

**Japan's Foreign Strategy in the 21st Century And
The Response of China**

by

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Certification Page

I hereby declare that I am the sole author of this research report. This is a true copy of the research report, including original and/or any required reference materials with final revisions, as accepted by my supervisor and/or examiners.

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Abstract

The purpose of this research report is to make an analysis of the basic characteristics of the Japanese foreign strategy since the threshold of the 21st century, and seek to articulate the outline of the concepts or visions shaped by the Japanese Prime Ministers from Mr. Koizumi to Mr. Noda in the context of current international community. This research report consists of an analysis of the domestic evolution and transitions of Japan's foreign strategic framework and Japan's exploration of new foreign strategic concepts since the end of cold war, while evaluating the influence from the outside on the decision-making of the Japanese foreign policy, and try to assess the basic foreign strategic ideas of each Japanese Prime Minister since the new century. The analysis will not only target the U.S.—Japan alliance, but also consider Japan's coordination within the Asia Pacific region. Based on evaluation of Japan's national development and its diplomatic relations with major powers and neighboring countries in Asia, this research makes an outlook of Japan's role in the international community in the future, considering its effort of pursuing state normalcy while facing China's peaceful rise, especially the maintenance of Japan-China relation in the trend of international multi-polarization. Finally, with assessment of how China should respond to Japan's foreign strategy and the way of overcoming the bottlenecks between the two countries' relation, this research makes reasonable choices and suggestions of maintaining a sound and stable China –Japan relationship

Keywords: Japanese foreign strategy, China-Japan relationship, foreign policy, Asia-Pacific region

CHAPTER 1: INSTRUCTION

1.0 INSTRUCTION

The foreign strategy of every country derives from her national strategy, while it also serves and exerts counter actions toward the latter. As long as one country does not implement the quarantine policy, it always makes communication with the outside world, while some specific value orientations and national objectives can be deemed in such process.

Since the beginning of the 21st century, though Japan has not published any official documents that clearly define the general national strategy, there are series of strategic conceptions and envisions put forward in some specific areas such as the foreign affairs, take the annual Blue Paper issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for good instance. Together with heated debates within the political, business, academic and media fields about this issue, almost each Japanese prime minister had initiated characteristics of foreign strategy conceptions, and various Japanese think tanks have also released reports about Japanese foreign strategy. Although the frequent shifts of Japanese Cabinets and the prudent attitude of Japanese government on issuing official documents caused many difficulties for the research of Japanese foreign strategy in the 21st century, a number of scholars of the international community have made explorations of the trends of Japanese foreign strategy based on the existing official documents and reports, in order to find out the national objectives of Japan and the methods to achieve them.

1.1 STATEMENT OF PROBLEMS

Being the most developed country in Asia, Japan's foreign strategy and its way of national development can greatly influence both of its peripheral areas and the international community. And how its neighboring countries (especially China) should respond to such strategy is critical for regional stability and common development.

Japan's role in the international system keeps growing with adjustments of foreign strategy, but it also faces challenges including the accession to be a permanent member of the UN Security Council, the integration of East Asia economic community and the realization of a normal state under the U.S.-Japan alliance.

. It's undeniable that despite close economic ties, there are some disputes between Japan and China over territorial (i.e. the Senkaku (Diaoyu Island for official Chinese name)) and historical issues, while some discordance between decision making bodies of both sides do exist and even last for a extended period. However, as the proverb goes, "Close neighbors have constant quarrels", since Japan and China shared a rich and profound history of communications, and the political and economic bonds at present are even more tighter than before, so it is understandable for both sides to have different views or even contradictions on several issues, some of which cannot be solved overnight. Therefore, the new era calls for common efforts of the two countries to seek proper solutions on existing issues and develop a Japan-China strategic relationship of mutual benefit.

1.2 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH

It is of great importance for Chinese fellow to research Japanese foreign strategy in the 21st century, since it's the need for promoting the China-Japan mutual benefit relationship. China and Japan share a history of communication for 2000 years, while at present both sides regard the other as the most important trade partner and

neighboring country. Whether China can have a stable peripheral environment is greatly affected by the Japanese side, while it is also important for Japan to keep sound relationship with China in order to maintain its position in international arena accordingly. As the prerequisite for a sound and stable relationship between China and Japan is the common development and prosperity of the two countries, so a better understanding of the characteristics and targets of the Japanese foreign strategy is necessary.

1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

In order to make possible suggestions and recommendations for nurturing a healthy Japan-China relationship of mutual strategic benefit, this paper focuses on the appraisal of Japan's foreign strategy and international policy since the 21st century, the questions that will be examined by this research include:

Main Question: What are the basic characteristics of Japan's new foreign strategy in the 21st century, and how China should respond to Japanese foreign strategy by overcoming bottlenecks in the bilateral relations?

Sub-Questions:

- . What are the main foreign strategic conceptions of each Japanese Cabinet (from Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro to Noda Yoshihiko) since the 21st century?
- . How to evaluate the Japanese foreign strategy or decisions based on the U.S. - Japan alliance, esp. within the Asia-Pacific region?
- . What is the prospect of the implementation of Japanese foreign strategy in the new century, and how its neighboring countries like China could respond?

1.4 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

This research aims at analyzing the basic characteristics of the Japanese foreign strategy since the threshold of the 21st century, and seeks to articulate the outline of the concepts or visions shaped by the Japanese Prime Ministers from Mr. Koizumi to Mr. Noda in the context of current international community. This report consists of an analysis of the domestic evolution and transitions of Japan's foreign strategic framework and Japan's exploration of new foreign strategic concepts since the end of cold war, while evaluating the influence from the outside on the decision-making of the Japanese foreign policy, and try to assess the basic foreign strategic ideas of each Japanese Prime Minister since the new century. The analysis will not only target the U.S.—Japan alliance, but also consider Japan's coordination within the Asia Pacific region. Based on evaluation of Japan's national development and its diplomatic relations with major powers and neighboring countries in Asia, this research makes an outlook of Japan's role in the international community in the future, considering its effort of pursuing state normalcy while facing China's peaceful rise, especially the maintenance of Japan-China relation in the trend of international multi-polarization. Finally, with assessment of how China should respond to Japan's foreign strategy and the way of overcoming the bottlenecks between the two countries' relation, this research makes reasonable choices and suggestions of maintaining a sound and stable China –Japan relationship

1.5 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This research will be conducted by comparative studies of each Japanese Cabinets' conceptions on foreign policy since the beginning of the 21st century, with analysis of the changes after each shift of the Japanese Cabinets, and the evolution of Japanese foreign strategy will also be explored.

In order to make more objective assessment of Japanese foreign strategy in the new century, analytical results of this research are made by emphasizing the descriptive and empirical findings. The citation of documents and data used in this research are from official released channel, academic sources or public media, i.e. the speech of the Japanese Prime Ministers, annual foreign policy papers by the Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and statistics data from authoritative departments or organizations, such as the Cabinet Office of Japan and the Goldman Sachs. etc.

1.6 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

The research on Japan's foreign strategy since the 21st century is generally a new issue, all of the results findings are regarded as periodic. Contact of high officials or groups was beyond the researcher's capability. Therefore this research is conducted on resources of official documents, speeches and newspapers of Japan and China. The researcher had been made aware of the fact that analysis of original Japanese academic references such as books, journals or periodicals could be difficult because of a language barrier and spatial distance. Therefore, the researcher took time of searching informative resources of Japanese foreign strategy with English translation.

This research report discusses the evolution and overall development of Japan's foreign strategy in the new century, focusing on the main foreign strategic conceptions of each Japanese Cabinet (from Prime Minister Koizumi to Noda), the structural adjustments of Japan's foreign policy based on the U.S. - Japan alliance and Japan's efforts for state normalcy in the process of accession with the permanent member of United Nations Security Council, as well as dealing with other countries especially in the Asia Pacific. Meanwhile, the researcher intends to assess the outlook of Japanese foreign strategy and her position in the international community, and

reasonable responses of China toward a more healthy mutual strategic beneficial relation with Japan, while some suggestions are made for overcoming the bottlenecks concerning practical disputes between the two sides, together with an analysis of the East Asia cooperative mechanism. However, further research on these topics cannot be conducted due to insufficiency of time and other conceivable constraints, which is also detrimental to the researchers' greater understanding of the issues.

This chapter provides a brief introduction of this report with the statement of problems, research objectives, questions, methodology, significance and limitations of this study themed in analyzing Japanese foreign strategy with practical problems in maintaining stable peripheral relations, especially with China. Because of the relative newness of the issue, there is a need for a better understanding of the basic characteristics of Japanese foreign strategy and goals in the new century, and of the responses China shall make for reciprocal bilateral relations, which may help with the future development of policies and guidelines for strategic resolutions.

Next chapter will display the representative academic achievements on Japan's foreign strategy ever since the new century, both from Western and Chinese scholarships. Such kind of references was used as valuable sources to inform and direct this paper.

CHAPTER 2: REVIEW OF LITERATURES

The ideas of the researcher are benefited from several books, articles or journals for the content of analysis, and the researcher found that the trend of the Japanese foreign strategy in the new century has already drawn attention by a number of scholars or commentators, while many insightful academic experiences were shaped through. By and large, with attention to the academic publications about the Japanese foreign strategy, the famous ones are as follows:

2.0 REPRESENTATIVE WESTERN LITERATURE ON JAPANESE FOREIGN STRATEGY AND JAPAN-CHINA RELATIONSHIP

(1) Japan Rising: The Resurgence of Japanese Power and Purpose

Kenneth Pyle (2007) described that Japan has vacillated between infuriating ethnocentrism and remarkable receptivity to foreign influences during its history without ultimately sacrificing its unique culture, but has often not done enough to cast light on the legitimate concerns of other countries in its "opaque" decision-making process, resulting in some needless frictions. The author also looks at the triangular relations among China, Japan, and the U.S., and concludes that the continued engagement of the U.S. in the region is vital to keep Japan from putting itself in the orbit of China. Japan, mindful of its past, location, and culture, has been conditionally engaging China in a way that is somewhat different from the U.S.

