meeting with the Chief of General Staff of the Chinese People's Liberation Army Cai Yingting (Xinhua, 2011). There was very little research done on the relations between Brunei and China. However, Brunei is the only country, which did not establish military garrisons in Spratlys Islands (Joyner, 1997). In the case of Cambodia, Beijing ended up supporting its former ally, the Khmer Rouge, and put effort in normalizing relations with the Phnom Penh leadership. Although Cambodia went through complex domestic politics since 1991, China managed to maintain strong ties with Cambodia (Sutter, China-Southeast Asia Relations, 2005).

Indonesia had big shifts in its policies towards China. Before 1998, the Indonesia-China relations were associated with a rivalry rooted in Indonesian foreign policy elite's sense of standing and entitlement within Southeast Asia. This entitlement was based on an extensive geographic scale, a strategic location, a large population as well as on a national revolutionary tradition (Leifer, 1999). The vulnerability, shared with other neighboring countries is another source of concerns over the hegemonic potential and intent of a rising China (Leifer, 1999; Tjhin, 2011). Although the relations between Indonesia and China improved after Suharto stepped off the presidential

position, there is still limit in the Indonesian effort to make progress in having close relations with China, due to the domestic elites' opposition (Leifer, 1999; Tjhin, 2011).

Before the year 2011, China was the closest friend to Myanmar. China offers political and military support to Myanmar as a counter action to the U.S isolation of Myanmar (Bert, 2004). 2011, to Myanmar was a special year. Transforming from a very isolated country to a democracy on the way, its relation with China has switched 180 degrees. During the past 6 years, China and Myanmar's friendly relations were only growing deeper (Kuppu, 2011). The rejection from the government of Myanmar to China for its dam built program was a signal of more openness towards the West, or the United States (NY Times, 2012). This is the U.S's political success, to transform a dictatorship to democracy right on China's boarder, opening or has opened to the future is definitely going to be significant to this region. This event also removes China from the special friend list of Myanmar, which means Myanmar has the U.S as another choice for its economic reform and a better position in ASEAN (Haacke, 2012).

ASEAN ten countries act in the international state with their institution ASEAN, trying to institutional balance big powers and maintain the regional stability and their interests. However, the policies and attitude towards a rising China are different depending on their individual characteristics. Dividing countries into three groups by their China strategies, there are "balancing" group, "bandwagoning" group, and "ambiguous" group. However, each country in ASEAN has own characteristics, the hypotheses testing happens with each single country's strategy.

#### Individual ASEAN case studies

Although ASEAN countries sometimes try to speak through the institution, the soft binding fashion of this institution is still not binding country's behavior or attitude, especially the foreign policy. The sections below are studies of individual country's China policies and strategies.

## Brunei

The previous studies on Brunei's strategy towards a rising China is limited. After putting in the key words "Brunei, China, relations, and policy". There are only two previous studies. After building the diplomatic relations with China, Brunei has seen China as a "crucial partner to engage to both diversify and strengthen its fossil-fuel-based economy and preserve peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region" (Parameswaran, 2012). During the most recent 10 years, two countries relations deepened. The recent visit of President Hu Jintao and another top official Yang Jiechi to Brunei for the first time over a long time strengthened the close relations between two countries (Parameswaran, 2012). Not only commercial interaction but also people-to-people relations are promoting a close relation between Brunei-China relations (Parameswaran, 2012). Although there are problems for Brunei, such as having only one close partner China, may lead to some disadvantages in ASEAN as a new chair, Brunei is still pursuing a "bandwagoning" strategy towards China (Storey, Testing Brunei's resolve over China , 2012).

Table 4.6 Hypotheses test-Brunei (Bandwagon)

	continental	insular	big	Mid &Small	disputed	Non- disputed	Dev- well	Dev- slow
Similar culture	Similar culture			both	Similar culture			Both
Different culture								
Marxist- Leninist								
Non-com	neither			Mid &small	neither			Dev- slow

Brunei only supports the hypotheses that “Similar cultures do not balance a rising China.”

“Middle and small powers do not balance a rising China.” and “Countries that develop relatively slower in the American dominant system bandwagon a rising China”. The rest are rejected.

