Population Change and Economic Revitalization in Japan: Satisfying Labor Demand in an Age of Population Decline

by

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Statement of Authorship

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Hereby I certify that the thesis has been written by me. Any help that I have received in the process of conducting my research and writing this thesis has been clearly acknowledged. I certify that I have not used any additional sources and literature except those I cited in the thesis.

Signature of Author

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Abstract

This thesis discusses the present trends of population change in Japan, and the government's reactions to it in terms of policy. Theoretically and methodologically, the thesis brings together a number of different types of material: demographic statistics on Japan's current aging and declining population and its history; social science discussions of the effects of aging on rural communities; the current situation in relation to immigration, and how far this can make up for the decline in population; and policy documents on the response of the Japanese government and society over the years.

The first chapter presents the theoretical model, and deals with the increase in old age life expectancy and the welfare system; the declining birth rate and its relation to costs of children; the problems of depopulation and the declining labor force, and the problems of government expenditure limiting policy options.

The second chapter deals in greater details with the dynamics of population decline, including the problems of the rural areas, the responses of the family to aging and population decline, and the possibility of immigration.

Chapter 3 concentrates on the history and present patterns of immigration in Japan, from the Edo period to the present, and the distribution and characteristics of the immigrant population at present: groups discussed include the Koreans, Chinese, Filipinos and Nikkeijin from Latin America.

Chapter 4 discusses government and citizen responses to population change, including both local and central government initiatives, and informal initiatives from citizens' groups and Non-Governmental Organizations.

The conclusion in chapter 5 notes that none of the government policies to deal with the problems of population decline and aging have fully produced the desired results, and suggests that future solutions may lie in more open borders and greater regionalization.

Chapter 1. Introduction

"Human Capital will soon rival – and may even surpass financial capital as the critical economic engine of the future" (World Economic Forum 2010: 7)

"Japan must create an environment where foreigners can actively participate in economic and social activities. […] The government must open Japan's doors to people from around the globe so that they can display their ability in this country" (Nippon Keidanren 2003: 7)

1.0 Introduction

Demographic change is a global issue. Every country is only as great as its people. Demographic development and changes in age composition of a society arise from a variety of factors, including armed conflict, changing birth rates and advances in medical technology and distribution. Japan's population is among the oldest and most rapidly aging in the world, and the birth rate among the lowest. This has produced a crisis in the taxation, welfare and pension systems: there are an increasing number of people in need of care and a decreasing number of workers earning the money to pay for it.

Japan's National Institute of Population and Social Security Research says that one in five Japanese is already over 65, and by 2035, one in three will belong to this age cohort (see Table 1). As Japan's population began to decline around 2007 after a prolonged period of diminished fertility and increasing longevity, it

undergoes an unprecedented qualitative change in its composition.

Table 1. Projected future population, proportion by the major three age groups (under 15, 15-64 and 65 and over) and age structure coefficient: [Medium-variant fertility (with Medium-variant mortality)]

Year	Population (thousand) by age group				Proportion (%) by age group		
	Total	0-14	15-64	65+	0-14	15-64	65+
2005	127,768	17,585	84,422	25,761	13.8	66.1	20.2
2006	127,762	17,436	83,729	26,597	13.6	65.5	20.8
2007	127,694	17,238	83,010	27,446	13.5	65.0	21.5
2008	127,568	17,023	82,334	28,211	13.3	64.5	22.1
2009	127,395	16,763	81,644	28,987	13.2	64.1	22.8
2010	127,176	16,479	81,285	29,412	13.0	63.9	23.1
2011	126,913	16,193	81,015	29,704	12.8	63.8	23.4
2012	126,605	15,880	79,980	30,745	12.5	63.2	24.3
2013	126,254	15,542	78,859	31,852	12.3	62.5	25.2
2014	125,862	15,201	77,727	32,934	12.1	61.8	26.2
2015	125,430	14,841	76,807	33,781	11.8	61.2	26.9
2016	124,961	14,486	76,025	34,450	11.6	60.8	27.6
2017	124,456	14,133	75,346	34,977	11.4	60.5	28.1
2018	123,915	13,803	74,732	35,380	11.1	60.3	28.6
2019	123,341	13,488	74,199	35,655	10.9	60.2	28.9
2020	122,735	13,201	73,635	35,899	10.8	60.0	29.2
2021	122,097	12,892	73,141	36,064	10.6	59.9	29.5
2022	121,430	12,622	72,678	36,131	10.4	59.9	29.8
2023	120,735	12,381	72,144	36,210	10.3	59.8	30.0
2024	120,015	12,159	71,549	36,307	10.1	59.6	30.3
2025	119,270	11,956	70,960	36,354	10.0	59.5	30.5
2026	118,502	11,769	70,363	36,371	9.9	59.4	30.7
2027	117,713	11,597	69,728	36,388	9.9	59.2	30.9
2028	116,904	11,438	69,028	36,438	9.8	59.0	31.2
2029	116,074	11,290	68,274	36,510	9.7	58.8	31.5
2030	115,224	11,150	67,404	36,670	9.7	58.5	31.8
2031	114,354	11,017	66,835	36,502	9.6	58.4	31.9
2032	113,464	10,888	65,896	36,681	9.6	58.1	32.3
2033	112,555	10,762	64,942	36,851	9.6	57.7	32.7
2034	111,627	10,637	63,949	37,041	9.5	57.3	33.2
2035	110,679	10,512	62,919	37,249	9.5	56.8	33.7
2036	109,714	10,384	61,832	37,498	9.5	56.4	34.2
2037	108,732	10,253	60,699	37,779	9.4	55.8	34.7
2038	107,733	10,118	59,528	38,087	9.4	55.3	35.4
2039	106,720	9,978	58,387	38,354	9.4	54.7	35.9
2040	105,695	9,833	57,335	38,527	9.3	54.2	36.5
2041	104,658	9,682	56,358	38,619	9.3	53.8	36.9
2042	103,613	9,526	55,455	38,632	9.2	53.5	37.3
2043	102,560	9,366	54,589	38,605	9.1	53.2	37.6
2044	101,503	9,202	53,779	38,522	9.1	53.0	38.0
2045	100,443	9,036	53,000	38,407	9.0	52.8	38.2
2046	99,382	8,868	52,268	38,245	8.9	52.6	38.5
2047	98,321	8,701	51,541	38,079	8.8	52.4	38.7
2048	97,261	8,535	50,792	37,934	8.8	52.2	39.0
2049	96,205	8,373	50,038	37,794	8.7	52.0	39.3
2050	95,152	8,214	49,297	37,641	8.6	51.8	39.6
2051	94,102	8,061	48,588	37,453	8.6	51.6	39.8
2052	93,056	7,914	47,894	37,248	8.5	51.5	40.0
2053	92,013	7,774	47,224	37,014	8.4	51.3	40.2
2054	90,971	7,641	46,577	36,753	8.4	51.2	40.4
2055	89,930	7,516	45,951	36,463	8.4	51.1	40.5

Current population as of October 1 of each year. Indices for 2005 are based on the "Population Census Report" by the Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (the population of "unknown" age adjusted by equally distributing over all age groups).

Source: Kaneko et al. (2008: 84).

Not only the numerical loss of people, but also the continuing increase in the

proportion of elderly citizens and subsequent challenges related to the long-term financial sustainability of its pension and healthcare system threaten the future of Japan. However, the looming change stretches beyond the lack of bodies. Companies face losing significant numbers of their most experienced workers in retirement or to other businesses, their special – even unique – skills, training and qualifications. Talent shortages and a substantial loss of knowledge and experience in more and more sectors may be the result. Against this background, companies are facing tight labor markets on the one hand and having to consider what kinds of people to employ in the future on the other.

Immigrants, who could partly compensate for the lack of national reproduction, do not come to Japan in large numbers, partly because of the country's restrictive immigration laws. Immigration has a rejuvenating effect on the population as people moving here are generally younger than those going abroad. However, since 2008 Japan's immigration balance has been negative (OECD 2011: 294-95). More people are leaving the country than entering it. The government blames the economic crisis for this, and the lack of domestic jobs. Compared with similar developed countries, relatively few qualified people have come to Japan during this period: a small number of foreigners have been allowed to settle permanently in the last few years, nowhere near enough to offset the estimated shortage of people with sought after educational qualifications such as engineers and geriatric nurses. The dearth of semi-skilled workers is also hardly encouraging. People suspect that the decline in the number of foreigners coming into Japan is not just a temporary setback, and after Fukushima, many highly-

skilled people – Japanese and resident foreigners alike – have begun looking for jobs in neighboring countries (cf. Hayashi and Maeji 2011). Sakanaka Hidenori (2005) – a former director of Tokyo's Immigration Bureau – fears that the demographic decline and the subsequent inability or unwillingness of the national government to cope could irreversibly reduce its vitality and (economic) prosperity.

According to estimates in a much-quoted report on replacement migration published by the United Nations (United Nations Population Division 2001), between 2000 and 2050, Japan would need 647,000 immigrants per annum, a total of 32.3 million, to stabilize its quantitative labor force at the current height, or to maintain an elderly support rate of 3.0, it would need an additional immigrant stock of almost 95 million (1.9 million per annum)[1]. As the primary baby boom generation born between 1947 and 1949 retires, more people are leaving than entering the domestic labor market. In March 2011, the potential labor force stood at around 62 million, of which 59.28 million people were employed (Statistical Bureau 2011).

Despite the prerequisites set by the immigration law and the position of the government that only skilled workers should be allowed in, there has still been a flow of undocumented migrants, working in the construction sector and similar industries, often organized by the local *yakuza*.

However, as traditional migration theories suggest, people migrate in the face of push/pull factors. If conditions deteriorate in a limited area or on a national

1 In the former case its total population would increase to 150.7 million, while in the latter case it would increase to 229 million, almost double the current size. But as will be argued in this thesis, even today's Japan has difficulties to attract more foreign labor.

level, people try to improve their livelihood by moving away in large numbers, and they often congregate as minorities in a particular destination. Historically, foreigners in Japan were not only unwelcome as supplementary labor, but also often object of political calculation and target of ethnic and racial discrimination. Some fear that social tension will rise if Japan does not manage this process of integration quickly and solve the problems, despite the costs.

Theoretically, therefore, this thesis tries to bring together a number of bodies of literature which are usually considered separately, from history, demography, sociology and anthropology, to discuss the reasons for Japan's population decline and aging society, the effects throughout Japan in different prefectures, and in the rural and urban areas, and the policies adopted by national and local governments in response to this. The variables I will discuss are:

- The increase in life expectancy
- The welfare system
- The birth rate
- The cost of education and upbringing
- Rural depopulation
- Government expenditure
- Immigration
- Competition from outside

The relations between these are shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1. Relationship of main variables in theoretical model



The relations between these elements are discussed in the following section, after a brief discussion of literature and methodology. As will be seen below, this thesis is based mainly on library sources and publications available on line. The problem with dealing with the Japanese economy is that there are several different bodies of literature relevant to the problem. First, there is a large amount of demographic work on the Japanese population and its decline, as represented in the studies by Kaneko et al. Many of the key diagrams of population pyramids and the populations of regions and prefectures are taken from this work, and key tables have been included in the appendices. Second, there is a large body of historical work dealing with movements of migrants in and out of Japan, including for instance the major studies of the Korean population by Weiner (e.g.

1993). Thirdly, there is a developing literature on the population and migration policies of the Japanese government, represented both by the official sources from Ministries in Tokyo, and commentary (often critical) by sociologists including Nagy, Pak and others. Fourth, there is now a considerable literature on depopulation of the rural areas and its social effects, by anthropologists such as Traphagen (2003), Thompson (2003), Knight (2003), Burgess (2008), Faier (2009) and others. Finally, there is now a very large body of information from anthropologists on the increasing number of migrant minorities within Japan, which are becoming very well documented. This includes the outstanding work on the Chinese by Liu-Farrer (2010), the Koreans by Ryang (1996) and Fukuoka (2000), the Nikkeijin by Tsuda (2003), and the Filipinos by Faier (2009). In this thesis I have attempted to bring these different strands of the literature together to create a picture of the current state of migration and migration policy in the country, and its likely success in heading off population decline.

1.1 Increase of old age life expectancy and the welfare system

The emergence of Japan's highly aged groups is predicated upon several factors that will be explained in the following paragraph.

First of all, with the introduction of a general healthcare system, Japan was able to decrease its infant mortality rates from one of the highest in Asia to one of the lowest worldwide. As illustrated in Table 2, in 1950, 60.1 children per 1,000 live births children did not reach their first birthday, since then it constantly declined to 2.4 in 2009. In particular, farmers and other inhabitants of the rural

areas often did not have the means to protect their children against illnesses via inoculation and hospitals were spread sparsely across the country. Unlike modern times with 222.3 physicians (nurses an assistant nurses: 980.7) per 100,000 citizens, that number was much lower in the early postwar years (Statistical Bureau 2010: 172)[2]. People often had to travel long distances to bring their children to a hospital, often not in time. However, after 1945 with the introduction of its current healthcare system, these mortality numbers dwindled drastically, as can be seen in Table 2, with new hospitals built across the country and declining treatment costs.

Table 2. Vital Statistics

Year	Rates per 1,000 population [1]				Total fertility rate [2]	Life expectancy at birth (years)	
	Live births	Deaths	Infant mortality	Natural change		Males	Females
1950	28.1	10.9	60.1	17.2	3.65	a) 59.57	a) 62.97
1955	19.4	7.8	39.8	11.6	2.37	63.60	67.75
1960	17.2	7.6	30.7	9.6	2.00	65.32	70.19
1965	18.6	7.1	18.5	11.4	2.14	67.74	72.92
1970	18.8	6.9	13.1	11.8	2.13	69.31	74.66
1975	17.1	6.3	10.0	10.8	1.91	71.73	76.89
1980	13.6	6.2	7.5	7.3	1.75	73.35	78.76
1985	11.9	6.3	5.5	5.6	1.76	74.78	80.48
1990	10.0	6.7	4.6	3.3	1.54	75.92	81.90
1995	9.6	7.4	4.3	2.1	1.42	76.38	82.85
2000	9.5	7.7	3.2	1.8	1.36	77.72	84.60
2005	8.4	8.6	2.8	-0.2	1.26	78.56	85.52
2007	8.6	8.8	2.6	-0.1	1.34	79.19	85.99
2008	8.7	9.1	2.6	-0.4	1.37	79.29	86.05
2009	* 8.5	* 9.1	* 2.4	* -0.6	* 1.37	79.59	86.44

1) The infant mortality rate is per 1,000 live births. 2) The average number of children that would be born alive to a hypothetical cohort of women if, throughout their reproductive years, the age-specific fertility rates for the specified year remained unchanged. a) 1950-52 period.
Source: Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare.

Source: Statistical Bureau (2010: 13).

2 "While the number of physicians providing healthcare is increasing nationwide, their uneven distribution has become a problem due to the lack of physicians specializing in certain areas of medicine and the lack of physicians operating in regional parts of the country." (Statistical Bureau 2010: 172).

Secondly, due to its resource scarcity, people are Japan's primary source of economic prosperity. As prosperity rose and the birthrate declined, the public and private sector acted accordingly to improve the general health of the people. Smoking, for example - once a sign of achievement and independence - was increasingly regarded as health risk. However, as the influence of Western cuisine has increased, so also have obesity rates increased in Japan. There is growing health consciousness (e.g. in relation to smoking, alcohol) in all age cohorts, despite the recent increase in the incidence of obesity. Respiratory illnesses related to production which once were a burden for the public, have now been reduced, as the government has promoted the change to a green Japan. Environmental regulations were introduced, and government became conscious of the problems caused e.g. by pollution in production processes, as the 1970s led to the spread of diseases such as Minamata disease, *itai itai* disease, and Yokaiichi asthma (McKean 1983, George 2006). Military disarmament meant the end of the military campaigns – particularly the Second World War – which had emptied the ranks of young men in prewar Japan. Economic prosperity and the absence of war allowed the underlying trends that were brought about by better hygiene and other factors to become more visible. National access to affordable healthcare at first decreased infant mortality, high by western standards, and this was eventually supplemented by increasing life expectancy to provide a longer, healthier life after retirement. Famines and starvation which had been a feature of the prewar period in some regions disappeared after land reform. The advances in medical technology in the developed countries since 1945, coupled with the effective delivery of medical

services in Japan, resulted in increasing life expectancy, while the high-speed economic growth which began in the 1950s also contributed to a fall in the birth rate.

As a result, financial experts now warn of a collapse of the social security system. The causes of population decline are varied and the influence of politicians over these factors is limited. The aging of the population becomes more pronounced as the numbers and proportions of the young and elderly groups move in opposite directions: there is an increasingly small number of young people, and an increasing number of old people. The age pyramids in Figure 2 illustrate the aging of Japan for the future.

Figure 2. Population pyramid: Medium fertility (with Medium mortality) variant



Source: Kaneko et al. (2008: 90).

This development is apparently due to an avoidance of procreation, and cohabitation frequencies for married and unmarried couples are at an all-time low (marital sex about 40 times a year), often attributed to long working hours.

Figure 3. Proportion of sexlessness among married couples by age group



Source: Sato et al. (2008: 14).

The key problem of future population change therefore does not arise only from decreasing size, but also from its changing age structure. From a simplistic viewpoint, we have a situation where we have an aging population, a dropping birth rate in most prefectures, and no comprehensive strategy to respond to that. Since the 1960s, the period during which the average person draws a pension has doubled, and the size of pensions has also increased, which culminates in a higher burden than ever before. The baby boomers who dedicated their lives to the rise of the world's second – now third – largest economy, through their retirement, are leaving the country with a serious problem. Rising numbers of divorces further accelerate the process, as procreation outside of marriages is still rare and pregnancies often result in wedlock marriages, or in other words: "Given the rise of the divorce rate among mature couples in Japan, marriage can no longer

provide a guarantee of long term care by the spouse or children in old age" (Yamashita 2008: 167).

1.2 The declining birth rate and costs of children

In Japan, in relation to the number of children a woman has during her life, significant differences can be identified between the generations. Reproductive behavior is dependent on several factors, including forms of contraception available, women's employment, and the financial conditions of a life with or without children.

Japan's nonphysical infrastructure, in terms of human resources, is crumbling away and the future appears bleak at best. It requires a birth rate of 2.1 children per women for the population to remain stable, and a higher rate if it is to increase (United Nations Population Division 2001). The reasons for the decline of the birth rate are well known: the readily availability of abortion and several contraceptives after the Second World War, the absence of the pronatal propaganda seen during the militarist period, and the high-speed economic growth from the 1950s have all contributed.

Figure 4. Number of births and total fertility rate (1947 – 2005)



Source: Sato et al (2008: 4).

The wane of arranged marriages and societally preferred role models has allowed women more freedom in their choice of partner and employment, and reproductive behavior and frequency in general: sexual intercourse and conception is no longer only controlled by the husband, but by the wife as well, ultimately giving both partners control over the number of children, time of birth and a variety of options for family planning, as can be seen in Figure 5. The number of women who never used contraceptives declined from around 65 to less than 20 percent over the last 50 years, while the combined majority – over 70

percent - of married Japanese women are nowadays either current or past users.

Figure 5. Contraceptive use among married women



Source: Sato et al. (2008: 11).

The widespread improvement of secondary and tertiary education was accompanied by the introduction of freely available family planning and information (Coleman 1992). As the economy grew in the 1950s and 1960s, there was a decline in the proportion of families with more than three children, and the family with one or two children became the socially acceptable norm. This was coupled with an increase in marriage age (1950: groom 25.9, bride 23.0; 2009: groom 30.4, bride 28.6 years) (Statistical Bureau 2010: 16)[3]. There has also been

3 Number of divorces in 2009: 253,000.

the growing independence of children, and their increased mobility, with serious implications for the future well-being of their parents. As children moved to the cities, a larger proportion of the elderly stayed in the smaller towns and the rural areas, particularly in the north of the country. Some social classes, such as male farmers in the rural areas who are eldest sons, have found it increasingly difficult to find wives, leading to them either remaining bachelors, or finding wives outside the country. From the 1970s, the phenomenon of *Japayuki* – women from the Philippines and elsewhere in Southeast Asia, many of whom were coming to Japan hoping to marry – has been a feature of migration, and some rural areas now have significant proportions of these women maintaining the rural social structure (Faier 2010). "There is a positive correlation between income level and the probability of marriage, particularly for males" (Toyota 2008: 166).

The increasing competitiveness of the school system in terms of academic achievement has resulted in parents spending more money on their children's education, including evening classes provided by the *juku* that specialize in getting children through examinations to high school and university, and has increased the costs of education for many families, also putting pressure on them to reduce family size. However modern family policy could exacerbate the central demographic problem – chronic childlessness – even further. This is clear from the age of mothers when they have their first children. In the 1960s and 1970s of the last century, it stood at around 25. In 2009, the average age climbed to 29. This trend increases the risk of remaining childless.

Women's increasing integration into the labor market has also led to a drop

in both the marriage and the birth rates. As the equality of sexes has increased, many women have been unwilling to remain as only housewives, and have had less children as a result. Parallel to the decrease in the average number of children, the share of women who remain childless has permanently increased. More importantly, therefore, is the drastic decrease in the number of births, which has become irreversible, while, as several scholars pointed out, small nuclear families have gradually became the predominant and most popular norm, and even these are starting to disappear. As in other highly developed countries, many couples do not get married at all, but simply cohabit – and tend not to have children. Millions of young people in Japan find themselves supported by their wealthier parents and live at home into their 20s, the so-called “parasite singles”. The number of potential parents has been reduced in the last three decades to such an extent that further serious birth declines are inevitable. Many people prefer their material comfort over having a family. The long economic recession since 1990 has increased this trend in Japan: people are living within their means, and with decreased earning potential, they tend to have lower numbers of children. The opportunity costs of having children have increased with the prolonged decline of Japanese economy, leading to stagnant wages, and the need for two breadwinners instead of one.