(2) Japan's Foreign Policy Since 1945

Kevin Cooney (2007) lays out the policy options and choices that Japan faces in the twenty-first century, and also tries to explore the inner workings of Japanese

foreign policy making and the direction of Japanese foreign and security policy.

Cooney (2007: 200-202) challenged the popular belief that Japan is merely pursuing an institutionalist foreign policy by noting that “under Article Nine of the Constitution of Japan (November 3, 1946), Japan does not have the choice of pursuing relative gains but is pursuing absolute gains for realist reasons”. The decision-making matrix is influenced both internally by cultural norms and externally by foreign pressure. Two important findings are also yielded in this book; one was that “much of Japanese foreign policy is made on an emergency basis, there seemed to be few planned-response scenarios for the government to fall back on when a major foreign or security policy even took place. The lack of contingency planning on the part of the government of Japan that was evidenced by the slow governmental response to the Kobe earthquake (improved performance in the response of 2011 Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami) or the lack of emergency laws governing the SDF (Japan Self-Defense Forces) and U.S. forces in Japan seems to pervade the foreign-policy community as well.” The author also argues that “excluding its general capitalist, democratic, and pacifist tendencies, Japan does not seem to have a particular ideology or philosophy to guise its strategic planning, which means that Japan has been slow to react to an international security event in a timely and appropriate manner.” Another major finding is “the power shift that is moving major foreign policy issues from the more cautious MOFA (Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs) to the more volatile Diet largely because of the generational shift taking place in Japan”. The Diet, as the source of foreign policy, offers many new and interesting considerations to the Japanese foreign policy community and the scholars studying it. The author believes that what makes Japanese foreign policy different is Article Nine of its Constitution, and Japan needs to better plan its foreign policy

within the limitations set by the Constitution, in response to the world events and also builds internal structures in conjunction with the United States - its ally, to deal with and coordinate crises in a timely and appropriate manner, particularly in East Asia. The author also concludes that contrary to the conventional wisdom among the ruling elite, Japan will not gain its full stature as a nation until it deals with its historical responsibilities in a forthright and honest way, while Japan's quest for normalcy in its foreign relations in East Asia will be obstructed until it adequately addresses this kind of issue.

(3) Securing Japan: Tokyo's grand strategy and the future of East Asia

Richard Samuels (2011) provides a clear reading of Japanese security strategy, starting in the early 50s, as affirmatively choosing alignment with the U.S.. The author debates the choices around this alignment from the early post-war era, through the Cold War, and into the post-1989 and post-911 eras, and recognize the U.S.- Japan alliance is applicable to maintain the Asia-Pacific regional stability and the development of Japan.

(4) Can Japan Compete?

Michael. E. Porter and Hirotaka Takeuchi (2000) discussed the requirements for both government and companies to move Japan forward in the new century. In order to address the realities of modern global competition, what Japan needs is nothing short of a new economic strategy, but one that builds on the true bases of Japan's past success, recognizes the differences between the country's rebuilding challenges and its present circumstances. To do so, however, it will require the systematic changes in both business and government.

(5) Japan's Reluctant Realism: Foreign Policy Challenges in an Era of Uncertain Power

Michael Green (2003) argues that the Japanese foreign policy has undertaken some changes since the new century. Though the general foreign policy of Japan still converges with the U.S. on some fundamental issues, it has become increasingly independent. While remaining low-risk, it is more sensitive to balance-of-power issues. It is still reactive, but it is far less passive. The author believes that this emerging strategic view, what he calls “reluctant realism,” is being shaped by a combination of changes in the international environment, insecurity about national power resources, and Japanese aspirations for a national identity that moves beyond the legacy of World War II. As a result, it is time for the US and the world to recognize Japan as an independent actor in Northeast Asia and to assess Japanese foreign policy on its own terms. The author also points out several trends of Japanese foreign policy worth observing including: a greater focus on balance of power, growing realism and frayed idealism, a higher sensitivity to security and a more determined push for an “independent” foreign policy.

(6) Japan in A Dynamic Asia

Denny et al (2006) examines a new phenomenon in Japanese foreign policy: Japan’s increasing activism under the Koizumi administration during the early times of the new century. Many factors including the end of the Cold War, the drastic growth of China, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and new transnational security threats have been influencing this policy. Among array of essays discussing the Japanese foreign policy in the context of her bilateral and multilateral relations not only with the U.S, but also with individual Asian countries and subregions, the researcher found several impressive comments as follows:

While Green (2003) emphasizes the changes in Japan’s foreign policy, Takashi Inoguchi and Purnendra Jain (2000) identify three constants in Japan’s post-Cold War

foreign policy, they are:

“Preeminence” of the U.S.-Japan relations (in defense, diplomatic, and economic relations)

- Strong imperative to sustain essential commercial relations
- A peace constitution constraining overseas military engagement

Another question worth analyzing is about the views between Green and Ingoguchi on China’s growth and relative power balance in Asia.

2.1 REPRESENTATIVE CHINESE LITERATURE ON JAPANESE FOREIGN STRATEGY AND JAPAN-CHINA RELATIONSHIP

While in China there are also journals discussing the Japanese foreign strategic conceptions in the 21st Century, one of the most famous ones is as follows:

The Development Trends of Japanese Foreign Strategy in the new century

Jin Linbo (2004) found three characteristics of Japan’s foreign strategy, that are emphasis of national interest, intensification of diplomatic independency, and response of new peripheral situations, which reflect Japan’s aspiration of further improvement of her national power, position in the international community and influence in global affairs.

All of aforementioned publications or journals have made thoughtful analysis about Japanese foreign strategy, but a more systematic analysis of the political concepts of the Japanese foreign ministers since the 21st century, and the implications of Japanese foreign strategy to the countries in the Asia-Pacific are still needed to be pursued.

2.2 SUMMARY

The literature review has offered a glimpse at the positive academic achievements

that is centering on the Japanese foreign strategy and policy making, as well as the role China plays in the mutual relationship with Japan.

Concerning the reasons discussed in the previous chapter, the making of Japan's overall foreign strategy is a gradually undertaken progress. Rooted from the frequent shift of Japanese cabinet, the confronting political views sometimes occurred between the elites and others, and the prudent attitude adopted by Japanese government on issuing relevant official documents, there are many difficulties for people outside Japan to gain an insight or clear comprehension of Japan's foreign strategy.

Chapter 3 will provide discussion drawn from the findings and study of Japanese foreign strategy. The next chapter will also demonstrate how the research objectives have been fulfilled throughout the study. The discussions of Chapter 3 will look at an evolution of Japanese foreign strategy since the new century and main ideologies that affect Japan's foreign policy making, as well as overall characteristics of each Japanese Cabinet since 21st century (from Prime Minister Koizumi to Noda Yoshihiko). The U.S. – Japan alliance as the pillar of Japanese foreign policy will also be taken into consideration. The researcher also discusses the outlook of the Japanese foreign strategy and its role in the transition of international system.

CHAPTER 3: DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS

3.0 EVOLUTION AND TRANSITIONS OF JAPAN'S FOREIGN STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK

Intersected with pervasive and profound changes taken place to the power structure of the world since the threshold of the 21st century, the political, economic and social pattern of Japan also faced with tremendous transformations, giving rise to challenges on many traditional ideologies and mechanisms that were proved to be effective in governing this Asian developed country. While in the greater context, with the end of Cold War, the pursuit of enhancing comprehensive national strength had become the focus of interstate competition. Though the U.S. remains the sole superpower with its ever-growing dominance in scopes of international politics, economy and culture, the U.S. power of intervention into key regions of the world has been diminished by the depletion of wars in Afghanistan and Iraq after the 9.11 terrorist attack; what's more, the integration of Europe and rise of emerging powers such as India and China also led to clearer future of globalization, while global issues in finance, energy, food, environmental protection and climate change also become more and more grave.

Considering the abovementioned factors, it's of no surprise that the Japanese leadership had been striving to seek solutions and establish proper foreign strategy that adapts to Japan's position in the new era. Ever since the first decades of the new century, there have been intense debates or even conflicts between different political forces. Symbolized by series of strategic perceptions on foreign policy initiated by the

Cabinets from Prime Minister Koizumi to Noda, the exploration of better shaping the global image of Japan in a strategic way has never been ceased. Therefore the research of the establishment and evolution of Japan's foreign strategy in the new century is of important worth, especially by common recognition of the great influence of Japan in the Asia Pacific region, which has become one of the most dynamic and promising regions in the world, maintaining sound economic momentum and making important contribution to global sustainable growth.

Before further discussion of Japan's foreign policy in the new century, one thing that should not be ignored is that the end of Cold War and the close U.S. – Japan alliance was not the sole determinant of Japan's external policy making. As Sato (2006) noted, “(Japan's) relations with Asia had historical roots much longer than the U.S.-Japan relationship and were based on interests often divergent from those of the United States. Japan's relations with Asia since the end of World War II have been a constant search for its own place in the region and foreign policy independent of the United States. ”

3.0.1 JAPAN'S EXPLORATION OF NEW FOREIGN STRATEGIC CONCEPTS SINCE THE END OF COLD WAR

Ever since the end of the Cold War and termination of East-West confrontations, some Japanese preeminent think-tanks and scholars had begun to contemplate the national strategic objectives toward the future and the approaches to fulfill such objectives, by re-evaluating the historical processes of the various tensions between the East and West which had deep impacts on the global political economy. To a great extent, Japan's resurgence after the World War II and her successful rise to gain the second largest world economy attributes to the maintenance of the U.S.-Japan alliance.

Though the termination of the Cold War drew an end of Japan's convenience in the security area, the significant share of Japan in the world economy entitles her with more and more influence in the international arena.