### Vietnam

Although the previous section specifically talks about Vietnam’s reaction to the South China Sea issue, the main factor Vietnam concerns with a rising China is the border issue since 1990s (TranI, VieiraII, & Ferreira-PereiraIII, 2013). After the cold war, Vietnam’s vital interests lie in safeguarding the South China Sea area, so that China’s military building-ups worries Vietnam (TranI, VieiraII, & Ferreira-PereiraIII, 2013). Despite the geopolitical issue, the dynamic relations between Vietnam and China is also from historical memories (Guan, 1998). Vietnam was under China’s direct rule for almost 10 centuries from from 3BC to 1000AD (Guan, 1998). However, they still remained very strong nationalist (Guan, 1998). The 10 centuries’ history would always remind Vietnam that it has a strong neighbor vis-à-vis its

weakness (Guan, 1998). Since Vietnam splited from China, “balancing” has become a tradition to Vietnamese policy makers to do to China (Vuving, 2006). Internal balancing has always been in the grand strategy of Vietnam to China, meanwhile external balancing was always absent (Vuving,2006). Not until 1991, when Vietnam stopped the military alliance with former Soviet Union against China during the Cold War Era and built diplomatic relations with China (Vuving, 2006). Balancing is all too familiar to Vietnamese policy makers throughout time (Vuving, 2006). However, there were strategy changes in the 1990s. Vietnam had solidarity strategy towards China and it stood close to China against the West, together with other Marxist-leninst states, Laos, Cuba, and North Korea (Vuving, 2006). In the late 1990s to early 2000s, there was a decline in the Vietnam-China relations after the failure of building a strategic partnership. The Asian financial crisis worsened the situation (Vuving, 2006). From the year 2003 to now, again Vietnam pursued balancing strategy towards China out of three reasons: (1) The solidarity approach has lost its advantage vis-à-vis the other policy options. Solidarity policy is waning although policy makers in Vietnam realize that China and Vietnam share the same political ideology; (2) The change of position has improved national interests, compared to the foreign priority policy in the past; (3) The balancing position towards China cleaned the way to a closer relation with the United States (Vuving, 2006). Very obviously, Vietnam is pursuing a balancing strategy towards a rising China.

Table 4.7 Hypotheses test-Vietnam (Balance)

	continental	insular	big	Mid &Small	disputed	Non- disputed	Dev- well	Dev- slow
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Similar culture	Continental		Neither	disputed		neither
Different culture						
Marxist-leninst	continental		neither	disputed		neither
Non-com						

The hypotheses test outcomes of Vietnam is very special and interesting. It only supports the hypotheses that “continental powers balance a rising China” and “disputed countries with China balance a rising China”. Although both countries share similar culture and political ideology, border wars and disputes in South China Sea erase off all the similarities and became the main factor that drive Vietnam to the “balance” side towards China.

## Laos

Similar to Brunei’s case, there is not a lot of previous studies on Laos-China relations. However, both case studies agree that Laos has a very close and friendly relation with China. Two countries have very long diplomatic relations from 1961 to 2014 (N/A, Souvenirs mark 50 years of Laos-China relations, 2012). The presence of China in Laos is increasing recent years (Fujimura, 2009). Although one of the studies is about Laos media including China’s presence in Laos from the year 2007 to 2009, it shows a close relation between two countries. Therefore, Laos is in the “bandwagoning” group. Putting Laos’s features into the testing table, it looks like this in below.

Table. 4.8 Hypotheses test-Laos (Bandwagon)

	continental	insular	big	Mid &Small	disputed	Non- disputed	Dev- well	Dev- slow
Similar culture	Similar culture			Both		Both		Both
Different culture								
Marxist-Leninist	Communist			Both		Both		Both
Non-com								

The case of Laos supported all the hypotheses, despite the one derived from realist theory that “Continental powers balance a rising power in the region”.