When they were set up in the postwar period, the social security and pension systems were based on the paradigm of numerous youngsters and a limited group of old people with relatively low expectation of life (the old age support rate), but the age pyramid has changed drastically in shape, from a pyramid to coffin as

noted above. In Japan, the dependency ratio in the next few years will continue to rise (see the figures for potential support ratio in Appendix 16). This development is set to make the cost of pension and health care to rise sharply. This is a huge challenge when one considers that the national debt already exceeds 100 percent of GDP (net value) (Rogers 2010). There is now a major cleavage in society between childless people/couples versus families with children in regard to current disposable income and future pensions, instead of a simplistic old vs. young. Generally families with children have lower disposable incomes and lower pension prospects, as the wife stops working to have children, and her lifetime income is reduced as a result.

Government programs implemented to increase the birth rate have had little success so far. Despite the increase of child allowances, statistics show that parents spend about 37.6 percent - 1,982,000 yen - of their income on the education and related costs for their children, and the financial aid provided to families is a mere fraction of that (Japan Today 2010). With the introduction of the national healthcare and pension systems, children have gradually lost their economic value to their parents, and have instead become a drain on the family. In times of flexibility in terms of (un)employment and location, children act as irremovable anchors: people without children enjoy higher economic prosperity both while they work and in retirement, given that pensions are determined by income and number of years employed. In Japan, there are fewer and fewer families with multiple children and more and more university graduates without children.

1.3 Rural depopulation

As birthrates have declined and the expectation of life has increased, so has the population become concentrated in urban areas. The result is the depopulation of many of the smaller towns and rural areas, particularly in the more remote parts of the country. People have moved because of better labor opportunities and higher income in urban environments, the small size of the farms inherited from parents, better infrastructure and academic opportunities in the cities, and the availability of jobs in building projects, mostly located in already urbanized areas, and in the large sized industrial production sites which grew up after 1945. There is thus increased friction between a growing periphery and the major economic and administrative centers, including the Greater Tokyo area, which now produces 25 percent of national economic output. In the rural areas there has been a process of fusion of administrative units (*gappei*), to make the administration of the declining population more economical. There are regions where people have left and are leaving, and where companies have difficulties to procure enough labor. The problem in Japan is the increasing gap between highly developed regions around the capital and the rest of the nation (cf. Tabb 1995: chapter 7). Aging mainly takes place in the countryside. Also this is a trend that other developed countries in Europe and the rest of East Asia will probably face in future. Particularly badly hit are the areas in the north of Japan, including Tohoku and Hokuriku, as Matanle notes for Niigata prefecture: “To put these figures into their national context, […] the 46 per cent decrease in Sado's population occurred at the same time as a 51 per cent increase in the population of Japan from approximately

84 million to 127.5 million between 1955 and 2005" (Matanle 2006: 151). As rural populations decline, so other services collapse: for instance, transport companies have been striving to adapt their services for a rapidly aging population, and reduced demand.

1.4 The problem of government expenditure

While today Japan is mostly indebted to its own population (foreign debts stand at around 5 percent), in the future public spending will not be a feasible option. At the end of January, 2011, the rating agency Standard & Poor's reduced the credit rating for Japan for the first time in years by one point, from previous AA to AA-, three levels below the top rating of AAA (Kajimoto 2011). Fitch did the same recently (White and Ishiguro 2011). However, unlike the United States or some European countries at the moment, Japan is not immediately threatened by insolvency.

There is also the problem of deflation: the Japanese government has tried for some time to keep it in check. Since the beginning of the 1990s, it has launched dozens of economic programs to stimulate the economy, so far without success. Instead, the Japanese public debt has risen to 104 percent of its GDP (net value) and with the volatile economic situation across the globe, interest rate are on the rise[4]. Japan has already ceded its position of second largest economy to China, and the financial burden related to the Fukushima incident and the Tohoku earthquake and tsunami is still increasing.

4 See for instance Rogers (2010).

1.5 Labor force and immigration

Japan's response to its aging crisis has taken a number of forms. First, many companies have outsourced their production to other countries. This has some effect on reducing the demand for labor, but it hardly touches the problem of lack of people.

Second, there has been a trend towards automation and the use of robots in industry, but as a general solution this would be expensive, and current and future generations of people still would face lower incomes.

A third response is to raise the retirement age. Measures such as increasing the retirement age of a now healthy elderly population would increase the ratio between active workers and retired persons. This is already happening in some industries, e.g. the rise in the retirement age for professors in some of the major national universities, from 60 to 65 and beyond.

A fourth response is to export the problem of the aged. In fact there is some retirement migration, with countries such as Malaysia and Thailand opening their doors to rich pensioners from Japan and the West to come and settle in purpose built settlements (Miyasaki 2008, Ono 2008). If it is difficult to bring nurses to Japan, the elderly can go elsewhere. Retirement migration is an emerging global trend, but given the size of the problem it cannot be a general solution.

A final solution is to expand the group of contributors to the pension system by the employment of people currently unemployed (including the NEETS, people not in employment, education or training, and the *furiita* who choose to do only occasional casual work). In Japan, there is a growing proportion (after the

bubble bust) of NEETS, temporary workers, and poor workers without the chance of societal mobility. Young people know that they must be flexible and extremely hard working to get good job opportunities, and overtime is seen by them as a practically mandatory part of their life, which is why many prefer the *furiita* option. The problem is that those who are affected by unemployment for a long time are not likely to be in demand from companies as permanent workers. The long recession in Japan means that companies have cut costs by hiring more workers on a temporary basis. The result is that there is a growing proportion in the post-bubble period of NEETS, temporary workers, and poor workers without the chance of societal mobility. Even the traditional urban casual workers are being largely replaced by foreign labor (Gill 2001). A large number of hard-to-employ job seekers will remain. In some industries it is likely that many open positions can be filled only if higher wages are paid.

So how willing is Japan to raise its net immigration rate to raise the size of the population? There is a limit to which existing unemployed persons can be reeducated for other jobs (mailmen cannot to changed into heart surgeons). Outsourcing of production sites in manufacturing is already well advanced, and many of the jobs remaining in Japan are skill-intensive, which requires local training. As the working age population declines and as skilled and experienced workers retire, the viability and prosperity of Japan's future is endangered, despite the mass provision of tertiary education. The shortage has so far only affected individual professional groups, and the national labor market at large is not yet impaired. In particular, Japanese SMEs (small and medium size enterprises) face

serious problems and do not have the potential of large corporations to use international staff to remove these bottlenecks.

1.6 Competition from other regions

Increasingly international immigration draws on a global labor market, and Japan is involved in increasing (economic) competition from neighboring regions. Its competitive advantage is declining in conventional manufactures, which means that in future, it will have to focus on high quality and sophisticated products. If the population is aging and reproductively unwilling, Japan has to worry about its competitiveness if it is unable to bring the best and the brightest into the country in future. So, despite its dire need for foreign labor, Japan is losing in the competition with other countries in terms of accessibility and attractiveness[5]. It is now low ranking, behind most European countries, the USA, Australia and even Korea (in regard to accessibility) (Global Migration Barometer 2008: 9-12).

1.7 Japan as a model for other countries with similar aging problems

The reason why Japan is interesting from a research and policy point of view is simply that it is the first economically advanced nation to suffer from a super-aged, shrinking population, and therefore one that has to choose from a variety of options how to handle this peculiar development. Independent of the prospect of failure or success, any data generated from Japan's experience can aid other countries in finding their own solution when they reach that inevitable

5 Overall ranking: 28th; Attractiveness to Migrants: 22nd; Accessibility for Migrants: 53rd; Need for Migrants: 1st.

crossroad.

1.8 Research questions and the remainder of the thesis

Given these variables, the remainder of the thesis will concentrate on the following research questions.

- What has been the impact of population decline on Japanese society?
- What have been the main patterns of migration to and from Japan historically, and what are the most important contemporary flows in and out of Japan?
- What ethnic and national minorities are now resident in Japan, what are their main social characteristics, and in what kinds of niches in the labor market are they primarily employed?
- What has been the government response to population change, both at the national and local level? In particular, what attitudes to migration have developed at the grass roots level, in local administrations, and what initiatives have they put in place to support the integration of the migrants?

Chapter 2 discusses population decline in Japan, particularly with reference to the rural areas. It also discusses the impact of population decline on the rural family, and in particular relations between the generations, and between foreign wives and their husbands' families. Finally this chapter discusses the implications of these findings for the labor market and patterns of immigration.

Chapter 3 looks at the historical roots of migration to and from Japan, which

goes back longer than is often supposed. It considers the main patterns of migration from the end of the Edo period, and the impact of Japanese imperialism on flows of migrants, mainly from China and Korea. The chapter then turns to a discussion of the postwar flows of migration, as Japan's economy moved into a long period of high-speed growth, followed by the end of the bubble economy, and the long period of recession starting in the early 1990s. The main minorities present in Japan are then discussed in detail, in particular Koreans, Chinese, Filipinos, and Nikkeijin as well as smaller groups including Thai, Nepalese, Pakistanis, Iranians and others.

Chapter 4 describes the response of Japanese government and society to population change, and the changing policies towards immigration and the integration of the newly arriving migrants. It discusses local government initiatives, together with less formal mechanisms of integration organized by NGOs or by groups of migrants themselves.

The final chapter summarizes the arguments, and considers the most likely scenarios for the development of the Japanese population, the labor market, and immigration in the future.

Chapter 2. The impact of population decline

2.0 Introduction

In the first and second sections, Chapter 2 discusses the current and future population decline in Japan and its consequences with a particular focus on rural areas. The available data show that economically weaker regions are already facing the outmigration of younger people, with even the most prosperous regions and their younger working age populations facing decline by 2025, ultimately decreasing the number of (financial) providers of services and social security. Particularly hard hit are likely to be the education institutions in rural areas with schools closing down, further reducing the competitive advantages of these regions. As an example, Tohoku's Towa-cho tries to overcome these trends by subnational cooperation, tourist activities, going green, etc.

The third section discusses the subsequent effects on rural families that in some cases arise from inheritance traditions, which cause intergenerational tensions between family members still living in the rural areas, and their relatives who now live in the cities but are considering returning. The results of these disputes range from living in separate households on the same property to divorce.

The fourth section introduces already visible evidence of aging and depopulation in postwar Japan's labor market, and how the domestic labor market circulation has been supplemented by international immigration.

2.1 Population decline in Japan

A look at the subnational level reveals that today's differences in rates of speed and severity of population decline continue to increase, widening the gap both between regions and prefectures (Nishioka 2011). In the future, this will result in damaging some prefectures, and leading to demographic collapse in others, even in the absence of future adverse events including natural disasters such as the recent Tohoku earthquake, which will lead to even more rapid population decline.

Generally speaking, the previously described evolution of the Japanese population living in what are, for the time being, economically stronger and wealthier urban areas and relatively weaker rural regions, has revealed its full effects since the onset of nationwide population decline in 2005. Nishioka's figures (2011) show that Japan's only remaining growth regions before the population reached its inevitable peak (Kanto, Chubu, Kinki), only Kanto, or more precisely Southern Kanto (2005: 34.48 million; 2010: 35.06 million; 2015: 35.2 million) has withstood the general trend and has a growing citizenry, Chubu's population has stagnated at around 17 million, and the other regions are falling below their previous levels at an accelerating rate. None of the losses in the country's nine regions between 2030 and 2035 are forecast to be less than three percent; whilst today (2010-15) only Tohoku and Shikoku have reached that level. Another four regions are losing only up to two percent, as can be seen in Table 3.

Table 3. Projected Population Growth Rate by Regional Block

(%)

Block	2000–2005	2005–2010	2010–2015	2015–2020	2020–2025	2025–2030	2030–2035
Hokkaido	-1.0	-2.0	-2.8	-3.6	-4.4	-5.1	-5.8
Tohoku	-1.8	-2.7	-3.3	-4.1	-4.6	-5.1	-5.6
Kanto	2.6	1.2	-0.0	-0.9	-1.6	-2.3	-3.0
Northern Kanto	-0.0	-1.1	-1.9	-2.7	-3.3	-3.8	-4.4
Southern Kanto	3.2	1.7	0.4	-0.5	-1.3	-2.0	-2.7
Hokuriku	-0.7	-1.8	-2.6	-3.3	-3.9	-4.3	-4.9
Chubu	1.3	0.1	-1.0	-1.7	-2.4	-2.9	-3.4
Kinki	0.2	-0.9	-1.7	-2.5	-3.3	-3.9	-4.5
Chugoku	-0.7	-1.8	-2.5	-3.3	-3.9	-4.3	-4.9
Shikoku	-1.6	-2.6	-3.4	-4.1	-4.7	-5.1	-5.6
Kyusyu/Okinawa	-0.3	-1.2	-1.8	-2.5	-3.1	-3.6	-4.0

Source: Nishioka et al. (2011: 14).

On a prefectural level, this development becomes even more polarized (for prefectural figures, see Appendix 8, for prefectural growth rates, see Appendix 9).

Between 2005 and 2010, only seven prefectures could retain or expand their total populations, primarily Tokyo[6] and Okinawa – both of which will continue to grow in future. On the other hand, the worst cases of shrinkage have occurred in Akita (-4.5%) (cf. Mock 2008), followed by Wakayama (-4.1%) (cf. Knight 2003) and Aomori (-3.5%), which will lose more than one fourth of their populations in the near future (2035: Akita: 31.7%; Wakayama 28.8, Aomori 26.9%); others will also depopulate fast. Besides Tokyo and Okinawa, by 2035, only other six prefectures will have rates of decline lower than that of the Japanese population as a whole, and they are located in the three main urban areas of Kanto, Chubu and Kansai (Nishioka et al., 2011). With that in mind, Japan's urbanization will

6 Tokyo will follow the general trend in 2020, first declining by 57.000 people to 13.05 million over a five year period (2035: 12.7 million), following its industrial brothers in the Kansai area, yet still larger than current levels.

continue on an unbroken path. In the future, three in ten people (2010: 27.6%) will be living in Southern Kanto, already today Japan's most populated region, and 35.8 percent in Kanto as a whole. Furthermore, whilst its second most populated region – Kinki – faces a minuscule decrease of 0.5 percentage points (2035: 15.9%) due to Osaka losing 1.5 million, Chubu can catch up. Overall, Japan's dwindling population is projected to work, live, and procreate in further concentrated areas of the country.

The continued increase in childlessness, continuing the decline which began back in the late 1940s (see Figure 3), further exacerbates the shrinking of the general population. It can be found anywhere in Japan, on any subnational level, and there are no exceptions. In spite of temporary growth in some places, only a little more than one million children will populate the playgrounds and schools of Tokyo in 2035. But these children will make up only eight percent of the population, the lowest proportion of any prefecture. At the other end of the scale will be Okinawa, which will maintain the highest rate of children aged 14 or less throughout the projected period (2010: 17.4%, 2035: 13.3%). Whilst today the rate of the child population in every prefecture is still in the two digit range, just as at the national level, the majority (27) of prefectures will fall into the single digit range, aggravating the existing burden on the shoulders of current working age citizens and children already born, who are facing a growing elderly population (see Appendix 11).

Unsurprisingly, with minor exceptions, the working age population will continue its downward trend since it peaked around 1995 (see Appendices 5 and

6). Exceptions include Okinawa, where due to its comparatively higher fertility rate in the past, its present labor force will continue to increase until 2015 in absolute numbers. Tokyo, Aichi, Kyoto and Osaka will increase between 2020 and 2025 in relative numbers. The implications for the labor force can be seen in the difference of 11.1 percentage points between the participation rates projected for 2035 for Tokyo (61.4%) and Akita (50.3%) (see Appendix 12).

The severity of the problem of aging in Japan can be seen in the increase in the old-age population (Nishioka et al. 2011, see Appendix 14). Its size will continue to increase in the course of the next decades in absolute and relative numbers. There are already today 13 million more pensioners than children living in Japan, and further along the road, this difference will increase to 27 million. If both are seen in combination, the dependency ratio will increase to unprecedented levels.

In conclusion, you can say that the general age-structure will be turned upside down. Where once the number of children supported economic prosperity in later years as they turned into adults, the same cohort of once playful children has turned old and grumpy, burdening the succeeding generations, with no option of escape.

One consequence of this is that the number of people living beyond 100 will dramatically increase in future. In their paper, “Survival beyond Age 100: The Case of Japan,” Robine and Saito note that the number of centenarians has grown by a factor of 100 in just 38 years – from 154 in 1963 to 13,036 in 2000. In the 1960s, the number of people over 100 doubled around every six years, which had

fallen to 4.8 years at the end of the 1990s (Robine and Saito 2003: 210). The greater part of the increase since 1973 in the number of persons 100 years old currently living in Japan (55 percent) was due to the increased probability of surviving, while the rest of the increase (45 percent) was due to the increase in the size of the birth cohorts (Robine and Saito 2003: 213). Their results suggest that the emergence of the centenarian population in Japan will continue to accelerate, with the time necessary for this population to double being reduced by half in just 25 years.

2.2 Rural depopulation

The impact of the demographic trends of aging population and declining fertility is regionally very different: some prefectures, especially those near the large cities, are still growing in population, while many in the rural areas are already in rapid decline. At present, the effects of persistently lower numbers of children has already been visible for some time in rural areas where large families were once the norm (Matanle 2006). These regions have supplied growing metropolitan areas with migrants for some time, and outmigration, coupled with low rates of fertility, mean that the population is already in rapid decline, a trend that dates back in some prefectures to the early 1950s. In recent years there have been increasing examples of the merging of administrative bodies and the unification of cities, towns and villages, to decrease the related costs of public officers. The closing of schools, primarily elementary schools, is well advanced in some rural areas, and the children are sent to urban areas where they can attend

more prestigious schools, a stepping stone for their later careers. The urbanization of the education system results in a vicious circle, with children getting worse education than the rest if they stay in the rural areas, and middle class parents moving to the larger cities, as the rural environment does not provide the best educational infrastructure for the future of their children.

In John Mock's study of Akita, the trends are particularly dramatic. He gives the example of Kita Akita City, an amalgamation of four small townships arranged so that they would qualify for better funding from the central government. The population was 42,050 in 2000, and is expected to fall to 30,040 by 2020 (Mock 2008: 126). The decline in the population of rural townships began in the middle of the 20th century, with an increase in the upper age cohorts, and the population over 65 has been increasing. Mock argues that only systematic long term social and economic restructuring can position Japan to cope with the post-maximum population era.

As the population falls, there are severe implications for the education system. Since local districts cannot effectively raise funds, either the prefecture or the national government will have to be the sources for basic funding of education, against the background of rapid population decline. As for the school curriculum, it follows national standards set by MEXT, but there are differences between townships and major urban areas, and in the peripheral cities, there are fewer *juku*, to provide the additional training necessary to get into the higher ranked universities. Most secondary schools are located in densely inhabited areas of the prefecture, and tertiary institutions are located mainly in Akita and

Yurihonjo City. The implication is that children from rapidly depopulating areas will be at a disadvantage in competing for the best universities. In addition, as in other rural areas of Japan, there are many marriages between Japanese men and women from other countries such as the Philippines (Faier 2009), but multicultural education is not given priority, either in the formal or informal educational sectors. There has been little impact in terms of making Japan more multicultural. The expectation so far is that minorities will assimilate. Chinese and Filipinas will take Japanese names and blend into the Japanese cultural scene.

John Knight's study of rural Wakayama shows some of the environmental problems of the aging society (Knight 2003). He cites examples of efforts to resist rural depopulation in upland Japan, though the populations of many uplands areas are still declining (2003: 107). In Wakayama, forest was the dominant local industry. Fairly typically, the population of the community he studied had fallen from 10,276 in 1955 to 4,310 in 1995, due to the outmigration of younger family members rather than the departure of whole families. The low fertility rates therefore result from the removal of the more fertile younger age groups through outmigration. In 1970, local deaths exceeded local births for the first time. In 1960, children aged between 0 and 14 made up 37 percent of the population but by 1996 this had diminished to 12 percent. In 1955 people, aged over 65 made up 6.7 percent of the local population, but by 1995 this proportion had increased to 33 percent. In 1994, 31 percent of men in their 30s were unmarried, compared with a national figure of around 25 percent. These problems tend to affect white collar workers much less than agricultural workers. Even though family ties bind

migrants to their natal localities, the population still continues to drop (Knight 2003: 108-109).

Things are made worse by the demoralization of the residents in depopulating areas (Knight 2003: 110). There has been a large drop in the area of rice cultivation, much of which has been transformed into dry fields for the cultivation of vegetables. As a result, the forest has expanded in upland areas. The countryside is seen by many as a depressing place, due to the number of empty houses, closed schools, abandoned farms, and the spread of the forest with its wild animals. There are high rates of family breakdown and depression, with high rates of suicide among unmarried men. The incursion of wild animals, such as bears, boars, deer and monkeys into the village space is accelerating the process (Knight 2006). The damage that they do to houses and farms, and the dangers which they pose helps speed up the migration of the local population to the cities.

The local administrations are trying to reverse this with programs of *akarui machizukuri* (Creating the Bright Town), in order to promote positive thinking about the town's future. There are infrastructural projects, construction of facilities, and attempts to attract investment from the private sector, including the location of industry. The hope is that the availability of jobs might attract migrants looking for employment. There are also efforts to stimulate the birthrate, through setting up marriage brokerage services, establishing clubs in which local men and women can meet, and even creating formal relations with foreign countries to recruit potential brides. There are also schemes to promote having children, as well as encouraging people who have left the town to consider returning, through

nostalgic *furusato* images and cash incentives. There are also initiatives to provide housing for migrants wishing to come back. To publicize the district, a rural-based mail order operation has been established to sell local produce to the urban areas. There have been a small number of new settlers since the 1980s: Knight found that some people living in the cities had been attracted back to try their hand at organic farming or to work in forestry (for these initiatives see Knight 2003: 112-118).

One further strategy is to attract the elderly (Knight 2003: 119-120). Given that some towns with high rates of aging and large populations over 65 have good services, it would seem rational to concentrate large numbers of old people in one place. Some rural municipalities have established “Silver Areas” and “Welfare Villages” as special zones to meet this need. He argues that in future, municipalities may could compete with each other to attract the elderly, and to attract additional funding for these services. Even though these schemes in effect define the elderly as a resource which can be exploited, they have also been criticized, on the grounds that areas which already have a large proportion of elderly people are being used to dump the elderly from other areas. The argument is that a balanced population is needed in order to prevent the outmigration of the remaining local youth.

