I. Globalization, Nationalism, and Democracy

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The topic of the symposium for which a summary of this paper was prepared\(^1\) is as complex as its subject matter is vital in today’s world, for Japan and for every other country. As a political theorist, I cannot offer much in the way of empirical analyses or detailed policy recommendations, but I may be able to make a contribution by suggesting some definitions and classifications regarding globalization, nationalism, and democracy and, against this background, by advancing some hypotheses.

Many who write about globalization, nationalism, or democracy assume that these terms have univocal meanings. For example, in a recent book on the topic, *The Globalization Paradox*, Dani Rodrik argues that democracy, nationalism, and globalization are always mutually incompatible (2011). While on some meanings of each term, this is accurate, there are other meanings in which these things may be compatible. So attention to alternative interpretations is essential. As in the case of all core political concepts (freedom, equality, justice, and so on) each of the terms addressed below may be given more than one meaning, and the ‘right’ meaning is a matter of contestation.

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Globalism, National Attitudes, Democracy

Stances Toward Globalism. The term globalization is sometimes used in a broad sense to refer to the fact that now more than ever before in the modern era the economic, political, and cultural aspects of each of the world’s nation states2 is affected, for better or for worse, by similar aspects in other states and by super-national agencies or global economic and cultural forces. Amartya Sen labels globalization in this sense ‘globalism’ (2002). In a narrower sense ‘globalization’ designates those respects in which global forces constraint national sovereignty, even to the point of overriding it altogether. It is in this sense that globalization is treated in this paper. First, a comment about ‘sovereignty’ is in order.

The notion of sovereignty is an especially vague and problematic one, embedded as it is within the history of nation building, where national sovereignty, at least in Europe, was modelled on divine rule and was, and still is, intertwined with international legal, political, and military contests over territorial rights or holdings. This leads some theorists to agree with the conclusion of Michael Newman that the concept ‘is so ambiguous and distorted that it is now a barrier to analysis’ (1996, 14-15). Accordingly, this chapter will follow the advice of Charles Beitz (1991) and instead of ‘sovereignty’ employ the notion of ‘autonomy’ to refer to the de facto powers of a state to act on goals that it sets for itself, whether these powers are in accord with its declared sovereignty or not. Anthony Giddens’s description of national sovereignty can therefore be used instead to characterize a fully autonomous state as:
a political organization that has the capacity, within a delimited territory or territories, to make laws and effectively sanction their up-keep; exert a monopoly over the disposal of the means of violence; control basic policies relating to the internal political or administrative form of government; and dispose of the fruits of a national economy that are the basis of its revenue (1985, 282).

Focusing on autonomy allows one to take account of constraints on a state’s abilities in the respects Giddens describes, for instance, when it is subjected to mandates of extra-national entities such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, or binding multi-national trade agreements, even when a nation is nationally and internationally recognized as ‘sovereign’ in a formal sense. Also, while the concept of sovereignty lends itself to being thought of as an all-or-nothing matter, it is appropriate to regard a state lacking some aspects or degree of autonomy as still being on balance autonomous.

National autonomy may be restricted by globalization in two very different ways. One approach is that of neoliberalism which favours a free global market. Its enthusiasts claim that competitive world markets free of national strictures create general global prosperity. In today’s world this neoliberal support for globalization is dominant. Susan Strange, a critic of neoliberal globalization, understands it to mean in practice that ‘the impersonal forces of world markets, integrated over the postwar period more by private enterprise in finance, industry and trade than by the cooperative decisions of government [that] are now more powerful than the states to whom ultimate political authority over society and economy is supposed to belong’ (1996, 4, and pt. Two, and see Stiglitz 2017 and Streeck 2016). Defenders of neoliberalism do
not disagree with this as an accurate description, but unlike Strange, they applaud globalization precisely for exhibiting these characteristics.

There are also defenders of a version of globalization who reject neoliberalism and favour instead social-democratic or welfarist restrictions on unbridled capitalism. On their view, in a world of pervasive national interactions (globalism), primary focus on national autonomy is at best futile and at worst impedes efforts to address world or regional problems internationally or to take advantage of the opportunities offered by global interactions to further economic development and cultural exchanges for all of the world’s or of a region’s states. For David Held structures are required that create ‘the possibility of an expanding institutional framework for the democratic regulation of states and society’ where states ‘would no longer be regarded as sole centres of legitimate power within their own borders’ (1995, 13-14, and see Habermas 2001). Related to Held’s view is Thomas Pogge’s conception of citizenship, where ‘persons should be citizens of, and govern themselves through, a number of political units of various sizes without any one political unit being dominant and thus occupying the role of the state’ (1994, 24). For Held, the needed trans-national structures do not encompass the entire globe but regions of it, and in particular the countries of the European Union, so his approach is one favouring ‘regionalism.’ More ambitious are calls for a world parliament (Archibugi, 1998, 21-22). Other variations of super-national institutions are well-summarized by Carol Gould (2004, 166-173), who herself favours a model mixing ‘international’, ‘transnational,’ and ‘global’ political arrangements (ibid, 173).