Japan's use of ODA (Official Development Assistance) in its search for a more active role in international politics and also safeguard the national security can be traced back to the late 1970s, when Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira initiated the concept of "comprehensive security," in which Japanese ODA was considered as an international contribution to peace and stability and part of Japan's overall national security effort. In addition, as Takakazu Kuriyama (1990) the former ambassador of Japan to the United States noted in when he was Vice-Minister of MOFA (Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs), that Japan " can no longer conduct a passive foreign policy" characteristic of a minor power, because its economic influence obligates it to "share responsibility for the creation and maintenance of the international order." With a reference to the 1922 Washington Naval Treaty limiting capital ships of the United States, Britain and Japan to a ratio of 5:5:3 respectively, he points out that of the 20 trillion dollar world GNP, the United States accounts for 5 trillion, the EC 5 trillion and Japan 3 trillion. He views the parallel as illustrating the position of Japan as one of the three major economic powers in the world, much as it was one of the three major military powers in Asia 70 years ago. Kuriyama concludes that Japanese economic power impels it to a more responsible role in shaping the new international order, and that its ODA is a major pillar of international cooperation for peace, together with the coordination mechanism of the U.S., Japan and Europe. As a matter of fact, the components of Japan's international role as envisioned by Kuriyama were nothing new, as they had been stated by Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu's speech before the Diet in March 1989, it was proposed that Japan would participate in the creation

of international order that ensures peace and security, respects freedom and democracy, guarantees world prosperity through open economies, preserves an environment in which people can lead decent lives, and create stable international relations based on dialogues and negotiations. As Leitch (1995) wrote, Kuriyama defends this policy against charges on that it is vague and idealistic, by stating that fulfillment of each of these goals has a specific policy component for Japan. Kuriyama also reiterated that none of these goals would be achieved by military means with noting “Japan has pledged never to become a military power, and in this sense, Japan’s international role will be exclusively limited to non-military contributions”. In this way, Kuriyama believes, Japan will be able to pursue “the diplomacy of a big power without appearing to be”.

There were also many academic efforts in formulating Japanese foreign strategy or perceptions to face the challenges of the new world situation, and one exemplar publication is to be discussed in this research report.

It was the study made by former Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone (2002) in his book of *Japan: A State Strategy for the Twenty-first Century*. In this critical and thought-provoking analysis, Mr. Nakasone, one of the most highly regarded former prime ministers of Japan, considers what should be Japan's strategic direction in the 21st century. For quite a long time, Japan is often accused of lacking a vision, being slow to respond to changing circumstances, and then only responding reluctantly, with piecemeal changes. Nakasone, broadly agreeing with this view, considers why things should be so, and goes on to put forward a vision for Japan for the twenty-first century. He emphasizes in particular the need for radical change in economic policy, education, defence and science and technology policy, and argues for amendments to the constitution. The key points raised in this study includes that Japan should

contribute to world peace and prosperity on the basis of freedom and democracy, and shape the nation as:

a. a nation at peace – by upholding the principles of defense, ban on exports of weapon, and three non-nuclear principles, and to play an active role in maintenance of world peace and security

b. a nation of laws – to protect every person’s equality and fairness before law, and with respect of universal beliefs such as human rights

c. a nation of parliamentary democracy – by operating fair elections that can fully reflect the people’s will, and cabinet system with clear political duties and administration

d. a nation of industry – with free and fair market of competition, diligent labors and economic operations with the world

e. a nation of vibrant culture – to create environment that preserves the culture of Japan and the world

In Nakasone’s study, the Japan-U.S. alliance was also emphasized as the pillar of Japan’s diplomacy, and Japan’s participation under the framework of the United Nations to function in maintaining world peace and security was underlined, while the Japan’s pursuit of permanent member of the Security Council of the UN was also listed.

3.0.2 ROLE OF *GAIATSU* IN JAPANESE FOREIGN STRATEGY

Though the Japan - U.S. alliance has always been emphasized as the bolster of Japan’s diplomacy, Japan’s potential for regional leadership may be still weak in light of the U.S. presence, as many argue that both inside and outside Japan, the presence of the U.S. forces based in Japan is an infringement on Japanese sovereignty, and

Japan must find a proper way to assert itself in global affairs with a position that is more independent from the U.S.

The role of the U.S. in the process of the formation of SDF (Japan Self Defense Forces) and Japanese foreign policy cannot be neglected. U.S. pressure since the post World War II occupation has always been an issue which has gone through the formation of Japanese defense and security policy, and Japanese politicians have been able to explain many of their bolder actions regarding the SDF by referring to pressure from the United States (Chinworth, 1992) . This “American Pressure” is named *gaiatsu*, which can also be translated as “pressure from the outside” and is a common term used in any Japanese newspaper reporting on foreign policy or security issues. The Japanese official explanation for many of the nation’s defense and security policy decisions especially in the international arena is also because “the Americans made us do it” (Chinworth, 1992).

However, does such concept of *gaiatsu* really deny personal or national responsibility and choice for Japan’s actions in the world? or Japan’s sovereignty be denied and causing it incapable to make its own decisions? As a matter of fact, the *gaiatsu* is just part of the situation and decision-making of Japan. All nations including the hegemons as the U.S. face the challenge of foreign pressure. The problem is how to react to the pressure from the outside world. Therefore, Japan is not unique in facing foreign pressure, and Japan’s ability to deal with foreign pressure depends on its position vis-à-vis the pressure. For instance, Japan’s continual trade conflicts with America are the “true sign that it is a world power” (Drifte, 1990). A “poor little Japan” argument is not valid when one takes the scope and breadth of Japanese power into consideration. As Drifte argues, the question of Japanese power “has implications for the policies of other countries which, for example, expect Japan

to contribute to the international system in a way commensurate with its economic power. They exert influence (commonly referred to in Japan as *gaiatsu*) on Japan to this effect. As a result, it is most opportune to appreciate in a more systematic way by considering the issues such as: what sort of power Japan has, how and if at all this power is exerted, whether the demand for ‘commensurate contribution’ is compatible with the internal and external conditions that Japan is facing, and whether those making these requests are conscious of the implications. ... There are even Japanese who have to ask themselves whether the outside world really wants to face the consequences”(Drifte, 1998) .

Therefore, the researcher believes that Japan makes its own decisions because of its own needs and interests, not just in response to *gaiatsu*.

3.1 FOREIGN STRATEGIC CONCEPTS OF JAPANESE CABINETS SINCE THE NEW CENTURY

Ever since the entrance of 21st century, regardless of whether the LDP (Liberal Democratic Party of Japan) or the DPJ (Democratic Party of Japan) holds the power, all previous cabinets led by the Prime Ministers from Mr. Koizumi Yoichiro to Mr. Noda Yoshihiko, have attached great importance to the formulation and implementation of foreign strategy that Japan should follow. Taking all of such characteristic perceptions held by the top Japanese leaders, some noteworthy lines of guiding principles which perpetuated in Japanese foreign strategy can be comprehended.

3.1.1. The One-sided Pro-American Policy of Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi

Being the first Japanese prime minister in the new century, Mr. Junichiro Koizumi

won pervasive support from the voters for his resolute stance toward structural reforms. From the April of 2001 to September of 2006, Mr. Koizumi's term of office lasted for about five years and a half, being the prime minister with third longest term following only to Mr. Eisaku Sato and Mr. Shigeru Yoshida of post-war Japan.

As a matter of fact, the foreign relations was not the area which Mr. Koizumi was adept at, however, compared to other debating efforts he made in the structural reforms in Japan, his foreign policy become the focus of mass and media. During his terms, Mr. Koizumi paid 51 times of official visit to 81 countries; 8 times to the U.S., 7 times to the South Korea, 4 times to the Russia, 3 times to China, 2 times each for Vietnam, Thailand, Malaysia and North Korea. (Iijima, 2007: p.2). He also made first official visit by the Japanese Prime Minister to Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Ethiopia and Ghana. Mr. Koizumi's talks with then North Korea leader Kim Jong Il in September of 2002 was another historical pace in post-war Japan- North Korea relationship. All of these made Mr. Koizumi the first Japanese prime minister to exert the summit diplomacy to the full extent.

Mr. Koizumi seldom showed intact concepts of Japanese foreign strategy during his terms of office. The exception was his speech made on 14th of January, 2002 in Singapore, about the Japanese foreign policy to the Southeast Asia before he concluded his official visit to five Southeast Asian countries, which was the another elaboration of Japanese foreign policy to the Southeast Asia since Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda initiated the well known Fukuda Doctrine in 1978. In this speech, Mr. Koizumi stated the Japanese envisage cooperating with the ASEAN, including Australia and New Zealand on the basis of "10 + 3" framework.

Nonetheless, the most impressive foreign strategy taken by Mr. Koizumi was his persistence to the one-sided and pro-American policy. While in office, he paid eight

times of official visit to the U.S., and established close personal relationship with then U.S. President George W. Bush similar to that between Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone and President Ronald Reagan. The U.S. Japan alliance was then defined as global scale, while Mr. Koizumi always expressed support to the U.S. anti-terrorism military actions in Afghanistan and Iraq, and Japan also dispatched troops to the war overseas, including that initiated by the U.S. in Iraq. Japan seeks to establish an alliance group that covers almost all of the allied countries with the U.S. in the Asia-Pacific region, which is similar to that of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In general, by formulating several bills ranged from the *US-Japan Defense Cooperation Guideline*(1997), the *Perimeter Situation Law*(1999), *The Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law* (2001) , etc.

On the one hand, the structural reform measures taken by Mr. Koizumi in the aim to stimulate Japanese economy made slow progress; while on the other aspect of diplomacy; Mr. Koizumi adopted one-sided policy to keep close relationship with the U.S. The biggest achievement of Koizumi diplomacy was the intensification of the U.S. Japan alliance, while the biggest failure of it also lies with the over dependence on the U.S. in terms of Japanese diplomacy and security. And some behaviors of Mr. Koizumi also caused negative effect to the Japanese diplomatic relations with her peripheral countries, for instance, his visits to the Yasukuni Shrine which worshipped some of the war criminals in the World War II incurred sharp retrogress of Japan's relationship with China and South Korea, while the failure of Japanese government's effort to quest for permanent member of the United Nations Security Council in 2005 was also partly because of the lack of support of the countries in the Asia Pacific.

3.1.2 The "Strategic Asian Diplomacy" Envision of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe

After the resignation of Prime Minister Koizumi, Mr. Shinzo Abe succeeded the posts of both president of the LDP and then Prime Minister (first term) in September of 2006.

