

Donors, government and society in Indonesia's democratic elections

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Abstract

Democratization theory suggests that “fair and free” elections tend to decrease government control and strengthen civil society. In Indonesia elections held in 1999, 2004 and 2009 were widely believed to be fair and free, but the effect was to enhance the power of government and weaken the position of donor agencies and civil society. An international context on a new discourse on aid (Paris Declaration) that strengthens the position of recipient governments in relation to donors also contributed to that situation. In particular, governmental control of international assistance has restricted the activities of Indonesian Domestic Election Monitoring Organizations (DEMOS). By enhancing government legitimacy, the elections allowed it to alter its relations with donor agencies and with Indonesian DEMOS. It shows that although theoretically the process of democratization through “fair and free” election is believed will bring positive impacts to a democratic agenda including the decreasing of government control, this study argues that in the case of Indonesia the impact was different. At the same time, DEMOS have found a new method of monitoring through social media and technological means. The method differs from the old way of monitoring by offering cost efficiency, higher participation, and sustainability. In addition, the practice of this kind of monitoring has a flexibility of ways, means, time and people to participate in observing the election, without restrictions from government.

Keywords: donor, government, Indonesia DEMOS, democratization, election monitoring

Introduction

After the 1990s, the interaction between international and domestic actors in Indonesia changed as a result of democratization. The rise of international assistance focused on promoting democracy, including an element of developmental cooperation that allowed the international community to play a role in the democratization process (Ottaway & Carothers, 1997).

The interaction between domestic and international actors in democratization has generally been investigated through the phenomenon of conditionality, which is one way international actors (donors) can play a role in encouraging democratization within a country (Whitehead, 1986). This article adopts a different approach by focusing on democracy assistance. Conditionality expresses the dominance of foreign donors over domestic actors, but the democratic movement in Indonesia was based on pressure from domestic rather than international actors.

Concerning democracy assistance, most discussions have been strongly colored by debates regarding the positive and negative impacts on democratization by stressing the weak relationship between aid and democracy promotion (Finkel, Pérez-Liñán, & Seligson, 2007). Discussions of DEMOS stress the importance of international actors in supporting election-monitoring activities conducted by international observers and DEMOS. However, most studies agree that domestic actors have several advantages when conducting monitoring (Carothers, 1997).

Although several works have discussed DEMOS (Chand, 1997), very few deal with the Indonesian case. In a study of the 1999 elections, Eric Bjornlund emphasized the importance of collaboration between international and Indonesian DEMOS, and the need for international support to work with Indonesian DEMOS as local actors in order to enhance the quality of the elections (Bjornlund, 2004). Based on a study of the first Indonesian DEMOS (KIPP), Mitsuru Yamada stressed the role of international assistance and international networking (INGOs) in the successful conduct of monitoring activities by Indonesian DEMOS in the 1997 and the 1999 elections (Yamada, 2008).

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It is remarkable that there have been so few attempts to explore a comprehensive background and the role of Indonesian DEMOs as new actors after the decline of the Soeharto regime, or the relationship among Indonesian DEMOs, donors and the government after the election of a new government. One exception is Annette Marie Clear, who analyzed donor strategies in supporting democratization in post-Soeharto Indonesia. She identified three different approaches, namely state-oriented, society-oriented and state-society interactive (mediator) strategies (Clear, 2002). She suggested that donors would do better to focus on mediator strategies, and highlighted the value of having donor countries or organizations serve as mediators in bridging state-society interaction.

Using Clear's work as a starting point, this article analyses the relationship between international donors and domestic actors such as Electoral Management Bodies (EMB) i.e. General Election Commission (Komisi Pemilihan Umum or KPU) and Electoral Supervisory (Badan Pengawas Pemilihan Umum or Bawaslu), and Indonesian DEMOs in supporting democratic elections in Indonesia. I argue that the positive results of the transitional elections changed the relationship between donors, EMBs as part of the government body, and DEMOs, as indicated by growing EMBs control over donors and Indonesian DEMOs. The election of a new "democratic" government greatly reduced the role of DEMOs in Indonesia. In addition, I argue that in these circumstances donors find it difficult to play a role as mediators, and have little choice apart from focusing on the government (state-oriented approach) while still trying to promote the necessity of state- society interactions.