Globalization is sometimes formally enforced, for instance by binding terms
of trade agreements, specified conditions for debt relief by the World Bank, decisions of the World Court, or, in the European Union, laws passed by the European Parliament. It can also be informal, as when nations find their options in making use of technological or medical innovations limited by patents applying beyond their boundaries or when monopolization of cultural industries impedes the production and distribution of national film, music, or TV shows and tends to homogenize world cultures. (A history and critique of globalization, especially its informal economic aspects, is in May and Sell 2006.) For the purpose of this paper, the important differences between formal and informal globalization and between economic and cultural globalization are set aside. Also not treated is the claim of Saskia Sassen and others that while globalization weakens the power of nations, it also strengthens the powers of some urban regions (Sassen 1991). In a full treatment of globalization, these topics would need to be taken into account. Finally by way of qualification, it should be emphasized that the categories described in the paper are ideal types, each admitting in real world incarnation of degrees, overlaps, and grey areas.

The opposite of the stance of globalization (or regionalization) is ‘isolationism,’ where nation states attempt to escape the pressures of globalism altogether, even in its benign forms. For the isolationist, the autonomy of his or her nation should be protected in all respects, and it should always look just to its own national interests in advancing both domestic and international polices. In its pristine form isolationism aims at economic self sufficiency. Isolationism is not just opposed by those who think it unrealistic or, of course, by those who champion globalization. It is also resisted in a third stance toward globalism which is here called ‘cosmopolitanism.’ This term is
sometimes used, for instance by Held, to refer to attitudes that endorse subordination of national powers to international associations, in his case the European Union. But in this paper cosmopolitanism refers to rejection both of globalization/regionalization and of isolationism. For the cosmopolitan as here understood, national autonomy is important to protect, but it neither need nor should be complete. For prudential or sometimes for ethical reasons autonomy can be relaxed to accommodate the interests of other nations or to participate with them in projects of global or regional importance while primary centres of political decision making remain within nations. This is the stance that motivated the formation of the United Nations and the Paris Accord on climate control.

*National Orientations.* The orientations in this category have to do not with structures or institutions but with people’s attitudes. They pertain to those for whom the preservation of national autonomy is an important value. For this reason they oppose globalization. ‘*Nationalist* orientations often include chauvinistic views of one’s nation as being superior to other nations and hostility or xenophobic fear of them. This stance might also be called ‘national sovereigntist’ where sovereignty is taken to encompass all aspects of a nation’s comportment with respect to other nations. John Dewey describes the stance as:

> the denial on the part of a political state of either legal or moral responsibility. It is a direct proclamation of the unlimited and unquestionable right of a political state to do what it wants to do in respect of other nations and to do it as and when it pleases. It is a doctrine of international anarchy.... (1984 [1927], 156).
Nationalism in this sense may be contrasted with an alternative conception where one’s national identity includes positive feelings toward members of other nations and willingness to cooperate with them, that is, where national pride is taken in being a good global citizen. This is the orientation of nation-based ‘global citizenship.’ Contrary to those who find any form of national loyalties as objectionable, on this orientation positive sentiments toward other nations is regarded as compatible with people identifying with and valuing their own nation, for example, in feeling pride when their compatriots or governments make admirable achievements in world forums but also in feeling shame when their nations conduct themselves badly. A cosmopolitan standpoint encourages both protecting one own nation’s autonomy and relating in positive ways to other nations, for instance, in cross border trade or cultural exchanges, and taking joint actions regarding the environment, natural disasters, or regional poverty. The orientation mandates taking on responsibility for the well being of fellow nationals while at the same time recognizing responsibilities for people of other nations. See Phillip Resnick’s treatment of this subject (2005).

Democratic Leadership. The meaning of ‘democracy’ is perhaps the most contested of those addressed in the symposium. (I discuss these complexities in my Democratic Theory and Socialism, 1987, ch. 3.) For present purposes it suffices to make just one distinction, bearing in mind that, like those regarding globalism and national orientations, it admits of gradations and nuances. This is a distinction pertaining to political leadership between ‘quasi-autocracy’ and ‘responsive leadership.’ Quasi-autocrats are not responsive to citizen wishes and needs, but take advantage of their positions to pursue whatever policies they want or that are mandated by their strongest, usually
economic, supporters. Responsive leaders, by contrast, comport themselves either as trustees for their nation’s population tasked with governing in the best interests of the nation as a whole or as delegates, charged with pursuing the policies desired by voters, or at least by the majority that voted for them, or in a combined role of trusteeship and delegation. (Alternative approaches to representation are reviewed in Cunningham, 2002, 90-100, in the 2004 Japanese translation, 135-150.)