However, a more demographically balanced rural society really depends on the establishment of a viable economic base. Whether organic farming or forestry can supply this is doubtful: the problem is that most young people are already used to living in the city: as Knight notes, in a sociological sense, rural Japan has

ceased to exist, as most people's experience is now of urban life (Knight 2003: 121).

Thompson's study of Towa-cho in Tohoku suggests similar problems and strategies (Thompson 2003). As in other parts of Tohoku, the main direction of migration is from rural to urban Japan (ibid: 93-94). The municipality is striving to retain its vibrancy, and local bureaucrats are also fighting for the survival of their jobs and budgets (ibid: 95-96). The key is to generate new patterns of income and consumption. Restrictions on agriculture have led to a situation in which farming has become a part-time job, and living only on the income from agriculture becomes difficult. Generally, levels of employment in occupations outside agriculture have increased.

The government recognized the problem and gave grants to communities of ¥100 million to promote their "home town" image, and to develop new kinds of crops which could find a wider market. In line with this, Towa-cho attempted to improve its image nationally by getting together with three other towns with the same name to form a "Four Towa Alliance" and market the towns' products throughout Japan (ibid: 100-103). After the Kobe earthquake of 1995, Towa-cho also gained publicity by offering empty houses to help earthquake victims relocate to Iwate prefecture. There were also attempts to develop a hot spring resort by drilling for hot water. However, these projects came to nothing and did not increase employment or reverse the population decline. The mayor, who was the main force behind these developments, resigned in an argument over rice production.

Another problem resulting from depopulation is the fall in the government funding which comes to the village for each additional resident (Thompson 2003: 95-96). Local communities and politicians spend much time and effort traveling to Tokyo to lobby the central bureaucracy. Given the fall in the population, they have become increasingly dependent on additional sources of funding for their operating budget since the 1980s. Like other rural communities, the town is making efforts to stop young people from leaving, and to attract new residents, mainly through generating jobs in the service sector. It is making efforts to project the image of the town as a community full of possibilities, and the media coverage helps to heighten the town's profile, which makes funding easier to raise in Tokyo. Solving the town's problems therefore depends on the ability of its bureaucrats to utilize the Japanese system and devise creative solutions to the problems the communities face, through what Thompson terms "population politics" (2003: 97).

2.3 The family and population decline

In addition to its effects on the local economy and politics, rural depopulation in Japan is having a profound impact on the family. This is also linked to the issue of the support of old people in old age, given that families are now small and scattered, and younger people are more likely to live in the city than in the rural areas.

In prewar Japan, the general principle was that the eldest son would inherit the parent's property, together with the leadership of the household and its

economic activities. In return for this, he and his wife would have the primary responsibility of looking after his parents in old age. One major area of change is therefore the relationship between married women and their in-laws, discussed most dramatically by John Traphagan (2003). Historically, in the Japanese family, married women were expected to support their husbands' parents rather than their own parents in old age, and to some extent this is still the case. But it is a role that potentially can lead to conflict, and many stress their independence by refusing to provide this support. Living with in-laws potentially means conflict, and a lack of independence. Some 90 percent of those providing care for the elderly are women, and with the increasing number of people living to a great age, and the declining number of their children, the probability of having to share this kind of responsibility is much higher than it was in the past (for details, see Traphagan 2003: 204-210).

Whether or not a woman should live with her in-laws or parents is therefore a major issue. Traphagan cites a number of cases from his research in Mizusawa, a town in Tohoku with an aging population. In the first case, a woman's mother-in-law decided that she would buy land for her son to build a house, so that she could come and live with him and his wife, should she become ill in later life. The wife was horrified, and her husband eventually persuaded his mother to use the money to buy help if necessary, rather than move in with her son. Traphagan's informant also said that if the mother-in-law did move in with her son, she would consider divorcing him (this case is drawn from Traphagan 2003: 212-213).

The second case (ibid: 213-214) was that of a woman who was an eldest

daughter, who married a man who was an eldest son. She had married late, by which time, from her viewpoint, the only prospective husbands available were eldest sons[7]. However, she could not agree with the attitudes and values of his parents, and the conflict over which set of elderly relatives they would support finally led to divorce.

A third informant (ibid: 214-217) lived together with her mother-in-law in separate houses on the same plot. She had married a third son, but his two elder brothers moved to Tokyo, leaving her husband to look after the parents. She said that if she had found out that he would have to do this, she would not have married him. After some years living in Yokohama, her husband decided that they would have to return to his home town to look after his parents, who were noisily demanding he should return. After they moved, her father-in-law died, and her husband was transferred by his company back to Yokohama – leaving his wife living with her mother-in-law. She had provided in-home care for her father-in-law before he died, and also much of the hospital care such as taking him food and changing diapers. She told Traphagan she intended to move back to Yokohama herself when her children had grown up and moved out – but anticipated big problems if her mother-in-law was still alive. She mentioned two specific problems with mothers-in-law in rural areas: pressure for her to go out and work to bring in extra money, and conflict over how to bring up the children.

The fourth case (ibid: 217-220) was that of a couple who had moved back to

7 "I married late, in my early thirties. The problem is that by that age, the only ones remaining are eldest sons and eldest daughters, because nobody wants to marry an eldest. They have a very difficult time getting married. This is unlike being a second son or second daughter." (Traphagan 2003: 214)

Mizusawa five years before, to help the husband's mother take care of his grandmother. She got on relatively well with her husband's mother and grandfather – but neither of them got on well with his father, who they saw as trying to control their lives. The wife said that she had taken a job, simply to get out of the house and get away from her father-in-law. The husband had problems with him as well – which had led to physical fights in the past.

Traphagan's conclusion is that co-residence is often resisted, and the precise terms have to be negotiated. To many women, it "implies loss of autonomy, personal conflict, and emotional strain" (Traphagan 2003: 224). The values of the older and younger generations are often different, and parents often assume that their children and their spouses should look after them in return for the eventual inheritance of property. They have the attitude that they save money for their child's college, and intend to give it their property, so it is natural that they should expect to be cared for by their children in the future. However, wives are often unwilling to provide care for their in-laws. There is often a power struggle over the raising of the children, and to some extent the grandmother has the upper hand because it is often her household and the son's bride is considered essentially an outsider. In some cases, like the fourth of Traphagan's informants (2003: 217-220), they even dislike their in-laws intensely. Co-residence is therefore both contested and resisted – so that assumptions that the welfare of the elderly can be left to their children and their spouses in future would seem to be rather unrealistic.

As seen in these examples, it is often difficult for those living in the

peripheral areas of the country to find spouses at all, and this increasingly means that Japanese without partners look for them internationally, as described by Chris Burgess in his study of Yamagata (Burgess 2008). Most of the foreigners in Yamagata are permanent migrants, and many of them have married locally. Because of their location, they are more likely to make efforts to integrate with local society in the region, making it more multicultural in the process, and challenging stereotypes of who is "Japanese" and who is "foreign" (Burgess 2008: 65). As is typical of peripheral areas, the population of Yamagata is aging faster than the national average, with the result that spouses are likely to be living with their in-laws and working in the local labor market. Yamagata took the lead in the 1980s in bringing in brides from abroad, and one in fourteen marriages in 2000 was international (ibid: 65-66). The area therefore has long and extensive experience in helping these foreign newcomers settle into their new surroundings, so that cultural change may be more rapid in these peripheral areas than elsewhere. Burgess argues that it is the local communities like Yamagata which are at the forefront of internationalization in Japan (2008: 76) as well as the debate as to whether to open up the country for foreigners. Two-thirds of the foreign residents in the area are Chinese and Korean, though in some other areas of the country there are also a number of brides from the Philippines (Faier 2009). Women are at the center of these changes. To make the most of these opportunities, the foreign women have to be proactive, appear to accept local customs and values, and make the most of the situation. They have to change their own lives, rather than wait for someone to do it for them, and they find that with

patience and understanding, acceptance is possible. Burgess argues that to construct a society that can accept foreigners requires a change in the way that identities are represented in Japan (2008: 76). Even though Japan is less homogeneous than it once was, the influx of transnational migrants can also help reinforce both local ethnic identities and national(istic) ideologies, a point which will also be apparent from the consideration of Latin American migrants in a later section.

2.4 Labor markets and immigration

Given the problems of the falling population and the labor shortage in some sectors of the market, it is not surprising that many people see the necessity of an increase of immigration into Japan in the future. Douglass and Roberts note that there is a popular view in Japan of migration as a temporary phenomenon, "which will be overcome through factory automation and off-shore relocation of corporate Japan's labor-intensive industries" (Douglass and Roberts 2003: 3). In fact, an increasing numbers of foreign workers and their families will probably settle permanently in Japan, and despite the long economic recession, migrants are still finding niches in the domestic labor market. Despite negative stereotypes in the media, they are hard working and responsible, very similar in many cases to the rest of the Japanese. There are therefore many people willing to champion the rights of foreign workers to equal treatment, both at work and in the community. With the influx of migrants, Japan is becoming more multicultural: "Ethnic neighborhoods are appearing in cities, and urban as well as rural areas are seeing

an influx of foreign brides who bring along their own cultural heritage and lifestyles" (Douglas and Roberts 2003: 5).

The influx of foreigners since 1945 has gone through a number of phases. Even before WWII, there was a substantial influx of Chinese and Koreans into Japan (Yamawaki 2003). After WWII and the exodus of most of the Koreans and Chinese "oldcomer migrants" in Japan, some 34,000 Chinese (14,000 of them Taiwanese) and around 600,000 Koreans remained. After the end of the War, both the Chinese and the Koreans lost their rights as citizens, and the Alien Registration Law (1952) deemed both Korean and Taiwanese residents aliens. This in turn meant exclusion from many social welfare benefits, and from public sector employment. They could naturalize – but this meant assimilating and losing their own identities. Meanwhile, the large numbers of soldiers and Japanese colonial settlers returning after the war meant that little additional immigration was needed until the late 1970s. In addition, 50 percent of Japan's labor force was in the agricultural sector, and they provided much of the urban labor as the economy started to expand (for details, see Douglas and Roberts 2003: 5-6).

In the 1970s and 1980s, rural-urban migrants dried up as a pool of cheap labor, and more than 75 percent of the total population was now living in urban areas, while this proportion was about one third in 1950. The increasing shortage of labor and the rising value of the yen during the bubble economy of the 1980s meant an increasing number of foreign laborers in Japan, and immigrants became a new source of cheap labor. Emigration gave way to immigration. From the 1970s, Asian women began to come to Japan in search of jobs as "entertainers"

(often in the sex industry), with over 50,000 arrivals a year in the 1990s. In the 1980s, male migrants began to move into the lower paid jobs regarded as 3-D (dirty, dangerous, difficult) or its Japanese equivalent, 3-K (*kitanai*, *kiken*, *kitsui*, Douglas and Roberts 2003: 6-7) which were increasingly avoided by the Japanese.

Problems of migrant control also increased. By the 1990s, there were an estimated 300,000 irregular migrants who had overstayed their visas, in addition to around 900,000 immigrants with work visas, mostly Nikkeijin, migrants of Japanese descent from Brazil and other countries in Latin America. There was an equal number of male and female migrants, though occupations and immigration status differed by gender. The dominance of sex workers among female migrants started to decline, and increasingly women came in as spouses for foreign male workers and Japanese men, who were employed in an increasingly wide variety of jobs (for details see Douglas and Roberts 2003, Weiner 2003, Fielding 2010). Key events included revision of immigration laws to allow in large numbers of Nikkeijin from Latin America (Tsuda 2003, 2008), while tightening up controls for other foreign workers looking for work. This mainly affected Bangladesh, Iran and Pakistan (Minami 2008), whose workers had been able to come in without visas in the 1980s. This happened at the same time as the end of the bubble economy, which led to a long recession and a falloff in the numbers of migrants coming to Japan, opening up for large-scale immigration of 200,000 Nikkeijin; but closing doors for many other foreigners seeking low-wage work. The history of migration to Japan and its current trends will be considered in the next section.

2.5 Summary

This chapter has discussed population decline in Japan, particularly with reference to the rural areas. It also discusses the impact of population decline on the rural family, and in particular relations between the generations, and between wives and their husbands' families. Finally this chapter discusses the implications of these findings for the labor market and patterns of immigration.

As was seen in section 2.1, the population of many of the prefectures in Japan, particularly northern Tohoku, is already in steep decline, with the collapse of both services and communities. As seen in this chapter, education is particularly badly hit as the number of children in some areas falls. In fact, it is only the major urban centers, Kansai, Kanto and Aichi/Chubu, in addition to Okinawa, which are managing to hang onto their share of the population, but decline will also set in there eventually. Given that the future population of Japan can fit into the present urban housing capacity, it seems likely that the populations of the rural areas will continue to fall, as the low rate of fertility seems likely to continue. Meanwhile, the working age population will also decline, while the population of the aged – particularly the hyper-aged, will greatly increase.

The recent rural studies carried out in the rapidly ageing regions of the country show the impact of this at the micro-level. Knight's work in Wakayama, in the Kansai area, but with similar problems to Tohoku, concentrates on the ecological effects of depopulation – with the decline of agriculture, the residents are demoralized, and the increasing encroachment of wild animals into former agricultural areas is increasing the outmigration. The main problem in

Thompson's work on Towa-cho shows the financial problems of towns with declining populations, as the flow of subsidies from central government declines. As in Wakayama, the government has a number of colorful initiatives in place to reverse the trend – but as yet they have had little effect on the population decline. Finally, Traphagan's work shows the impact of these kinds of pressures on the family, the increasing conflict between the generations, as the old people feel more neglected, and the younger people feel increasing unwilling to return to the rural areas to look after them. Finally, given that it is difficult to find wives for many farmers in the rural areas, the work of Burgess, as well as that of Faier discussed below (2009) shows one possible solution – the importation of brides from abroad, particularly from the Philippines. This relates to the subject of how far the population problem can be solved more rapidly by the alternative of immigration, and this is discussed in more detail in the next chapter.

Chapter 3. Patterns of migration

3.0 Introduction

Chapter 3 looks at the historical roots of migration to and from Japan, in both historical and contemporary perspective. It describes the main patterns of migration from the end of the Edo period, and the impact of Japanese imperialism on flows of migrants, many of whom came from Japan's occupied territories in Korea and China prior to the Second World War. The chapter then turns to a discussion of the postwar flows of migration, as Japan's economy moved into a long period of high-speed growth, followed by the end of the bubble economy, and the long period of recession starting in the early 1990s. This is then followed by a detailed discussion of some of the main national and ethnic minorities in Japan, particularly the Koreans, the Chinese, the Filipinos, and the Nikkeijin from Latin America, mainly from Brazil. It also considers smaller groups such as Thai, Nepalese, Pakistanis, Iranians and others.

3.1 The Edo Period

Japan was fully involved in the trade and politics of the Asian region, until the Edo period. The Tokugawa shoguns were worried about the impact of the Portuguese and Spanish, together with Christianity and imports of arms, on the stability of Edo Japanese society, and closed up the country. Immigration, along with foreign trade, was tightly controlled, and the only place open to foreign trade from China and the Netherlands was Dejima, a small island which is now part of Nagasaki.

Even though the inflow of information from the outside world continued, emigration from Japan was forbidden by capital punishment, in the policy of "national seclusion" (*sakoku*). Even within the country, mobility of goods and people was limited. There were checkpoints on the major roads, staffed by the agents of the regime. In the stratification system, traders had a low rank, below those of samurai and peasants, but during the Edo period, as trade boomed, they became increasingly rich, as the samurai lost both wealth and influence. But it was not until the collapse of the Tokugawa regime in the mid-19th century that the country opened up, and movement in and out resumed. The relevance of this history is that Japan historically has had long phases in which migration was welcome (e.g. Befu 2000), and also those in which the country was closed, and these images of globalization and closure (*sakoku* – e.g. Itoh 2000) are often found in contemporary discussions of migration and the position of migrants in Japan.

3.2 Migration from the Meiji period

As soon as the Meiji regime was established, emigration began, first to Hawaii and later to Latin America. The Meiji regime and its successors were worried about overpopulation, and emigration was encouraged. According to Shintani's study of the Japanese migration to Peru (2005, 2006), the historical factors that influenced the initial Japanese immigration to Peru were the growth of the population, the need to provide impoverished farmers with work, if necessary abroad, the need for foreign currency supplied by remittances from overseas, the

need to develop Japanese trade through exports, and overseas settlement as a tool to expand Japanese influence. The following is a summary of her arguments. Some 29,000 Japanese workers were sent abroad to work on sugar plantations up to 1984. The Meiji government decided to ban further emigration of Japanese workers for the sugar industry, and this led to the redirection of emigration to Latin American countries. The United States of America was not only seen as a labor market due to higher wages and better working conditions, but also as a place to receive additional education, thus North America became a preferred destination for Japanese emigrants before the imposition of immigration restrictions. Large-scale Japanese migration to Latin America began in 1899: Japan and Peru had already signed a Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation in 1873, and in 1888, the Peruvian government allowed the immigration of Japanese labor to meet the demand for exports, especially sugarcane and cotton for the European Market. From 1899-1923, contract workers were imported, though the images of a South American paradise used by the emigration companies to promote migration soon vanished, as breaches of their obligations by the Peruvian landlords led the Japanese workers to strike, shortly after their arrival. Continued injustice and abuse forced many Japanese to run away from their employers. However, after 1924, sufficient numbers of Japanese were successful enough to invite their relatives and friends to work in Peru, mostly in urban areas. Previous Japanese immigrants served as guarantors, financing the trip for their friends and relatives. Brides were recruited for those already in Latin America through *shashin kekkon* (photo marriages) as family

members of migrants looked for prospective brides and introduced them via photos: the marriages took place by proxy in Japan before the brides left for Latin America.

Japanese immigrants in Latin America were also aware of the importance of education for their younger relatives, and they began to establish schools to serve their communities there, starting in 1908. Lima Nikko was founded by the Japanese Central Society in 1920, and was recognized by the Japanese Ministry of Education. Before the First World War, about 22 Japanese schools were established, three of them recognized by Japanese Ministry of Education. Those that could afford it sent their children back to Japan for education, but otherwise it was provided in Peruvian centers. Within Peru, there was a secondary migration from the rural to the urban areas, and the Japanese established small businesses. These stimulated the establishment of Japanese associations and these, together with commercial groups, influenced the development of the Japanese community.

By 1930, 87 percent of the Japanese population in Peru was concentrated in Lima, and a number of other associations had developed, including the Nihonjin Kyokai (Japanese Association), Nihon Doshikai (Japanese Society), and Chou Nihonjinkai (Central Japanese Society). Associations were at the center of Japanese social life, and were one of the pillars of their ethnic community.
The concentration of Japanese in urban areas of Peru continued, and led to a backlash: in 1932, the '80% Law' was passed, stating that the workforce of foreign commercial establishments must have at least 80% of Peruvians workers. In 1936, naturalization procedures were cancelled to prevent Japanese obtaining citizenship

which would allow them to stay in the country. Peru was limiting immigrants in order to protect its own unemployed nationals. Despite protests by the Japanese, the restrictions were imposed without modifications. The political power of Japan at the time and the tight social boundaries of the ethnic minority increased suspicion and mistrust towards the Japanese, and in 1940 there were a series of assaults and arson attacks on them, the most traumatic event during the history of the Nikkei community in Peru.

In summary, the Japanese migrants to Latin America encountered severe difficulties in both rural and urban areas. The appealing posters advertising emigration companies clearly differed from the reality, and most of the immigrants' expectations were still not fulfilled after almost 40 years in Latin America. However, the second generation obtained better social and economic status than their parents. Meanwhile, the economic situation in Japan continued to force many farmers as to emigrate. National programs and propaganda promoted and supported the migration to Brazil. Later, the government had to apologize for misinforming people about the actual situation there. Japanese who did migrate to Brazil had a long period of struggle to be accepted into Latin American society. Later, the success of the Japanese in Peru meant that a Nikkeijin (Fujimori) became president of the country (Shintani 2006: 41). After the Meiji Restoration, Japan for a long time was mainly a country of emigration, with people settling all over the world, including the USA (Hawaii), Brazil and Peru.

Later, with increased economic prosperity, Japan became for a short time an immigrant destination, at first for conscripted workers, and later on, a destination

sought out by people that wanted to improve their personal economic prosperity.

3.3 The Japanese empire: Migration to and from Korea and China

In Japanese history, the growth of the foreign worker population since 1980s is not new. Already from the 1890s to the 1920s, foreign labor was a serious issue in Japan. As the Japanese empire expanded, the unskilled labor market was increasingly supplemented by Koreans and Chinese, while Westerners acted as international traders and professionals (*oyatoi*) in the public and private sector. They lived in the foreign settlements in Yokohama, Nagasaki, Hakodate, Kobe and Niigata and had extra-territorial rights, so that they were not controlled by the Japanese government. In 1894, the foreign treaties were revised, and after 1899, foreigners could settle anywhere in the country (for details, see Yamawaki 2003). Koreans had no extra-territorial rights, and were not restricted to these settlements. Before 1910, most Koreans in Japan were students, but after the annexation of Korea, increasingly they provided labor. Korean migration to and from Japan was officially controlled by the Government-General of Korea, and they provided much of the cheap, unskilled labor for the Japanese labor market (for details, see Weiner 1994). In the 1920s and 1930s the Chinese and Koreans were important in the expansion of Japan's economic power throughout the region. Japanese companies were allowed to recruit large numbers of Korean workers, and from 1941 as the war intensified, they also brought in Chinese workers from Manchuria (*Manchukuo*), the site of Japan's informal "total empire" (Young 1998). These Chinese workers were mostly conscripted to support the

military effort, and to provide cheap labor for the domestic agricultural industry.