In terms of political position, P.M. Abe as the first Japanese Prime Minister born in the postwar years was regarded as an even more right-wing nationalist than most of his predecessors. Stated in P.M. Abe's opening remarks in a press conference held in the National Diet after he assumed the position, he would not only "carry on the structural reforms by continuing the reform programs that former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi had been advancing for the past five years", but also initiated his strategic envision (during his visit to India in August 2007) of establishing a new Asian alliance or "Broader Asia" alliance of democracies as a counterweight to China's growing influence in the realm of economic and military power, including Japan, the U.S., Australia and India (Abe, 2007). P.M. Abe took credit for the outline of his policy decisions in his best-selling book, *Toward a Beautiful Nation*. By interpreting the notion of building Japan as a *beautiful nation* from three aspects such as: developing human resource, innovation (meaning the innovation of epoch-making new technology, tackling new challenges, and pursuing new ideas), and open (meaning an opening of society, the economy, and the nation), P.M. Abe also made some remarks on Japanese diplomacy. He emphasized that the Japan-U.S. alliance forms the bedrock of Japan's national security and diplomatic strategies, and this alliance must be strengthened by enhancing mutual trust of Japan and the U.S., while placing a framework that ensures constant communication between Japan and the U.S. , and shall Japan firmly take a proactive role in the international community.

P.M. Abe attached strong importance to Asian strategic diplomacy, trying to make efforts to achieve even closer relations with neighboring countries such as South

Korea (Republic of Korea), Russia, India and Australia, as they are regarded as sharing fundamental values with Japan like freedom, democracy, basic human rights, and the rule of law in society. He also recognized that a peacefully developing China is an important and essential nation for Japan, saying that China's development would bring remarkable benefit to Japan as well, and he would “make efforts to develop Japan-China relations even further”.(Abe 2006).

To achieve such decisions, P.M. Abe took several reform measures bearing new nationalist characteristics, such as upgrading the Japan Defense Agency to Japan Ministry of Defense (passed by the 165th national congress) and planned to set up the Japan National Security Council similar to that of the U.S., by concentrating the decision-making power on diplomacy and security issues to the office of the Prime Minister. And his official visit to China soon after he assumed the post also contributed to breaking the ice of the Japan-China bilateral relations for many years since the period of P.M. Koizumi.

However, P.M. Abe as not able to implement his strategic decisions successfully due to many problems and scandals related to corruption, and his cabinet lost public support dramatically in the 21st Election of the House of Councilors in July of 2007, which led to the failure of LDP only about one year after Mr. Abe assumed his first term of office as Prime Minister.

3.1.3 The Concepts of “Peace Fostering Nation” of Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda

P.M. Yasuo Fukuda assumed the post as his father Mr. Takeo Fukuda (who as Japanese Prime Minister was engaged in the concluding of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and China) did in the 1970s, and the most symbolic and thorough articulation of his strategic ideas was laid in his speech of “When the Pacific

Ocean Becomes an "Inland Sea": Five Pledges to a Future Asia that "Acts Together", which was made on the occasion of the 14th International Conference on The Future of Asia.

In this speech, P.M. Fukuda put forward five pledges in making the Pacific an Inland Sea (Fukuda 2008):, such as

(1) To cooperate with the efforts of ASEAN, which is aiming to establish the ASEAN Community by 2015, in the belief that the stability and prosperity of ASEAN is also in the interests of Japan

(2) To reinforce Japan's alliance with the United States of America as a form of public goods of the Asia-Pacific region

(3) To forge Japan into a "Peace Fostering Nation," sparing no efforts to work for the realization of peace in Asia, the Pacific and the world.

(4) To step up efforts in youth exchanges. As a necessary prerequisite to the entire range of cooperation, Japan would foster and strengthen infrastructure of Asia and the Pacific for intellectual and generational exchanges. Japan has already begun to undertake a "Plan for 300,000 Exchange Students." Under the Japan-East Asia Network of Exchange for Students and Youths Programme (or the JENESYS Programme), Japan will continue inviting 6,000 youths to Japan every year from all across Asia.

(5) To tackle climate change with countries of Asia and the Pacific region.

In addition, P.M. Fukuda also stated to pursue "diplomacy for disaster management cooperation."(Fukuda, 2008), considering Asia had then suffered from a series of large-scale natural disasters, from tsunamis to cyclones to violent earthquakes in Sichuan Province of China. In order to reinforce disaster response capacity, Japan was working to promote "disaster management cooperation," making

use of, among other means, its ODA, first with the countries of ASEAN, and later with other countries in the Asia and Pacific.

3.1.4 The Concept of “Values Diplomacy” of Prime Minister Taro Aso

The concept of Japan’s values diplomacy was proposed by Mr. Taro Aso in 2007 when he was the foreign minister in the cabinet of P.M. Abe. And in the period of P.M. Fukuda ruling, this diplomacy temporarily withdrew from Japanese diplomatic stage, but its democratic values concept is still displayed in diplomatic activities. Similar to the comprehensive safety guarantee strategy by the cabinet of P.M. Ohira Masayoshi and P.M. Nakasone Yasuhiro in the 1980s, Mr. Aso’s concept of values diplomacy is an important part of the new strategy in the 21st century. It is a general strategic implementation of Japanese diplomatic policy, which not only included the elements of freedom and democracy, but also contained elements to cope with China and Russia. The researcher argues that the proposal of values diplomacy has three main backgrounds such as:

(1) Better circumstance for Japan to promote general values with the surrounding Asian countries

Since the end of the cold war, not only South Korean democracy progress quickened, but China also accepted and developed the general values. All Asian countries quickened their democracy progress. Under such a circumstance, Japan thought that obstacles in proposing values diplomacy had greatly decreased.

(2) Decrease of Japan’s apprehension for diplomatic unbalance

After the end of the cold war, multilateral diplomacy was extremely active, and the relationships between Asian and Western countries became more and more close, so worries about unbalance of values between Western and Asian countries saw its

mediation. Therefore, Japan expected that its diplomacy could attain a breakthrough at this period.

(3) Improvement of domestic human rights and democratic establishment

In the early period of post World War II, many Japanese people thought that their freedom and democracy were forcibly implanted by America. However, it was just this kind of foreign values that made its fast growth in Japanese culture. Today, 60 years after the war, a majority of Japanese think freedom and democracy belong to their own, though originated from the Western countries. This indicates that the values of Japanese have already made obvious changes after a century. So P.M. Aso's concept towards freedom and democracy was just the same as that towards the proper pride of Japanese people.

In addition, we should not just see the values diplomacy from a narrow viewpoint, because it also mobilizes several policy methods, such as safety guarantee, economy, economic cooperation, culture and propaganda, etc. The value diplomacy's strategic target is not to adopt reforming methods in terms of diplomatic activities, but to establish diplomatic policies according to Japan's geographical position with an evaluation of current context of international community. Its final target is to realize a "normal state" status in the UN.

Then in Jun. 30 of 2009, P.M Aso made a speech in Japan Institute of International Affairs with a title of "Japan's Diplomacy: Ensuring Security and Prosperity", which reflected more of his main strategic ideas of diplomacy. In this speech, not only the importance of the Japan-U.S. alliance was reiterated, but also P.M. Aso's position toward improving the security and prosperity of both Japan and the world was articulated. Two main initiatives were made concerning the security and prosperity of Japan and the world. One is to enhance the building of "*The Corridor for Peace and*

Prosperity”(Aso, 2009), which was put forward by P.M. Koizumi, that Japan aims to promote the cooperation with Israel, the Palestinian Authority, and Jordan in the development project of the West Bank of Jordan River, by providing ODA and using Japanese and Israeli technologies. The other is the initiative of a *Eurasian Crossroads and the Concept of a Modern-Day Version of the Silk Road*. According to this concept, a "North-South Logistics and Distribution Route" that will run vertically from Central Asia through Afghanistan to the Arabian Sea will be developed. Together with previous projects in the Asia's subregion-wide development such as the Delhi-Mumbai Industrial Corridor in India and the Mekong Economic Corridors in Indochina, it will be possible for example to shorten the travel time from Ho Chi Minh City in Vietnam to Chennai, India from the current roughly two weeks by sea to only eight days by developing infrastructure and making use of Japanese technology such as "one stop" services at border crossings, which could also be called a modern-day version of the Silk Road.

Though P.M. Aso's concepts reflected his prospect of Japan's role as a continuous pacemaker economically in the Asia and the world, and strategically bridging the U.S, Russia and China in the regional integration in the Central Asia and the Caucasus, the failure of LDP in the 45th election of the House of Councillors held in 2009 made the strategic concepts of P.M. Aso only a blueprint.

3.1.5 The Ideas of “Brotherhood Political Philosophy” of Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama

Being one of the founders of the DPJ and also its 2nd and 6th party representative, P.M. Yukio Hatoyama's taking office marked the first real power shift in the political arena for over 50 years postwar.

Before he became prime minister he had already put forward the “brotherhood” political philosophy, as he noted in his article “My Political Philosophy” (Hatoyama, 2009), this philosophy came from the French Revolution by expressing “liberty, equality and fraternity”. However, this concept was widely criticized by the Japanese media. For instance “*Yomiuri Shimbun*” thought that such mystical philosophy was difficult to understand, let alone applied to international areas. And even political opponents described it as more ambiguous than the ice-cream.

But as P.M. Hatoyama stated in his first policy speech since taking office, which was about how to implement the “brotherhood” of philosophy and political philosophy, he stressed the importance of coexistence and respect for differences both at the international and domestic level. In his opinion, Japan would continue to play the role of leader of conscience to help poor countries combat climate change in the international arena.

P.M. Hatoyama also maintained in his speech that Japan’s role should be a part of the global system and act as a “bridge between the world”, namely the East and West, rich and poor countries and multi-bridge between civilizations. Though his “brotherhood” philosophy was quite idealistic, the spirit of replacing conflict with cooperation accords with the global trend.