Sometimes, though rarely, quasi-autocratic leaders are paternalistically motivated, but usually they employ their political power to further their particular interests. The only thing that disqualifies quasi-autocratic leaders from being entirely undemocratic (that is, only quasi-autocratic leaders) is that, in keeping with the thin conception of democracy associated with Joseph Schumpeter and the school of self-described ‘democratic realists’ who followed him, they must still periodically stand for election (Schumpeter 1964 [1942] and see the critique by C.B. Macpherson, 1977, ch. 4). Even if election rules can be biased and even in the face of disproportionate financial support, autocratic leaders can be voted out of office. When elections are completely rigged or financial concerns shut out all rivals, quasi-autocracy becomes full autocracy. Like democracy generally, autocracy admits of degrees.

Responsive leaders differ from the autocrats for attending to the wishes and interests of citizens, including as far as possible both those who voted for them and those who did not, and they are responsive between elections as well as just before them. (This paper focusses on national leaders; while recognizing that in some countries leaders of sub-national jurisdictions, such as provinces, states, or even cities, frustrated by unresponsive leadership at a national level,
are increasingly formulating and acting on their own foreign policies. See Acuto, 2013).

Summary of Classifications and Some Combinations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stances Toward Globalism</th>
<th>Combinations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Globalization</td>
<td>1. Globalization (Regionalization)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cosmopolitanism</td>
<td>5. Isolationism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Isolationism</td>
<td>Nationalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Quasi-Autocracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Orientations</td>
<td>2. Globalization (Regionalization)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalism</td>
<td>6. Isolationism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Citizenship</td>
<td>Nationalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership</td>
<td>Responsive Leadership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quasi-Autocratic</td>
<td>3. Globalization (Regionalization)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsive to Citizens</td>
<td>7. Cosmopolitanism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Global Citizenship</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Quasi-Autocracy</td>
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<td>4. Globalization (Regionalization)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>8. Cosmopolitanian</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Responsive Leadership</td>
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Since isolationism and global citizenship are conceptually incompatible, the two combinations that would include them are not listed. Similarly, combinations including of cosmopolitanism and nationalism are not included. While not logically incompatible, it is difficult to think of them coexisting in practice, or at least for very long. A nationalist might hold on prudential grounds there is no option but to give up some autonomy, but this is far from a cosmopolitan stance and is not at all motivated by the values of global citizenship. For the nationalist, retaining absolute autonomy is, if at all
possible, the desirable and default state of affairs.

Before the First World War, the United States manifested popularly supported isolationism and nationalism (combination 6), while after the Second World War it exhibited a popularly supported form of globalization over which it had decisive control with nationalistic confidence that this would especially benefit it (combination 2). If not globalization at least regionalization enjoys significant popular support in some countries of the European Union, and in some quarters this includes a culture of global citizenship (combination 4). Under President Trump, the U.S. is moving in the direction of isolationism and nationalism. It is a matter of current debate in the United States how autocratic or popularly responsive Trump’s leadership is. One author (Karoline Postel-Vinay, 2017) opines that the aim of Japan under Prime Minister Abe is to combine Japan-dominated regionalization with nationalism, and as in the case of Trump the question of how democratic Abe’s leadership is can be debated (so 2 or 3). Examples of the other combinations can be adduced.

Some Questions

Notwithstanding the pretenses of some social scientists about the power of taxonomies, even the most complete and nuanced classifications (which those in this presentation certainly are not) fail to provide much understanding of social or political dynamics or to provide policy recommendations. But they can help to frame questions.

1. Are a politics of globalization compatible with citizens adopting the values of global citizenship and states comporting themselves accordingly (3/4)? As
noted, it is an assumption of champions of the European Union that this is a possible combination, on which they count to strengthen pan-European economic arrangements.

2. Are attitudes of global citizenship on the part of the bulk of a country’s citizens and reflected in its foreign policies compatible with quasi-autocracy (combinations 3/7)?

3. Related to the second question, do quasi autocrats require nationalism to maintain their positions of relatively unchallenged power. (1, 3, 5, 7)?

4. Are widespread attitudes of nationalism compatible with responsive leadership (2/6)?

5. Which, if any, of the combinations are both realistic and morally desirable?

6. Further to the last question, is a favoured combination applicable to all nation states?

**Problems and Possibilities**

Some hypothetical answers will be proposed to these questions all of which confront problems of various sorts for each combination. How severe the problems are will determine whether realization of a combination is possible, and if it is possible whether actually realizing it is desirable.

*Globally/Regionally Hegemonic Nationalism.* The first two combinations
describe efforts to conjoin nationalism with globalization or with the localized version of globalization in regions. In these combinations a nation looks to be protective of its own autonomy while obliging other nations, either of the entire world or of its region, substantially to give up their autonomy in the hegemonic state’s interests. In its global form this is the stance of hegemonic nations in the age of colonialism. Problems for these combinations pertain to whether or how certain preconditions for their joint realization are available. The combination’s major precondition is that one nation, the hegemon, possesses overwhelming economic and military power with respect to all the other nations. The last post-colonialist time this was approximated was in a relatively short period after World War Two, when the United States was globally dominant and other nations were too weak from the war to challenge it. Another precondition is that the citizens of a would-be hegemonic state comport themselves in ways that support its domination of other nations.