The migration was not one way. As the Japanese established their control over Manchuria, Japanese emigration to China was also encouraged (Young 1998). In what Young has called the "migration machine" (ibid: 352-98), the Japanese set up an extremely efficient propaganda organization to persuade Japanese of the delights of living in northern China, and the flow of migrants continued until the start of 1945, when the war was already largely lost. At the end of the war, the Russians invaded Northern China, the Japanese were swept out, and many of them died on the way back to Japan. From the empire as a whole, about six million Japanese including children returned to Japan, providing much of the labor which was absorbed during the 1950s as the economy started to grow again.

As for Korea, according to Fukuoka's account (2000: 3-20), the 1876 Treaty of Kanghwa established consular jurisdiction over Korea, and from the late 1890s, thousands of unrecorded Korean workers moved to blue collar jobs in coalmines and on the railway in Japan. In 1910, Japan formally annexed Korea, and from 1910-1918, confiscated large areas of land for "Land Survey Enterprises." From 1920-34, the "Rice Production Increase Plan" boosted rice production, but exports of crops to Japan increased the level of rural impoverishment. As a result, many Koreans moved in search of jobs to Manchuria or Japan. Despite the massacres of Koreans in the wake of the 1923 Tokyo earthquake (Weiner 1994: 78-85), migration to Japan continued, and temporary migrants gradually settled and brought their families from Korea. Permanent residence became common in the late 1920s, and by 1938 there were 800,000 Koreans in Japan. The aim of the

Japanese authorities was to assimilate the Koreans, forcing them to adopt Japanese versions of their names in 1940.

During the Second World War, more Koreans were brought in as forced labor, including women to act as "comfort women" (sex slaves) for the Japanese military (Hicks 1997a). By 1945, the Korean population had risen to around 2.3 million. Most returned to Korea after the Japanese surrender, but around 600,000 stayed on, forming the nucleus of the present-day Korean community.

3.4 The Postwar Period

After WWII, 6 million refugees returned to Japan, and there was a brief baby boom before the population stabilized and the number of children began to fall. The supply of returned migrants and migration from the countryside to urban industries meant that Japan did not need to import much foreign labor until the late 1970s. Unlike the situation in much of Western Europe, even during the period of most rapid economic growth in the 1950s and 1960s, there was no mass importation of foreign workers to meet Japanese labor shortages, making Japan a "negative case" (Bartram 2000). This was a period that saw both the "income doubling program" of Prime Minister Ikeda (Tabb 1995: 92), the construction of the highway network, and the introduction of the high-speed *shinkansen* trains, first between Tokyo and Osaka, extending later on to include many of the other large cities in the country. As the country boomed, the population transition took place: the expectation of life rose rapidly, and the birthrate fell dramatically, with the spread of contraception and the legalization of abortion after 1948 (Coleman

1992).

The high-speed growth lasted until the 1970s, and a series of "shocks" which affected the economy (Tabb 1995: 183). These included the floating of the American dollar by President Nixon, which led to the rise in the value of the yen against the dollar, which since 1949 had been fixed at ¥360 to the dollar, and the increase in the oil price, following the Middle East War of 1973. The result was that economic growth stopped, and then started again, but at a slower rate than before. However, the effects of the demographic transition in the 1950s and the fall in the birthrate were now apparent, and there was an increasing shortage of labor. The rising value of the yen also made Japan more attractive as a destination for workers, and the numbers of foreigners in the country started to rise.

The 1980s saw the "bubble economy" (Wood 1993) which really took off after the Plaza Accord, an agreement on currently levels between the major industrial countries, in 1985. This allowed the value of the yen to soar against other currencies. The Japanese were now wealthy, and started to buy up companies and real estate around the world, arousing increasing hostility, particularly in the United States, leading to increasing confrontation (Tabb 1995: chapter 9).

By this time, rates of education among the Japanese population had risen, making 3-D/3-K jobs increasingly unattractive, and raising the need for unskilled labor. The government did relax its immigration policies, but only for skilled labor. There were calls from industry to improve the skills of the unemployed, raise the retirement age, and allow more immigrants to come in. These calls came particularly from smaller companies where the majority of Japanese still worked

and where the shortage of labor was most acute. But as other countries complained about the size of the Japanese trade surplus, some of the largest companies also began to offshore production, and establish manufacturing plants overseas. Meanwhile, the foreign population in Japan began to diversify, as Japan was fast becoming a multicultural society. By the late 1980s, there were already between 100-300,000 undocumented foreign laborers in Japan (Tabb 1995: 306-7).

3.5 Present day minorities in Japan

One of the best summaries of the current distribution of minorities throughout Japan is that of Tony Fielding in his paper, "The occupational and geographical locations of transnational immigrant minorities in Japan" (2010). The following section follows his analysis. In this, he argues that one of the most striking population-related developments in postwar Japan was the reversal of its transnational migration flow, as a number of foreign groups rushed in to benefit from the country's growing economic prosperity and to contribute to the labor force. Although Japanese had emigrated in large numbers during the Meiji period, particularly to Latin America, to reduce the pressure of population to settle in Japan's new colonies, the foreign population in Japan had remained relatively small, apart from the Koreans and Chinese. After 1945 and the start of high speed growth, despite the government's official policy of only allowing skilled labor to come into the country, Fielding argues that the foreign population which resulted was mostly blue-collared. There were gender differences: while many of the

migrants from Korea, China and Latin America were male, the Thai and Filipino migrations were largely of women. From the late 1970s until the mid-1980s, the influx was mostly female, but since the late 1980s and the bubble economy, it has been predominantly male. A new stream of migration was the “return migration” of ethnic Japanese from Peru and Brazil and their numbers increased steadily after they were given preference in new legislation in the late 1980s, on the assumption that they would be culturally similar to the local population. However, they did have a distinct Latin American cultural identity, and this has been retained. The foreign population of Japan therefore ranges from the Koreans with the greatest similarity (given that many were born in Japan and had never been abroad) to the Nikkeijin. But even for foreigners who speak fluent Japanese, their foreign nationality bars them from entering public or security related occupations. Generally, with the decline of the rural population, international migration is now taking the place of the rural-urban migration of the 1950s and 1960s in supplying the urban labor market. The main exception is the movement of Asian women, mainly from the Philippines, to marry men in rural areas in which there are few Japanese women. Generally, the Tokyo region has expanded in economic importance at the expense of Kansai. The areas into which manufacturing expanded in the 1960s and 1970s, especially between Tokyo and Nagoya, are the regions in which the highest concentrations of new migrants are to be found. The sex ratio of migrants reflects their occupations, with men in manufacturing and women in services, including entertainment. Generally, employment regulations prevent foreign migrants from employment in public and security-related sectors.

The broad distribution of specific groups is as follows.

Koreans

Until recently, the Koreans were the largest ethnic minority in Japan, though they have now been overtaken by the Chinese (see Appendix 21). Even today, many are the descendants of old-comers who were in Japan before 1945. Given that many were born in Japan, speak only Japanese, and were educated in Japanese schools, their occupational profile is similar to that of the host society. In terms of region, they are largely concentrated in Kansai, though they are also found throughout the rest of the country.

In Fukuoka's account (2000), the Koreans who returned to Korea after 1945 were generally the forced laborers of the wartime period. Those who stayed had been in Japan with their families for some time. In addition, new unregistered migrants came in and settled in the Korean districts of the major cities in the postwar period. Technically Koreans remained Japanese until the Peace Treaty of San Francisco in 1952, but in fact they had been deprived of the right to vote in 1945, and made subject to Alien Registration in 1947. Various options were available to the Japanese, including respecting the human rights of the migrants, assimilation, and expulsion. Instead they opted for subjugation, allowing the Koreans to stay, but making life difficult for them and denying them citizenship, leaving them in a permanent inferior social status, a situation described by Hicks as "hidden apartheid" (Hicks 1997b). There were gradual reforms: with the normalization of relations with the Republic of Korea (South Korea) in 1965, the

Koreans in Japan were granted "treaty-based permanent residence." All residents from former Japanese colonies were given the status of "special permanent residents" in 1991, and the hated fingerprinting of zainichi Koreans for identity cards was abolished in 1992 (after some cities refused to enforce it, see Pak 2003: 263), but Koreans were still debarred from jobs in public administration.

At the time of the Korean War, the Korean community divided into two, affiliated to North and South Korea respectively. The North Koreans set up their own education system in Korean, so they have generally retained their identity and language to a greater extent than the South Koreans (Ryang 1997), but with the current difficulties of North Korea, they are also tending to assimilate and adopt either Japanese or South Korean citizenship. Many Koreans have assimilated and taken Japanese citizenship, and the discrimination which they used to encounter in Japan has been greatly reduced in the last 20 years, even though it is still there, e.g. in relation to employment or marriage. There are also newcomer Koreans, many of them professionals with high levels of education. Generally, with their long history of settlement, the Koreans are the most similar to the Japanese in terms of their demographic profiles, with similar problems of a falling birthrate and an aging population.

Chinese

Some of the Chinese are descended from old comers in Japan since before 1945 (Yamawaki 2003), both from Taiwan and the Mainland, though with the economic growth of China since the 1980s, there are an increasing number of

newcomer Chinese working and living in Japan, predominantly from the mainland. They are mainly working class, though there are also a growing number of middle-class professionals. Generally they are clustered around the Tokyo region.

The most recent study of the influx of highly educated professional Chinese is that of Liu-Farrer. In her paper, "Between Privilege and Prejudice: Chinese Immigration in Corporate Japan's Transnational Economy" (2010), she discusses the emergence of a growing occupational niche for Chinese immigrants in Japanese corporations, due to their high levels of education and bilingualism, which are important as trade and economic relations between the two countries expand. These skills give the Chinese a high degree of job mobility, and open up the labor market, even if there are still limits to their movement. With globalization, the Chinese often find themselves in strategically important roles within companies, which value them for their bilingual proficiency and hire them as "Specialists in Humanities/International Services" or "Engineers" for immigration purposes. Many of them have come to Japan to study, and have stayed on to find jobs after graduation, given that salaries in Japan are still higher than those in China, and that relations with China are increasingly important for Japanese companies. Generally, international education is seen as a means of recruiting skilled workers throughout the region.

Companies find that with Chinese-speaking staff in the office, they are able to start business with China and they sometimes expand their businesses into China as a result. Some are recruited directly from China, while others are

recruited from Japanese universities, where two thirds of the foreign university students are Chinese. The jobs they prefer are in the corporate sector, where they are able to use the cultural skills they acquired in school.

Many of them work in information technology, as software engineers, and from the mid-1990s, the Japanese government encouraged the importation of these kinds of workers. Often they provide a bridge between the two countries, designing programs with Japanese clients, and then working with Chinese teams to implement the project.

Whereas Japanese corporate personnel often remain with the same firm until retirement, the Chinese tend to move more rapidly, often to different firms, depending on their calculation of opportunities and returns. Their progress is thus often horizontal rather than vertical within the same firm. However, they are increasingly starting to gain permanent residence in Japan, or even Japanese citizenship, and these workers are more likely to take on leadership roles in Japanese corporations. Eventually some of them may decide to cash in on their experience and skills gained in Japan, and move into senior positions in corporations in China, or become transnational entrepreneurs.

Women have less opportunity, experiencing the double barrier of being both female and foreign, though high tech businesses are often more progressive in relation to gender and promotion, and in some areas such as marketing women are particularly valuable (Liu-Farrer 2010: 140-42).

Thus relative to the past, the Chinese in Japan have a widening range of opportunities because of their cultural and language skills within the transnational

economy, even though these opportunities are still more limited than for their Japanese counterparts in the same jobs. Japanese companies have also been recruiting skilled personnel from other parts of Asia since the 1990s.

Filipinos

The majority of Filipino migrants are involved in production and personal services. They are highly concentrated in the capital region and also in the prefectures between Tokyo and Kansai, with men involved in construction, automotive and semi-conductor industries. The women are predominantly in the service sector, particularly in entertainment. Chitose (2006) notes that in recent years the migrants from the Philippines are the most feminized group of migrants in Japan, with 20 percent men and 80 percent women.

Cortez (2010) addresses the movement of migrants from the Philippines to Japan, and the push and pull factors which make them move, and his argument can be summarized as follows. First of all there is the gap between the economic levels of the two countries. Migration improves the standard of living of the migrants, and the Japanese generally avoid "3-D" jobs. Many of the jobs involved with family care, particularly of the elderly, could be seen as falling into this category. As noted above, the Japanese (particularly the women) are traditionally culturally obliged to take care of their elderly parents or parents-in-law, but demographic change including mobility, the shrinking of the family and the rising expectation of life mean that hiring health workers is becoming more and more necessary. This results in the further attraction of Filipino labor migrants to do the

job. While male Filipino migrants tend to be workers in companies under Japan's training system, especially in the automotive and semi-conductor industries, female migrants in the post-war period increasingly moved into Japan's entertainment industry. In 1960 there were only around 5,000 coming annually in as entertainers. In 1980 the number of female migrants overtook that of the males, and the annual total increased to 129,000 in 1998. In 2006, the Japanese government cracked down on the entertainment migrants, and now requires them to have artistic certification from their home country.

Many of those employed as domestic labor in Japan were either hired in directly, or came in as tourists. Relatives in Japan were also helpful in finding them jobs. These workers are generally better educated than the entertainers, with a higher percentage of women with college education. Remittances from Japan are 25 percent of the total remittances from the whole of Asia, and are therefore vital for the Philippine economy. As the demographic transition in Japan continues and life expectancy increases, so demand for this type of labor seems likely to increase as well. This need could be met by using older people in the labor force, or by changing patterns of youth employment, but the engagement of foreign workers is the quickest way to deal with this growing problem. Japanese family obligations are increasingly seen as being met not by caring for the elderly using family members, but by hiring in additional labor from outside. Filipina nurses are in demand throughout the world because of the high level of training and their ability to speak English. Institutions giving training in care and nursing have mushroomed all over the Philippines, and the local industry cannot absorb all the

graduates. In the case of Japan, the Japanese government has negotiated an agreement with the Philippines to accept 400 nurses and 600 caregivers from 2007, with the requirement that they have to pass Japanese qualification examinations in Japanese within three or four years in order to stay in the country permanently. So far, however, very few have been able to pass the exams, so whether this gesture by the Japanese to open up their labor market is more than symbolic is open to question. In future, all prospective migrants could be asked to take Japanese language instruction before leaving the Philippines, which would allow them to fulfill the other requirements more easily. Another requirement for the system to work easily would be mutual recognition of nursing qualifications between the Philippines and Japan. However, two final problems remain: the preference of the elderly in Japan for Japanese carers, and the extent to which large-scale recruitment of carers from the Philippines will eventually cause a shortage of labor within the Philippines itself.

In her study of women migrants from the Philippines, Dizon (2006) also notes that the gap between the rich and the poor countries pushes Filipinos to seek better economic alternatives abroad. Earnings in Japan are about seven times as much as in the Philippines, and the discrepancy between Japan and the Philippines is one of the important factors that causes migration. Until the early 2000s, most of the entertainers coming into Japan were women from the Philippines. They were able to come in because they were classified as skilled workers, even though the majority worked as hostesses in bars throughout Japan. Dizon discusses the qualifications of these entertainers, and the ways in which the system was

subverted. The 1981 certification issued by the Philippine government replaced an earlier requirement of "two year's experience as a professional entertainer". Formally, "overseas performing artists" (OPAs) underwent training, testing and certification from accredited institutions, and received advice on their rights and the protection available to them working overseas. However, the system became a source of graft and corruption, and the training agencies made a practice of receiving "commissions" for accrediting women who wanted to migrate. They were also in collusion with travel agencies and club owners and managers in Japan. On arrival in Japan, many women found that they were working for abusive employers, and had to surrender their passports while paying off fees owed to the agents and employers. The reality for most entertainers was very different from the written rules and regulations devised by the Japanese and Philippine governments, and failed to protect them from abuse. Some employers forced them to go on dates or have sex with their clients. Finding a Japanese husband is the best long-term option for many entertainers, as marriage ensures their long-term residency status together with other rights and benefits accorded to foreign residents in Japan. By 2004, the Japanese government was coming under international criticism for allowing what was seen as human trafficking related to the sex industry to continue. At the same time, an increase in crime and the increasing number of illegal migrants also pushed the government in the direction of action. Requirements for entertainers' qualifications were tightened up, and the number of women entertainers coming into Japan fell drastically. However, the moves were not popular among women in the Philippines who wanted to come to

Japan, and the result was a demonstration by angry women outside the Japanese embassy (Dizon 2006: 69).

The recent study of the Kiso Valley region of central Japan by Faier (2009) is the most detailed picture of the lives of women from the Philippines who have settled in the rural areas of the country. Few Japanese women are willing to come as brides to the countryside and live with their mothers-in-law, so in many rural areas, women from abroad are the only alternative. Although Kiso now seems something of a rural backwater, it was not always so: in the Edo period, it was culturally ahead of Tokyo as travelers from Kyoto to Tokyo brought the latest fashions there first. More recently it has seen different kind of cosmopolitanism, with a number of marriages between Filipina women and Japanese men. Even though by Japanese standards it is off the beaten track, it is still part of a modern prosperous largely middle-class country, and life there is much easier than in the Philippines countryside. The men living there find it difficult to find brides, and so the marriages between Filipina women and Japanese men stemmed from desperation, rather than love. The women Faier interviewed saw lifestyles as a hierarchy, in which life in the Philippines was at the bottom, life in the urban areas of Japan was at the pinnacle, and life in rural Japan lay somewhere in between. Many women had not intended to move to rural Japan, but that is where they ended up (2009: 7). It had been badly affected by the long recession that began with the bursting of the bubble economy in the early 1990s, which hit Kiso more rapidly and harder than the cities. The numbers of foreign brides had increased in the areas not simply because young Japanese women were unwilling to marry

local men, but because some Japanese men preferred women from humbler backgrounds and less egoistic; one of her interview partners described them as: "They're like traditional Japanese women. They're patient" (Faier 2009: 128). Many of the women would have preferred to have gone to America, but became "stuck" in Japan on the way. Despite this, some had settled down and married, and were increasingly accepted by the local community. Despite stories of Filipina wives running away from Japanese husbands, many were still seen as *ii oyomesan*, good brides, who worked hard, took care of their in-laws, and had mastered the Japanese way of life.

Latin American Nikkeijin (Brazilians, Peruvians)

The Latin American "returnees" are overwhelmingly involved in manufacturing industry as manual laborers, many of them in smaller companies supplying components to the auto and other export industries. They tend to be culturally distinct, and form their own communities, separate from those of the Japanese and other immigrants. Fielding regards them as the most segregated of Japan's new minorities (2010: 112-13).

The most important studies of the Brazilians in Japan are those by Tsuda (2003, 2008), who looks at both the influx of the migrants into Japan, and how the Japanese have reacted to them. The reason why they come to Japan is obvious. Migrants classified as middle class in Brazil can earn from five to ten times as much as their Brazilian income in unskilled or semiskilled factory work in Japan. When they first started to arrive in Japan, it was assumed that their Japanese

heritage would make it easy for them to assimilate into Japanese society, but this generally has not happened, and the position of the Brazilians in Japanese society remains marginal. In Brazil, they see themselves as Japanese, but in Japan they are seen as Brazilians, different from native Japanese both in terms of language ability and in attitudes and behavior. They lack the company loyalty of their Japanese colleagues, and are labeled as *gaijin*, foreigners, because of their distinctive behavior. Interaction with Japanese outside work is generally rather limited to encounters in shops or offices. They are often classed as casual workers, move around, and do not form strong ties with their Japanese colleagues as a result. Because of this isolation, they create self-contained migrant communities, and interact largely within their ethnic social networks. City governments in areas with large numbers of Latin American migrants tend to be supportive, providing them with support and services, given that they are valuable members of the local economy, and are likely to stay in Japan. Meanwhile, the migrants continue to "perform" their national identities, through the use of distinctive clothes, language, rituals, and festivals (samba and carnival parades). Their presence also raises questions of what it means to be Japanese – at the outset the Brazilians identified themselves as Japanese, but were clearly not classified as such by their Japanese hosts. In other words, the presence of the Brazilians has in some ways heightened the sense of nationalism among the Japanese themselves, and their presence is seen by some politicians and commentators as a threat to Japan's cultural homogeneity and social stability. Interestingly, however, Tsuda comments that some Japanese are more tolerant towards the Nikkeijin than the Koreans in

Japan: even though the Koreans were born in Japan and are culturally assimilated, the Nikkeijin are at least seen as Japanese in origin, even if not in behavior. Tsuda concludes rather gloomily that "if Japan is currently having trouble ethnically accepting and socially integrating its own Nikkeijin descendants, its ability to do so for other, more alien immigrants in the future is seriously in doubt" (2008: 133).

In a recent conference paper, Higuchi [n.d.] looks at the effects of the recent economic recession on migrant labor in Japan and the Brazilians in particular. Because of the increasing flexibility of the labor market, there has been a lack of policies to integrate the Latin American Nikkeijin into Japanese society, and thus they are vulnerable to downturns in the economy. Despite the instability of their jobs, few of them had thought of collective action before the economic crisis, but preferred to move on to other jobs. Now, however, with less hope of finding other jobs, some have started to protest. Generally in Japanese firms, the last to be hired are also the first to be fired, and the ratio of jobs to applicants fell due to the recession from 0.83 to 0.42. Surveys showed that by late 2008 and early 2009, around 40 percent of Latin American workers were unemployed. Some decided to return home on as their unemployment insurance expired, and the number of returnees reached at peak in early 2009. Between September 2008 and June 2009, more than 50,000 Brazilians left the country, some 17 percent of the population. Higuchi estimated that the Brazilian population in Japan was likely to decrease by 20 to 25 percent as a result of the recession. Many of them worked as "agency workers" – dispatched by agencies to work in large companies as the need arose.

Many large companies now use agencies to fill their temporary positions. These workers however are disposable. They often work in the auto and electronics industries, the sector of the market worst hit by the recession. However, the government has done little about the concentration of these migrants in temporary jobs. Employers take advantage of them because they have privileged visa status and can work freely in Japan, but they are both employable and disposable.