This article is divided into four sections. The first examines the scheme of the dynamic relations of actors under the Soeharto regime during three periods: 1) a period of development (1967-1990), 2) of aid conditionality (1991-1996), and 3) of Economic Crisis (1997-1998). Thereafter, the analysis will focus on the relationship of donor, government and civil society in the post-Soeharto period. As in the first section, the scheme of relationships among the actors will be presented. The final section presents the conclusions reached in this study.

Donor-government-society relationship under the Soeharto regime

The period of development (1967-1990)

Donor-government relations were very close under the Soeharto regime. When Soeharto took the position of president in 1967, he faced a dire economic situation. Thus, he made economic stabilization a primary target for his government. One of his strategies was to ask for international development assistance. At the time, the international political situation was dominated by the cold war conflict between communist and non-communist countries. Considering that about 60% of Indonesian debt was owed to communist countries, Soeharto first asked the USSR for help. However, when there was no response from the USSR, Soeharto turned to Japan for assistance. With Japanese help, the first assembly of international donors, omitting the communist countries, was convened. This became the initial force behind the establishment of the Paris Club and the Intergovernmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI), created as a forum for discussion regarding the provision of foreign aid to Indonesia lead by the Dutch government (Clear, 2001).²

Foreign aid was one of the most significant financial sources for the Indonesian National Budget under the Soeharto regime. Foreign aid contributed about one-fifth of the total national income and Japan was a major donor, as approximately 16% of Japanese ODA was allocated to Indonesia. Hence, donor-government relations were shaped by a Soeharto's call for financial assistance to stabilize the domestic economic situation and by the effort of non-communist countries to keep Indonesia away from communist influence (containment policy). Considering that economic stability would lead to political stability under

² The IGGI was replaced by the Consultative Group on Indonesia (CGI) as a respond of Indonesian government towards the Dutch government policy to linkage human rights and economic aid as happened in Dili Incident. CGI was gathering Indonesia's international donors from 1992 to 2007 under chairmanship of the World Bank (Gillies, 1996, 187-189).

Soeharto, donors provided Indonesia with large amounts of development assistance aid, and the restoration of economic and political stability made it impossible for pro-Communist groups to gain political support.

In the case of government-society relations, in the 1970s Soeharto's government restricted political participation under the banner of preserving Indonesian unity. In the 1980s, the Soeharto regime introduced a politics of openness (Politik Keterbukaan). Subsequently, public demands for a political opening-up continued, and democratization has been a public issue since that time. However, the government also introduced a subversion law and a Civil Society Organizations Law (UU ORMAS) in 1985 that limited the freedom of individuals and of organizations or associations. Thereafter, government-civil society relations were tainted by conflict because society often resorted to confrontation when dealing with the government.

After the end of Cold War, the "enlargement of the democratic community" became a key element of U.S. foreign policy (Hook, 2002). Soon, democracy, human rights and good governance became objectives associated with aid from donor countries. The emphasis on these issues influenced the development of democracy in Indonesia through aid conditionality at the government level and democracy aid promotion at the grassroots level.

The Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 affected not only the economic and social situation but also domestic politics, giving rise to the demand for political reform that brought down the Soeharto regime. The economic crisis also allowed international actors such as the IMF, the World Bank, the United States and Japan to play a role by emphasizing economic and political reform.

The period from the mid-1980s through 1997 can be categorized as a pre-liberalization period. As O'Donnell and Schmitter argue, "when the authoritarian leaders begin to modify their own rules in the direction of providing secure guarantees for the rights of individuals and groups, it means the transition already started" (p. 6). In retrospect, it can be seen that the protests in the 1980s and early 1990s against the autocratic style of the Soeharto regime mark the start of a period of what Hadiwinata and Schuck term "instrumentalized" liberalization (p. 16).

I prefer the term "compulsive liberalization," by which I mean that liberalization was introduced without being motivated by the regime's enthusiasm for introducing it. It was a response to pressure from people, both domestic and international, who urged the government to create opportunities for political activities that were wider than they were before. Moreover, after the Cold War, the international community, especially donor countries and organizations, emphasized democratization as one of the primary requirements for receiving assistance. Political aid conditionality became a tool for promoting democracy on the part of the donors.