These two conditions are difficult to maintain for any length of time. A hegemonic state can keep under-developed and relatively poor countries subordinate to it, but even this requires no small amount of military and related investment, and revolt is an always-present problem for colonial and neocolonial powers. Maintaining dominance over developed states is much harder. So even the enormous strength of the United State’s economy found itself challenged not too long after the War, first by Germany and Japan, which, ironically, the Americans had helped to recover as bulwarks against the Soviet Union and China. It is now challenged by China and a resurgent Western Europe.

Meanwhile, citizen compliance with U.S. hegemony has been weakened from
two quite different directions. One is that segments of its capitalist class, again ironically (since it was this class that provided its economic might), have taken advantage of globalization in ways that work against U.S. autonomy, as for example in dismantling the industrial basis of its economy by relocating factories outside of the country. Thus both Presidents Obama and Trump, from opposite ends of the political spectrum in the United States, have decried the lack of national loyalty of American capitalists. From another direction, segments of the U.S. population have resisted its dominance of other countries largely on moral grounds. The American loss of its war in Vietnam was in no small part due to massive anti-war campaigns by its own citizens.

Faced with lack of willing internal compliance, a would-be hegemonic state might resort to enforced compliance. This is what is described by combination (1), where leaders are protected from democratic pressures. But this is a precarious stance. The pressures of globalism are so strong and persisting that states lacking popular home support are ill placed to resist them for the same reason that it is difficult for states to engage in sustained warfare without the willing support of their people. On the positive side, such support means that it is easier to demand sacrifices on the part of a population and to count on energetic participation in a state’s projects when it is supported by its citizens. Negatively, state leaders who rely on force or the threat of force directed at its own population must divert much of its efforts into keeping popular discontent from undermining their leadership.

This poses a dilemma for the quasi-autocratic leader: to relax autocratic constraints to a limited degree or for some segments of the population (the erstwhile Soviet Union in its later years comes to mind as an example) or to
turn to complete autocracy, which likely means a totalitarian state (as in present-day North Korea). The first option runs the risk of whetting popular appetites for more democracy. The second option exacerbates the threat of rebellion as the oppressive conditions of a police state create a situation where people see themselves as having nothing to lose by defiance. Also, there is the problem, illustrated in many parts of the world, that state leaders without democratic controls take advantage of their positions of power for self-aggrandizement whether it is in national interests or not. These points are not just made by pro-democrats, but are found also in Aristotle’s defense of democracy as ideally a bad form of government, but realistically the least bad since a democratic state can draw on the experience of more people than an autocratic one, and rebellion is averted (1943 [c300BCE], bks. Γ and Δ) and in Machiavelli’s arguments that brute forces is inconsistent with effective hegemony (1979 [1532], see 349, 418, and see Cunningham 2007, 568-570 in the Japanese translation, 201-205).

As noted, some nationally motivated states have gravitated toward support of a regionalized version of globalization, where they would be hegemonic not with respect to the entire world, but to regions of it. As in the case of the erstwhile colonialism, this effort had manifested itself earlier when the world was divided into spheres of influence with dominant forces in each sphere: for instance, France for a time on the European Continent, Great Britain in its Commonwealth, the United States in the Americas, Turkey in the Middle East. In contemporary times what exist instead are blocs of associated states tied together largely by trade agreements, but in some instances expanding to include unimpeded movements of people as well as goods, and joint infrastructural projects and governance structures. The European Union,
the U.S./Canada/Mexico Free Trade Agreement, and Mercosur, or more recently the Union of South American Nations, are existent examples.

Of these examples only the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) comes close to being divided into a hegemonic power (the United States) and subordinate nations (Canada and Mexico). While Germany is the strongest member of the EU, it is not hegemonic in the association, and Mercosur is marked by a standoff rivalry between Argentina and Brazil for pre-eminence in it. If the Pan Asian Alliance could have much more control over its member nations than at present, China and Japan are the likely candidates to strive for hegemonic dominance in it or in a new Asian association.

Achieving regional dominance is more realistic than trying to attain world hegemony, but all the problems attending the latter project also pertain to the more modest one, and in fact regional associations are especially insecure as bases for a would-be hegemon. The United States under Trump is finding that the NAFTA alliance offers attractive opportunities for its own business enterprises to relocate abroad. Also, coexisting as they do with other regional associations and with non-aligned states, defections from a regional association by one or more of its members is an always-present possibility. The Brexit decision of Great Britain is a dramatic case in point regarding the EU. Mexico is already partly aligned with the Union of South American Nations (holding observer status) and could move to become a full member.