3.1.6 The Exploration of “Third Approach” and Pragmatic Diplomacy of Prime Minister Naoto Kan

Born in grassroots family and having no eminent background as his predecessors, P.M. Naoto Kan was supposed to be different. In a nation where so many national politicians are second-, third- and even fourth-generation lawmakers, he was the rare self-made man, and was famous for his quick temper, persistence and linguistic agility

during debates in the National Diet. Though he did not make systematic arguments on diplomacy and security issues, and he admitted of his little experience in foreign affairs, he still held clear-cut positions on several key issues such as the balance of Japan's relationship with neighboring countries while strengthening the Japan-U.S. alliance.

During his career he promoted the "third way" that emphasized globalization and reform of the bureaucratic state. In his policy speech at the 174th Session of the Diet, he proposed the notion of "Third Approach" as a new blueprint after his predecessor Hatoyama Cabinet, to revive the economy, rebuild public finances and turn the social security system around Japan (Kan, 2010). As he explained, the Japanese economy had "continued to be stagnant because of the pursuit of economic policies that did not match the changes in the structure of industry and of society". By learning from this past failure of the "First Approach" (which economic policy was centering on public works) and the "Second Approach"(which economic policy was conducted with an emphasis on productivity, grounded in excessive market fundamentalism and overly slanted towards the supply side), Japan should pursue the "Third Approach" as a policy that matches current conditions. This policy aimed to turn the problems besetting the economy and society into opportunities for creating new demand and employment, and to link them to new forms of growth.

For the policy on foreign affairs and national security, P.M. Kan stated that this should be "grounded in a sense of responsibility" (Kan, 2010), while in the context of new global situation that Japan must clarify her position in the international community and pursue a foreign policy based on "balanced pragmatism". He emphasized that the Japan-US alliance supports not only the defense of Japan but also the stability and prosperity of the Asia and Pacific region and would continue to be

deepened, while Japan's bilateral relations with neighboring countries (mostly in Asia) would be strengthened in various fields such as the political, economic and cultural spheres, and he also reiterated the pursuit of the East Asia Community, the deepening of Japan-China mutually beneficial and strategic relationship, etc. In responding to the international security environment, P.M. Kan reviewed the state of Japan's defense capabilities and announced a plan for reviewing the *National Defense Programme Guidelines* and the next *Mid-Term Defence Programme*.

Just as the low profile performance in his remarks, P.M. Kan poorly handled neither financial problems nor the March 2011 Great East Japan earthquake and tsunami fallout and Fukushima nuclear crisis, and with a large number of disapproval rating and pressure from both in and outside, P.M. Kan was forced to resign in the Diet election of August, 2011.

3.1.7 Agenda for TPP and U.S. – Japan Alliance Priority Diplomacy of Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda

In September of 2011, the new cabinet of DPJ (Democratic Party of Japan) was established, and Mr. Noda Yoshihiko became the prime minister. Facing the various domestic and foreign problems, he placed preferential agendas on diplomatic problems. P.M. Noda's active attitude have been reflected through a series of summit activities, such as highlighting the consolidation of the U.S.-Japan alliance, cooperation with Southeast Asian countries, and the level-headed policy with China to avoid any impact on the two countries' economic ties. Noda also stressed that the Japan-US alliance is set as Japan's "cornerstone and utilizing frameworks participated in by a wide-range of countries and regions, the foundation of our (Japanese) diplomacy is continuous efforts to play a proactive role in the creation of order and

rules in this region, (the U.S. – Japan alliance) is essential for the stability and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region and the world” (Noda, 2012), which means this alliance constitutes Japan's security and foreign foundation and maximum property. The evaluation of P.M. Noda’s strategies on Japan’s foreign relations must be taken from the perspectives of realistic interests and values. In order to fulfill the diplomatic priority of consolidation and strengthening of the Japan-US Alliance, the Noda Cabinet announced to participate in the TPP (Trans-Pacific strategic economic partnership agreement (TPP)). In addition, P.M. Noda also reaffirmed that the stability and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region cannot be achieved without China playing a constructive role in it, and the policy to deepen the mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests between Japan and China would be adopted. Taking the opportunity of the 40th anniversary of the normalization of Japan-China diplomatic relations (2012), he sought to deepen the mutually beneficial relationship through dialogues and interactions at various levels, starting with people-to-people exchanges and tourism promotion. Regarding such statements, Noda Cabinet also had to tackle with several problems such as how to integrate the domestic different opinions while balancing the interior affairs with foreign interests, and how to connect the fulfillment of the domestic public demands with Japan’s share of duty in the Japan-US Alliance interests, also how to maximize the safeguarding of the national economic interests in the TPP negotiation process, etc. All of such issues had become a severe test for Noda’s cabinet and DPJ’s ruling capacity.

As for each Japanese prime minister’s cabinet since the beginning of the new century, inner-connections existed in their strategic ideas of foreign affairs. The researcher summarizes the abovementioned analysis on foreign strategic ideas of the Japanese prime ministers (from 2011 to 2012) in following table for easier reference.

Table 3.1 Main Strategic Ideas on Foreign Affairs of Japanese Prime Ministers (2001-2012)

Term of Office	Name of P.M.	Main Strategic ideas on Foreign Affairs
(1 st) Apr.2001 – Nov.2003	Junichiro Koizumi	One-sided Pro-American Policy. In conjunction Of
(2 nd) Nov.2003 – Sep.2005		cooperating with the ASEAN, including Australia
(3 rd) Sep.2005 – Sep.2006		and New Zealand on the basis of “10 + 3” framework
Sep.2006 – Sep.2007	Shinzo Abe	Strategic Asian Diplomacy and Building a Beautiful Japan. Emphasizing the Japan-U.S. alliance as the bedrock of Japan's national security and diplomatic strategies. Pursuing closer relations with neighboring countries such as China, South Korea (Republic of Korea), Russia, India and Australia
Sep.2007 – Sep.2008	Yasuo Fukuda	The Concepts of “Peace Fostering Nation” and five pledges in making the Pacific an Inland Sea
Sep.2008 – Sep.2009	Taro Aso	The Concept of “Values Diplomacy” and two main initiatives of: (1) Enhance the building of “The Corridor for Peace and Prosperity”, which was put forward by P.M. Koizumi, that Japan aims to promote the cooperation with Israel, the Palestinian Authority, and Jordan in the development project of the West Bank of Jordan River, by providing ODA and using Japanese and Israeli technologies. (2)Building a Eurasian Crossroads and a modern-day version of the Silk Road
Sep.2009 – Jun.2010	Yukio Hatoyama	The Ideas of “Brotherhood” Political Philosophy”, through which can make Japan an unprecedented integration into the international community, and Japan would continue to play the role of leader of

		conscience to help poor countries combat climate change in the international arena..
Jun.2010 – Sep.2011	Naoto Kan	The Exploration of “Third Approach”(emphasized globalization and reform of the bureaucratic state), and Pragmatic Diplomacy
Sep.9 – Dec.2012	Yoshihiko Noda	Agenda for Japan’s participation of TPP and U.S. – Japan Alliance Priority Diplomacy

3.2 JAPAN’S FOREIGN STRATEGY AND THE U.S. - JAPAN ALLIANCE

As mentioned above, the U.S.-Japan alliance constitutes the pillar of Japan’s foreign policy through each prime minister’s cabinet since the 21st century. In general, the U.S.-Japan alliance had gone through four historical periods in the postwar history: first, the formation process of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty after the Second World War and the consequent minimal rearmament (1945-1956); second, the revision of the bilateral Security Treaty (1957-1960) – both of these two phases can be described as *Hegemonic Alliance* or the forming period; third, minimum defense burden sharing under international pressures (1968-1989) – this can be deemed as *Mutual reliable and Cooperative Alliance* or the expansion period; fourth, strategic adjustments after the conclusion of the Cold War (1990-future) – which can be viewed as *The Partnership Alliance* or the redefining period.

Japan signed a peace treaty in San Francisco in September 1951, with forty-eight nations and a military agreement with the United States. This agreement with the United States was a bilateral security pact. Because the peace treaty was linked to the U.S.-Japan bilateral military agreement, it was not endorsed by the Soviet Union and its allies. Thus, the San Francisco settlement represented a peace that excluded the Communist nations, including the most populous country in the world, China: it

was a “separate peace.” In the peace-settlement process, at least two other options were available for Japan other than a security alliance with the United States: neutrality and rearmament.

During the late 1940s and early 1950s, Japan’s security policy became the most divisive foreign policy issue in the country. Indeed, as Tae-Hyo Kim (2003) noted: “the Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida government’s pursuit of a security alliance with the United States incurred the wrath both of anti-American leftists and pro-rearmament rightists.” Leftists alleged that, in renouncing war, Japan also renounced its right to an armed force. Quoting the constitution’s no-war article, they claimed the Self-Defense Force was unconstitutional and opposed Japan’s conclusion of an alliance with the United States. In particular, the Socialist Party was fundamentally opposed to the views of the Japanese government. The Socialists were clearly opposed to rearmament and were not willing to accept a security guarantee from the West in the form of a temporary stationing of armed forces in Japan. While on the other hand, Rightists claimed that, despite its constitutional pledge not to wage war, Japan had the right to possess an armed force. Politicians such as Ichiro Hatoyama and Ichiro Kono insisted that Japan should not, in its foreign policy, rely mainly on the United States but should seek to broaden the scope of its international relations as widely as possible. They also emphasized the need to revise the Constitution, which they said had been forced upon Japan by the United States, to eliminate American influences, and to rearm the nation. Japan, they claimed, must be defended by the Japanese people themselves. As the Japanese government put it, “only the country that lacks in strategic value or has armaments powerful enough to protect itself can hold neutrality,” but Japan fulfilled neither of these requirements. To Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida, espousal of neutralism for Japan was the height

of irrational idealism. To seek neutrality for Japan, Yoshida wrote, was like “the babbling of a sleepwalker,” and “a cowardly attitude, the opportunism of the weak.”

Then on Jan.19, 1960, the new *Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security* between the United States of America and Japan was signed in Washington. According to this treaty, for the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East, the United States of America is granted the use by its land, air and naval forces of facilities and areas in Japan , while it also reiterated that the use of these facilities and areas as well as the status of United States armed forces in Japan shall be governed by a separate agreement, replacing the Administrative Agreement under Article III of the Security Treaty between Japan and the United States of America, signed at Tokyo on February 28, 1952, and by such other arrangements as may be agreed upon. Meanwhile, it was noted in this treaty for the first time that both the two Parties recognize that an armed attack against either Party in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declare that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes. Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations.