The period of aid conditionality (1991-1996)

In tandem with the end of Cold War in the 1990s, almost all donors and international institutions focused on democracy as a prerequisite of assistance by stressing the conditionality of political and administrative reform in recipient countries. Democracy, human rights, and good governance became objectives of aid conditionality, and all donors except Japan began to call on Soeharto to pay attention to these issues. The Dili Incident in 1991 attracted the international community's concern, especially from donor countries such as the Canadian and Dutch governments (members of IGGI), and resulted in aid freezes (Arase, 1993). While the Japanese Government differed with other donors, it did not conduct any aid sanctions against Indonesia (Furuoka, 2007). Following that time, issues related to human rights and democratization colored the relationship between the Soeharto and aid donors.

Although there were limitations to society-donor relations under Soeharto, international support for civil society, especially from the US, was a primary source of civil society movements and NGO activities in Indonesia. Dinorah Azpuru et.al (2008) noted that the US distributed democracy assistance to Indonesia starting in 1990, before the end of the Soeharto regime. One organisation that emerged as a result of international support was the KIPP, one of the leading Indonesian DEMOs. The activities of Independent Committee for Election Monitoring (Komite Independen Pemantau Pemilu-KIPP) were supported by

international donors, which provided funds, technical assistance and training even though the government response to KIPP was negative.

With regard to government-society relations in this period, it could be said that conditionality on the part of the donors indirectly advanced the position of civil society organizations (CSOs). A number of new groups were established in this period, including the Legal Aid Institute (Lembaga Bantuan Hukum-LBH), International NGO Forum on Indonesian Development (INFID) and Indonesian Labour Union (Serikat Buruh Pekerja Indonesia-SPSI) (Mansour, 1996). CSOs and donors had more power and were closer than they had been in the previous period, but the relationship between the CSOs and the government was often characterized by conflict.

The period of economic crisis (1997-1998)

Tensions between the Soeharto regime and international donors reached a climax during the economic crisis that started in mid-1997. Indonesia was hit the hardest. The value of the rupiah dropped from Rp. 2,400 per US dollar in August 1997 to Rp. 4,000 per US dollar in October of that year. Conditions became worse after the Central Bank of Indonesia allowed the currency to float, resulting in devaluation from around 2,600 to nearly 3,000 rupiah to the US dollar. The highest devaluation of the rupiah approached Rp.17, 000 to one US dollar in January 1998.

Soeharto asked for international assistance from the IMF in October 1997, and the first agreement between Indonesia and the IMF was signed in the same month, followed by a second and third agreement on January 15 and April 8, 1998. As a result of these agreements, the IMF became deeply involved in Indonesia's economic recovery program and played an important role in determining the economic policy of Soeharto. The economic crisis made the political situation worse and, finally led to Soeharto's resignation. Regarding this situation, Steve Hanke, an economic advisor to Soeharto, suggested that the IMF package was designed to remove Soeharto from power and create an opportunity for political reform.

CSOs and other social movements applied great pressure to satisfy the demand for democratic reforms, and after Soeharto resigned, students around the country continued to demand economic and political reforms and a change in national leadership. The tragedy that occurred on May 12th as a result of a clash between students and security forces caused a nationwide riot.

The situation described above shows that the economic crisis greatly increased the power of donors and CSOs, leaving Soeharto's government with little choice other than to follow the IMF plan and accede to domestic demand. *Table 1* summarizes donor-government-CSOs relations under the Soeharto regime.

Table 1: Dynamics of donor-government-civil society relations under Soeharto

Period	Indicator	Characteristics of Relations		
		Donor-Govt	Govt-Society	Donor-Society
1967-1990	Form of relations	Harmonious	Conflicted	Informal
	Control of Government	Strong		
1991-1996	Form of relations	Harmonious but Coloured by the Issue of Human Rights	Conflicted	Informal Relations
	Control of Government	Still strong, but donors and society became more powerful		
1997-1998	Form of relations	Tending to be hostile	Conflict	Formal and direct
	Control of Government	Strong, but became weaker at the end of the Soeharto regime		

Note: The table is created by the author.

The relationship between donors, government, and Indonesian DEMOS during the reform period

The election of Habibie as President in the 1998 launched a period of liberalization characterized by political instability and increasing public participation in political activities. Under Habibie the government introduced new regulations and laws that supported democratization, including freedom of the press and of association, a new election law, and a decentralization law. The liberalization period ended with a free and fair democratic election that gave Indonesia a new government with strong claims to legitimacy.

I argue that, although Indonesia had a new political regime and had already implemented three democratic elections, the presidency of Abdurrahman Wahid was part of a transitional period leading to democratization. I divide this period into two phases, the first marked by the organisation of transitional elections and the second by consolidation through a process of formulating new laws and regulations that allowed the public to become involved in the political process.