Added together, the problems of securing and maintaining the preconditions for combinations (1) and (2) cast doubt on their feasibility at least in modern times. From the point of view of desirability and in an amoral, power-political
sense, these combinations will, of course, be desired by a globally or regionally hegemonic power. But from a moral point of view, the desirability of the combinations is questionable. Countries that have achieved at some times in their histories a measure of hegemonic control over other peoples – England and its colonies, Imperial Japan with respect to Korea and Manchuria, China over Tibet, and so on – sometimes maintain that those under their control have profited in some way (culturally, economically, in protection from hostile neighbouring countries, and the like) from this subordination. Such claims need to be examined on a case-by-case basis, but in general that the putative largesse of hegemonic states is enforced militarily or by means of economic blackmail, casts doubt on such claims and explains why many if not all the peoples of India, Korea, Tibet, and so on, beg to differ with assertions of beneficence by dominating powers.

**Globalization and Global Citizenship.** Estimation of the merits of combinations (3) and (4) differ depending on what form of globalization is being considered. For the full blown neoliberal, globalization means that the world as a whole is governed by market interactions freed as much as possible from deliberate constraints, whether imposed by super state bodies, such as the United Nations or by multi-lateral environmental or other such agreements. On the definition of ‘global citizenship’ employed in this paper, where it refers to willingness to constrain the autonomy of one’s nation, a neoliberal orientation simply requires that each nation avoid state regulations or other constraints on free markets outside a nation as well as in it.

In a world fully in accord with neoliberalism, therefore, combinations (3) or (4) could, in principle be met. This paper will not enter into the debates over
whether neoliberalism is feasible or desirable, but just assume that it fails on both counts. Claims that neoliberal policies lead to national and world prosperity are challenged by failure of the enormous wealth created by these policies for very small numbers of people to trickle down to others or in general to contribute to economic growth both of individual states and globally (see Stiglitz 2010 among many others). Neoliberalism undermines democracy and prompts a culture of selfishness, competition, and greed (see Macpherson’s criticism of Friedman, 1973, essay vii, and Lisa Duggan, 2003). Other examples of pertinent criticisms of neoliberalism are books by David Harvey (2005), David Katz (2015), Wolfgang Streeck (2016), and Loïc Wacquant (2009).

An alternative, anti-neoliberal and typically social-democratic conception of globalization (or regionalization) is that of Held, Pogge, Gould and others (op. cit.) where institutions and social movements cutting across national boundaries are the appropriate loci of governance and global action. In opposition to this globalist orientation is one which is closer to the literal meaning of ’global citizenship’ employed here where the nation remains the primary agent of globally relevant activity.

The following passages illustrate the two sides of this debates on this topic:

[T]here is a growing body of opinion which implies that the EU level [of political action] now has primary importance in the establishment of an advanced socially regulated economy. As one proponent of this viewpoint puts it, ’The theory of national roads is bankrupt ... the epoch of
construction of social democracy in one country has come to a close’ (Newman, 1996, 60, quoting Donald Sassoon, 1992).

Or in a similar vein:

[T]he main antagonists and sites of struggle can no longer be accurately comprehended by reliance on a statist view of the world. The main antagonists are market forces and their allies on the one side and an array of civil society actors, on the other’ (Richard Falk, 2014, 153-154).

In contrast to these opinions is that of J.W. Mason that:

[A]ny struggle to preserve social democracy as it exists today is a struggle to defend national institutions. And do we ever, today, see national governments compelled by international agreements or by the pressure of international trade and finance to nationalize private industries, strengthen labor protections, or increase the generosity of social insurance? Or is the pressure invariably in the other direction (2017, 32)?

More generally Robert Dahl challenges the realism of global governance in a world where even the foreign policies of individual states are largely beyond the control of their own citizens (1999). Will Kymlicka is more optimistic than Dahl on this point and argues against this supranational perspective that international institutions and practices can and should be made indirectly accountable by ‘debating at the national level how we want our national governments to act in intergovernmental contexts’ (1999, 123).
On the perspective exemplified in the passage from Mason, super national institutions are not primary world actors, but depend upon individual nations. As Richard Sandbrook puts it:

The global governance institutions that define and enforce the rules of the game, principally the IMF, the World Bank, and the WTO, are, after all, creatures of national governments. Hence, a major policy shift in national governments is virtually a precondition for a shift in the global regime’ (2014, 339).

A trans-national project of democratizing new or existing international institutions, such as economic forums, regional governments, or a strengthened United Nations, cannot be achieved from the top down if for no other reason than that a recalcitrant and sufficiently powerful member state can subvert such efforts or simply withdraw. As to bottom-up cross border initiatives of the kind Falk and others advocate, they also require national bases.

Falk has in mind the way that the pernicious effects of neoliberal globalization have sparked ground-level popular actions cutting across state boundaries, such as multi-national protests at meetings of the G20 or in gatherings of the World Social Forum. But it is doubtful that these actions could be sustained or attain their magnitude without drawing on the leadership and enthusiasm of protests against gross inequality at national levels. Thus, while Leslie Sklair calls for ‘transnational’ social-movement activism to lay the basis for ‘socialist globalization,’ in illustrating such activism he refers only to individual nation-based examples: participatory budgeting in
Brazil, self-help networks for women in India, and rural women’s co-ops in China (2002, 305). A nation-centric approach need not shun cross-border coalition efforts, but the ground work for these needs to be laid in member countries. For example, cooperation in opposing objectionable features the North American Free Trade Agreement among Canadian, Mexican, and U.S. unions was preceded by protracted and sometimes difficult campaigns within the unions of these states (see Dreiling & Robinson, 1998).