## Thailand

Thai-China relations was close since 1978 and it grew through arm deals between two countries in the late 1980s to early 1990s (Chinwanno, 2009). Thai Navy purchased frigates from Chinese government for twice in the early 1990s with low “friendship” price (Chinwanno, 2009). The purchase was under a strategic cooperation created by Chinese and Thai governments (Chinwanno, 2009). The growing economic relations between China and Thailand, especially the aid China provided after the Asian financial crisis promoted a better political relation between China and Thailand (Chinwanno, 2009). The majority of Thai leaders perceive China’s rise as an economic opportunity for Thailand. They believe that encouraging China’s economic growth does not only provide opportunities to the neighboring countries but also makes China stay stable and integrate itself more in this region (Chinwanno, 2009). Instead of seeing a rising China as a threat, Thai leaders view China as a status-quo power. Therefore, Thailand does not pursue any

balancing policy towards China (Chinwanno, 2009). Instead, it pursues an “engaging” policy to China (Chinwanno, 2009). “Engagement” is a term derived from Liberalism, looking like a behavior in between of “balancing” and “bandwagoning”, more towards a “bandwagoning” action (Vuving, 2006). The fact that Thailand is also a military ally of the United States may lead to a conclusion that Thailand would balance a rising China. However, it is not true. Thailand is believed to be the only U.S ally in the region, which enjoys a close solidified relation with China (Pongsudhirak, 2013). Although there are debates in Thailand on geopolitical issues with China such as the absence of claims in South China Sea, balancing the relations with the U.S meanwhile with China, China’s long term ambition in the Asia Pacific region, currently Thailand still enjoys a rising China in the neighborhood (MATHEWS, 2003).

Table 4.9 Hypotheses test-Thailand (Bandwagon)

	continental	insular	big	Mid &Small	disputed	Non- disputed	Dev- well	Dev- slow
Similar culture	Similar culture			Both		Both		Both
Different culture								
Communist								
Non-com	Neither			Mid & small		Non- disputed		Dev- slow

Thailand’s bandwagoning strategy rejected the hypotheses of “Continental powers balance a rising China”, and “Different political ideology and system powers balance a rising China”.

Cambodia

Some scholars call the Cambodia-China relations a positive-sum game, because Cambodia and China have close relations in many aspects (Pheakdey, 2012). Politically, Cambodia is China's closest long-term ally; Economically, China is Cambodia's biggest foreign invest and donor; Culturally, Chinese culture is deeply embedded in Cambodia (Pheakdey, 2012). Some scholars believe that the Cambodia-China relation is at the peak right now (Sambath, N/A). Cambodia is solely relying on China politically, economically, and military wise (Sambath, N/A). For instance, in 1997 August, China granted Cambodia 6 million dollars to build wells (Sambath, N/A). Right after that, the interior minister Sar Kheng visited Beijing and discussed cooperation on "some security issues". Very soon, the Taiwanese representative office in Phnom Penh was shut down (Sambath, N/A). Similar to this pattern, most Chinese aid to Cambodia are technical support, low interest-loans, and grants. In return, Cambodia supports China politically, such as "one China policy" (Sambath, N/A). Apart from the economic aspect, China supports Cambodia on military matters as well. Since the late 1990s, China also provided the kingdom military and police training, and demining support (Sambath, N/A). A series of high-level visits from Cambodia leaders to China in 1999 promoted the relations between Cambodia and China (Sambath, N/A). The Co-Defensive minister of Cambodia spent five days visiting Beijing at the invitation of Chinese defense minister Chi Haotian (Sambath, N/A). More recently, China conducted another military training with Cambodia which strengthened the relationship of two countries (Sambath, N/A). The relations between Cambodia and China boosted after Chinese President Jiang Zemin visited Cambodia in 1997, as the first Chinese head visiting Cambodia (Ian Storey, 2006). After that, visits between Hu Sen and Chinese heads became more frequent. From every visit, two countries reach some bilateral agreements and China promises some amount of aids to Cambodia (Ian Storey, 2006). In the article of "Why

China Charms Cambodia”, Heidi Dahles points out that Cambodia’s infatuation with China even makes Cambodia refuse to talk about South China Sea Issue as an ASEAN chair (Dahles, 2013).

Cambodia apparently is pursuing a bandwagoning strategy towards a rising China.