Changing relations among domestic actors during the transitional phase, and between Indonesian DEMOs and donors, indicate that the case of Indonesia does not support theories of democracy and democratization that see the period of transition as the starting point for the implementation of democratic reforms. The newly achieved legitimacy of government that resulted from democratic elections affected the power of the government to control civil society and donors. Moreover, the 2005 Paris Declaration gave rise to a new discourse on aid that directly affected the relationship between the government and donors, and between the government and society.

The relations among domestic actors

Several types of DEMOs operate within Indonesia's political system. Sharon Lean (2007) identifies two basic categories of DEMOs, organizations created for the specific purpose of monitoring elections (stand-alone DEMOs) and networks or coalitions of previously existing organizations that combine their efforts and create a staff infrastructure (network DEMOs). In Indonesia, most monitoring organizations were established after the start of the reform period, and were not created to monitor elections but focused instead on activities such as empowering women, fighting corruption, dealing with migrant labour issues, and so forth. Furthermore, most of these groups conducted their activities through networking, and only a few organizations can be described as "stand alone" organizations. Although the first of the Indonesian DEMO was of the "stand-alone type," the number of DEMOs that fit this description has not increased significantly.

The dominance of the networking model built good relationships among DEMOs, and Indonesian DEMOs also enjoyed good relations with the governmental supervisory body. However, when the respondents were asked about KPU support for DEMOs' efforts to communicate and conduct their activities freely, most responded positively to each question, but the number of respondents that gave negative answers increased with each election. Moreover, the positive attitude of DEMOs toward the KPU declined in the 2009 election compared to the 2004 election.

Referring to the survey results, most DEMOs reported that the KPU and Bawaslu (both locally and centrally) saw DEMOs as partners whose work complemented the activities of governmental electoral bodies, and that their relationship with DEMOs was close and quite good. Bawaslu has limited personnel and similar responsibilities, and saw collaboration with DEMOs as necessary. However, the KPU at both the local and the central level said that because DEMOs do not share monitoring results with the KPU, its relation with DEMOs is not close.

Most DEMOs felt that there had been no change in their relationships and said they were satisfied with these relationships. However, some leaders suggested that coordination between DEMOs had gradually decreased from the time of Soeharto's regime. As one of them pointed out that "[t]he cooperation between DEMOs had gradually decreased from the time of Soeharto's regime. Now democracy is already running,

then NGOs feel have no common enemy more, so cooperation among each other becomes less than before” (Interviews, Director of LP3ES³, 2009).

Another leader pointed out that budget constraints had reduced the level of cooperation. “DEMOs have not been able to carry out regular meetings or mobilize a network and coordination to conduct the activities together without having enough funding” (Interviews, ex-National Coordinator of JAMPPI⁴, Indonesia DEMOs 2009). Other respondents said that “each DEMOs was now focused on their own program, and do not put the cooperation with other DEMOs as the important aspects for their program” (Interviews, KPU Officer, 2009).

Concerning the satisfaction of DEMOs regarding their relationships with KPU and Bawaslu, most respondents said that they were satisfied. Similarly, although some DEMOs identified changes in relations among DEMOs, most of the DEMOs said that they were satisfied. However, the responses to these questions indicated some level of dissatisfaction, and the number of DEMOs with a positive view of relations with other DEMOs is smaller than the number that are satisfied with the relationship with KPU and Bawaslu.

Considering the above results, the relations between DEMOs and other DEMO or EMBs can be summarised as being generally positive. However, the fact that the dynamics of relations between DEMOs and others has altered, is significant and will be analysed in the next section.

Relations between Indonesian DEMOs and donors

Election monitoring and voter education were the primary activities that donors had funded and these activities involved collaboration between the DEMOs and the donors. Other activities included conducting a quick count, but the complicated procedure used for the quick count and limited funds for carrying it out meant that very few DEMOs were involved. In general, donors provided financial support for DEMO activities rather than providing expertise, training or capacity building. Most of the Indonesian DEMOs acknowledged their dependency on foreign support, but they also identified certain problems connected with communication with donors, domination by donors, and the slow response of donors to DEMO requests (Interviews, Coordinator FPMP⁵, Indonesian DEMOs, 2009).