Whether the population of Latin American origin will increase or decrease in future is therefore an open question. On the one hand, they can gain permanent residence and stay in Japan freely, but on the other hand they are still concentrated in unstable jobs and therefore vulnerable to recession. In a paper published before the recession, Chitose (2006) drew attention to the demographic characteristics of the Brazilians, based on figures from 2004. Despite the stagnation of the Japanese population as a whole, the population of Brazilians grew 1.8 times between 1994 and 2004, and 147 times between 1984 and 2004. By 2004, they accounted for 14.5 percent of foreign nationals in Japan, compared with Koreans (31%) and Chinese (25%). Like other foreign populations, with the exception of the long-settled Koreans, the Brazilians were a relatively young population on average. The most distinctive feature of their demographic profile were the number of men to women (122: 100), suggesting that the migration was still at an early stage, and the number of children. After a drop in the percentage of children on their first arrival in the 1980s, it began to rise again after 1992, reaching 18 percent in 2003, in contrast with the falling rates for the Japanese population as a whole. Brazilian children are also unevenly spread throughout the country, with high

concentrations in Gunma, Aichi and Shizuoka prefectures. The falling proportion of men to women and the large numbers of children both suggest that the Brazilian population was becoming stabilized in Japan, but this is counterbalanced by the evidence for an exodus, as the economic crisis grew in 2008-09.

Other foreigners

Given the globalization of Japan, a number of other smaller ethnic groups have also entered the country, and are distributed largely on the basis of occupation (see Fielding 2010). The distribution of the Thai is similar to that of the Filipinos, with the men strongly represented in manual production work and many of the women in entertainment, in the "resort periphery". Similarly other smaller groups of Southeast and South Asians are mainly involved in manufacturing industry, in the Tokyo region and in the industrial cities along with Tokaido line, between Tokyo, Nagoya and Osaka.

There are some recent studies of other Asian migrant groups in Japan, such as Keiko Yamanaka's paper, "Transnational Community Activities of Nepali Visa-Overstayers", based on research in the Tokai region of central Japan (Yamanaka 2008). Her informants put up with life as undocumented workers, doing 3-D jobs, but their wages are far higher than they could earn in Nepal. As undocumented workers, they encounter prejudice and discrimination from local residents, and exploitation at the hands of employers, while being harassed by the authorities. All the same, their labor is valuable because of the aging population and the jobs which still have to be done. As an industrial region, Tokai suffers from a chronic

labor shortage in small scale businesses, and there are a number of Nepali migrants, who are very diverse in terms of ethnic identity, caste, language and religion. Inflation and unemployment in Nepal during the 1980s and 1990s meant that many began to look for opportunities to work outside. The workers come in on tourist visas and stay on, and form a pool of cheap docile labor for local employers, though their daily earnings are comparable to monthly earnings of officials and professionals back home. Even though some workers in manufacturing industry are legal and some are not, it makes little difference to their wages. The idea most migrants have is to save money quickly and return home, but meanwhile they suffer from isolation and marginalization. Even though they are undocumented, they are still helped by some Japanese activists, volunteers, NGOs and unions in negotiations with employers or the Labor Standards Bureau. The low cost of their wages means that they can still find work, even though the penalties for the recruitment and hiring of illegal foreign workers are up to three years imprisonment or a maximum fine of two million yen. Nikkeijin migrants from Latin America, mainly Brazil and Peru have the legal right to stay in Japan, and so can command higher wages, but small-scale employers may not be able to afford to hire them, and prefer overstayers instead, despite the risks. In return, the migrants work hard, and are dedicated to their employers. The government is unwilling to crack down hard, because the jobs have to be done and the economy has been in a fragile state since the end of the bubble period. All the same, the crime wave associated with migrants by the media (including the crime of overstaying), and the increase in foreigners who

dress differently and speak different languages (even if they look similar) has caused public concern. Yamanaka makes the point that without the help of Japanese volunteers and NGOs, it would be difficult for these migrants to take action against abusive employers, or get medical aid and regular checkups (Yamanaka 2008: 191).

Other Asian minorities include the Pakistanis discussed by Kudo (2008), many of them entrepreneurs in the second hand car trade and, interestingly, sometimes married to Japanese women. There is also a small literature on Iranians, mainly laborers, who came to Japan in the 1980s but left as the economy fell into recession in the early 1990s (Asgari et al. 2010).

3.6 Summary

It is clear from the foregoing descriptions that Japan now has a substantial number of foreign residents, both legal and undocumented, and that this has been increasing steadily in recent years. The "oldcomer" migrants from China and Korea, whose histories go back beyond World War II to the colonial period, have been joined by a substantial number of new groups, including the Filipinos (many of them women entertainers up to 2004), and Nikkeijin from Latin America, who are particularly numerous in the manufacturing industries between Tokyo and Nagoya. As Fielding's work shows (2010), the distribution of these migrants in various parts of Japan and the occupations in which they are engaged varies considerably, but even in the rural areas there are substantial numbers of migrants, as shown in the work by Faier and Burgess. Indeed they argue that, paradoxically,

it is the rural areas which are in many ways at the forefront of the integration and assimilation of new groups of migrants in the Japanese population. In addition, the position is complicated by changing policies on the part of the Japanese government, for instance in the decision to cut down on the numbers of entertainers from the Philippines in 2004, as well as paying Nikkeijin unable to settle satisfactorily in Japan to return to their countries of origin in the face of the continued recession. It is also clear that many of the jobs for which the government will allow in legal migrants are not suitable for the skills of the migrants themselves, though this is changing, as Liu-Farrer's study of professional Chinese immigrants shows. The next chapter focuses on both central and local government and the extent to which they are mounting initiatives to enable the migrants to live in and adapt to life in Japan.

Chapter 4. Government response to population change

4.0 Introduction

Chapter 4 describes the response of Japanese government and society to population change, and the changing policies towards immigration and the integration of the newly arriving migrants. It discusses local government initiatives, following less formal mechanisms of integration, organized by NGOs or by groups of migrants themselves. It will be seen from the recent work of scholars such as Nagy and Pak that in fact many local authorities are extremely active in these initiatives, aimed at helping migrants over a wide range of problems encountered in their social lives. But in addition to these, the migrants themselves, along with NGOs of Japanese sympathizers, are also establishing institutions to help support migrants, particularly when they run into problems with employers, relatives, or the state. In contrast, the efforts of the national government are mainly at the policy level, having little impact on the lives of many migrants.

4.1 Formal local government initiatives

With the declining population and tax revenue base, the Japanese government is forced to consider opening up the country to more immigrants, though their approach has so far been cautious, and many people are still somewhat opposed to the idea. The usual arguments include the one that, as long as there are still unemployed or underemployed Japanese, immigrants should not be allowed in on a larger scale. This ignores the problems of the 3-D jobs,

however, and the fact that illegal migrants will still enter the country and find work in small companies or through *yakuza* organizing casual labor for the construction industry, because there is so much work to be done.

Japan is openly trying to encourage some categories of migrants, most notably students and tourists (Koizumi's *yokoso*, or "Welcome to Japan" campaign). There is a difference in some sectors of the job market between foreigners who acquired their qualifications abroad and foreigners who went through Japan's education system. The latter usually have an advantage in finding jobs and dealing with administrative issues like the acquisition of a working visa, if only because they tend to be more fluent in Japanese. A number of international universities are now recruiting students to come to Japan, and one of their main selling points is their success in finding jobs for international students. A number of American universities set up campuses in the bubble economy period in Japan, but with the exception of Temple University, whose Tokyo campus is still flourishing, most of these have now been closed (Mock 2005). The government has now become involved with its Global 30 (G-30) program, even though with budget cuts it has now become G-13: the stated aim is to raise the number of foreign students studying in Japan from over 100,000 to 300,000 (for details, see the Japanese Ministry of Education website, http://www.jsps.go.jp/english/e-kokusaika/index.html).

Recent research projects have looked at both central and local government initiatives to help the immigrants integrate into Japanese, society. In her paper, "Foreigners are local citizens too," Pak (2003) gives details of the role that the

cities and regions play in immigration, together with the effects of activities taking place in the regions compared with the nation as a whole. Local governments and the region most affected by the migration are filling the gaps left by the state in relation to foreigners living in Japan. She also says that the local governments are changing their policies in order to treat foreigners like any other local citizens (*gaikokujin to no gyosei shakai*). She recognizes three forces that contribute to the efforts and local policies in incorporating foreigners. The first is the proximity of foreign migrants who are visible at the local level, and who are in need social benefits as residents in a specific region. Also the complaints about migrants by local citizens are generally directed at local government rather than national ministries. Second, as the local governments responded to demands for policy changes on social issues in the 1960s and 1970s, they became recognized as legitimate policy innovators. In the context of immigration, in view of the national government's actions discriminating against against Koreans - even those born in Japan -, e.g. the former requirement of fingerprinting, migrants have cooperated with local government through local government consultative councils. Third, local governments have redefined the national government's project and have devised an alternative agenda so that they can reach out to the foreign residents and give them support.

Pak describes the differences between four different cities in response to international migration: Kawasaki, Hamamatsu, Kawaguchi, and Shinjuku (for details, see Pak 2003: 253-60). Historically, the cities followed the national government's lead by ignoring the oldcomers' needs and forcing the

implementation of measures like registration controls. Unlike the European case where migrants and locals are fighting over employment, in Japan most cities have concluded that they need migrants in the labor force, and they need to get involved in supporting them, in order to avoid the kinds of problems which have been experienced in Europe.

Departments that are involved in providing services to non-citizens are aware of potential problems that can arise. But they are unwilling to look at problems outside their jurisdiction, because of the system of "vertical administration" in which departments tend to be independent form teach other. General appointments are less tightly linked to the chain of command and so officials in them can act more freely. Some cities have allowed new international officers to carve out new policies and new positions that work effectively. Local internationalization provides a framework for local initiatives – *uchi naru kokusaika*. Local officials are thought to be the appropriate implementers of internationalization, as grassroots agents, and thus able to avoid the negative connotations associated with the central government. When they are working out how to meet the challenge of an international population and implement changes, they are exercising local autonomy. However, though local practices and terms differ, usually the policies implemented are aimed only at documented migrants.

Pak (2003: 250-51) reports a Kawasaki official says that, instead of fixing the problems one by one, as local government officials they had to think about how to solve all of them – so an international office was necessary to clear up all the problems at the same time. As for the differences and similarities of the

programs in the four cities she considers: many of them are targeted at overcoming the language barrier, by providing information materials in foreign languages, and teaching the migrants Japanese. The most progressive local governments define foreigners as local citizens who have the right to communicate with local government. Although the constitution only guarantees full political rights to Japanese citizens, the local government act specifies the protection and security of all local citizens, including non-Japanese. As a result, many local governments have abolished the nationality requirement for most local administrative positions. Kawasaki goes even further with a foreign advisory council, where the foreign population can confer with local bureaucrats and politicians. These efforts stem from past efforts by zainichi Koreans in the city to obtain civil rights and access to jobs.

Pak (2003: 255-59) outlines the main dimensions of differences between the four cities. The first is the extent of initiatives undertaken by the city, how accessible they are to foreign residents, and to what extent the needs of the foreign residents are taken into consideration. The second is the intensity of the efforts to shape community response, and whether the international office is developing an incorporation program which reaches across departments in the city government, and between local and other government agencies. In general, counseling services for foreign residents show the greatest variation, whereas the published material available for foreigners in each city in various languages is more or less the same. Some cities have a 24-hour hotline for foreign residents with problems, while others just have an office open once a week. Another aspect is the degree to which

cities recognize foreign residents as local residents, seek to know their needs, and attempt to involve them in the local community.

Of the four cities, Kawaguchi and Shinjuku give these matters little priority, while Kawasaki and Hamamatsu are more proactive. For internationalization to have any impact, international offices must involve other institutions in the program, but they are often marginalized and have little impact when acting alone. Where the international office is located within the administration matters: in Shinjuku and Kawaguchi, it is located in the general affairs division, while in Kawasaki and Hamamatsu it is located in a more prestigious division of City Hall. Regular channels have been established for foreigners to communicate with public officials, to explain their problems and goals. These two cities have also done more to involve the general public in internationalization, through creating high profile organizations. Kawasaki has also published brochures in Japanese which state the city's official policy to include foreigners.

In the 1960s and 1970s, progressive local governments strengthened ties between local officials and citizens, so that the officials had more knowledge than previously. Japanese cities began to pursue international exchanges, while also introducing policies to help foreigners at home. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs tried to take over international exchange programs, and local government was required to set up international exchange sections. These were not to provide a basis for the foreign migrants' incorporation – but this is what has happened. Not much of an extension is needed to extend services to new foreign residents.

Kawasaki was one of the first local governments that refused to comply

with the fingerprinting of aliens, because the zainichi community which led the opposition to fingerprinting is well organized there, and the local government approves of its efforts to support them. After positive experiences working with the Koreans, the city set out to develop incorporation programs which would also extend to newcomers (Pak 2003: 263).

Hamamatsu was different because of its ethnic background. Its international efforts stemmed from the arrival of a small group of Vietnamese in the early 1980s. Volunteers took on the work of helping them, and later Nikkeijin, and the city developed its reputation for internationalization (Pak 2003: 265).

What shaped the policy environment? A city's experience of outside interests appears to increase the commitment to internationalization. When recent foreign migrants have a generally positive image, it is easy to reach out to them through new programs. There is a lot of coverage of these issues by the national media, and through collaboration with local intellectuals, social movements and activists have worked closely with the city to develop a foreign advisory council. Hamamatsu is a major site for studies of Nikkeijin employment and their cultural adjustment (Pak 2003: 265).

Shinjuku has had problems with Pakistanis, Iranians and Bangladeshis who overstay and become involved in the local construction industries (Pak 2003: 265). In the 1990s, Iranians became involved in telephone card scams, and Chinese gang activities are centered on Shinjuku. Unlike Kawasaki, Shinjuku has a reputation for large numbers of foreign migrants engaged in illegal activities. In Kawasaki, the foreigners are relatively invisible. So Kawasaki and Hamamatsu

have greater ease in helping the migrants. However, despite all this, there are limitations to the extent of the incorporation of foreigners, and these are linked to ongoing discussions of national identity.

Nagy's article (2010) deals with the problems of immigration in Japan. The unbalanced and uncontrolled immigration or the potential for it can weaken the foundations of the nation. So in order to cope with this, the state has to construct a mode of cultural coexistence at national and local levels to integrate foreigners into Japanese society. (2010: 150, *tabunka kyosei seisaku*). On a national level, this process is still in its infancy, but at the local level it is more advanced with official plans and policies recently introduced. This has to be adapted to the needs and direction of each municipality. He analyzes the process in three areas of Metropolitan Tokyo: Shinjuku Ward, Adachi Ward, and Tachikawa City.

Shinjuku (Nagy 2010: 151-58) has the largest and most culturally diverse population of foreigners of the three. At the center of the arrangements is the Shinjuku Cultural Coexistence Plaza. The main objective is to ensure that foreign residents do not become a burden to the local government and the other Japanese residents. The activities and projects that it organizes include Japanese language classes, publications of information on the ward and problems of living there, and promotion of social networking in Shinjuku. This is to help the foreigners come into contact with others foreigners and the local people, reduce the problems arising from poor social integration, and allow foreigners to be more independent. One of the problems that arose was that the activities of the local government overlapped with those of existing foreigners' social networks and they preferred to

work through their own networks rather than those of the city. In addition, the involvement of the foreigners in the local community was seen as being limited to receiving information and access to social welfare, education and other government services, but did not extend to political participation or voting rights. Foreigners tend to go to ethnic centers to get information where they can talk to others in their own languages, and as a result tend to remain isolated from Shinjuku social life. Illegal or undocumented migrants do not make full use of services providing advice on visas and immigration issues, from the fear that they will be forcibly repatriated. The Japanese and the foreigners therefore act not as co-residents of Shinjuku, but as hosts and guests.

In the case of Adachi (Nagy 2010: 158-68), it has changed since the 1980s from being a mainly Japanese ward to one with a large population of foreigners. Many of the foreigners are Koreans (41%), Chinese (29%), and Filipinos (17%). There are also some Thai residents (around 1%). In 2005 the Ward carried out a questionnaire, and used the results in designing its multicultural coexistence policies. So the emphasis has changed from one on supporting local cultural programs to supporting foreign residents. Based on the slogan “Richness and Difference”, there have been a series of measures introduced to deal with problems concerning communications, lifestyles, and multicultural coexistence. Multilingual information is provided at various locations throughout the ward. The main aim is to allow foreigners easy access to the various services provided by the local government. The creation of a multicultural ward involves the creation of networks, and the (informal) opportunity to participate in ward

administration and planning. A foreign residents' advisory board has been established to enable this participation. There is also research being carried out on how to give permanent residents voting rights, to show that the ward is dedicated to at least some measure of civic inclusion. Efforts are also being made to network with other organizations in providing aid to foreign residents.

The foreign groups vary in the extent to which they need these services: for instance, Koreans in Japan generally face few difficulties with language and culture. However, as in Shinjuku, there is still a tendency for groups of foreigners of the same origin to stick together, though the measures taken have allowed a greater extent of participation than in Shinjuku, at all levels of politics and society. Foreigners are employed on full time basis to act as translators and to provide liaison with the city authorities for foreigners. The ward also sponsors cultural exchange events, even though there is a tendency in these simply to contrast Japanese and foreign cultures.

In the case of Tachikawa (Nagy 2010: 168-75), Chinese and Koreans also make up the majority of the foreign residents, and the city's four-point plan includes multicultural awareness, the creation of a "municipality in which foreign residents can live with ease," promotion of social exchange and networking, and encouragement of foreign residents to contribute to the local community. The aims are therefore rather similar to those of the other two Tokyo cases. Tachikawa's stated aim is to treat its foreigners not as guests but as residents who can contribute to the development of the city as a whole, by protecting their human rights and promoting multicultural coexistence. As in the other two cities,

despite the emphasis on human rights, there is still no commitment to providing full political rights to the foreigners. However, a multicultural coexistence committee has been formed, which involves foreign residents, a measure similar to that in Adachi. The rationale is that foreign residents pay taxes like the Japanese, and so the city should take measures to provide for their specific needs. There are also events organized to include foreigners, such as a Japanese speech contest, introductions to Japanese culture such as tea ceremony and flower arrangement, multicultural festivals, and sister city twinning arrangements. However, Nagy argues, despite the intentions of these programs, they still emphasize the separation of the Japanese from the foreigners. In addition, they center on traditional Japanese culture, which Nagy sees as largely irrelevant for living in modern Japan, and they are only arranged for the foreigners, and not for all the Japanese residents. Even though the aim of the city is to identify leaders among the foreign migrants, the formation of ethnic associations does little to integrate them with the rest of the residents, and continues to identify them as outsiders. However, Nagy concludes that the continued growth of the foreign communities will eventually compel local governments to put into effect policies which genuinely meet the needs of the foreign residents.

4.2 Informal initiatives

In her paper, "NGO support for migrant labor," Glenda Roberts (2003) distinguishes between male and female undocumented workers, and the institutions which have arisen to support them. Men and women differ in the

extent to which they can get help with violations of human rights. The problem is how to create social institutions and open doors that are closed. She further differentiates between volunteer-based citizens' action oriented organizations and local labor unions. Both are active in supporting human rights and labor law, and organizing programs, but non-union groups have substantial expertise in relation to the problems encountered in daily life. Unions focus more narrowly on labor issues.

Her focus is on the Tokyo area and the shelters and unions that concentrate on undocumented workers, including Koreans, Thai, and Filipinos. By 1997, there were 145 NGOs supporting migrant workers throughout Japan, given that the extent to which migrant workers are incorporated into the wider society is very varied. Although the general public is not convinced of the benefits of migrants in Japan, the NGOS are willing to take on their problems and work for solutions. As an example of a union, *Zentoitsu* was established in 1992, with a membership of 20 Bangladeshi, Iranian and Pakistani workers (Roberts 2003: 277-84). This was after 1991, when the leadership encountered cases of foreigners injured in labor accidents without adequate insurance. Their joint activities have included publishing a white paper, and other materials to campaign for migrant workers' rights and attending international conferences to raise awareness of the issue. Annual rallies on behalf of foreigners and their rights have been held since 1983. The unions take 10 percent of the settlements they arrange. The most typical problems are unpaid wages, sudden dismissal, and labor accidents. Japanese workers find themselves in difficulties and can often resolve them without unions,

but because of the language barrier, foreigners are unable to use the system without the expertise and advocacy of the union.

Foreign workers are unlikely to form their own branch union in future, as only workers with legitimate visas can take on this role. There is also often factionalism among the members based on ethnic and class differences, e.g. between blue- and white-collar workers. Expanding the membership may be difficult, as unions have problems in collecting the dues. Social movements need continual support if they are to take off and achieve their goals.

As for the women migrants (Roberts 2003: 284-94), their work is often stigmatized from legal and social viewpoint, and legal means to protect the rights of women foreign workers often absent or inaccessible. Basically many of them are involved in sex work: they are often tricked into coming into Japan, and given conditions in the sex industry, they often find that their movements are curtailed. Factory and construction workers in contrast are usually able to move around, but women are beyond the framework of socially legitimate work.

One change Roberts notes is that, whereas a few years ago women coming to shelters sought assistance in returning home, by 2000 they were coming for help with problems legalizing their stay in Japan, and they tended to have children. She also mentions that an increasing number of women had mental health problems. In 1998, a quarter of the women sheltered had been sex workers prior to seeking shelter. A majority of the women seeking shelter were from Thailand and the Philippines – and more recently, the majority was from Thailand. The reason she suggests for the increase in Thai women is that they tend to have

fewer support networks available in Japan. The Filipinas have better support from the Catholic Church and other religious groups. Thai women typically arrive on tourist visas and so are not covered by contractual benefits which the entertainment visa carries with it.

Help, one of the shelters Roberts studied, dated from 1986 (Roberts 2003: 286-90), and the main financial contributors were foundations and church organizations. Since 1990, it had some support from Tokyo Municipal Government. Its policy is to support the independence and equality of women. The shelter had recently been given a face lift, with more color, furniture, facilities and a TV, and the women living under duress appreciated this. Women who stayed at the shelter felt at home. Women from foreign countries were not charged, unlike the Japanese. The funding from foundations and local government also helped in regard to the immigration office and the police: the grant from the city government gave the organization respectability so the police and immigration office treated them with more respect.