Table 4.10 Hypotheses test-Cambodia (Bandwagon)

	continental	insular	big	Mid &Small	disputed	Non- disputed	Dev- well	Dev- slow
Similar culture	Similar-culture			Both		Both		Both
Different culture								
Marxist-Leninist								
Non-com	Neither			Mid&small		Non-disputed		Dev-slow

The bandwagoning strategy of Cambodia rejects “Continental powers balance a rising China” and “Different political ideology and system countries balance a rising China”. The other hypotheses are supported.

## Myanmar

China was not able to be influential to Myanmar until late 1980s (Trevor Wilson, 2014). Although China sufficiently advocated Myanmar to reform and have policy changes, it did not successfully make Myanmar make economic reform (Trevor Wilson, 2014). After the late 1990s until 2005, China was concerned of Myanmar possibly becoming a transnational criminal breach source (Trevor Wilson, 2014). China was also disappointed about Myanmar’s poor human rights records and reputation at the United Nations regarding this issue. It was disappointed because the

loan China gave to Myanmar was remained unpaid, meanwhile Myanmar did not have any sufficient improvement from the past (Trevor Wilson, 2014). China remained significant presence in Myanmar as a foreign investor, donor, and trader. However it was still far from meeting China's expectations on Myanmar's political, economic reform (Trevor Wilson, 2014). Differently, there are also scholars focusing on the strategic relations between China and Myanmar. What is Myanmar to China? a de facto ally, a client state or a satellite to China, because the recent focus of China-Myanmar relations have been on strategic implications to the Indian Ocean and the region as a whole (Arnott, N/A). Although China did not successfully persuade Myanmar to reform at beginning, it is believed to have influence in its reform in 2011 (Trevor Wilson, 2014). Compared with the U.S, China's media censorship brought doubt on its intention in Myanmar from other countries (Trevor Wilson, 2014). However, Myanmar's attitude and strategy remain unclear after the reform took place.

Table. 4.11 Hypotheses test-Myanmar (not sure)

	continental	insular	big	Mid &Small	disputed	Non- disputed	Dev- well	Dev- slow
Similar culture								
Different culture								
Marxist- Leninist								
Non-com								

Myanmar has just experienced transformation in political system and the foreign policies were adjusted along with the transformation. The strategy towards China is not very clear. Therefore, Myanmar does not test the hypotheses.

## Singapore

Staying in between of a rising China and the U.S with close relations, Singapore has clear goals of what to achieve in between these two countries. Singapore's key interests are to survive and prosper a nation among all its strategic interests (Dexian, N/A). Lee Kuan Yaw once said that Singapore could only progress under international order, regional peace and stability. It certainly does not want war in the region, because it is going to be difficult to attract trades (Dexian, N/A). To deal with the relations with China and the United States, Singapore tries to keep the U.S presence in the region by having the U.S in Changi Naval Base and offered logistics support (Dexian, N/A). This kind of action is defined as "external balancing" in this research. See Seng Tan defined Singapore's strategy straightly in his study of a Singaporean strategy to a rising China. Since Singapore is a middle-small power in the Asia Pacific region, it has to treat big powers that influence the region very carefully for its own security and interests in the region (Tan, 2014). See Seng Tan describes Singapore's policy to China as "hot in economics and cold in politics" (Tan, 2014). Singapore keeps a close trade relation with China, meanwhile "balancing" China politically (Tan, 2014). Overall Singapore perceives the rise of China a potential threat rather than an actual one (Storey, 2002). In the post-cold war era, because of the South China Sea disputes and China's military modernization program, Singapore has deep security concerns towards China (Storey, 2002). Thus, Singapore welcomes the military presence of the U.S and plays an important role in facilitating the presence (Storey, 2002).

Table 4.12 Hypotheses test-Singapore (Balance)

	continental	insular	big	Mid &Small	disputed	Non- disputed	Dev- well	Dev- slow
Similar culture	Continental			Neither		Neither	Dev- well	
Different culture								
Marxist- Leninist								
Non-com	both			Non-com		Non- com	both	

Singapore's balancing strategy does not support that "Similar culture countries bandwagon a rising China" and "Non-disputed countries balance a rising China". The rest are supported.