Under the Paris Declarations, a new mechanism of distributing aid has been designed that regulates the methods and process by which donors distribute their assistance in support of the DEMO’s activities. The Paris Declaration, followed by the Jakarta Commitment in 2009, was signed as a result of the heavily criticised issue of aid effectiveness. The criticism revolved around the belief that foreign aid was a conduit for donor countries political, socio-cultural, and economic interests. The Paris Declaration could be perceived as a triumph of developing or recipient countries in their dealings with donor countries. The declaration agrees on five principles of aid effectiveness: ownership, alignment, harmonisation, results and mutual accountability. The role of recipient countries’ governments is significantly enhanced because the Declaration positions them as important actors in deciding the distribution of budgets and top priority projects.

With regard to aid in the 2009 elections, the Indonesian government did not include election observers in the list of top priority projects. As a result, donor countries did not provide for ‘observation of the election’ in their aid because, according to the Paris Declaration, the donor countries must harmonise their aid with the recipients’ top priorities.

In the 1999 and 2004 elections, the donor countries aid directly to the DEMOs. However, after 2004, the DEMOs have had to submit proposals that are then discussed at a committee meeting attended by

³ LP3ES is *Lembaga Penelitian, Pendidikan dan Penerangan Ekonomi dan Sosial* (Institute of Research, Education and Information for Social and Economy), one of the oldest nongovernmental in Indonesia.

⁴ JAMPPI is *Jaringan Masyarakat Pemantau Pemilu Indonesia* (Society Networking for Indonesia Election Monitoring).

⁵ FPMP is *Forum Pemerhati Masalah Perempuan (Women Forum)*, an NGO in Indonesia that concerned on women empowerment.

Indonesian government representatives (The National Development Planning and Ministry of Domestic Affairs), the KPU and the donor.

Direct aid to NGOs is also technically limited by the implementation of a new mechanism that requires the government's involvement in transferring aid to NGOs, an arrangement that required NGOs to deal with convoluted bureaucratic procedures. Donors emphasized the positive aspects of the mechanism, saying that it could facilitate interaction between governmental and non-governmental actors. The survey shows that most of the DEMOs saw the new mechanism as a poor method for building relations between the government and the DEMOs. They argued that the arrangement could allow the government to control and limit the activities of DEMOs (Interviews, Director of LP3ES, 2009). Implementation of the mechanism had an adverse effect on relations between donors and DEMOs because DEMOs could not interact with donors directly as they had done in the past. Moreover, rather than improving relations between the DEMOs and the government, it made them more complex. Most respondents argued that the previous, direct mechanism was a better arrangement, and they felt that the government should be limited to a supervisory role, with the positioning of the various actors balanced. Most respondents felt that the donors failed to take steps to bridge the relationships between the government and the DEMOs.

The direct observation results of the 2009 elections indicate that international and Indonesian DEMOs monitoring the election process less enthusiastic about the process than they were for the 1999 and 2004 elections. Although some organizations, both domestic and international registered observers at Central KPU, the areas that were monitored by international and Indonesian DEMOs were limited, and many focused their attention on Aceh. Limited personnel from International and Indonesian DEMOs took part, and it seems that their participation was largely symbolic. With regard to Indonesian DEMOs, a lack of funding was an important reason that they were not as deeply involved in monitoring the elections as they had been in the 1999 and 2004 elections.

Bawaslu had more legitimate authority than before, but the limited number of personnel proved a significant obstacle to monitoring on election-day. Although Bawaslu had established a consortium for election monitoring, few organizations took part, and Bawaslu had to rely on volunteer participation.

All political parties had the opportunity to monitor the election, but only the big parties and a few at the middle level arranged for election observers, and those were the parties that won majorities. The limitations of funding and personnel affected the willingness of the small political parties to monitor the election.

A change and implications

The survey and the results of direct observation point to a change in relations among donors, government and society between 1999 and 2009. In the early stages of political liberalisation, relationships among these actors were quite strong. The mature democracy and democratic legitimacy of the government, including KPU members that were selected through a free and fair process, resulted in a change in the relationship of both international and domestic actors. The government has more confidence in formulating and revising election laws, and the 2004 and the 2009 Election Laws restricted the role of Indonesian DEMOs. For example, Election Law no. 12 /2003 states that the election monitoring organizations should register with and obtain an accreditation from the KPU. Election Law No. 10/2008 contains 60 articles related to the existence and activities of Indonesian DEMOs.