In the other two organizations, *Mizura* and *Sala* (Roberts 2003: 290-93), the women staying there were responsible for cooking and cleaning themselves. Comparing the organizations which receive government funding with those that do not, the fundamental difference is that *Mizura* was a local union dealing with women's employment problems, and was therefore dealing with problems of gender and dismissal. The funding was based on donations and membership dues, but there was an increasing cash shortage as fewer single women had been seeking shelter, and more mothers with children had been turning up. *Mizura* had

negotiated with the city social welfare office to help look after the children, even if the women were overstayers. They also collaborated with government in other ways. The official policy on overstayers was that they are not allowed to stay in state supported facilities, so they were sent on to *Mizura* and *Sala*. Public employees urged the NGOs to make services available to foreigners, whether documented or undocumented. Another area of collaboration was in training –the local government sent staff to the NGOs so that they could find out how to circumvent the rules and be more effective. In addition, the people running the shelters took local government staff to the immigration office to show them how tough it is. Informal relationships were also helping officials in wealthier districts – because they did not understand why foreign women might not have a passport, or why women who were divorced did not want to go home. In other words the shelters helped educate the public officials about the real problems. However, another problem was that officials were frequently shifted to different jobs so that there was a loss in expertise. NGOs therefore acted as buffers between the immigrants and the immigration officials, and lobbied local officials to make arrests and detention procedures less traumatic.

Help organized lecture tours of its facilities and educated the public on double standards in sex and morals/behavior: tolerance of male sexuality contributes to strong sex and entertainment industries, but criminalizes those that work in them. There was need to rethink assumptions about sex, gender and family relationships. Before, migrant women generally wanted to go home after broken marriages, but now they wanted to live on in Japan permanently and

independently, so the public had lost interest in them as a group in need of help. The shelters also organized a national network with solidarity for migrant workers composed of 66 groups and 72 individual members – this network was lobbying the national government to improve the situation of migrant workers and their families. Japan's NGOs encouraged citizens to look at their relations with the foreigners who were providing essential services in construction etc. People who saw this were thought to be more open to living in a society which is multicultural and multiethnic.

Dizon (2005, 2006) discusses women's support groups among women from the Philippines. The labor exporting policy of the Philippines government was started by the Marcos regime in the 1970s: as they grew in number, the formation of Filipina migrant communities in Japan led to the formation of social networks and support groups. According to Dizon, they play a big role in the development of interpersonal relations between the migrants and the international relationships between Japanese and Filipinos. Her 2005 paper is about the role of social networks as agents of social change. For most of the Filipino migrants, these networks are an important source of strength and support. Her case study focuses on *Damayan* ("help" in Tagalog), founded in Sendai in 1991. There were already reports of domestic abuse from Filipinas living in Sendai because of their employment situation and bad housing. There was a high possibility of meeting husbands, but even after marriage they experienced discrimination from Japanese employers, their in-laws, and even other Filipinos. Because of the situation, they wanted to found an institution which would help them adjust to their lives in

Japan, including the Japanese way of life, culture and tradition. Membership would also allow them to contact people from their own country and come together in group meetings. At the start there were about 15 members, all of them married to Japanese men, and the founder was a Japanese woman, Kumiyama-san. Despite conflicts within the group, the members all greatly respected her. Damayan serves as a support system in cases of domestic abuse, and it has also supported members going before the courts. The membership fee is 6,000 yen, with that they finance their activities. The Filipina housewives bring their families with them to meetings and invite Japanese friends, so this promotes Filipino culture and tradition and allows them to share them with other people. They also try to promote cultural understanding and awareness.

As Dizon mentions, most Philippine migrants still have strong bonds with their families and home towns, so that they also send remittances to fulfill family obligations back home and make investments in families, buildings and cars. However, these investments also cause friction with their husbands, so that they eventually want to go back and settle in the Philippines.

One of the main problems they face is the lack of acceptance of these women by the state as active participants in Japanese society. Also there is the stereotyping of Filipinas as entertainers, even though they have high levels of education in some cases, and many women have never been engaged in this type of activity. So they basically find that Japanese society allocates them lower status along with other Asian migrants in general. Although they want to stay in Japan, it is difficult because of perceived discrimination. As a conclusion she says that

these factors leave them in a difficult situation – they cannot go home to live nor can they be accepted as citizens in Japan.

In the future, Kumiyama-san wants to establish a day center for all the women, and there will be a need for these kinds of services in relation to the Japanese population – which can also serve for Filipinas as a place to work. The people who get help from *Damayan* are not restricted to the immediate members. It is advantageous to be a member of a social network because migrants can learn about the benefits and help available to them, and it can also help them in case of law suits or difficulties with domestic violence, as well as with access to subsidies and services from local government. In addition, the church performs a unifying function for the migrants, not only in Sendai but in other parts of Japan.

As a conclusion, Dizon (2004: 82) says that it is important to analyze the importance of networks by trying to understand migration processes: migrant women through these networks form links and networks through which they can communicate, exchange their experiences, and can get better access to opportunities in Japan and elsewhere.

4.3 Summary

Chapter 4 has described some of the responses of the national government to population decline and the entry of immigrants into the country, both at the national and local level. What is clear from the case studies presented is that while national government can make policies in the areas such as assimilation and agreements with foreign governments, it is left to the local level to deal with the

day to day problems of migrants living in Japan. Other government programs have included measures to stimulate the flow of students, some of whom they hope will stay and work in Japan after graduation, with initiatives such as the recent G-30 efforts to increase the number of foreign students dramatically. How far these will be successful in the face of government budget cuts must remain in doubt – the G-30 may well remain the G-13 program, with no additions to the present list of universities participating.

Meanwhile local authorities are concerned with the idea of "foreigners are citizens too) and are making efforts to integrate them into local society. As the papers by Nagy and Pak show, these vary from local authority to local authority, and indeed many of them are impatient of the lack of central government involvement in these projects. Many of these efforts are well-meaning and probably do give many migrants access to language skills and information which they otherwise would not have. As some scholars have indicated, however, some of the cultural initiatives still tend to draw a line between the Japanese and their "Others" by emphasizing the cultural differences rather than similarities. Perhaps more successful for many migrants are the efforts of the NGOs described by Roberts and others, especially for those migrants that have social or economic problems in their lives in Japan.

Chapter 5. Conclusion

"Immigration of culturally diverse people presents nation-states with a dilemma: incorporation of the newcomers as citizens may undermine myths of cultural homogeneity; but failur to incorporate them may lead to divided societies, marked by severe inequality and conflict." (Castles and Miller 2003: 40-41)

5.0 Introduction

The final chapter summarizes the arguments, and considers the most likely scenarios for the development of the Japanese population, the labor market, and immigration in the future. As the United Nations and others have shown, the Japanese working population is now in decline, and this is likely to accelerate for some time in the 21st century. The foreign population of Japan is rising, but not fast enough to make up for the shortfall in domestic fertility, let alone allow the population to start growing again. Even some professional areas like nursing and the medical professions are already short of trained staff, and this has been recognized in the Japanese government's willingness to allow Filipina nurses to train and work in Japan – even if the program has been very limited so far. Government policies to increase the birth rate have produced few results, and the populations of many rural communities, particularly in the North of the country, are still in rapid decline – aided in eastern Tohoku by the recent earthquake and associated disasters. Even though many in Japan are worried about the likely effects of large-scale immigration, it still seems the easiest way to stem Japan's

current population decline.

At the outset of the thesis, the following questions were posed. In what follows, I try to give the answers based on the information presented in the main chapters of the thesis.

What has been the impact of population decline on Japanese society?

Many of the results of population decline were discussed in chapter 2 of the thesis. The results of population decline throughout Japanese society have been far reaching and are potentially catastrophic. The country is losing its competitive edge as the numbers of young people decline, while at the same time seeing an increase in the numbers of the elderly who increasingly have to be cared for. As the chapters on the rural areas show, population decline is leading to the collapse of rural communities, and families. The old caring family mechanisms have in many cases broken down, leading to tension and conflict between the generations, including old people in the rural areas and their young kin living in the cities. There are particular shortages of workers in the caring professions such as nurses who have to take the place of the family in the care of the elderly, in the 3-D jobs in the construction industry and elsewhere, which many Japanese, particularly the highly educated, are no longer interested in. Much of the shortfall has been met by undocumented workers, and one of the main challenges facing the Japanese government is to adjust policies so that workers who are needed can come into the country legally to work. The Japanese government has attempted a strategy similar to that of other countries in the region, in inviting and attracting talent in

through the educational system, but the small numbers who have arrived so far suggests that this will not do much to make up for the shortfall.

What have been the main patterns of migration to and from Japan historically, and what are the most important contemporary flows in and out of Japan?

The main patterns of migration to and from Japan were discussed in chapter 3 of the thesis. Historically, many of the migrants to Japan, even before the Edo period, came from Korea and China, due to proximity and cultural similarity, and this remained the case after the Meiji restoration when the country opened up. With the expansion of the Japanese empire in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, Japan like other imperial powers generally imported labor from its own colonies, even through many of them left the country at the end of WWII, as Japanese settlers throughout the empire returned. Even with the postwar period, the dominant ethnic groups coming into the country were still Koreans and Chinese, though joined by new groups such as the Filipinas and Thai (mainly females) and the Nikkeijin – allowed in because of their supposed cultural similarity. With the strength of the Japanese economy and the emergence of internal migration patterns from rural to urban areas, jobs in labor intensive industries like construction and production became more attractive to people from the Middle East, including Iran in the 1980s and 1990s. However, with the long recession in the Japanese economy, many of the undocumented workers of the bubble economy period have gone to other parts of the world, leaving an increasingly

diverse foreign population in a variety of jobs.

What ethnic and national minorities are now resident in Japan, what are their main social characteristics, and in what kind of niches in the labor market are they primarily employed?

These issues were also discussed in chapter 3. The four main groups of migrants in Japan have rather different characteristics.

Many of the Koreans in Japan are Zainichi, born in Japan, many of whom have limited contact with, or interest in, Korea, especially in the third and fourth generations. Many have now taken Japanese names, and even Japanese citizenship. In other words they have assimilated fast.

The Chinese were also "oldcomers" but in recent years, the flow of Chinese migrants into Japan has increased, and they have now become the largest single foreign ethnic groups. As Liu-Farrer's work shows, an increasing number of them have professional qualifications. Many of them are educated in Japan, and they act as bridges between Japanese companies and businesses back home in China. They are becoming an increasingly important part of the resident foreign workforce. The main trends of migration are shown in Appendix 21.

A third major group is the Nikkeijin, who were allowed to enter and stay in Japan on the grounds that they were Japanese in ancestry and therefore likely to be similar in culture. As Tsuda (2003) has shown, the reality is different, and even though the Japanese in Brazil thought of themselves as Japanese, in Japan they are thought of as Brazilians – and culturally different. Many are concentrated in the

manufacturing industries in the Tokyo, Aichi and Kansai areas.

A fourth major group is the Filipinos. They are interesting because a large number of them were women, who came to Japan to work in the entertainment industry. This lasted until Japan reduced the number of entertainment visas in 2004, in response to international pressure because of the association between Filipinas and the sex industry. Many Filipinas have married Japanese husbands, and have permanent residence in Japan through their children who are Japanese citizens. Gradually the Japanese government is moving towards the legalization of Filipino migration, through encouraging the arrival of care workers – especially nurses, even though the numbers so far have been small.

Other smaller groups also have distinctive job patterns – the Thai migrants are largely women, with patterns similar to those of the Filipinas. The Nepalis are involved in chain migration, and at the moment are moving in large numbers into the restaurant industry.

Finally there are a large number of highly educated professionals in Japan from the western countries – perhaps the biggest single group being the JET program English teachers, many of whom stayed on in Japan in various professional jobs once their contracts had ended.

What has been the government response to population change, both at the national and local level? In particular, what attitudes to migration have developed at the grass roots level, in local administrations, and what initiatives have they put in place to support the integration of the migrants?

The response of the Japanese state has been ambiguous, within the framework of the Basic Immigration Control Plan: on the one hand the migration of skilled migrants is officially encouraged, but the kinds of 3-D workers that the country really needs are still prevented from entering. The attitude of local government is different. As Thompson (2003) shows, a loss of population in rural communities and small towns means a loss of revenue, so foreigners are welcome from the fiscal point of view, in addition to the work that they do. Small towns and villages have been creative in trying to reverse the outmigration of younger people, and so even Filipina wives of local farmers, as described by Faier (2009), are a welcome addition to the local population. City governments as described by Nagy and Pak have made considerable efforts to smooth the entry and integration of the foreign workforce, even if the results vary between cities and are patchy in their success. There are also the private sector NGOs set up to support and help the migrants, in addition to their own social networks and social institutions such as the church.

5.1 Future scenarios and options

According to the United Nations Population Division Report (2001), Japan could play a leading role in finding ways of revamping the labor market and social system and coping with demographic change in an aging society, before other countries or regions will be confronted by the same challenge. Since the end of the bubble economy, there has been a decrease in employment, coupled with deflation. Wage levels have been stagnant, or have even fallen in some cases.

Even employment which requires higher levels of skills is no longer safe. The erosion of the Japanese hiring system (leading to employment directly after university) and the poor economic environment have cost a whole generation of young people of reproductive age a certain future, and many have been turned involuntarily into NEETs, part-time workers, or *furiita*. Others have had to accept poorly paid jobs in ordered to get hired. Probably, the employment situation for the young would have been much worse, if it had not been for the declining birth rate at the same time. In some cases, young people have to compete with older age groups, as their employment has also become uncertain: McDonalds Japan employs thousands of retired people on the basis of short-term contracts, traditionally a student occupation. The jobs that are available are very often in the 3-D category, which do not attract younger high school and university graduates. Once they were filled by migrants from the rural areas, but from the 1980s they have increasingly been filled by migrants from overseas.

Despite the prerequisites set down by the immigration law and the position of the government that only skilled workers should be allowed in, not all the foreign migrants actually work in the skilled and professional sectors of the labor market. Rates of university education in Japan are high by comparison with other highly industrialized programs. In addition, public programs aimed at increasing the skill sets of the unemployed and underemployed Japanese have allowed them to move up the ladder to more prestigious and better paid jobs. This has accelerated the movement of Japanese out of jobs at the bottom of the labor market, as the numbers in the working-age population picks fall increasingly

rapidly. In other words, the immigrants are filling the holes that the upwardly mobile young Japanese are leaving behind.

These trends are general, but some sectors of the labor market are suffering more than others. It is particularly serious in the medical profession as more old, but not necessarily sick, people are in need of long term medical treatment and domestic help. The scarcity of medical personnel in the more peripheral areas of the country has already reached critical levels (see Editorial: Fixing doctor shortage, asahi.com).

Below I discuss the most likely Japanese policy options in this situation, with their respective advantages and disadvantages. In response to demographic changes, there are three main strategic approaches: an increase in the number of children, an increase in immigration, or changes in social and economic policy to allow society to adapt.

The real question is how, given the present trends, can Japanese society maintain (or even expand) its prosperity in the future. This depends on the number of children. The question of how many children someone can and wants can hardly be dissociated from the issue of associated costs, particularly direct costs of education and other indirect costs. If the government wants to raise the birth rate in the longer term, it will have to improve conditions for families and ensure that children are not seen primarily as a burden. Pure transfer payments, such as child allowances, are not enough. Young couples need security by providing them with high-quality and affordable education and welfare infrastructure.

The situation of the Japanese labor market continues to be unsatisfactory in

comparison with earlier decades. If, because of the stagnant economy, employees' incomes are not rising, and if the declining and aging population is putting pressure on tax revenues and social security contributions, there will be many adverse consequences.

Various new measures have been introduced to keep up the birthrate and persuade people to have more babies, including child allowances, education, the "Golden Plan," subsidized births and so on, but so far none of them have had the desired effect. "While the conventional family ideology and the expectations of old-age support from children persist, it has become increasingly difficult for women to work, look after children, and care for elderly parents. As a result, the employment of live-in domestic workers has become a common de facto mode of providing care for the elderly" (Toyota 2008: 168).

Success in the fight against unemployment will also considerably help mitigate the problems caused by demographic change for social security systems. If Japan succeeds in exploiting the reservoir of previously unemployed labor more fully, then it can partly counteract demographic-related revenue losses in the pension, health and care insurance systems.

The problems are worst in the rural areas, where the population is in many cases already collapsing, as in Akita (Mock 2008). Many strategies of rural revitalization have been tried, with patchy results, as shown in the case studies of rural communities discussed above. There is much discussion in Japan of generating new settlers in the rural areas by promoting rural industries or tourism, but for many communities these may not help in the long run. The much smaller

Japanese population which is predicted for later this century could easily fit into the current urban housing stock. This suggests that large parts of the country will in fact become depopulated, and the rural areas that will be most viable are those near the large cities and the motorway and railway systems.

Immigration remains the means by which the labor force can be increased most rapidly, and many of the 3-D jobs are already carried out by migrants. Probably the government should increase the number of job categories available to migrants, and there have already been moves in this direction. But Japan is already in competition with other countries for the most highly skilled labor, and other countries facing the same difficulties have developed better images and reputations as migrant destinations earlier than Japan. Other Asian countries, which have been the primary sources of migrants in the past, already have, or will have, their own demographic crises during the course of this century. As their economies and general prosperity levels increase, these improved conditions will increasingly allow them to compete with Japan as an attractive place to live and work.

Despite the public's worries about increasing levels of migration, most studies conclude that, even under more adverse conditions, on balance, the contribution of immigrants to the economy is positive. Historically, the proportion of immigrants from China and Korea in Japan has been high, but as economic growth in those countries continues to forge ahead, they will see Japan as a less promising country in which to live and work.

In any case, studies of replacement migration and the levels of movement

required, such as the UN report, have shown that current immigration levels, or even much greater numbers, cannot, and most likely never will, compensate for Japan's birth deficit. In any case, pressure to stabilize or reduce immigration will come both from nationalist politicians and from the less educated and qualified Japanese workers who fear being replaced by foreign workers: competitive pressure on wage levels from immigrants will mean that these Japanese workers will increasingly be unable to make ends meet.

On the other hand, the future could be positive for younger people and foreign nationals, as population decline will increase their bargaining power and force employers to improve their hiring procedures, as well as forcing government to abolish what are, from their viewpoint, unreasonable barriers to entry and employment.

While other developed nations have courted foreign skilled workers for years, some even for decades, and can rely on their international reputations, Japan is not widely known as a society that embraces immigrants, even those like the Nikkejin of Japanese descent. For many years, the auto industry has used "trainees" from abroad as a source of cheap labor, but the majority of trainees felt used or mistreated. They complain about low wages, lack of leisure time and insecure employment, and this does nothing to improve Japan's image in the eyes of potential migrants with choices available elsewhere.

As the major industrial nations engage in a race to raise their birthrates, repopulate, and revitalize their labor force, Japan is facing increasing competition in the manufacturing and electronics sector with China's rise. Already today,

China is heavily involved in cooperation projects across the globe and projecting its economic power internationally. Meanwhile, Japan has to come to terms with the limitations of what it can do within its own power. It could be that the future lies in greater regional cooperation, with the movement of goods and services across borders, which is a prominent feature of the European Union. In order to further collaborate with e.g. China and South Korea, it will need to settle long-standing historical disputes with both neighbors, given that the three countries (together with Taiwan) are becoming increasingly integrated economically. It could be, therefore, that in a globalized world, the only real solution to national problems is regional collaboration, without which it will be impossible to solve the kinds of demographic problems which Japan is facing.

Japan only accommodates a relatively small percentage of foreigners compared with other major industrial countries (1.71% in 2009, see Appendix 20), and many of them, particularly the Koreans, were actually born in Japan, distinguished from the rest of the general population only by the color of their passports and their citizen rights. Despite this, the idea of mass immigration is still opposed by many conservative politicians. The notion of ethnic homogeneity has obsessed politicians in Japan for decades – but now they have to rethink this, in order to allow in more foreign workers. "Our Constitution grants those with Japanese nationality voting rights in return for their obligation to pay taxes […] Granting suffrage to those without Japanese nationality is clearly a mistake in national policy" (Tadamori 2010).

However, Prime Minister Naoto Kan's New Growth Strategy (Targets) do

take into account the need to accept foreign labor (National Policy Unit). They include

- Boosting the annual number of foreign visitors to 30 million
- Establishing Japan's reputation as a leading provider of medical examinations and advanced medical care in Asia
- Doubling the number of highly skilled foreign personnel in Japan
- Accepting 300,000 foreign students, and dispatching 300,000 Japanese youngsters abroad

In recent years, there has also been the LPD initiative (2008) to accept 10 million immigrants in the next 50 years (Matsutani 2008).

Certainly an increase in migration would help reduce the general age of the population, even if only by a small amount. Appendix 18 shows that the largest age groups of the foreign population are under 40. Compared to the average age of the general population, the median age of the foreign population living in Japan is lower: in Appendix 18, the median is in the 30s: compared with the national figure of 44.5).

If immigration on a mass scale is to be allowed, it is increasingly important to provide educational qualifications for every possible candidate. Family and social background are of growing importance for a child’s employment prospects. In Japan, foreign-born migrant children have lower educational attainments than Japanese children. Children of immigrants have problems in school because of insufficient language proficiency, a drawback that haunts them while entering the labor market. However, there are market niches available: Japanese generally have

little desire to become entrepreneurs, and Japanese young people prefer to work for companies rather than risk starting a business. The children of immigrants (involuntarily) take that chance, and a higher proportion become entrepreneurs, for instance running small restaurants (cf. Fukuoka 2000: 135).

Therefore social integration is necessary for the improvement of their living conditions, as more people settle and have more children, and as they contribute with their taxes to the well being of the whole society.