## Malaysia

Malaysia is also one of the disputant in the South China Sea issue with China. However, Malaysia does not act as vocal as Vietnam and the Philippines. It still tries to remain a good relation with China. When two countries were celebrating their 40 years diplomatic relations this June, it looks like two countries are going to continue their close relations through trade, investment and mutual benefit (Star, 2014). When the Malaysia prime minister visited China in May this year (2014), most of the discussion was on trade and investment (Star, 2014). However, President Xi Jinping's last visit to Malaysia brought a progress in the relationship, which is to create a comprehensive strategic partnership between two countries (Star, 2014). One point that the communique Rajib and Chinese Premier signed during Rajib's visit to China in May brought was the people factor: "promote mutual understanding between their peoples and consolidate the China-Malaysia traditional friendship through exchanges between the academic, cultural, media



and sports communities” (Star, 2014). Apart from trade relations, Malaysia is also promoting close interaction with China in different aspects. Generally, the relations between Malaysia and China in post-cold war era is close, as the former Malaysian Foreign Minister Abdullah Badawi commented: “Close relations and cooperation between Malaysia and China would alleviate any attempt by China to resort to military action because that would also be detrimental to China...If there is no cooperation, there is a possibility China may resort to military action (against Malaysia) or cause a conflict here because it will not lose anything. We want to create a choice (for China)” (Liow, N/A). Malaysia has tried to maintain a close relation to the extend which is the closest with China among ASEAN countries (Liow, N/A). Another scholar Baginda agrees that although South China Sea disputes have been contributing to the negative perception towards rising China, Malaysia is wishing to solve the problem soon instead of being aggressive in this matter. Even though from 1990s, Malaysia did not perceive China as a direct threat, China has not only strengthened its presence and power projection capabilities in the South China Sea, but also demonstrated its firmness over the issue sovereignty (Baginda, 2002). This makes the Malaysian government concern about China’s intentions (Baginda, 2002). The section “Dr. Mahathir and Malaysia’s Perception of China” talks about Malaysia’s official perception being influenced by the views of Prime Minister Mahathir, who believes China is not a threat but a potential economic power (Baginda, 2002). The perceptions of a China threat in Malaysia seem to be fading away and there’s a wish for China to solve internal problems to change the nature of threat perceptions in the region (Baginda, 2002). Studies above all reaches to the agreement that Malaysia is having a close relation with rising China. Therefore Malaysia is in the bandwagoning group in the hypotheses test.

Table. 4.13 Hypotheses test-Malaysia (Bandwagon)

	continental	insular	big	Mid &Small	disputed	Non- disputed	Dev- well	Dev- slow
Similar culture		Both		Both	Similar culture			Both
Different culture								
Marxist- Leninist								
Non-com		Insular		Mid- small	Neither			Dev- slow

Malaysia is an interesting case. It is different from the other countries that are in the South China Sea disputes with China. The bandwagoning strategy does not support the hypothesis that “Countries with disputes with China balance a rising China”. As a non-communist ruled, democratic country, Malaysia is bandwagoning China. This fact rejects the hypothesis that “different political ideology and political system make one country balance a rising power”. The rest of the hypotheses are supported.

## Indonesia

Indonesia and China established diplomatic relations in 1990 (Sukma, Recent development in Sino-Indonesian Relations: an Indonesian view, 1994). It was not long until now but two countries faced some difficulties in the early 1990s. Two major ones include Taiwanese leader Lee Tenghui’s visit to Indonesia causing a protest against this in China, and Indonesia’s strong reaction to China’s “concern” over the labor strife which led to the anti-Chinese riot in Medan in 1994 (Sukma, 1994). From 1998, Indonesia-China relations commenced to develop