Even though national powers are diminished by global forces, states still have more resources to resist these forces than individuals or in today’s world cross-border associations, such as international unions or social movements, without the support of people in individual nation states. Institutions that affect culture, such as schools, are located within and administered by states as are, at least potentially, news and entertainment media. State leaders and social-movement activists are better placed to advocate for and help to organize international cooperation when they have the backing of people in their own national constituencies than otherwise. The conclusion, for someone who agrees with this perspective about nations as the loci of global interactions, is that global citizenship is better paired with cosmopolitanism than with any version of globalization. This combination will be addressed shortly, but first the combinations including isolationism merit attention.

Isolationism and Nationalism. Combinations (5) and (6) offer at once the most and the least feasible pairings of any of the possible combinations. They are the most feasible because nationalist attitudes naturally lead to isolationist political policies. Trump’s ‘make America great again’ campaign slogan, in addition to its ominous sword rattling connotations, invokes the attitude of
nationalism exactly in the negative sense decried by Dewey, and it is conjoined
with Trump’s isolationist policies to bring U.S. industry back to the
geographical confines of that state and to build walls against immigration.
While this package is a coherent one, it is at the same time completely
unfeasible in today’s globalized world, where, as Ulrich Beck puts it:

No country or group can shut itself off from others. Various economic,
cultural and political forms therefore collide with one another, and things
that used to be taken for granted (including in the Western model) will
have to be justified anew (2000, 10).

Beck draws from this characterization the conclusion, contrary to Sandbrook,
Kymlicka, Mason, and Dahl, that ‘the totality of social relationships’ are ‘not
integrated into or determined (or determinable) by national-state politics’
(ibid.), but if Sandbrook and the others are right, this is not a necessary
conclusion. It does not follow from the fact that the nations of the world are
economically, culturally, and one might add environmentally interdependent
that therefore there is no room for any national autonomy or for nations being
the bases from which international political projects are launched. What does
follow is that attempts of a nation to void itself of dependence on any other
states or on any international associations, that is, to embrace isolationism is
futile, and nations will have to find other ways to retain their autonomy.

In addition to being unfeasible, isolationism is undesirable. Except in the few
countries the resources and industrial strengths of which are large and diverse
enough to approach self sufficiency, isolationism will create extreme hardships
on a population with attendant discontent. This, in turn, becomes a factor in
prompting unresponsive leadership to the point of autocracy, with the disadvantages described above. North Korea is a case in point. Isolationism, also forgoes the potential advantages to a nation offered by global interconnections. Each of the world’s nations has developed over the years, indeed, over the centuries, ways of addressing economic, environmental, infrastructural, political-institutional, and other such persisting problems. Some solutions are uniquely suited just to the geographic, demographic, climatic, etc. conditions unique one or a few nations, but many are suited to a large number of other nations, and there is no reason why they should not profit from one another’s achievements.

Cosmopolitanism and Global Citizenship. Similarly to the way that nationalism and isolationism are natural bedfellows, attitudes of global citizenship support cosmopolitan comportment of states, where the protection of national autonomy is valued but some elements of autonomy may be foregone in the interests of international cooperation. The desirability of this combination is questioned by those who, in agreement with one characterization by Dewey, see any pro-national stance as objectionable:

Patriotism, National Honor, National Interests and National Sovereignty are the four foundation stones upon which the structure of the National State is erected. It is no wonder that the windows of such a building are closed to the light of heaven; that its inmates are fear, jealousy, suspicion, and that War issues regularly from its portals (1984 [1927], 157).

Dewey’s characterization is certainly apt regarding nationalism and isolationism. However this evaluation is qualified by Dewey in the same work
Like most things in the world which are effective, even for evil, nationalism is a tangled mixture of good and bad. And it is not possible to disguise its undesirable results, much less to consider ways of counteracting them, unless the desirable traits are fully acknowledged (ibid., 152).

For Dewey, the ‘intense loyalty to the good of the community of which one is a member’ characteristic of national patriotism ‘surely deserves all the eulogies and reverence bestowed upon it.’ His objection is thus not to this loyalty as such but to a form of patriotism that degenerates into a ‘nationalist religion’ where ‘a mark of public spirit becomes intolerant disregard of all other nations [and] patriotism degenerates into a hateful conviction of intrinsic superiority’ (ibid., 155). So, unless it can be shown that degeneration of national loyalty is inevitable (and Dewey nowhere alleges that it is) this Janus-faced perspective on pro-national sentiments maintains space for positively valuing the loyalty to one’s nation central to global citizenship. Protests against the U.S. war in Vietnam by U.S. citizens, of Israeli treatment of Palestinians by Israeli’s, or of Imperial Japanese war crimes by Japanese critics have often been based on these things being out of keeping with some core American, Judaic, or Japanese values and at least some strains in their tradition.