In general, the 1951 *San Francisco Peace Treaty* ended Japan’s status of occupation by the U.S after the World War II, and the new *Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security* enabled Japan with the legal equality with the U.S. to certain extent.

On the one hand, the rise of Japan’s position in the Alliance was related to the strategic need of the U.S., but on the other hand, the public voice within Japan also took effects on the change of the nature of the Alliance. In February, 1960, after the

Cabinet of the Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi submitted the new Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States of America and Japan to the National Diet for approval, a debate about whether the defense duty of the U.S. army in Japan was involved with the collective defense right, which was banned by the Japanese Constitution, was taking place between the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and Socialist Party. Then a series of massive demonstrations were aroused nationwide, and Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi was forced to resign after passing the new treaty. The signing of the new Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States of America and Japan since the passing of the *San Francisco Peace Treaty* indicated the rise of Japan's international standing. This treaty marked a new developmental stage in the US-Japan relations. While the US saw it as a means to secure the use of its Okinawa military base, Japan saw it as an important step to regain Okinawa. The new US-Japanese Security Treaty also institutionalized consultation in advance while leaving several exceptions including U.S.'s deployment of regular weapons in Japan, moving its troops and attack overseas targets from its bases in Japan, and entry of U.S. nuclear warships into Japanese ports. The treaty was applicable both on Japanese territory proper and in the Far East. These points reflect the differences and commonalities in the strategic interests of the US and Japan. In this period, the U.S. and Japan acted on mutual reliance based on the intersection of strategic interests toward China, which also granted Japan with the capacity of its enlargement of armament and strengthening of its role in regional stability. As the new Treaty defined, the Far East area include the northern part of Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan region , Japan and its surrounding coastal areas, which consequently led to strong discontent of China. The Chinese government took such explanation of the Far East area as a prospect of the U.S. to make Japan paving the way for its

expansion in the Asia-Pacific. Henceforth, the influence of the U.S. Japan alliance to the regional stability of the Asia-Pacific was increasing. In this period, though the U.S. and Japan were mutually reliable on their strategic interests, some problems also existed, while the outbreak of the Vietnam War exerted an influence on the Alliance. With the progress of the Vietnam War, Japan started to take cooperation issue as a bargaining chip against the U.S. to reclaim the Okinawa and Ogasawara Islands. And the U.S. also criticized Japan of its lack of support to U.S. and the increase of Japan's military capability. And it was noted in the report of the U.S. House of Representatives in 1966 that there were deep divergences in the U.S. Japan relationship. Therefore, it can be understood that Japan, within the scope of economy and strategic choice, was in a dilemma between providing support to its ally and pursuing its own interests in the Asia-Pacific.

Such kind of mutual reliable relations lasted until the expiration of the new Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. On Jun.22, 1970, Japan and the U.S. declared that the Treaty was extended indefinitely. From 1972 to 1976, Japan completed the Fourth Defense Plan which enabled the Self Defense Forces (SDF) to engage active attack. In Nov.1978, Japan and the U.S. issued the Defense Guideline and took it as the programmatic document for the military cooperation between the two countries. While the U.S. constantly urged Japan to take on more duty in defense of the Asia-Pacific region, Japan, however, took the resistance against the Soviet Union as an excuse for self development of arms within the framework of the Treaty. By the year of 1990, Japan had fully accomplished the best military level in time of peace that goes beyond of self defense. With the growth of Japan's defense capability, the U.S.'s need for Japan's participation to realize its interests in the Asia-Pacific also increased, which led to the turning point of the U.S.-Japan alliance to the partnership

alliance. Japan also regains the equality and confidence within the alliance.

With Japan's economic rise and the U.S.'s strategic demand in the Asia-Pacific region, the intersection of mutual interests between the two countries also expanded. The U.S. calls for the help of Japan to maintain its position in this region, while Japan also needs the U.S. support to intensify its influence. Then on Nov.8 of 1995, the new *Defense Guideline of Japan* was unveiled, which shifted Japan's security policy from domestic defense to basic defense. According to the new guideline, Japan would deepen cooperation with the U.S. in the area of intelligence, military maneuver, training of equipment and technology, and the operation of the U.S. presence in Japan. This kind of cooperation can be extended to the East Asia. Meanwhile, the budget for Japan's SDF is increased by more than 2.1% per year, which also explained the two countries' uniformity in military demand. Through joint effort, the inconformity of the alliance interests was gradually coordinated. In April of 1996, the U.S. President Bill Clinton and Japanese Prime Minister Hashimoto signed the *U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration on Security* in Tokyo, in which the U.S – Japan bilateral relationship was affirmed as the most successful one in history, and it also stressed that the alliance between the two countries should play an important role in maintaining the Asia-Pacific's prosperity and security in the 21st century. Then the U.S. and Japan reached a consensus on making amendments to the *Defense Cooperation Guideline* signed in 1958. Actually, the *U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration on Security* was a formal confirmation of both the American strategy toward East Asia and the new *Defense Guideline of Japan*, while it constituted substantial modifications of the *Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security* between the United States of America and Japan in 1960. Then on Sep.23 of 1997, the two countries formally released the latest *US-Japan Defense Cooperation Guideline*. Thereafter, the framework of redefining

the U.S.-Japan alliance was established. Based on the new Guideline, the scope and function of military cooperation was greatly intensified. Later on May.24 of 1999, the House of Councilors of Japan passed three bills related to the *Defense Cooperation Guideline*, including the *Perimeter Situation Law*, *Revision Bill of the Law of Self Defense Forces (SDF)*, and *ACSA (Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement)* in order to implement the new guideline. The concerned law or agreement entitled the Japanese government with the right of providing maritime search and rescue or logistic reinforcement to the U.S. in case it was involved with military conflicts in the peripheral area of Japan. That's to say, the containment and intervention of peripheral affairs became the new objective of the U.S-Japan alliance after the end of Cold War, and the participation in international security issues became one of the major tasks of the Japan SDF. Since then, Japan transformed the state defense strategy to an extrovert one. What's more, the U.S. and Japan also consolidated the alliance through adjustment of foreign aid policy respectively. When Mr. Koizumi came to be the Japanese Prime Minister in 2001, he placed the U.S.-Japan alliance as the priority in foreign affairs. Guided by his policy, Japan not only rendered full support to the U.S.'s policy in international arena and cooperated with American military deployment in the Asia-Pacific region, but also dispatched troops to the war overseas, including the war initiated by the U.S. in Iraq. Japan seeks to establish an alliance group that covers all the allied countries of the U.S. in the Asia-Pacific region, which is similar to that of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In general, by formulating several bills ranged from the *US-Japan Defense Cooperation Guideline*(1997), the *Perimeter Situation Law*(1999), *The Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law* (2001), *The Wartime Legal Regime*(2003), *The Special Law on Reconstruction aid for Iraq*(2003) to the *The Wartime Legal Regime*(2004), the

reform of the U.S.-Japan alliance was completed.

3.2.1 Reasons for the Intensification of the U.S.-Japan Alliance

With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of Cold War, the common strategic threat ever faced by the Japan and the U.S. was alleviated, so it's understandable if the U.S. - Japan alliance tended to be loose and become weakened, and the emergence of strategically divergences is also reasonable. On the contrary, the alliance between the two countries was intensified. This paper summarizes the possible reasons as follows:

(1) For the U.S.

There are three main reasons for the U.S. to maintain the alliance. First is to take advantage of this alliance to bolster its global hegemony, and expand the U.S.- Japan alliance as a worldwide one. As a matter of fact, the maintenance of its global hegemony is the key factor in the U.S. national interests after the end of Cold War. In view of the super power, it is still difficult for the U.S. to gain exclusive hegemony. Therefore, the U.S. intends to reform its alliance with Japan based on new international situation and strategic threat, while urges Japan to shoulder some of its burden. *The Common Strategic Objective of the U.S. and Japan* issued in 2005 explicitly defined the global nature of the alliance, while it noted that the objective includes promotion of the basic value of human rights, democracy and rule of law, the enhancement of world peace, stability and prosperity, non proliferation of Weapons of Massive Destruction (WMD), the elimination of terrorism, the strengthening of the function of the UN, the stability of global power supply, etc.

Second, the U.S. seeks to use the alliance to serve for its Asia-Pacific strategy. However, the East Asia security is largely unstable due to some pending issues such

as the North Korea Nuclear Issue and the Taiwan Strait Problem. Therefore, the U.S. also includes some other concerning issues as its common strategic objectives with Japan in the East Asia, like the maritime transportation security and the security of the Southeast Asia.

Third, the U.S. intends to use the alliance to face possible challenges that may occur by the rise of China. At present, the U.S. deems that the rise of China is the one of its major challenges in the 21st century. According to the *Quadrennial Defense Review Report(QDR)* in 2006 and *Annual Report To Congress, The Military Power of the People's Republic of China* (2007), the U.S. treated China as the most potential power to undertake military competition. Therefore, it can be seen that the precaution of the U.S. for China is deeply rooted. Out of the common strategic interests, the U.S. wishes to transfer its focus from the Atlantic to the Asia-Pacific through Japan's participation in the NMD (National Missile Defence), in the aim of making military deterrence against China.