towards a positive direction, due to the domestic politics change in Indonesia and China's Southeast Asia policies (Sukma, Indonesia-China Relations: the politics of re-engagement , 2009). Currently, although Indonesia and China have no "hot" disputes, China's aggression in South China Sea is on Indonesia's concern heavily (Org, 2014). The seizure of some Chinese illegal anglers warned the high possibility of territorial disputes (Org, 2014). Prejudice against ethnic Chinese in Indonesia and Indonesian concerns of Muslim in China Xin jiang do not bring any positive influence to the relations of two countries (Org, 2014). " An April 2009 Office of Opinion Research poll showed 35 percent of urban respondents viewed the United States as Indonesia's closest security partner in five to ten years, compared to only three percent who said so for China. While 54 percent said they expected the United States to be the biggest military power in East Asia in that time frame, only four percent viewed China as such" (Org, 2014). China tried to establish strategic partnership with Indonesia but bilaterally, Indonesia prefers to cooperate more with the United States, especially militarily (Org, 2014). What is more about Indonesian perceptions of China is that the special feature of Indonesia's relation with China there is a significant Ethnic Chinese Minority group in Indonesia. Since Indonesian Chinese are economically successful but politically discriminated, the public perceive China and Chinese people negatively. Even after the riots against China in May. 1998, 'anti-Chinese sentiments' still remained strong. Both the public and some elites still doubt the loyalty of Indonesian Chinese to Indonesia. This highly influences Indonesia-Chinese relations (Sukma, 2002). Negative image of China in Indonesia, ethnic group issues, Indonesia's choice of standing close to the United States brings Indonesia to the "Balancing" group and the hypotheses test is as follows.

Table 4.14 Hypotheses test-Indonesia (Balance)

	continental	insular	big	Mid &Small	disputed	Non- disputed	Dev- well	Dev- slow
Similar culture		Neither		Neither	Disputed			Neither
Different culture								
Marxist- Leninist								
Non-com		Non- com		Non- com	Both			Non- com

Indonesia is an interesting case as well, similar to Vietnam. The balancing strategy to China does not support most of the hypotheses derived from realist theories but “disputed countries with China tend to balance a rising China”. Neither does the strategy support the hypothesis that “countries with similar culture bandwagon a rising power”.

## The Philippines

The Philippines is one of the most vocal country in the South China Sea Issue. As discussed earlier in the South China Sea issue section, the Philippines invited the presence of the United States to balance China’s aggression in South China Sea. Although China and the Philippines relations have been improving over the last decade due to trade and economic cooperation, the overall relation is not great (Baker, 2004). From 1992, when China started military modernization, the ASEAN foreign minister declared to exercise restraint and call for cooperative ventures to prevent conflict (Baviera A.S., 2002). Followed by a series of disputes and issues on South China Sea, the Philippine government even started perceiving China as a “bully” in the region (Baviera A.S., 2002). The factors that contribute to Philippine perceptions

of China: history and geography; ideological and political differences; perceptions of both internal and external vulnerability; the general strategic uncertainty in the post-cold war era; and even ideational influences emanating mainly from the western media (Baviera A.S., 2002). The perceptions and concerns over PRC is imminent or potential threat to the security of the country (Baviera A. S., 2002). Carl Baker calls it a “cautious cooperation”, as the Philippines cooperates economically with China but militarily stays close with the United States (Baker, 2004). China’s presence definitely worries Philippines, since they are in conflicts with each other on the South China Sea issue (Baker, 2004). In terms of the exact strategy the Philippines has been having towards a rising China after 1990s, Zhao Hong calls it “Hedging”, which refers to on the one hand the Philippines strengthens military ties with the United States and Japan because China’s long-term purpose brings the Philippines anxiety (Zhao, 2013). This Hedging strategy is defined as “external balancing” in this research, therefore the Philippines belongs to the balancing group against China.

Table 4.15 Hypotheses test-The Philippines (Balance)

	continental	insular	big	Mid & Small	disputed	Non-disputed	Dev-well	Dev-slow
Similar culture		Neither		Neither	Disputed			Neither
Different culture								
Marxist-Leninist								
Non-com		Non-com		Non-com	Both			Non-com

The case of the Philippines is exactly same as that of Indonesia. It rejects most of the hypotheses from realist theories, apart from “countries with disputes with China balance a rising China”. The

balancing strategy also supports that “countries with different political ideology and system balance a rising China”. This could be out of the influence from the United States, but also could be the initial fear from a non-democratic neighbor in the region.

#### 4.4.7 Australia

Australia is far neighbor of China in this region. It has a formal alliance with the United States known as the ANZUS. The alliance has been in place for more than 60 years (Department of foreign affairs and trade, Australian government official site, 2012). The president of the United States Barack Obama visited Australia at the end of 2011 for its first step in the “return to the region of the Asia-Pacific”. Several influential news presses, the BBC, the Washington Post, and The Guardian all together pointed out the obvious purpose of countering rising China’s influence.