A new immigration policy would be for them a major advantage. The question should therefore no longer be whether Japan should be willing to control economic migration, but only how and how quickly Japan can become established as a leading competitor for the best minds in the global market. Given the problems of the past, it will require a long time before Japan is regarded by the highly qualified as an attractive destination and be included in any serious consideration.

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Appendices

Appendix 1. Pregnancy rates, by age group (1955-2005)



Source: Sato et al. (2008: 6).

Appendix 2. Proportion of married couples who have had concerns about infertility



Source: Sato et al. (2008: 13).

Appendix 3. Proportion of sexlessness among married couples by age group



Source: Sato et al. (2008: 14).

Appendix 4. Actual and projected population of Japan – Medium, high and low fertility (with medium mortality) variants –



Source: Kaneko et al. (2008: 88).

Appendix 5. Trends in the number of major three age groups – Medium fertility (with medium mortality) variant –



Source: Kaneko et al. (2008: 89).

Appendix 6. Trends in the proportion of major three age groups – Medium fertility (with medium mortality) variant –



Source: Kaneko et al (2008: 89).

Appendix 7. Projected Total Population by Prefecture

(1,000 people)

Region	2005	2010	2015	2020	2025	2030	2035
Nationwide	127,768	127,176	125,430	122,735	119,270	115,224	110,679
Hokkaido	5,628	5,513	5,360	5,166	4,937	4,684	4,413
Aomori	1,437	1,386	1,330	1,266	1,196	1,124	1,051
Iwate	1,385	1,342	1,292	1,234	1,171	1,106	1,040
Miyagi	2,360	2,334	2,291	2,231	2,158	2,074	1,982
Akita	1,146	1,094	1,037	975	911	847	783
Yamagata	1,216	1,178	1,134	1,084	1,032	979	925
Fukushima	2,091	2,039	1,976	1,902	1,821	1,737	1,649
Ibaraki	2,975	2,935	2,873	2,790	2,690	2,577	2,451
Tochigi	2,017	2,006	1,978	1,934	1,879	1,816	1,744
Gunma	2,024	2,001	1,961	1,908	1,845	1,776	1,699
Saitama	7,054	7,082	7,035	6,923	6,752	6,527	6,258
Chiba	6,056	6,108	6,087	6,008	5,879	5,706	5,498
Tokyo	12,577	12,906	13,059	13,104	13,047	12,905	12,696
Kanagawa	8,792	8,962	9,018	8,993	8,896	8,737	8,525
Niigata	2,431	2,366	2,286	2,193	2,092	1,986	1,875
Toyama	1,112	1,090	1,058	1,019	975	929	880
Ishikawa	1,174	1,155	1,128	1,093	1,053	1,009	960
Fukui	822	807	788	763	736	707	676
Yamanashi	885	872	853	829	802	772	739
Nagano	2,196	2,155	2,095	2,021	1,941	1,858	1,770
Gifu	2,107	2,083	2,041	1,984	1,917	1,842	1,761
Shizuoka	3,792	3,771	3,712	3,623	3,511	3,384	3,242
Aichi	7,255	7,367	7,392	7,359	7,276	7,152	6,991
Mie	1,867	1,854	1,823	1,779	1,725	1,666	1,600
Shiga	1,380	1,401	1,406	1,401	1,388	1,368	1,341
Kyoto	2,648	2,629	2,590	2,533	2,459	2,372	2,274
Osaka	8,817	8,736	8,582	8,358	8,072	7,741	7,378
Hyogo	5,591	5,564	5,482	5,355	5,193	5,007	4,799
Nara	1,421	1,389	1,349	1,298	1,240	1,175	1,104
Wakayama	1,036	994	949	898	846	793	738
Tottori	607	596	580	561	540	518	495
Shimane	742	717	688	656	622	588	554
Okayama	1,957	1,942	1,910	1,864	1,808	1,746	1,677
Hiroshima	2,877	2,842	2,784	2,706	2,613	2,509	2,393
Yamaguchi	1,493	1,444	1,387	1,321	1,250	1,178	1,103
Tokushima	810	788	762	730	696	659	622
Kagawa	1,012	991	963	927	887	846	802
Ehime	1,468	1,429	1,380	1,323	1,260	1,195	1,127
Kochi	796	771	742	708	671	634	596
Fukuoka	5,050	5,034	4,977	4,884	4,759	4,609	4,440
Saga	866	850	829	804	775	744	712
Nagasaki	1,479	1,431	1,379	1,319	1,255	1,187	1,117
Kumamoto	1,842	1,809	1,766	1,712	1,649	1,582	1,510
Oita	1,210	1,186	1,154	1,115	1,070	1,022	971
Miyazaki	1,153	1,127	1,095	1,055	1,010	962	912
Kagoshima	1,753	1,708	1,656	1,595	1,529	1,460	1,389
Okinawa	1,362	1,394	1,416	1,429	1,433	1,431	1,422
#pop. dec.*	32	40	42	45	46	47	47

* # pop. dec. refers to the number of prefectures where the population has declined with comparison with those 5 years earlier.

Source: Nishioka et al. (2011: 10).

Appendix 8. Index of Projected Total Population by Prefecture (2005 = 100)

Region	2005	2010	2015	2020	2025	2030	2035
Nationwide	100.0	99.5	98.2	96.1	93.3	90.2	86.6
Hokkaido	100.0	98.0	95.2	91.8	87.7	83.2	78.4
Aomori	100.0	96.5	92.6	88.1	83.3	78.3	73.1
Iwate	100.0	96.9	93.3	89.1	84.5	79.8	75.1
Miyagi	100.0	98.9	97.1	94.5	91.4	87.9	84.0
Akita	100.0	95.5	90.6	85.2	79.5	73.9	68.3
Yamagata	100.0	96.8	93.2	89.1	84.9	80.5	76.0
Fukushima	100.0	97.5	94.5	90.9	87.1	83.1	78.8
Ibaraki	100.0	98.7	96.6	93.8	90.4	86.6	82.4
Tochigi	100.0	99.5	98.1	95.9	93.2	90.0	86.5
Gunma	100.0	98.9	96.9	94.2	91.2	87.7	84.0
Saitama	100.0	100.4	99.7	98.1	95.7	92.5	88.7
Chiba	100.0	100.8	100.5	99.2	97.1	94.2	90.8
Tokyo	100.0	102.6	103.8	104.2	103.7	102.6	100.9
Kanagawa	100.0	101.9	102.6	102.3	101.2	99.4	97.0
Niigata	100.0	97.3	94.0	90.2	86.1	81.7	77.1
Toyama	100.0	98.0	95.2	91.6	87.7	83.5	79.1
Ishikawa	100.0	98.4	96.1	93.1	89.7	85.9	81.8
Fukui	100.0	98.2	95.9	92.9	89.6	86.1	82.3
Yamanashi	100.0	98.6	96.4	93.8	90.7	87.3	83.6
Nagano	100.0	98.1	95.4	92.0	88.4	84.6	80.6
Gifu	100.0	98.8	96.9	94.2	91.0	87.4	83.6
Shizuoka	100.0	99.4	97.9	95.5	92.6	89.2	85.5
Aichi	100.0	101.5	101.9	101.4	100.3	98.6	96.4
Mie	100.0	99.3	97.7	95.3	92.4	89.2	85.7
Shiga	100.0	101.5	101.9	101.5	100.6	99.1	97.2
Kyoto	100.0	99.3	97.8	95.7	92.9	89.6	85.9
Osaka	100.0	99.1	97.3	94.8	91.6	87.8	83.7
Hyogo	100.0	99.5	98.1	95.8	92.9	89.6	85.8
Nara	100.0	97.7	94.9	91.4	87.2	82.7	77.7
Wakayama	100.0	95.9	91.6	86.7	81.7	76.5	71.2
Tottori	100.0	98.1	95.6	92.5	89.0	85.4	81.5
Shimane	100.0	96.6	92.7	88.4	83.8	79.2	74.6
Okayama	100.0	99.2	97.6	95.2	92.4	89.2	85.7
Hiroshima	100.0	98.8	96.8	94.1	90.8	87.2	83.2
Yamaguchi	100.0	96.8	92.9	88.5	83.8	78.9	73.9
Tokushima	100.0	97.3	94.0	90.1	85.9	81.4	76.8
Kagawa	100.0	97.9	95.1	91.5	87.6	83.5	79.2
Ehime	100.0	97.3	94.0	90.1	85.9	81.4	76.8
Kochi	100.0	96.9	93.2	88.9	84.3	79.7	74.9
Fukuoka	100.0	99.7	98.6	96.7	94.2	91.3	87.9
Saga	100.0	98.1	95.7	92.8	89.4	85.9	82.1
Nagasaki	100.0	96.8	93.3	89.2	84.8	80.3	75.6
Kumamoto	100.0	98.2	95.9	92.9	89.5	85.8	82.0
Oita	100.0	98.1	95.4	92.2	88.4	84.5	80.3
Miyazaki	100.0	97.7	94.9	91.5	87.6	83.5	79.1
Kagoshima	100.0	97.4	94.4	91.0	87.2	83.3	79.2
Okinawa	100.0	102.4	104.0	104.9	105.3	105.1	104.4

Source: Nishioka et al. (2011: 11).

Appendix 9. Projected Population Growth Rate by Prefecture

(%)

Region	2000–2005	2005–2010	2010–2015	2015–2020	2020–2025	2025–2030	2030–2035
Nationwide	0.7	-0.5	-1.4	-2.1	-2.8	-3.4	-3.9
Hokkaido	-1.0	-2.0	-2.8	-3.6	-4.4	-5.1	-5.8
Aomori	-2.6	-3.5	-4.1	-4.8	-5.5	-6.0	-6.5
Iwate	-2.2	-3.1	-3.7	-4.5	-5.1	-5.6	-6.0
Miyagi	-0.2	-1.1	-1.8	-2.6	-3.3	-3.9	-4.4
Akita	-3.7	-4.5	-5.2	-6.0	-6.6	-7.1	-7.5
Yamagata	-2.2	-3.2	-3.7	-4.4	-4.8	-5.2	-5.5
Fukushima	-1.7	-2.5	-3.1	-3.7	-4.2	-4.6	-5.1
Ibaraki	-0.4	-1.3	-2.1	-2.9	-3.6	-4.2	-4.9
Tochigi	0.6	-0.5	-1.4	-2.2	-2.8	-3.4	-4.0
Gunma	-0.0	-1.1	-2.0	-2.7	-3.3	-3.7	-4.3
Saitama	1.7	0.4	-0.7	-1.6	-2.5	-3.3	-4.1
Chiba	2.2	0.8	-0.3	-1.3	-2.2	-2.9	-3.7
Tokyo	4.2	2.6	1.2	0.3	-0.4	-1.1	-1.6
Kanagawa	3.6	1.9	0.6	-0.3	-1.1	-1.8	-2.4
Niigata	-1.8	-2.7	-3.4	-4.1	-4.6	-5.1	-5.6
Toyama	-0.8	-2.0	-2.9	-3.7	-4.3	-4.7	-5.3
Ishikawa	-0.6	-1.6	-2.4	-3.1	-3.7	-4.2	-4.8
Fukui	-0.9	-1.8	-2.4	-3.1	-3.6	-3.9	-4.4
Yamanashi	-0.4	-1.4	-2.2	-2.8	-3.3	-3.7	-4.3
Nagano	-0.8	-1.9	-2.8	-3.5	-4.0	-4.3	-4.7
Gifu	-0.1	-1.2	-2.0	-2.8	-3.4	-3.9	-4.4
Shizuoka	0.7	-0.6	-1.6	-2.4	-3.1	-3.6	-4.2
Aichi	3.0	1.5	0.3	-0.5	-1.1	-1.7	-2.3
Mie	0.5	-0.7	-1.6	-2.4	-3.0	-3.5	-4.0
Shiga	2.8	1.5	0.4	-0.3	-0.9	-1.4	-2.0
Kyoto	0.1	-0.7	-1.5	-2.2	-2.9	-3.6	-4.1
Osaka	0.1	-0.9	-1.8	-2.6	-3.4	-4.1	-4.7
Hyogo	0.7	-0.5	-1.5	-2.3	-3.0	-3.6	-4.2
Nara	-1.5	-2.3	-2.9	-3.7	-4.5	-5.2	-6.0
Wakayama	-3.2	-4.1	-4.6	-5.3	-5.8	-6.3	-6.9
Tottori	-1.0	-1.9	-2.6	-3.2	-3.8	-4.1	-4.5
Shimane	-2.5	-3.4	-4.0	-4.7	-5.2	-5.5	-5.9
Okayama	0.3	-0.8	-1.6	-2.4	-3.0	-3.4	-4.0
Hiroshima	-0.1	-1.2	-2.0	-2.8	-3.4	-4.0	-4.6
Yamaguchi	-2.3	-3.2	-4.0	-4.7	-5.4	-5.8	-6.3
Tokushima	-1.7	-2.7	-3.4	-4.1	-4.7	-5.2	-5.7
Kagawa	-1.0	-2.1	-2.9	-3.7	-4.3	-4.7	-5.1
Ehime	-1.7	-2.7	-3.4	-4.2	-4.7	-5.2	-5.7
Kochi	-2.2	-3.1	-3.8	-4.6	-5.1	-5.5	-6.0
Fukuoka	0.7	-0.3	-1.1	-1.9	-2.6	-3.1	-3.7
Saga	-1.2	-1.9	-2.4	-3.1	-3.6	-4.0	-4.4
Nagasaki	-2.5	-3.2	-3.7	-4.3	-4.9	-5.4	-5.9
Kumamoto	-0.9	-1.8	-2.4	-3.1	-3.7	-4.1	-4.5
Oita	-0.9	-1.9	-2.7	-3.4	-4.0	-4.5	-4.9
Miyazaki	-1.4	-2.3	-2.9	-3.6	-4.3	-4.7	-5.3
Kagoshima	-1.8	-2.6	-3.0	-3.6	-4.2	-4.5	-4.9
Okinawa	3.3	2.4	1.6	0.9	0.3	-0.2	-0.6

Source: Nishioka et al. (2011: 11).

Appendix 10. Projected Young Population by Prefecture

(unit: 1000 persons)

Region	2005	2010	2015	2020	2025	2030	2035
Nationwide	17,585	16,479	14,841	13,201	11,956	11,150	10,512
Hokkaido	720	644	567	495	441	400	363
Aomori	199	173	149	130	117	107	97
Iwate	191	170	150	133	121	111	102
Miyagi	327	303	275	247	223	204	188
Akita	143	124	107	94	84	76	68
Yamagata	167	150	134	121	111	103	95
Fukushima	308	277	247	221	202	187	172
Ibaraki	423	388	344	303	272	251	232
Tochigi	286	268	244	218	197	182	171
Gunma	292	272	243	215	195	184	174
Saitama	989	920	818	715	641	597	564
Chiba	822	785	711	627	563	524	498
Tokyo	1,443	1,441	1,363	1,248	1,132	1,054	1,011
Kanagawa	1,190	1,152	1,049	931	843	796	770
Niigata	331	298	262	233	211	195	179
Toyama	150	139	123	106	94	88	83
Ishikawa	166	154	136	118	107	100	94
Fukui	121	112	101	91	84	79	75
Yamanashi	128	116	102	92	85	80	75
Nagano	317	294	261	229	206	193	184
Gifu	306	286	255	226	205	193	182
Shizuoka	538	504	453	400	361	338	320
Aichi	1,075	1,037	945	849	781	747	724
Mie	267	249	224	199	182	171	162
Shiga	213	206	190	173	160	153	147
Kyoto	347	332	302	273	247	230	216
Osaka	1,219	1,149	1,014	885	792	740	702
Hyogo	797	750	668	587	529	495	468
Nara	197	178	155	135	120	110	101
Wakayama	143	126	107	92	83	76	70
Tottori	85	78	72	65	59	55	51
Shimane	101	91	81	73	66	61	56
Okayama	277	260	235	211	193	182	171
Hiroshima	405	376	335	293	264	246	230
Yamaguchi	197	180	158	137	123	113	105
Tokushima	106	96	85	75	68	62	57
Kagawa	140	131	117	102	91	84	79
Ehime	200	181	159	139	125	115	106
Kochi	102	93	82	73	65	60	55
Fukuoka	705	665	609	551	503	466	436
Saga	132	122	110	99	91	85	79
Nagasaki	216	192	168	149	135	124	114
Kumamoto	264	242	220	200	184	171	159
Oita	165	152	137	123	112	104	97
Miyazaki	169	153	136	122	112	103	95
Kagoshima	252	229	209	190	174	161	148
Okinawa	254	243	229	214	203	196	189

Source: Nishioka et al (2011: 16).

Appendix 11. Rate of Age-specific Population to Total by Prefecture: Young Population

(%)

Region	2005	2010	2015	2020	2025	2030	2035
Nationwide	13.8	13.0	11.8	10.8	10.0	9.7	9.5
Hokkaido	12.8	11.7	10.6	9.6	8.9	8.5	8.2
Aomori	13.9	12.5	11.2	10.3	9.8	9.5	9.2
Iwate	13.8	12.7	11.6	10.8	10.3	10.1	9.8
Miyagi	13.8	13.0	12.0	11.0	10.3	9.9	9.5
Akita	12.4	11.3	10.3	9.6	9.2	8.9	8.7
Yamagata	13.7	12.7	11.9	11.2	10.8	10.6	10.3
Fukushima	14.7	13.6	12.5	11.6	11.1	10.7	10.5
Ibaraki	14.2	13.2	12.0	10.8	10.1	9.7	9.5
Tochigi	14.2	13.4	12.3	11.3	10.5	10.0	9.8
Gunma	14.4	13.6	12.4	11.3	10.6	10.3	10.3
Saitama	14.0	13.0	11.6	10.3	9.5	9.2	9.0
Chiba	13.6	12.9	11.7	10.4	9.6	9.2	9.1
Tokyo	11.5	11.2	10.4	9.5	8.7	8.2	8.0
Kanagawa	13.5	12.9	11.6	10.4	9.5	9.1	9.0
Niigata	13.6	12.6	11.5	10.6	10.1	9.8	9.6
Toyama	13.5	12.8	11.6	10.4	9.6	9.4	9.4
Ishikawa	14.2	13.3	12.0	10.8	10.1	9.9	9.8
Fukui	14.7	13.9	12.8	12.0	11.4	11.2	11.0
Yamanashi	14.4	13.3	12.0	11.1	10.6	10.4	10.2
Nagano	14.4	13.6	12.5	11.3	10.6	10.4	10.4
Gifu	14.5	13.7	12.5	11.4	10.7	10.5	10.3
Shizuoka	14.2	13.4	12.2	11.0	10.3	10.0	9.9
Aichi	14.8	14.1	12.8	11.5	10.7	10.4	10.4
Mie	14.3	13.4	12.3	11.2	10.5	10.3	10.1
Shiga	15.5	14.7	13.5	12.3	11.5	11.2	10.9
Kyoto	13.1	12.6	11.7	10.8	10.1	9.7	9.5
Osaka	13.8	13.1	11.8	10.6	9.8	9.6	9.5
Hyogo	14.3	13.5	12.2	11.0	10.2	9.9	9.8
Nara	13.9	12.8	11.5	10.4	9.7	9.4	9.1
Wakayama	13.8	12.7	11.3	10.3	9.8	9.6	9.4
Tottori	14.0	13.1	12.3	11.5	10.9	10.5	10.2
Shimane	13.6	12.7	11.8	11.1	10.6	10.3	10.1
Okayama	14.1	13.4	12.3	11.3	10.7	10.4	10.2
Hiroshima	14.1	13.2	12.0	10.8	10.1	9.8	9.6
Yamaguchi	13.2	12.4	11.4	10.4	9.8	9.6	9.5
Tokushima	13.1	12.2	11.2	10.3	9.8	9.4	9.1
Kagawa	13.8	13.2	12.1	11.0	10.2	9.9	9.9
Ehime	13.7	12.7	11.5	10.5	9.9	9.6	9.4
Kochi	12.9	12.1	11.1	10.3	9.7	9.4	9.2
Fukuoka	14.0	13.2	12.2	11.3	10.6	10.1	9.8
Saga	15.2	14.3	13.2	12.4	11.8	11.4	11.2
Nagasaki	14.6	13.4	12.2	11.3	10.8	10.5	10.2
Kumamoto	14.3	13.4	12.5	11.7	11.2	10.8	10.5
Oita	13.6	12.8	11.8	11.0	10.5	10.2	10.0
Miyazaki	14.7	13.6	12.5	11.6	11.0	10.7	10.4
Kagoshima	14.4	13.4	12.6	11.9	11.4	11.0	10.6
Okinawa	18.7	17.4	16.2	15.0	14.2	13.7	13.3

Source: Nishioka et al. (2011: 17).