Above all, the U.S. Japan alliance, based on common strategic interests, has been intensified, and it not only constitutes the pillar of Japan's foreign policy, but also serves as a platform that connects the two countries. Both the U.S and Japan have reached consensus that the U.S.-Japan alliance is indispensable for ensuring the security of Japan and continues to play a key role in maintaining peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. It also facilitates the positive engagement of the United States in the region. Furthermore, the maintenance of this alliance can be regarded as the priority for Japan's stability in the Asia Pacific. But the alliance has also faced new challenges: domestic opposition to U.S. bases in Okinawa; Chinese criticism of a stronger U.S.-Japan security relationship; and growing international concerns with Japan's economic policies, etc. The alliance remains crucial to both nations' interests,

but the management of bilateral security ties has become far more complex. For the foreseeable future, Japan's alliance with the United States will remain the cornerstone of Japan's security, which is also arguably the most important factor in the stability of Asia Pacific region

(2) For Japan

While for Japan, the conceivable reasons for its will to intensify the alliance with the U.S. are as follows: First is to pursue a political and military power by way of the alliance. As the U.S scholar Katzenstein (1996) noted, the operation of an alliance is kind of informal communication rather than an institutional issue. In the course of the policy-making process, however, new institutional structures were created that insulated defense policy from the domestic and international pressures. Some of these structures were legal in nature, such as the restrictions placed on the German and Japanese armed forces by their interpretations of the constitutions. Such transnational communication has been set in the political agenda of Japan and place the military security as a higher position. To be more specific, it is the main strategic objective of Japan in the 21st century to become a political power that is commensurate with its economic position, and finish the process of being a "normal state", and the U.S. - Japan alliance is a critical platform to realize this objective. Within the framework of the alliance, Japan is eligible to engage much more in regional and global security affairs, while also dispatching the Self-Defense Forces overseas and enhancing its own position in the international community and military power. In addition, the U.S. does not oppose Japan's goal of being a political and military power, while asking Japan to make amendment to its Peace Constitution and possess the right of collective defense.

Second, Japan wishes to get protections from the alliance on its maritime security.

Because of the shortage of natural resources, most of Japan's necessary energy supplies are dependent on imports. So the security of the southwestern ship routes along the Japanese archipelago, the Taiwan Strait, the South China Sea and Malacca is of vital importance to Japan. However, since this route covers areas of many hot issues such as the North Korea Nuclear Issue, the Senkaku Island (Diaoyu Island) Issue, the East Sea Issue, the Taiwan Strait Issue, etc., it is possibly to be cut off in case of emergency. Therefore, Japan need the support from the U.S. and shall cooperate with the U.S.

Third, Japan also wishes to make use of the alliance to face challenges from the rise of China. Although China always upholds the policy of peaceful diplomacy and the construction of a world of harmony, the China Threat ideology is still somewhat popular in Japan's high level administrations. Anxiety and caution toward China have been increased through times. China's nuclear weapons, modernization of navy and air forces and developments of marine affairs were first noted in the *Defense Guideline of Japan* of 2004, then in the *White Paper on National Defense*, in 2005, and Japan paid more attention on the increase of China's national defense expenditure and participation of marine affairs, while urges China to be more transparent in national defense policy. It's believed by Japanese decision makers that the reliance on the U.S. is the best strategic choice in maintaining regional security with China. In April of 2005, the Taiwan Problem was incorporated into the Common Strategic Objectives, in which Japan's vision to get involved within the Taiwan Problem was listed. Moreover, Japan also participated actively with the U.S. in the research and deployment of missile defense system.

The researcher believes that in analyzing Japan's foreign strategy in the security area, the main emphasis should not be placed on the public mentality or institutional

mechanisms, but rather on the changing situation of international politics, which will continue to be the determinant of the direction of Japan's foreign policy regarding security issues. This means that basic shifts in Japan's foreign policy on security issues will be closely connected to changes in the international arena, not to independent initiatives by decision-makers in Tokyo. In addition, as a half century of insularity and passivity come to an end, and as Japan seeks to rebuild national self-respect and self-confidence through greater assertiveness and transformation, the strategic interests will gain even more explanatory power than institutional and cultural variables.

3.3 THE RESPONSE OF CHINA AND THE EAST ASIA COOPERATION

In general, Japan-China relations are often described as an uneasy mix of uniting and dividing issues in the context of above-mentioned global and regional situation. At the beginning of the new century, as Japan's *Yomiuri Shimbun* (2002) noted, upon the thirty-year anniversary of the normalization of China-Japan relations, many Japanese felt "Japan-China" relations are at their worst since normalization", while in China an opinion poll showed that half of respondents believed relations with Japan were "not good". These indications of poor China-Japan relations take place in the threshold of the 21st century, while curiously amidst a thriving bilateral economic relationship and a region-wide Chinese peace and reassurance offensive. Taking the current and practical disputes and even contradictions between Japan and China in multifaceted issues including territory and history into consideration, the strategic concerns of China is worth evaluating before getting through the response of China to Japan's foreign strategy.

3.3.1 CHINA'S STRATEGIC CONCERNS

From the overall perspective of the Asia Pacific region, Japan itself may not be the most pressing strategic issue for China, as the Chinese government is much more concerned about taking advantage of “strategic opportunity”¹ dealing with the “hegemonism” of the U.S., and preventing Taiwan from taking further steps toward independence.

China expects and encourages good relations with Japan, but the fulfillment is affected by certain conditions. From the perspective of China, the ideal Japan might be more neutral and militarily weaker than it now is, and should invest more heavily in China, offer more economic aid, and more generously share advanced technology with Chinese side. Politically speaking, Beijing also hopes Japan to support China's position regarding Taiwan and to show deference to China on several regional issues, which presently cannot be the case (Roy, 2006). As there are a number of factors causing tension in the bilateral relationship between Japan and China, these include: (1) the capabilities and activities of Japan's armed forces; (2) at least some aspects of Japan's security relationship with the U.S., such as missile defense; (3) the interpretation of the Pacific War by some Japanese (i.e. some Japanese think that the Japanese Empire had good intentions and did some right things, and did not commit some of the war crimes it is commonly charged with); (4) support for an independent Taiwan by some Japanese politicians; (5) Japan's possession or effective control of the Senkaku Islands.

It is believed by many Chinese that Japan seeks to increase its political influence both regionally and globally to complement its economic weight (which is

¹ Mainstream Chinese analysis says the “strategic opportunity” is that China can continue to concentrate on economic development now that its external security environment is relatively nonthreatening due to increased international respect for China's strength and improved Chinese relations with its neighbors and with the major powers, most important the United States.

understandable even in a period of economic decline). Some Chinese strategists seem to believe that if Japan is allowed to move from disarmed country to normal country as the recent cabinets pursued, Japan will inevitably make the next leap from normal country to aggressive militarist power. Such kind of displeasure stem from a few basic assumptions about Japan's inclination toward militarism and unwillingness to face up to its Pacific War record (i.e. the denial of atrocities such as the "Nanjing Massacre in 1937" and the whitewashing of history taught to Japanese school children). However, views among the Chinese elites are even more complicated than the general public; some progressive thinkers even caution China risks "getting bogged down to history" and should instead shelve the "old grudge" with Japan to pull Tokyo back from supporting U.S. dominance in Asia or Taiwan independence (Shi,2003). But to many Chinese intellectuals, such perceptions are thought to be unrealistic because of the history problem, the difference in political systems between Japan and China, and also Japan's close association with the U.S., which symbolizes the pattern of Japan's bandwagoning with the sole superpower in the international political system.

In general, Japanese and Chinese interests both favor a strong complementary economic relationship. For Japan, however, there remains an undercurrent of fear that this economic growth contributes to what may eventually become a dominant Chinese position in Asia. Both sides worry about each other's increase in military capabilities, seeing such buildups as potential adversary and unnecessary – a security dilemma. Both this and the disputes over territory which are common among close neighbors like Japan and China are made more acute by the deep level of mutual intolerance, with the Chinese believing Japan remains inherently warlike and the Japanese resentful that the Chinese government fosters (though not officially recognized) domestic anti-Japan sentiment.

3.3.2 FUNDAMENTAL METHODS OF ENHANCING JAPAN-CHINA RELATION

Though various problems existed between Japan and China, kinds of cooperation maintain as the stabilizers of the bilateral relationship of these two countries. History tells that at least a basic consensus has been reached among the governments and the majority of people of Japan and China, that a good bilateral relationship is mutually beneficial while conflict is harmful for both sides.

In order to safeguard and strengthen the driving forces of improving the Japan – China relationship, while seeking solutions to the existing problems, the possible and fundamental ways for the two countries to follow may include as follows:

- (1) Strengthen political dialogue and communication, make the policies of each side more transparent and publicized to reduce misunderstanding and increase mutual trust;
- (2) Explore more applicable areas of economic cooperation;
- (3) Expand the scope of cultural and personnel exchange especially for the younger generation

From the official visit to Japan by the then Chinese president Jiang Zemin in 1998, during which the two sides jointly declared to develop the Friendly and Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Development between the Governments of both countries in the 21st century, to the agreement made during then Chinese president Hu Jintao's visit to Japan in 2008, of issuing the fourth political document on the China-Japan relationship in “building a strategic relationship of mutual benefit” (Hu & Fukuda,2008), all of such events signified that the Japan – China relationship has experienced a period of post Cold War adjustment and re-established new objectives

toward the future.

Nonetheless, only gestures and guidelines cannot guarantee the mutual understanding between Japan and China, because the bilateral relationship is always affected by the domestic affairs of each side and also the international community. For instance, the scale of the exchanges between Japan and China in the 1980s and 1990s was far bigger than that in the 1970s, but much more problems also incurred at the same time.

As a matter of fact, the problems existed in the Japan – China relationship are involved with past and present factors, some of which are rooted in national sentiments and difference of political ideology, or even touching the deep level of state dignity or political culture, therefore it is understandable not to reach mutual consensus or acceptable solutions for every problem in a short time. The researcher intends to take the issue of improving Japan – China relationship from the perspective of forging a multilateral cooperation mechanism within the East Asia, which is co-led by Japan and China as a sustainable way of development in accord with the new trend of globalization.

By establishing such kind of mechanism, both countries can also set up new rules for extensive cooperation between Japan and China, under which the two sides can maintain check and balance through shouldering common duties in the region of East Asia, and mutual interests in various areas such as regional economic cooperation, facing the risks of financial crisis, mediating regional conflicts can be enhanced as well.