Australian government official website has a detailed section called “Asian Century Country Strategies”. The introductory paragraphs titled “Growing Asia”, “Road mad to the future”, and “In Partnership” presents clear purposes of this section. This section does not include all the countries in Asia as the title suggests but only China, Japan, India, Indonesia, and South Korea, because these countries have the closest economic links with Australia and the most significant political influence in this region and the globe (Government, Australia, 2013). It states that each strategy outlines a vision of what the relations between Australia and the country would be like in 2025 and how Australia is trying to achieve that. The strategies identify

opportunities for the government to participate, in order to deepen and strengthen the regional engagement (Government, Australia, 2013).

The strategy towards China shows the importance of China to Australia, ties between two countries in various areas, what policies Australia is having, and what Australia wants to do towards the year 2025 (Government, Australia, 2013). Chinese is the largest foreign students group in Australia, second-largest skilled immigrants' source, and largest trading partner. What is more, China itself has significant amount of world GDP share. In 2013, Australia and China agreed on new bilateral architecture with regular high-level contact to provide strategic direction to the relationship and deal with differences as they arise. The government official statements do not show the willingness of taking a "balancing" side towards China. However, the cooperation of Australia and the U.S in the U.S "Rebalancing China" in this region does make Australia in the "balancing" category. The previous studies show the complex feelings Australia has towards China economic and cultural wise, but a clear position Australia takes security-wise.

Since Australia is a small continental state or a big island state, geopolitically it is considered offshore balancing when it takes balancing action towards China (WSJ, 2013). However, the theme of Australia's role and its relations with China in security is about sea security. In this sense, Australia is an important supporter for the U.S. balancing action against China. In the year 2012, both president Obama and Secretary Hillary Clinton stated that they are going to "rebalance in Asia". The very first move the U.S took was to deploy rotated naval appearance in Australia (WSJ, 2013). During the recent years, both Southeast Asian neighbors and Australia itself feel the responsibility Australia has in the South China Sea security (WSJ, 2013). Towards the territorial disputes between China and other Southeast Asian countries, though Australia states its position by "not standing on either side", the rotated naval presence of the United States is a

significant sign of Australia's potential position once it gets involved more in this issue. Australian foreign minister Carr makes his points in a news report by Wall Street Journal,

1. Australia does not taking side in this territorial disputes, a resolution under international law is good.

2. He suggests to establish a joint development zone, for instance to demilitarize this sea.

3. China is Australia' biggest trading partner (in the business sector, "we should respect China and its position")

-The U.S troops in Darwin from 2012 is criticized by Australia leading businessmen

-Australia is considering itself as the potential mediator in this dispute (ANI, 2012).

In the case of East China Sea dispute, Australia is not a total outsider either. Australia established bilateral security agreement with Japan around 15 years ago, which successfully expanded the parallel bilateral security alliance with the U.S into a trilateral relation. Recently, Japan is asking the U.S to have a deeper commitment in this issue. However, the United States is taking a position close to be neutral. In this case, "what Australia should do with one side security agreement with Japan and the other side a significant concern over its traditional alliance relations with the U.S." becomes an interesting and difficult question to answer. Currently Australia's official statement on its position in the East China Sea problem is neutral according to the Australian Ambassador to Tokyo. As mentioned in the Wall Street Journal report, Australian leading businessmen are asking for a better relation between Australia and China. Economics is an important factor in the Australia-China relation.

Australia belongs to the West by its history and culture. However, because of its geographic location, it has been and it is moving closer towards Asia. The great number of Asian immigrants from China and India are slowly turning Australia Asian is an argument many scholars have. Even



Australian government is aware that it is important for Australia to get closer with China culturally. According to Australia's first ambassador to Beijing,

“Historically, Australians have always felt that our Asian neighborhood was something we could choose ... [the] view in many influential quarters in Asia [is] that the Australian commitment to Asia is hedged and conditional (FitzGerald, 1997). We are often judged by feelings in Asia. And here we have to remember our past ... We may say that this history does not matter. But we have to really demonstrate that this history is in the past ... This does not mean, however, that we have to deny our Western origins. This is our heritage ... It is our strength. What we have to do is acquire an additional Asian dimension ... We have to be Australian and not European, we have to be quiet not strident, we have to learn humility and to listen to silence.” (FitzGerald, 1997).