The KPU also publishes a manual with a code of conduct that explains which activities should be and should not be conducted by DEMOs. One of the rules that Indonesian DEMOs have criticised prevents them from conducting monitoring activities inside the polling station area. Some leaders of Indonesia's DEMOs see this rule as giving the KPU a way to restrict the role of Indonesian DEMOs. There is also some indication that KPU does not perceive the Indonesian DEMOs as partners, and consider them unnecessary.

Both the KPU and Bawaslu express positive views of Indonesian DEMOs, and they agree with the proposition that the Indonesian DEMOS are needed and play an important role in helping Bawaslu and KPU to conduct a free and fair election. However, the complexity of networking with Indonesian DEMOs and the fact that DEMOs report the results of their monitoring activities directly to funding providers without sending them to KPU suggests that relations are not close.

After 1999, the international society viewed democratization in Indonesia as stable, and this conclusion caused a change in donor behaviour in terms of directly supporting elections in Indonesia, as well as the relations among domestic actors. The internal circumstances of the donors have also influenced their behaviour. In the case of the European Union, the progress of democratization in Indonesia led to a shift of the EU budget to a second objective of aid, enhancing trade and investment, and education.

The UNDP also made changes, in part arising from new internal situations. In 1999, the UNDP was an organization with loose procedures, which made it easy to distribute money. However, as a result of scandals connected with food aid, North Korea, and so on, the UNDP adopted an elaborate internal control framework, and by 2009 the institution had changed in significant ways. Multi-layered procedures have become an obstacle to the distribution of funds. Moreover, Indonesia is now defined as a middle-income country and donors consider the government capable of running elections without international assistance.

The decrease in funding has directly and indirectly influenced the activities of Indonesian DEMOs, most of which still rely on international financial support. In the 2004 and 2009 elections, the Indonesian government still calculated the international contribution as one of the financial resources for conducting the election. In 2004, international donors (UNDP) provided the government with approximately US\$32.67 million for voter education and election monitoring, activities for which there were no government budget. For the 2009 elections, the government provided Rp. 8.6 trillion to conduct the elections, but the budget contained no provision for election monitoring (Berita & Sore, 2008).

Another factor is the Paris Declaration and the Jakarta Commitment that followed, which emphasise five basic principles (ownership, alignment, harmonisation, results and mutual accountability) and stress the role of the government of recipient countries as the key to determining the direction of foreign assistance. This agreement has had a great influence on donor approaches to the relations between government-donors and donors-DEMOs.

Donors and Indonesian DEMOs played a significant role in the democratic elections in 1999 because the government had no choice but to follow the international and domestic demands. Relations changed after 1999 elections. KPU and Bawaslu, both representing the government, were positioned as the dominant actors in the election process, while donors were on the periphery, and Indonesian DEMOs were less central than before. Moreover, donors and Indonesian DEMOs could not communicate with each other directly.

According to democratization theory, the changes described above represent a positive trend toward democratization. As Linz and Stepan argues that, the powers of government in a democratic transition are increased both *de facto* and *de jure* (Linz & Stepan, 1996). However, for Indonesian DEMOs and civil society activities, the change was a backward step in that it increased government control over donors. Because the independence of EMBs is still open to question, the Indonesian DEMOs are the principle representatives of civil society in the democratization process, and independent election-monitoring is important for ensuring and enhancing the integrity and quality of the elections.

Mapping the relations of donor-government-Indonesian DEMOs

This section will map the trends and patterns of donor-government-Indonesian DEMO relations from 1997 to 2009. *Table 2* summarizes trends in the relations among EMBs, DEMOs and donors. In general, governmental control over donors and Indonesian DEMOs has increased since 1999. Under the new election law for the 2004 elections and the terms of the Paris Declaration, KPU and Bawaslu influence over Indonesian DEMOs increased, and donor-KPU relations also improved. Bawaslu and the Indonesian

DEMOs have similar functions, and relations between the two were more flexible than those between the KPU and Indonesian DEMOs.

Although these relations indicate increasing governmental control, an increase in the government's responsibility and confidence in carrying out the elections by minimising the involvement of external actors (donors and DEMOs) suggests a positive tendency towards democratization. Moreover, with the hardware and software of the elections already in place, there was less for DEMOs and donors to do. Donor relations with DEMOs began to change after the 2004 elections with positive implications for DEMOs, whose reliance on aid donors to conduct their activities seems to be decreasing, especially for network DEMOs. While stand-alone DEMOs have reduced their election activities due to a lack of financial resources, network DEMOs have been finding alternative financial resources and no longer rely on international assistance.