If global citizenship/cosmopolitan combinations are not ruled out on grounds of moral undesirability, they may still be subject to criticism for being unfeasible. This will be the opinion of someone who sees any abnegation of national control over anything as relinquishing national autonomy altogether, so someone claiming global citizenship will be in the schizophrenic position of
being a supporter of globalization regarding some matters and an isolationist regarding others. To this criticism advocates of global citizenship can grant that on their perspective aspects of national autonomy should sometimes be forfeited but maintain that overall autonomy is sufficiently secured if: a) many powers remain under national control; b) relinquishing autonomy over some matters is qualified and capable of being reversed; and c) decisions about what and when any national powers are relinquished are made by the nation itself and not dictated to it.

It does not seem that these conditions are unrealistic. In current disputes between the U.S and Canada over renewal of a free trade agreement (NAFTA), the Canadian position is that not all goods are subject to unrestricted trade, that Canada retains control in some areas, such as labour and environmental standards, that any trade treaty will be subject to periodic review and potential annulment, and that the country willingly signs on to a trade arrangement, rather than being bullied by the U.S. into compliance. These conditions do not in any obvious way undermine Canada’s status as an autonomous country, and they are not out of keeping with many international trade agreements. (If the conditions are not met, but the Canadian government signs off on the deal anyway, an appropriate criticism would be the same as one levelled at it in the original version of NAFTA in 1994, namely that the conditions are reasonable and that not securing them does adversely affect Canadian autonomy.)

Some Hypotheses

We return now to the questions posed earlier to formulate hypothetical answers to them:
1. *Are a politics of globalization compatible with citizens adopting the values of global citizenship and with states comporting themselves accordingly?*

As defined in the paper globalization or regionalization are only compatible with the attitude of global citizenship on a neoliberal conception of globalization and where nation states are prepared fully to integrate themselves into world markets. Non- or anti-neoliberal perspectives that wish to move decision making from nations to global or regional organizations are incompatible with the attitude of global citizenship, which sees the nation as the base from which global accommodations are made.

2. *Are attitudes of global citizenship on the part of the bulk of a country’s citizens and reflected in its foreign policies compatible with quasi-autocracy?*

Though not impossible, being pro-democratic in some contexts but not in others is difficult to sustain. The Shumpeterian, ‘democratic realists’ reduce democracy just to voting claiming in support that from a purely descriptive point of view this is what democracy in practice amounts to. But this is not what democracy amounts to even in the thin version of the realists. The reason for this is that collective decision making, of which voting is a species, is always culturally embedded. The ‘voters paradox’ (according to which a rational person will never bother to vote, since a single vote counts for so little) fails to predict actual voting behaviour because anyone who values democracy, even in this minimal sense, will have imbued as a normative motivation an obligation to vote. (See Christiano, 1996, 157-159,
for a similar argument against this ‘voters’ paradox.’) From the point of view of political culture, people who are prepared collectively and respectfully to confront trans-state problems with people of states other than their own will not for long tolerate undemocratic relations with respect to their own leaders.

3. *Do quasi-autocrats require nationalism to maintain their positions of relatively unchallenged power.*

Nationalistic attitudes are supportive of autocrats (and quasi-autocrats) because autocrats can position themselves as protectors of the nation and can take advantage of the hostilities toward other nations fostered by nationalism. However, nationalism may not be indispensable to the quasi-autocratic leader in a state fully supportive of neoliberalism. The reason for this is that neoliberalism fosters a form of democracy with weak mechanisms for leader accountability and where moneyed interests have disproportionate political influence.

4. *Are widespread attitudes of nationalism compatible with responsive leadership?*

Yes. If a nation’s political culture is nationalistic and its democratic procedures are well functioning at least in terms of electing leaders, even nationalistic leaders can enjoy popular support. As well, isolationism and neoliberal globalization are best served by states whose leaders have active support of their citizens.
5. Which, if any, of the combinations are both realistic and morally desirable?

Combination (8), where a country with democratically responsive leaders protects national autonomy while relaxing elements of it in the interests of international cooperation in a spirit of global citizenship, meets both criteria. That it is realistic is evidenced by its actual achievement in different times and places. It is desirable for anyone who values the ability of his or her nation to determine its own fate (i.e. to preserve its national autonomy) and who also recognizes both moral obligations to people in other nations and the practical advantages of international cooperation. The task of pursuing policies simultaneously responding to both national and international mandates is most securely undertaken when there is democratic support for state leaders charged with navigating this complex terrain.

6. Further to the last question, is a favoured combination applicable to all nation states?

It follows from some hypotheses above that combination (8) is unsustainable in a state whose policies are determined by neoliberal principles, and, by definition it is incompatible with autocracy. Of the remaining forms of states, whether or how this combination is achievable is sensitive to features that differ from state to state. Three of these features merit special attention.