In conclusion, Australia pushes itself close to Asia although it has a western cultural origin. However as a U.S strategic ally, its function of assisting the U.S to perform its rebalance in this region, specifically to balance a rising China still stays the same. Therefore, Australia is in the “balancing” category. Hypotheses testing is as follows: (see table.4.16)

Table. 4.16 Hypotheses test-Australia (Balance)

	continental	insular	big	Mid &Small	disputed	Non- disputed	Dev- well	Dev- slow
Similar culture								
Different culture		Different culture	both			Different culture	both	
Communist								
Non-com		Non- com	both			Non- com	both	

Because there are no bit disputes between China and Australia, the fact that Australia balances a rising China supports the hypotheses from cultural theories that different culture clash with each other and different political ideology and system influence on countries' strategies to other countries as well. As an insular country, Australia still balances a rising power-China. Thus, the cultural and political ideological factors may have influence in this matter. However, the other factors derived from realist theories matter to its strategies towards China. The driving factors can be all of them or some of them. Empirical studies suggest that the alliance with the United States is a big driving factor for Australian balancing strategy towards China.

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## **Section 5.**

### **Conclusion**

This research analyzes countries' strategies to a rising China in the Asia Pacific region. It also compares and tests realist and cultural international relations theories. **The research findings and outcomes answer the question** "Why do some Asian countries balance a rising China and some do not?" The findings are in three categories: the major factors that drive countries "balance" or "bandwagon" a rising China, realist theories or cultural theories explain countries

strategies better, and the patterns present some special characteristics of Asian countries foreign relations and strategies.

There are three groups of countries with different strategies towards a rising China, “balance”, “bandwagon”, and “not sure”. Countries that balance a rising China do not share all the characters, such as big powers, disputed, or culturally far from China. There are very special cases which rejects all the hypotheses but one, “countries with disputes with China balance a rising China”, Vietnam for instance. Theoretically, Vietnam is supposed to be a country that bandwagons a rising China, in terms of shared culture, political ideology and system, power size, and geopolitical factors. Most of the balancing powers reject the hypothesis that “similar cultures bandwagon a rising power”. Therefore, cultural factors may matter but not at the current stage in Asia. Many scholars believe that culture matters a lot in Asia. The outcomes of this research show that it is not necessarily true. The second variable from cultural theories of “political system and ideology” appear to be influential to Asian countries foreign strategies. The hypothesis that “continental powers balance a rising power while the insular ones do not because of the water power” is not always true in the case of Asian countries. Insular countries such as Japan, Taiwan, and Indonesia are balancing a rising China. On the contrary, many continental powers do bandwagon a rising China, such as Russia and Thailand. In the case of power size, only Russia does not support the hypothesis that “current and previous big powers tend to balance a rising power”. The other big powers are all in the “Balancing” group. Territorial and historical disputes appear to be at the vital interests of most Asian countries. Development is also very important to Asian countries.

Both realist and cultural theories explain Asian countries strategies to a rising power, while neither is explicit when applying on its own. However, going through all the countries’

cases hypotheses test, realist factors appear to be more dominant and influential to countries strategies to a rising China in Asia Pacific.

As mentioned in the first part of the conclusion, Asian countries treat territory and sovereignty as their vital interests. Political ideology and system differences also influence their foreign policies to one country. However, the “spread of democracy” is one purpose of the U.S alliance in Asia. Countries that are allied with the United States do have balancing strategy towards China, which support the idea that different political system influences countries relations. This can be seen as “political ideology and system” influence, but also can be specified as the U.S influence. The last but not least character of Asian countries is that development is very important to Asian countries. For instance, although Malaysia has disputes with China in South China Sea, it still adopts a bandwagoning strategy towards China for its development. It makes sense because those most Asian countries are developing countries.

Although each country has its own characteristics and complex reasons, why it adopts a certain strategy towards another country, similar to a rising power, this research achieves the goal of theory testing and detecting the trend of Asian countries strategy making factors.

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