Interactions between DEMOs and Bawaslu have gradually increased. Relations began to change with the beginning of the liberalisation period in 1999 (see *Table 2*). Since the legitimacy of DEMOs was recognised both internationally and domestically, Bawaslu had to cooperate and coordinate with DEMOs in order to conduct their duties. However, the relations of Bawaslu and Indonesian DEMOs are still uneasy, and Bawaslu officers observed, "the challenge is optimizing or establishing an effective communication and coordination with DEMOs that spread all over Indonesia" (Interviews, Bawaslu Officer, 2009).

Table 2: The patterns of relations among the actors under democratization

Relations Among Actors	Soeharto Period Pre-Liberalization (1987-1998)	Reform Period		
		Liberalization	Transitional	
			Initial Phase	Deepening Phase
1. Level of Control				
1.1. Government (KPU) to DEMOs	Strong	Weak	Moderate	Strong
1.2. Government (KPU) to Donors	Strong	Weak	Moderate	Strong
1.3. Government (BAWASLU) to DEMOs	Strong	Weak	Moderate	Moderate
2. Level of Cooperation				
2.1. DEMOs- donors	Strong	Strong	Moderate	Weak
2.2. DEMOs-DEMOs	Strong	Strong	Moderate	Weak
2.3. DEMOs-BAWSLU	Low	Moderate	Moderate	Weak

Note: The author created the table above.

Growing governmental control can be viewed both negatively and positively. If it is aimed at restricting the capacity of Indonesian DEMOs to observe the election process, as was feared by some Indonesian DEMOS, it should be viewed negatively. However, if it is aimed at showing the capacity of the government to conduct free and fair elections based on a budget it sets by itself, then control of donors can be viewed positively.

This study suggests three conclusions concerning the phases of democratization in Indonesia. Firstly, during the liberalisation period, because of the uncertainty of the political situation, the government was forced to accede to international and domestic demands. Donors and DEMOs could become intensely involved in the election process because the government needed external funding to conduct the general elections. Considering that the elections in this phase were part of regime change, independent Indonesian

DEMOs were an important source of legitimacy at a time when the societal level of trust in the government was low.

In the transitional period, the economic and political situation was relatively stable and the government had more power to manage the elections by formulating rules and allocating budgets to conduct the elections. Actors had close relations in the liberalization period, but in the transitional period, interaction among DEMOs and between Indonesian DEMOs and donors decreased as the political and economic situation in Indonesia matured, and democracy assistance provided by donors shifted from elections (involved support of civil society) to governance.

Epilogue: The 2014 elections and new methods of monitoring

A consolidated democracy, defined by Linz and Stepan (2001) as a political situation in which democracy has become “the only game in town,” involves five elements: a civil society, a political society, the rule of law, a state bureaucracy and an economic order that mediates between the state and market. These elements need to support each other, and Linz and Stepan (2001) make the point that “democracy is more than a regime, it is an interacting system” (p. 101).

Behind the success of Indonesia's democratization process, which is primarily measured by the implementation of democratic elections, there are developments that cannot be controlled and must be watched in order to prevent negative effects on democracy. Marcus Mietzner (2010) summed up the current situation in Indonesia by saying that “Indonesia's democracy, despite its successes remains vulnerable” (p. 194).

In 2014, election monitoring was conducted through social media and other technological means such as short messages services or SMS (Badrall, 2008), giving rise to terms such as crowd-sourced election monitoring, popular election monitoring and citizen election observation. Election monitoring using social media offers opened a possibility of participation of ordinary people to observe the election, without restrictions from government.

In the 2014 elections, many Information and Communications Technology (ICT) applications supported election monitoring. CSOs and ordinary people helped monitor the whole election process through SMS, Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, etc., inaugurating citizen participation as a way of enhancing the election quality. For example, the application *Mata Massa*⁶ or ‘Eye of the Masses,’ launched by Indonesian Journalist Alliance (Aliansi Jurnalis Indonesia, or AJI) users to report violence through a website, mobile phone, SMS, iOS, Android and Blackberry (Massa, 2014). This kind of monitoring differs significantly from the old way of monitoring by offering cost efficiency, a huge participation and sustainability. Maximizing the various method of monitoring will support the integrity and quality of election that necessary for the future of democratization.

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⁶ Details about Mata Massa at: <http://www.matamassa.org/>

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