*Federalism.* A culture of global citizenship and cosmopolitan institutional policies may be easier to achieve in federated states than in unitary ones, since the former already have analogous cultures and structures internally.
But this does not mean it is impossible in a unitary state. For instance, the unitary French state is also one of the stronger supporters of the European Union.

*Imperialist States.* A state whose history has included imperialist domination of other nations is one where attitudes of global citizenship may be especially difficult to achieve, even when, as in the case of the United States, it is a federated state. This is true to the extent that the culture of its citizens has included national chauvinism, racist or other prejudices with respect to the people of other nations and disregard for their wellbeing. Right-wing populists in nations with imperialist histories depend upon or try to rekindle such attitudes, sometimes with a measure of success. In a country with an overwhelmingly imperialist culture, global citizenship attitudes and cosmopolitan practice are likely impossible. If, however, such a culture, though dominant, is not overwhelming, then there is the possibility by means, one might say, of vigorous cultural campaigns engaged in both by governments and in civil society, to weaken it.

Wide support for views of Dewey, expressed in popular venues as well as in scholarly publications, reflected anti-imperialist values at the dawn of U.S. imperialism, just as does widespread support for the interventions, again in popular as well as scholarly venues, of Noam Chomsky in the twilight of this imperialism. A factor that weakens the grip of an imperialist culture is that it may be associated in the public mind with brutal effects of imperialism in practice, such as internal suppression (for instance, McCarthyism in the United States) or warfare (as in devastation of Japanese cities and obliteration of two of them). It is true that right-wing politicians, including
ones like Trump who play upon the remnants of imperialist culture, have been making electoral gains in several countries. But it seems that these do not reflect enthusiastic support for more than about 30% of a population, and where this is enough to secure electoral victories, as in the U.S. and Japan, this is due to weak opposition and flawed electoral systems rather than to groundswell support.

**Multiculturalism.** An advantage for nurturing a culture of global citizenship afforded by multiculturalism is that citizens in a multicultural country have had the experience of interacting with people from a variety of the world’s nations. This tempers attitudes of chauvinism, and people learn that bringing people from other cultures into a country does not threaten a dominant pre-existing culture in the host nation. Or rather, when this culture includes prejudicial attitudes, interactions with others usually (though admittedly not always) weakens the prejudicial attitudes, which typically depend upon ignorance and are stronger at a distance than when people of different cultures interact at work, in schools, in recreational venues, and so on. This explains why, in multicultural countries like Canada, prejudices are stronger in their uni-cultural small towns than in their diverse large cities.

Whether a mainly uni-cultural nation can inculcate attitudes receptive to cosmopolitan policies depends on characteristics of its dominant culture. On an optimistic view all national cultures are like the Janus-faced ones regarding nationalism that concerned Dewey in which case there are tolerant, welcoming aspects of a culture that can be the basis for nurturing attitudes favouring global citizenship. It should also be noted that few
countries began their nationhood as multicultural societies; rather, multiculturalism results from government immigration policies. So it is possible for a uni-cultural nation to change, and there are enough examples in the world, including recent ones, where this has taken place that a country can learn from them how best to do this, that is, what numbers to bring into a country and at what rate, what qualifications to mandate, what amenities in the way of education or jobs need to be provided, and so on. Finally, independently of a state’s immigration policies, it is also within the purview of a government to provide some of the sympathetic knowledge of the cultures of other countries through such things as school curricula and cultural exchanges.

Recommendations

Fully to defend the hypothetical conclusions drawn from answers to this paper’s questions would be a large task. This is why they are labelled ‘hypothetical.’ If they can be successfully defended, some recommendations regarding globalization, nations, and democracy follow:

1. All nations should set as a goal to promote a culture of global citizenship and to adopt cosmopolitan policies in their comportments with respect to other nations. This means that national chauvinistic and isolationist stances should be vigorously opposed at the same time that a national autonomy is sustained that is sufficiently sensitive to the legitimate needs of other nations and the exigencies of international cooperation to motivate appropriate ceding of some powers.
2. Democratic structures and processes beyond quasi-autocratic leadership should be put in place.

3. Neoliberal economic practices and policies along with the politics that support them should be avoided and combatted.

4. Nationalist and intolerant aspects of a nation’s past as well as present aspects should be exposed and criticized.

5. In the content of its educational institutions at all levels, through its immigration policies, and in international cultural exchanges, a state should aim to break down prejudicial attitudes toward peoples of other nations.

Notes
1) On ‘Nationalism and Democracy in the Age of Globalization,’ Ritsumeikan University, Kyoto, October 27, 2017.
2) In this paper the terms ‘state,’ ‘nation,’ and ‘nation state’ are used interchangeably abstracting from the phenomena of bi- or multi-national states – e.g., Belgium, Canada, and Spain - where sometimes there are differences among attitudes toward issues related to globalism between the nations of a single state.

References