Appendix 12. Projected Working Age Population by Prefecture

(unit: 1000 persons)

Region	2005	2010	2015	2020	2025	2030	2035
Nationwide	84,422	81,285	76,807	73,635	70,960	67,404	62,919
Hokkaido	3,701	3,515	3,241	3,007	2,819	2,615	2,400
Aomori	911	860	789	721	661	605	552
Iwate	853	810	750	691	640	592	548
Miyagi	1,562	1,509	1,424	1,341	1,272	1,202	1,124
Akita	695	650	587	526	475	432	394
Yamagata	739	707	657	607	565	528	494
Fukushima	1,309	1,258	1,179	1,094	1,021	954	891
Ibaraki	1,975	1,884	1,758	1,648	1,559	1,465	1,356
Tochigi	1,339	1,299	1,223	1,158	1,107	1,053	987
Gunma	1,315	1,260	1,181	1,121	1,075	1,019	948
Saitama	4,905	4,694	4,426	4,252	4,106	3,884	3,580
Chiba	4,170	4,002	3,779	3,642	3,534	3,364	3,120
Tokyo	8,809	8,737	8,538	8,515	8,489	8,243	7,790
Kanagawa	6,115	5,983	5,786	5,707	5,628	5,399	5,036
Niigata	1,518	1,449	1,342	1,244	1,167	1,090	1,008
Toyama	704	665	612	579	552	519	480
Ishikawa	762	726	674	641	611	576	535
Fukui	515	494	464	439	418	395	371
Yamanashi	563	544	515	488	463	435	403
Nagano	1,357	1,294	1,213	1,152	1,098	1,032	956
Gifu	1,359	1,299	1,219	1,163	1,116	1,056	986
Shizuoka	2,475	2,373	2,233	2,131	2,042	1,933	1,800
Aichi	4,925	4,826	4,673	4,621	4,570	4,421	4,189
Mie	1,199	1,156	1,094	1,051	1,013	961	902
Shiga	917	907	879	863	850	826	793
Kyoto	1,767	1,683	1,575	1,520	1,478	1,411	1,322
Osaka	5,953	5,600	5,247	5,049	4,881	4,597	4,219
Hyogo	3,681	3,519	3,313	3,180	3,062	2,895	2,687
Nara	940	877	807	754	708	655	598
Wakayama	643	596	544	502	464	423	384
Tottori	376	363	340	319	303	288	273
Shimane	440	418	383	354	331	311	291
Okayama	1,241	1,192	1,123	1,080	1,041	998	945
Hiroshima	1,868	1,781	1,663	1,585	1,517	1,437	1,336
Yamaguchi	922	860	781	723	678	634	585
Tokushima	507	483	444	412	386	362	337
Kagawa	637	605	556	524	496	468	435
Ehime	915	868	800	745	699	652	604
Kochi	487	460	420	390	366	342	318
Fukuoka	3,343	3,243	3,066	2,929	2,824	2,707	2,558
Saga	538	521	490	459	434	411	389
Nagasaki	914	870	804	738	683	634	586
Kumamoto	1,140	1,103	1,035	969	913	862	814
Oita	751	719	668	625	591	560	528
Miyazaki	713	684	634	586	545	511	480
Kagoshima	1,066	1,031	968	898	837	788	742
Okinawa	888	910	910	892	876	860	838

Source: Nishioka et al. (2011: 18).

Appendix 13. Rate of Age-specific Population to Total by Prefecture: Working Age Population

(%)

Region	2005	2010	2015	2020	2025	2030	2035
Nationwide	66.1	63.9	61.2	60.0	59.5	58.5	56.8
Hokkaido	65.8	63.8	60.5	58.2	57.1	55.8	54.4
Aomori	63.4	62.1	59.3	56.9	55.3	53.8	52.5
Iwate	61.6	60.4	58.1	56.0	54.7	53.6	52.7
Miyagi	66.2	64.7	62.2	60.1	58.9	57.9	56.7
Akita	60.6	59.4	56.6	53.9	52.2	51.0	50.3
Yamagata	60.8	60.1	58.0	56.0	54.7	53.9	53.4
Fukushima	62.6	61.7	59.7	57.5	56.1	54.9	54.1
Ibaraki	66.4	64.2	61.2	59.1	57.9	56.9	55.3
Tochigi	66.4	64.7	61.8	59.9	58.9	58.0	56.6
Gunma	65.0	63.0	60.2	58.8	58.3	57.4	55.8
Saitama	69.5	66.3	62.9	61.4	60.8	59.5	57.2
Chiba	68.9	65.5	62.1	60.6	60.1	58.9	56.8
Tokyo	70.0	67.7	65.4	65.0	65.1	63.9	61.4
Kanagawa	69.6	66.8	64.2	63.5	63.3	61.8	59.1
Niigata	62.4	61.2	58.7	56.7	55.8	54.9	53.8
Toyama	63.3	61.0	57.8	56.8	56.6	55.9	54.6
Ishikawa	64.9	62.9	59.7	58.6	58.0	57.1	55.8
Fukui	62.7	61.2	58.9	57.5	56.8	55.9	54.9
Yamanashi	63.7	62.4	60.3	58.8	57.8	56.3	54.5
Nagano	61.8	60.0	57.9	57.0	56.6	55.6	54.0
Gifu	64.5	62.3	59.7	58.6	58.2	57.3	56.0
Shizuoka	65.3	62.9	60.2	58.8	58.2	57.1	55.5
Aichi	67.9	65.5	63.2	62.8	62.8	61.8	59.9
Mie	64.2	62.3	60.0	59.1	58.7	57.7	56.4
Shiga	66.5	64.8	62.5	61.6	61.2	60.4	59.2
Kyoto	66.7	64.0	60.8	60.0	60.1	59.5	58.2
Osaka	67.5	64.1	61.1	60.4	60.5	59.4	57.2
Hyogo	65.8	63.2	60.4	59.4	59.0	57.8	56.0
Nara	66.1	63.2	59.8	58.0	57.1	55.8	54.1
Wakayama	62.1	60.0	57.3	55.9	54.8	53.4	52.0
Tottori	61.9	61.0	58.6	56.9	56.0	55.6	55.2
Shimane	59.3	58.3	55.6	54.0	53.2	52.8	52.6
Okayama	63.4	61.4	58.8	57.9	57.6	57.2	56.3
Hiroshima	64.9	62.7	59.7	58.6	58.1	57.3	55.9
Yamaguchi	61.8	59.5	56.3	54.7	54.2	53.9	53.1
Tokushima	62.6	61.3	58.3	56.4	55.5	54.9	54.2
Kagawa	62.9	61.0	57.8	56.5	55.9	55.3	54.2
Ehime	62.4	60.8	57.9	56.3	55.4	54.6	53.6
Kochi	61.2	59.6	56.6	55.1	54.5	53.9	53.4
Fukuoka	66.2	64.4	61.6	60.0	59.3	58.7	57.6
Saga	62.1	61.3	59.1	57.1	56.0	55.2	54.6
Nagasaki	61.8	60.8	58.3	55.9	54.4	53.4	52.5
Kumamoto	61.9	60.9	58.6	56.6	55.3	54.5	53.9
Oita	62.1	60.6	57.8	56.1	55.2	54.8	54.4
Miyazaki	61.8	60.7	57.9	55.5	54.0	53.1	52.7
Kagoshima	60.8	60.4	58.4	56.3	54.8	53.9	53.5
Okinawa	65.2	65.3	64.3	62.4	61.1	60.1	58.9

Source: Nishioka et al. (2011: 19).

Appendix 14. Projected Elderly Population by Prefecture

(unit: 1000 persons)

Region	2005	2010	2015	2020	2025	2030	2035
Nationwide	25,761	29,412	33,781	35,899	36,354	36,670	37,249
Hokkaido	1,207	1,354	1,552	1,665	1,678	1,669	1,650
Aomori	327	353	392	415	418	412	402
Iwate	341	362	391	410	410	402	390
Miyagi	472	522	592	643	663	668	670
Akita	308	320	343	356	352	339	321
Yamagata	310	320	342	356	356	348	336
Fukushima	475	503	550	587	599	596	585
Ibaraki	577	663	771	839	859	861	862
Tochigi	392	440	511	558	575	581	586
Gunma	417	469	537	571	575	574	577
Saitama	1,160	1,468	1,792	1,957	2,005	2,045	2,115
Chiba	1,064	1,320	1,597	1,739	1,782	1,819	1,880
Tokyo	2,325	2,729	3,158	3,341	3,426	3,608	3,895
Kanagawa	1,487	1,828	2,182	2,354	2,426	2,542	2,718
Niigata	582	619	682	716	715	701	687
Toyama	259	285	324	334	329	322	317
Ishikawa	246	275	319	334	335	333	331
Fukui	186	201	223	233	234	233	230
Yamanashi	194	212	236	250	254	258	261
Nagano	522	567	620	640	637	632	630
Gifu	442	498	567	595	596	594	592
Shizuoka	780	894	1,026	1,092	1,108	1,113	1,122
Aichi	1,254	1,503	1,774	1,889	1,925	1,984	2,077
Mie	401	449	506	529	531	533	536
Shiga	250	288	338	366	378	389	401
Kyoto	534	614	712	740	734	731	735
Osaka	1,645	1,988	2,321	2,424	2,399	2,403	2,457
Hyogo	1,113	1,296	1,502	1,588	1,603	1,617	1,644
Nara	284	333	387	410	411	409	406
Wakayama	250	272	298	304	299	293	285
Tottori	146	154	169	177	179	176	171
Shimane	201	208	224	229	225	217	207
Okayama	440	489	552	574	574	566	561
Hiroshima	603	685	786	828	832	826	826
Yamaguchi	374	405	448	461	450	430	413
Tokushima	197	209	232	243	242	236	228
Kagawa	236	256	290	302	301	294	288
Ehime	352	379	421	439	437	428	417
Kochi	206	219	240	245	240	233	223
Fukuoka	1,002	1,126	1,301	1,404	1,433	1,436	1,446
Saga	196	208	229	245	250	248	243
Nagasaki	349	369	406	432	437	430	418
Kumamoto	438	464	511	543	552	549	537
Oita	294	316	350	367	367	358	346
Miyazaki	271	290	324	347	353	348	337
Kagoshima	435	448	479	508	518	512	499
Okinawa	219	241	277	323	354	375	395

Source: Nishioka et al (2011: 20).

Appendix 15. Rate of Age-specific Population to Total by Prefecture: Elderly Population

(%)

Region	2005	2010	2015	2020	2025	2030	2035
Nationwide	20.2	23.1	26.9	29.2	30.5	31.8	33.7
Hokkaido	21.5	24.6	28.9	32.2	34.0	35.6	37.4
Aomori	22.7	25.5	29.5	32.8	34.9	36.6	38.2
Iwate	24.6	27.0	30.3	33.2	35.0	36.4	37.5
Miyagi	20.0	22.3	25.8	28.8	30.7	32.2	33.8
Akita	26.9	29.3	33.1	36.5	38.7	40.1	41.0
Yamagata	25.5	27.2	30.2	32.8	34.5	35.5	36.3
Fukushima	22.7	24.7	27.8	30.9	32.9	34.3	35.5
Ibaraki	19.4	22.6	26.8	30.1	31.9	33.4	35.2
Tochigi	19.4	21.9	25.8	28.8	30.6	32.0	33.6
Gunma	20.6	23.4	27.4	29.9	31.1	32.3	33.9
Saitama	16.4	20.7	25.5	28.3	29.7	31.3	33.8
Chiba	17.6	21.6	26.2	28.9	30.3	31.9	34.2
Tokyo	18.5	21.1	24.2	25.5	26.3	28.0	30.7
Kanagawa	16.9	20.4	24.2	26.2	27.3	29.1	31.9
Niigata	23.9	26.2	29.8	32.6	34.2	35.3	36.6
Toyama	23.3	26.2	30.6	32.8	33.8	34.6	36.0
Ishikawa	20.9	23.8	28.2	30.5	31.8	33.0	34.5
Fukui	22.6	24.9	28.3	30.5	31.8	33.0	34.0
Yamanashi	21.9	24.4	27.7	30.1	31.7	33.3	35.3
Nagano	23.8	26.3	29.6	31.7	32.8	34.0	35.6
Gifu	21.0	23.9	27.8	30.0	31.1	32.2	33.6
Shizuoka	20.6	23.7	27.6	30.1	31.6	32.9	34.6
Aichi	17.3	20.4	24.0	25.7	26.5	27.7	29.7
Mie	21.5	24.2	27.7	29.7	30.8	32.0	33.5
Shiga	18.1	20.5	24.0	26.1	27.2	28.4	29.9
Kyoto	20.2	23.4	27.5	29.2	29.9	30.8	32.3
Osaka	18.7	22.8	27.0	29.0	29.7	31.0	33.3
Hyogo	19.9	23.3	27.4	29.7	30.9	32.3	34.3
Nara	20.0	24.0	28.7	31.6	33.2	34.8	36.8
Wakayama	24.1	27.3	31.4	33.9	35.4	37.0	38.6
Tottori	24.1	25.9	29.1	31.6	33.0	33.9	34.5
Shimane	27.1	29.0	32.6	34.9	36.2	36.8	37.3
Okayama	22.5	25.2	28.9	30.8	31.8	32.4	33.4
Hiroshima	21.0	24.1	28.2	30.6	31.8	32.9	34.5
Yamaguchi	25.0	28.0	32.3	34.9	36.0	36.6	37.4
Tokushima	24.4	26.6	30.5	33.3	34.7	35.7	36.7
Kagawa	23.3	25.8	30.1	32.5	33.9	34.8	35.9
Ehime	24.0	26.5	30.5	33.2	34.7	35.8	37.0
Kochi	25.9	28.4	32.3	34.6	35.8	36.7	37.4
Fukuoka	19.9	22.4	26.1	28.8	30.1	31.2	32.6
Saga	22.6	24.4	27.6	30.5	32.2	33.3	34.2
Nagasaki	23.6	25.8	29.5	32.7	34.8	36.2	37.4
Kumamoto	23.8	25.7	28.9	31.7	33.5	34.7	35.6
Oita	24.3	26.6	30.3	32.9	34.3	35.0	35.6
Miyazaki	23.5	25.8	29.6	32.9	35.0	36.2	36.9
Kagoshima	24.8	26.2	28.9	31.8	33.8	35.1	35.9
Okinawa	16.1	17.3	19.6	22.6	24.7	26.2	27.7

Source: Nishioka et al (2011: 22).

Appendix 16. Population Indicators For Japan By Period Of Each Scenario

Scenario	*I*	*II*	*III*	*IV*	*V*	*VI* *
Period	*Medium variant*	*Medium variant with zero migration*	*Constant total population*	*Constant age group 15-64*	*Ratio 15-64/65+ not less than 3.0*	*Constant ratio 15-64/65 years or older*
			A. Average annual number of migrants (thousands)			
1995-2000	0	0	0	231	0	*5 990*
2000-2025	0	0	221	615	1 502	*5 183*
2025-2050	0	0	464	679	2 292	*15 758*
2000-2050	0	0	343	647	1 897	*10 471*
1995-2050	0	0	312	609	1 724	*10 064*
			B. Total number of migrants (thousands)			
1995-2000	0	0	0	1 155	0	*29 950*
2000-2025	0	0	5 535	15 366	37 548	*129 587*
2025-2050	0	0	11 606	16 965	57 288	*393 957*
2000-2050	0	0	17 141	32 332	94 837	*523 543*
1995-2050	0	0	17 141	33 487	94 837	*553 495*
			C. Total population (thousands)			
1950	83 625	-	-	-	-	-
1975	111 524	-	-	-	-	-
1995	125 472	-	-	-	-	-
2000	126 714	126 714	126 714	127 923	126 714	*158 061*
2025	121 150	121 150	127 457	141 877	166 849	*323 376*
2050	104 921	104 921	127 457	150 697	229 021	*817 965*
			D. Age group 0-14 (thousands)			
1950	29 643	-	-	-	-	-
1975	27 109	-	-	-	-	-
1995	20 019	-	-	-	-	-
2000	18 765	18 765	18 765	19 078	18 765	*26 888*
2025	16 349	16 349	17 994	21 065	27 897	*60 256*
2050	14 511	14 511	19 297	23 619	41 266	*170 785*
			E. Age group 15-64 (thousands)			
1950	49 847	-	-	-	-	-
1975	75 625	-	-	-	-	-
1995	87 188	-	-	-	-	-
2000	86 335	86 335	86 335	87 188	86 335	*108 454*
2025	72 418	72 418	76 803	87 188	104 213	*217 547*
2050	57 087	57 087	72 908	87 188	140 816	*535 088*
			F. Age group 65+ (thousands)			
1950	4 135	-	-	-	-	-
1975	8 790	-	-	-	-	-
1995	18 264	-	-	-	-	-
2000	21 614	21 614	21 614	21 657	21 614	*22 719*
2025	32 383	32 383	32 660	33 624	34 738	*45 572*
2050	33 323	33 323	35 253	39 890	46 939	*112 092*
			G. Potential support ratio 15-4/65+			
1950	12.05	-	-	-	-	-
1975	8.60	-	-	-	-	-
1995	4.77	-	-	-	-	-
2000	3.99	3.99	3.99	4.03	3.99	*4.77*
2025	2.24	2.24	2.35	2.59	3.00	*4.77*
2050	1.71	1.71	2.07	2.19	3.00	*4.77*

** Scenario VI is considered to be demographically unrealistic.*

Source: United Nations Population Division (2001: 55).

Appendix 17. Trends in the proportion of elderly – Medium, high and low fertility (with medium mortality) variants –



Source: Kaneko et al. (2008: 88).

Appendix 18. Number of foreign nationals entering Japan by gender and age (2009)



Source: Immigration Bureau (2010: 4).

Appendix 19. Changes in the number of new arrivals by the status of residence for employment



Source: Immigration Bureau (2010: 8).

Appendix 20. Changes in the number of registered foreign nationals and its percentage of the total population in Japan



*1 "Number of registered foreign nationals" as of December 31 each year.

*2 The "percentage of the total population of Japan" is calculated based on the population as of October 1 every year taken from the "Population Estimates" and the "Population Census" of the Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications.

Source: Immigration Bureau (2010: 22).

Appendix 21. Changes in the number of registered foreign nationals by major nationality (place of origin)



Source: Immigration Bureau (2010: 23).

Appendix 22. Changes in the estimated number of overstayers by major nationality (place of origin)



Source: Immigration Bureau (2010: 38).

Appendix 23. Changes in the estimated number of overstayers by major nationality

(place of origin)

(People)

Nationality (Place of Origin) \ Date	May 1 1991	May 1 1992	May 1 1993	May 1 1994	May 1 1995	May1 1996	January 1 1997	January 1 1998	January 1 1999	January 1 2000	January 1 2001	January 1 2002	January 1 2003	January 1 2004	January 1 2005	January 1 2006	January 1 2007	January 1 2008	January 1 2009	January 1 2010
Total	159,828	278,892	298,646	293,800	286,704	284,500	282,986	276,810	271,048	251,697	232,121	224,067	220,552	219,418	207,299	193,745	170,839	149,785	113,072	91,778
R.O. Korea	25,848	35,687	39,455	43,369	47,544	51,580	52,387	52,123	62,577	60,693	56,023	55,164	49,874	46,425	43,151	40,203	36,321	31,758	24,198	21,660
China	17,535	25,737	33,312	39,738	39,511	39,140	38,296	37,590	34,800	32,896	30,975	27,582	29,676	33,522	32,683	31,074	27,698	25,057	18,385	12,933
Philippines	27,228	31,974	35,392	37,544	39,763	41,997	42,547	42,608	40,420	36,379	31,666	29,649	30,100	31,428	30,619	30,777	28,491	24,741	17,287	12,842
China (Taiwan)	5,241	6,729	7,457	7,871	7,974	8,502	9,409	9,430	9,437	9,243	8,849	8,990	9,126	7,611	6,760	6,696	6,347	6,031	4,950	4,889
Thailand	19,093	44,354	55,383	49,992	44,794	41,280	39,513	37,046	30,065	23,503	19,500	16,925	15,693	14,334	12,787	10,352	8,460	7,314	6,023	4,836
Malaysia	14,413	38,529	30,840	20,313	14,511	11,525	10,390	10,141	9,989	9,701	9,651	10,097	9,442	8,476	7,431	6,822	6,397	4,804	2,986	2,661
Peru	487	2,783	9,038	12,918	15,301	13,836	12,942	11,606	10,320	9,158	8,502	7,744	7,322	7,230	6,624	5,997	5,283	4,481	3,396	2,402
Singapore	1,435	1,712	1,914	2,342	2,600	2,850	2,946	3,027	3,084	3,178	3,302	3,494	3,556	3,216	3,075	3,587	2,241	2,207	2,128	2,107
Sri Lanka	2,281	3,217	3,763	3,395	2,980	2,783	2,751	3,071	3,734	3,907	3,489	3,730	3,909	4,242	4,209	4,590	4,042	3,615	2,796	1,952
Indonesia	582	1,955	2,969	3,198	3,205	3,481	3,758	4,692	4,930	4,947	5,315	6,393	6,546	7,246	7,169	6,926	6,354	5,096	3,126	1,820
Others	45,685	86,215	79,123	73,120	68,521	67,526	68,047	65,476	61,692	58,092	54,849	54,299	55,308	55,688	52,791	46,721	39,205	34,681	27,797	23,676

(*) "China" does not include Taiwan, Hong Kong or others.

Source: Immigration Bureau (2010: 38).

Appendix 24. Changes in the number of cases of illegal work by nationality (place of origin)

(People)

Nationality (Place of Origin) \ Year		2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Total		45,935	45,929	36,982	32,471	26,545
	Male	26,232	24,759	20,926	19,270	16,522
	Female	19,703	21,170	16,056	13,201	10,023
China		14,239	13,750	10,223	9,583	8,205
	Male	8,749	7,614	5,910	5,950	5,343
	Female	5,490	6,136	4,313	3,633	2,862
Philippines		7,378	7,978	7,075	6,083	4,845
	Male	2,647	2,887	2,815	2,559	2,250
	Female	4,731	5,091	4,260	3,524	2,595
R.O. Korea		6,514	6,696	5,315	4,077	3,241
	Male	2,274	2,232	1,977	1,555	1,306
	Female	4,240	4,464	3,338	2,522	1,935
Indonesia		1,844	2,286	2,034	2,162	1,557
	Male	1,297	1,521	1,438	1,568	1,230
	Female	547	765	596	594	327
Thailand		2,816	2,650	2,013	1,694	1,512
	Male	1,158	1,159	985	903	822
	Female	1,658	1,491	1,028	791	690
Viet Nam		900	1,189	1,318	1,473	1,152
	Male	490	630	756	887	741
	Female	410	559	562	586	411
Sri Lanka		1,024	1,440	1,264	1,278	1,042
	Male	898	1,270	1,117	1,150	946
	Female	126	170	147	128	96
Peru		894	927	785	786	932
	Male	588	609	518	532	652
	Female	306	318	267	254	280
Bangladesh		1,405	1,176	907	702	490
	Male	1,328	1,114	873	670	473
	Female	77	62	34	32	17
Nepal		590	830	610	535	456
	Male	435	568	431	364	340
	Female	155	262	179	171	116
Others		8,331	7,007	5,438	4,098	3,113
	Male	6,368	5,155	4,106	3,132	2,419
	Female	1,963	1,852	1,332	966	694

(*) "China" does not include Taiwan, Hong Kong or others.

Source: Immigration Bureau (2010: 44).