However, there are still many difficulties in establishing a new multilateral cooperative mechanism within East Asia co-led by Japan and China, i.e. how to view the influence of external powers such as the United States, how to build up an image

of Japan – China cooperation rather than conflict, how to increase other East Asian countries' trust on the common responsibilities of Japan and China in regional affairs and maintaining regional stability, etc. At least, the intentions of strengthening cooperation between Japan and China in regional affairs have been already publicized in the official level, just as noted in the *Joint Statement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China on Comprehensive Promotion of a "Mutually Beneficial Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests"* (Hu & Fukuda, 2008), that both sides resolved to cooperate together while building frameworks for dialogue and cooperation, cooperate together based on the following five pillars:

(1) Enhancement of mutual trust in the political area

(2) Promotion of people-to-people and cultural exchange as well as sentiments of friendship between the people of Japan and China

(3) Enhancement of mutually beneficial cooperation, with particular priority on the areas of energy and the environment, and expand common benefits in a wide range of fields, including trade, investment, information and communication technology, finance, food and product safety, protection of intellectual property rights, business environment, agriculture, forestry and fisheries industries, transport and tourism, water, and healthcare, etc.

(4) Contribution to the maintenance of peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region

(5) Contribution to the resolution of global issues such as energy security, environmental protection, poverty, contagious diseases, and other global issues which are common challenges that the two countries face.

3.3.3 INSUFFICIENCY OF EXISTING EAST ASIA COOPERATION MECHANISM

However important the cooperation between Japan, China and other East Asian countries may stand and the recognition of both sides on conducting effective and strategic cooperation, the current mechanisms under which such cooperation takes place are still insufficient to promote and strengthen substantial outcome. The researcher believes that effective cooperation not only is foundation of enhancing the Japan – China relationship, but also acts as shared duty of the two influential powers for the development and prosperity of the whole region of East Asia. And only by fulfillment of sound multilateral cooperation between China, Japan and other East Asian countries, a real solid Japan - China relationship will be established.

On the one hand, some rudimental multilateral cooperative mechanisms have been established in the East Asia region, such as the APEC (Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation), the ARF (ASEAN Regional Forum), the ASEAN+3 (Japan, China and Republic of Korea) (“10+3”) mechanism, Japan-China-ROK trilateral summit, China-ASEAN Free Trade Area (FTA), etc. But on the other hand, there are several insufficiencies in these mechanisms, which the researcher argues as follows:

- (1) Involvement of external powers such as the U.S., which makes neither Japan nor China to play a key role in promoting the intra-regional cooperation.
- (2) Narrow areas of cooperation which cannot effectively affect interstate relation
- (3) Some cooperative agendas are not feasible enough or even involves with biased political implications, for instance, the emerging U.S. –led TPP(Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement) talks invites the participation of Japan but excludes China, which is negative for cooperation between the two sides and the East Asia region.

In a word, the establishment of a new cooperative mechanism co-led by Japan and China can be conducive both for improving the bilateral relationship of the two countries, and maintenance of sustainable peace and prosperity of the region of East Asia. For now, the most pressing issue may be setting up dialogues to prevent contradictions between Japan and China from escalating into crisis, and promote various multilateral cooperation within the region.

3.4 SUMMARY

This chapter has provided a set of discussions on a range of issues that are related with the evolution and characteristics of Japan's foreign strategy. Analyses that have arisen from the sources and the researcher's ability to satisfy the objectives that were originally proposed at the beginning of this report are presented and discussed thereafter.

The next chapter will make conclusions based on a critical view toward Japan's successful development and China's peaceful rise, while paying attention that Japan's effort for state normalcy and China's rise are all resulted from international multi-polarization.

CHAPTER 4: CONCLUSION

4.0 JAPAN'S EFFORT OF STATE NORMALCY AND CHINA'S PEACEFUL RISE

Judging from the facts discussed in previous chapters of this report, the first decade in the 21st century can be regarded as the most dynamic period for post war Japan's foreign relations. From the quest for the permanent member of the United Nations Security Council to the wide-spread program of ODA, from foreign strategic perceptions of each prime minister's cabinet since the beginning of the new century to Japan's prominent influence to the global economy, all of Japan's achievements in the world stage are bolstered by the foreign strategies that are inherently connected and integrated, which is also drawing attention of the researchers interested in this area.

However, one thing in common for the various Japanese foreign strategic perceptions is to face the rise of China and its consequence on the Japan – China relationship, the balance of power in the East Asia, and the restructuring or readjustment of the international system, and “China” has become a new keyword for Japan's foreign strategy in the 21st century.

It's understandable that Japan seeks economic benefits through communication with a rising China while worries its dominance in Asia since the 20th century is impaired due to the expansion of China influence. Though P.M. Koizumi - the first Japanese Prime Minister in the new century had expressed that China poses no threat but opportunity, the idea of “China threat” still has some space in the political decision making process of Japan.

Historically speaking, every emerging power in its pursuit of a larger role of international affairs may draw concerns or worries of the existing powers, while the

latter tries to prevent their interests from getting lost. But the historical lessons also tell us that nothing but failure would be gained for any emerging power launching warfare for the purpose of expansion. China just chooses the way of peaceful rise for the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. But since there is no precedent in history for peaceful rise of emerging power, both the neighboring countries of China and global powers may watch the Chinese stances with caution and concern.

For the Japan side, the elements that affect the making of foreign strategy are mainly comprised of two parts, one is the desire of pursuit the state normalcy, and the other arise from the concern that a rising China may lead to more competition in the international arena with Japan in the long run, in which Japan seeks to gain its own strategic advantage. In fulfillment of such goals, Japan had taken unremitting efforts such as pursuing the permanent member of UN Security Council, rapid development of SDF, and numerous measures taken in expanding economic cooperation and cultural exchanges all over the world.

4.1 INTERNATIONAL MULTI-POLARIZATION AND JAPAN-CHINA RELATION

The trend of multi-polarization cannot be denied in the current context of international arena, while any country regardless of its state capacity must contribute to the world peace and prosperity on its share. Therefore, both Japan's pursuit of state normalcy and China dream of peaceful rise is result of development of international multi-polarization. The only thing that matters is the measure and attitude of the two sides to achieve their goals respectively.

Considering the vicinity and geopolitical significance, Japan and China are equally critical for the development of each side. But most of pressing tensions or conflicts are rooted in historical resentment and present shortage of mutual trust. The

common strategic demands and challenges facing Japan and China in enhancing the stability and prosperity through social and economic development call for proper solutions for peaceful coexistence.

4.2 RECOMMENDATIONS AND FURTHER STEPS

The following part of this report will set out the recommendations that have come out of the research, and also provide a policy formation framework that could be considered as an effective structure to aid in tourism industry. This final chapter ends with some thoughts of the importance of nurturing Japan-China mutually beneficial and strategic relationship through joint efforts, and expectations for future research on the sources of change in Japan's foreign strategy, in the purpose of balancing the strategic interests and concerns of Japan and China, seeking mutual benefit through joint efforts, and toward building of peace and prosperity of the Asia Pacific and the world.

4.2.1 OVERCOMING THE BOTTLENECKS OF JAPAN-CHINA RELATIONSHIP

Following the three historical documents in the diplomatic relations between Japan and China as *The Joint Communiqué of the Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China* (1972), *The Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and the People's Republic of China*(1978), and *Japan–China Joint Declaration on Building a Partnership of Friendship and Cooperation for Peace and Development*(1998), the *Joint Statement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China on Comprehensive Promotion of a "Mutually Beneficial Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests"* signed by then Japanese prime minister Yasuo Fukuda and Chinese president Hu Jintao in May of 2008 is the fourth documents serving as the

guideline in developing the Japan – China relationship in the 21st century.

However, in fulfillment of this joint statement, some bottlenecks are still to be overcome in order to promote the bilateral relations of these two countries to a new level. I hereby summarize as follows:

(1) Building strategic mutual trust. Though reiterated in this Statement that “The two sides recognized that they are partners who cooperate together and are not threats to each other”(Hu & Fukuda, 2008), there are still some expression or concern of “China threat” in the Japanese official document like the Diplomatic Bluebook and Defense of Japan (Annual White Paper) , i.e. in the report of "Defense of Japan 2007 , China was identified as one of Tokyo's primary strategic concerns while reaffirming Japan's alliance with the United States, by stating that “concerns over the future modernization of the Chinese military forces have been increasing” (Japan Ministry of Defense,2007:53). Since the national development of every country should be equally respected, and over competition or even conflict can be detrimental for both Japan and China, so the two sides should take a fair and objective view toward the other’s position in order to push forward their mutually beneficial and strategic partnership in the new century.

(2) Increase the level of cooperation

China is Japan’s largest trading partner while Japan is China’s third largest trading partner and one of the major sources of foreign investment, and as such, the mutual economic dependence has been commonly recognized by the two sides. The deepening of economic partnership and expansion of cooperation to larger scope such as environmental protection and energy saving can be conducive to safeguarding the interests of the two sides and promote the regionalization of East Asia.

(3) Improving the nationals’ sentiment

In recent years, the political tensions between Japan and China also lead to some negative effect on the mutual understanding of the people, making the level of friendliness declined. More efforts should be done to increase the contact between the Japanese and Chinese people as part of enhancing the Japan – China bilateral relationship.

4.2.2 THE IMPORTANCE OF NURTURING JAPAN-CHINA MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL AND STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP THROUGH JOINT EFFORTS

The next decade is a key period for China in building a moderately well-off society and achieving part of the China Dream, which is of great strategic importance for the nation. A sound and friendly Japan – China relationship can be booster for overall development of China, while a tensive one can be obstacle for driving the nation forward.

At the same time, it is also critical for the Japan side to evaluate the Japan – China relationship in the process of planning foreign strategy. Though safeguarding national interests stands as priority for diplomacy, those regional and interim interests should make way for the entire and long-term ones. Both Japan and China shall collaborate to maintain the general situation of their relationship, and prevent potential conflicts from escalating into crisis or breaking down.

After all, China and Japan are two large, powerful states that aspire to leadership and influence over the same geographic region, this research report provides the personal analysis and expectations for the way forward in an academic perspective based on the researcher's study in Japan. Since the Japan-China relationship also highlights some of the broader challenges confronting Japan's relations with other

countries within the dynamic region of Asia Pacific, further research and study may be needed on the sources of change in Japan's foreign strategy and policy making. It is also the responsibility of the governments of countries concerned to make use of the analysis proposed in this research, and ensure that the international coordination and collaboration are taken to the further step.

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